NucNews - April 25, 2005 -------- NUCLEAR -------- britain Blair 'to debate nuclear power' A public debate on nuclear power could be opened Monday, 25 April, 2005 (BBC) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/vote_2005/frontpage/4480125.stm A re-elected Labour government would put nuclear power back on the agenda in an effort to meet targets on climate change, government sources have said. The sources told BBC News Tony Blair wanted a national debate on the issue. He would raise the issue when ministers responded to a climate change policy review in June or July, they said. The Tories say there should be new nuclear stations provided they meet cost and waste concerns but the Lib Dems oppose the idea. National debate Mr Blair has said his policy has not changed since the energy White Paper two years ago, which left nuclear power on the back burner. But a senior source told BBC News Mr Blair would raise the issue in June or July, when the government has to respond to its climate change policy review. The government says the UK is on course to meet the Kyoto targets on climate change but has admitted it is slipping behind its own tougher targets. BBC News correspondent Roger Harrabin said the review would not mean a "shoo-in" for nuclear power, but will open a national debate on the topic. He said the public and cabinet ministers would have to look at whether the threat of climate change was so pressing that the problems of nuclear waste and cost would outweigh the risks. Options open Last week, Environment Secretary Margaret Beckett said the White Paper on the issue two years ago had said closing down nuclear power was an option. "But we also said that there is a huge amount we need to do [to combat climate change], and between 2010 and 2020 we can probably do about at least half of what we need to through energy efficiency and renewable energy," she said. She added that no company was asking the government to let it build a new nuclear power station. "In our energy White Paper we said explicitly that if people began to feel that we would have to go towards nuclear power, there would be a further examination then, and a further White Paper," she added. Conservative shadow environment secretary Tim Yeo said he found it hard to see how the problem of carbon emissions could be tackled if existing nuclear power stations were not replaced. A decision was needed within a year of the election, he said. "We believe nuclear power can play a role in addressing this problem providing it is cost-effective and provided it can satisfy people's concern about waste disposal," he explained. Lib Dem environment spokesman Norman Baker said relying on nuclear power to tackle climate change was "like jumping from the frying pan to the fire". "Nuclear power may not have the problems associated with carbon emissions, but it does produce tonnes of radioactive waste that costs billions to store and will pose a risk to humans for thousands of years after disposal," he said. For the Green Party, Darren Johnson said nuclear reactors had an operational life of between 30 and 40 years but created waste that lasted "thousands". "It is barking mad to consider nuclear power as part of a sustainable energy policy," he said. -------- korea South Korea Warns North Over Nuclear Test By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS April 25, 2005 Filed at 11:52 a.m. ET http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/international/AP-Koreas-Nuclear.html?pagewanted=print&position= SEOUL, South Korea (AP) -- South Korea warned North Korea on Monday that conducting a nuclear test would further isolate the communist state, and the United States said the North's resistance to international disarmament talks was unacceptable. The pressure on the North to return to the six-nation talks comes amid escalating concerns it is trying to develop an atomic weapons arsenal after it apparently shut down a nuclear reactor recently -- a move that could allow it to harvest weapons-grade plutonium. South Korea's foreign minister, Ban Ki-moon, said in a Monday speech that North Korea ''cannot have its future guaranteed'' if it conducts a nuclear test. ''Nuclear weapons can never guarantee North Korea's security and will only bring about and worsen the isolation of its politics and economy,'' Ban said, according to South Korea's Yonhap news agency. The South Korean warning came after U.S. media reported over the weekend that Pyongyang might be preparing for its first nuclear test, and North Korea threatened to bolster its ''nuclear deterrent.'' The North, meanwhile, lashed out at Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice for recently saying that Washington was willing to take the nuclear issue to the United Nations. ''If the United States wants so much to drag the nuclear issue to the U.N. Security Council, it may do so,'' North Korea's Foreign Ministry spokesman said, according to the North's official Korean Central News Agency. ''However, we want to make clear that we will regard sanctions as a declaration of war.'' North Korea declared in February that it had nuclear weapons and was boycotting international disarmament talks, which also involve the United States, China, South Korea and Russia. Since then, efforts to get the North back to the bargaining table have foundered. During the previous negotiations, North Korea claimed to have nuclear capability and the potential to demonstrate it. American analysts have said during the past week that they believe some of the claims are genuine. U.S. intelligence analysts have estimated in the past that North Korea has produced at least two nuclear bombs. In the latest diplomatic push, Washington's top envoy on the nuclear issue met with South Korean officials Monday and discussed ways to revive the negotiations. Three rounds of nuclear disarmament talks -- also involving China, Japan and Russia -- have been held since 2003 with no breakthrough. A September session was never held because the North refused to attend, citing Washington's alleged hostile policy toward Pyongyang. ''What we are focusing on is the diplomatic track and the need to get the talks going, and more importantly, once they get going, to achieve progress in the talks,'' Christopher Hill, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said following his meeting with his South Korean counterpart, Song Min-soon. Washington, however, is reportedly exploring other options in stopping North Korea from building its alleged arsenal. The New York Times reported Monday that the Bush administration is debating a plan to seek a U.N. resolution allowing countries to intercept shipments in or out of North Korea that may contain nuclear materials or components. The proposed resolution, promoted by a growing number of senior administration officials, would enable the United States and other nations to intercept shipments in international waters off the Korean Peninsula and force down aircraft for inspection, the Times reported. The United States has told its negotiating partners it has serious concerns about ''recent provocative statements'' by North Korea on its nuclear weapons intentions. ---- White House May Go to U.N. Over North Korean Shipments By DAVID E. SANGER April 25, 2005 NY TIMES http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/25/politics/25prexy.html?pagewanted=print&position= WASHINGTON, April 24 - The Bush administration, facing a series of recent provocations from North Korea, is debating a plan to seek a United Nations resolution empowering all nations to intercept shipments in or out of the country that may contain nuclear materials or components, say senior administration officials and diplomats who have been briefed on the proposal. The resolution envisioned by a growing number of senior administration officials would amount to a quarantine of North Korea, though, so far at least, President Bush's aides are not using that word. It would enable the United States and other nations to intercept shipments in international waters off the Korean Peninsula and to force down aircraft for inspection. But, said several American and Asian officials, the main purpose would be to give China political cover to police its border with North Korea, the country's lifeline for food and oil. That border is now largely open for shipments of arms, drugs and counterfeit currencies, North Korea's main source of hard currency. Two years of six-nation negotiations with North Korea have proved fruitless so far. It is uncertain, however, that China and South Korea would go along with any plan to step up pressure. To ward off a confrontation with the North, the two nations have opposed taking the issue to the United Nations Security Council. Until last week, the administration insisted it was committed to solving the North Korean crisis through six-nation negotiations. But the discovery this month that North Korea has shut down its main nuclear reactor - perhaps to harvest plutonium for more weapons - prompted Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to raise publicly the possibility of seeking United Nations action, a route the Clinton administration took in 1994. "We are willing - when the time is right, when we believe that we have exhausted the possibilities of the framework we are in - to go to the Security Council," Ms. Rice said on Thursday on Fox News. But the administration has never said publicly what it would seek from the United Nations. Though Ms. Rice made no mention of it, American intelligence agencies were also trying to decipher the meaning of renewed activity at a suspected North Korean nuclear test site. Activity at the site in October and again in January led to concerns that North Korea may be preparing for the first underground weapons test - which would end any ambiguity about whether it has the technology to build a warhead. [In Seoul on Monday, South Korea's foreign minister, Ban Ki Moon, warned North Korea against conducting any nuclear tests, saying they would further isolate it, The Associated Press reported.] "They are either heading toward a full nuclear breakout, so that we are forced to deal with them as an established nuclear power, or they are putting on quite a show for our satellites," said one senior administration official, who added that the quarantine option had not yet been formally presented to President Bush. The White House has said little so far about North Korea's actions, following a strategy very different from the one it pursued two years ago with Iraq. Ms. Rice has repeatedly said that North Korea's pattern is to seek a public reaction from Washington, and she has made clear she does not intend to oblige. But some experts say the statements and actions North Korea have taken recently could mark a significant shift in strategy: It may now see a chance to build a modest nuclear arsenal while the United States and Asian nations debate how to react. The C.I.A. estimates that North Korea already has enough plutonium for six or eight nuclear weapons. "I'm afraid they are now more interested in getting away with it than getting a reaction out of the United States," South Korea's former foreign minister, Han Sung Joo, said in an interview last week. Since February, when it declared itself a nuclear power, North Korea's public statements have changed. It appears to be attempting to establish itself as a nuclear power that, like Pakistan, is now considered a permanent member of the nuclear club. North Korea's No. 2 official, Kim Yong Nam, said on Friday that America so threatens North Korea "it stands to reason" for it "to equip itself with a nuclear deterrent as a legitimate self-defensive means." On Sunday, North Korea's army chief of staff, General Kim Yong Chun, opened a meeting of military officers with a warning that the country's nuclear program would speed ahead. North Korea often issues strident warnings, many of which Washington dismisses. But the combination of the statements and the satellite imagery have put the White House and Pentagon on edge. Administration officials said that even