NucNews - December 15, 2005 -------- NUCLEAR People Back Atomic Power but not New Plants - Survey REUTERS ITALY: December 15, 2005 http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/34045/story.htm VIENNA - Most people back the use of existing nuclear power plants but are against building new reactors as some states are considering, a survey conducted in 18 countries for the UN nuclear watchdog showed on Wednesday. The survey, commissioned by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is charged with promoting nuclear energy, showed 62 percent of the roughly 18,000 respondents said existing nuclear facilities should continue to be used while 59 percent were opposed to building new plants. Its release comes two weeks after British Prime Minister Tony Blair put nuclear power back on the agenda by launching a review of his country's energy policy, pressured by booming oil and gas prices and global warming. "While majorities of citizens generally support the continued use of existing nuclear reactors, most people do not favour the building of new nuclear plants," the survey, conducted by GlobeScan Inc., said. The countries surveyed included the world's richest nations, such as the United States, Britain, France, and Japan, and less developed states like Cameroon, Jordan, Morocco and Indonesia. It did not, however, include Austria, where the IAEA is based, a staunch opponent of nuclear power. "We decided to focus on countries that have a big nuclear programme," IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming said. Greenpeace said the survey's results showed people saw nuclear energy as dangerous. "It shows that no matter how much money the industry tries to throw at this, the majority of people still believe that nuclear is dirty, decrepit and dangerous," Greenpeace nuclear analyst William Peden told Reuters. -------- accidents and safety France hid extent of Chernobyl contamination: report PARIS (AFP) Dec 15, 2005 http://www.spacewar.com/2005/051215132508.tkij2vpv.html French authorities deliberately suppressed information about the spread of radioactive fallout from the May 1986 Chernobyl disaster over France, according to details of an experts' report leaked Thursday. Two independent physicists say in the report that the state-run Central Service for Protection against Radioactive Rays (SCPRI) knew of high levels of contamination in Corsica and southeastern France but kept the details under wraps. The study was commissioned by magistrate Marie-Odile Bertella-Geffroy, who since 2001 has been examining allegations that the atomic cloud from Chernobyl caused a surge in cases of thyroid cancer in parts of France. This week Bertella-Geffroy handed over the report -- originally completed in March -- to civil plaintiffs in the case, who passed details to AFP. "Now we have proof that there was a breakdown in the system. So now the judicial case will succeed -- I can't see how it can do otherwise," said Chantal Hoir, president of the French Association of Victims of Thyroid Cancer. The report states that the SCPRI issued imprecise maps that concealed the high levels of fallout in certain areas, according to sources who saw the document. It also states that with full information health authorities could have taken targeted steps to reduce the exposure of vulnerable people such as children and pregnant mothers. It was the first time an independent study gave substance to long-standing accusations from anti-nuclear groups that the French government deliberately played down the risk posed by the nuclear cloud. "There was a veritable campaign of lies instigated by the state in order to protect the image of the French nuclear industry," said the campaigning organisation Sortir du Nucleaire (Get Out of Nuclear Power), welcoming details of the report. "As in other European countries, people should have been told not to eat fresh vegetables and milk products, which absorb most radioactivity, or to let their children play in sand-pits and so on," it said. Earlier this year anti-nuclear campaigners demanded that SCPRI's director at the time of the disaster, Pierre Pellerin, be placed under judicial investigation in the case. However scientific opinion remains deeply divided, with several renowned physicists sending an open letter to President Jacques Chirac in June commending Pellerin for not giving way to panic in his handling of the crisis. In April, France's high court of appeal confirmed a conviction for libel against leading Green party deputy Noel Mamere, who wrongfully accused Pellerin of claiming that the Chernobyl nuclear cloud stopped at the French border. Doctors also question the supposed link between Chernobyl and the rise in thyroid cancer, a trend which began in the mid-1970s. -------- canada Nuclear power on table, McGuinty says By MURRAY CAMPBELL AND KAREN HOWLETT Thursday, December 15, 2005, Page A13 Toronto Globe and Mail http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/Page/document/v4/sub/MarketingPage?user_URL=http://www.theglobeandmail.com%2Fservlet%2FArticleNews%2FTPStory%2FLAC%2F20051215%2FONTNUKE15%2FTPNational%2FCanada&ord=1135633426013&brand=theglobeandmail&force_login=true TORONTO -- Premier Dalton McGuinty is promising "a very important conversation" with Ontarians before committing his government to a renewed nuclear-energy program. Mr. McGuinty, making his first public comments since a provincial advisory agency last week recommended spending up to $40-billion to refurbish existing reactors and build new ones, said "nuclear remains on the table for us." -------- india Many Indians favour building nuke plants Thursday, 15 December, 2005, 2005, 11:32 http://sify.com/finance/fullstory.php?id=14048532 New York: While a large number of people around the world support the continued use of existing nuclear reactors and are opposed to new ones, many in India, United States and South Korea favour building of new plants, according to a survey. However, the per centage of Indians supporting construction of new power plants was the lowest among the three countries, the survey conducted by Globescan for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) showed. While 33 per cent Indians favour building new plants, 23 per cent would like the existing ones to continue and are against building new ones. Another 22 per cent would like to shut down all nuclear based power plants immediately. The maximum support for building new nuclear power plants is in South Korea where nearly 52 per cent would like to see new plants come up with only 34 per cent opposition building new ones and 13 per cent want all plants to be closed down. Forty per cent of Americans consider nuclear power plants safe and would like more to be built against 29 per cent who feel that current plants should continue and 26 per who want even the existing ones to be closed down. The least support was in Morocco where 49 per cent wanted all nuclear plants to be shut down against 13 per cent who considered them safe. Majority of those in Saudi Arabia and Cameroon wanted even the existing plants to be closed down. At a time when the nuclear power option is being vigorously pursued in the fast developing countries of Asia and being reconsidered in some European nations and the United States, the findings raise questions as to whether the nuclear industry and politicians have sufficiently raised public confidence in the safety and efficiency of the nuclear power option, IAEA said. |Read more Finance news.| Overall, it finds that six in ten citizens (62 per cent) believe that existing nuclear reactors should continue to be used, but nearly the same number (59 per cent) do not favour new plants. The survey was conducted between May and August this year among 18,000 people in Argentina, Australia, Cameroon, Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and the United States. Other findings of the survey were: Majority in all but three of the 18 countries believe IAEA inspections are not effective in monitoring countries' nuclear programmes - 46 per cent against 29 per cent. The survey also revealed that majority of people in 14 countries believed the risk of terrorist acts involving radioactive materials and nuclear facilities was high due to insufficient protection, with 54 per cent believing the risk to be high and 28 per cent low. -------- iran Bush: 'Axis of evil' member Iran is 'real threat' WASHINGTON (AFP) Dec 15, 2005 http://www.spacewar.com/2005/051215001101.3ptyu3n8.html US President George W. Bush on Wednesday called Iran "a real threat," repeated his charge from 2002 that it is part of an "axis of evil," and urged Tehran to prove it does not seek nuclear weapons. Washington accuses the Islamic republic of using a civilian nuclear program to hide a quest for atomic weapons, and has charged that Iran is a destabilizing force in Iraq. Tehran has denied that it seeks nuclear arms. "I called it (Iran) part of the 'axis of evil' for a reason," Bush said in an interview with Fox News. "It's a real threat." The US president first lumped Iran with North Korea and Saddam Hussein's Iraq in an "axis of evil" during his 2002 State of the Union speech to the US Congress. His comments Wednesday came amid an escalating war of words with Tehran, whose hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has stoked outrage in the West by calling Israel a "tumor" in the Middle East and saying that the Holocaust is a myth. Asked how he would deal with Iran, Bush replied: "We continue to work the diplomatic front." "I'm concerned about theocracy that has got little transparency, a country whose president has declared the destruction of Israel as part of their foreign policy, and a country that will not listen to the demands of the free world to get rid of its ambitions to have a nuclear weapon," said Bush. Asked whether he had a message for authorities in Tehran, Bush said: "I would hope they'd be wise enough to begin to listen to the people and allow the people to participate in their government." -------- iraq / inspections Summary - Iraq Confidential: The Untold Story of the Intelligence Conspiracy to Undermine the UN and Overthrow Saddam Hussein Author: Scott Ritter Publisher: Avalon Publishing Group Date of Publication: October 2005 ISBN: 1560258527 No. of Pages: 336 [Summary published by CapitolReader.com on December 15, 2005] http://www.capitolreader.com/sum/summary-121505-s-rit-iraqconf.pdf About The Author: Scott Ritter is a former marine officer who served as a United Nations (UN) weapons inspector. He was charged with oversight of Iraq's disarmament of weapons of mass destruction as part of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). During his seven years of service, Ritter was privy to political intrigues and other factors affecting the disarmament of Iraq. General Overview: Scott Ritter and UNSCOM set a goal of working with Iraq to gather the necessary intelligence to determine whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) or the capabilities to produce them. Formed in the early 1990s, UNSCOM was the international force charged with disarming Iraq. However, as Ritter reveals in Iraq Confidential, the political powers that be in Washington, D.C. were only interested in disarmament as a tool for their own agenda: regime change in Iraq. While Ritter and his team put boots on the ground in Iraq, interviewing sources and inspecting questionable sites, he discovered that the CIA was determined to stop UNSCOM from finding and sharing the truth: that Iraq had destroyed all its WMDs in the summer of 1991. Ritter's conclusion, based on his own inside working knowledge of the inspections process in Iraq, impacts the ongoing debate about current affairs in Iraq. * Please Note: This CapitolReader.com summary does not offer judgment or opinion on the book's content. The ideas, viewpoints and arguments are presented just as the book's author has intended. The Birth of UNSCOM In April 1991, the United Nations passed Resolution 687, the original disarmament resolution of the UN Security Council regarding Iraq. This resolution authorized the creation of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). The ostensible purpose of Resolution 687 was to rid the world of Iraq's WMDs. However, the real intent behind Resolution 687 was far different. George H. W. Bush's war in early 1991 had failed to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and for domestic political reasons, President Bush wanted to get rid of Hussein. Thus, the actual goal of Resolution 687 was not pure disarmament, but the undermining of Saddam Hussein. "Disarmament was merely a vehicle for the larger U.S. objective of regime change." Sanctions imposed on Iraq, originally established after Iraq's invasion of neighboring Kuwait, were extended until Iraq was found to be in complete compliance with its disarmament mandate. The stakes were high and the burden of proof heavy because the U.S. wanted Iraq to fail, whether the Iraqis were telling the truth about disarming or not. UNSCOM, however, was unbiased. As a group under the control of the United Nations, UNSCOM should have been, from the very beginning, an international body that strove to do what was best for the international community. However, from its very inception in 1991, UNSCOM was thwarted, manipulated and frustrated in its task by the United States. The CIA pushed for involvement in both the intelligence and logistical aspects of UNSCOM's missions in Iraq. CIA agents were used in covert actions. In contrast, UNSCOM inspections were carried out in full view. In addition to operational differences, the U.S. intelligence community "sought leverage over UNSCOM by controlling the information that it had access to." This would prove to be a major point of contention over the coming years of disarmament. Showdown with Iraq Tariq Aziz, Iraq's deputy prime minister and chief negotiator on WMD issues, made things worse for the Iraq cause when he came before the UN Security Council in March 1992. He berated the Council and charged that its resolutions on Iraq disarmament were "unfair." Aziz claimed that Iraq had destroyed all WMDs in 1991, but refused to provide details or proof to support his position. Aziz reinforced to the president of the Security Council that UNSCOM needed to be the final authority and arbiter on all matters regarding Resolution 687. Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, a Swedish diplomat with extensive arms control experience, sat down to negotiate with Aziz. Ekeus revealed to Aziz that UNSCOM possessed photographic evidence that proved Iraq had lied about the numbers of missiles and missile launchers it possessed in its original declaration. Ekeus hoped that, by letting Aziz know that the inspectors were coming with or without Aziz's help, he could influence Aziz to come clean about past guilt. What was not known at the time was that Saddam Hussein had unilaterally destroyed stockpiles of WMD in 1991. But, top Iraqi leadership didn't want to admit wrongdoing in the past. Tariq Aziz's deputy, Amer Rashid, argued with other Iraqi leaders that Iraq should admit that its original declarations were wrong, come clean about unilateral destruction of WMDs and cooperate with inspectors to verify Iraq's claims. However, two objections were raised. Hussein Kamal, Saddam's son-in-law, declared it impossible that they admit any aspect of biological warfare because the world would judge Iraq harshly. Additionally, Qusay, Saddam's younger son who headed the Special Security Organization (which is responsible for presidential security), insisted that the role of the Special Security Organization never be discussed or disclosed. The president's security would be at stake if inspectors went sniffing around presidential palaces, but Qusay had another, more sinister, reason for his demand. Under his direction, the Special Security Organization was protecting a secret archive of documents pertaining to Iraq's missile, chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs. Qusay hoped that, once sanctions were lifted and UN inspectors left Iraq, those documents could provide the "seed stock" for revitalizing Iraq's WMD programs. Going with Rashid's suggestion, the Iraqis offered "a stunning admission:" their original declarations were incomplete and they had secretly retained 89 operational missiles and eight mobile launchers. In spite of that admission, Qusay and Hussein Kamal had their way, as well. Biological weapons were not discussed and the Iraqis held firmly to their claim that the Special Security Organization was not involved in concealment of weapons. Then came the big twist. All of the retained materials had been "unilaterally destroyed by Iraq in June 1991." The UNSCOM 31 mission team, poised to enter Iraq on an inspection, witnessed their goal change from a conventional search for hidden weapons to "a more conventional verification and destruction inspection." This transferred the burden of proof from Iraq onto UNSCOM. Anatomy of an Inspection Mission The exact personnel and specifics of each inspection mission in Iraq varied, but many aspects remained consistent from inspection to inspection. Before Ritter's team could even be assembled, the chairman of UNSCOM (Ekeus first, and later, Richard Butler) had to sign off on Ritter's proposal for what the inspectors would do while in Iraq. By using intelligence gleaned from various sources, Ritter would work to prepare a plan for how inspections would be carried out in what order, and what the overarching goal of the trip was. The most important component of the plan was the required Notification of Inspection Site (NIS) document. This paper was UNSCOM's version of a search warrant, and it meant "Iraq had to grant the inspection team wielding the document immediate and unrestricted access to the designated site." After Ekeus signed off on his plan, Ritter would assemble the team, usually in Bahrain, where UNSCOM had secure use of a building for training the inspectors before entering Iraq. Training was intense and the team would then board a plane for Iraq. All teams stayed at one of several hotels in downtown Baghdad, but their presence was well known. "Shadowy Iraqi intelligence and security personnel followed [their] every movement." Sometimes, the inspection team was met with hostility and due to the weak American and UN response to such hostility (which included barricades around some authorized search sites), the Iraq leadership was emboldened. Often, however, the searches were anti-climactic. Ritter and his team were left to question whether this was because the Iraqis were two steps ahead in concealing weapons and other prohibited materials, or whether the intelligence provided to UNSCOM by the CIA was incorrect or incomplete. Resolving Ballistic Disarmament The most intensive inspection ever undertaken by UNSCOM was known as UNSCOM 45 and ran between October 19 and 30, 1993. It was grand in both scope and success: 75 inspection sites, three major seminars, dozens of informal meetings and hundreds of pages of notes including new information about Iraq's ballistic missile program. Every major concern Ritter had highlighted prior to this inspection was cleared up by Iraq's disclosures, including fuel production discrepancies for operating SCUD missiles (a short-range missile system originally designed for a range of 300 miles, but modified by Iraq for ranges in excess of 500 miles), as well as when and how the missiles and launchers were destroyed. Ritter, at the conclusion of the inspection, was "fairly confident" that the inspection had revealed enough to resolve the question of ballistic disarmament. Upon his return to Washington, Ritter briefed 30 U.S. missile experts from the intelligence community on what he and his team had learned during UNSCOM 45: the U.S. government was wrong when it claimed that Iraq was still maintaining a covert SCUD force. Ritter's report was met with icy silence and he was warned to expect backlash for UNSCOM's conclusions. Within a week, a response came in which the U.S. intelligence community ignored the conclusions drawn by UNSCOM. The U.S. was "interested only in maintaining the perception that the Iraqis were not telling the truth, regardless of what the facts showed." CIA vs. UNSCOM, Round 1 Intelligence information provided to UNSCOM by the CIA was often half true, at best. After the U.S. intelligence community rejected UNSCOM's claims that Iraq was disarmed of ballistic weapons, Ritter decided to try and determine whether U.S. assertion that Iraq still had 200 missiles was true or not. The CIA enthusiastically offered a list of many sites in Iraq where they believed missiles, warheads and other prohibited weapons were buried. As was the case in previous missions, the U.S. was not objective in the results of the mission. The U.S. had something to lose if UNSCOM was right about Iraq no longer possessing SCUD missiles. George H. W. Bush had wanted regime change, and so did the new president, Bill Clinton. The rigorous standards of inspection set and carried out by UNSCOM were inconvenient for U.S. political policy. Ritter was concerned that even if he took the CIA intelligence at face value and did an investigation using Ground-Penetrating Radar (GPR) and found no evidence of a SCUD force, the Americans still wouldn't accept the UNSCOM results as legitimate. He feared a never-ending inspection cycle in which nothing was ever found, but Iraq's enemies could simply say that the weapons were there, but just hadn't been located yet. Just as Ritter suspected, UNSCOM 63 found no signs of buried SCUD missiles. The only conclusion that he could draw from the mission was that "the CIA's estimate on an Iraqi covert SCUD missile force was completely without foundation in fact." Nevertheless, the U.S. government and intelligence agencies persisted in their claims that Iraq was harboring such weapons. In frustration, Ritter decided to leave his job at UNSCOM, telling his boss, "They [the Americans] don't want the truth. And I don't know what we can do anymore than what has already been done to convince them we are going a good, credible job." A New Partnership Ritter's time away from UNSCOM was short. Within a few months, Ritter received a call, asking him to return to UNSCOM. A new alliance had been formed; UNSCOM was secretly working with Israel. Ritter traveled to Israel in early October 1994. There, he met with Major General Uri Saguy. In a secretive meeting, Ritter dropped a big statement: UNSCOM was planning to dispatch a team of radio intercept operators "for the purpose of exploiting Iraqi communications related to the hiding of prohibited material inside Iraq." UNSCOM would provide the team, but was requesting the help of Israel in equipping and training personnel, as well as "exploiting" all captured signals. This was a sensitive subject and one not often discussed with members of other nations' intelligence teams; communications intelligence, or SIGINT, is the most "sensitive of disciplines." Ultimately, Israel decided not to compromise their national security and intelligence operations by taking part in the UNSCOM effort, but offered help in another, equally vital way: a team of Israeli experts would provide interpretation of photos taken from U-2 aircraft flying over Iraq. (Ritter had long been disappointed in CIA interpretations; often, the CIA analyst was not familiar with the site being photographed and offered no new interpretations of the photograph.) Israel's active cooperation with UNSCOM represents the shift from a traditional weapons inspection to something more covert: Ritter believed that Iraq was playing a game of cat and mouse, in which the Secret Security Organization was covertly moving documents and evidence around the country to avoid discovery by UNSCOM. On Hussein Kamal's Chicken Farm Hussein Kamal, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law and former head of the Military Industrial Commission, and the one responsible for all of Iraq's WMD programs, defected to Jordan in August 1995. Once there, Hussein Kamal declared his intention to help remove Saddam Hussein from power. His defection set off a "wave of panic inside Iraq." Qusay Hussein (Saddam's younger son) made a last ditch effort to severe ties between the hidden document archives and the Special Security Organization. "Rather than admit the role played by the SSO in hiding the documents," Qusay transported the documents to Hussein Kamal's chicken farm outside of Baghdad. Iraqi leaders then led Rolf Ekeus to the site in an effort to frame Hussein Kamal for the whole concealment. Once there, Ekeus was shown the "holy grail of weapons inspections since 1991." By submitting these documents to Ekeus, Iraq had surrendered the last "vestiges of its proscribed weapons programs." However, Iraq stubbornly refused to tell the whole truth about how it concealed those documents from UN inspectors for years. If Iraq had hidden such a large cache of documents in the past, how could the UN and the world trust that they weren't hiding more? Ritter and others needed to know how Iraq had concealed sensitive materials from the inspectors before sanctions were lifted and Iraq declared to be in compliance with UN resolutions. A Breach of Trust: CIA vs. UNSCOM, Round 2 Out of the blue, the CIA contacted Ritter with an offer. They wanted him to assist in the preparation of an inspection of Special Republican Guard facilities in Baghdad. The purpose: to "squeeze" any prohibited material out. But, the CIA never offers something for nothing. Unbeknownst to Ritter (or Ekeus) at the time, the CIA was taking advantage of their involvement with the plan to pursue a coup attempt on Saddam Hussein. Steve Richter, the CIA director of Near East Operations, briefed the White House on the coup plan, called "The Silver Bullet." The White House approved, mainly motivated by political reasons-it was a presidential election year. The coup was set for the third week of June in 1996. The problem? The planned coup was well known to the Iraqi government. The Iraqi intelligence agency had infiltrated the CIA and discovered the plot. However, the CIA tried to proceed, using the UNSCOM 150 inspection as cover for their own coup plan, which included at least 800 Iraqi plotters, all of whom were rounded up, tortured and killed after the coup was discovered. The Poison Pill: CIA vs. UNSCOM, Round 3 Soon after the botched coup, the CIA blew UNSCOM's cover in an "unacceptable breach of protocol and security." UNSCOM had, for some time, been operating a SIGINT operation in Iraq, intercepting transmissions of the Special Security Organization. Very few people knew about the dangerous operation, titled the Special Collection Element. The U.S. sent out a document to "every embassy and military headquarters the U.S.A. maintained" that completely exposed the covert operation, including details about the mission, "who the personnel involved were, by name, and what their nation of origin was." It "blew the cover to smithereens." Whether the transmission of such a sensitive document was done in error or on purpose, "the American transmission of the sensitive details of a covert intelligence operation was an incomprehensible act which only underscored the cavalier attitude the U.S. intelligence community had towards matters pertaining to the work of UNSCOM." A Breakthrough Ritter and UNSCOM became hopeful in late 1997, when an interview with the former Iraqi Special Republican Guard Commander, Kamal Mustafa, revealed for the first time that the Special Republican Guard had played an important role in past concealment activity. Ritter believed that this breakthrough "gave UNSCOM a solid foundation for bringing the concealment investigation to a close." However, the Iraqi leadership quickly realized that UNSCOM's final push to find out the truth about disarmament and concealment would "compromise the security of Saddam Hussein to an unacceptable level." Thus, the Iraqi government decided to stop cooperating with UN weapons inspectors. Test Inspection for War With UNSCOM inspections dead in the water, many in the Clinton Administration believed that Iraqi refusal to permit weapons inspectors served as a legitimate cause for military action. The American public, however, did not back a military response. The U.S. turned to UNSCOM to create a blatant excuse for a military attack on Iraq. Madeleine Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, proposed designing a "test" that the Iraqis would be "bound to fail, thus providing the administration with fresh justification for military action." Ritter built a trap from which he believed the Iraqis could not "extricate themselves." He established a plan that included inspections of highly sensitive sites. Ritter was the chief inspector for the inspection and was shocked in a meeting with Richard Butler, ostensibly a UN employee and Ritter's boss. Butler drew a chart on a whiteboard listing two timelines: one labeled "inspection" and the other "military action." He drew a circle on a date, and told Ritter, "We need to have a crisis with Iraq by this date so that the U.S. can complete its bombing campaign" by the upcoming Muslim holidays. Ritter was stunned. A UN official, Butler, was in "collusion" with the USA over military action that was not approved by the UN Security Council. However, Ritter knew that he was in a struggle to do the right thing and felt that he didn't have an option of backing out. Ritter's team, intended to be used as the tip of a spear, actually diffused the seemingly impossible situation. American aircraft carriers in the Gulf, as well as fighter-bombers deployed throughout the Middle East, were all at the ready for a military response to the anticipated failure of Iraq to permit the inspectors to enter a sensitive target, the Ministry of Defense building. Amazingly, Ritter and Amer Rashid, a high level Iraqi officer, worked out a plan to permit the inspection to take place after all. Rashid said, "We know America would lick your feet if you could only start a war. We are grateful you are here as an inspector, not as a representative of your government. You are an honest man, Mr. Scott. Iraq appreciates this, even though your own government does not." Ritter's inspection diplomacy with Amer Rashid destroyed America's plan for attacking Iraq. The backlash against Ritter and UNSCOM was immediate. Albright was furious and demanded that Ritter be removed as chief weapons inspector. Although Ritter wasn't formally reprimanded for the previous inspection, his viability and integrity as an inspector was dwindling. In a conversation with "the Counselor," a long-time intelligence professional at the CIA, Ritter asked what the Counselor thought of the U.S.'s position on UNSCOM inspections. He responded, "After your inspection of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, the White House got fed up with UNSCOM and inspections. They were not interested in real disarmament, just the illusion of disarmament. UNSCOM's job was to do only what was necessary to produce two reports to the UN Security Council a year which legitimize the continuation of economic sanctions." Ritter asked, "How do they expect us to accomplish our mission?" The Counselor replied, "They don't." Ritter resigned as a UN weapons inspector on August 26, 1998 after seven years of service. Today The Iraqis bear some of the blame for the failure of weapons inspections that ultimately was used as a reason to go to war in 2003. However, the real reason that the inspections failed was because the U.S. never intended for them to succeed. Whenever UNSCOM was close to a "breakthrough on Iraq's final status, the USA would withdraw its support." There was a willingness to compromise the integrity of UNSCOM, as well as to make UNSCOM's work all the more difficult by withdrawing U.S. intelligence support. "Disarmament was simply not the U.S.A.'s principle policy objective in Iraq after 1991. Regime change was." Ritter's experiences show that intelligence is often misused to support pre-conceived agendas and that such misuse undermines national interests. We can't really understand and fix where we are now, at this point in history, without a firm understanding of the mistakes and failures of the past. -------- missile defense US missile-defence test 'a success' From correspondents in Washington 15 dec 05 Australia Herald Sun http://www.heraldsun.