NucNews July 27, 2006 -------- NUCLEAR -------- accidents and safety Clean-Up Experts Rush to Serbian Nuke Site By GEORGE JAHN, Associated Press Writer 2:35 AM PDT, July 27, 2006 http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/wire/sns-ap-serbias-nuclear-horrors,1,1957332.story?coll=sns-ap-world-headlines http://www.serbianna.com/news/2006/02111.shtml VINCA, Serbia -- The Vinca reactor stands still, its decrepit innards purged of their unused weapons-grade fuel. But it remains Serbia's little shop of nuclear horrors, and a potential magnet for terrorists. That makes it representative of the next step in the world's quest to lift the threat of nuclear material falling into the wrong hands -- first by taking control of the fuel that makes atomic bombs, and now by tackling the lesser but still potent menace of a dirty bomb, meaning radiation spread by blowing up radioactive material with conventional explosives. At the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences outside Belgrade, there are only a few armed guards in sight, and the barbed-wire fence around the 48-acre facility is only as tall as a man. For would-be terrorists, "it's almost like a candy store," says Mike Durst, the International Atomic Energy Agency's point man working to strip Vinca of its attraction to nuclear thieves. These fears are driving international agendas. Presidents Bush and Vladimir Putin used a summit of the world's richest countries earlier this month to launch the "Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism," which calls for better accounting and protection of the Vincas of the world, scattered around the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa. The new program is meant to build on others created by the Bush administration, including the 3-year old "Global Threat Reduction Initiative" to deal with a broad range of vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials around the world. Most of the existing programs focus on unused weapons-grade fuel, nearly 100 pounds of which lay in Vinca until four years ago, when Washington, Moscow and Belgrade mounted a joint operation to remove it. Helicopters and 1,200 heavily armed troops including snipers were deployed along with decoy trucks to thwart potential mischief-makers. Half of Belgrade was sealed off, and within six hours, the fuel -- enough to make at least two simple nuclear warheads -- was trucked from Vinca to the airport and onward to a Russian government plant about 470 miles east of Moscow. But that still leaves dozens of other badly secured and dangerous nuclear facilities to deal with. Inside the Vinca reactor building, 8,000 spent fuel rods sit in pools of brackish water. Dozens contain uranium in varying degrees of enrichment -- potential dirty bomb material, not to mention the environmental hazard. The bomb-worthy material is not uranium, but its highly radioactive byproducts. These would quickly kill any terrorist who was not equipped with protective suits, robotic arms and tons of lead to encase the stolen material. Still, research reactors such as Vinca tend to be less heavily protected than power plants, and experts like Durst fear terrorists shown willing to sacrifice their lives in other situations might do so as well to secure the material. And while building a full-blown nuclear device is technologically daunting, terrorists could easily use the material such as that in the rods to construct a dirty bomb. With just one dirty bomb, "you could hit Broadway, and you couldn't decontaminate it for years," says Obrad Sotic, Vinca's former operations manager. And there are concerns other than raids on Vinca. While no nuclear material is known to have gone missing employees speak openly of the potential temptations of selling some on the black market as a way supplementing monthly incomes of less than $750. There's a lot to steal -- old medical and industrial equipment, and tons of material inside the reactor or in two rickety corrugated metal sheds. There are bags of irradiated grass, containers of depleted uranium ammunition fired by NATO during its 1999 Kosovo campaign, and several tons of yellowcake -- processed uranium ore of the kind Iran plans to process and enrich in what the U.S. says is an attempt to make nuclear arms. The Serbian Science Ministry, which is responsible for Vinca, has a budget of less than $90 million for this year. That wouldn't cover the cost of upgrading security, shipping the spent fuel back to Russia and dismantling the reactor. A centrally monitored alarm system is being installed and police will be tasked with security under a plan being worked out under IAEA guidance. Also foreseen is the shipment of the spent fuel to Russia and building safer storage facilities for the collected nuclear junk. The ultimate goal is to dismantle of the reactor and other parts of the facility. But again, money is a problem. Sending the spent fuel back to Russia will cost around $10 million, and more money is needed to reprocess the fuel in Russia. Building better storage will cost an additional $5 million. About 60 percent of that amount has been pledged by donor countries, but dismantling the facility will cost some $60 million. For Serbia's science minister, Aleksandar Popovic, the 2002 operation to remove the weapons-grade fuel has left the job only half done. He told The Associated Press he was "very unhappy" that help has not materialized for the other half. "Once the spent fuel is gone, I'll be one happy guy," he said. -------- business Defense Firm Gets No-Bid Bomb Support Contract Amidst Conflict of Interest Claims July 27, 2006 http://tpr.typepad.com/thepeacockreport/2006/07/defense_firm_ge.html F22Defense manufacturer EDO Corp. is getting a sole-source contract to provide conventional- and nuclear-bomb ejectors to the U.S. Air Force, in spite of revelations that one of its board members simultaneously led a Pentagon-supported think-tank which consulted the Dept. of Defense on the procurement of the F-22 Raptor program -- a multibillion-dollar aerospace project for which EDO is a subcontractor. While the Washington Post today reported the imminent resignation of Retired Admiral Dennis C. Blair -- who is both EDO Corp. president and board member of the DoD-funded Institue for Defense Analysis -- The Peacock Report has discovered that the Air Force Material Command plans to award the noncompetitive contract to EDO for the bomb-ejector racks. The potential value of the contract was not disclosed. While the conflict of interest allegations have begun to draw media and congressional attention in the U.S., an EDO affiliate in the U.K. separately has come under fire from pro-Palestinian British activists for providing the Israeli Defense Forces with technologies that they claim are "likely" being used to cause the death of civilians in Gaza, the BBC reported. -------- depleted uranium Prepared Testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security Author: Michael A. Levi, Fellow for Science and Technology Council On Foreign Relations July 27, 2006 http://www.cfr.org/publication/11160/prepared_testimony_before_the_senate_subcommittee_on_terrorism_technology_and_homeland_security.html Testimony Chairman Kyl, Senator Feinstein, thank you for inviting me to speak with you about U.S. efforts to detect smuggled nuclear weapons. Current programs to enhance detection of smuggled nuclear weapons are, despite some important flaws, making valuable contributions to national security.They are not, and will never be, the most powerful means of defense—that role falls to programs that secure nuclear weapons and materials at the source. But assessed in the context of a much broader system aimed at reducing the likelihood of catastrophic nuclear attack, and judged against the full range of existing and potential adversaries, not only against worst-case scenarios, their value is undeniable. There remains much room for improvement. U.S. efforts to defeat nuclear terrorism are insufficiently integrated across the federal government, between federal, state, and local levels, with the private sector, and internationally. This reduces the value of those detection programs that are currently underway. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) has taken important steps to promote integration, but it cannot, and should not, do the entire job itself. It would be best for DNDO to focus on developing and deploying technology and on integrating radiation detection efforts, as it largely does today. Congress should explore the utility of establishing a broader system integrator in the Executive Office of the President. An effective strategy to detect smuggled nuclear weapons would also benefit enormously from a far better understanding—a strategic intelligence assessment—of the covert nuclear threat. We are not fighting the movement of radioactive materials—we are fighting states or organizations with their own internal limits that must acquire, possibly build, transport, and detonate a weapon, all with some strategic, political, or religious goals in mind. Simply testing the sensitivity of our radiation detection instruments is thus insufficient alone for judging whether our investments are worthwhile. Without a better understanding of the enemy, we cannot adequately assess the value of our defensive investments. Congress should support a concerted effort to produce a detailed strategic intelligence assessment of the covert nuclear threat, and use this assessment as the basis for judging investments in defense against nuclear smuggling. This assessment should draw upon analysts with expertise in terrorism, rogue states, and nuclear technology, as well as on new intelligence operations as required. You have also asked me to comment on the potential of “transformational” technology. This is technology that could lead to “dramatic improvement in national capabilities in nuclear/radiological detection and verification.” Physics imposes basic limits that must be acknowledged, but there is room for technological advance. Congress should, in principle, support long-term transformational programs, which would benefit from increased funding and from better use of the national laboratories. Congress should, however, exercise oversight to ensure that resources are deployed in ways that complement broader defensive efforts. Outline The remainder of this testimony is divided into five parts: 1. Describes the broad system for defending against covert nuclear attack, of which direct defense against nuclear smuggling is a part, and makes recommendations for better integrating the system. 2. Makes the case for a new strategic intelligence assessment of the covert nuclear threat, as a basis for defensive planning and evaluation. 3. Assesses the potential of transformational radiation detection technology. 4. Describes the transformational potential for detection systems that integrate radiation detection with other detection tools. 