NucNews - June 10, 2005 -------- NUCLEAR -------- accidents Mysterious powder at test site catches fire LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL Friday, June 10, 2005 http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2005/Jun-10-Fri-2005/news/26697817.html A gray powder caught fire Thursday inside a glove box at the Nevada Test Site while workers were sorting transuranic waste for shipment to a New Mexico disposal site, a National Nuclear Security Administration spokesman said. A glove box is a clear containment box that allows workers to handle materials without direct contact. The spokesman, Kevin Rohrer, said four workers in the glove box building were wearing protective gear, and none was exposed to radioactive materials. He said the fire was contained inside the glove box and was snuffed out when one of the workers punched an emergency button that released carbon dioxide. The workers were using the glove box to examine items from a 55-gallon transuranic waste drum. Rohrer said officials did not know what the powder was. Most of the transuranic waste stored at the test site, 75 miles northwest of Las Vegas, comes from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California and is destined for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant near Carlsbad, N.M. -------- australia Australian protesters may target military exercise 13:46 AEST Fri Jun 10 2005 AAP http://news.ninemsn.com.au/article.aspx?id=52176 A nuclear lobby group spokeswoman has said protesters may attempt to enter the Shoalwater Bay Training Area in central Queensland in an effort to stop a major military exercise starting on Sunday. Three busloads of people were on Friday travelling to the central Queensland city of Rockhampton where they will gather outside the Australian Army barracks for a vigil, said protest organiser and spokeswoman for Everyone for a Nuclear-Free Future, Robin Taubenfeld. Others were coming from the local area and interstate and some may enter the Shoalwater Bay Training Area where 17,000 Australian and United States troops will be conducting exercise Talisman Sabre 2005 (TS05) which runs from June 12-30. "It is a possibility that people do attempt to enter the site or take arrestable, non violent direct action," Ms Taubenfeld said. "But it has not been planned in our regular schedule of events." Featuring in the Rockhampton protest will be a six metre-long replica of an anti-nuclear missile. The weekend protest includes protests in and around the Rockhampton area and a concert and forum on the beach at nearby Yeppoon on Sunday afternoon. Other protests were due to be held in other cities around Australia over the coming week, Ms Taubenfeld said. "Our major concern is these exercises are sabre-rattling in our region," Ms Taubenfeld said. "We want to work with the community to raise awareness to voice opposition and to stand up for peace." Environmentalists were also concerned depleted uranium munitions will be used and the exercise will damage the fragile environment of Shoalwater Bay and the adjacent Coral Sea. The Australian Defence Force has denied both accusations. ADF spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Dick Filewood said it would be "dangerous" if protesters entered the Shoalwater Bay training area where live firing exercises will be carried out. "If people wish to protest peacefully it's their democratic right...we are happy to let them do that," he told ABC Radio. "If they step over the mark of military requirements we'd expect civil police to take appropriate action." -------- britain Cancer alert for children born close to dockyard GARETH ROSE, Fri 10 Jun 2005 The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/health.cfm?id=639702005 CHILDREN living close to the Rosyth dockyard have a higher incidence of cancer, a report has claimed. An examination of British nuclear sites found that the percentage of leukaemia and non-Hodgkin lymphoma (NHL) sufferers increased the closer to Rosyth a child was born. However, the Committee on Medical Aspects of Radiation in the Environment (Comare) found no evidence that living close to nuclear power stations led to an increased risk of cancer. Rosyth, where nuclear submarines are stored, was the only new site identified by the report as potentially dangerous. The authors said the rate of other cancers was also "significantly increased" within 25km of the dockyard. They did admit that there is already a high rate of childhood cancer in the Fife and Lothian regions. And they would not say living close to Rosyth "genuinely confers a higher risk of leukaemia and NHL" as previous studies had not found the same trends. The evidence shows a small excess of leukaemias and NHL - 218 cases where 211 would have been expected, and 392 where 342 would have been expected. Although those statistics alone would not cause alarm, researchers also found a decreasing number of cases moving outwards from the dockyard. Professor Bryn Bridges, chairman of Comare, said: "This was the one result from our study that had not come up before. "There is no overall excess of leukaemia and NHL cases within the 25-mile radius of Rosyth. "However, within that area there were more cases in the middle of the circle than there were at the edge. "This does not agree with the results of the report published in 1996. "We have asked the authors of that report to work with the authors of this one to discover why." The findings are also being investigated by NHS Fife. Dr Lesley Macdonald, director of public health at NHS Fife, said: "We are aware of the report and we are looking into the findings." Four decommissioned nuclear submarines are stored at Rosyth. Although the radioactive fuel has been moved to Sellafield, in Cumbria, radioactive material still remains in the reactor compartment. The Comare study was based on the analysis of 32,000 cases of childhood cancer diagnosed between 1969 and 1993. It backed previous studies that found increased rates of leukaemia and NHL around nuclear installations of Dounreay in Caithness, Sellafield, and Burghfield in Berkshire, where Trident warheads are built and decommissioned. The Department of Health welcomed the fact that Comare's findings did not support the theory that there are more childhood cancer cases near nuclear power stations. A spokesman said: "It is important to reassure the public that this research found no evidence of an excess number of cancer cases around any of the nuclear power stations in the UK." Prof Bridges said: "There is no evidence from this very large study that living within 25km of a nuclear generating station in Britain is associated with any increased risk of childhood cancer." ---- Tory nuclear waste sites revealed Many believe a storage site at Sellafield is the most likely option Friday, 10 June, 2005, 08:57 GMT 09:57 UK (BBC) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4079542.stm A list of 12 sites considered for storing nuclear waste by the last Tory government has been released under the Freedom of Information Act. The list included uninhabited Hebridean islands Fuday and Sandray, and offshore sites near Hunterston and Redcar. Other sites were in Essex - at Bradwell and near Southend - Stanford, in Norfolk, and at Sellafield and Dounreay nuclear power stations. The body handling waste says any future sites will be chosen from scratch. The list was released by Nirex, who are responsible for dealing with Britain's intermediate-level nuclear waste. It was drawn up in the 1980s, but the plan to bury waste at the sites was abandoned following the landslide defeat of John Major's government in 1997. Waste is currently stored at more than 30 sites around the country. TORY POTENTIAL SITES Bradwell, Essex Potton Island, Essex Two sites at Sellafield, Cumbria Dounreay, Caithness Altnabreac, Caithness Fuday, Hebrides Sandray, Hebrides Killingholme, South Humberside Stanford, Norfolk Offshore site near Redcar Offshore site near Hunterston Nirex is emphasising that the released list is purely historical and when a decision is made on where to store nuclear waste, the Tory list would not become the starting point of a new exercise. The issue is sensitive with some energy experts beginning to say that Britain can meet pollution targets only if it builds a new generation of nuclear plants. Sellafield favourite One of the Tory list sites in Essex, at the former Ministry of Defence facility at Potton island, is just a few kilometres from the centre of Southend. The other is at the former nuclear power station at Bradwell. Sellafield remains a favourite, with much nuclear material already there, and the local population seen to be supportive. Two sites at the Cumbrian plant are on the list. A site at Dounreay nuclear power station presents another obvious option. Also in Caithness, a site at Altnabreac was discussed. And there has been speculation about Stanford in Norfolk, where the MoD owns land, which is also on the Tory list. Their list also contains some new suggestions, including the sites on the Hebridean islands. It also considers sites off the east or west coasts of Britain served by the ports of Redcar and Hunterston. The current government is looking for a definite solution to nuclear waste storage, and will start from scratch. Its Committee on Radioactive Waste Management will report next year but will only give technical specifications, such as whether nuclear waste will be below or above ground and how it will be monitored. Site selection will follow later. The offshore sites are understood not to be an option now because of changes in the law. Transparency vow Chris Murray, managing director of Nirex, said: "Radioactive waste exists and needs to be dealt with whether or not there is any programme of new build in the UK. "Openness and transparency must underpin everything that is done in this area." Nirex spokesman David Wild said it would have broken the law to release the list during the election. "Our legal advice was very clear. We had to try our best not to damage the future process." But Rob Edwards, a journalist for the New Scientist and Sunday Herald, said: "It's just a sign of the inherent characteristic secrecy of the whole nuclear operation in the past. "Nirex wanted to keep it out of the general election but they have now agreed and government ministers have agreed." He said it was likely that the same sites would feature in any future discussions. "If you are on the old list, you stand a very good chance of being on any new list." Friends of the Earth's Chief Executive, Duncan McLaren, said: "The government needs to learn that the best way to begin dealing with the UK's nuclear waste legacy starts with halting the production of any more waste." ---- List of possible UK nuclear dumping sites revealed 10 Jun, 2005, 16:40 Anglia TV http://www.angliatv.com/news.php?region=Anglia&content=21004 A secret list of places in our region which were considered as possible sites for dumping radioactive waste has been made public today. The list includes 12 places across the UK where the government considered dumping intermediate radioactive waste. Three of those are in our region: Bradwell in Essex, Potton Island near Great Wakeing in Essex and Stanford near Thetford in Norfolk. No waste was ever dumped at any of these these sites, and the proposed programme of dumping waste was abandoned in 1997. Nuclear waste disposal consultants NIREX, who drew up the list, have been keen to stress that while the need for sites to bury radioactive waste continues, any new list would be drawn up from scratch. --- Nuclear industry under pressure after dumping sites revealed Fri Jun 10, 2005 11:52 AM ET http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20050610/wl_uk_afp/britainenvironmentnuclear_050610155208%3b_ylt=A9FJqZkJu6lC.KQAjhDgOrgF%3b_ylu=X3oDMTBiMW04NW9mBHNlYwMlJVRPUCUl http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/afp/20050610/sc_afp/britainenvironmentnuclear_050610170940 LONDON (AFP) - Calls by environmentalists for an end to Britain's nuclear industry rose after a sensitive shortlist of 12 sites earmarked as potential dumping grounds for dangerous radioactive waste was made public. Consultancy firm Nirex finally released the list, which was drawn up in the 1980s, following requests made under freedom of information laws. It identified seven sites in England and another five in Scotland that were considered as part of a programme for waste burial that was abandoned in 1997. Nirex insisted that any new selection process of suitable sites to dispose of nuclear waste would not use the old list as a starting point. But environmentalists and the New Scientist magazine, which demanded the publication of the list, warned that such a threat still hung over the named locations. "It is an absolute disgrace that the location of these sites has been kept from the public for so long," said Tony Juniper, director of the environmental action group Friends of the Earth. "Despite what ministers might say, Nirex has made it quite clear that each of the sites considered geologically suitable in the past could be considered suitable in the future," he said. "Every community named on this list should take steps to help halt plans to expand nuclear power in the UK." Juniper said the best way to start tackling a long legacy of nuclear waste in Britain would be to halt further production immediately. "The UK's energy future must lie in energy efficiency, the production of safe, renewable energy and the cleaner use of fossil fuels, not in trying to breathe new life into the discredited, dangerous and expensive disaster of nuclear power," he said. The Committee on Radioactive Waste Management, a group charged with finding the best option to manage Britain's long-term radioactive rubbish, is due to report next July with recommendations for waste management -- a matter that urgently needs to be resolved, said Nirex's managing director Chris Murray. "Radioactive waste exists and needs to be dealt with whether or not there is any programme of new build in the UK," he said. "Dealing with the waste is as much an ethical and social issue as a scientific and technical one. This is the key lesson we have learned from the past," he said, adding that it was also important to be open and transparent in the process. Green Party members of the Scottish parliament in Edinburgh noted that the earmarked sites were all in uninhabited or low population areas, which underlined the sense of danger around long-term nuclear waste disposal. "Nuclear power should be unequivocally ruled out as a possible energy option," said South of Scotland lawmaker Chris Ballance. "Until then, communities up and down the country, especially those on the final list