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5478,17574703%255E1702,00.html THE US successfully tested a Boeing-managed missile defence system aimed at thwarting a limited, long-range ballistic missile attack, but did not use a live target, the Pentagon announced. A ground-based interceptor missile was launched from Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands against a simulated target, the Pentagon's Missile Defence Agency said late last night. The simulation was based on a hypothetical missile launch from Kodiak, Alaska, using data from previous launches, said the agency, known as MDA. In full-fledged interceptor tests of the so-called Ground-Based Midcourse Defence System, the system has successfully shot down five live targets in 10 tries. The last successful intercept took place in October 2002. The interceptor failed to launch in the two tests that preceded the latest one, in February 2005 and December 2004. The latest test in the Pacific was designed chiefly to evaluate the performance of the interceptor missile's rocket motor system and Raytheon Co-built "exoatmospheric kill vehicle", the bit designed to smash into the target warhead and pulverise it in space, MDA said. It also successfully tested, among other things, silo support equipment, the agency said. Last February, a ground support arm in the silo malfunctioned because of hinge corrosion caused by what MDA later said had been "salt air fog" that entered the underground silo. Boeing said in a statement that the interceptor will be flown against a live target in subsequent tests. The flight test yesterday validated the system's ability to track, acquire and provide the interceptor with the data for a "hit-to-kill" intercept, Chicago-based Boeing said. All told, the United States is spending roughly $US9 billion ($11.95 billion) a year to develop a layered missile shield, including components based at sea and in space. The shield is designed to knock out the type of ocean-leaping missile that could be tipped with a nuclear, chemical or germ warhead. Other big contractors in the project include Orbital Sciences Corp, which builds booster rockets, and Northrop Grumman Corp, which is developing battle management, fire-control and communications software. Lockheed Martin Corp builds the Aegis ballistic missile defence system at the heart of the shield's ship-based component. -------- security Allegation of dive-bombing over Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant - Jane Swanson, spokesperson San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace From: Eric Epstein Sent: Thursday, December 15, 2005 7:14 PM What follows is the complete communication that I sent to NRC Region IV at about 10:20 p.m. Dec. 14, following the NRC meeting held in San Luis Obispo. At that "town hall" meeting I read aloud the second and third paragraphs of the report in bold print, and asked if there was a no-fly zone over Diablo, as there is over Disneyland. The answer was that there is NOT a no-fly zone over Diablo. Because MFP has now submitted the report as an allegation, the NRC will investigate and respond to our questions and concerns. Feel free to contact me if you have further questions about this allegation or about MFP concerns about plant security. My contact information is included in the document that follows. I am more likely to be home in the mornings and 7 a.m. is not too early to call. December 15, 2005 TO: Harry A. Freeman Allegations Coordinator R4allege@nrc.gov U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV Texas Health Resources Tower 611 Ryan Plaza, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011-4005 FROM: Jane Swanson, San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace janeslo@slonet.org 475 Squire Canyon Road San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 Phone (805) 595-2605 RE: Allegation of low flying plane over Diablo Canyon plant In early December of 2005, the San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace (MFP) received a phone call from a person who reported a disturbing incident. This person said s/he was a passenger in a small plane with a friend as pilot. The pilot flew directly over the Diablo plant, "dive-bombing" within 500 feet of the dome. The person making the phone call (henceforth referred to as P, as in "plane") was feeling very guilty about being a part of such an irresponsible act, although P reported yelling at the pilot to fly away from rather than directly toward the plant. P was even more distressed that there was no response from plant security. P is seeking a means of reporting this incident for the purpose of forcing an improvement of plant security from attack by aircraft. The identity of P is not known to MFP. P contacts myself, Jane Swanson via phone, and I do not have caller ID. I have made no attempt to discover the identity of P, and in fact have told P that I do not want to know. The responsibility for revealing or not revealing P's identity belongs with P, as I can not advise him/her as to possible legal consequences should his/her identity become known. P has given to MFP the details of the incident in writing. P has requested that MFP transmit P's report to the NRC. Below in bold font please read P's narrative of the incident, followed by MFP comments and questions. Dec. 6, 2005 TO: San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace FROM: Unidentified source who contacted MFP by phone and followed up with this written report RE: Concerns about lack of security from aircraft at Diablo Canyon nuclear plant and radioactive waste storage facility I have lost many nights of sleep over the past six months after discovering the truth about the lack of security at the Diablo Canyon nuclear plant. The story I must now tell is true and very scary as plans to store additional nuclear waste on site is moving forward. My family lives close to this nuclear power plant and I must now speak out. In the middle of May, 2005 I was flying with a friend whom I will call Jim. Jim and I are both pilots, and we both enjoy extreme sports. We were flying off the coast some two or three miles from the plant when I informed Jim that we may be too close to the plant and should head further out to sea. Crazy as it may seem, on a dare we decided to test the air security of the plant, not knowing what to expect. From an altitude of 1,500 feet we began a high-speed aggressive dive at a 45 degree angle directly toward the power plant. At an altitude of only 500 feet we dive bombed directly over the top of the containment domes. We could have crashed our plane within seconds and within a few feet of any location at the plant. We got their attention as I could see people running around below us. I thought for sure that we were being shot at and that a chase plane or helicopter would come after us. We flew to an airport, tied down our airplane and went home. Nothing happened! Please make a note of this: NOTHING HAPPENED! Understand that the airplane we were flying is very unique and could have held up to 700 pounds of explosives! I need to understand why there is not any air security around this nuclear plant. Why is there not a jump jet, cobra helicopter or some other high- speed aircraft that would have met us halfway? How is it possible for us to dive bomb this nuclear facility without anything happening in these times of terrorist attacks? How can PG&E consider storing nuclear waste on site or even having an unprotected plant so close to our homes? This is a nightmare waiting to happen! I am very upset and want some answers, not excuses. People need to know the true nature of the lack of security at Diablo. I know the truth and it scares the hell out of me. I love the central coast and do not want my family and friends getting into our cars and driving away, never to return. Please wake up, people! Name withheld to avoid prisons? MFP comment: Jane Swanson and MFP fully recognize that MFP can not make any assertions as to the truth of this report. However, regardless of the report's veracity, it raises very serious questions about the safety of those of us living in the communities surrounding Diablo Canyon and its radioactive waste facilities. MFP questions of the NRC: 1. Was such an incident reported by PG&E to the NRC during the middle of May, 2005? If so, did they report to the NRC what PG&E's security force's response was to the plane? 2. If the incident is acknowledged, MFP would like to know if PG&E took measures to upgrade its security plan because of the incident and whether NRC has concurred with the revisions. 3. If PG&E did not report such an incident, MFP requests that NRC ask PG&E if such an event did occur. 4. Why is there not a no-fly zone over Diablo Canyon as there is over Disneyland? What instructions does the FAA or any other authority give to pilots, commercial or private, when flying in the vicinity of Diablo Canyon or other nuclear plants? -------- ukraine Ukraine rules out storing foreign nuclear waste at Chernobyl KIEV (AFP) Dec 15, 2005 http://www.spacewar.com/2005/051215163120.0j08ybo0.html Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko said Thursday that no foreign nuclear waste will be stored at the Chernobyl nuclear plant, the site of the world's worst civilian nuclear disaster. Stockpiles of foreign nuclear waste "will exist in no case" in Ukraine, the president's office said in a statement. Yushchenko apparently discarded the idea after he sparked a loud public outcry last week when he said the government was studying the possibility of storing foreign nuclear waste at Chernobyl, in the north of the country less than 150 kilometers (90 miles) from the capital Kiev. He said waste from Ukraine's four working nuclear power plants -- currently primarily exported to Russia -- could also be stored there. A 30-kilometer exclusion zone was established around the site soon after Chernobyl's number-four reactor, in what was then the Soviet Union and is now Ukraine, exploded on April 26, 1986, sending a radioactive cloud across Europe. The power station was completely shut down on December 15, 2000. -------- u.n. Nuclear Projects Opposed by Public, UN Poll Shows (Update2) (Bloomberg) Last Updated: December 15, 2005 06:12 EST http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10001099&sid=aaTq3EOeAFIs&refer=energy A majority of people oppose building new nuclear power plants, according to a poll commissioned by the United Nations nuclear agency. ``While majorities of citizens generally support the continued use of existing nuclear reactors, most people do not favor the building of new nuclear plants,'' the International Atomic Energy Agency report said. The report, issued late yesterday, was based on a poll of 18,000 people in 18 countries. The IAEA report adds to a debate among the nuclear industry, government and citizens. Germany plans to phase out nuclear power by 2021. In the U.S., the Energy Policy Act of 2005 offers incentives to build new plants. U.K. citizens may support more nuclear reactors as long as the government also expands renewable- power sources, a Deloitte & Touche LLP study showed on Dec. 2. ``If you want electricity, you have to build the facilities,'' said World Nuclear Association spokesman Ian Hore-Lacy in an interview from London. ``It's an uphill job.'' A third of the respondents to the UN survey want to use existing nuclear plants without building new ones. A quarter said nuclear power is dangerous and plants should be shut down. Less than three in 10 survey respondents want to build new reactors. The IAEA raised its forecast for nuclear power for a fourth year in April. The equivalent of 127 1,000-megawatt plants will be built by 2020, raising capacity to 427 gigawatts from 367 gigawatts today. U.S. Demand In the U.S., 40 percent of 1,004 people surveyed called nuclear power ``safe'' and wanted to build more plants compared with 20 percent who called reactors ``dangerous.'' Almost half the 1,002 Germans polled want nuclear power phased out as existing reactors come to the end of their lifespan. Twenty- six percent want to ``close all plants.'' Thirty-seven percent of the 1,011 U.K. citizens polled said existing nuclear plants should be operated but no more should be built. A third of British respondents want to build more plants. South Korea is the country where the nuclear industry has the most support, with 52 percent of the population favoring new reactor projects. The country, which already produces 38 percent of its electricity with nuclear energy, is planning to build 12 new reactors by within 10 years, said Paris-based Nuclear Energy Agency spokeswoman Karen Daifuku in a telephone interview. Moroccans showed the most aversion to nuclear energy, with 49 percent of respondents calling it ``dangerous'' and disinclined to open plants. ``There's a lot of caution that people use when forming an opinion about a technology they might not be totally familiar with,'' Daifuku said. ``The results reflect human nature.'' Asia is driving demand for nuclear power. China plans to boost electricity derived from nuclear power to 40 gigawatts in 2020 from 6.5 gigawatts today. India is building nine reactors and will increase capacity to 20 gigawatts from 2.7 gigawatts by 2012. A gigawatt is equivalent to 1 billion watts of electricity. The Vienna-based IAEA hired GlobeScan to do the polling for the report. The Toronto-based GlobeScan conducted around 1,000 phone and face-to-face interviews in: Argentina, Australia, Cameroon, Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, the U.K. and U.S. To contact the reporter on this story: Jonathan Tirone in Vienna at jtirone@bloomberg.net -------- u.s. nuc weapons Does the U.S. need new nuclear weapons? December 15, 2005 at 1:22 am | Wall Street Journal Philistine Review http://philistinereview.wordpress.com/2005/12/15/does-the-us-need-new-nuclear-weapons/ In domestic politics, global politics, in this world of too many weapons and minds of mass destruction, this question is as asking for more heat in hell... U.S. Weighs Whether to Build Some New Nuclear Warheads Idea Is to Replace Aging Ones With More Reliable Type; Critics Dispute the Need Big Concern: Foreign Reaction By CARLA ANNE ROBBINS Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1540260/posts LOS ALAMOS, N.M. - On this remote mesa where the atom bomb was born, a fresh question is in the air: Does the U.S. need new nuclear weapons? Some 15 years after the Cold War, and at a time when the U.S. is demanding others restrain their nuclear ambitions, the Bush administration thinks the answer is yes. With little notice, it has been pressing Congress to fund research into a new generation of nuclear weapons. Lawmakers have twice turned down proposals to design a new nuclear "bunker-buster" bomb, to blow up buried caches of weapons. But last month, with little debate, Congress approved $25 million for research into what is supposed to be a sturdier, more reliable warhead than those designed during the Cold War. If the work is successful, the U.S. could someday spend billions of dollars replacing much of the current arsenal. The U.S. hasn't designed or built a new nuclear warhead since the late 1980s. It hasn't tested one since 1992. U.S. officials say the aging arsenal is becoming increasingly difficult and costly to maintain, and was designed to deter a foe far different from those the U.S. now faces. "You would not create the current stockpile if you were starting now," says Linton Brooks, head of the Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration, which maintains the arsenal. President Bush has committed to deep cuts in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The overall stockpile numbers are classified. But by 2012 the cuts would leave the U.S. with about 2,200 nuclear warheads deployed on long-range launchers, along with some 700 short-range weapons. In addition, the Pentagon is expected to keep some 3,000 backup warheads, as a hedge against technical failures or a resurgent Russia. Mr. Brooks says with a more dependable warhead, along with a revival of the weapons-production complex, the U.S. should be able to make "significant" cuts in the hedge. Critics say any international perception that the U.S. is strengthening its nuclear capability with new warheads could severely undercut its credibility at a time when it is