5. Explains why traditional detection efforts will be less effective against covert nuclear attack by states, and stresses the importance of attribution and deterrence in these cases. The Defensive System Were we able to secure all nuclear weapons and materials, there would be no need for a broader effort to prevent nuclear smuggling. Security at the source, including, most prominently, cooperative threat reduction, is the most powerful tool available, and would benefit from increased investment and attention. But it will never be sufficient alone. A system of defensive tools, including materials and weapons security, law enforcement, intelligence, border controls, consequence management, denial of sanctuary, targeting of terrorist financing, and disruption of terrorist recruitment, can work to significantly reduce the likelihood of a successful nuclear plot, and to dissuade terrorist groups from pursuing such plots in the first place. (Preventing covert state attack is very different from preventing terrorist attack. I discuss this challenge below under “Attributing Attacks”.) Even if no single defensive tool has a high probability of defeating a given terrorist attack, a combined defensive system can still be effective. If, for example, twenty independent defensive measures each have only a 10% chance of defeating a terrorist plot, they would, combined, have a 90% chance of defeating that plot. If each defensive element forces a terrorist group to alter its plot, the effect is even more powerful. Tools for detecting nuclear smuggling must be developed and assessed in this context. That a particular defensive tool cannot defeat all terrorist plots is not reason enough for rejecting it—so long as a defensive tool complicates terrorist plots, increases their probabilities of failure, and is pursued within a broad defense, it may deserve investment. This way of thinking about nuclear terrorism—refusing to assess defensive elements except as parts of a system—must be institutionalized. DNDO was in part an attempt to do that, but it falls short. Though DNDO includes interagency mechanisms for coordination, its efforts have been principally focused on coordinating radiation detection programs. This is useful but insufficient, as the wide range of tools relevant to defense against nuclear terrorism, outlined above, suggests. It is, however, natural, and perhaps inevitable, for an organization whose funds are spent primarily on radiation detection. Ultimately, DNDO should be one (major) piece within a broader effort to defeat nuclear terrorism, directed from within the Executive Office of the President. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which is responsible for strategic operational planning against terrorist threats, appears to be the right place for such coordination. Congress should consider directing the NCTC to produce a strategic operational plan that prescribes and delineates responsibilities for defense against nuclear terrorism across the U.S. government, and to periodically assess the effectiveness of that plan. Such a scheme would help efforts to detect nuclear smuggling, and provide context for evaluating them. Understanding the Enemy It is meaningless to talk about the effectiveness of a defense without understanding the enemy that it faces. Yet we do not have a strong understanding of that enemy. In assessing detection of nuclear smuggling, we thus fall back against two poor substitutes. Sometimes, we adopt a narrow technical focus, evaluating technologies against quantitative goals that are at best loosely connected with careful study of terrorist plots. Here, our tendency is often to adopt goals simply because they are achievable. At the other extreme, we focus on the worst-case threat, a terrorist group that is so resourceful, flexible, and lucky that it can evade essentially any defense. This is what many would call the “Ten-Foot Tall Terrorist”. In reality, many terrorist groups have far more limited, though still very threatening, capabilities. These are the “Five-Foot Tall Terrorists”. It is critical to understand these more limited threats, and to design defenses against them as well. As in military planning, defenses optimized against the worst-case threat are not necessarily the best possible defenses. Instead, defenses designed to contend with a range of enemy capabilities have the potential to be far more effective. What does this mean in practice? TheUnited Statesneeds a new strategic intelligence assessment of potential covert nuclear plots. That assessment should draw upon expertise in terrorism, rogue state behavior, and nuclear technology, and outline a range of terrorist capabilities, rather than simply estimate a worst-case or most-likely threat. Novel intelligence operations can help refine this estimate – for example, intelligence operatives posing as nuclear scientists could improve our understanding of how terrorist groups might recruit technically skilled assistance. As with the strategic operational plan, this intelligence assessment most likely should be led by the NCTC. This would provide an intimate connection between underlying intelligence and strategic operational planning. It would also help institutionalize the practice of assessing the value of U.S. programs against a realistic assessment of the threats they face. Radiation Detection: Techniques, Targets, and Transformational Potential Materials used in nuclear weapons—uranium and plutonium—emit radiation: neutrons and gamma rays. Detectors are designed to sense that radiation. To be useful, they must be able to distinguish radiation emitted by nuclear materials from naturally occurring radiation, which may come from the earth, from building materials, from space, and from other sources. In many cases, detectors must be able to do that in the presence of “shielding”, material placed around the nuclear material that absorbs gamma rays or neutrons before they can reach a radiation detector. Unfortunately, material used in nuclear weapons need not be highly radioactive, and hence may not emit many neutrons or gamma rays, making detection difficult. Much has been made of the difficulty of detecting highly-enriched uranium, a challenge to which I will return later. It is important, though, not to focus narrowly on this worst-case threat. Many materials that terrorists might transport as part of a nuclear plot emit considerably more radioactivity, providing greater opportunities for detection. (There is no reason to believe that terrorists can be selective, rather than opportunistic, in acquiring nuclear materials, at least without making themselves more vulnerable to defeat.) These materials include highly-enriched uranium that is below weapons-grade, that it not metallic, or that has been extracted from used nuclear fuel (as much Russian nuclear-weapons material has been). They also include plutonium, in both metallic and non-metallic forms. And stolen weapons may incorporate large masses of depleted uranium, which substantially increases radiation emissions. Detectors that can spot some but not all potential weapons or materials—an accurate description for many detectors—can be valuable. Many challenges still remain, both in detecting low-radioactivity materials (including weapons-grade uranium metal) and in detecting shielded materials. Here, at least four types of “transformational” technology make sense. It is too early to evaluate specific technologies, but it is useful to understand where the potential for advances exists, along with their limits. Combined radiation detection and radiography, analyzed using new software, has the potential to substantially increase detection capabilities. Used in close proximity to a suspect source such as a cargo container (within a few meters), radiography, like an x-ray, produces an image that may be able to identify shielding material. Thus, if a terrorist group uses shielding to hide material from radiation detectors, radiography may be able to identify it. Intelligent data analysis algorithms can increase the combined value of radiation detection and radiography by automatically synthesizing data from both sources, a process that is currently labor-intensive, prone to human error, and slow. Indeed, it is this software, rather than any of the hardware used, which has the potential to be transformational, and that should be the focus of investments. Active interrogation is also potentially transformational. Again, it must be used in fairly close proximity to a suspect source. Active interrogation bombards suspect objects with radiation. If those objects contain nuclear materials, they will, in turn, emit radiation that can be detected. In principle, such technology can be used to detect well-shielded material, so long as an intense enough radiation source is used. (Increasing the radiation source is, very crudely, like turning on a brighter light when searching for something.) However, such strong sources of radiation raise health concerns, since they can be dangerous to operators and to bystanders, among other problems. It is thus essential that development of active interrogation systems be accompanied by careful evaluation of what radiation exposure is socially acceptable, a process that has not received the same attention as the technology has. (This is a political process.) Current limits on radiation exposure may already be too low. Moreover, in a very high threat environment—for example, in the aftermath of a theft of nuclear material—society will likely be willing to accept much more hazardous means of inspecting cargo. Yet if we do not develop technologies in advance, we will not be able to exploit such situations. Ultimately, though, safety issues will place limits on the potential of active interrogation. Detectors that are more efficient and that have better energy resolution than current models might also be transformational. (Their potential, however, is more limited than that of active interrogation, though they do not carry the same dangers.) What does this mean? Radiation detectors only detect a fraction of the radiation emitted by nuclear materials. That fraction is called their “efficiency”. While we cannot change the fact that many nuclear materials emit little radiation—these are the “limits of physics” that many refer to—we can improve how much of that radiation we detect, allowing us to better find nuclear materials. Radiation detectors are also characterized by their “resolution”. Radiation varies in energy, and the energy of radiation can sometimes be used to distinguish nuclear material. If a detector can more effectively discriminate between different energies—if it has improved “resolution”—it will be better at identifying nuclear material. Think of energy as color, and the gamma rays emitted by a particular type of nuclear material as “red”. A detector with poor energy-resolution is color-blind—it cannot use color to spot the nuclear material. Improving detector resolution is like improving ability to see in color, and thus to identify nuclear material. A final potential for transformational radiation detection technology lies in integrating data from large numbers of detectors. This has both hardware and software components. It requires reduction in weight, cost, and power requirements for detection systems, so that large numbers can be deployed cost-effectively, and often in mobile configurations. It requires software to dynamically integrate data from a large number