if they go to the United Nations, the White House would not abandon the six-nation talks, which also include Japan, South Korea, Russia and China. They said a resolution could take several forms, including additional political and economic sanctions, all of which North Korea says it would regard as an act of war. But the idea of a quarantine has attracted the most interest, especially among administration hawks who never liked the idea of negotiations with North Korea. The quarantine idea has been pressed by the Pentagon and members of Vice President Dick Cheney's staff. If approved, several officials said, it would be loosely modeled on the one President John F. Kennedy ordered against Cuba four decades ago. But in North Korea's case, the operation would be far more complicated - both because of the weapons that the North may already possess, and because the entire effort will fail if China is not a full partner. ---- N Korea will treat UN sanctions on nuclear programme in "do-or-die" spirit SEOUL (AFP) Apr 25, 2005 http://www.spacewar.com/2005/050425113955.1zf3b3r2.html North Korea said Monday it would react with a "do-or-die" attitude if the United States brought UN sanctions over the Stalinist state's nuclear programme, saying the US was "getting on its nerves". "The stand of the DPRK (North Korea) is that the US may bring the nuclear issue to the UNSC (United Nations Security Council), if it wants that so much," a foreign ministry spokesman said in a statement carried by KCNA news agency. "But, we make one thing clear: The DPRK will regard the sanctions as a declaration of war. We are fully ready to cope with everything in a do-or-die spirit and have already prepared all countermeasures against the sanctions." The spokesman reiterated Pyongyang's line that Washington should offer incentives if it wanted the North to rejoin stalled six-nation talks on getting the isolated regime to give up its nuclear weapons programme. "If the United States is really interested in the resumption of the six-way talks, it should provide the DPRK with conditions and justification to return to the talks," the unnamed spokesman said. "Far from showing elementary respect and sincerity to the dialogue partner, it is seriously getting on the nerves of the DPRK," he said. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warned last week that North Korea could be referred to the UN Security Council for possible sanctions if it failed to rejoin multiparty talks. Rice was also behind comments labeling Pyongyang as "an outpost of tyranny," which the North says will have to be retracted before it will return to the negotiating table. "For the resumption of the six-way talks, the US should withdraw its remarks about 'an outpost of tyranny' at an early date.... We can never return to the talks nor can we have any form of dealing with the US unless the ill fame of an 'outpost of tyranny' is shaken off." Three inconclusive rounds of talks between the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the United States ended last June and were followed by North Korea's boycott of a fourth, scheduled for last September in Beijing. The standoff saw a dramatic escalation in February when Pyongyang said it possessed nuclear weapons and was pulling out of dialogue. In early April, it shut down its only functioning nuclear reactor and said it planned to unload spent nuclear fuel from the plant and reprocess it into weapons-grade plutonium. "We have built the nuclear deterrent force with so much effort despite enormous difficulties in order to effectively cope with the arrogant, outrageous and brigandish method of the US," the ministry spokesman said. "We remain undeterred by reckless remarks of Rice. We know what we should do at the decisive moment and will react to the hardline action of the US with the toughest action." -------- mideast Russia's Putin Heads Off for Tense Mideast Tour By REUTERS April 25, 2005 Filed at 7:36 a.m. ET http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/international/international-russia-israel.html?pagewanted=print&position= MOSCOW (Reuters) - President Vladimir Putin will become the first Russian leader to visit Israel this week as part of a Middle East tour -- but Moscow's warming ties with Israel's arch-foes in the region may spoil the party. Israel is expected to press Putin to sever growing nuclear and military links with Iran and Syria, countries it believes have ties to terrorism, political commentators said. In turn, Putin is likely to ask Israel to extradite Russian business tycoons, including media magnate Vladimir Gusinsky and former oil company YUKOS executive Leonid Nevzlin, who live in exile in Israel and face a variety of charges in Russia. ``But there will be no bombshells ... What we see is just a family scuffle between Russia and Israel,'' Mikhail Margelov, chairman of the international affairs committee in the upper house of parliament, said in daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta. Putin first visits Egypt and then Israel Wednesday for talks with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and other officials in a two-day trip to be capped by a meeting with Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas in the West Bank city of Ramallah. The Soviet Union forged ties with Israel when the Jewish state was founded in 1948 but cut them after the 1967 Middle East War in which Israel captured Arab territory. Moscow restored relations in 1991, shortly before the Soviet Union collapsed and after then-Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev allowed Jews to emigrate. Russia is a member of the so-called quartet of international mediators for the Middle East peace process along with the United Nations, the United States and the European Union. But Moscow has so far only played a minor role in the process. Analysts see Putin's visit as part of Russia's wider bid to recoup its Soviet-era influence in the Middle East. ``But in terms of bilateral ties we should not expect too much of this visit,'' said Russian newspaper Moskovskiye Novosti. ``Israel is the only country where Moscow has powerful levers of influence. Almost a quarter of Israelis talk and think in Russian. But this potential remains largely unused by Russia.'' SYRIANS AND IRANIANS In an interview with Israeli media last week, Putin confirmed plans to sell short-ranged vehicle-mounted missiles to Syria, saying it would not threaten Israel's security. But he added the missiles ``will of course make it difficult to fly over the residence of the Syrian president,'' an apparent reference to a 2003 flight over the palace by Israeli jets. Russia's construction of a nuclear reactor in Iran has also angered Israel, which, like Washington, says Tehran could use it to develop atomic weapons. In an interview to Egyptian paper Al-Ahram, Putin said Russia's involvement in the project depended on Iran using the reactor only for peaceful purposes. ``We will go ahead with our obligations under Iran's civilian nuclear project on condition that international organizations ... will have full access to all Iranian nuclear projects and Iran gives up technology and research which could lead to creating nuclear weapons.'' -------- nato Macedonia Constructs Nuclear Waste Dump in Secret By Natasa Dokovska SKOPJE, Macedonia, April 25, 2005 (ENS) http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/apr2005/2005-04-25-01.asp The Ministry of Environmental Protection and Spatial Planning is constructing a nuclear waste dump in the new community of Petrovec, near Skopje. Unannounced, the ministry is building the facility only three kilometers (two miles) from the Skopje airport, on the site of the Cojlija military airport. The residents of this village and of 14 other local communities have made the existence of the dump public, and they say it is almost finished. These citizens and activists in environmental nongovernmental organizations say that the dump will be filled with radioactive waste imported from other countries. While protesting the construction of the nuclear waste dump, the activists say it is not first such waste disposal facility in Macedonia. In the period of conflict in the late 1990s, they say, this kind of dump was constructed in several places where NATO soldiers were stationed. The citizens who live near the dump are reacting against the facility and are joining environmental activists to organize a big demonstration in the front of the government buildings in Skopje. The country's largest environmental nongovernmental organization, the Movement of Environmentalists of Macedonia (DEM), is strongly opposed to construction of the dump. The group accused the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Spatial Planning of failing to provide timely information about the project to the general public. DEM is worried about the lack of transparency on the part of the ministry, as well as about the fact that no environmental impact study for construction of the radioactive dump was ever done. They are asking the ministry what kind of waste materials will be placed in the dump and in what quantities, and they are requesting information on the positive or negative effect on the environment of the dump's operations. Concerned after their efforts to construct the nuclear waste dump in Petrovec was discovered, the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Spatial Planning has stopped all construction activities at the dump site. In their official statement, finally released last week, responsible officials in the ministry say that this dump should be in use for a period of 10 to 15 years. Officials confirmed to the public that they want to construct this dump, but they strongly denied that radioactive waste exists in Macedonia. -------- treaties United States and Latvian Governments Sign Agreement to Allow Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Cooperation April 25, 2005 U.S. Dept. of Energy http://www.energy.gov/engine/content.do?PUBLIC_ID=17802&BT_CODE=PR_PRESSRELEASES&TT_CODE=PRESSRELEASE WASHINGTON, D.C. – As part of the Bush administration’s ongoing efforts to secure vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide, the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Latvian Ministry of Environment signed an agreement today that will allow collaboration in nonproliferation and threat reduction areas. Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman and Latvian Minister of Environment Raimonds Vejonis signed the agreement, which will provide for repatriation to Russia of Soviet/Russian-origin nuclear fuel from Latvia’s shutdown research reactors at Salaspils; security enhancement of the reactor site and storage of the nuclear materials at the site; and safe and secure storage of Latvia’s nuclear materials, including improved methods of protection, control, and accountability of nuclear materials to reduce the risk of theft or possible diversion of nuclear materials stored at the premises. “Reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism is a priority for President Bush and my department, and this agreement with Latvia is another important step in our effort to keep nuclear weapons material out of the hands of terrorists,” Secretary Bodman said. “We applaud the Latvian government for its ongoing work to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation, and we look forward to our new partnership.” The Salaspils research reactor was permanently shut down in 1998 and is being prepared for decommissioning. The agreement signed today will allow DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to remove the Soviet- and Russian-origin nuclear fuel containing highly enriched uranium (HEU) now stored at the facility. The work is a component of NNSA’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and an essential part of the president’s efforts to end the use of HEU in research reactors worldwide. To date, Russia has accepted approximately 105 kilograms of fresh Russian-origin HEU from six countries under GTRI’s Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program. The most recent shipment repatriated six kilograms of fresh HEU from the Czech Republic in December 2004. The goal of GTRI, announced by the administration on May 26, 2004, in Vienna, Austria, is to identify, secure, remove, or facilitate the disposition of vulnerable nuclear and radioactive materials and equipment around the world that pose a threat to the international community as quickly and expeditiously as possible. International partners, such as the government of Latvia, are key participants in this new initiative. Media contact: Anne Womack Kolton, 202/586-4940 -------- ukraine Ukraine to Accept U.S. Nuclear Smuggling Detection Equipment WASHINGTON, DC, April 25, 2005 (ENS) http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/apr2005/2005-04-25-09.asp#anchor1 The United States and the Ukrainian governments Friday announced a joint program to detect smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive material. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Administrator Linton Brooks and Colonel-General Lytvyn, chairman of the Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, signed an agreement to install radiation detection equipment at key land borders, airports and seaports in Ukraine. "The United States and Ukraine recognize the need to work cooperatively to stem the threat posed by the trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials," said Brooks. "This agreement will enable our countries to further international nonproliferation efforts and better protect the citizens of Ukraine, the United States and other countries against nuclear terrorism." This equipment is designed to detect, deter and interdict illicit movements of nuclear and other radioactive materials. Ukraine will be one of several countries to employ the detection systems provided under the NNSA Second Line of Defense Program (SLD). The agreement follows the April 4 joint statement of U.S. President George W. Bush and Ukranian President Viktor Yushchenko following their meeting at the White House that pledged to "begin a new chapter in the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery." Building on cooperation "through the G-8 Global Partnership, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and the Proliferation Security Initiative," the two presidents said, "We will deepen our cooperation on nonproliferation, export controls, border security and law enforcement to deter, detect, interdict, investigate and prosecute illicit trafficking of these weapons and related materials; enhance the security of nuclear and radiological sources; and dispose of spent nuclear fuel." The NNSA works with foreign partners to equip border crossings, airports, and seaports with radiation detection equipment and to provide training to law enforcement officials. The specialized radiation detection technology deployed under this program was originally developed by NNSA laboratories as part of overall U.S. government efforts to guard against proliferation of weapons materials. Established by Congress in 2000, NNSA is a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy responsible for maintaining and enhancing the safety, security, reliability and performance of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear testing; working to reduce global danger from weapons of mass destruction; providing the U.S. Navy with safe and effective nuclear propulsion; and responding to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the U.S. and abroad. -------- u.n. Nuclear Power International Safety Meeting Termed a Success VIENNA, Austria, April 25, 2005 (ENS) http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/apr2005/2005-04-25-03.asp The majority of countries operating nuclear power plants concluded a two week peer review meeting Friday on the Convention on Nuclear Safety with a tight-lipped media briefing that emphasized success of the process. The conference held at headquarters of the UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, opened April 11 with 51 of the 56 contracting parties to the Convention in attendance. This month India became the latest country to ratify the pact, bringing the number of ratifying countries to 56. All of the world's 441 nuclear power plants now are operating in countries where the Nuclear Safety Convention is in force. The meeting was closed to the media, and the only statement offered was at a briefing Friday. Linda Keen, president of the meeting and head of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, said that the meeting had "successfully completed its process." A comprehensive, 93 paragraph summary report, outlining what was discussed and reported during the two week meeting, is in the process of being finalized, Keen said. She did say that discussions had touched on the possible role of the Convention with respect to research reactors. Keen said the Convention has decided to request IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei to convene meetings with member states to discuss how best to assure the effective application of the Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors. This code was approved by the IAEA General Conference in 2004. The Convention noted the positive contributions of international organizations and regulatory bodies to the international safety culture, Keen said. Safety initiatives in international organizations like the IAEA, as well as safety and peer review processes, have helped improve overall safety culture on a facility to facility basis, she said. Conference Chair and President of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Linda Keen addresses the concluding press briefing. (Photo by D. Calma courtesy IAEA) While giving few details of international discussions over the past two weeks, Keen did offer insights into Canada's nuclear security posture in a presentation to the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security in London on March 17. "The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 challenged traditional approaches to security and transformed views of risk all over the world, and especially in North America," Keen said. "The security of nuclear facilities was brought under increased scrutiny and attention on September 11th 2001, and in the 3½ years since the security enhancements that have been put in place have become the new norm," she said. Keen focused on two key ideas, both contained in Canada's Nuclear Security Policy. First, "The complex threat environment we are facing evolves continuously. Therefore, the system we build needs to be capable of responding proportionately to existing threats while adapting quickly to meet new threats that may emerge.” Second, she said, "While we strive to eliminate these threats, this is not always possible. Strengthening our security is also about managing and reducing risks.” Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety meet every three years. The 10 year old treaty is an international agreement that commits participating countries to maintain a high level of safety in the operation and regulation of nuclear power plants. The catalyst for the Convention was the 1986 Chernobyl accident in Ukraine, when global implications of nuclear safety were magnified and interest intensified in internationally binding safety standards. Nearly 8.4 million people in Belarus, Ukraine and Russia were exposed to radiation when the Chernobyl plant caught fire and exploded. Beyond the cancers and chronic health problems, especially among children, some 150,000 kilometers - an area half the size of Italy - were contaminated, according to the United Nations, while agricultural areas covering nearly 52,000 square kilometers, more than the size of Denmark, were ruined. ---- UN atomic agency to meet to decide on new leader but vote not certain VIENNA (AFP) Apr 25, 2005 http://www.spacewar.com/2005/050425144610.qtszis6p.html The UN atomic agency meets Wednesday to decide on its next director general, with US officials hinting for the first time that they may accept current chief Mohamed ElBaradei, who is the sole candidate. The United States officially opposes ElBaradei, who is 62, serving more than two terms but is actually against the former Egyptian diplomat for not being tough enough on Iran, which Washington charges is hiding a covert nuclear weapons program, diplomats said. There is no guarantee of a vote Wednesday as the 35-nation board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency may put off the decision until a June meeting, which would be the deadline for choosing a new IAEA director general, diplomats said. ElBaradei's term expires November 30. The new director general would be ratified at an IAEA plenary conference in September. The United States may be forced eventually to accept him as "there is no country that has said it is not able to support ElBaradei," who is widely credited with doing a good job in investigating Iran's nuclear program, a Western diplomat, who asked not to be named, told AFP. "Everything shows the United States won't have the blocking minority (of 12 votes) needed to stop ElBaradei," another Western diplomat said, referring to the two-thirds majority of the 35-member board needed to elect a director general. Diplomats said that putting off the decision until June would be in order to give Washington time to sign on to the consensus for ElBaradei for which non-aligned and developing nations on the board are lobbying. The United States is still hoping however for a vote on ElBaradei to fail and for a "competing candidate" to emerge, a US official told AFP but admitted that time was running short. The official, who asked to remain anonymous, said the United States may eventually yield and accept ElBaradei. "The White House does not want this to become a damaging foreign policy problem at a time when we are working well with Europe and others on pressing challenges like Iraq, Darfur, Iran, arms embargo to China, etc.," the official said. "If no competing candidate emerges 'soon', I imagine the president and secretary of state will be faced with a tough choice, and that they would ultimately choose to avoid a damaging diplomatic split at the (IAEA) board," the official said. Developing nations at the IAEA are pushing for a decision however "as there is a restive feeling the process has gone on too long as there is a candidate and almost no one is opposed to him," a diplomat from a non-aligned nation, who asked not to be named, told AFP. The deadline for submitting candidacies fell last December 31. Washington justifies its stance against ElBaradei, who has run the IAEA since 1997, on the grounds that agency heads should not serve more than two terms, in line with a policy set by a Geneva group of top 10 contributors to UN organizations. But IAEA board chairman Ingrid Hall, the ambassador from Canada, had told an IAEA board meeting in March that "ElBaradei has strong and broad support," according to a Western diplomat. Hall said earlier this month that the April 27 board meeting was being held "as requested by the Group of 77 (developing nations) and China." ElBaradei also has support from European states, which back a policy of urging Iran to cooperate rather than confronting it as Washington has sought. The United States wants the IAEA to report Iran to the UN Security Council for possible sanctions but ElBaradei says the "jury is still out" on whether Tehran's program is peaceful or not. ElBaradei has also earned the ire of Washington by questioning US intelligence that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction under now deposed dictator Saddam Hussein. ---- UN nuclear chief ElBaradei seeking third term VIENNA (AFP) Apr 25, 2005 http://www.spacewar.com/2005/050425150324.ewxflriu.html UN atomic energy chief Mohamed ElBaradei, who is seeking a third term in office despite US opposition, is a seasoned diplomat at the heart of international controversies such as whether Iran is secretly making atomic weapons. As director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), he leads