pressing North Korea and Iran to curb nuclear appetites. "You cannot tell people that nuclear weapons are bad for you but we are modernizing ours," says Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Some also question the technical rationale. Currently, the U.S. spends billions of dollars each year to monitor its stockpile and extend the weapons' life. Critics say some minor changes in this maintenance effort could buy even more time. Some also say any plan to build new warheads without testing them - which is the administration's declared goal - could leave more doubt, not less, about the arsenal's reliability. "We'll have to see how much of a change they're proposing, but it's hard to understand how a redesigned warhead that's never been tested would give you higher confidence than warheads which have been tested more than a thousand times," says Sidney Drell, a Stanford University physicist and member of the Jasons, a scientific group that advises the government on weapons issues. Scientists at Los Alamos are engaged in their own vigorous debate. Joe Martz, a chemical engineer, heads a small team working on a preliminary design for a more-reliable warhead. He says new technology should permit crafting one that is easier to build, cheaper to maintain and safer to store, and that wouldn't need testing. At the same time, he fiercely opposes the Pentagon's proposed nuclear bunker-buster, saying any change that might make it more tempting to use nuclear arms would be "destabilizing." When the Defense Department chose this spot in late 1942 as the site for its secret atom-bomb program, there was little here but farms and the Los Alamos Ranch School, built to toughen up sickly East Coast boys. The military put up a barbed-wire fence around the newly created town, then an interior fence around the lab itself, to keep the work secret even from scientists' families. Reminders of that history are never far away. Los Alamos, now a town of 18,000, has an Oppenheimer Drive (after J. Robert Oppenheimer, head of the Manhattan Project), a Trinity Drive (after the desert site of the first test) and two atomic-bomb museums. Inside the lab's security fences today, scientists are focused on more recent history and what they fear is a steady erosion of skills. "The really scary thing is that there are only two designers [of warheads' plutonium triggers] left at the laboratory who have underground-test experience," says James Peery, one of the weapons program's directors. The U.S. got out of the business of making nuclear weapons almost by inadvertence. By the late 1980s, the Cold War was winding down and the once-sacrosanct weapons complex began to face public scrutiny. Under pressure from Congress and environmental groups, the Energy Department admitted in 1988 to causing radioactive and toxic pollution at installations in a dozen states. The next year, federal agents, looking into allegations of illegal dumping and falsified records, raided and closed Colorado's Rocky Flats plant, which produced all of the arsenal's plutonium triggers. Then the first President Bush, amid his unsuccessful 1992 re-election campaign, reluctantly agreed to a congressionally mandated moratorium on testing. A reprieve of sorts came in the mid-1990s. The Clinton administration, committed to a test-ban treaty that the Senate never did ratify, agreed to spend billions at the labs for technology to ensure the nuclear stockpile's continued reliability without test explosions. Even after more than 1,000 test blasts, scientists had a limited understanding of what happens inside a nuclear warhead in the few billionths of a second as it explodes. They had still less experience with the effects of aging on warheads that once were replaced every 15 or 20 years. Today, in a program known as stockpile stewardship, the U.S. uses elaborate machines to try to determine how well its aging nuclear arms would work if the U.S. ever needed to detonate one. A 220-foot-long electron accelerator, housed inside a thick concrete blockhouse here, produces some of the world's most powerful X-rays to photograph the inside of a mock nuclear warhead as it's subjected to the searing heat and pressure of a conventional explosion. Supercomputers then extrapolate the resulting data to gauge how the components would hold up under the far greater extremes generated by a nuclear chain reaction. On a recent morning, scientists provided a taste of what their mix of real and virtual testing can do. They used computers to simulate the stress on foam used to hold a nuclear warhead together for the few microseconds needed to ensure that its series of explosions goes off. Inside a small room called the Cave, engineers projected a greatly magnified three-dimensional model of the foam's cellular structure as it was compressed by a virtual nuclear explosion. Projected on the floor, ceiling and three walls, the yellow foam's branches, looking like undersea coral, sprouted dots of red as the foam began to break down under the pressure. The engineers then replayed this slowed-down virtual explosion, rotating the foam and the blast direction to get a view from all sides. The process enables them to see whether the foam holds up without setting off a warhead to find out. The stewardship program has given the labs enough confidence that it plans to begin replacing certain aging components of a 30-year-old warhead called the W-76, the most numerous one in the arsenal. The plan is to extend its life another 30 years. Still, the Bush administration came to office questioning how long this arsenal could be maintained without new testing, and determined to revive the weapons production complex and begin developing new warheads. A 2001 review identified a new set of potential adversaries, including Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria and China. It called for a broader array of nuclear capabilities, including weapons that could go after hardened, deeply buried targets, and less-powerful warheads to reduce "collateral damage." Officials saw the huge warheads that deterred the Soviets as much less credible against today's far weaker adversaries. Leaders of nations such as North Korea or Iran, they argued, would be unlikely to believe a U.S. president would order even a retaliatory strike with arms that might kill hundreds of thousands. Hobson's Choice Early proposals from the administration to study new nuclear weapons met little congressional resistance. But in 2004 it ran into an unexpected foe: an Ohio Republican congressman named David Hobson, head of the House subcommittee that funds nuclear-weapons programs. He was critical of what he saw as poor security and management problems at the labs. But more than anything, he opposed a new nuclear bunker-buster. "We can't tell other countries don't build any nuclear weapons, but we're so superior that we'd like a new weapon of our own," he says. Mr. Hobson has stared down both the administration and the nuclear labs' top congressional patron, Senate Energy Committee Chairman Pete Domenici of New Mexico, blocking funding for design of a bunker-buster that would put a harder case around an existing warhead. At the same time, Mr. Hobson has become the leading proponent of building a new, sturdier replacement warhead, an idea pitched to him by Los Alamos scientists. He says it makes technical sense and would also help head off pressure to build new designs such as the bunker-buster. The reliable warhead "only replaces what we have - there's no new mission," so it should be easier to explain internationally, he says. When the administration sought money last year to study weapons that would have new missions, he redirected the funds to what his staff dubbed the Reliable Replacement Warhead. By spring of 2005, the administration's Mr. Brooks also had become a champion of the replacement warhead. He spoke of designing a new stockpile that was more reliable, less expensive, more environmentally sound and ultimately smaller. He also made clear, in congressional testimony, that the administration set its sights beyond that. The reliable-warhead program, he said, would help create a flexible nuclear infrastructure able "to provide new or different military capabilities" if needed. And he pressed for funding to begin planning for a new plutonium-trigger plant, replacing Rocky Flats. This year, when the administration asked for $9.4 million to study the reliable warhead, Congress, at Mr. Hobson's urging, appropriated nearly three times that. Exactly how new this warhead would be isn't yet clear. Teams at Los Alamos and at California's Lawrence Livermore Lab now are working on competitive designs. They've been told to design a warhead that has the explosive power of the W-76, but inside the larger body of a more powerful warhead, the W-88. The end of the Cold War makes this possible, says Los Alamos's Mr. Martz. When the U.S. was packing 10 warheads on a single missile to confront the Soviet Union, the labs were told to design the most powerful warheads they could with the least size and weight. So they took risks, such as using the smallest possible amount of plutonium that would ignite a full thermonuclear explosion. Not having to make a warhead so light gives designers more options. For instance, instead of surrounding the plutonium "pit" with beryllium, which is light but toxic and creates cleanup issues, they can use a heavier metal such as titanium or even stainless steel. They also can put in more-effective trigger locks, to make it harder for a terrorist who stole a warhead to set it off. Mr. Martz says the freedom to make a heavier warhead could also include a heftier plutonium pit, to ensure the full explosion ignites. As a result, he believes - though he won't guarantee - that all these changes wouldn't require testing. He says he also can't guarantee there will never be a need to test older warheads to confirm their reliability. Quiet Preparations Outside Las Vegas, the government's Nevada underground test site is quietly preparing for such possibilities. The test site has stayed alive by doing its own share of virtual testing. Almost 1,000 feet below the desert floor, inside a maze of well-lit tunnels, engineers do "subcritical" experiments: compressing aging plutonium samples nearly to the point of a chain reaction to see how they perform. Since the Clinton administration, the site has been kept three years short of readiness to conduct new tests. The Bush administration won funding to shorten that to two years. Early next year engineers will lower a new plutonium trigger, made experimentally at Los Alamos, into a 600-foot hole, drilled in the 1970s. They'll then implode it, short of a nuclear explosion. The experiment will give crane operators their first practice in over a decade in lowering a test canister. Other technicians will get experience in feeding in diagnostic cables. Such simulations lead some to wonder if this administration or a future one might use the reliable-warhead program as an excuse to resume testing or - something now forbidden by law - as an opening to build new military capabilities. "I don't trust this group....We have to be on guard," Rep. Hobson says. Raffi Papazian, Los Alamos's lead engineer at the site, says he and his colleagues are aware the actions might be misread. "We've worked with the State Department" to explain to embassies there's no plan to violate the test moratorium, he says. Comments from Arms Control Wonk WSJ On Reliable Replacement Warhead posted by jeffrey under nuclear-weapons Carla Anne Robbins, writing in the Wall Street Journal (subscription required) has a long article summarizing the Reliable Replacement Warhead program (A blog has posted the full text of Robbins' article). Unfortunately, the article suffers from the shallow "he said, she said" style of journalism that simply presents unsupported assertions in matched pairs (The RRW is awesome! Critics doubt awesomeness.) Bob Peurifoy sent a note to Ms. Robbins, asking a series of uncomfortable questions about some of these unsupported assertions. I reprint it here: December 16, 2005 Carla Anne Robbins: I read with interest your front-page article on nuclear warheads in the December 14, 2005, issue of the Wall Street Journal. I believe that this nation must maintain a credible nuclear weapon system deterrent as a component of national security. I assert that national security policies and strategies, rather than NNSA/Lab self-interests, should direct the future maintenance of the nuclear weapon program. I suggest that your article lacks balance and that you have been misled. I cite examples: Example 1 I find in your article phrases such as "...sturdier, more reliable warheadŠ" "...more-reliable warhead" "...a more dependable warheadŠ" "...building a new, sturdier replacement warhead" "...The reliable warheadŠ" "...the Reliable Replacement Warhead" "...a new stockpile that was more reliable" "The reliable-warhead programŠ" "...hedge against technical failuresŠ" My response to the above phrases: The antonym for reliable is unreliable. Are the warheads now in the stockpile unreliable? Have the design labs misled the country? What does sturdier mean? Are the warheads now in the stockpile frail, e.g., don't meet military requirements? How can warheads of the same type, built at the same time, offer a hedge against technical failures? How will these technical failures be found? Example 2 I find in your article phrases such as: "...the aging arsenal is becoming increasingly difficult and costly to maintain." "...the U.S. spends billions of dollars each year to monitor its stockpile and extend the weapons' life." "...new technology should permit crafting one that is easier to build, cheaper to maintain and safer to storeŠ" :...still less experience with the effects of aging on warheadsŠ" "...to begin replacing certain aging components of a 30-year-old warhead called the W-76ŠThe plan is to extend its life another 30 years. My response to the above phrases: Why is the aging arsenal becoming "increasingly difficult and costly to maintain"? The only scheduled maintenance involves the periodic replacement of components containing tritium. Will the new warheads not use tritium? Occasional non-scheduled repair or replacement of hardware found defective by surveillance activities has been necessary. If finding such defects is important, why is the stockpile surveillance program being scaled back? I do not believe the U.S. spends billions of dollars each year to monitor its stockpile. [Ed. note: Peurifoy is correct. In FY 2005, the US spent $1.3 billion on Directed Stockpile Work including $ 278 M for routine maintenance and surveillance, as well as $363 M on "service life-extension programs". The remaining $806 M was appropriated for warhead retirement and research and development programs such as the RRW.] What surveillance data justifies spending billions to extend a weapon type's life? What is their expected life? No weapon type has ever been retired because it died. Tell me about this new technology. "Easier to build"? Perhaps at the margin. "Cheaper to maintain"? Please explain. "Safer to store"? What does this mean? What aging effects have been found? The general character of the independent surveillance program was established in the late 1950s when sealed pit/thermal battery-powered warheads first entered the stockpile. Improvements to the program have been made as deemed desirable. Perhaps 15,000 weapons have been examined. Concerns about aging seem to focus on plutonium pits, now said by NNSA and the labs to be okay for 60 years. What components in the W-76 are suffering unacceptable aging that will void their value before 2040? Why can't components be remanufactured to original specifications? Example 3 I find in your article two statements: "...was designed to deter a foe far different from those the U.S. now faces. 