of detectors. One example of such a program might involve radiation detectors mounted on large numbers of police cars, transmitting data to a central location where it is continuously combined. Advances in computational power would also help advance these technologies. These technological innovations might also be combined. For example, higher efficiency radiation detectors might be combined with radiography using advanced data analysis. How should this affect American investments? In FY06, DNDO received $56.6 million for “Transformational Research and Development”. In contrast, only one major program area at DARPA, which supports transformational research through the Department of Defense, was funded at less than $100 million during FY06. As DAPRA understands, ambitious, high-risk research requires funding many failures in order to yield a single success. Transformational efforts would profit from expanded funding. Congress should consider earmarking such funds for the national laboratories, which are currently excluded from applying for several critical DNDO transformational R&D grants. (They may apply as subcontractors.) This occurs despite their having deep strength in relevant technologies. Moreover, if we are to direct efforts at detecting realistic nuclear weapons, rather than just generic samples of radioactive materials, we must exploit the understanding of weapons design that the laboratories have accumulated over more than half a century. DNDO has asserted that most of its transformational work will be unclassified; as a result, it will not be able to exploit this opportunity. The national laboratories will. In the long term, transformational detection efforts should be assessed against a new, nuanced strategic intelligence assessment, and within the context of a broad strategic operational plan. Integrating Radiation Detection into a Broader System for Detecting Nuclear Smuggling Radiation detection is not the only way to spot nuclear smuggling, especially if terrorists decide to smuggle an assembled bomb. In many cases, explosives detection may play an important role, as might detection of the weight and bulk of a weapon or of nuclear materials. Automated systems that integrate data from multiple detectors would be particularly valuable. Strategists should also explore automated means for integrating radiation detection with non-technical detection. For example, it would be useful to develop algorithms for airports and official border crossings that combine radiation data with passenger profile information to yield combined assessments of nuclear threats. A similar scheme could be useful for identifying suspect cargo containers, based on radiation detection and non-technical intelligence. In many cases, radiation detection will play a supporting, rather than a leading, role. This is particularly notable in defending against nuclear smuggling at non-official points of entry, such as land, sea, and air borders. Transformational schemes envisioning continuous and universal radiation monitoring of American borders are unrealistic. Instead, efforts aimed at identifying and interdicting terrorists attempting to enter theUnited States, regardless of whether they are involved in nuclear plots, will play the leading role, with radiation detection supporting them. Consider, for example, attempts to smuggle nuclear weapons or materials across the southern border. The probability of an illegal immigrant successfully crossing the border after one attempt is likely less than fifty percent; such low odds of success might well deter a would-be nuclear terrorist from attempting a crossing. What makes illegal immigration easier is the “catch-and-release” policy that affords would-be-immigrants multiple chances to attempt illegal entry. Portable radiation detection equipment can, however, be used to ensure that individuals caught at the border while carrying nuclear weapons or materials are not released. Here, radiation detection plays a critical but supporting role. Similar schemes might be applied to aircraft intercepted while illegally entering U.S. airspace. Applying this approach on the water presents greater challenges, as the United States currently has much weaker capabilities to detect illegal sea-based entry. Addressing this requires efforts to improve maritime domain awareness, and maritime interdiction capabilities, rather than to improve radiation detection. This emphasizes the need for a broad defensive plan, and cautions that technical detection investments must not outpace other complementary, non-technical, homeland security needs. Intelligence can also multiply the effectiveness of radiation detection. If we know or strongly suspect that terrorists have acquired nuclear weapons or significant amounts of nuclear materials, a surged response is possible. Such detection begins at the source of nuclear materials and weapons. For over a decade, the United States has been helping other countries install systems for protecting their nuclear weapons and materials (so-called MPC&A systems). If terrorists acquire materials or weapons, MPC&A systems will in many cases provide warning, allowing a surged response to any ensuing attempt at nuclear smuggling. The United States should attempt to secure agreements with facilities that receive MPC&A assistance, requiring that they promptly share warning information. DNDO is already tackling this challenge, and should be strongly supported by other parts of the U.S. government. It would be wise to go beyond this and develop protocols and agreements for sharing warnings of theft, including from facilities secured without U.S. assistance. Such warning may be the most powerful source of intelligence that can be leveraged by detection systems. Its value would be strengthened if the United States stockpiled equipment needed for a surged response, which could be deployed only when necessary. (Despite the high prices of many detection systems, the bulk of their costs come from the labor required to operate them.) Other sources of intelligence should also be pursued. For example, if terrorists are caught attempting to bribe radiation detector operators, intensified interdiction efforts might be mounted. Advance development and stockpiling of detection equipment would be essential. Attributing Attacks Against states, which generally have deeper resources and more extensive military and intelligence capabilities than terrorist groups, American efforts to directly defeat nuclear smuggling are far less likely to be successful. In particular, states will have greater abilities than terrorists will to evade radiation detection and border control efforts. Our best hope against these threats is to enhance deterrence by improving our ability to attribute covert attacks to their sponsors, thus allowing us to threaten retaliation. (This is a form of detection, albeit post-attack detection.) Attribution would work through a mixture of traditional forensics and technical tools that exploit nuclear-specific signatures. The latter would operate primarily by analyzing samples of material dispersed in a nuclear attack, and comparing them to a database of “fingerprints” for various nuclear states. Our greatest current deficiency on this front is in the fingerprint database. Theoretical analyses of material produced by suspect facilities, along with intelligence operations to obtain foreign material samples, would be valuable. So would better coordination: multiple government agencies with strong capabilities in this area, such as the CIA and the DOE, are not fully sharing what they know with each other. International cooperation, done with appropriate consideration for secrecy, would also help enhance deterrence. Summary Six points should be kept in mind when thinking about detecting smuggled weapons: 1. Securing nuclear weapons and materials at the source will always be the most powerful defensive tool. 2. Within the context of a broader defensive system, efforts to detect nuclear smuggling can be valuable. 3. It is essential to assess these efforts against a wide range of realistic threats, not only against semi-arbitrary numerical targets or worst-case scenarios. 4. Transformational technology has real potential but firm limits. It is as much about innovative software, concepts of operations, and leveraging intelligence, as it is about hardware. 5. Technology will often play a supporting role to traditional tools for controlling land, sea, and air borders. Those traditional tools must receive strong support. 6. Detection and interdiction are much weaker tools against covert state threats than against terrorist plots. Against state threats, enhancing attribution capabilities is critical. ---- Lebanon/Israel: Urgent need for arms embargo on Israel and Hizbullah AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL PRESS RELEASE 27 July 2006 http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/document.do?id=ENGMDE010022006 As civilians continue to bear the brunt of the conflict in Israel and Lebanon, Amnesty International called for an immediate arms embargo on both Israel and Hizbullah. Amnesty International is gravely concerned about the continuing transfer of weapons from the US, via the UK, as information emerged that a UK airport is being used by USA cargo planes on their way to deliver munitions to Israel. "The pattern of attacks and the extent of civilian casualties show a blatant disregard of international humanitarian law by Israel and Hizbullah," said Irene Khan, Amnesty International Secretary General. "Direct targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure and launching indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks amount to war crimes." "Governments supplying Israel and Hizbullah with arms and military equipment are fuelling their capacity to commit war crimes. All governments should impose an arms embargo on both sides and refuse permission for their territories to be used for the transfer of arms and military equipment." UK media have reported that two chartered Airbus A310 cargo planes filled with GBU 28 laser-guided bombs containing depleted uranium (DU) warheads and destined for the Israeli airforce landed at Prestwick airport, near Glasgow. The planes landed for refuelling and crew rests after flying from the US this past weekend. Other reports claimed that the USA has requested that two more planes be permitted to land in the UK en route to Israel in the next two weeks. The reports said the aircraft will be carrying other weapons, including bombs and missiles. "The UK government should refuse permission for its sea and air ports to be used by planes or ships carrying arms and military equipment destined for Israel or Hizbullah," said Ms Khan as Amnesty International wrote to the UK's Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett. The organization also called on the UK to suspend the sale or transfer of all arms and military equipment to Israel. "It is ridiculous to talk about providing humanitarian aid on the one hand, and to provide arms on the other. In the face of such human suffering in Lebanon and Israel, it is imperative that all governments stop the supply of arms and weapons to both sides