of 12 sites, will be living with the prospect that their environment will become a nuclear waste dumping ground," he said, uring the Scottish executive and British government to replace nucelar power with cleaner sources of renewable energy. "Only then can we be certain that public health and safety and the future of the Scottish environment is safe. Nuclear power and weapons are completely unacceptable." Radioactive waste has been created in significant quantities in Britain since the 1940s and the nation has significant amounts which will remain potentially hazardous for thousands of years. Previous attempts to provide a long-term waste management facility for this rubbish have ended in failure. The waste is currently being stored at 34 locations around Britain awaiting disposal. -------- iran Iran has frozen work at nuclear site - UN diplomats Fri June 10, 2005 6:04 PM GMT+02:00 By Louis Charbonneau (Reuters) http://www.reuters.co.za/locales/c_newsArticle.jsp;:42a9bad8:ad712625e5faf1b?type=topNews&localeKey=en_ZA&storyID=8758297 VIENNA - Experts from the U.N. nuclear watchdog have inspected an underground uranium enrichment plant in Iran and verified that Tehran has kept its word by freezing all sensitive nuclear work there, diplomats said on Friday. A team from the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) went to the uranium enrichment plant at Natanz in central Iran on Thursday and verified that no activities related to the production of uranium fuel were taking place. "The IAEA went to Natanz and, among other things, verified the suspension," a Western diplomat familiar with the IAEA's investigation of Iran said on condition of anonymity. The agency was expected to inform the IAEA's 35-member board of governors at next week's quarterly meeting that Iran had kept its promise about freezing sensitive work at Natanz and elswhere, diplomats said. Tehran has frozen its enrichment programme, which could produce fuel for nuclear power plants or weapons, under a November deal with France, Britain and Germany, which have offered Iran incentives to halt and dismantle the programme. The European trio shares Washington's suspicions that Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons and determined to prevent Tehran from mastering the science of enriching uranium. Iran, which says its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes only, has said the freeze at Natanz and elsewhere would last only until the end of July, when the European Union trio has promised to give Iran a detailed package of incentives. However, the EU has said that resuming enrichment at Natanz, which is still under construction, would prompt it to back U.S. calls to refer Iran to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions. ACCESS PROBLEMS? One diplomat with access to Iran's nuclear programme said the inspection team ran into problems when it tried to visit one facility at the 450-hectare (1,110-acre) Natanz site because the Iranians refused to grant the inspectors access. "The team that got to Natanz is having a lot of trouble there," a diplomat told Reuters on Thursday night. "The Iranians are very strictly limiting their access." The problem related to one specific facility at the site and, after a delay of several hours, the situation was resolved and the team was let in, the diplomats said. During the IAEA's two-year investigation of Iran's nuclear programme, members of the board of governors have criticised Iran for not showing full transparency or granting complete and immediate access to sites. Diplomats said the brief delay raised concerns that Iran might have something to hide there, but an IAEA official said that in general the agency was getting all the access it needed. "There are no problems with access at Natanz," an IAEA official said on condition of anonymity. Mohammad Saeedi, deputy head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organisation, confirmed that IAEA inspectors had visited Natanz but denied that there were access problems. "They have visited wherever they have requested in Natanz facility and their inspections there are finished," he said. Earlier this week, diplomats familiar with Iran's programme said Iran had stuck to the letter of its suspension agreement with the EU but had quietly continued construction work at Natanz to prepare for when they might want to resume enrichment. Reporters taken on a tour of Natanz by government officials in March said it was more than 18 metres underground and surrounded by at least 10 anti-aircraft batteries -- ostensibly in case of U.S. or Israeli airstrikes. -------- israel Hackers may have gained access to info on Israel's unacknowledged nuclear arsenal By JOHN DALY, UPI International Correspondent June 10, 2005 http://interestalert.com/brand/siteia.shtml?Story=st/sn/06100000aaa04c6a.upi&Sys=siteia&Fid=WORLDNEW&Type=News&Filter=World Israeli security officials are nervously investigating the possibility that hackers may have gained access to computers storing information pertaining to Israel's unacknowledged nuclear arsenal. The hackers were uncovered after water company Gal-Al complained to police that a rival outfit pilfered drawings and formulas on how to produce and separate heavy water in a project at Israel's Dimona nuclear reactor, where Israel covertly produces nuclear material for its arsenal. Israeli authorities believe that hackers involved in the "Trojan Horse" affair, where private investigators used Trojan horse computer virus software to spy on companies, may have gained access to sensitive material on Gal-Al's computers, possibly resulting in the leak of Israel's nuclear bomb technology. Twenty people have so far been arrested in an industrial espionage investigation involving Israel, Britain, Germany and the United States. On Thursday suspect Yitzak Rath, chief executive of the Modiin Ezrahi private investigation firm, fell from the second story of a police station in what police said was a suicide attempt following a lengthy interrogation by the national fraud squad over his alleged involvement in the industrial espionage ring. Rath is in "serious and unstable condition" in a Tel Aviv hospital. Authorities suspect that Rath bought a trojan horse program from Israeli software developer Michael Haefrati, which allowed his business clients to gain sensitive information from their competitors. -------- japan Japan Shuts Research Nuclear Reactor After Glitch Fri Jun 10, 2005 03:08 AM ET (Reuters) http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=topNews&storyID=8752839 TOKYO - A Japanese research nuclear reactor was shut down on Friday due to a malfunction, but there was no radiation leak to the outside environment and no workers were affected, the Education and Science Ministry said. The Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute's 3.5 MW nuclear reactor in Tokaimura, north of Tokyo, was shut down manually at 11:29 a.m. (0229 GMT), due to a glitch with one of the reactor's five control rods, the ministry said in a statement. Nuclear safety officials at the site were making checks, it said. A science ministry official said the incident was not serious. "The reactor has been shut down safely," said Terumi Aoki, director at the Education and Science Ministry's office for nuclear regulation. "It's more of a malfunction than an accident," Aoki said, adding that the reactor would eventually be restarted once officials ascertain what caused the problems with the control rod. One of the worst accidents at any nuclear facility in Japan occurred at a uranium-processing plant in Tokaimura on Sept. 30, 1999, when an uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction was triggered after three poorly trained workers used buckets to mix nuclear fuel in a tub. The resulting release of radiation killed two workers and forced the evacuation of thousands of nearby residents. Last August, hot water and steam leaking from a broken pipe at Kansai Electric Power Co.'s (9503.T: Quote, Profile, Research) Mihama No. 3 nuclear power generator killed five workers in Japan's worst-ever nuclear power plant accident. -------- russia US funding in Russia should encourage nuclear reform in Moscow Bellona Position Paper, Friday, June 10, 2005 12:22:32 PM http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/nuke_industry/co-operation/38312.html It is the assertion of The Bellona Foundation that money sent to Russia by the United States for the purposes of improving nuclear and non-proliferation safety would be more effective if that funding supported a fundamental reform of the Russian nuclear industry. In Bellona’s assessment, simple and well established programs supported by the United States, such as submarine dismantlement, are in good working order. However, more complicated programs involving western investment such as the Mayak Fissile Materials Storage Facility (FMSF) in the Southern Urals, and the shut down of Russia’s remaining plutonium production reactors, have faltered. Such programs as the HEU-LEU program—whose funding is allocated on a freer basis—allows Russia to maintain the Soviet-era status quo of its nuclear industry, and offer no impetus for Moscow to re-assess the current structure of its nuclear industry. The United States contributes approximately $1 billion to $1.3 billion annually to nuclear dismantlment and security projects in Russia. Nearly half of this funding is accounted for by the US Defence Department’s Co-operative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which began in 1992. after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, with the goal of neutralising ex-Soviet weapons of mass destruction. Among these items are ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), bombers, inter-continental ballistic missiles, nuclear war-heads, missile silos and launchers, and chemical weapons. CTR’s efforts are combined with those of the US Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and the US Department of State. The DOE contribution consists mainly of bolstering nuclear security at additional vulnerable sites, finding alternative employment for out of work weapons scientists, the on-going shutdown of Russia’s three remaining plutonium production reactors, and building coal-fired sources of energy in the towns that these reactors power. The DOE also heads up the Plutonium Disposition program, under which both nations have agreed to destroy 34 tonnes each of surplus weapons grade plutonium. Additionally, the 1993 HEU-LEU Agreement, also known as the “Megatons to Megawatts” program, brings up to $500,000 million annually into the Russian nuclear industry’s coffers, and is, indeed the industry’s lifeblood. Through this program, Russia down-blends weapons usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) and sells the resultant low enriched uranium (LEU) to the United States for use in commercial reactors. The US agent for this program in the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC). Tenex, Russia’s nuclear fuel exporting giant, is USEC’s Moscow-based counterpart. Russia draws on its Cold War stocks of HEU to keep this program in operation. The program is scheduled to end by 2013. By that year, the Russian nuclear industry will have netted $7.5 billion from the program. Effects of the programs The targeted programs, or structured programs, run primarily by the DOE and DOD have gained considerable results. The programs have succeeded in dismantling nuclear submarines and securing many nuclear sites with updated technologies. More complex programs like the FMSM and plutonium reactor shut down, however, have fallen short of expectation. The DOD-run CTR scorecard for nuclear materials destroyed, as of January 27th 2005, includes: * 6,564 of 13,300 targeted warheads deactivated (49 %); * 570 of 1473 targeted ICBMs destroyed (38 %); * of 831 targeted missile silos eliminated (57 %); * 17 of 442 targeted ICBM mobile launchers destroyed (3.8 percent); * 142 of 228 targeted bombers eliminated (62 %); * 761 of 829 targeted nuclear ASMs destroyed (91 %); * 420 of 728 targeted SLBM launchers eliminated (57 %); * 28 of 48 targeted SSBNs destroyed (58 %); * 194 of 194 targeted nuclear test tunnels and holes sealed (100 %). Yet CTR’s project to open a safe storage facility for 50 tonnes of plutonium and 200 tonnes of HEU have flagged considerably. Begun in 1993, FMSF is CTR’s longest running program to date. A ribbon-cutting ceremony was held for the facility in December 2003, but additional safety equipment installation, training and test remain before the facility can being to receive fissile materials for storage. DOE run programs are harder to quantify, but its Materials Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) programs have offered both so-called “rapid upgrade” and “comprehensive upgrades” at sites storing weapons usable nuclear material. In conjunction with its Weapons Protection Control & Accountability (WPC&A) sister program at CTR, 37 percent of weapons usable nuclear material has been secured under lock and key in the past dozen years. Many in US Congress and a host of nuclear experts have complained that this progress is far to slow. But Senator Richard Lugar has argued that the alternative to slow progress is no progress at all. Bellona supports his position. The MPC&A programs have also received substantial budget increase requests for 2006. The DOE’s efforts to shut down Russia’s remaining weapons-grade plutonium production reactors—two in Seversk near Tomsk, and one at Zheleznogorsk near Krasnoyarsk, all in central Siberia— have been hobbled. As the reactors in question also supply heat and electricity to the communities where they are located, the DOE’s task it to shut the reactors down completely and build or refurbish nearby fossil fuel plants to compensate for the power loss when the reactors go off-line. But this project has become overburdened by bureaucracy and contractors, and a plan to shut down the reactors have yet to be developed. It is highly unlikely that the program will be effected prior to 2011. The reactors are meanwhile pumping out a combined 1200-1500 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium each year they remain operational. The HEU-LEU agreement an “unstructured” program We refer to the HEU-LEU Agreement as an “unstructured” program—that is the program serves its goal by converting HEU to LEU, but at the same time supplies considerable financial resources directly to the Russian nuclear industry. It has, in other words, less build-in financial accountability than do CTR and DOE programs. The question is, how does Russia spend the estimated $500 million annual financial windfall it yearly receives from the HEU-LEU program? In 2004, only 