the global effort to uncover nuclear threats to world peace, a task that involves juggling often competing national interests. The United States, for instance, would like to see the IAEA crack down harder on Iran for what Washington says is a covert nuclear weapons program but ElBaradei insists that its investigation of the Islamic republic needs time. Since winning the top job at the Vienna-based IAEA in 1997, ElBaradei, 62, has been at the center of non-proliferation issues concerning the three states US President George W. Bush has labeled the axis of evil -- Iraq under the rule of Saddam Hussein, Iran and North Korea. His IAEA was a key player in the build-up to the US-led war against Iraq in 2003. ElBaradei pleaded at the United Nations for more time for inspections. Washington was unwilling to wait, but has been embarrassed since then by revelations that Saddam did not have weapons of mass destruction. A similar conflict has shaped up over Iran. ElBaradei urges the international community not to jump to conclusions, but the United States says the IAEA is giving Iran a chance to stall and buy time for building a bomb. "Verification and diplomacy, used in conjunction, can be effective," ElBaradei has said. "When inspections are accompanied by adequate authority, aided by all available information, backed by a credible compliance mechanism, and supported by international consensus, the verification system works," ElBaradei said. IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming said reconciling the interests of the agency's 137 member states would be "impossible without ElBaradei's leadership." "He provides a vision. He often reminds countries of their responsibilities in a way that makes it seem not only like a legal obligation but a moral responsibility," Fleming said. Born on June 17, 1942 in Egypt, ElBaradei, now married with two children, has been at the IAEA for two decades. ElBaradei studied law in Cairo before going on to New York University, where he later taught. He started out at the Egyptian ministry of foreign affairs in 1964 and then went to the United Nations as a member of Egypt's permanent mission, both in New York and Geneva. In 1984, he joined the IAEA as legal counsel and deputy director general for external relations. He is seeking a third term as IAEA chief, despite opposition from the United States which wants to stick to an informal rule that the heads of international organisations do not serve more than two terms. -------- u.s. nuc weapons US Takes Brakes Off Nuke Arms Race by Dave Zweifel Published on Monday, April 25, 2005 by the Capital Times (Madison, Wisconsin) http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0425-22.htm As hard as it might be to believe, the United States is embarked on a path that's bound to trigger yet another nuclear arms race. Yet few in this country seem to be paying attention. It's as if we were lulled to sleep about nuclear weapons when the Berlin Wall came tumbling down in 1989. All those Cold War years of worrying whether the United States and the Soviet Union would start lobbing bombs at each other were finally over. They should have been, but, unfortunately, the chances of nuclear devastation are as strong today as they've ever been. That's the message that an international organization known as Mayors for Peace wants us all to get when it stages a rally in New York City this coming Sunday. Mayors for Peace was founded by the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, the only two cities in the world that have experienced the destruction of an atomic bomb. Their aim was to get cities throughout the world to work toward a day when all nuclear weapons would be destroyed so that innocent people, particularly children, would never again have to suffer the consequences of a nuclear explosion. Some 750 cities have joined that effort, although far too few from the United States. It's good to see that Madison's mayor, Dave Cieslewicz, will go to New York to lend our city's support along with 21 other U.S. mayors. Several other Madisonians will be there as well, including representatives of our Physicians for Social Responsibility chapter. What has been disturbing is the Bush administration's attitude toward nuclear weapons. Back in 1969, America was instrumental in getting most of the rest of the world to sign the much-heralded Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which was aimed at eventually eliminating nuclear weapons as instruments of war. But, rather than reducing the numbers, the administration is in the process of building more, "modernizing" some of the older nukes and seeking to build new "mini-nukes" and "nuclear bunker busters," presumably to work in places like Iraq. The pity of it all is that if we start building new and better nuclear weapons, so will other countries with nuclear capabilities - Russia, China, India, for example. Twenty years from now, nations will probably be boasting about their bunker busting A-bombs, rather than celebrating the end of the threat of nuclear annihilation. In other words, we will have learned nothing from history. Yet there's a strange silence among members of Congress and in the media over these alarming developments. Sunday's rally is aimed at awakening us all to the perils. It is timed, incidentally, to precede the May 2-27 meetings in New York among the 189 countries that signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty way back in 1969. They gather every five years to evaluate the progress of the treaty and to negotiate further reductions in atomic weapons. There's a lot of work to be done this year, not the least of which will be getting the United States back on board. Dave Zweifel is editor of The Capital Times. -------- u.s. nuc facilities Navajos ban uranium mining, oppose federal subsidies Posted: April 25, 2005 by: Brenda Norrell / Indian Country Today http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=1096410830 WINDOW ROCK, Ariz. - The Navajo Nation Council passed a new law banning the mining and processing of uranium on the Navajo Nation, which if signed by President Joe Shirley Jr. will bring an end to the legacy of uranium mining death for Navajos. Navajos have been the unknowing victims of uranium contamination since the time of the Cold War and now face new threats from uranium mining in the eastern portion of the Navajo Nation. Aneth (Utah) Councilman Mark Maryboy told the council, ''It's very simple: uranium kills.'' Navajos celebrated the council's passage of the Din? Natural Resources Protection Act of 2005, which became law by a vote of 69 - 13 on April 19. Then, Navajos immediately began intensifying their opposition to federal energy bill provisions that would subsidize uranium corporations with $30 million in incentives. Anishinaabe activist Winona LaDuke applauded the effort. ''People worldwide are eternally grateful to the Navajo Nation for protecting future generations from more nuclear contamination, whether they are communities with nuclear reactors, or Native communities like Skull Valley Goshutes and Western Shoshone where nuclear waste dumps are planned. ''It is time for Native people to be part of the next energy era - wind and solar - those sources are in keeping with our relationship to Mother Earth and our responsibilities for future generation,'' LaDuke told Indian Country Today. Eastern Navajo Dineh Against Uranium Mining (ENDAUM), a group founded by local Navajos, urged other Navajos to call their congressmen and oppose the subsidies. ENDAUM said the $30 million could be funneled to Hydro Resources Inc., which is proposing in situ leach uranium mining which could poison Navajos' water supply in the Church Rock and Crownpoint, N.M. communities. Even with uranium mining banned on the Navajo Nation, the company could carry out in situ leach mining on adjacent land already identified by the company and poison the aquifer and Navajo drinking water. Citing the threat to Navajos' water supply, ENDAUM and the Southwest Research Information Center have challenged in court the license issued to HRI for in situ leach mining by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Navajos in Church Rock and Crownpoint were the victims of the nation's worst radioactive uranium spill in 1979 when a liquid uranium tailings dam was breached and 100 million gallons of radioactive liquid spilled into Navajo waterways. U.S. Congressman Tom Udall, D-N.M., is among those opposing the uranium subsidies in the energy bill. Udall said he is offering an amendment to House Bill 6 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to strike Section 631. He called the subsidies ''an unnecessary $30 million handout for the domestic uranium industry.'' Section 631 authorizes the appropriations of a $10 million subsidy for the next three fiscal years to ''identify, test and develop improved in situ leaching mining technologies, including low-cost environmental restoration technologies.'' ''This corporate subsidy is both unnecessary and potentially environmentally dangerous,'' Udall said in a letter to fellow congressmen, urging their support and vote. ''This corporate welfare also will have a severe impact on the Southwest's environment and on the public health of the Native American communities I represent.'' Udall said the in situ leach mining procedure can cause radioactive uranium and other toxic chemicals to leach into groundwater and is a threat to public health. He said in a ''time of skyrocketing federal deficits,'' Congress should not give away $30 million to the uranium industry. ''We need a comprehensive national energy policy that safely provides new energy sources without drastically harming the environment and causing potential harm to thousands,'' Udall said. ENDAUM co-founder Mitchell Capitan told the United Nations that Navajos with little means have maintained the costly struggle of opposition to new uranium mining because of their deep belief in the sanctity of water. '''Water is life' is not just a political slogan - it's a description of some of the fundamental principles we live by every day. Water is used in our religious ceremonies, just like it is used in the ceremonies of the Christian, Hindu, Jewish and Muslim faiths. It is essential to our survival in an arid climate,'' Capitan told the United Nations' 57th Annual Department of Public Information Conference in September 2004. Meanwhile, Taxpayers for Common Sense Action joined ENDAUM and Udall in opposition to the corporate uranium subsidies. ''The 50-year-old nuclear industry has benefited from cradle-to-grave subsidization for too long,'' cofounder Jill Lancelot said in a statement. ''These subsidies distort price signals and undermine the natural market forces of the energy industry. This $89 billion energy bill is ballooning in cost, and at a time of unprecedented deficits it is the taxpayers of the next generation that will foot the bill.'' ---- New Nukes? No Thanks. April 25, 2005 — By Chris Clarke, Earth Island Institute An ENN Commentary http://www.enn.com/today.html?id=7594 James Lovelock, the British scientist best known for his co-authorship of the Gaia hypothesis, has turned heads recently with searing essays exhorting environmentalists to drop their opposition to nuclear power. An odd opinion for an environmental icon? Not from Lovelock's perspective. An atmospheric chemist by trade, Lovelock is scared to death at the prospect of global climate change caused by the combustion of carbon fuels. Nuclear power plants release no carbon into the atmosphere and so, says Lovelock, they are the only answer to the looming climate threat. Lovelock is right to be worried. Our society's carbon addiction will seriously alter life on Earth, and soon, and not in a good way. It's not unlikely that sea levels will rise by seven meters within a couple centuries, forcing abandonment of coastal cities; rising temperatures will consign whole biomes to extinction. No more Amazon rainforest; no more boreal forest. But Lovelock's call for a nuclear renaissance is based on mushy, ill-informed