immediately," stated Ms Khan. Public Document For more information please call Amnesty International's press office in London, UK, on +44 20 7413 5566 Amnesty International, 1 Easton St., London WC1X 0DW. web: http://www.amnesty.org ---- £3bn to clean up MoD nuclear sites JAMES KIRKUP POLITICAL EDITOR Thu 27 Jul 2006 The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/index.cfm?id=1088632006 * It will cost taxpayers £3bn to decontaminate military bases * Sites include Rosyth dockyard in Fife the and Dounreay nuclear complex * Accountants estimate the costs will not be paid for another ten years Key quote "Genuine action to clean up radioactive contamination is good news for areas currently blighted by the MoD's nuclear programme, but yet more bad news for the taxpayer," - Stuart Hay, Friends of the Earth Scotland Story in full CLEANING up military nuclear sites and equipment in Scotland will cost taxpayers up to £3 billion, official figures have revealed. The bulk of the costs north of the Border will come at the Dounreay nuclear complex in Caithness, where the Royal Navy's nuclear submarine programme has a test reactor and waste disposal facility. The Ministry of Defence forecasts that decommissioning the two units will cost £2.1 billion. Decommissioning both retired and active Trident nuclear submarines will take place at the Rosyth dockyard in Fife and at the Devonport yard in Plymouth. The cost of that work will be £837 million, with another £4 million set aside for the "disposal of support equipment which contains depleted uranium". Cleaning up Rosyth and the surrounding area following the decommissioning work there will cost another £32 million, the MoD calculates. At the Faslane submarine base on the Clyde, arguably Scotland's best-known military nuclear site, technology used to process the radioactive "effluent" produced by nuclear submarines is being replaced at a cost of £2.2 million. The detailed estimates made by the MoD put the department's total bill for decommissioning sites around the UK at almost £10 billion in the coming years. The MoD's projected costs of £9.8 billion are in addition to the £70 billion the government estimates will be needed to clean up civilian nuclear work. Opponents of nuclear weapons last night seized on the military clean-up costs as another argument against replacing Britain's ageing Trident nuclear missile system, which is due to be retired by 2024. A new deterrent system could cost more than £20 billion, but Gordon Brown, the Chancellor, has signalled he is ready to pay for new nuclear arms when he becomes prime minister. But as the MoD's own figures make clear, the government is already facing a huge bill as a legacy of Britain's existing nuclear weapons programme. The bulk of the MoD's remaining £6 billion in nuclear liability costs will come at the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston in Berkshire. Another £1.1 billion will help NIREX, the nuclear industry's clean-up contractor, build a "deep waste repository". In all, the MoD's latest accounts forecast that the department will incur "undiscounted costs" of £9,753,827,000 in the coming years. The timetable is not precise because of uncertainties about the retirement of various facilities, but accountants estimate most of the bill will not have to be paid for at least ten years. But at least £311 million will have to be paid over the next three years. Opponents of a new British nuclear deterrent said the MoD's costs should count against a replacement for Trident. "Genuine action to clean up radioactive contamination is good news for areas currently blighted by the MoD's nuclear programme, but yet more bad news for the taxpayer," said Stuart Hay, of Friends of the Earth Scotland. "This is yet another wake-up call highlighting the folly of creating a new generation of radioactive waste whilst we still have to meet the costs of dealing with a historic legacy of contaminated sites." Willie Rennie, the Liberal Democrat defence spokesman and Dunfermline MP, said he was pleased the MoD was planning a clean-up at Rosyth, but added: "The cost of decommissioning nuclear sites must be a consideration in the wider debate about replacing the UK's nuclear deterrent." An MoD spokesman said it was "too early to say" what possible clean-up costs might be, but insisted it would be properly and publicly assessed when ministers reached a decision. -------- europe Serbian Nuclear Site a Potential Magnet for Terrorists July 27, 2006 (AP) http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?section=nation_world&id=4405145 VINCA, Serbia - The Vinca reactor stands still, its decrepit innards purged of their unused weapons-grade fuel. But it remains Serbia's little shop of nuclear horrors, and a potential magnet for terrorists. That makes it representative of the next step in the world's quest to lift the threat of nuclear material falling into the wrong hands - first by taking control of the fuel that makes atomic bombs, and now by tackling the lesser but still potent menace of a dirty bomb, meaning radiation spread by blowing up radioactive material with conventional explosives. At the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences outside Belgrade, there are only a few armed guards in sight, and the barbed-wire fence around the 48-acre facility is only as tall as a man. For would-be terrorists, "it's almost like a candy store," says Mike Durst, the International Atomic Energy Agency's point man working to strip Vinca of its attraction to nuclear thieves. These fears are driving international agendas. Presidents Bush and Vladimir Putin used a summit of the world's richest countries earlier this month to launch the "Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism," which calls for better accounting and protection of the Vincas of the world, scattered around the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa. The new program is meant to build on others created by the Bush administration, including the 3-year old "Global Threat Reduction Initiative" to deal with a broad range of vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials around the world. Most of the existing programs focus on unused weapons-grade fuel, nearly 100 pounds of which lay in Vinca until four years ago, when Washington, Moscow and Belgrade mounted a joint operation to remove it. Helicopters and 1,200 heavily armed troops including snipers were deployed along with decoy trucks to thwart potential mischief-makers. Half of Belgrade was sealed off, and within six hours, the fuel - enough to make at least two simple nuclear warheads - was trucked from Vinca to the airport and onward to a Russian government plant about 470 miles east of Moscow. But that still leaves dozens of other badly secured and dangerous nuclear facilities to deal with. Inside the Vinca reactor building, 8,000 spent fuel rods sit in pools of brackish water. Dozens contain uranium in varying degrees of enrichment - potential dirty bomb material, not to mention the environmental hazard. The bomb-worthy material is not uranium, but its highly radioactive byproducts. These would quickly kill any terrorist who was not equipped with protective suits, robotic arms and tons of lead to encase the stolen material. Still, research reactors such as Vinca tend to be less heavily protected than power plants, and experts like Durst fear terrorists shown willing to sacrifice their lives in other situations might do so as well to secure the material. And while building a full-blown nuclear device is technologically daunting, terrorists could easily use the material such as that in the rods to construct a dirty bomb. With just one dirty bomb, "you could hit Broadway, and you couldn't decontaminate it for years," says Obrad Sotic, Vinca's former operations manager. And there are concerns other than raids on Vinca. While no nuclear material is known to have gone missing employees speak openly of the potential temptations of selling some on the black market as a way supplementing monthly incomes of less than $750. There's a lot to steal - old medical and industrial equipment, and tons of material inside the reactor or in two rickety corrugated metal sheds. There are bags of irradiated grass, containers of depleted uranium ammunition fired by NATO during its 1999 Kosovo campaign, and several tons of yellowcake - processed uranium ore of the kind Iran plans to process and enrich in what the U.S. says is an attempt to make nuclear arms. The Serbian Science Ministry, which is responsible for Vinca, has a budget of less than $90 million for this year. That wouldn't cover the cost of upgrading security, shipping the spent fuel back to Russia and dismantling the reactor. A centrally monitored alarm system is being installed and police will be tasked with security under a plan being worked out under IAEA guidance. Also foreseen is the shipment of the spent fuel to Russia and building safer storage facilities for the collected nuclear junk. The ultimate goal is to dismantle of the reactor and other parts of the facility. But again, money is a problem. Sending the spent fuel back to Russia will cost around $10 million, and more money is needed to reprocess the fuel in Russia. Building better storage will cost an additional $5 million. About 60 percent of that amount has been pledged by donor countries, but dismantling the facility will cost some $60 million. For Serbia's science minister, Aleksandar Popovic, the 2002 operation to remove the weapons-grade fuel has left the job only half done. He told The Associated Press he was "very unhappy" that help has not materialized for the other half. "Once the spent fuel is gone, I'll be one happy guy," he said. ---- Heat Wave Shows Limits of Nuclear Energy Julio Godoy, Jul 27, 2006 IPS, OneWorld http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=34121 http://www.commondreams.org/headlines06/0728-06.htm PARIS - The extreme hot summer in Europe is restricting nuclear energy generation and showing up the limits of nuclear power, leading environmental activists and scientists say. The heat wave since mid-June has led authorities in France, Germany, Spain and elsewhere in Europe to override their own environmental norms on the maximum temperature of water drained from the plants' cooling systems. The French government announced July 24 that nuclear power plants situated along rivers will be allowed to drain hot water into rivers at higher temperature. The measure is intended "to guarantee the provision of electricity for the country," according to an official note. France has 58 nuclear power plants, which produce almost 80 percent of electricity generated in the country. Of these, 37 are situated near rivers, and use them as outlet for water from their cooling systems. The drought accompanying the hot summer has reduced the volume of water in the rivers, and might force some power plants to shut down. Under normal circumstances, environment rules limit the maximum temperature for waste water in order to protect river flora and fauna. "For many years now, French authorities have defended nuclear power arguing that it is clean energy, good for the environment, and that it will help combat global warming, for