16 percent of the received funding is spent on increasing safety at nuclear installations. The bulk of this HEU-LEU funding is spent on construction of new nuclear sites outside of Russia (41 percent). Only 7.8 percent goes to reforms within Russia’s nuclear industry. Another 29 percent of the proceeds are used for unspecified expenses (approximately $162 million dollars in 2004). In reality this funding channel not only helps Russia to build nuclear power plants and other nuclear sites in such countries as Iran, India and China, but also supports the Cold War era nuclear infrastructure that has remained basically unchanged since Soviet times, and could barely survive without this funding feeding tube. Restructuring the programs As seen above the target programs (such as those sponsored by CTR and the DOE) bring leverage, but also have their share of remediable flaws. The HEU-LEU program converts weapons grade material, but at the same time pumps cash into the Russian nuclear infrastructure and Russian nuclear ambitions abroad, essentially putting the two programs at cross purposes. Massive Cold War uranium resources, equalling some 1200 tonnes of HEU, are of no use to the Russian military. These resources prevent the reform, as the country can live on them without reforming anything. But these HEU resources are finite. What will the United States and other donor countries do when these resources are depleted and Russia asks for considerable support again? Is it not better to make sure that these issues are resolved sooner rather than later, and that Russia’s nuclear infrastructure (both technical and regulatory) begins reforms now? The answer is obviously affirmative. But what should be done to achieve that goal? The problem is that Russia has yet to perform a true evaluation of its past strategies and policies, and has simply taken habits and practices inherited from Soviet times for granted. One such policy is the closed nuclear fuel cycle that Russia employs—taking spent nuclear fuel, reprocessing it at great danger to the environment and proliferation, and putting the separated uranium and reactor grade plutonim back into use. Is it this an effective strategy for Russia’s beleaguered nuclear industry that can barely keep up with its reprocessing back-log at Mayak? Nobody among Russia’s top nuclear brass has ever even tried to answer this question. Meanwhile, the current Plutonium disposition agreement—should it overcome its current liability deadlock—stipulated the destruction of only 34 tonnes of Russia’s estimated stockpile of 100 to 150 tonnes of weapons grade plutonium. What is to become of the rest? These questions remain unanswered, and will remain so as long as such policy questions are not evaluated in Moscow and no clear political decision has been made. There have been "concepts" forwarded by Russia’s current nuclear industry authority, Rosatom, but they are arguable on many points, even within the nuclear community itself. It must be asserted therefore that no political decision is in place. The lack of policy decisions in Moscow have led to roadblocks in a large number of US led programs, as well as European programs. To resolve this issue the EBRD has launched a project to create a so-called “Master Plan” for nuclear remediation of Northwest Russia’s limping nuclear infrastructure. The resultant Master Plan for Northwest Russia produced by Moscow fell short of expectations. The paper produced by Russian counterparts contained a methodically prioritised list of projects or areas of urgency. But there was a pronounced lack of comparisons to similar problems, and questions of what to do with Russia’s mounting stock of spent nuclear fuel were not elaborated upon. Russia should be encouraged to make clear, reason-based policies—a Master Plan for the whole Russia. Only then it will be clear how and what projects will work and whether they will be effective in the long run. Russia should also be encouraged to spend funds received from such philanthropic agreements as the HEU-LEU agreement for the safety and restructuring, rather than on the mere survival of Cold War era enterprises. Such policies will also create a clear picture on whether a particular project genuinely contributes to Russia’s nuclear security, instead of the Russian nuclear industry's corporate ambition. ---- Russia’s Abandoned Submarines Pose Threat By OLGA NEDBAYEVA, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, MOSCOW 06/10/05 14:11 http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=907064&C=europe Russia’s scrapped atomic submarines pose a serious nuclear threat, according to a British report published June 10, as a leading Russian environmental activist praised the country’s authorities for “unprecedented” openness in assisting the report’s authors. Russia must act to prevent a nuclear accident in northwest Russia’s Barents Sea region, home to 118 scrapped nuclear submarines as well as spent nuclear fuel storage sites, said Mark Gerchikov, coordinator of the report from British consulting firm National Nuclear Corporation. It was funded by the 60-nation European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. “Certain nuclear installations are in such a state that we cannot exclude a chain reaction” leading to a nuclear accident, Gerchikov said at the report’s presentation. The report is notable for having been written with the cooperation of Russia’s nuclear energy ministry, after years in which the state tried to quash discussion of abandoned nuclear submarines and waste sites littering the Barents Sea area. It focuses on two sites in Murmansk province as being of particular concern, including the Gremikha Naval Base, where spent nuclear fuel from Alfa class submarines is unloaded. Radiation levels at the sites are several times higher than recommended limits, yet workers often lack adequate protective clothing, Gerchikov said. Higher rates of illness noted among children in such areas should be studied in depth, he said. The 40-page report won ringing endorsement at the presentation from Alexander Nikitin, a former naval officer who spent 11 months in jail on charges of treason and espionage after he published articles about the nuclear threat posed by the Northern Fleet. The report is “a real turning point,” Nikitin said. “The atomic energy ministry has for the first time made unprecedented sacrifices, publishing secret documents for the first time,” Nikitin said. “This is the first attempt at dialogue with society on this sensitive problem,” said Sergei Baranovski, president of the Russian branch of the Green Cross, an environmental group set up by former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Since 1958 Moscow has constructed 450 naval nuclear reactors. Of these, two-thirds are located in the Barents Sea region, representing 20 percent of the world’s nuclear reactors. Western countries and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development have long been involved in trying to resolve the Northern Fleet’s nuclear problems. In 1999 Britain’s then Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, paid a visit to Murmansk to highlight the problem. The European Bank earlier this year launched a tender for carrying out clean-up work, to be paid for out of its Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership Support Fund. --- Report breaks new ground on nuclear threat posed by Russia's northern fleet MOSCOW (AFP) Jun 10, 2005 http://www.terradaily.com/2005/050610155416.bq5jscby.html Russia's scrapped atomic submarines pose a serious nuclear threat, a British report published Friday said, as a leading Russian environmental activist praised the country's authorities for "unprecedented" openness in assisting the report's authors. Russia must act to prevent a nuclear accident in northwest Russia's Barents Sea region, home to 118 scrapped nuclear submarines as well as spent nuclear fuel storage sites, said Mark Gerchikov, coordinator of the report from British consulting firm National Nuclear Corporation (NNC), funded by the 60-nation European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). "Certain nuclear installations are in such a state that we cannot exclude a chain reaction" leading to a nuclear accident, Gerchikov said at the report's presentation. The report is notable for having been written with the cooperation of Russia's nuclear energy ministry, after years in which the Russian state tried to quash discussion of the abandoned nuclear submarines and waste sites littering the Barents Sea area. It focuses on two sites in Murmansk province as being of particular concern, including the Gremikha naval base, where spent nuclear fuel from Alfa class submarines is unloaded. Radiation levels at the sites are several times higher than recommended limits, yet workers often lack adequate protective clothing, Gerchikov said. Higher rates of illness noted among children in such areas should be studied in depth, he said. The 40-page report won ringing endorsement at the presentation from Alexander Nikitin, a former naval officer who spent 11 months in jail on charges of treason and espionage after he published articles about the nuclear threat posed by the northern fleet. The report is "a real turning point," Nikitin said. "The atomic energy ministry has for the first time made unprecedented sacrifices, publishing secret documents for the first time," Nikitin said. "This is the first attempt at dialogue with society on this sensitive problem," said Sergei Baranovski, president of the Russian branch of the Green Cross, an environmental group set up by former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Since 1958 Moscow has constructed 450 naval nuclear reactors. Of these two thirds are located in the Barents Sea region, representing 20 percent of the world's nuclear reactors. Western countries and the EBRD have long been involved in trying to resolve the northern fleet's nuclear problems. In 1999 Britain's then foreign secretary, Robin Cook, paid a visit to Murmansk to highlight the problem. The EBRD earlier this year launched a tender for carrying out clean-up work, to be paid for out of its Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership Support Fund. ---- Court sides with Adamov By The Associated Press Friday, June 10, 2005 http://pittsburghlive.com/x/tribune-review/s_342753.html BERN, Switzerland -- A Swiss court ruled Thursday that former Russian nuclear energy minister Yevgeny Adamov, indicted by a federal grand jury in Pittsburgh, should be released from detention, but he remained in prison pending an appeal from the Swiss Justice Ministry, a spokesman said. The Federal Criminal Court upheld an appeal from Adamov, but the ministry immediately appealed the decision to the country's supreme court. Adamov will remain in custody until the court rules on that appeal, Justice Ministry spokesman Folco Galli said. "The federal supreme court hasn't responded yet, but at the moment he's still in detention," Galli told The Associated Press. Adamov and his Monroeville business partner Mark Kaushansky face a 20-count indictment alleging money laundering, tax evasion and conspiracy to defraud the United States. The indictment says that from 1993 to January 2003, the defendants laundered stolen nuclear-safety aid money into their personal and business bank accounts in Pittsburgh, France and Monaco. Lawyers for Adamov, who was arrested in Switzerland on a U.S. warrant, appealed May 17 against his detention on the grounds that Switzerland violated his immunity as a former government minister. Lanny Breuer, Adamov's American attorney, told a news conference in Washington that the Swiss court found that Adamov's arrest was illegal and violates Swiss and international law. "This decision shows that without question that the Swiss courts are independent and have shown, in our view, great wisdom," Breuer said. "The rule of law in Switzerland remains strong despite, in our view, the overreaching of the United States government and the United States Department of Justice." In Washington, Justice Department spokesman Bryan Sierra declined to comment on the ruling or its implications. He said the department does not "comment on extradition on specific cases." He referred questions to the U.S. Attorney's Office in Pittsburgh, which didn't immediately return a message. At the United States' request, Adamov was arrested May 2 during a visit to his daughter in the Swiss capital Bern. He has since been indicted by a federal grand jury in Pittsburgh. The United States says Adamov and Kaushansky diverted up to $9 million in U.S. Energy Department money intended to improve Russian nuclear security. Russian authorities, concerned that Adamov could divulge nuclear secrets if extradited to the United States, have demanded he be sent instead to Russia to face allegations concerning the illegal appropriation of money intended for nuclear security. The United States has yet to file for Adamov's extradition, but has until June 30 to make an official request. -------- security Plan to improve nuclear-detection technology mired in red tape By Siobhan Gorman, National Journal, June 10, 2005 http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0605/061005nj1.htm Back in 1987, as President Reagan's undersecretary of Defense for policy, Fred Ikle worked on what he felt was a groundbreaking Defense Science Board report that highlighted the need to improve nuclear-detection technology. Nothing happened. In 2004, he worked on another Defense Science Board report that highlighted the need to improve nuclear-detection technology. This time, he wasn't about to let the report go unnoticed. Ikle knew that the Center for the Study of the Presidency, a small Washington think tank, had been organizing roundtables aimed at offering practical advice to the Department of Homeland Security. The center, founded by former NATO Ambassador David Abshire, used its pull to assemble a heavyweight group of scientists who had defense backgrounds, including Norman Augustine, former CEO of Lockheed Martin. In the spring of 2004, the roundtable convened and concluded that politics, more than technology, was hindering the development of nuclear-detection capabilities. The group thought that if someone could break through the bureaucracy and create a type of "mini-Manhattan Project," the government could perhaps produce a real technological breakthrough in five to 10 years. The goal would be to create nuclear-detection equipment that was small enough and cheap enough to deploy around the world -- from Tora Bora to the Port of Los Angeles -- and sensitive enough to detect highly enriched uranium. Ikle and Richard Wagner, who authored the 2004 Defense