thinking. For one thing, nuclear power is not climate-neutral. Uranium fuel reprocessing plants are responsible for a large fraction of atmospheric chloroflurocarbons (CFCs), chemicals best known as ozone-depleters but which are also powerful greenhouse gases. But the biggest problem with Lovelock's nuclear boosterism is that it is based on the worst sort of industry propaganda. In an article published by the UK paper The Independent in May 2004, Lovelock writes: "Opposition to nuclear energy is based on irrational fear fed by Hollywood-style fiction, the Green lobbies and the media. These fears are unjustified, and nuclear energy from its start in 1952 has proved to be the safest of all energy sources. " Coal power is horribly dangerous to the environment, as is oil. But point out a coal-fired power plant that has rendered an area the size of Ukraine essentially uninhabitable, as did Chernobyl. Even the so-called "safe" Generation Four nuclear reactors now in development buy their allegedly greater margin of reactor safety at the cost of hugely increased amounts of nuclear waste. In the US, desert preservation activists have fought pitched battles to prevent the opening of one radioactive waste dump after another, from Ward Valley to Yucca Mountain to the proposed surface dump on the Goshute Indian reservation. What Lovelock advocates is, essentially, killing specific ecosystems with radioactive waste in order to save unspecified ones. And the worst part of it is that even if nuclear were safe, new plants would be unlikely to produce energy for another ten or fifteen years - unless Lovelock also advocates gutting environmental and worker safety regulations. The earth cannot handle ten or fifteen years of continued carbon emissions without serious resulting damage. Oddly enough, there are technical fixes readily available that could replace TODAY the same amount of energy that would be produced ten years from now if industrial societies went all out to build nuclear power plants. Here's just one: the compact fluorescent light bulb. Switching two thirds of the incandescent bulbs used in the US alone - which could be done in less than a year, given the social will - would reduce energy consumption by seven gigawatts. That's fourteen big coal-fired plants. Incentives to replace wasteful appliances, weatherize homes, use mass transit and find other ways to reduce our profligate energy use could provide immediate benefits, unlike Lovelock's radioactive pie in the sky. Environmental writer Chris Clarke is Publications Director at Earth Island Institute. He has written extensively on politics and the natural world. His most recent writings are available at his website (http://www.faultline.org/place/pinolecreek). He lives in the San Francisco Bay Area. ENN welcomes a wide range of perspectives in its popular Commentary Series. To find out more or to submit a commentary for consideration please contact Jerry Kay, Publisher of the Environmental News Network: publisher@enn.com. ---- Entergy Posts Lower 1Q Earnings 04.25.2005, 07:42 AM Associated Press http://www.forbes.com/home/feeds/ap/2005/04/25/ap1971393.html Natural gas and electricity distributor Entergy Corp. said Monday that first-quarter earnings fell 17 percent year-over-year as utility results were dragged down by lower residential usage and higher maintenance costs. Net income fell to $172 million, or 79 cents per share, from $207.2 million, or 88 cents per share, a year ago. Excluding earnings from Entergy-Koch LP's trading and gas pipeline business, which were sold in the fourth quarter of 2004, the company earned $192 million, or 81 cents per share, in last year's period. Analysts surveyed by Thomson Financial were looking for profit of 80 cents per share in the latest quarter. "Solid performance at Entergy Nuclear helped to offset Utility results dampened by lower residential usage," said J. Wayne Leonard, Entergy's chief executive officer. "The degree of success we are able to accomplish on our regulatory agenda at both the state and federal level in the coming months will be critical to our ability to achieve our financial objectives." Entergy said utility results decreased during the quarter due to lower residential customer usage and higher operation and maintenance expenses. However, Entergy Nuclear results increased year-over-year due to higher contract pricing and a reduction in the decommissioning liability, partially offset by lower available generation as a result of a planned refueling outage. The company reaffirmed earnings estimate for fiscal 2005 at the lower end of the range of $4.60 to $4.85 per share. Analysts are predicting income of $4.65 per share, on average. ---- Department of Energy Announces Personnel Changes in the Offices of Radioactive Waste Management and Environmental Management April 25, 2005 US DOE http://energy.gov/engine/content.do?PUBLIC_ID=17801&BT_CODE=PR_PRESSRELEASES&TT_CODE=PRESSRELEASE Washington, DC - The United States Department of Energy (DOE) today announced several personnel changes in the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management and the Office of Environmental Management. Mr. Theodore (Ted) Garrish, Deputy Director for Strategy and Program Development in the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (RW), is retiring May 13, 2005. Mr. Garrish has worked in RW since July, 2003. Previously, he served as the department’s General Counsel from 1983 – 1985; as Assistant Secretary of Energy for Congressional, Intergovernmental and Public Affairs from 1985-1987; and as Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy from 1987 – 1989. “During Ted’s many years at DOE, he has developed a wealth of expertise and perspective that has served as an invaluable resource for the department,” said Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman. “His dedication to DOE and his leadership on the Yucca Mountain project will be greatly missed.” Mr. Paul Golan, who currently serves as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management, will assume the position currently held by Mr. Garrish on May 8, 2005. Secretary Bodman further noted, “I am confident that Paul will carry on Ted’s good work. As part of the leadership in the Office of Environmental Management, Paul has done an outstanding job overseeing major cleanup projects throughout the country. I’m confident that he will bring the same effectiveness and professionalism to the safe, secure management and disposal of America’s nuclear waste.” Mr. Charles Anderson, who currently serves as deputy director of DOE’s Savannah River Site, will replace Mr. Golan as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Office of Environmental Management on May 8, 2005. Mr. Anderson brings considerable field experience to his new assignment, having worked in the department’s environmental management program, nuclear weapons facilities, and at the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). “Because of his broad experience both inside and outside of DOE, Charlie will be a welcome addition to the staff at headquarters,” Secretary Bodman said. “We look forward to working with him on the projects being undertaken by the department’s Office of Environmental Management.” Media contacts: Anne Womack Kolton, 202/586-4940 Mike Waldron, 202/586-4940 -------- nevada DOE announces new leadership of Yucca nuclear waste program By Erica Werner ASSOCIATED PRESS 2:09 p.m. April 25, 2005 http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/nation/20050425-1409-wst-yuccamountain.html WASHINGTON – Management of the troubled Yucca Mountain nuclear waste dump project is changing hands for the second time in several months, the Energy Department announced Monday. Theodore Garrish, who has been in charge of Yucca since February, is retiring May 13, the department said in a news release. He will be replaced by Paul Golan, who is currently principal deputy assistant secretary for environmental management at the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, the DOE office that handles Yucca. Garrish's retirement is unrelated to recent problems with the government's plans for the underground nuclear waste dump in Nevada, including criminal investigations of whether workers on the project falsified data, said Energy Department spokeswoman Anne Womack Kolton. "This is a long-planned retirement and we are sorry to be losing him," Womack Kolton said. Garrish has been acting director of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management since Margaret Chu resigned in February. The department is still looking for a permanent replacement, Womack Kolton said. Golan will assume management of the Yucca project and Garrish's title of deputy director for strategy and program development but has not been named acting director, Womack Kolton said. Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman said in a statement that Garrish's "dedication to DOE and his leadership on the Yucca Mountain project will be greatly missed." Also Monday, several state officials, nuclear industry groups and others that support Yucca Mountain announced formation of a new task force to promote the project. They said they would push for more funding and remind leaders in the 39 states where nuclear waste and spent fuel now sits at defense sites and commercial reactors that if it doesn't go to Nevada, it will stay in their backyards. "It's been a one-sided conversation as of recent weeks, months," said Charles P. Pray, co-chairman of the new task force and Maine's appointed nuclear safety adviser. "I don't think there's really been an overall discussion about the alternatives. Nobody seems to put that out for general discussion among the public." Members of the new Yucca Mountain Task Force said at a news conference that the formation of their group was unrelated to the DOE's disclosure last month of e-mails suggesting workers on the project falsified data. The problems at Yucca – also including a court decision that's forcing a rewrite of radiation safety standards for the site 90 miles northwest of Las Vegas – have forced DOE to abandon a planned 2010 completion date without setting a new one. "It almost looks like it's coming back to a standstill," said Martez Norris, executive director of the Nuclear Waste Strategy Coalition, a task force member. After recent meetings with administration and congressional officials, "it was very apparent that we need to do a grass-roots effort really to move things forward," she said. On the Net: Yucca Mountain project: www.ymp.gov -------- MILITARY -------- britain Iraq factor: Blair's 34 words Blair's support for Bush over Iraq is haunting the British prime minister's campaign for re-election. By Robin Oakley CNN European Political Editor Monday, April 25, 2005 Posted: 9:48 AM EDT (1348 GMT) http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/04/25/blair.iraq.oakley/index.html?section=cnn_latest LONDON, England (CNN) -- In the run-up to the war in Iraq, British intelligence agents worked to find out what weapons Saddam Hussein may or may not have had. Much of that intelligence found its way to 10 Downing Street and the desk of Prime Minister Tony Blair. Exactly what it said or did not say we'll probably never know. But in the run-up to war, Blair was keen to get public support onto his side. So he decided to share some of that intelligence with the public in a document now known commonly as the dodgy dossier. The prime minister continued sharing intelligence with members of parliament, where he spoke 34 words in September 2002 that could now come back to haunt him: "Iraq has chemical and biological weapons. Saddam has continued to produce them. He has existing and active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons which could be activated within 45 minutes." Those 34 words alleging that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction illustrate Blair's main justification for war. But as we now know, the intelligence on Iraq's weapons was wrong. No evidence could be found that Saddam had WMD in the run-up to war. If