it does not emit greenhouse gases," Stephane Lhomme, coordinator of the environmental network Sortir du Nucleaire (Phase Out Nuclear Power) told IPS. "Now, with global warming leading to extreme hot summers, we are witnessing that it is the other way round," Lhomme said. "Global warming is showing the limits of nuclear power plants, and nuclear power is destroying our environment." During the hot summer of 2003, French authorities had allowed nuclear power plants to drain excessively hot water into rivers, leading to considerable damage to flora and fauna, Lhomme said. According to the minutes of the National Surveillance Committee on water drained from reactors August 21 and September 3, 2003, "hot water temperatures might have led to high concentrations of ammoniac, which is potentially toxic for the rivers' fauna." The minutes point to a European norm on the concentration of ammoniac in rivers, which France did not respect. Meanwhile France is importing some 2000 megawatts of power per day from neighbouring countries to compensate for shortages in production at nuclear power plants. While the French authorities have overridden their own environmental norms, in Germany energy providers have slowed down some nuclear reactors to limit waste water temperature and to protect flora and fauna. Reactors Kruemmel, Brunsbuettel and Brokdorf situated along the river Elbe which flows through Eastern and Northern Germany have all been slowed down. So have traditional fossil fuel power plants situated along the river Rhine. The nuclear reactors Isar 1 near Munich, and Neckarwestheim near Stuttgart have being authorised to drain hotter water into the nearby rivers than normally allowed. In Spain, the nuclear power plant at Santa Maria de Garona, one of eight Spanish reactors, was shut down last weekend due to the high temperatures recorded in the river Ebro, into which the reactor drains the water used in its cooling system. The power plant, Spain's oldest, provides 20 percent of the electricity generated in the country. German energy expert Hermann Scheer says the situation shows a need for radical change in policy. "We must massively invest in renewable energy sources, and get rid of nuclear power as soon as possible," he told IPS. Scheer is president of Eurosolar, the European association for renewable energy resources, and winner of the 'Alternative Nobel prize' for his commitment to the environment. In France, nuclear scientist Hubert Reeves urged the government to "invest massively" in renewable energy resources. "We are behind many of our European partners such as Germany, Denmark and Spain in this matter, and cannot wait until the energy crisis reaches its climax to find an alternative to our present model," he told IPS. A crisis, he said, "is round the corner." Fossil energy sources are about to be exhausted, and "nuclear technology will not solve present problems within a reasonable period of time. We should abandon nuclear power and invest in alternative sources." -------- india India Cautiously Welcomes US Nuclear Deal Approval By REUTERS July 27, 2006 (Reuters) http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/news/news-nuclear-india.html NEW DELHI - India welcomed on Thursday the U.S. House of Representatives' initial approval of a landmark civilian nuclear cooperation deal but said the accord had a long way to go before it was fully sealed. The U.S. chamber approved the controversial deal with an overwhelming 359-68 vote on Wednesday. Lawmakers rejected amendments that aimed to curb India's nuclear weapons program. ``The passage of the bill ... by a large margin of bipartisan votes in the U.S. House of Representatives demonstrates the broad political consensus in the U.S. in the promotion of Indo-U.S. relations,'' Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman Navtej Sarna said. ``We must, nevertheless, await the finalized text of the legislation which will emerge after a Senate vote and the reconciliation of the two bills, before we are able to comment on its contents,'' he said. Under the deal, India will get access to U.S. nuclear fuel and equipment -- barred so far as New Delhi has not signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and conducted nuclear tests -- to meet its soaring energy needs. However, it also needs to be approved by the U.S. Senate and a vote is not expected until September. The House and Senate would vote again after negotiations on the technical details of the agreement are completed. India must also complete negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency on a system of inspections for its civilian nuclear sites and the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group must change its regulations to allow nuclear transfers to India. The deal has been strongly criticized by the non-proliferation lobby in the United States. Experts say the agreement would allow India to produce nuclear weapons easily because it frees its domestic atomic supplies for military use. SENATE HURDLE It has also been attacked in India with supporters of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's government, as well as the opposition, accusing New Delhi of submitting to tough conditions imposed by Washington and compromising its nuclear security. Singh said the U.S. legislative process was still on and New Delhi remained concerned about some aspects of the deal which are seen as trying to impose curbs on India's nuclear program. ``All I can say is if the United States' legislative process leads to an end product which is not consistent with what we have committed, that would be the determining factor of what we will do next,'' Singh told parliament. ``It is for the United States government to ensure that ... what is contemplated is within the parameters of the July 18 statement,'' he said, referring to a 2005 pact with President George W. Bush when the deal was first agreed in principle. Analysts said Wednesday's vote in support of the deal reflected the strong efforts by the U.S. administration and New Delhi in convincing Congressmen about the pact's benefits. ``At a political level, the importance of India has been acknowledged and we can see it in this vote,'' said C. Raja Mohan, strategic affairs editor at the Indian Express newspaper. ``The vote is an extraordinary demonstration of huge bipartisan political support for the deal in the United States.'' The next approval process, though, could be tougher. ``The bill still has to be passed by the Senate and that is where the challenge will be as that is where all the non-proliferation advocates are,'' said R.R. Subramanian, an independent nuclear expert. ---- US Congress Approves Indian Nuclear Deal Aaman Lamba July 27, 2006 Blogcritics http://www.topix.net/content/blogcritics/2922088186036732664627281207702794310121 It is through treaties and deals that the world finds order in the midst of chaos. Some treaties last, like the NATO pact, and others fade away leaving merely a glimmer of their grandiose intentions. The incongruity of India's 'peaceful nuclear explosions' has been explained away as 'the right of one-sixth of humankind', yet in the energy-hungry years ahead, it may well be nuclear power that will lead to progress, peace, and all that jazz. There is also the matter of respect - the Indian establishment has long been envious of China's position in international affairs, and believes that is in no small part due to it's recognition as a nuclear power. A year ago, India and the United States entered a new rapprochement, with the signing of a nuclear deal, wherein the United States will supply nuclear fuel and technology to augment India's civilian nuclear capabilities. The United States House of Representatives voted in favor of the deal (359 to 68) on Wednesday, and if the deal clears the Senate, it can go under the President's pen. Critics have not been hard to find on either side of the pond. Western critics have mainly termed the deal a blow to the non-proliferation treaty. Indian critics believe it may lead to giving America the ability to exert 'undue influence' on Indian decision making. Both sides, as usual, miss the point. India is not a signatory to the non-proliferation treaty, and the restrictions that have been in place thus far have not limited Indian nuclear research. As wikipedia notes, 'In terms of nuclear nonproliferation, since India has an extensive civil and military nuclear program, which includes ten nuclear reactors, uranium mining and milling sites, heavy water production facilities, a uranium enrichment plant, fuel fabrication facilities, and extensive nuclear research capabilities, it is now impossible to stop India's nuclear program by means of a nuclear export control regime. In the future, India plans to commission fast-breeder reactors, thorium 232 reactors (which will yield U233--a plutonium-type substance), and nuclear-powered submarines. In short, India has the capability of becoming an overt nuclear power if it is willing to absorb the short-term economic and political pain that the resulting international sanctions would inflict.' As regards the risk of being under the influence of the United States, it is naive to believe that any nation is an island in the tumultuous ocean of world affairs. India's own policy, post-independence may have been often at cross-purposes to the British, as they foresaw, but we only traded the lion for the bear, and a generation of statis, neglect, and drift under the shadow of the Soviet Union. There is indeed the danger of the fears of both groups of critics coming true. India could indeed escalate it's weaponization program, and advanced nuclear technology could leak into the civilian sector, and thereby to interested parties who are willing to pay a pretty penny for it. It could also mean that India grows closer to the United States, politically and economically. Would both scenarios be that surprising? Corruption is not that unusual and government functionaries are not known to be paragons of propriety. The Mitrokhin Archives allege that half the establishment was in bed with the Soviets. As regards Indo-US relations, the strategic interests of both sides are served by the deal, at least in the present context when the world is 'either with us or against us'. India's strong condemnation of Israeli actions in Lebanon shows that the Foreign Ministry mandarins will continue the long-standing policy of ambiguous friendships that seems as ingrained as Chanakya-neeti in our cultural ethos. ---- Bush urges swift approval of India nuclear pact Thu Jul 27, 2006 (AFP) http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20060728/wl_sthasia_afp/usindianuclearpoliticsbush_060728030656 WASHINGTON - US President George W. Bush urged the Senate to swiftly approve a controversial US-India civilian nuclear energy deal a day after the House of Representatives did so overwhelmingly. "I want to applaud the House of Representatives for passing an important piece of legislation when it comes to America's relationship with India," Bush said in a speech to a manufacturing association on Thursday. The House voted 359-68 late Wednesday in favor of the legislation, which supporters say will be the cornerstone of a strategic alliance and critics charge will only fuel tensions between India and nuclear rival Pakistan. "The president urges the Senate to act expeditiously to pass companion legislation to enable this important initiative to become a reality," Bush spokesman Tony Snow said in a statement. "The US-India civil nuclear cooperation initiative will help India generate more nuclear power to meet its enormous energy needs in a manner that does not increase greenhouse gas emissions and air pollution, or increase demand on global oil and gas supplies," said Snow. "This initiative also advances US nonproliferation objectives by bringing India into the international nonproliferation mainstream," the spokesman said. -------- u.s. nuc facilities -------- tennessee TVA wants to study finishing 2nd nuclear reactor The Associated Press By DUNCAN MANSFIELD July 27, 2006 http://www.topix.net/content/ap/1873444575106027007640156788620377775355 http://www.wbir.com/news/local/story.aspx?storyid=36458&provider=rss There are a number of letters from a number of utilities saying they are contemplating applying for early site permits and-or construction permits for new reactors. None have come in yet The Tennessee Valley Authority is ready to pursue a study on completing a second nuclear reactor at its Watts Bar station _ the last nuclear plant to come on line in the United States, a top official said Thursday. Directors of the nation's largest public utility will be asked Friday to approve $20 million for a detailed engineering study to show how much it will cost to complete Watts Bar Unit 2, TVA President and acting CEO Tom Kilgore told The Associated Press in an interview. 