Science Board study, pressed their Defense Department contacts. James Loy, the deputy secretary at Homeland Security, pressed within his department. Eventually, the issue rose to the level of a White House "Deputies Committee" meeting. "In Washington, people mostly have meetings," Ikle grumbles, noting that while the Manhattan Project produced the A-bomb in 28 months, "it takes Washington 28 months to produce an organizational chart." It was really more like six months before the deputies settled on a model, which they called the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, and got the go-ahead from the White House. Loy says the purpose of the office was to balance the premise that nuclear-detection capabilities were inherently limited by physics and couldn't get much better, against the more optimistic notion of Ikle and his allies that scientists weren't pushing the limits of physics hard enough. So, the office was charged with both maximizing the current capabilities and establishing a "mini-Manhattan Project." Vayl Oxford got a call in November 2004 asking him to lead the office's start-up. At the time, he was director of counterproliferation at the National Security Council. He accepted and immediately began drawing up his plans. The office would coordinate detection efforts across the federal government; establish common operational plans for officials at all levels of government who handle detection; and develop a global "architecture" of nuclear detection. But even as Oxford was planning, a skeptical Congress began yanking the rug out from under him. Arguing that DHS had no clear plan for how to spend the money, the House Appropriations Committee slashed the office's funding from $227 million to $127 million. "We're not going to resign ourselves to that number," says Oxford, noting that budget figures are rarely final this early in the year. Some of the participants in the original think-tank group behind the idea worry that the research-and-development program won't have the stature of a Manhattan Project if it is buried in the bowels of the Homeland Security Department. Ikle is concerned that the R&D program, if it gets funded at all, might parcel out small amounts of money to universities in various congressional districts, and not amount to much in the end. Many in the original roundtable group are already trying to persuade the White House to establish a mega-nuclear-detection research project outside of the new office. At the White House, though, Kenneth Rapuano, deputy assistant to the president for homeland security, says he sees the office as an ambitious research effort. Ikle's criticism, he says, "is a bit premature." If the new office eventually produces truly revolutionary detectors, the only place they're sure to be deployed is at the ports of entry along the border. Oxford has the power to cajole, but not to compel, the Energy Department and the FBI to heed his recommendations. Insiders report that the Defense Department is transferring people and programs to the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and sticking Homeland Security with the bill. Meanwhile, as the office, which plans to eventually house 110 employees, collects agents borrowed from other parts of the government, it runs the risk of filling up with other departments' castoffs. If all of these problems sound familiar, they should: The creation of the Homeland Security Department happened pretty much this way. Maybe the mini-Manhattan Project will do better. -------- treaties Going Ballistic? Reversing Missile Proliferation Aaron Karp, June 10, 2005 Arms Control Association http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2005_06/Karp.asp?print * The Status of the Major Nuclear-Weapon States' Ballistic Missile Forces * Notification of Missile Tests: The Easiest Step in Confidence Building? India celebrated the anniversary of its constitution Jan. 26 with the annual Republic Day parade along New Delhi’s imperial Rajpath. All the armed services were there, including horse and camel companies, but the culmination was the passing Prithvi and Agni ballistic missiles. Two months later, it was Pakistan’s turn, rolling out four ballistic missiles, including the 2,000-kilometer-range Shaheen-2, for the Pakistan Day military parade and cultural pageant.[1] As symbols, missiles remain unsurpassed. They are the ultimate visible manifestation of many countries’ military power (nuclear bombs are best kept out of sight). Although it has been decades since missiles were on the technological cutting edge and more than 60 years since Germany launched the first V-2, they have lost little psychological resonance. Celebrated in parades and praised by national leaders, they are valued as a reaffirmation of national identity, strategic power, and importance. Their value as a symbol of high-tech destruction transcends military logic. After all, in purely military terms, it is what the warheads carry that matters, and the most significant concerns arise in their coupling with nuclear weapons. Ballistic missiles have come to symbolize both the erratic threats of paranoid dictators and the final defense of insecure nations. The public display of ballistic missiles testifies to their widespread acceptance. It also illustrates the difficulties that have been encountered by countries seeking to control their spread. Unlike weapons of mass destruction, there is no taboo inhibiting their acquisition or forbidding their use. Some observers maintain that we are approaching a tipping point in world history, as the nonproliferation and arms control accomplishments of the last two generations become vulnerable to reversal.[2] Ballistic missiles illustrate this risk. None of the existing barriers to ballistic missile proliferation are sufficient to prevent a setback. One of the most important legal elements of the current framework, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), is in serious danger of being rendered ineffective as missile technology spreads. Other arms control approaches remain underdeveloped. Military responses such as pre-emption and missile defense do not work well enough to become full substitutes. Instead of a strong single mechanism, we are gradually shifting to an era in which security against ballistic missile threats depends on a collection of instruments, none fully effective, several working at cross purposes. Rather than accepting this patchwork, it is time to re-evaluate our fundamental attitude toward the ballistic missile itself. Although the moment for visionary schemes such as banning ballistic missiles has not arrived, this is the right time to take steps in that direction. In particular, leading countries should reconsider the role of ballistic missiles in their force structures and begin to reduce their salience and visibility. Three Multilateral Dialogues Diplomatic responses to missile proliferation range across a broad spectrum, from the bilateral to the universal. The risks of the unrestrained spread of missile capabilities have inspired considerable imagination. Among the prominent proposals of the last few years are concepts such as globalization of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Russia’s more recent Global Control System for universal rocket launch notification, and proposals for unification of export control systems or a UN verification agency. None have acquired much momentum. Instead, it is the more familiar MTCR, the Hague Code of Conduct, and to a lesser extent the UN Panel of Government Experts that dominate multilateral activity. Although the three are often described as different approaches to a common goal, they actually aim toward distinct objectives. They are based on very different and largely incompatible assumptions. That their divergences have been overlooked is possible only because their progress has been so uneven. The MTCR, based on export controls among a select group of countries, is the oldest and most institutionalized. The Hague Code of Conduct is much younger, based on the need for a normative principle to guide nonproliferation diplomacy. The UN experts process is the least developed, responding to pressure to find a universal agenda for missile policy. None of the three ever claimed to be a comprehensive solution to the global spread of ballistic missiles. Indeed, they are increasingly overburdened by specific missile challenges. Even so, collectively they constitute one of the most sophisticated international dialogues on arms control and disarmament in the world today. The MTCR The MTCR appears to be doing better than ever. Since it was unveiled in 1987, it has become about as institutionalized as a voluntary, informal organization possibly can be. It has become ever more adaptable, sophisticated, and engaged as it deals with countries other than its 34 formal members and contends with additional technologies. The interest of China, Libya, and nine other countries in joining the regime illustrates the global shift in attitudes toward a mechanism previously dismissed as a poorly disguised cartel. The formerly controversial group is acquiring global acceptance, maybe even legitimacy. At a more fundamental level, however, the MTCR is not doing so well. It has three basic problems. First, it still lacks the right members. Like many international disarmament mechanisms, it tends to preach to the choir; others try to ignore it. Some of these problems are easing. Chinese membership, for example, would be an extraordinary step toward comprehensiveness.[3] Nevertheless, there will always be countries outside of it—the North Koreas of the world. Second, there are problems of technology. The MTCR was built on the assumption that it was sufficient to block a few key technologies. This was true when it was first conceived in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. Then the biggest export challenges came from France, Germany, and Italy.[4] After considerable protest and denial, they changed their export policies dramatically. Facilitating the task was the complexity of projects such as the Condor-2. This collaborative German-Argentine-Egyptian-Iraqi effort to create a 900-kilometer-range missile relied on relatively sophisticated technologies. Such dependence, however, made them highly vulnerable to export controls. The MTCR was not trying to restrict the simple stuff; it targeted advanced technologies. By 1989, that job was completed for the most part.[5] The technologies available today, however, are much more difficult to restrain. At the low end, ubiquitous Scud technology is well known and readily modified. As it is available from North Korea and other secondary suppliers, it is very difficult to halt the spread of single-stage, liquid-fueled systems capable of delivering a nuclear-sized payload a distance of 280-1,200 kilometers. No less troubling are problems at the high end of the spectrum. The revolution in global manufacturing and the shift from mechanics to electronics has created missile technologies that are much simpler, cheaper, and better. In other words, the technological bottlenecks on which export controls relied gradually are disappearing as old technologies become easier to manage and easier substitutes appear. A prime example is solid fuel technology. With recipes from textbooks and chemicals from uncontroversial sources, amateurs are building ever-larger rockets. Last summer, a small group of American hobbyists launched a rocket weighing more than 600 kilograms that ascended several thousand feet. Another launched a smaller rocket to an altitude of almost 80 kilometers.[6] These folks literally work in their backyards and garages, building sophisticated, large rocket engines with minimal funding and no outside assistance. If this is what hobbyists do for fun, we need to reassess what governments and nonstate actors might be able to achieve in pursuit of mayhem. A similar revolution has transformed guidance systems. The MTCR was based on the assumption that the best way to guide a long-range rocket was to install an inertial navigation system (INS). Inertial navigation was perhaps the pinnacle of mechanical engineering and among the most complicated objects ever manufactured. In the mid-1990s, it became obsolete, replaced with much simpler microelectronic mechanical systems (MEMS). Some of the key accelerometer technologies are in every car; they deploy the emergency airbag. MEMS gyroscopes and accelerometers are not especially precise, but they are cheap, reliable, and easy to use. Their weaknesses are readily compensated through positional inputs from the Global Positioning System (GPS) network. MEMS technology can now be used to guide ballistic missiles, and when combined with GPS guidance,[7] its accuracy can surpass even the very best INS. The greatest technological questions today surround acquisition of ICBMs, the issue that has preoccupied U.S. analysts since the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission report.[8] There still are important barriers to acquiring ICBMs, but they are not largely technological bottlenecks. Instead, policy considerations pose the greatest obstacles. In other words, if countries fail to acquire ICBMs in the next decade or two, it will not be because they cannot get the essential hardware. Rather, it will be because they choose not to do so. The third major problem confronting the MTCR is the ambivalence of key members as they struggle to protect their own preferred export activities, be it cruise missiles or missile defense technology. The dedication to export prohibitions is eroding under pressure from changing strategic priorities and commercial needs. The desire to export cruise missiles has been extremely controversial, especially French- and British-led efforts to sell the Apache/Shaheen. The United States is struggling to reconcile export control with transferring ballistic missile defense capabilities to Israel, India, and East Asian allies.[9] A literal reading of the MTCR’s core “Technology Control Annex” reveals that much of this is prohibited, including technologies shared by offensive and defensive systems such as propulsion, guidance and control.[10] In the end, a formula undoubtedly will be found permitting exporters to have it both ways, but there is a cost to be paid for weakening the credibility of the regime. The Hague Code of Conduct Where the MTCR relies on technological criteria to guide policy among a select group of states, the Hague Code of Conduct tries to elevate a single, consistent set of principles to guide all countries in efforts to halt ballistic missile proliferation. The undertaking is all about building moral norms, rules of the road that everyone will accept. Completed in 2002, the Hague Code of Conduct is not a treaty for signature but a text to which states subscribe, pledging cooperation to: • Prevent and curb the proliferation of ballistic missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction; • To exercise the “maximum possible restraint” over their own ballistic missile procurement; • Not to “contribute to, support or assist” any ballistic missile program in countries violating international obligations; and • To implement transparency “to increase confidence and to promote non-proliferation.”