'You would not create the current stockpile if you were starting now'"; and "A 2001 review identified a new set of potential adversaries, including Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria and China. It called for a broader array of nuclear capabilities, including weapons that could go after hardened, deeply buried targets, and less-powerful warheads to reduce 'collateral damage.'" My response to the above two statements: Is it realistic to believe that the U.S. needs different weapon designs in order to atom-bomb such adversaries? What would the new stockpile consist of? What is a "broader array of nuclear capabilities"? The active stockpile now contains warheads with available yields ranging from subkilotons to megatons. They can be delivered by aircraft, ICBMs and SLBMs. Careful design and manufacturing have provided good reliability, as attested to by the surveillance program. They all meet DOD safety requirements. Regarding weapons that could go after hardened, deeply buried targets, see Effects of Nuclear Earth-Penetrator and Other Weapons, by a committee chaired by Dr. John Ahearne and sponsored by the National Research Council of the National Academies. Example 4 I find in your article this statement: "They've been told to design a warhead that has the explosive power of the W-76, but inside the larger body of a more powerful warhead, the W-88." My response: What does this mean? If you want a warhead that has the explosive power of the W-76, then use the W-76. If the 'larger body' means the Navy MK5 reentry body and you wish to use the W-88 at a lower yield, detune the warhead. Keep in mind that the major costs of such a modification fall on the Navy. Example 5 I find in your article a paragraph which I paraphrase: Los Alamos's lead engineer at the [Nevada Test] site, says, "We've worked with the State Department" to explain to embassies there's no plan to violate the test moratorium. My response: I am overjoyed to learn that Los Alamos engineers at the Nevada Test Site have promised the State Department that Los Alamos has no plan to violate the CTBT. ....................... By separate e-mail I am sending you attachments to a paper I prepared dealing with the possible use of uranium 235 pits rather than plutonium pits in some of our primaries. My objective is to eliminate the need for a costly modern pit facility. Also, I'm sending you a critique I wrote and distributed in response to the draft SEAB Report concerning the nuclear weapon complex of the future. Bob Peurifoy I've also posted the attachments to Peurifoy's paper on the possible use of Uranium 235 pits in the URRW. Keep in mind that Peurifoy's first preference is to keep the current arsenal and that his goal is to start a much-needed discussion, not provide the last word. Peurifoy notes some previous tests of U-235 pits and amends his previous suggestion, by concluding that the diameter of plutonium pits would be preferable for certain naval systems. Pu pit production for these warheads could be handled at Plutonium Facility 4 (PF4) at Los Alamos Technical Area 55-eliminating the need for a Modern Pit Facility. Comments 1. John Field says: This uranium RRW is really my favorite topic. I wish there were an open source collaboration I could join to compete against the LANL and LLNL teams. Sort of like Space/X or something. I need a blog. My concern[/complaint] has always been that the uranium primaries are going to be heavier and therefore less efficient at a given yield which would lead to problems in the radiative efficiency. From Bob's attachments, I see that Stokes test was 19 kt in 317 lbs in an all oralloy pit. OK, I guess that's good enough. Franklin prime seems a little thin at 5 kt in 300 lbs though. Everything kind of stops working when you get down to less than about [roughly speaking] 40 tons TNT yield per pound of primary weight. This is about the point where there is as much energy in photons as in hot gas. Below this point, the reductions almost all come out of the photons and radiative efficiency falls like a missile out of the sky. I've always figured that the US fancy primaries today are probably in the range of several tens of kt and maybe 200-300 lbs so therefore north of this threshold. At least that's what the rumors seem to be. 1. Greg Mello says: Thank you for the Wall Street Journal/blog link regarding the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) and the excellent comments by Bob Peurifoy. Having spent a lot of time studying pit production at LANL, I think your statement, "Pu pit production for these warheads could be handled at Plutonium Facility 4 (PF4) at Los Alamos Technical Area 55-eliminating the need for a Modern Pit Facility" is incorrect. As time goes by I am learning more about why this idea won't work; one snapshot of the problems was included in a 2004 article: [Greg Mello, "U.S. Nuclear Warhead Research and Production With No Real Debate, Diminishing Prospects for Control, _INESAP Bulletin_ 23]. I know that Frank von Hippel and Steve Fetter have judged otherwise, but their paper basically just counts pits in an very idealized fashion as physicists will do, without taking into account the very real institutional, production engineering, cultural, and political problems involved. [see: Steve Fetter and Frank von Hippel, "Does the United States Need a New Plutonium-Pit Facility?" Arms Control Today May 2004.] Their cost estimates are ludicrously low as well as I recall, and have been left behind by subsequent events (i.e. current cost estimates for the Chemistiry and Metallurgy Replacement facility, or CMRR, essential to the project). LANL has more severe seismic problems than decisionmakers have fully absorbed as well; LANL's seismic team has found stratigraphic records of 3 events of magnitude "~ 7" in the Holocene on the fault that comprises the western boundary of the lab. As you know, the LANL facility has been judged by the SEAB Task Force on complex infrastructure to be running at "5%" efficiency; this is just a symptom of many underlying problems which have no easy solutions that are also SAFE solutions from an engineering perspective. For example, there is a deep disagreement between the DNFSB and NNSA over the safety systems for PF-4 and the proposed adjacent CMRR as well. As PF-4 ages further it is getting more expensive; by the time it is supposed to be up and running as a production facility it will be about as old as Rocky Flats was when it closed. Best, Greg Mello ---- Nuclear Deployment for an Attack on Iran And the nuclear hitmen behind it by Jorge Hirsch, December 16, 2005 Antiwar.com http://www.antiwar.com/orig/hirsch.php?articleid=8263 Are U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in the Persian Gulf, on hair-trigger alert, and ready to be launched against Iran at a moment's notice? The answer is contained in presidential directive NSPD 35, "Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization," issued May 2004, which is classified. Nevertheless, we can infer the answer from the fact that every other element needed for a nuclear strike on Iran is now "deployed" and ready, namely: * The nuclear hitmen: Stephen Hadley, Stephen Cambone, Robert Joseph, William Schneider Jr., J.D. Crouch II, Linton Brooks, and John Bolton are nuclear-weapons enthusiasts who advocate aggressive policies and occupy key positions in the top echelons of the Bush administration. * A nuclear doctrine that advocates nuclear strikes against non-nuclear countries that precisely fit the Iran profile: the "Nuclear Posture Review" and the "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations." * The doctrine of preemptive attack adopted by the Bush administration and already put into practice in Iraq, and the "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction" (NSPD 17), which promises to respond to a WMD threat with nuclear weapons. * 150,000 American soldiers in Iraq, whose lives are at risk if a military confrontation with Iran erupts, and who thus provide the administration with a strong argument for the use of nuclear weapons to defend them. * Americans' heightened state of fear of terrorist attacks and their apparent willingness to support any course of action that could potentially protect them from real or imagined terrorist threats. * The allegations of involvement of Iran in terrorist activities around the world [1], [2], including acts against America [1], [2], and its alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction. * The determination of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission that Iran has connections with al-Qaeda. * Senate Joint Resolution 23, "Authorization for Use of Military Force," which allows the president "to take action to deter and prevent acts of terrorism against the United States" without consulting Congress, and the War Powers Resolution [.pdf], which "allows" the president to attack anybody in the "global war on terror." * The Bush administration's willingness to use military power based on unconfirmed intelligence and defectors' fairy tales. * The fact that Iran has been declared in noncompliance [.pdf] with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which makes it "legal" for the U.S. to use nuclear weapons against Iran. * The course of action followed by the Bush administration with respect to Iran's drive for nuclear technology, which can only lead to a diplomatic impasse. * The Israel factor [1], [2] . I have discussed many of these elements in previous columns. Here I will focus on the people, the doctrine, and the weapons. Nuclear Hitmen The decision to employ nuclear weapons at any level in a military conflict rests with the president. Neither Congress nor state governments nor you nor I have to be consulted. According to Robert McNamara (U.S. secretary of defense during the Cuban missile crisis), to launch a nuclear attack requires "20 minutes' deliberation by the president and his advisers." In preparation for the nuclear strike on Iran, the Bush administration in its second term has deployed into key positions hardliners that have both expertise in nuclear weapons and a known history of advocating the aggressive use thereof. Thus the president can say, "I feel like I'm getting really good advice from very capable people" to justify nuking Iran. National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley Hadley is one of the coauthors of the document "Rationale and Requirements for U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms Control" [.pdf], which served as a blueprint for the " Nuclear Posture Review" of 2001. In a 1997 paper, "Policy Considerations in Using Nuclear Weapons," Hadley applauded the "many men and women" who "have devoted their professional lives" to nuclear weapons as having made "a significant contribution to our nation." Further, "It is often an unstated premise in the current debate that if nuclear weapons are needed at all, they are needed only to deter the nuclear weapons of others. I am not sure this unstated premise is true ... this is not why we got into the nuclear business." He was one of the leading proponents of the claim that Iraq had a nuclear weapons program, and he was profiled in a 2004 Los Angeles Times article as "A Hawk in Bush's Inner Circle Who Flies Under the Radar." Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone Cambone is Rumsfeld's right-hand man, another coauthor of "Rationale and Requirements," and a longtime promoter of missile-defense systems. If there is any doubt as to whether he will promote the policies advocated in that document, let's hear his own words: "Any policymaker has certain views. Policymakers are where they are and doing what they do because they have a view." (New York Times, April 11, 2003) Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs Robert Joseph Joseph has the position formerly held by John Bolton and is another coauthor of "Rationale and Requirements." He also helped draft the document "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction" (NSPD-17), which advocates the use of nuclear weapons in response to WMD and names Iran as one of the countries that are the focus of the new U.S. strategy. He is a member of the National Institute for Public Policy, which says on its Web page that Joseph is a leading promoter of counterproliferation policy ("formulation and implementation of national security strategies to counter proliferation threats") and "criminalizing proliferation activities." He was the National Security Council member supervising the portion of the 2003 State of the Union speech dealing with intelligence about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. According to Right Web, Joseph "advocates the offensive use of nuclear weapons" and advocates placing "preemptive attacks and weapons of mass destruction at the center of U.S. national security strategy." In a recent interview, Joseph "dismissed Iran's contention it seeks only civilian nuclear power," said that "Iran is closing in on production of nuclear weapons and even UN sanctions may not deter the aggressive government in Tehran," and averred that "once they begin to enrich, that is the point of no return," echoing similar statements by Israeli officials. National Nuclear Security Administration Director Linton Brooks Brooks oversees the country's nuclear weapons infrastructure and is another coauthor of "Rationale and Requirements." He also served on the Pentagon's Deterrence Concepts Advisory Panel, which was charged with overseeing the production of the Nuclear Posture Review policy document. In explaining the Nuclear Posture Review to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2004, Brooks stated [.pdf]: "The Nuclear Posture Review represented a radical departure from the past and the most fundamental rethinking of the roles and purposes of nuclear weapons in almost a quarter-century. ... Instead of treating nuclear weapons in isolation, it considered them as an integrated component of American military power. ... Instead of treating the future as static and predictable, it recognized that requirements could change and that U.S. nuclear forces must be prepared to respond to those changes, including by increasing the fraction of the force that is deployed. ... The Nuclear Posture Review broadens our thinking to encompass a New Triad of flexible response capabilities consisting of non-nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities." In that address, he also advocated research on the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator initiative to "hold at risk hardened, deeply buried facilities that may be important to a future adversary," and repealing the prohibition on low-yield nuclear weapons to allow research in "advanced concepts" of more usable nuclear weapons. He stated, "We need to make sure our weapons will in fact be seen by other countries as a deterrent. One element of that is usability. If nobody believes there is any circumstance where you will use the weapon, it is not a deterrent." Chairman of the Pentagon's Defense Science Board William Schneider Jr. Schneider is another coauthor of "Rationale and Requirements." He was a staff member at the Hudson Institute between 1967 and 1971, where "he contributed to studies on strategic forces, Soviet affairs, theater nuclear force operations, and arms control." In his own words, "The leakage of nuclear weapons-design technology over time has become a flood in recent years," and "Both Iran and Iraq sought to develop their own military ballistic and cruise missiles as well as weapons of mass destruction. In conjunction with offshore procurements of conventional defense products, they produced formidable military establishments posing an overwhelming threat to U.S. allies." Deputy National Security Advisor J.D. Crouch II Crouch served as assistant secretary of defense from 2001 to 2003, and was the "principal advisor to the secretary of defense on the formulation and coordination of policy ... for nuclear forces, missile defense, technology security policy, counterproliferation, and arms control." In a briefing he gave on the Nuclear Posture Review in 2002, he stated, "Now, we are trying to look at a number of initiatives. One would be to modify an existing weapon, to give it greater capability against deep and hardly - or hard targets and deeply-buried targets." He is characterized as a "nuclear weapons enthusiast." Conclusion? None of these people, when asked for advice, is likely to advise against the use of nuclear weapons for reasons that you or I would find eminently reasonable [1], [2], [3], [4], [5]. Finally, there is the infamous John Bolton. While