'That doesn't mean that they are deciding to do Watts Bar 2,' he said. 'It means that we are asking them to spend money so that we can decide how much it would cost.' TVA will continue working with a group of utilities looking at another nuclear option _ using TVA's unfinished Bellefonte nuclear reactor site in Alabama to build a modern nuclear reactor, which would be more reliable and less costly than current reactors. 'It is not an either-or on Bellefonte,' Kilgore said. 'It is more of timing with Bellefonte. In other words, we could finish Watts Bar 2 faster than we could finish Bellefonte.' TVA believes it will need new base generation capacity by 2014. The unfinished 1,160-megawatt reactor at Watts Bar in Spring City, Tenn., about 50 miles south of Knoxville, could produce enough electricity to serve more than 670,000 homes. Construction on the Watts Bar station halted in 1985 with the rest of TVA's nuclear program because of safety concerns. Construction later resumed on Watts Bar 1, which came on line in 1996 _ the last nuclear reactor to start up in this country. TVA currently operates three nuclear stations in Tennessee and Alabama with five running reactors. A sixth reactor is slated to return to service in 2007 at the Browns Ferry station in Alabama after a $1.8 billion modernization project. There are 103 licensed reactors operating at 65 sites in the United States. The Browns Ferry Unit 1 reactor would be the 104th, which TVA expects to start around May 2007. 'There are a number of letters from a number of utilities saying they are contemplating applying for early site permits and-or construction permits for new reactors. None have come in yet,' said Ken Clark, spokesman for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Designed in the 1970s, the Watts Bar Unit 1 reactor took nearly 23 years and $7 billion to complete. The twin Unit 2 reactor was more than half finished when construction stopped in 1985. Finishing Unit 2 is expected to cost less than Watts Bar 1 _ Kilgore estimated $2 billion to $3 billion _ because of common facilities, but still would require replacing parts that have been cannibalized for other TVA reactors. 'If we were to go back today and start finishing Watts Bar 2 we would obviously need to replace all those parts, and we would need to also update a lot of things. Controls and even processes. We would really have to look at everything to see what needed to be not just replaced but renewed,' Kilgore said. The TVA board of directors will consider the study request as part of a nearly $9 billion budget request for fiscal 2007 that will include a staff recommendation to cut electric rates by 3.5 percent to 5 percent. TVA provides electricity to 158 distributors serving about 8.6 million consumers in Tennessee and parts of Kentucky, Alabama, Mississippi, North Carolina, Georgia and Virginia. TVA: http://www.tva.gov -------- MILITARY -------- arms Russia's arms sales to Venezuela may total $3 billion By Aleksandras Budrys Thu Jul 27, 2006 (Reuters) http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20060727/ts_nm/russia_venezuela_dc_5 MOSCOW - Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez may sign arms deals worth $3 billion when he meets Vladimir Putin on Thursday at the end of his visit to Russia. Chavez, a vociferous critic of Washington, has praised Russia for defying a U.S. arms blockade and had been expected to spend $1 billion on fighter aircraft for oil-rich Venezuela. "The biggest threat which exists in the world is the empire of the United States," Chavez said while unveiling a bust of 19th century South American liberation hero Simon Bolivar at a Moscow library. "It is a senseless, blind, stupid giant which doesn't understand the world, doesn't understand human rights, doesn't understand anything about humanity, culture and consciousness." The Vedomosti business daily, quoting Sergei Chemezov, head of Russian state arms trader Rosoboronexport, reported that Venezuela, the world's No.5 oil exporter, would sign deals worth $3 billion. On top of an expected deal to buy at least 24 Russian Sukhoi-30 jets to replace Venezuela's U.S. F-16s, Chavez will buy helicopters, surface-to-air missiles and possibly even a submarine, Vedomosti said, citing Russian defense sources. Chavez, who praised revolutionary Vladimir Lenin as a genius who dreamed of justice, said he would discuss energy, world politics, security and defense with President Putin. "The positions of Russia and Venezuela on the majority of international problems are close or coincide," a senior Kremlin official, who asked not to be identified, said. KREMLIN ARMS Washington has banned U.S. arms manufacturers from selling to Chavez. The United States says the populist leader, who proclaims socialist ideals to unite South America against U.S. influence, is destabilizing the region. U.S. officials said they hoped to talk Russia out of the arms deals. Senior Kremlin officials say they see no reason to take advice from the United States. The Kremlin official said Chavez would discuss energy matters with Putin. Russia, not an OPEC member, is the world's biggest natural gas producer and the world's second largest oil exporter. The deal to buy Sukhoi-30 jets was worth nearly $1.5 billion, when all the necessary armaments and support technology was included, Vedomosti said, citing a source in the Russian aerospace industry. Vedomosti also cited an unidentified Russian defense ministry source as saying that Venezuela would buy short-range TOR-M1 tactical surface-to-air missiles. Russia's plans to sell Iran the same missiles have angered Washington. Chavez is on a world tour that has included meetings with U.S. foes such as Fidel Castro and Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko. He will also visit Iran. -------- mideast First, Destroy the Archives 9/11 Nablus By GALE COUREY TOENSING July 27, 2006 CounterPunch http://www.counterpunch.org/toensing07272006.html Nablus. For anyone who witnessed the results of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center buildings in New York City, the scene was horrifyingly familiar, albeit on a smaller scale. The first evidence of the devastation was seen and felt blocks away from the site--billowing clouds of brown dust that filled the air, stung the eyes, and clogged the back of throats. The site itself was a landscape of obliteration--the legacy of the Israeli Occupation Forces' three-day blitzkrieg on a complex of public buildings that included the muqata'a--an enormous command and administrative structure built in the 1920s by the British--a Palestinian security building, part of a prison, and the ministries of agriculture and the interior. Mountains of still smoldering debris were everywhere. Piles of stones, building materials, wood, twisted metal, shards of glass, crushed cars, and wires dangling crazily from fragments of electrical systems covered the ground. The Israeli soldiers assaulted the city on Wednesday searching for "wanted men" for the purpose of "national security." The siege followed the death of an Israeli soldier last Sunday when a group of soldiers entered the Old City by foot and engaged in a shooting clash with Palestinian resistance fighters. The soldiers had used high grade military explosives to blow up the buildings in blasts so loud and powerful they could be heard all over the city. Windows and doors in surrounding buildings, most of which are residential homes, were blown out. In addition to the destruction of public buildings, the Israelis killed at least six Palestinians and injured 85 before leaving the city in their armored vehicles Friday after dark under cover of a final massive explosion they set at the building complex. Buried and half buried in the ruins of the Ministry of the Interior were hundreds of thousands of file cases and documents--birth and death certificates, identification records, passports and other travel documents, ledgers of hand written information--a heritage of historical information about Nablus residents that covered more than 100 years of successive Palestinian occupations under the Ottoman Empire, the British Mandate, the Jordanian kingdom, and the current Israeli regime. "We offered to give the Israelis the keys of the building so they could search it to make sure there was no one hiding there, but that was not good enough for the Israelis, who insisted on demolishing everything," said Abed Al Illah Ateereh, the director of the Ministry of the Interior in Nablus. Ateereh was at the site Saturday morning directing dozens of municipal employees and volunteers sifting through the piles of wreckage and digging in the ruins in an effort to retrieve the few documents that were salvageable.. It was not an easy task. "There is 100 percent damage," Ateereh said. "They destroyed the building completely, but that wasn't enough for the Israelis. They then used their Caterpillar bulldozers to churn up everything and mix all the documents with the soil so that nothing is able to be preserved," Ateereh said. The ministry had at least 175,000 individual case files each containing multiple documents. It will be impossible to recover an entire case file, Ateereh said. Some of the newer documents are backed up on a computer, but the old historical records are priceless and irreplaceable. "Passports, birth certificates, family information, identity records--all the kinds of information that an interior ministry would keep are all gone. These documents were used not only by Palestinians, but also by UNICEF and other