[11] With 119 subscribing states to date, this is the most important effort to correct the greatest shortcoming of the MTCR: its lack of a unifying normative principle to guide all action against the spread of ballistic missiles.[12] With its focus on collective ideals, this European initiative represents perhaps the last surviving initiative of universalist arms control and disarmament from the 1990s. First appearing in 1999, almost exactly as the U.S. Senate rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the prospects for such an approach never were bright. Despite the burdens of swimming against the tide, however, the Hague Code of Conduct is integrated into the fabric of international arms control and disarmament.[13] Although it appeals to international sensibilities, the Hague Code of Conduct was the creation of a small, self-appointed group. The founders labored to distinguish their creation from the MTCR but could not avoid the stigma and weaknesses of a concept conceived by a few and presented to the many. As it struggled to gain support— the clearest measure of success and legitimacy—the document came under strong pressure to adapt to the demands of later signatories. The result is that a relatively weak document is coming under progressively greater pressure to become even more diluted. In this regard, the Hague Code of Conduct runs into the multilateral arms control tendency to degenerate into political logrolling. The only way to broaden voluntary participation is through appeals to specific national interests, but in doing so, universal principles and norms are diluted. The compromises inherent in negotiating a consensus tend to undermine any set of norms. The most immediate problem is pressure to include cruise missiles. Although the original authors worried most about ballistic missiles, many subsequent and potential signatories worry more about attacks with cruise missiles, whether from the United States and its allies or from emerging powers such as India and its new Brahmos system. If it is to prosper, expanding the Hague Code of Conduct to include cruise missiles probably is inevitable, if only because so many governments want it. There are good strategic reasons to control cruise missiles,[14] but the issues are very different from ballistic missile control, involving technologies much easier to acquire, more difficult to regulate, and more widely accepted. Nor is there any reason to believe the process will end there. If we include cruise missiles tomorrow, what about stealth attack aircraft such as the Joint Strike Fighter, designed to perform virtually identical military missions as a cruise missile? Do we include other tactical aircraft? What about precision munitions such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition? Strong regimes depend on strong norms. Rather than watering down these restrictions, they should be made more explicit. The Hague Code of Conduct establishes a useful norm when it declares its “[r]ecognition of the need to comprehensively prevent and curb the proliferation of ballistic missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.” A much stronger principle would declare the possession or use of ballistic missiles unacceptable. Until we have a norm establishing that ballistic missiles are a taboo, just as landmines and biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons are for most countries already, we will not have a strong missile technology control regime. A missile taboo remains far away. A modest step is missile test notification, an acknowledgement that with ownership comes responsibilities. As a stronger step, the Hague Code of Conduct should consider formally advocating ballistic missile dealerting. Although removing warheads or essential components for storage elsewhere does not affect the missiles themselves, it slows crisis escalation and strengthens stability. It reduces risks of unauthorized or accidental launch. To be meaningful, however, de-alerting requires someone to take the first step. De-alerting is one area where the established missile powers can take the lead, pioneering a path for others to follow. The UN Panel of Government Experts In theory, norms do not have to be enunciated fully mature like visions from above. It should be possible to create them through deliberation and consensus building. That was the goal of the process undertaken in 2001-2002 and 2004 by the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Missiles, a process scheduled to resume in 2007 and representing the mirror image of the Hague Code of Conduct. Instead of allowing a like-minded faction to create a principle to be sold to the rest of the world, this process started with a diverse group representing the world in pursuit of some kind of consensus. Where the Hague Code of Conduct was essentially an effort of deductive persuasion, the UN process was a project of inductive exploration. No one thought this was going to be easy. Many assumed it was impossible. Indeed, the greatest accomplishment of the first Panel of Governmental Experts was avoiding disaster.[15] It completed the task of producing a report in July 2002, albeit only by cutting so many corners there was precious little left on which to agree. Most blatantly, the troublesome word “missiles” was left undefined. Instead, much of the report was devoted to a seemingly anodyne list of international arms control and disarmament instruments. Included over the initial opposition of some delegations, this made the implicit point that the international community does indeed have the right to address the issue.[16] When the second panel met in July 2004, the guarded tolerance of the first round had dissipated. The exercise collapsed with recognition of the impossibility of drafting a consensus report, with criticism of the exercise coming from several quarters, including Iran (the original sponsor of the exercise); Pakistan, who feared becoming a target of missile controls; and Egypt and other Islamic states preoccupied with Israeli nuclear weapons.[17] Unable to establish a consensus, there was nothing left to do. Near-term hopes for a global missile norm all but died then and there, but the process refuses to die. A new study and a third experts panel was authorized by the UN General Assembly later that year. In an oblique acknowledgement of the frustrations, however, the new panel will not begin until 2007.[18] Although it has not dropped the ballistic missile issue, the United Nations’ attention has shifted. Rather than getting stuck on the hard realities of ballistic missiles, a recent report of the UN Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters recommends focusing on man-portable air-defense missiles. These have emerged as the common denominator, the technology where agreement is broadest.[19] The UN process has not been helped by a sense that it must make an original contribution to be worthwhile. This asks too much of its delicate formula. As it tries to recover momentum, the UN process will move faster if it primarily reinforces progress elsewhere, focusing on areas where consensus is most mature already. Above all, this means reinforcing the Hague Code of Conduct. Missile test notification is a modest but concrete measure well suited to consensus machinery. More ambitiously, missile de-alerting belongs on the UN agenda as well. No Diplomatic or Military Panaceas One thing that none of these three arms control and disarmament avenues has created is confidence. This is of particular concern to the United States, whose global engagement makes sensitivities to nonproliferation failures especially acute. It is a measure of U.S. weariness and insecurity that its most recent innovations rely not on cooperation but coercion. Although these offer important contributions to the emerging future security architecture, they cannot solve our proliferation problems. • Proliferation interdiction, most spectacularly through the Proliferation Security Initiative, offers a valuable tool of last resort against destabilizing exports. Whether it would prevent the recurrence of incidents such as the interception in December 2002 of the North Korean ship So San, with a cargo of 15 Scud missiles bound for Yemen, is not clear. As Libya’s renunciation of its weapons of mass destruction programs showed, interdiction can help enormously, but it is too narrow and reactive to halt basic proliferation trends. • Missile defense remains technically rudimentary and has not been adequately tested. Intended to respond to deterrence failures, it is not reliable enough to inspire confidence. It joins the global security equation as a source of additional doubt rather than transcendent certainty.[20] • When interdiction fails and missile defense is inadequate, pre-emptive nonproliferation warfare may become more difficult to resist. It has been tried roughly a dozen times since the Allies tried to destroy Norway’s Vemark heavy-water plant and the German V-2 program at Peenemünde in 1943.[21] Operation Iraqi Freedom did not enhance preemption’s image, but we have not seen the last of it. As dramatic as these three military departures appear, in at least one vital aspect they are identical to the three diplomatic avenues. None offer a comprehensive solution and none are sufficient responses to the challenges of missile proliferation. Missile defense is not a solution to the problem. Pre-emptive war amounts to a very costly way of slowing down a determined proliferator, not halting them. We have searched through the diplomatic and military vernaculars, only to prove there are no panaceas for missile worries. Indeed, military alternatives might best be appreciated as vehicles enabling us to pursue an arms control agenda more aggressively. Like all other active approaches to the problem, they ultimately can only buy time. Although this is not glorious, it is not bad either. Time is useful if used well. First Steps to Reverse Proliferation Multilateral approaches lack the tools, but they undoubtedly have the right idea. The only enduring solution to ballistic missile proliferation is to degrade the missile itself. In lieu of a taboo making procurement inconceivable and use unacceptable, proliferation will continue. As long as ballistic missiles are maintained as a source of pride, they will continue to arouse jealousy and imitation. As long as major powers invest in ballistic missiles for their security, it is only with luck that others can be convinced not to do the same. The most straightforward alternative is banning ballistic missiles outright. In its current form, the idea originated with President Ronald Reagan at the surreal 1986 Reykjavik summit where he and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev may have come near to a deal to ban all “offensive ballistic missiles.” Since then, it has acquired a gentle stream of support. Advocates of an outright ballistic missile ban have everything in their favor: logic, stability, and security[22]—everything except any prospect of near-term success. The 1990s showed that most major powers were willing to trim their ballistic missile forces substantially. Rather than building momentum toward eliminating such systems, however, these efforts appear to have run their course. Ballistic missiles remain fundamental elements of their deterrent forces, and have often only increased in importance. For some countries, they serve as totems of national identity as well. The trends in development and deployment favor modernization, if not expansion. Such trends do not portend a global arms race—far from it. The stability of ballistic missile forces, however, reaffirms the importance of such weapons, forming an additional barrier to global progress against proliferation. Even if a country’s missiles endanger no one, the mere fact that someone is clinging to them sends out a message that others are bound to hear. If we are serious about dealing with ballistic missile proliferation, we have to stop making distinctions between missiles— theirs are destabilizing, mine are just fine. To be sure, some owners are infinitely more alarming than others. In the short run, such distinctions are essential for effective security policy. A long-term solution, however, requires that we begin to see all ballistic missiles as undesirable. Recognizing the connection between the ballistic missiles of established powers and those of relative newcomers is an essential step for ending proliferation. Agreement on the elimination of chemical and biological weapons and anti-personnel mines became feasible only after leading powers declared they lacked any intrinsic interest in having them. This is not yet true of ballistic missiles, a weapon that remains much more legitimate. Yet, once we express a desire to be free of these weapons, however distant the ambition, we will achieve a crucial step toward global prohibition. The first concrete steps toward a ballistic missile taboo need not be revolutionary, nor need the final goal even be part of the process. Test notifications will help build stability. De-alerting would achieve even more. Above all, what is needed is a ban on new weapons. A process could be initiated with one country’s unilateral statement of intent not to procure additional ballistic missiles or to modernize current inventories. A more ambitious declaration would announce phased reductions. To be effective, policies to end reliance on missile forces would require widespread international support, but the first steps could come from any of the major powers. Even the modest acts of one of the secondary ballistic missile powers would be enough to start the creation of a taboo. Although others might continue to modernize or expand their forces, they would be compelled for the first time to justify such steps before a global audience. In the business of norm creation, the simple act of justification is tantamount to accepting the principle’s existence. By creating a cloud of doubt around the probity of ballistic missiles generally, reversal of proliferation will become truly feasible. The Status of the Major Nuclear-Weapon States' Ballistic Missile Forces China China continues gradual introduction of a new generation of solid-fuel ballistic missiles, including the DF-31, China’s first fully modern ICBM. Initially deployed in 1999, approximately eight were in service as of mid-2004.