undersecretary of state, he warned that "efforts to attain nuclear weapons pose a direct and undeniable threat to the United States and its friends and allies around the world. Whether the nuclear capabilities of states like Iran, North Korea and others are threats today, or threats tomorrow, there can be no dispute that our attention is required now before the threats become reality, and tens of thousands of innocent civilians, or more, have been vaporized." Concerning Iran specifically, he stated that "Iran has a covert program to develop and stockpile chemical weapons," that "Tehran probably maintains an offensive BW program," and in this connection that the "risks to international peace and security from such programs are too great to wait for irrefutable proof of illicit activity." Concerning missiles, he said, "Iran continues its extensive efforts to develop the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction," and just like his successor, he stated categorically that "Iran has a clandestine program to produce nuclear weapons." Today, John Bolton is "deployed" as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, where he will be most effective (simply cutting and pasting from his old speeches) explaining to the world why a nuclear strike on Iran was necessary. Note that there is no obvious reason why the national security advisor, the deputy national security advisor, the undersecretary of defense for intelligence, the chairman of the Pentagon's Defense Science Board, and the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations have to be people with experience in nuclear weapons policy. This was not the case in other administrations. That it is the case in this administration is highly unlikely to be a coincidence. Instead, it gives a strong indication that it was envisioned in advance that the use of nuclear weapons would be a central theme of the second term of the Bush administration. Doctrine Deployment The Bush administration has been busy in recent years "deploying" the doctrine that will underpin the upcoming nuclear strike against Iran. Some of this deployment occurred through presidential speeches, some through unclassified policy documents, and some through classified documents, parts of which were "leaked." It has been a well-orchestrated process with a clear purpose: that the more alert sectors of the public and policymakers, and in particular the arms control community, become fully aware of it, so that when nuclear weapons are used it does not come as a total surprise. At the same time, the mainstream media have provided little coverage on the radical change in the nuclear weapons doctrine (a few articles in the New York Times and Washington Post), so the issue has remained largely invisible to the general public. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America of September 2002 codifies the doctrine of preemptive attacks, with phrases such as "We cannot let our enemies strike first..." "We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries..." "[E]ven if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack..." "[T]he United States cannot remain idle while danger gathers..." This doctrine was used with Iraq and will be used next with Iran. The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction states, "The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force - including potentially nuclear weapons - to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies." The Nuclear Posture Review delivered to Congress in 2001 is classified, but portions have been made public. It substantially broadens the role of nuclear weapons from their traditional role as deterrents against nuclear countries to encompass non-nuclear "rogue" nations. It states that "U.S. nuclear forces will now be used to dissuade adversaries from undertaking military programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of allies and friends," and that "Nuclear weapons could be employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack." The Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations [.pdf] is the Pentagon's implementation of the new nuclear posture. According to Hans Kristensen's analysis, "Foremost among the doctrine's new features [is] the incorporation of preemption into U.S. nuclear doctrine...." It lists a variety of new conditions under which nuclear weapons will be used, including, "For rapid and favorable war termination on U.S. terms," "To demonstrate U.S. intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter adversary use of WMD," and against "An adversary using or intending to use WMD against U.S., multinational, or alliance forces or civilian populations." The " Rationale and Requirements for U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms Control" [.pdf] was produced by the National Institute for Public Policy and served as a basis for the Nuclear Posture Review. Furthermore, five of its authors are in key positions in the administration today as discussed above, and as a consequence, the contents of this document are likely to reflect also the views of these policymakers and forecast the future actions of the administration. Statements in this document include: * "[A] counterforce strategy will entail more targets, including many that are harder to find and are better protected..." * "[A] larger number of weapons, weapons with varied characteristics and greater accuracy, will be needed for a counterforce strategy..." * "Hardened targets built underground and deeply buried facilities are the most difficult to destroy and will influence the required number and characteristics of nuclear weapons..." * "Examples of hardened and buried targets include missile silos, launch control centers, concrete aircraft shelters, deeply buried command posts, tunnels for missile storage and assembly, storage bunkers, and underground facilities for weapons research and production..." * "For example, although conventional weapons could be used to attack the entrances, exits, or 'umbilicals' - electrical power, air supply, and communications links - of a deeply buried facility, one or more nuclear weapons might be required to destroy the facility itself..." * "To ensure that enemy facilities or forces are knocked out and cannot be reconstituted, attacks with nuclear weapons may be necessary. Indeed, in the future the United States may need to field simple, low-yield, precision-guided nuclear weapons for possible use against select hardened targets such as underground biological weapons facilities." In summary, the doctrines proclaimed by the administration envision preemptive nuclear attacks on enemy facilities suspected of harboring WMD and other "assets most valued" by the enemy. Tactical Nuclear Weapons Deployment It is generally believed that the U.S. has tactical nuclear weapons deployed only in Western Europe, remnants of the Cold War. According to Hans Kristensen of the Nuclear Information Project: "The 480 bombs deployed in Europe represent more than 80 percent of all the active B61 tactical bombs in the U.S. stockpile. No other U.S. nuclear weapons are forward-deployed (other than warheads on ballistic missile submarines)." [.pdf] According to Kristensen, the Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization Presidential Directive (NSPD 35) merely "authorizes the military to continue deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe." However, Kristensen himself states that the new Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations calls "for maintaining an aggressive nuclear posture with weapons on high alert to strike adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), preemptively if necessary." The reasons listed above make it essentially certain that NSPD 35 authorizes deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in the Persian Gulf, and it is likely that such deployment has already occurred and that the weapons are there for the specific purpose of targeting Iran. The U.S. had tactical nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea for many years to defend against a massive conventional North Korean attack. It is easy to argue that an invasion of southern Iraq by a 9-million strong Iranian Basij militia reacting to Israel's bombing of Iran's nuclear facilities cannot be stopped without nuclear weapons. The following statements in the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations [.pdf] suggest that tactical nuclear weapons have been already deployed and are ready to be used, given that "all options are on the table" with respect to Iran and that many of Iran's facilities are underground: * "Integrating conventional and nuclear attacks will ensure the most efficient use of force and provide U.S. leaders with a broader range of strike options to address immediate contingencies. Integration of conventional and nuclear forces is therefore crucial to the success of any comprehensive strategy. This integration will ensure optimal targeting, minimal collateral damage, and reduce the probability of escalation." * "Combatant commanders may consider the following target selection factors to determine how to defeat individual targets. ... 1. Time sensitivity. 2. Hardness (ability to withstand conventional strikes). 3. Size of target. 4. Surrounding geology and depth (for underground targets). 5. Required level of damage." * "Nuclear weapons and associated systems may be deployed into theaters, but combatant commanders have no authority to employ them until that authority is specifically granted by the president." * "Deployed nuclear-strike capabilities include ... theater-based, nuclear-capable dual-role aircraft." * "Nuclear-capable aircraft offer a greater degree of flexibility in escalation control because they may be a highly visible sign of resolve and, once ordered to conduct a nuclear strike, are recallable, if necessary. Aircraft-delivered weapons also provide strike capability across the range of nuclear operations." The F-16 fighter planes, of which there are many deployed in Iraq and surrounding American bases, are such dual-role aircraft, capable of delivering B61-11 earth-penetrating nuclear bombs. The Public Has a right to know It is likely that the administration has briefed key senators (e.g., John Warner, John McCain, Carl Levin, Dianne Feinstein, Joe Lieberman) on the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in the Persian Gulf as classified information, arguing that it is necessary to protect American troops in Iraq against an unprovoked Iranian attack, and the American people from a possible terrorist attack with WMD sponsored by Iran, and that making the information public could endanger American forces in Iraq or make a terrorist attack more likely. However, the use of nuclear weapons by the United States is a grave decision that affects every man, woman, and child in America (not to mention the rest of the world). The American public has a right to know if its government has deployed nuclear weapons in the Persian Gulf targeting Iran, because given the circumstances described above, it is highly likely that those weapons will be used. The administration has created the circumstances to make it appear that the upcoming use of nuclear weapons against Iran will be "unavoidable." The most likely (though not the only) scenario is that Israel will "pull the trigger," bombing some Iranian facilities, and that the U.S. will be dragged into the conflict to protect American, Iraqi, and Israeli lives. The use of low-yield nuclear weapons to destroy underground Iranian facilities and deter an Iranian response will appear to be the most "humane" path to achieve U.S. goals of eliminating Iran's nuclear program and destroying its military capabilities, minimizing casualties, and achieving "rapid and favorable war termination on US terms." The American public and the rest of the world will not fall for this deception. The circumstances surrounding the nuking of Iran were created with the specific intent of making the use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. "unavoidable." The real purpose of nuking Iran is to establish the credibility of U.S. nuclear weapons as a deterrent against any undesirable action by "rogue" states. If Bush, Rumsfeld, Cheney, and the other nuclear hitmen are really convinced that this is the best course of action for America, they should make their case public now. The president should tell the American people that the exercise of "all options" against Iran will include nukes. He should allow for a democratic debate on the pros and cons of using nuclear weapons in the Iran situation, and on pursuing alternative courses of action, before it is too late. The president was not elected on an agenda of nuking a non-nuclear country, and the radical views of the nuclear hitmen are not likely to be the views of the majority of Americans. If the president engages in the use of nuclear weapons against Iran in the coming weeks or months, without disclosing the preparations to the American public, he will be making a mockery of the most fundamental democratic principles that America represents. And he will have provided clear evidence of duplicitous intent, no matter how many eloquent speeches he delivers afterwards. -------- u.s. nuc facilities -------- california Diablo Future Discussed By: Andrew Masuda, December 15, 2005 KSBY TV, San Luis Obispo, CA http://www.ksby.com/home/headlines/2078651.html Federal officials visit the Central Coast Wednesday night to discus security and the future of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, prompting a watchdog group has raised new concerns over the plant's security. "We want to have a say on if we clone it. We ask the N.R.C. to shut it down." The "Singing Sirens" first sing their concerns for the safety of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant. Then, with statements during a town hall style meeting with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. "That's their right and we're here to listen to their concerns and answer their questions," says Victor Dricks of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Diablo opponents are concerned about Pacific Gas and Electric's plan to store used nuclear fuel at the plant. The N.R.C. has already approved the dry-cast storage project. "It's a way to store the used nuclear fuel until Yucca Mountain, a permanent waste suppository is opened and can be transported there for a final resting place," says Diablo Canyon Vice President and General Manager David Oatley. "They want to go ahead with projects and then answer questions, and it's really more prudent to answer questions and then go along with the projects," says Rochelle Becker from the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility. With the Yucca Mountain project facing roadblocks, Diablo opponents fear the temporary on-site storage will become permanent fixtures and targets for terrorists. And that's real possibility according to one watch dog group. "Whether it's true or not, it certainly raises interesting concerns," says Jane Swanson, who is with Mothers For Peace. She informed the Comission about an unconfirmed security breach at the plant told over the phone by an anonymous source. "This report says the individual was in an airplane that actually dive-bombed Diablo Canyon in the middle of may 2005. And the alarming thing is that nothing happened. There was no chase plane, there were no shots fired." Swanson wants the N.R.C. to investigate the claim. They want assurances, even if it's not true, that it can't happen. Utility officials call the report unsubstantiated. But if something like it happened, a utility spokesperson insists measures are in place to protect the plant from the air and the ground. The spokesperson says the plant also has one of the largest armed security forces in the county. An N-R-C spokesperson says it will take the comments and concerns under consideration. Diablo opponents, however, are skeptical. They think N.R.C. members are not taking their claims seriously. -------- new jersey Feds don't like NJ's objections on Oyster Creek plant The Associated Press December 15, 2005 4:23 PM http://www.phillyburbs.com/pb-dyn/news/104-12152005-584939.html LACEY TOWNSHIP, N.J. - Federal regulators say New Jersey's objections to renewing the license of the Oyster Creek nuclear power plant don't hold water. The state's Department of Environmental Protection has joined activists calling for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission not to renew the plant's license when the current one expires in 2009. Specifically, New Jersey said the radioactive spent fuel from the Lacey Township plant is vulnerable to an aircraft attack, there isn't a reliable backup power supply for the plant, and the plant should adhere to current engineering codes, which are more stringent than when Oyster Creek received its original license in 1969. In a response issued this week, lawyers representing the NRC's staff said the issues the state raised fall outside the renewal process, which focuses on plants' operations and their environmental impact. The NRC could still consider the state's objections as it considers the Oyster Creek application. Information from: Asbury Park Press, http://www.app.com -------- ohio Ohio should prepare for hazardous waste transport Originally published December 15, 2005 http://www.marionstar.