agencies and foreigners who came to the ministry to do research," Ateereh said. The destruction will have an immediate impact on thousands of people who intended to travel out of the country soon--students going abroad to continue their education, old people or sick people seeking medical care, people planning to visit family and anyone who depended on the ministry's records. Refugees in exile and in local refugee camps may also be impacted by Israel's destructive spree. Several refugees from the Nablus area who are now in Syria came to the ministry for proof of their history and status as refugees, Ateereh said. The Israeli military also attacked the Ministry of the Interior in Gaza earlier this month, and recently, journalist Amira Hass reported in Haaretz newspaper on a new Israeli clamp down to stop Palestinians in exile and the non-Palestinian spouses of Palestinian residents in the West Bank from entering the country. Observers of the conflict said the destruction of personal identification records may indicate a new phase in Israel's ongoing policy of ethnically cleansing the indigenous Arab population while the Jewish state continues its land grab through construction of the Apartheid Wall, expansion of its illegal settlements, and expropriation of around 28 percent of the West Bank in the Jordan Valley, some of the best agricultural land in the country. Nablus Mayor Adly R. Yaish was also at the site early Saturday morning consulting with Ateereh on the situation. Yaish said the devastation of the public buildings was deliberate and unjustifiable. "This is a civilian institution where all the reports for people are kept. You can see they were determined not only to destroy it, they mashed it and turned it upside down. These documents are from 100 years ago. They destroy everything," Yaish said. Asked if the city could afford the massive clean up effort, Yaish said, "Of course, the city has no money for this kind of clean up." The city also has no means of testing whether the Israelis used any chemicals or depleted uranium in their explosions, Yaish said. None of the workers digging through the debris were wearing masks or other protective gear. The city will declare an emergency and refer people to other cities to try to solve the problem, at least temporarily, Ateereh said. The city also plans to take legal action against Israel for its wanton destruction. "We plan to take this case to the international court. We will work on it and we plan to contact all kinds of humanitarian institutions in the United States and everywhere about this injustice and violation of human rights. We hope everyone will express the Palestinians' feelings of suffering from this kind of operation," Ateereh said. -------- POLICE / PRISONERS / COURTS / JUSTICE -------- courts / tribunals Ohio Supreme Court Rejects Taking of Homes for Project By IAN URBINA July 27, 2006 NY TIMES http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/27/us/27ohio.html?_r=1&ref=us&pagewanted=print&oref=slogin The Ohio Supreme Court ruled unanimously yesterday that a Cincinnati suburb cannot take private property by eminent domain for a $125 million redevelopment project. The property rights case was the first of its kind to reach a state’s highest court since the United States Supreme Court ruled last year that municipalities could seize property for private development that public officials argue would benefit the community. The Ohio decision rejected that view, and is part of a broader backlash. Since the ruling last year, 28 state legislatures have passed new protections against the use of eminent domain. “This is the final word in Ohio, and it says something that I think all Americans feel,” said Dana Berliner, a lawyer with the Institute for Justice, a public-interest law firm in Arlington, Va., who argued on behalf of the homeowners before the Ohio court. “Ownership of a home is a basic right, regardless of what the U.S. Supreme Court may have decided.” Since the Ohio case was argued based on the state’s Constitution, yesterday’s decision cannot be appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which decides matters involving federal law. The United States Supreme Court decision last year made it clear that state constitutions could set different standards for property rights. “The Ohio decision takes the loophole that was left by the U.S. Supreme Court decision and drives a Mack truck right through it,” said Richard A. Epstein, a law professor at the University of Chicago. Mr. Epstein said the decision was especially surprising coming from the Ohio Supreme Court, which he said had rarely reached unanimous decisions and had often sided with developers. “But this decision indicates that the justices were entirely distrustful of planning officials and developers working under nebulous criteria.” The Ohio decision involves the city of Norwood, which moved in 2002 to seize about 70 houses for a project to build offices, shops and restaurants in a neighborhood widely viewed to be deteriorating. Virtually all the property owners sold their land voluntarily, often at prices greatly above their audited value, state officials said. All but three of the houses at the site have been bulldozed. “We’re just grateful that this is still a constitutional republic,” said Joy Gamble, one of the plaintiffs in the lawsuit against the state. “We raised our children in that home, we lived there for 35 years, and we planned to live out our retirement there.” Mrs. Gamble said that after being evicted in February 2005, she and her husband, Carl, moved in with their daughter across the Ohio River in Independence, Ky. “We were nervous because we knew that the same developer who built the mall across from us with help from the city and eminent domain was the one who wanted our land,” said Mrs. Gamble, whose house is one of the three still standing on the contested site. “But in the end, the city and developer took it away and the courts gave it back, which makes you feel like there is real justice.” In a 5-to-4 decision last year in a Connecticut case, Kelo v. City of New London, the United States Supreme Court ruled that economic development is an appropriate use of the government’s power of eminent domain. That decision gave New London the authority to condemn houses in an aging neighborhood to make way for private development. The legal debate over eminent domain has not been whether governments could condemn private property to build a public amenity like a park or a highway. That power was established by the Fifth Amendment, provided that property owners are given “just compensation.” The conflict has been over government attempts to take private homes or businesses for redevelopment projects that at least partly benefit private entities. Two months after the ruling in June 2005, Justice John Paul Stevens, who wrote the majority opinion, said he was bound by the law and legal precedent. But in responding to criticism, he called the outcome “unwise,” and said that had he been a legislator he would have opposed it. Ms. Berliner of the Institute for Justice said the Ohio decision was a reaction to the growing use of eminent domain by developers and local officials. Since the Kelo decision, more than 5,700 properties nationwide have been threatened with seizure or have been seized through eminent domain, a threefold increase from the numbers before that decision, she said. The Ohio decision was a blow to Norwood officials, who hoped to gain $2 million a year in tax revenue through the seven-acre project. “The city is running one hell of a deficit,” said Mayor Thomas Williams, who predicted that the city would run out of money for its operating budget in October. “We’re just trying to generate enough income to keep our doors open.” The developer, Jeffrey R. Anderson Real Estate, could not be reached for comment on whether the project would go forward. The 58-page Ohio decision said that while economic factors may be considered in determining whether governments can take private property, the economic benefit to the government and community cannot be the only justification used for seizure. “For the individual property owner, the appropriation is not simply the seizure of a house,” Justice Maureen O’Connor wrote. “It is the taking of a home, the place where ancestors toiled, where families were raised, where memories were made.” The decision said that justifying the seizure by claiming that the area is deteriorating was unconstitutional because the term is too vague. Christopher Maag contributed reporting from Cleveland for this article. -------- ACTIVISTS CodePink Founder Interrupts Iraqi PM's Speech To Congress in Protest Against Iraq War Thursday, July 27th, 2006 Democracy Now! http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=06/07/27/1423254 On Wednesday, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki addressed a joint session of Congress. He was interrupted when CODEPINK founder Medea Benjamin yelled out: “Iraqis want the troops to leave, bring them home now.” Benjamin was arrested and charged with disrupting Congress. She joins us from Washington, where she is on her 24th day of a fast against the war. [includes rush transcript] On Wednesday, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki addressed a joint session of Congress. In his 30-minute speech al-Maliki stated that his country’s future depended on continued US commitment and that Iraq was a front line in the war on terrorism. At one point during the speech a protester began to scream ‘Iraqis want the troops to leave, bring them home now.’ The protester, CODEPINK’s Medea Benjamin, was arrested and charged with disrupting Congress. Medea is on her 24th day of a long-term fast for peace called - the Troops Home Fast. Also fasting is environmental activist and co-founder of CodePink Diane Wilson. Diane has said that she will continue fasting until the U.S commits to a plan to bring the troops home. Medea Benjamin and Diane Wilson both join us from our Washington D.C. studio. * Medea Benjamin. Longtime peace activist and founder of the anti-war group CODEPINK * Diane Wilson. Texan environmental activist and co-founder of the anti-war group CODEPINK. She has been on a hunger strike outside the White House since July 4. She is the author of the book "An Unreasonable Woman: A True Story of Shrimpers, Politicos, Polluters, and the Fight for Seadrift, Texas." RUSH TRANSCRIPT JUAN GONZALEZ: At one point during the speech, a protester began to scream, "Iraqis want the troops to leave. Bring them home now!" MEDEA BENJAMIN: Iraqis want the troops to leave. Bring them home now! Iraqis want the troops to leave. Bring them home now! REP. DENNIS HASTERT: Our honored guest, we'll suspend for the moment. The chair notes a disturbance in the gallery. The sergeant in arms will secure order by removing those engaging in disruption. MEDEA BENJAMIN: Listen to the Iraqi people. Bring the troops home now! AMY GOODMAN: The protester, CODEPINK's Medea Benjamin, was arrested and charged with disrupting Congress. Medea is on her 24th day of a long-term fast for peace called the Troops Home Fast. Also fasting, environmental activist and co-founder of CODEPINK, Diane Wilson. She has said she'll continue her fast until the U.S. commits to a plan to bring the troops home. They both join us in our Washington studio. But let's begin with you, Medea . Describe the scene yesterday. First of all, how did you get in, once again, to Congress? MEDEA BENJAMIN: I had an invitation from a congressperson, a legitimate invitation. They actually tried to stop me when I came in. They told me I couldn't be seated in the seat that I had. I just walked right in and threatened to sit in the lap of a person who took my seat. And then they sat two Secret Service police next to me and surrounded me with the Capitol police, and they were watching every single move I made. But, luckily, our voices are our voices, and I felt really compelled, especially since the Prime Minister had actually promised to meet with us. We talked to the ambassador twice, after Maliki arrived into town. And we did get a promise from the ambassador that he would have a meeting with the fasters. And they had us sitting outside the embassy for six hours the first day, six hours the second day, and reneged on their promise for a meeting. So, we really felt that we didn't have a chance to meet with him privately, that we had to express ourselves in a public fashion. JUAN GONZALEZ: And, Medea, the fast that you've been on now for about three weeks, what kind of response has it gotten outside the White House? MEDEA BENJAMIN: Well, the response around the country has been incredible. There are probably now over 5,000 people that have joined in the fast, some of them doing a fast once a week, some of them doing a rolling fast in their communities. We keep getting new people writing to us and telling us that they're joining in on the fast. And for most people, this is the first time they've done this, ever. You'll soon be speaking to veteran faster, Diane Wilson. But most of us, it's a brand new experience. And I’ll tell you, I never thought I could go as many days without eating as I have. I guess I have Diane to thank or to blame for this. But, it is something that deepens one's personal resolve to these issues, as well as gives us more commitment to going out there like we have been every day. Today, there will be people in John Bolton's hearing. We're waiting for Tony Blair to come tomorrow. And especially for those of us in Washington, we've not only been paying attention to news, we've been making it. AMY GOODMAN: Diane Wilson, who's sitting next to you in the Reuters studio, who wrote her own biography, An Unreasonable Woman: A True Story of Shrimpers, Politicos, Polluters, and the Fight for Seadrift, Texas, you've come into the studio in a wheelchair. You're on a water-only fast? DIANE WILSON: That's right. Water only. AMY GOODMAN: Why? I mean, you are very weak now. DIANE WILSON: Because I’m a firm believer in commitment. I don't like having safety nets. And also when I did all my hunger strikes back in Texas, you don't get much support down there, so I did get support from reading Ghandi. And I know that was one of his ways. It was water only. And also I think it has a purity about it. And it also -- the way a hunger strike affects people is -- you know, this country has got weird ideas about food and not eating. And I do know when you really start getting out there -- day 30, day 40 -- on a water fast, it can get real critical, because I know you can do a juice fast. I believe Dick Gregory, the legendary faster who did it for the Vietnam, he did over 275 days. AMY GOODMAN: And how long do you plan to do this, and what exactly are you demanding, as you take your place outside the White House? DIANE WILSON: Well, to tell you the truth, we have been looking for a plan to bring the troops home, a very serious plan to start troop withdrawal. And only in the last couple days, we seemingly have had a breakthrough, and we've been invited by the Iraqi parliament to go to Jordan and discuss their peace plan. They want to tell us about their peace plan. And we're planning on probably doing this by next Wednesday. And we're seeing this as a major breakthrough. And they have -- one of the stipulation is, is they wanted to us break the fast, and so we're seriously considering it. JUAN GONZALEZ: And, Medea, you've been to Iraq and the Middle East a number of times. Are you planning to go on this particular trip, as well? And how was it that the Iraqi parliament even contacted you? MEDEA BENJAMIN: Well, we've been doing outreach to Iraqis for years now. When it was safer to travel there, we'd go directly. We would be meeting people in the region. We helped bring people like a women's delegation to the United States. And we've taken out ads in Iraqi newspapers. Just this week, together with United for Peace and Justice, we put out an open letter to the Prime Minister. And through all of these efforts, we were contacted by several leading parliamentarians in Iraq who understand the commitment that we have taken, actually even heard that the Prime Minister had offered to meet with us on the condition that we break bread with him. And then that was violated. They felt terrible about that and said that “we would like to meet with you,” that there is a serious reconciliation plan, a 28-point plan that has gotten no coverage here in the United States, except probably for Democracy Now!, and that they want to talk to us about it, and they want to work with us to find ways to come back to the United States and promote that plan. So we'll be leaving on Wednesday. We'd love it if you, Amy or Juan, would come with us, or someone from Democracy Now! We're going to be inviting some congresspeople to join us. And we hope this will be a major effort to make this peace plan more viable. AMY GOODMAN: Well, I want to thank you very much for being with us, both Medea Benjamin, longtime peace activist, co-founder of Global Exchange and, as well, CODEPINK; and Diane Wilson, who has written her own story, An Unreasonable Woman: A True Story of Shrimpers, Politicos, Polluters, and the Fight for Seadrift, Texas. They're in the 24th day of a hunger fast for peace. Their website, troopshomefast.org. ---- Student protests turned up in Pentagon database By nathan johnson July 27, 2006 The Daily Pennsylvanian. http://www.dailypennsylvanian.com/vnews/display.v/ART/2006/07/27/44c852f623603 When a group of students at the University of California at Berkeley convened to protest on-campus military recruitment last year, they hoped their effort would get some attention. But they didn't expect that attention would wind up in a terror-threat database. The day before the protest, on April 20, 2005, an agent of the Department of Homeland Security filed a report on the planned demonstration. Among the items included: an e-mail sent by an organizer, along with the student's e-mail address and phone number. The agent's report was included in a Pentagon-managed database intended to compile information on threats from international terrorists. The report listed as a reason for the filing that "a strong potential for confrontation at this protest given the strong support for anti-war protests and movements in the past." Not so, says Snehal Shingavi, an English graduate student at Berkeley who helped organize the April 21 protest as part of a student group opposed to the war. The planned protest at a career fair, intended to object to both the war in Iraq and the military's don't-ask-don't-tell policy regarding homosexuality, was peaceful, as had been several previous protests on the same subject. Protesters intended to "inform students ... about the realities of employment in a military career," Shingavi said. On that day, 30 to 40 students assembled to challenge the recruiters verbally, asking how they could justify recruiting in light of scandals like Abu Ghraib and civilian deaths in Iraq. It was more of a "heated discussion" than a confrontation, Shingavi said. The group's members "don't believe in more violent tactics than these," he added. It is not fully clear how the student e-mail wound up in the database. Hicks said that the Department of Defense did not actively monitor any student correspondence. Shingavi has his own theory as to how a Homeland Security agent obtained it. He said that Berkeley officials can review e-mails sent over university servers and that correspondence has turned up in administrators' hands before. Jennifer Ward, a representative of the California state system of schools, denied that officials generally do this and said that policies are in place to prevent it. The state system's policy forbids the examination of e-mail without notifying the sender unless the law requires it, officials believe someone has violated a law or policy, or under "compelling," time-dependent or critical circumstances. System records show that during a one-year period that did not include the sending of the e-mail in question, no requests for such access were approved at Berkeley. David Millar, an information security officer at Penn, said that the University does not review such e-mails. The incident at Berkeley last year was not the only one to appear on the Pentagon's radar. According to documents obtained by the Servicemembers Legal Defense Network ? which works to combat the "don't ask, don't tell policy -- the database at one time contained records on protests at six schools, including Berkeley, the University of California at Santa Cruz and New York University. Such filings, called Threat and Local Observation Notices, or TALONs, were authorized in a memo by former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, as a way to keep tabs on potential terrorist threats. The memo lists a number of specific reasons for which a TALON would be justified, but also allows one to be filed in response to general "suspicious activities/incidents." A Pentagon spokesman, Cdr. Greg Hicks, said that the TALONs about student protests and other records that did not pertain to terrorist threats were later purged from the 13,000-entry database. The purpose of the bank is to provide a "foreign terrorist threat nexus," enabling the government to "connect the dots" of individual agents' observations to form a picture of potential threats, not to keep track of campus demonstrations, Hicks said. Now, he added, submissions are subject to multiple reviews before being included. And the information contained in the database has been helpful in assisting investigations being conducted by intelligence organizations, Hicks said. Sharra Greer, director of Law and Policy for the Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, said she is glad the TALONs on student protests are gone. Protesting the policy is a legitimate use of First Amendment rights, she said, not a threat to national security. But she added that her group is still seeking access to additional records from the database. "I think we will feel more comfortable when we have finished the process," she said. Rob D'Ovidio a Drexel University professor specialized in surveillance methods, said that government programs monitoring civilian activities have persisted throughout the 20th century and are not unique to the current administration. "We've been spying on our own citizens through proxy for years."