[1] Early versions reportedly have a range of 8,000 kilometers with a single warhead, but extended range versions with multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles have been reported as well. Another ICBM, the DF-41, has been reported in development since the mid-1980s. This weapon is said to be much larger, but details remain obscure. Whether these systems will complement or replace the country’s inventory of roughly 20-24 deployed DF-5 liquid-fueled ICBMs remains unclear. Production of short-range systems continues at a much faster pace, with about 50-70 additional missiles reportedly deployed opposite Taiwan annually, about 700 in all so far.[2] France France abandoned its land-based ballistic missiles in the 1990s but has just ordered final development and production of the M51, a new generation of sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). With a range of more than 6,000 kilometers, these reportedly will be able to reach China from normal patrols.[3] Deployment is scheduled to begin in 2010 and production is expected to total 50 missiles.[4] Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin justified the project as “a basic component of France’s independence.”[5] Russia Russia is simultaneously cutting and modernizing its ICBM and SLBM forces. A recent report notes that the land-based ICBM force is expected to decline from 496 missiles today to about 313 by 2010.[6] Meanwhile, President Vladimir Putin has publicly praised strategic modernization efforts.[7] The service lives of older, liquid-fueled SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs are being extended for an additional 10-20 years of operation.[8] Simultaneously, development is being completed on a new generation of solid-fuel systems: a road-mobile version of the Topol-M solid-fueled ICBM, scheduled for deployment in 2006, and the Bulava-30 solid-fuel SLBM.[9] Development of a new short-range ballistic missile, the 280-kilometer-range Iskander, also has been completed. The United Kingdom The United Kingdom stands out for its apparent contentment with a force of 58 Trident-2 SLBMs, acquired in the 1980s and 1990s to arm its four Vanguard-class submarines.[10] A decision on whether to replace the Trident missiles and Vanguard submarines is likely in 2007.[11] The United States The United States began a 15-year service-life extension program for the 500 Minuteman-3 ICBMs in 1997. No new Minuteman ICBMs have been built since 1979, but modernization includes new motors, guidance, and ground-support systems.[12] There are further plans to improve the range and accuracy of the existing fleet under the “Minuteman-3 Elite” program.[13] The Navy’s D5 Trident-2 SLBM remains in lowrate production, with orders for six to 12 annually. There has been official discussion about fielding a new land-based ICBM, possibly beginning in 2018, but there are no firm plans.[14] Current debates focus more on the possibility of adapting long-range ballistic missiles to conventional missions.[15] The last of the 50 MX Peacekeepers will be deactivated this September.[16] ENDNOTES 1. The Military Balance 2004-2005 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 170. 2. “Taipei: China Missile Threat Grows,” CNN.com, January 31, 2005. 3. Laurent Zecchini, “In Brest, Michele Alliot-Marie Defends the New Generation M51 Nuclear Missile,” Le Monde, January 13, 2005 (FBIS translation). 4. Isabelle Lasserre, “France Modernizes Its Nuclear Deterrent,” Le Figaro, January 15, 2005 (FBIS translation). 5. “France Arms Procurement Body Places 3-BN Euro Order for Submarine Missiles,” Agence France Presse, December 23, 2004. 6. Ivan Safronov, “Russian Missiles Will Die of Age, Nuclear Disarmament,” Kommersant, April 1, 2005 (FBIS translation). 7. Steven Lee Myers, “Putin Says New Missile Systems Will Give Russia A Nuclear Edge,” The New York Times, November 18, 2004, p. A3. 8. “Russian Strategic Missile Forces Working to Extend Missile’s Service Lives,” Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, May 6, 2004 (FBIS translation). 9. Nikolay Khorunzhiy, “Missile Arms Expert Vladimir Dvorkin: Maneuverable Warheads Could Also Be Used,” Izvestiya, November 30, 2004, p. 7; Igor Korotchenko, “The Topic: Underwater Strike, Successful Tests of Buluva-30 Missile Complex Held,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, September 29, 2004, p. 1 (FBIS translation). 10. Military Balance 2004-2005, p. 73. 11. Andrew Chuter, “Old Problems Await New U.K. Government,” Defense News, April 11, 2005, p. 4. 12. “Minuteman Motor Production Resumes After a Nine-Month Gap,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, September 2004. 13. Scott R. Gourley, “Minuteman III Elite Concept Emerging,” International Defense Review, July 2004. 14. Amy Butler, “Hatch Pushes for ICBM Enhancement Funds,” Defense Daily, January 29, 2004, p. 7. 15. Jeremy Singer, “AF Space Command to Study Arming ICBMs With Conventional Warheads,” Defense News, October 25, 2004, p. 44. 16. Walter Pincus, “Commander Seeks Alternate Uses for ICBMs,” The Washington Post, April 21, 2005, p. A24. Notification of Missile Tests: The Easiest Step in Confidence Building? Pre-notification of missile test flights is a familiar part of the confidence-building canon, but implementation has been tough. This was illustrated by the fate of the proposed U.S.-Russian Joint Data Exchange Center, conceived to minimize confusion over ballistic missile launches that could be mistaken for a first strike. Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin agreed to set up a Moscow-based center in September 1998. Details were finalized in June 2000, requiring pre-notification of all ballistic missile tests greater than 500 kilometers.[1] As of this writing, however, the center still has not opened, ostensibly because of lack of interest on both sides. The idea is extremely relevant anywhere missile flights are a strategic concern. It is endorsed by the Hague Code of Conduct and has support in South Asia, where tests are highly publicized and provocative political signals. India and Pakistan agreed to notify each other of such tests in the 1999 Lahore Memorandum of Understanding: “The two sides undertake to provide each other with advance notification in respect of ballistic missile flight tests, and shall conclude a bilateral agreement in this regard.”[2] Subsequently, both countries have usually warned each other, and often the United States, a few days before major flight tests. After India’s Congress Party formed a new government in May 2004, the two countries have attempted to construct a more formal regime. Talks in July 2004 in Islamabad between Indian Foreign Minister K. Natwar Singh and Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf authorized formal negotiations. At a meeting last December, the two “discussed and narrowed further their differences on the draft agreement on pre-notification of flight testing of ballistic missiles, and agreed to work towards its early finalization.”[3] Although the participants hope to complete an agreement this summer, several serious issues remain unresolved: • The types of missiles to be included. Pakistan wants to include all missiles, including the Russian- Indian Brahmos cruise missile, while India wants an agreement limited to “long-range” ballistic missiles, possibly to exclude their short-range Prithvi missiles. • The location of tests. India wants to restrict launches to sites at least 100 kilometers from any national border. Pakistan, citing geographic constraints, seeks to test from sites closer to its boundaries. • The number of days before a test that notification would be required. • The directions in which test launches would be permitted. • How much information to provide about the size of areas that could be impacted by missiles. Negotiators are attempting to reconcile the requirements of maritime and aviation safety with preservation of secrecy of missile accuracy. • The rules governing notification of third parties, such as the United States. • What mode the two countries should employ in notifying each other. As the talks continue, the negotiating agenda has grown and bogged down. It increasingly appears that the process can be rescued only by high-level intervention. Meanwhile, both sides continue with informal notification of major ballistic missile tests.[4] ENDNOTES 1. Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the Establishment of a Joint Center for the Exchange of Data from Early Warning Systems and Notifications of Missile Launches, signed June 4, 2000. 2. The text of the Memorandum of Understanding signed by Indian Foreign Secretary K. Raghunath and Pakistani Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad in Lahore on February 21, 1999, is available at http://www. usip.org. 3. Joint statement of the meeting between the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan, Islamabad, December 28, 2004. 4. Shaiq Hussain, “Informal Talks for Missile Test Agreement,” The Nation (Islamabad), February 23, 2005. Aaron Karp is an adjunct professor of political science at Old Dominion University in Virginia and author of Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Techniques (Oxford University Press: 1996). ENDNOTES 1. “Ghauri, Shaheen Missiles, Tanks Displayed at Pakistan Day Parade,” PTV World, March 23, 2005 (FBIS translation). 2. Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2004). 3. Victor Zaborsky, “Does China Belong in the Missile Technology Regime?” Arms Control Today, October 2004, pp. 20-26. 4. The best introduction to the birth of the MTCR is Richard Speier, “The Missile Technology Control Regime: Case Study of a Multilateral Negotiation” (manuscript, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., November 1995). 5. The early years of MTCR implementation are the subject of Wyn Bowen, The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation (London: Macmillan, 2000). 6. Neil McGilvray, “Give Me Liberty or Give Me a Crane and Some Scaffolding,” High Power Rocketry, vol. 35, no. 6 (September 2004): 6-47. 7. The unclassified literature on MEMS and GPS/ INS is surprising large, a direct result of its commercial importance. A useful summary of the export control issues is Vago Muradian, “Little Chip, Big Problems: How a Solid-State Gyro Is Reshaping U.S. Export Policy,” Defense News, November 24, 2003, p. 1. 8. Greg Thielmann, “Rumsfeld Reprise? The Missile Report That Foretold the Iraq Intelligence Controversy,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2003, pp. 3-8. 9. Bradley Graham, “U.S. Controls Hamper Foreign Role in Missile Defense,” The Washington Post, October 19, 2003, p. A27; Amy Svitak and Gopal Ratnam; “Missile Defense vs. Non-Proliferation: White House Policy Tests International Limits,” Defense News, July 14, 2003. 10. Richard Speier, “Complementary or Competitive? Missile Controls vs. Missile Defense,” Arms Control Today, June 2004. 11. The text is available on the website of the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at http://www.bmaa.gv.at/up-media/114_HCOC.pdf. 12. Subscribing states are available at http://www.bmaa.gv.at. 13. Mark Smith, “On Thin Ice: First Steps for the Ballistic Missile Code of Conduct,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2002, pp. 9-13. 14. Dennis M. Gormley, “New Developments in Unmanned Air Vehicles and Land-Attack Cruise Missiles,” SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), chap. 12. 15. For the analysis by the primary consultants to the panel, see W. Pal S. Sidhu and Christophe Carle, “Managing Missiles: Blind Spot or Blind Alley?” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 72 (August/September 2003) pp. 25-29. 16. The Issue of Missiles in All Its Aspects: Report of the Secretary-General, A/57/229, July 23, 2002. 17. UN Panel of Governmental Experts participant, conversation with author, March 30, 2005. 18. First Committee, UN General Assembly, “Missiles,” A/C.1/59/L.6/Rev.1, October 26, 2004. 19. “Multilateral Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Regimes and the Role of the United Nations: An Evaluation,” DDA Occasional Paper no. 8 (New York: UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, October 2004), pp. 29-34. 20. For further development of this perspective, see Aaron Karp, “The New Indeterminacy of Deterrence and Missile Defense,” Contemporary Security Policy, April 2004. 21. Robert S. Litwak, “The New Calculus of Preemption,” Survival, Winter 2002-03, pp. 53-80. 