Blair loses the election or scrapes back into power with a significantly reduced majority, much of the blame will fall on those 34 words. And while official inquires cleared the prime minister of deliberate deceit, they still pinned some blame on him. "Language in the dossier and used by the prime minister may have left readers with the impression that there was fuller and firmer intelligence than was the case. It was a serious weakness," inquiry chairman Lord Robin Butler said last July. At Labour's glitzy manifesto launch, Iraq was not a subject Blair wanted to push to the head of the queue. There's no wonder. Opinion polls show that two-thirds of the voters don't trust him. But luckily for the prime minister, his decision to go to war was supported by Britain's opposition Conservatives. That hasn't stopped their leader, Michael Howard, from continually raising the question about whether Blair can be trusted. "Why should people ever believe a word he says again," Howard has said. And it's not just his opponents who worry Blair. Thousands of people, many of them traditional Labour supporters, demonstrated on the streets of London against the war. Even some of Blair's own party members fear the Iraq factor would see many potential Labour supporters refuse to back the party this time. "That's the millstone around Labour's neck," said MP Alan Simpson. One party that opposed the war was the Liberal Democrats. At the last election, they picked up seats from the Tories. This time Labour is in their sights on Iraq and domestic issues. "The Labour Party is very, very much weaker," said Lord Chris Rennard of the Liberal Democrats. "I think as a result of the Iraq war and the claims of weapons of mass destruction and the unpopularity of things like student top-up fees, the Lib Dems are now also very well placed to gain from Labour." Few British people are expected to cast their votes directly on the Iraq issue. But all parties accept there is an Iraq factor, and none of them knows exactly how it will play out. -------- business Contracts Awarded Washington Technology Monday, April 25, 2005 Washington Post; E04 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/04/23/AR2005042301797_pf.html VSE Corp. of Alexandria won a $543.9 million, five-year contract from the Navy to provide support services for naval vessels bought for Egypt and other countries under the Foreign Military Sales program. The services include design, spare parts support, maintenance and depot-level repairs. BAE Systems North America Inc. of Rockville won a $58 million contract for technical services from the Navy's Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center. Under the contract, which could reach $314 million if all options are exercised, BAE Systems will design, build and maintain security and antiterrorism-force protection systems at government facilities worldwide. NCI Information Systems Inc. of Reston won a three-year, $11.6 million contract from the Air Force to provide management and engineering technical support to the service's Defense Message System program. IGov.com of McLean received a $3 million purchase order from the Air Force for 2,400 IBM ThinkPad notebooks as part of an initiative supporting more than 160 combat support information technology systems. CSSI Inc. of Washington won a five-year, $35 million contract from the Federal Aviation Administration for research, engineering, analysis and policy support. ManTech International Corp. of Fairfax has won a five-year, $23.9 million contract from the State Department for information technology security services. Lockheed Martin Corp., Maritime Systems and Sensors of Manassas won a $70.5 million contract from the Naval Sea Systems Command for sonar system upgrades for SSN 774-class submarines. Innovative Concepts Inc. of McLean won a $8.5 million contract from the Army Aviation and Missile Command for software upgrades of data modems. Hensel Phelps Construction Co. of Chantilly won a $6.3 million contract from the Pentagon Renovation and Construction Program Office for construction of Pentagon Wedge 3. DynPort Vaccine Co. of Frederick won a $192.3 million contract from the Army for development and licensure for botulinum serotypes A/B vaccine. Titan Corp.'s Unidyne Group of Norfolk won a $26.4 million contract from the Naval Sea Systems Command for modifications to extend the life of five landing craft air cushion craft, including hull refurbishment and upgrades to the engine and navigation and communication systems. Lankford/Sysco Food Services Inc. of Pocomoke City, Md., won a $25 million contract from the Defense Supply Center Richmond to provide food and beverage support for the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard. DynPort Vaccine Co. of Frederick won a $19.6 million contract from the Army for research and development of the Bioscavenger. International Resources Group of Washington won a $50 million contract from the Agency for International Development to provide program management training. HomeSource Real Estate Asset Services Inc. of Gaithersburg won a $19.7 million contract from the Housing and Urban Development Department for management and marketing services. Systems Research and Applications Corp. of Fairfax won a $148 million contract from the Environmental Protection Agency for information technology solutions and business information strategic support. Project Performance Corp. of McLean won a $128 million contract from the Environmental Protection Agency for information technology solutions and business information strategic support. Harlan Lee & Associates of Falls Church won a $2.5 million contract from the General Services Administration for management, organizational and business improvement services. Radio Reconnaissance Technologies Inc. of Fredericksburg won a $3.4 million contract from the Navy for electronic components. Ensco Inc. of Springfield won a $9 million contract from the Transportation Department for design, fabrication and testing of Automated Track Inspection Program and Track Geometry Measurement Rail Cars. Angelic Luxury Coach Inc. of Forestville won a $1 million contract from the General Services Administration for logistics management support worldwide. Washington Post staff writer Judith Mbuya contributed to this report. -------- mideast High Oil Prices, Terrorism on Bush - Abdullah Agenda By REUTERS April 25, 2005 Filed at 1:20 a.m. ET http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/politics/politics-bush-saudi.html?pagewanted=print&position= CRAWFORD, Texas (Reuters) - President Bush will meet Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah at his Texas ranch on Monday to praise the kingdom's efforts to fight terrorism and seek its help in countering the economic threat posed by record oil prices. Abdullah and other Saudi officials met with Vice President Dick Cheney in Dallas on the eve of the meeting with Bush, which was expected to produce statements about cooperation between the two countries. Saudi Arabia's image in America was tarnished by the fact that 15 of the 19 hijackers in the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks were Saudi citizens and members of the al Qaeda network led by Osama bin Laden who was born in Saudi Arabia. The kingdom has disavowed bin Laden. The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 angered Saudi Arabians, but U.S.-Saudi ties strengthened after the kingdom took steps to capture or kill senior al Qaeda members within its borders. ``We need the Saudis and they need us, despite the poor image of the United States in Saudi Arabia and their poor image here,'' said David Mack, vice president at the Middle East Institute. The White House is facing growing consumer dissatisfaction over rising oil prices, with retail gasoline hitting a record nationwide average of $2.28 a gallon this month. Bush is expected to press for more oil production from Saudi Arabia, the biggest producer within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Democratic Rep. Edward Markey of Massachusetts blamed the Bush administration for a ``failed energy policy'' and called for a plan that focused on renewable technologies, energy efficiency and conservation rather than an expansion of oil and gas drilling in the United States. The House of Representatives has approved an $8 billion energy bill with incentives to increase domestic production of crude oil, natural gas, coal, nuclear and other energy sources. It would allow oil drilling in Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. The Senate was expected to complete its version of the bill in May. The Saudis are hoping for an agreement that would pave the way for the kingdom to join the World Trade Organization. Officials have been working around the clock to see if the last sticking points can be ironed out so it can be announced at the Bush-Abdullah meeting. The United States wants barriers eased to allow more U.S. corporate participation in the Saudi insurance, financial services and telecommunications markets. Bush also planned to discuss his efforts to promote democracy and peace in the Middle East as well as the battle against terrorism. In his February State of the Union speech, Bush mentioned Saudi Arabia as one of the countries that had captured or detained al Qaeda militants. Saudi Arabia says it has killed more than 90 militants behind the suicide bombings and shootings that have killed civilians and security personnel in the past two years. ``They have been rooting out al Qaeda sympathizers, organizers in their country,'' a former U.S. intelligence official said. ``They've been knocking off senior guys.'' The Saudis also want the United States to play a stronger role in the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians, and that issue was likely to be discussed at the meeting. -------- prisoners of war Getting Away with Torture? Human Rights Watch Calls for Accountability Into U.S. Abuse of Detainees Monday, April 25th, 2005 Democracy Now! http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=05/04/25/1342206 Human Rights Watch is demanding that a special prosecutor be named to investigate Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, former CIA director George Tenet and other top officials for possible war crimes related to the torture and abuse of prisoners. We speak with Human Rights Watch special counsel Reed Brody. [includes rush transcript] An internal investigation by the Army's inspector general has cleared four of the Army's top five officers in Iraq of any wrongdoing in connection to the torture of Iraqi detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison. Unless new evidence emerges, the investigation effectively ends the Army's investigation into its role in the abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison. Meanwhile, Human Rights Watch has demanded that a special prosecutor be named to investigate Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, former CIA director George Tenet and other top officials for possible war crimes related to the torture and abuse of prisoners. The report, titled "Getting Away with Torture? Command Responsibility for the U.S Abuse of Detainees" - found that there was overwhelming evidence of widespread mistreatment and abuse of Muslim prisoners not only at Abu Ghraib but throughout Afghanistan and Iraq, Guantanamo Bay and other "secret locations" around the world. The report also called for investigations of Lt. General Ricardo Sanchez - the former top U.S commander in Iraq - and General Geoffery Miller the former commander of the prison camp at Guantanamo Bay. Reed Brody, Special Counsel for Human Rights Watch. RUSH TRANSCRIPT This transcript is available free of charge, however donations help us provide closed captioning for the deaf and hard of hearing on our TV broadcast. Thank you for your generous contribution. Donate - $25, $50, $100, more... AMY GOODMAN: We are joined right now by Reed Brody. He is the Special Counsel for Human Rights Watch. Welcome to Democracy Now! REED BRODY: Happy to be on your show, Amy. AMY