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20051215/OPINION03/512150314/1014 Dear Editor: Quite soon, shipments of spent nuclear-reactor fuel will be traversing Ohio toward a storage site in Utah. As mentioned in a recent issue of Scene Magazine, a Cleveland alternative news tabloid, Ohio is one of the few states along the route lacking an agenda concerning this potentially hazardous circumstance. Measures should probably be taken to ensure the adequate inspection of roadway and railroad conveyances and the safety of the containers in which the nuclear waste is to be transported. This is especially requisite in as much as the shipments will pass near on through densely populated areas, such as Cleveland, Akron and Youngstown. "The best part of our knowledge," as Oliver Wendell Holmes observed, "is that which teaches us where knowledge leaves off and ignorance begins." William Dauenhauer Willowick -------- south carolina Notice filed on plans for nuclear plant SC BUSINESS BRIEFS Thu, Dec. 15, 2005 http://www.thestate.com/mld/thestate/business/13410310.htm As expected, SCANA Corp. and Santee Cooper told federal regulators of intentions to build a nuclear power plant. The filing with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission did not name a location, and SCANA said it had not made a final decision about its plans. The filing "just allows us to keep our place in line," a company spokesman said. SCANA operates and owns two-thirds of the V.C. Summer plant in Fairfield County. State-owned Santee Cooper owns the rest of the facility. Shares of SCANA closed at $40.38, up 26 cents. • BMW supplier might build plant in Union UNION - August Lapple & Co. might locate in Union County with 125 jobs, the first BMW supplier to locate in the county. The (Spartanburg) Herald-Journal reported that the German stamping company could have up to 200 workers at a plant making body panels. The investment would be worth $50 million and be for a third model to be made at the Greer BMW plant. • Friedman's emerges from bankruptcy SAVANNAH - Jewelry retailer Friedman's Inc. has emerged from Chapter 11 proceedings, less than a year after a Securities and Exchange Commission levied fraud charges and the company sought bankruptcy. The chain will pay $2 million to a fund to settle fraud charges, and it canceled its outstanding common stock and emerged as a privately held company controlled by investors. The company said it would close 51 of its 424 stores after the holidays. It has not named sites of stores that will close. • Two companies raise quarterly dividends Two companies with South Carolina ties said Wednesday they would raise their quarterly dividends: • The South Financial Group of Greenville will raise its quarterly dividend by 1 cent a share, to 17 cents. The new dividend will be paid Feb. 1 to shareholders of Jan. 15. Shares in the parent of Carolina First Bank closed at $29.40, up 15 cents. It announced the dividend increase after the market closed. • Progress Energy of Raleigh raised its dividend to 60.5 cents per share, up from 59 cents. The new dividend will be paid Feb. 1 to shareholders of Jan. 10. Shares of the company, which sells power in the Pee Dee region of the state, rose 55 cents to $44.78. It made its announcement before the market closed. • Faulds rejoins UCI Medical board Thomas G. Faulds has returned to UCI Medical Affiliates' board of directors. He replaces Dr. Ashby M. Jordan, who resigned from the board Tuesday. His resignation said he had no disagreement with the company. Faulds, 64, has been president and chief operating officer of the BlueCross BlueShield Division of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of South Carolina, which holds a major stake in the Columbia-based owner of Doctors Care facilities. Faulds was on UCI's board from 1996 to 2003. Shares closed at $3.40, up 5 cents, Wednesday. From staff and wire reports E-mail: biznews@thestate.com -------- texas Radioactive Materials Still Missing in North Texas North Texas Independent Media Center ^ | Dec 15 2005 | by Cliff Pearson http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/1543843/posts Nuclear Vials Presumed Stolen, Questions Remain About Safety and Procedures Federal and state officials report they still have not located two vials of radioactive material that went missing November 3 as they were being shipped by truck from Albuquerque to Kilgore, Texas. Two plastic tubes of antimony-124, a highly toxic and radioactive liquid primarily used by the oil and gas industry, are looking increasingly like they have been stolen somewhere en route from Albuquerque to Kilgore, Texas, according to New Mexico and federal officials. An official event notification filed with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by Pro Technics, one of the companies involved in the event, describes the incident in detail and provides some startling information about nuclear security and safety procedures (emphasis added): AGREEMENT STATE - LOST/MISSING SHIPMENT "On Monday, October 31, 2005 a shipment of RAM [radioactive material] was packaged in Albuquerque, N.M. by SpectraTek Services and offered for ground shipment to ProTechnics, in Kilgore, Texas. There were seven packages, four fiber-board boxes and three twenty gallon drums, the latter being yellow III, TI=5.0. "When the shipment arrived at Kilgore, Texas subsite #004 on the RAML03835 [radioactive materials list], Thursday afternoon November 3, 2005, two vials of liquid (Antimony) Sb-124 with 40mCi/each were missing along with the inner shipping container, an ammo box. "A tamper seal on the 20 gallon drum was still intact, but this type did not contain a unique serial number. "The inventory at SpectraTek has been verified as correct and video surveillance indicates that the materials were packaged> and offered for shipment to Con-Way shipping for ground service. "The corporate RSO [radiation safety officer] reported the missing material to the answering service at 1830 hrs, Thursday, Novevember 3, 2005. "Sb-124 [antimony] is used for sub-surface field studies in the oil and gas industry. All parties are continuing the investigation." The event notification filed by SpectraTek Services further elaborates on the incident: AGREEMENT STATE NOTIFICATON - MISSING SHIPMENT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL "On November 3, 2005, at approximately 2:30 p. m., SpectraTek Services received a call from Pro Technics in Kilgore, Texas. "They stated a seven (7) piece shipment of four (4) fiber-board boxes and three (3) 20-gallon drums had been received. "The contents of one of the 20-gallon drums were not in the drum. The drum was to have contained an ammo box with two 25 pound lead shipping containers, each containing 40 millicuries of antimony-124 used in oil and gas well completion studies. " All packages had security seals in place when they arrived at the Pro Technics facility in Kilgore. "Notification was made to the Pro Technics corporate office, the freight company, and the N.M. [New Mexico] Radiation Control Bureau. "Interviewing all employees involved in packaging the shipment resulted in written statements from them. "The inventory has been double-checked and it appears the material balance is correct. "Security camera tapes have been reviewed showing the packaging area for the day of the shipment [October 31, 2005]. "The tapes show the radioactive material being loaded into the containers and the containers being closed and they also show the shipment being loaded onto the freight carrier's trailer." The discovery of missing radioactive material triggered notices to public health and safety officials and to the FBI and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Weeks of searches on the ground have thus far found nothing. Significantly, aerial "sniffing" searches for the missing vials, using specially-equipped U.S. Energy Department helicopters equipped with sensitive radiation detectors, have also turned up no trace of the missing radioactive vials. Officials report that the radioactive materials' first stop in Texas was in Abilene, but the truck carrying the vials continued on through the Dallas area, into Tyler, Texas, finally arriving in Kilgore. It is unknown if the stuff was removed or stolen in North Texas, or elsewhere along the route. A careful reading of the event notifications above does sound as though the materials were stolen, rather than merely lost. Note the italicized phrases above: video surveillance shows nothing unsual with the packing of the vials, SpectraTek finds no descrepancies in their inventory, and the security seals were found intact. (You might also wonder why the security seals did not contain unique serial numbers, as reported by one of the event notices.) It looks very much as though someone was trying to conceal a theft to buy him or herself some time. It also looks as if the likely theft was by someone who knew the security seals do not contain unique identification numbers. Another interesting fact emerges when one notices the shipping company reportedly used, Con-Way shipping. According to public records obtained by the NTIMC, they have been sued over 25 times in the last two years, in Oregon, Pensylvania, California, Arizona, and Texas. Almost all of the lawsuits were for damages, negligence, or personal injury by a motorized vehicle. In short, , SpectraTek should probably re-think their shipping company contract. There has been one unconfirmed rumor made to the NTIMC that the mssing radiation vials are actually part of a covert homeland security exercise. But this is unlikely, since the incident has been an embarassment for all parties involved, and it seems unlikely they would would report a failure, rather than a success, to the news media. But even if it was merely a shipping error that caused the radioactive materials to go missing, the alarming fact remains that highly toxic and radioactive vials had been missing for over two weeks before anyone reported it to the general public. And even after nearly two months missing, there is still no clue as yet as to there whereabouts. Why did the officials involved wait so long before notifying the mainstream media of the vials' disappearance? Why have the vials still not been found? Why has there been no follow-up on this event by the mainstream media? More important, if the stuff was stolen, who would want it, and why? According to environmental data, antimony-124 can cause serious health problems if swallowed or breathed by humans or animals. It also emits gamma radiation, which can cause severe internal damage. Environmental officials in New Mexico affirmed this information in an online report saying the material "can result in significant radiation exposure" and strongly cautioning anyone finding it not to come within 15 feet of the material, and to immediately notify authorities. The materials are not considered a terrorist threat because of the small quantity of antimony-124 involved, according to the New Mexico statement. However, terrorists have been found with the chemical in the past. Apparently they bought it, because they thought it was uranium. Is it possible that someone on the inside, possibly a freight handler with the shipping company, decided to steal the radioactive vials in an attempt to sell them to some unwitting terrorist who thought he or she was buying a more potent source of radiation? If so, who is this person or group? What is their goal? Where are they? And more important, what are homeland security officials doing to protect us? Pro Technics, is offering a $1,000 reward for information that leads to the recovery of the missing vials. Both Pro Technics and SpectraTek are owned by Core Laboratories, an international oil and gas corporation. Cliff Pearson is a freelance writer and a graduate student in journalism. He is a member of the North Texas Independent Media Center's Editorial Collective. -------- vermont Advisory panel endorses power increase at Vt. Yankee December 15, 2005 By Susan Smallheer, Rutland Herald Staff http://www.rutlandherald.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20051215/NEWS/512150334/1003/NEWS02 A national advisory committee on nuclear safety has given its preliminary approval to Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant's plans to boost power production by 20 percent. The group, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, was considered "the last best hope" by anti-nuclear advocates who say the production increase would create unnecessary stresses on the 33-year-old reactor, which has shown increasing signs of aging. The advisory group, which is made up of nuclear experts from around the country, voted 9-0 Saturday after four days of hearings last week at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's headquarters in Rockville, Md. The group's chairman, Graham Wallis of Norwich, Vt., is a retired engineering professor at Dartmouth College. He didn't return telephone calls requesting comment on the vote. Earlier this fall, the group had raised questions about whether the NRC staff was following its own rules in reviewing proposed power increases from nuclear power plants. NRC spokesman Neil Sheehan said the vote was only a "tentative" approval of the power boost, which has been sought by Entergy Nuclear for more than two years but has been delayed because of questions about a key component of Entergy's plan for operating the plant under new conditions. The group's final report won't be completed until the end of the month, he said. The final decision from federal regulators isn't expected until February. The committee's endorsement is advisory, but it was considered a key endorsement nonetheless. The final decision rests with the five-member Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Raymond Shadis, senior technical advisor for the New England Coalition, a Vermont anti-nuclear watchdog group, said the committee's two full days of hearings last month in Brattleboro had raised many people's hopes that it had critical concerns about Entergy's plan. More than 100 local residents testified, with only a handful offering support. "Everyone who was there saw the sharp and acerbic jousting; they (the advisory committee) didn't mind embarrassing the NRC staff, nor did they mind embarrassing the licensee, over and over again," Shadis said. Therefore, he said, he was surprised by the unanimous vote supporting the Yankee power boost. "This committee is erudite, articulate, witty, personable, and without personal ethics - they know better," Shadis said. The New England Coalition has been pushing for an independent safety assessment of the reactor, similar to an in-depth inspection that was conducted at Maine Yankee nuclear power plant eight years ago. That special inspection uncovered serious problems at the plant, which led to its shut down and dismantlement. A special NRC engineering inspection last year only scraped the surface, Shadis said. David O'Brien, commissioner of the state Department of Public Service, said he would reserve comment until he had seen a promised letter from the committee, outlining its reasons. The Douglas administration had raised questions about the power boost, saying safety margins could be compromised by the company's plans for calculating pressure inside the reactor during an emergency and whether emergency cooling pumps could function properly. O'Brien said Sarah Hofmann, director of public advocacy for the department, as well as William Sherman, the state's nuclear engineer, had attended most of the hearings in Washington last week, but had to leave before the vote. "We have been very impressed with the intensity of the review and the quality of the people on the advisory committee," O'Brien said. "We definitely feel comfortable that our issues have been taken up and evaluated." He said the state had spent a lot of money evaluating Entergy's plans, and that a similar appeal is still pending with another nuclear board, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. He noted that the state could "bill back" Entergy for the money it had spent on its review. -------- us nuc waste Ohio should prepare for hazardous waste transport December 15, 2005 Marion (OH) Star http://www.marionstar.