22. Alton Frye, “Zero Ballistic Missiles,” Foreign Policy, no. 88 (Fall 1992), pp. 3-20; Steve Andreasen, “Reagan Was Right: Let’s Ban Ballistic Missiles,” Survival, Spring 2004, pp. 117-129. -------- u.s. nuc facilities -------- nevada Chief of U.S. Geological Survey resigning amid flap over Yucca Mtn. documents Posted: 6/10/2005 11:13 am Reno Gazette-Journal http://www.rgj.com/news/stories/html/2005/06/10/101507.php LAS VEGAS — The U.S. Geological Survey director criticized since the disclosure that several agency scientists might have falsified documents about a planned Nevada nuclear waste repository is stepping down. Charles G. Groat’s resignation, announced Thursday in Washington, D.C., was not connected with the Yucca Mountain project, survey spokeswoman A.B. Wade said. Groat will return effective June 17 to the University of Texas at Austin, where he once served as an associate geology professor and acting director of the Bureau of Economic Geology. Interior Gale A. Norton praised Groat, who has headed the USGS since November 1998, for applying USGS science “to supporting important decisions regarding resource and environmental management and policy.” Groat has been under fire since he and Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman announced in March the discovery of e-mail messages written by USGS hydrologists between 1998 and 2000 discussing possible falsification of quality assurance documents on water infiltration research they did for the Yucca Mountain project. The disclosures sparked ongoing investigations by Energy Department and Interior Department inspectors general, aided by the FBI, and by a U.S. House subcommittee headed by Rep. Jon Porter, R-Nev. Nevada lawmakers have criticized Groat for not taking immediate disciplinary action against the hydrologists, who remain at the agency, and for not turning over requested documents. Groat expressed support for investigations to clear the USGS, which he said had a 125-year reputation for sound, unbiased science. The Energy Department plans to seek a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to entomb 77,000 tons of the nation’s most radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain. Congress in 2002 approved putting the repository at the site 90 miles northwest of Las Vegas. A date for opening the repository has been pushed back from 2010 to 2012 or later following a federal court ruling that an Environmental Protection Agency radiation standard was insufficient, congressional budget cuts and the e-mail revelations. John Arthur, a top Yucca Mountain project official, reported this week that the Energy Department has tentatively concluded that repository science was not compromised by the USGS scientists. Groat will be the Jackson Chair in Energy and Mineral Resources in the School of Geosciences at the University of Texas, the Interior Department said. He also will direct the school’s new Center for International Energy and Environmental Policy. ---- DOE official: Yucca plans advancing 2015 eyed as opening date for nuke dump By Stephen Curran LAS VEGAS SUN June 10, 2005 http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/text/2005/jun/10/518886841.html PAHRUMP -- An Energy Department official pledged Thursday that the planned nuclear waste dump at Yucca Mountain is moving "full steam ahead," although a representative of an energy company said he was eyeing 2015 for a potential opening. "We're moving full steam ahead with this thing," J. Gary Lanthrum, director of the Energy Department's Office of National Transportation, told the Central Nevada Community Protection Working Group. "But I don't want to get everybody energized and then have to pull back." Delays and now the question of falsified work on the project have clouded the future of the project 90 miles northwest of Las Vegas. Former Yucca Mountain Project head Margaret Chu said in March that engineers were looking for a 2012 opening date, two years later than expected, but engineer David Jones, who spoke to the working group on behalf of nuclear power plant owner Exelon Energy, said company officials were now eyeing 2015 as a possible target. Whether either date is a possibility will likely hinge on the outcome of a delayed license application engineers are now scrambling to complete before the end of the year, Lanthrum said. Even then, the department will face a lengthy Nuclear Regulatory Commission review before it receives the final go-ahead to begin building the repository. Despite congressional and internal investigations into a batch of e-mails that have raised concerns about the falsification of some of the science being used to support Yucca Mountain, project managers are pushing forward. Lanthrum said the department hopes later this year to begin the conceptual design of rail cars that would carry high-level nuclear waste to Yucca Mountain. Meanwhile the Energy Department is standing behind the scientific review of the site, said W. John Arthur, deputy director of the department's Office of Repository Development, as he discussed e-mails between U.S. Geological Survey and Energy Department scientists that brought the science into question. "It really is the worst thing, when individuals have an absolute disrespect for quality assurance, at least allegedly," Arthur said during the working group's public meeting at the Pahrump campus of the Community College of Southern Nevada. "The onus is on us to show this is limited to two out of the thousands of scientists working on the project. ... We have absolute confidence in the people working for us." The widely controversial project has been the source of tension between state leaders leaders and those in the rural counties where the 319-mile rail line would run. Rural leaders, who largely see the nuclear waste dump as inevitable, have publicly stated they intend to negotiate with federal officials for financial benefits from the project while state leaders have mostly been outspoken in bipartisan criticism of the federal government. The working group has been a forum for rural leaders to work with the Energy Department and others on Yucca Mountain issues. The state attorney general last year found the working group may have knowingly violated the state open meeting law when it closed doors of meetings to residents and media. The meetings were later ordered to be open after a complaint filed by the Sun and joined by the Nevada Press Association. Nye County Commission Chairwoman Candice Trummell, a long-time proponent of the project and member of the working group, estimated the rail line could bring "thousands" of jobs during a construction process likely to last years. Karen Leigh Kimball, a vice president for engineering firm Parsons, said no definitive studies on the economic impact on how the line could help the rural counties have been conducted but that it could likely bring about 1,000 construction-related jobs. How many of those would be recruited locally would depend on what percentage of those workers were management-level employees, who would likely be brought in from elsewhere, she said. Nye County, where Pahrump sits, has already seen more than $100 million in economic benefits from the Nuclear Waste Policy Act signed in the late 1980s. That legislation -- which has paid Nye County about $10.5 million a year since -- has allowed the growing county to pay for much-needed infrastructure improvements, Trummell said. In that time commissioners have approved improvements to parks and recreation facilities, including a new community center in Beatty and numerous public safety improvements, she said. If the Yucca project were to fail, the flow of money would stop, Trummell said. "That money is being used and has been used," she said. "There's a lot of things we've done." The board, on which she has sat since 2003, has been careful not to earmark the funds for necessary operating expenses, a move that will allow a county perhaps best known outside Nevada for its legalized brothels to keep running even without the windfall, Trummell said. So, even if the project goes belly-up, "it isn't like Nye County's going to go bankrupt," she said. -------- MILITARY -------- latin america Protests ease, but no honeymoon for Bolivia's new leader Updated 6/10/2005 5:11 PM (AP) http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-06-10-bolivia-president_x.htm SUCRE, Bolivia — Protesters who drove Bolivia's president from office began to leave occupied oil fields Friday and lifted the first of their 100-odd roadblocks as the country's new leader moved into the Government Palace. But demonstrators marched on the capital, La Paz, in a show of strength to make sure the new caretaker president respects pledges to call early elections and consider their demands for an end to widespread inequality and poverty. Evo Morales, the congressman who led the protests, declared a "truce" in a month of demonstrations and consulted with other opposition leaders on whether to declare a formal end to the protests after Eduardo Rodriguez became president. "One must understand that he is the new president and he has expressed a commitment to listen to our demands," said Morales, a former coca farmer with designs on the presidency. "His election is easing the tensions and we are going to accept a truce." (Related video: New leader pledges early elections) But it was clear from his first day in office that Rodriguez, the Supreme Court justice tapped to end the escalating crisis, would have no honeymoon. As Rodriguez stood Friday in La Paz's Government Palace to receive the presidential sash, firecrackers boomed and thousands of protesters marched only blocks away. The Harvard-trained jurist has a daunting challenge: to defuse a country on edge whose majority Indians, coca-leaf farmers and leftist labor and student groups are clamoring for a greater share of power, for nationalizing the oil industry and for backing away from U.S.-style free-market programs they blame for widespread poverty. Rodriguez said he would call presidential elections within five months to complete the term of Carlos Mesa, a U.S. ally who resigned after 19 chaotic months in power because of the enormous street protests. Congress accepted his resignation late Thursday. Fearing more protests, the two men in line for the presidency both deferred to Rodriguez. Under Bolivia's constitution, Rodriguez must call presidential elections within 150 days — about five months. Morales is expected to be a leading candidate. A presidency of Morales, an Aymara Indian who calls himself a follower of Venezuela's anti-American President Hugo Chavez, would bring to seven the number of leftist leaders in Latin America. He could face former President Jorge Quiroga, a U.S.-trained engineer of Spanish descent who governed from 2001-2002 with a free-market government. Quiroga has not yet said whether he would run. Rodriguez promised to study ways to bring together Bolivia's society, polarized between haves and have-nots, between people with more Indian or more European blood, and between long-established ruling elites and powerless poor. "Let's build the peace together and create a great national unity accord that will let us confront the great challenges facing our country," said Rodriguez, 49. Protests clogged La Paz on Friday, but with fewer people than the tens of thousands who marched in previous days. Sanet Pardo, one of 1,500 teachers and labor activists on the streets, said the show of strength was a warning to the new president that the opposition wants action. "We are still right here," Pardo said. "We are demanding the nationalization of the oil industry 100%. Until we get an answer we are going to keep marching, because there are no jobs, lots of hunger and we still don't have answers — even with this new clown." Protesters removed some of the more than 70 roadblocks across the country, and energy companies said radical farmers had pulled out of several occupied oil fields. "Bolivia has avoided the worst," said political scientist Jorge Lazarte. But slum dwellers in El Alto, above La Paz, signaled they weren't ready to lift the blockade keeping trucks away, and residents who have suffered through a month of shortages continued to wait. Yaguar Marquez, who runs a gas station with not a drop in the pumps, said he had to turn away a motorist on his way to the hospital with a woman in labor, an ambulance and a hearse loaded with a casket. "I guess the bodies were already starting to decompose at the funeral homes and there was no way to get to them to the cemeteries," he said. "A hearse pulled up and the driver said he had to get some gas. I told him we didn't have any, so I guess someone gave him a push." -------- nato Russia Objects to NATO Plans for Patrolling Black Sea Created: 10.06.2005 MosNews Russia objects to NATO plans for expanding its Mediterranean Sea anti-terror operations into the Black Sea, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said Thursday. Ivanov told Russian news agencies in Brussels, where he was meeting with NATO defense ministers, that there was no reason for Operation Active Endeavor to begin patrolling the Black Sea. The mission has monitored shipping in the Mediterranean and Straits of Gibraltar since the 9/11 attacks on the United States. NATO officials claim it has successfully deterred terrorists from carrying out attacks on shipping or using Mediterranean routes to transport materials for weapons, The Associated Press reported. About two dozen NATO ships are taking part in the operation; two Russian ships are also participating. “We do not see how the operation mandate can spread into the Black Sea,” Ivanov was quoted as saying by the Interfax news agency. Russia and NATO often have uneasy relations, particularly with the admission of the former Soviet Baltic states into the alliance. Ivanov also proposed hosting joint exercises between NATO and Russian special forces sometime next year, Interfax reported. “There is a need for new ideas and initiatives for the removal of stumbling blocks in our interaction and the solution of the problems that remain,” Ivanov was quoted as saying. Also, speaking in Brussels, Ivanov said that Russia was not planning to join NATO. “Russia is not a member of NATO and has no plans to join it in the near future,” he told the news conference after the summit. Ivanov said that various aspects of cooperation between Moscow and the alliance were examined at the meeting and documents aimed at increasing the level of operational compatibility of troops were adopted. “Today all the defence ministers of NATO and Russia approved the political-military instructions on increasing the level of operational compatibility of Russian and NATO troops. This will further strengthen the basis of our cooperation,” the Russian defence minister said. -------- POLITICS -------- us politics Schwarzenegger won't shy from confrontation By Jill Lawrence, USA TODAY Updated 6/10/2005 http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-06-09-schwarzenegger-cover_x.htm The former bodybuilder, film star and business mogul says he knows what Californians need and can convince them he's right. So Monday, he's going to call a special election to put his proposals directly to the voters Nov. 8. (Related item: Schwarzenegger timeline) "I was sent by the people," says the man who won his office in the recall election that ousted Democrat Gray Davis in 2003. "We are mad as hell, and we are not going to take it any longer." His solutions are to make it harder for teachers to get tenure, to strip legislators of the ability to draw their own districts and to give the governor vast new powers to cut spending. The results could resonate beyond California, because other states often follow its lead. The state estimates it will cost $80 million to put those initiatives before voters in a special election this fall. An independent public poll shows 33% of California adults support such an election. The governor himself is at 40% job approval in public polls and just above 50% in his own internal polls. Not the strongest position from which to try to upend the political processes of the nation's largest state. But this is a celebrity with little self-doubt and even less to lose, even if the initiatives are defeated. "What is going to happen if everything fails? Life goes on," Schwarzenegger said during a 45-minute interview Wednesday. "What do you think, I'm worried about that? I'm only thinking of one thing: victory for the people of California. ... I've done my trip to glorify myself, to do all my things, and to shine. I'm doing this because it gives me a chance to give something back." In a wide-ranging conversation punctuated by jokes, anecdotes and occasional flashes of heat, Schwarzenegger