GOODMAN: Well, talk about this report and your demands. REED BRODY: Well, as you say, Abu Ghraib was just the tip of the iceberg. The mistreatment of Muslim prisoners has been widespread in three countries, at these so-called secret locations where the C.I.A. is holding suspected al Qaeda leaders, as well as in the dungeons of third countries to which the United States has rendered detainees. And yet, there seems to be a wall of immunity that surrounds the top leaders one year out, because next Thursday is the first anniversary of those pictures from Abu Ghraib. And right after the pictures came out, people like Colin Powell and others were quick to say, look, watch how America deals with this. You know, we're going to take -- we're going to deal with this the right way. But a year out, in fact, the United States is doing what every banana republic does when its atrocities are uncovered. It's covering up and it's trying to shift the blame downwards. And so, we have seen very hesitantly a few prosecutions of the lower level people, people like Lindy England and Charles Graner, whose pictures were taken at Abu Ghraib. But it's obviously -- it’s not them who told the President of the United States that he could commit torture. It's not Lindy England who ripped up the Geneva Conventions. It's not Lindy England who authorized the use of guard dogs to terrorize prisoners. These decisions were made by people like Donald Rumsfeld. And yet, there seems to be no investigation up to that level. Obviously, we have a situation where the Attorney General of the United States, the person under whom any prosecution would have to be begun is Alberto Gonzales, who himself is very implicated in this whole scandal. It was Alberto Gonzales who advised the President that the Geneva Conventions were obsolete and its protections quaint. It was Alberto Gonzales who put together the working group that told the President that he could commit torture in the name of counterterrorism. Similarly, on the military side, any prosecution would have to be done under the auspices ultimately of the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. So we are in a situation of institutionalized impunity. And the only way around that would be to appoint a special prosecutor. Now, we have looked at the evidence, and in this report we put together, in particular, the evidence that warrants an investigation, for instance, of George Tenet. Under his direction, the C.I.A. disappeared detainees in secret locations, which is a violation of the Geneva Conventions. There are strong allegations that many of those detainees were tortured. There had been repeated allegations, for instance, that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was subject to so-called water boarding. That's where you make a prisoner -- you push a prisoner's head under the water and make him think he's going to drown. And that with Tenet's specific authorization, detainees were sent to countries like Syria and Egypt, where they were tortured, which would make George Tenet an accomplice, an aider and abettor to torture. In terms of Donald Rumsfeld, we know that Donald Rumsfeld approved methods for prisoners, things like hooding, stressed positions, and in particular, the use of dogs to terrorize detainees that went beyond the Geneva Conventions. But more importantly, he created the conditions for these crimes that we saw at Abu Ghraib and in Afghanistan and elsewhere to go on, and during three years, while groups like ours, like the Red Cross, like the press were reporting on abuses. At no point, as far as we know, and in all of the documents that have come out, these thousands of documents that have come out through the Center for Constitutional Rights and ACLU lawsuit, there's not one document in which Donald Rumsfeld says this has got to stop. So, for three years, during which troops under his command were committing atrocities, and he was aware of it, at no point did he put his foot down. And so, under the principle of command responsibility, Donald Rumsfeld should be investigated for the torture. AMY GOODMAN: And how do you know he approved all these different forms of torture? REED BRODY: Well, we know that for Guantanamo, on December 2, 2003, that he approved a list of interrogation techniques that included -- excuse me, I think it's 2002. That he included -- that included the use of dogs to instill fear in prisoners, the use of stress positions. Now, he withdrew that approval for Guantanamo, but as the various Pentagon investigations have found, those techniques migrated, as they put it, to Afghanistan and to Iraq. AMY GOODMAN: We're talking to Reed Brody. He’s Special Counsel for Human Rights Watch, which has just put out the report, “Getting Away with Torture? Command Responsibility for U.S. Abuse of Detainees.” Reed, what do you make of this army report that clears the -- among the highest up in the army? REED BRODY: Well, this just seems like another attempt at the -- you know, what they have done is they have now had nine separate reports, depending how you country it, 11 separate reports that look down the chain of command. All of the reports are self-investigations by the army or by the Pentagon. There has been no independent report. This report, for instance, absolves Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, who is the top officer in Iraq. Now, we know that on September 13, just before the, you know, the real mayhem at Abu Ghraib, that General Sanchez approved in a memorandum the use of, as he put it, -- to exploit Arab fear of dogs, in other words, to use dogs on prisoners. Now, we saw that that was used. And we saw in the pictures that that was used at Abu Ghraib. And for those three months of mayhem that were occurring right under his nose, he never stepped in. And also, he misled Congress about it. He was asked twice at a Congressional hearing whether he ever approved the use of guard dogs. This was before the memo came out. And both times he said he never approved it. And now, and just last month, we finally got the actual memo, in which he approves, as I said, (quote), “exploiting Arab fear of dogs.” So, it's just not credible for the army to keep investigating itself and keep finding itself innocent. And, you know, I think this is largely part of a damage control exercise, obviously, in the United States, but what many Americans don't realize is how this plays abroad. I mean, I spent a lot of my time, you know, hassling other governments for what they're doing, and the answer is always Abu Ghraib. Look, the Americans commit torture, and they get away with it. What do you want us from? And I think there’s, in the rest of the world, there is no credibility to these arguments that, you know, it was just the lower soldiers who inventing these torture methods and who carried them out, somehow coincidentally in Afghanistan, at Guantanamo and in Iraq. AMY GOODMAN: We are talking to Reed Brody, Special Counsel for Human Rights Watch. We'll continue on the report just came out, “Getting Away with Torture? Command Responsibility for U.S. Abuse of Detainees,” after the break. [break] AMY GOODMAN: We continue on this new report, “Getting Away with Torture? Command Responsibility for the U.S. Abuse of Detainees.” This is an army report, has come out clearing some of the top command in the army of abuse at Abu Ghraib. We're joined by Reed Brody, Special Counsel for Human Rights Watch. What about what is known as “extraordinary rendition,” and where did they even come up, by the way, with that name? REED BRODY: I don’t know where they came up with the name. I mean, rendition is anytime you transfer somebody from one country to another. Extraordinary rendition, we’ve defined as the rendition -- the extra-legal rendition of people to countries where they stand at risk of torture. And we know that the C.I.A. has rendered, because they have said -- they leaked this to The New York Times -- has rendered between 100 and 150 people since September 11. Now, the U.S. says that every time -- and President Bush has said and Alberto Gonzales, that every time they render someone, they get an assurance from the receiving country that the detainee will not be tortured. So, it was, for instance, in the case that your listeners know well about, Maher Arar, the Canadian who was sent to Syria for ten months where he had very credibly alleges that he was brutally tortured in the dungeon of a Syrian prison. AMY GOODMAN: He was coming back to Canada from a family vacation and was changing planes at Kennedy airport, which he was taken off the plane by U.S. authorities. REED BRODY: Exactly. He protested. He said, send me back to Canada. No. The U.S. sent him to Syria, but they got an assurance from the Syrian government that he wouldn’t be tortured. That’s like giving somebody over to a mafia don who says, “Okay, we'll take care of him. Don't worry.” How can you believe a government that systematically commits torture? AMY GOODMAN: Isn't that the U.S. allegation about Syria? REED BRODY: Yes. In fact, the State Department itself, the week after Maher Arar was released, President Bush in a speech to the National Endowment for Democracy talked about how the Syrian government was leading a legacy of torture. Now, this is the same Syrian government to which the United States has sent a detainee, many detainees, by the way. Similarly with Egypt. In every case of rendition that we know about, the detainee was tortured. There is no case of a detainee that we know about, being sent to Egypt or Syria, in which the person has not credibly alleged that he was tortured. AMY GOODMAN: Well, do you allege that that's the reason they are being sent to these other countries? REED BRODY: You know, that's a conclusion that one can draw. It seems like a pretty logical conclusion. The fact is that a person who sends a detainee, a security detainee, to Syria, and that person is then tortured, I would think becomes an accomplice to torture. Under criminal law, you know, there's “the foreseeable consequences of your action.” And the foreseeable consequence of sending a security detainee to a country like Egypt or Syria is that he will -- he or she – he, in all of these cases, will be tortured. AMY GOODMAN: Can you talk about the German citizen, Khalid al-Masri, who was secretly picked up in Macedonia on New Year's Eve, 2003. At the time, the U.S. thought he was a leader in Abu Ghraib. A few days ago, NBC News reported the U.S. picked up the wrong guy and held him for at least a month after they said that they learned that a mistake had occurred. REED BRODY: Right, now here is a guy whose name sounds like somebody else's name. So he’s going along to Macedonia, and the next thing he knows, he's picked up by the United States, and he’s sent to Afghanistan, and he’s tortured. And we just found out this weekend that Condoleezza Rice had to step in, when it was found out that it was the wrong person, to get this guy released. Now, how many other people like that are there who have the wrong name -- even if they are in fact tied to terrorism, you still can’t send somebody to be tortured. But what we're finding out is that more and more of these people like Maher Arar, like Masri, are either in the wrong place at the wrong time. In the case of Maher Arar it seems like the evidence -- the supposed evidence against him came from someone else's testimony under torture, who was rendered to Syria previously. So, we have -- the United States appears to operate or be part of this great archipelago of prison camps around the world, some of which -- in fact, it's funny, because Guantanamo is almost supposed to be the secret place, and Guantanamo has become the best known. But you’ve got other places like Bagram. You’ve got other places we don't even know about. And then you have got, you know, third world prisons like the Tora prison in Cairo or the Falastin branch of the prison in Damascus where the U.S. is sending people. So you have got, really, this underworld of prisons that are being operated by the United States totally outside of the