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20051215/OPINION03/512150314/1014 Dear Editor: Quite soon, shipments of spent nuclear-reactor fuel will be traversing Ohio toward a storage site in Utah. As mentioned in a recent issue of Scene Magazine, a Cleveland alternative news tabloid, Ohio is one of the few states along the route lacking an agenda concerning this potentially hazardous circumstance. Measures should probably be taken to ensure the adequate inspection of roadway and railroad conveyances and the safety of the containers in which the nuclear waste is to be transported. This is especially requisite in as much as the shipments will pass near on through densely populated areas, such as Cleveland, Akron and Youngstown. "The best part of our knowledge," as Oliver Wendell Holmes observed, "is that which teaches us where knowledge leaves off and ignorance begins." -------- MILITARY -------- chemical weapons White (Phosphorous) Christmas By Gabriele Zamparini December 15, 2005 American Chronicle http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/viewArticle.asp?articleID=4212 "(...) the broad masses of a nation are always more easily corrupted in the deeper strata of their emotional nature than consciously or voluntarily; and thus in the primitive simplicity of their minds they more readily fall victims to the big lie than the small lie, since they themselves often tell small lies in little matters but would be ashamed to resort to large-scale falsehoods. It would never come into their heads to fabricate colossal untruths, and they would not believe that others could have the impudence to distort the truth so infamously. Even though the facts which prove this to be so may be brought clearly to their minds, they will still doubt and waver and will continue to think that there may be some other explanation." - Adolf Hitler (1) "If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it. The lie can be maintained only for such time as the State can shield the people from the political, economic and/or military consequences of the lie. It thus becomes vitally important for the State to use all of its powers to repress dissent, for the truth is the mortal enemy of the lie, and thus by extension, the truth is the greatest enemy of the State." - Joseph Goebbels (2) Judging from our leaders and mainstream media, it seems these two gentlemen above didn't die in vain. A few days ago, the Chicken-Hawk-in-Chief said: "Stop throwing the Constitution in my face. It's just a goddamned piece of paper!" (3) On 29 January 2003, at the State of the Union speech, the same Chicken-Hawk-in-Chief addressed the Congress: "And as we and our coalition partners are doing in Afghanistan, we will bring to the Iraqi people food and medicines and supplies - and freedom." [It followed one of the many standing ovations from the Congress' members. Good to remember when still so many think the Congress should impeach the President. My grandma would say: If you want it done right, you have to do it yourself.] According to "The State of Iraq: An Update", an article published by The New York Times "A sober reading of the data argues against a rapid withdrawal, which would concede the fight to the terrorists." (4) One wonders how many people must be murdered before (soberly) calling someone terrorist: 30,000? 100,000? 500,000? 1,000,000? "The war in numbers: From WMD to the victims" is a collection of numbers published on 13 December 2005 by The Independent. It reads: "30,000 Estimated Iraqi civilian deaths" (5) What's the source of this number? Is The Independent (and the other mainstream media) accepting the numbers given by the official sources, which is to say the White House and the Pentagon? Why did most of the Western mainstream media bury the most serious study conducted on the subject? (6) This study, published on 29 October 2004 in the prestigious medical journal The Lancet (7), reads: Making conservative assumptions, we think that about 100000 excess deaths, or more have happened since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Violence accounted for most of the excess deaths and air strikes from coalition forces accounted for most violent deaths. (Interpretation) Most individuals reportedly killed by coalition forces were women and children. (Findings) Les Roberts, of the Center for International Emergency Disaster and Refugee Studies at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, one of the world's top epidemiologists and lead author of the report, recently wrote: "It is almost a year since a group of scientists from Al-Mustansirya University in Baghdad, and Columbia and Johns Hopkins Universities in the US, released a report in the medical journal The Lancet estimating that 100,000, and perhaps far more, Iraqis had died due to the US invasion. The issue of civilian deaths in Iraq and The Lancet report in particular were deemed by the group Project Censored as the second most under-reported story of 2005. (...) I thought the press saw their job as reporting information. This may indeed be the case for the coverage of auto accidents and the cost of pig-futures, but it was not the case regarding civilian deaths in Iraq." (8) On the same day The Independent gave those numbers, it published the leading article "The perils of planting democracy in a hostile land". The first and the last paragraph read: "One thousand days. This is how long British troops have been in Iraq, and still we are counting. Such an accumulation of time seemed inconceivable in the days after the invasion, when the military operation looked likely to be completed in weeks. As we now know to our cost, the ease of removing Saddam Hussein offered no preparation for the multifarious resistance that was to come. Ousting a dictator is one thing; sowing and watering the seeds of democracy where none existed is an undertaking of quite a different order." "It is possible that, if the security situation deteriorates further, not leaving now will come to be seen as a mistake and an ignominious retreat will follow. On balance, it is probably worth waiting in the hope that the elections usher in calmer times and serious reconstruction can begin. The only bright point in this whole sorry episode will be if we are able to plan an orderly departure and leave Iraq in a better state than we found it. Anything else will constitute a shaming defeat." (9) For those of you who don't know, The Independent is considered to be an anti-war newspaper. No kidding! Let's see how we have been "sowing and watering the seeds of democracy". Never mind the British colonialism, the slaughters and the use of poison gas by the British Empire, let's not consider the Iraq-Iran war and the US governments' role behind that war, providing weapons, intelligence and any kind of financial help and support for the carnage to continue. Let's just start from 1990. The UN sanctions against Iraq, wanted by the governments of the US and the UK and imposed on 6 August 1990 (HIROSHIMA DAY) ended only with the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. In 1996, Madeleine Albright - US Ambassador at the United Nations and soon to become Secretary of State under President Clinton - said about half million children murdered by those sanctions: "I think this is a very hard choice, but the price - we think the price is worth it." (10) Those sanctions killed a terrifying number of innocent people. One million? Two millions? Will we ever know? Denis Halliday, former UN Assistant Secretary General and Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq (1997-98) said: "I had been instructed to implement a policy that satisfies the definition of genocide: a deliberate policy that had effectively killed well over a million individuals, children and adults." After thirty-four years with the United Nations, he resigned in protest over the effects of the embargo on the civilian population. (11) Hans Von Sponeck, who had succeeded Denis Halliday as UN Assistant Secretary General and Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq (1998-2000), resigned on February 13, 2000. He asked: "How long should the civilian population of Iraq be exposed to such punishment for something they have never done?" Like Halliday, he had been with the United Nations for more than thirty years. (12) Remember the first Gulf War? Surgical bombings, smart missiles and a great show on TV. There were between 142,000 and 206,000 Iraqi deaths directly attributable to the Gulf War in 1991 (13) Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, kidnappings, tortures, cluster bombs, depleted uranium, white phosphorous, Fallujah... "sowing and watering the seeds of democracy"! The 'big lies', the 'colossal untruths', the 'large-scale falsehoods'. When our ruthless leaders and their apologists in the media use words such as democracy, freedom and human rights just run and run fast! Whatever the reasons Afghanistan and Iraq have been bombed and occupied, they have nothing to do with freedom, democracy and human rights. And the other big lie, the war on terror, is just a show for the western audience, a smoke screen Hitler and Goebbels would be proud. Every time our leaders and mainstream media "tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it", let's "dissent, for the truth is the mortal enemy of the lie". And as Oscar Wilde wrote: "If one tells the truth, one is sure, sooner or later, to be found out." NOTES 1) Mein Kampf, published in Germany in 1925-1926. Author: Adolf Hitler (1889 - 1945) Founder and Leader of National Socialism (Nazism), and German Dictator 1933 - 1945 2) Joseph Goebbels (1897-1945), German Propaganda Minister 1933 - 1945 3) Bush on the Constitution: 'It's just a goddamned piece of paper', by Doug Thompson, Capitol Hill Blue, December 9, 2005 4) The State of Iraq: An Update, by Nina Kamp, Michael O'Hanlon and Amy Unikewicz, The New York Times, December 14, 2005 5) The war in numbers: From WMD to the victims, The Independent, 13 December 2005 6) Suggested reading: BURYING THE LANCET - PART 1, September 5, 2005 BURYING THE LANCET - PART 2, September 6, 2005 BURYING THE LANCET - Update, September 12, 2005 WATCHING HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH. Open Letter to Kenneth Roth, Executive Director Human Rights Watch, by Gabriele Zamparini, December 7, 2005 7) Mortality before and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: cluster sample survey, The Lancet, Published online October 29,2004 8) A year later - 100,000 deaths in Iraq, by Les Roberts. This op-ed was sent to me by the author. 9) Leading article: The perils of planting democracy in a hostile land, The Independent, 13 December 2005 10) Lesley Stahl on U.S. sanctions against Iraq: "We have heard that a half million children have died. I mean, that's more children than died in Hiroshima. And, you know, is the price worth it?" US Ambassador at the United Nations (soon to become Secretary of State) Madeleine Albright: "I think this is a very hard choice, but the price - we think the price is worth it." CBS - "60 Minutes", May 12, 1996 11) Source: The New Rulers of the World, by John Pilger, Verso, 2002 12) Ibidem 13) Source: U.N. 1991 the Ahtisaari report; Daponte 1993 Gabriele Zamparini is an independent filmmaker, writer and journalist living in London. He's the producer and director of the documentaries XXI CENTURY and The Peace! DVD d author of American Voices of Dissent (Paradigm Publishers). He can be reached at info@thecatsdream.com - Find out more about him and his work at http://TheCatsDream.com. -------- iraq Live From Iraq By Nina Berman, AlterNet. Posted December 15, 2005. http://www.alternet.org/waroniraq/29538/ In the book, 'Unembedded,' four independent photojournalists reveal the human face of war-ravaged Iraq. Tools Two and a half years into the war in Iraq and we still know so little about the Iraqis on the ground and how they survive and die each day. News reports are dominated by coverage of American fighters. Our visual understanding of the war is almost exclusively American: our soldiers atop tanks racing to liberate Baghdad, suffering heat and sandstorms, their faces bathed in an orange glow; American Marines in full battle mode charging across the Diwanya Bridge; and the shock and awe over Baghdad, almost like Grucci fireworks -- as long as you don't see what happens when they hit their targets. And that's the whole problem. We rarely see who is at the receiving end of a hellfire missile, or a 50-caliber rifle, or a 500-pound bomb. The politics of that destruction and the anger and desperation it fuels, remains hidden. So it brings great relief to finally get a glimpse into the Iraqi experience, from four intrepid independent photojournalists who have compiled their images into the new book, Unembedded (Chelsea Green). Kael Alford, Thorne Anderson, Rita Leistner and Ghaith Abdul-Ahad decided to forsake the bubble of the American military and cross front lines to see what life is like from the Iraqi side. The collection of 149 photographs and dispatches from the photographers begins with the American invasion in March 2003, moves through the rise of the insurgency in Falluja and Sadr City and culminates with the siege of Najaf and the Mahdi Army in August 2004. Along the way we visit hospitals in Fallujah and Baghdad where relatives wash their dead and care for the wounded. We see a mosque in Baghdad where women mourn more than 50 killed by a U.S. bomb. We see an Iraqi boy triumphantly celebrating the explosion of an American vehicle. And from the courageous Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, the lone Iraqi photographer in the group, (Alford and Anderson are Americans, Leistner is Canadian) we see an extraordinary sequence of photographs of civilians running from a U.S. helicopter attack on Harif Street in Baghdad in September 2004. Amid the violence, there are many welcome images of daily life with Iraqis enjoying small pleasures: family members swimming in the Euphrates river, men dancing at a wedding in Ramadi, women squeezed into a car on their way to a henna party in Sadr City, and men playing dominoes at sunset on the banks of the Tigris River. In a book about war, the images of Iraqis at peace, done artfully and unsentimentally, humanize the conflict and remind us that before the American invasion and even after, Iraq is still a country of individuals who feel and dream and celebrate and socialize, like people everywhere. They are not just Sunnis, or Shiites or Kurds, or in soldier parlance, Hajjis. The photographers do not discriminate when it comes to the purveyors of violence. It is not just the Americans blowing up civilians. There are plenty of victims here from Iraqi car bombers and saboteurs. Yet the origin of the madness is leveled squarely at Americans as demonstrated by a strong image by Alford which appears early in the book, of angry Zafrania residents in April 2003 confronting American soldiers after a missile accidentally killed several people in a nearby house. The Iraqis, of all ages, are furious, demanding an explanation. We never see the American soldiers in the picture. The way A