discussed his proposals and his sense of urgency, his state's dire fiscal condition and his intended "year of reform." He talked about his confrontational relationship with public-employee unions and Democratic state legislators, and an adviser's recent assertion in a conference call with donors that the team aimed to create "a phenomenon of anger" against the unions. How does that anger strategy, reported this week in the Los Angeles Times, fit with Schwarzenegger's stated goal of bringing people together? "It doesn't," he replied bluntly. "This is one of the things when I'm not on the phone that happens, that people go a little bit off the deep end. I am in principle totally against this kind of dialogue." In his first comments on the report, Schwarzenegger said the monthly calls are meant to update donors on campaign activities, assure them their money is being spent wisely and motivate them to get other people involved. He said he has canceled the calls until "we make sure there are rules of what ought to be said." Confronting unions There's no question Schwarzenegger himself is angry with unions, particularly those representing teachers and nurses. He blames what he calls their ceaseless demands for money for the $22 billion deficit he faced when he took office. IN HIS OWN WORDS Excerpts from USA TODAY interview with California Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger: "My wife has been a great trouper. She doesn't ever complain, but I know that it must be difficult for her because she comes from a family that has been built by unions and in turn the family has done great things for the unions." - On Maria Shriver's reaction to her husband's tense relationship with public-employee unions. "I know he has to reach out to his constituents and show how ballsy he is." - On why California Assembly Speaker Fabian Nunez says Schwarzenegger is acting like "a right-wing nut." "People have always given me funny nicknames. I really enjoy them a lot." - On his latest nickname, "The Governator." Source: USA TODAY interview But no politician wants to be crossways with nurses and teachers, even an unconventional one such as Schwarzenegger. Ask about his tense relations with them, and he delivers a stern lecture on the difference between nurses and the nurses union, teachers and the teachers union. "I have faith in the teachers," he says. "I'm a big believer in nurses." If you have to break eggs to make an omelet, Schwarzenegger could be serving up a statewide brunch. Though the campaign won't officially start until Schwarzenegger makes his announcement Monday, the rhetoric has been red-hot since he signaled his intentions in his state of the state address Jan. 5. More than $20 million has been spent on advertising by both sides. Rallies against Schwarzenegger drew more than 10,000 protesters here and thousands more in Los Angeles last month. California Democrats say they are bewildered. Last year, they were Schwarzenegger's partners; this year, they are his enemies. State controller Steve Westly, who will announce his 2006 candidacy for governor this month, says Schwarzenegger cultivated a bipartisan, above-the-fray image in 2004. "This year, it's name calling and insults," he says. "He's kicking every hornet's nest in the state." It's all part of a three-year plan Schwarzenegger launched in 2004: "First is stopping the bleeding. Healing the patient is No. 2. No. 3 is build California." Is No. 4 run for re-election in 2006? The governor refused to say. His initiatives are the cornerstone of phase two. They would: • Transfer the authority to draw legislative and congressional districts from the Legislature to a panel of retired judges. That's hard to get lawmakers to do themselves, since they stand to lose enormous power. • Require teachers to wait five years for tenure, instead of the current two. Barbara Kerr, president of the California Teachers Association, says it will be harder to attract new talent without job security. • Give the governor discretion to cut state spending throughout the budget year to "live within our means." It would be a huge transfer of power from lawmakers to the governor. It would also override an earlier initiative requiring a certain level of education spending annually and, unions fear, open the door to deep cuts in other areas. Schwarzenegger's proposals won't be the only ones on the ballot. Another initiative would require unions to ask yearly permission of members to use part of their dues for political activities. Kerr calls it "an attempt to cripple us and silence our voices so we can't fight" the governor. Sponsored by a Schwarzenegger ally, it is guaranteed to mobilize both conservatives and unions. Schwarzenegger told USA TODAY he supports the idea "in principle" and will decide whether to endorse the initiative closer to the election. Confrontation with unions is driving Schwarzenegger's second year in office. Unions representing firefighters and other government employees are still smarting over a pension privatization plan Schwarzenegger proposed and then withdrew. They've formed a coalition to finance ads that conclude with the tagline: "He's not fighting special interests, he's fighting us." The California Nurses Association sued Schwarzenegger after he tried to suspend a law limiting patients per nurse, which holds down nurses' workloads. They also started protesting at his appearances, some 60 times since December. They've chanted, picketed, marched in a fake funeral procession to the Capitol, advertised on radio, TV and billboards, and hired planes to fly banners with anti-Arnold messages. This week, they won the lawsuit. The California Teachers Association launched a media campaign in January after the governor described them as a special interest working against children's interests. The union ceded $2 billion in education spending last year to help Schwarzenegger balance the budget and was incensed this year when he failed to restore it. The teacher union's latest TV ad says he wants more control over education spending even though "you borrowed $2 billion from the education budget and refused to pay it back. Governor, how can we trust you with more power, if you can't keep your promises to our schools and our kids?" Schwarzenegger said he is not breaking any promises and had harsh words for the union. "They don't know which way that they should lie to the people," he said in the interview. "They talk about $8 billion, $2 billion, $3.1 billion. They're crossing all the time with their stories" about how much money education should get. 'Mr. Special Interest' Schwarzenegger raised nearly $30 million last year from an array of corporate contributors, some of whom are giving in $250,000 increments to help promote his ballot initiatives. Asked whether they are special interests, he replied, "As soon as a group of people is between the public and the politicians, it becomes a special interest. Now that can mean the drug companies, that can mean the auto dealers. Anyone that is fighting for their (own) interests. It doesn't mean they're bad." J.J. Jelincic, president of the California State Employees Association, has his own definition: "For Arnold Schwarzenegger, a special interest is anyone who has not written him a $100,000 check." Bob Stern, president of the Center for Governmental Studies in Los Angeles, says Schwarzenegger's conference calls with donors highlight a paradox: "He came in saying that he was against the special interests and he's become Mr. Special Interest. You give a certain amount of cash, and you get special access to a special phone number to give your input." Stern adds, "He also came in saying he wanted to bring everybody together. Yet there's never been as much bitterness in Sacramento as there is today." Schwarzenegger insisted to USA TODAY that the atmosphere here is constructive. "Behind the scenes, we hug and we talk and we discuss things," he said. Still, he repeatedly depicted Democratic lawmakers as unprincipled puppets of their union contributors. "Legislators shouldn't sell out to the unions," he said. It's a theme of his current TV ad as well. Assembly Speaker Fabian Nunez, a Democrat from Los Angeles, has vowed mutually assured destruction. "If the governor's going to take us on and bring us down, he's coming down right along with us," he said at a briefing this week. 'Bigger than life' Democrats like to describe Schwarzenegger as if he were still playing action heroes in the movies: a chest-pounding, butt-kicking political impostor. "He still thinks he's an actor," says state Treasurer Phil Angelides, an announced Democratic candidate for governor next year. "He's just trying to bully his way through being governor." Democrats also like to offer other ways to spend the $80 million the governor would put toward a special election: tuition for 9,000 state university students; health insurance for 65,000 young adults; home care for 10,000 seniors or prescriptions for 89,000 of them. Where will he get $80 million? they ask. And what's the rush? They quote a poll showing six in 10 people would prefer voting on the initiatives in the next regular election, a primary in June 2006. Assemblyman Mark Leno suggests maybe Schwarzenegger wants the low turnout typical in elections with no candidates. "The fewer voters, the more easily the outcome can be controlled," he says. Schwarzenegger says he is in a hurry because the current system requires the state to spend more than it takes in — so the deficits keep piling up. "You would not walk around and wait for some election next year to have your blood pressure fixed or your broken arm be fixed," he said. "It's ludicrous. We've gotta do it now." Republicans, a minority here, find Schwarzenegger's aggressiveness bracing. "Because he's new, because he's bigger than life in every respect, he's willing to take on what's untouchable," says state finance director Tom Campbell, a former member of Congress. State Senate Republican leader Kevin McCarthy gives another reason for the Austrian-born Schwarzenegger's fearlessness: He's not angling for higher office, because only native-born Americans can occupy the White House. "This governor can't be president," he says. "He knows it; we all know it." Mark DiCamillo, director of the statewide, non-partisan Field Poll, says the slim leads Schwarzenegger's proposals enjoy will be hard to sustain in the endgame ad barrage. But then again, "he's a man who likes to overcome obstacles." Schwarzenegger says all people need is information, and he'll make sure they get it: "I'm an expert at that, to go out there and to market and to promote things." He demonstrated his style in defense of his budget initiative, which Nunez and others say would give him more power than any governor in the country and make him virtually king of California. "Would you rather give the budget to the legislators that have run down this state and created a budget deficit of $22 billion, or would you rather give it to me? Somebody who has hundreds of millions of dollars and has (made) the best investments of anyone in Hollywood?" Schwarzenegger asked. "Just do a little soul-searching right now and ask yourself: Do you want to give your checkbook to those guys or give it to me? Because I can guarantee you I can turn $1 into $2." But what if the next governor is a lousy money manager? Schwarzenegger was unperturbed. "The laws change here all the time," he said. "This is what laws are for." -------- ENERGY -------- alternative energy Yale Poll: Americans Want Renewables, Hydrogen Cars NEW HAVEN, Connecticut, June 10, 2005 (ENS) http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jun2005/2005-06-10-09.asp#anchor2 More than 90 percent of Americans interviewed for a new Yale University research survey say they are worried about dependence on foreign oil. Fully 92 percent say this dependence is a serious problem, while 68 percent say it is a “very serious” problem. The survey of 1,000 randomly selected adults nationwide shows a vast majority of the public also wants to see government action to develop new “clean” energy sources, including solar and wind power as well as hydrogen cars. Across all regions of the country and every demographic group, there is broad support for a new emphasis on finding alternative energy sources. Building more solar power facilities is considered a “good idea” by 90 percent of the public; 87 percent support expanded wind farms; and 86 percent want increased funding for renewable energy research. Gus Speth, dean of the Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies, said, “This poll underscores the fact that Americans want not only energy independence but also to find ways to break the linkage between energy use and environmental harm, from local air pollution to global warming.” Results of the poll indicate that 93 percent of Americans say requiring the auto industry to make cars that get better gas mileage is a good idea. Just 6 percent say it is a bad idea. This sentiment varies little by political leaning, with 96 percent of Democrats and Independents and 86 percent of Republicans supporting the call for more fuel-efficient vehicles. These findings come just after Congress rejected a proposal to require sport utility vehicles and minivans to become more fuel-efficient and achieve the same gasoline mileage as passenger cars. “This poll suggests that Washington is out of touch with the American people. Republicans, Democrats and Independents, young and old, men and women - even SUV drivers - embrace investments in new energy technologies, including better gas mileage in vehicles,” said Dan Esty, director of the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, which commissioned the survey. The survey also revealed broad support for action to improve air and water quality but growing discomfort with “environmentalists.” The pollsters also found that the public’s confidence in TV news as a source of environmental information has fallen sharply. This survey is one element of a broader research project at the Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies focused on environmental attitudes and behavior. Funding for this project, directed by Associate Dean Dan Abbasi, is being provided by the Betsy and Jesse Fink Foundation and Hartford-based United Technologies Corp., which has been ranked as Fortune Magazine’s “Most Admired” aerospace company based on criteria including social responsibility. The survey was conducted by professional phone interviewers on behalf of the Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies by Global Strategy Group from May 15 to 22, 2005. The survey results have an overall margin of error of ±3.1 percent at the 95 percent confidence level.