law. AMY GOODMAN: What about the soldiers who have been prosecuted? Has any information come out in those prosecutions, as their lawyers attempt to say they were only following orders? REED BRODY: Well, unfortunately, the judges in these cases have been very strict about not allowing higher-ups to testify. And in fact, even that intermediate range – I mean, there are a lot of allegations that anyone in the intermediate range who might have some connection to Donald Rumsfeld have not even been prosecuted so that, you know, they would not, you know, give up information up the chain of command. And so, normally, what a prosecutor does in an organized crime case or something like this is you charge the lower guys. You charge them with a crime. You get them to cooperate in order to rat on the higher-ups. That's the way you build the case. That's not happening here because there's no political will to make it happen. AMY GOODMAN: What do you think would make it happen? REED BRODY: You know, we have called for a special prosecutor. I think there needs -- Americans are obviously upset by the pictures of Abu Ghraib, but I don't think there's yet a full appreciation that Abu Ghraib was only the tip of the iceberg. I don't think there's a full appreciation in the United States of how much damage this scandal has done to the United States' reputation. And if there was sufficient political will to appoint an independent investigation, like a 9/11-style investigation, or a special prosecutor, I think that all of this would come out, and the United States could wipe away the stain of Abu Ghraib in one fell swoop, in fact, by prosecuting all of the people who are responsible for this scandal. AMY GOODMAN: Reed Brody is our guest, the Special Counsel for Human Rights Watch, “Getting Away with Torture? Command Responsibility for the U.S. Abuse Of Detainees.” How early on were non-governmental organizations like the International Red Cross letting the government know that they know, and demanding some kind of change, and do you think there's a problem with the Red Cross not making public earlier what they knew? REED BRODY: You know, this goes back to 2001. A lot of people forget the case, for instance, of John Walker Lindh, the so-called American Taliban. You know, we saw pictures of John Walker Lindh strapped to a gurney, naked. I think at the time it didn't set off the warning bells that perhaps it should have set off. This is a guy who had a bullet in his leg, who was purposely kept out, according to his lawyers, in the freezing Afghan cold, who was interrogated while he was strapped naked and blindfolded to a gurney. According to the Los Angeles Times, his responses were being cabled back to Donald Rumsfeld, whose lawyer, again according to the Los Angeles Times, said -- whose legal counsel said that the gloves should come off with John Walker Lindh. This was three years ago. This was something that was even in the public eye. The International Committee of the Red Cross, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, have been reporting this stuff for three years. In December, 2002, the Washington Post published a front page article in which it quoted ten governmental -- unidentified governmental sources as talking about the stress and duress positions in Afghanistan, as talking about sending detainees to third world countries, quoting governmental sources, saying that we don't kick the bleep out of them, we send them to other countries to kick the bleep out of them. And nothing was done. So, it's not just the Red Cross. You know, I think that the International Committee of the Red Cross is in a difficult position, because they get access in exchange for not going public with their information. But this stuff was coming out from us, it was coming out from Amnesty, it was coming out from the press. We wrote on December -- the day after that Washington Post article came out, we wrote a letter to President Bush, and said, “You are now on notice that the U.S. government is sending people to be tortured. You now have a legal responsibility to do something about it, or you could be prosecuted for torture.” And nothing was done. The program continued. AMY GOODMAN: You call for a special prosecutor to investigate George Tenet, former director of the C.I.A. and Donald Rumsfeld, Defense Secretary. Why do you stop there? Why don't you move up the chain of command from Cheney to Bush? REED BRODY: Well, let's see what happens? I mean, we know -- it has been alleged that President Bush in late 2001 signed an order facilitating the rendition of terror suspects to other countries, that at the same time period he signed an order allowing the C.I.A. to establish secret detention centers, which in effect means that these detainees are disappeared. I think a special prosecutor could ultimately also look at the culpability of the President. AMY GOODMAN: Well, I want to thank you for being with us. If people want to get access to the report, where can they go on the web? REED BRODY: Www.hrw.org. HumanRightsWatch.org. ---- Supreme Court declines to hear POW case 4/25/2005 (AP) http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-04-25-scotus-pows_x.htm WASHINGTON — The Supreme Court on Monday declined to consider whether U.S. prisoners of war who say they were tortured during the 1991 Gulf War should collect a $959 million judgment from Iraq. The justices let stand a lower court ruling that threw out the lawsuit by the 17 former POWs and 37 family members. That ruling, by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit last year, said Congress never authorized such lawsuits against foreign governments. The dispute pitted the Bush administration, which argued the money was needed to rebuild Iraq, against former service members. The decision by the appellate court "runs roughshod over decades of United States dedication to the laws of war, and sends a message to United States military personnel that while they protect their country, their country will not protect them," wrote the National League of POW/MIA Families in a friend-of-the-court filing. The administration countered that the courts should defer to the executive branch on foreign policy decisions. It suggested in filings that the president may seek compensation for the POWs through diplomatic means once the new Iraqi regime is "firmly established." At issue was a 1996 federal law that allows Americans to collect damages for hostage-taking, torture or murder committed by officials of foreign states who are designated as "state sponsors of terrorism" by the State Department. At the time, Iraq was listed as one such state. The 17 POWs filed their lawsuit in 2002, alleging that they endured severe beatings, starvation, electric shock, threats of amputation and dismemberment and continual death threats. Nearly 125 pages of the complaint detail the servicemen's stories, including those of Marine Maj. Michael Craig Berryman, who said his legs were beaten with a metal pipe and a wooden ax handle; Marine Col. Clifford Acree, who said he was so near starvation he could "feel his body consuming itself;" and Navy Cmdr. Lawrence Slade, whose body was described as so blue from bruises that it was "as if he had been dipped in indigo dye." The Iraqi government never appeared in U.S. court to argue its case, leading to the default judgment in 2003 that the POWs planned to obtain from $1.7 billion in assets frozen by the U.S. government. By then, however, the U.S. had invaded Iraq and toppled Saddam Hussein from power. Soon after, the Justice Department intervened in the lawsuit, saying the money was needed to rebuild Iraq. Government lawyers also argued that the POWs weren't entitled to the judgment because President Bush made an official determination in May 2003 that a statute allowing payment from frozen assets wasn't applicable to Iraq because it no longer supported terrorism after Saddam was overthrown. The D.C. appeals court agreed, saying the federal statute only allows lawsuits for pain and suffering if they are filed against agents and officers of those foreign states responsible for the torture who are not acting on behalf of their government. The case is Acree v. Iraq, 04-820. ---- U.S. prison population placed at 2.1 million ASSOCIATED PRESS April 25, 2005 http://www.washtimes.com/national/20050424-112051-4199r.htm Growing at a rate of about 900 inmates each week between mid-2003 and mid-2004, the nation's prisons and jails held 2.1 million people, or one in every 138 U.S. residents, the government reported yesterday. By last June 30, there were 48,000, or 2.3 percent, more inmates than the year before, according to the latest figures from the Bureau of Justice Statistics. The total inmate population has hovered around 2 million for the past few years, reaching 2.1 million on June 30, 2002, and just below that mark a year later. While the crime rate has fallen during the past decade, the number of people in prison and jail is outpacing the number of inmates released, said the report's co-author, Paige Harrison. For example, the number of admissions to federal prisons in 2004 exceeded releases by more than 8,000, the study found. Miss Harrison said the increase can be attributed largely to get-tough policies enacted in the 1980s and 1990s. Among them are mandatory drug sentences, "three-strikes-and-you're-out" laws for repeat offenders, and "truth-in-sentencing" laws. "As a whole, most of these policies remain in place," she said. "These policies were a reaction to the rise in crime in the '80s and early '90s." Added Malcolm Young, executive director of the Sentencing Project, which promotes alternatives to prison: "We're working under the burden of laws and practices that have developed over 30 years that have focused on punishment and prison as our primary response to crime." He said many of those incarcerated are not serious or violent offenders, but are low-level drug offenders. Mr. Young said one way to help lower the number is to introduce drug treatment programs that offer effective ways of changing behavior and to provide appropriate assistance for the mentally ill. According to the Justice Policy Institute, which advocates a more lenient system of punishment, the United States has a higher rate of incarceration than any other country, followed by Britain, China, France, Japan and Nigeria. -------- spies Spying and the Internet April 25, 2005 Washington Times By Ronald A. Marks http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20050424-101721-8924r.htm A recent director of central intelligence was asked by one of his senior intelligence analysts about establishing a group within the community to look at managing all the new sources of information on the Internet. The director immediately snorted back, "I only have money to pay for secrets." This is but one example of the ill-informed and unhappy basis on which America's intelligence analysts have been dealing with the modern Internet age. With billions of pages of free information expanding every day on the Internet, access is limited by both security concerns and language barriers. With intelligence analysis in shambles, new Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte must position America's intelligence organizations for the 21st century. He and his chosen senior intelligence analyst must come to grips with the exploding challenge of so-called "open-source" information, harnessing this source to bolster a new system of effective and useful analysis for America's policymakers. For Mr. Negroponte, the job will not be easy. In many ways, the intelligence community is a "first-generation" information business.Established mostly in the 1950s, the intelligence community's structure and information -sharing techniques reflect its age -- "stove piping" of information along organizational lines and compartmentation to the nth degree based sometimes on security, mostly on corporate turf protection. Still, the ability of American intelligence to uncover valuable secrets against its Cold War adversaries was impressive. However, like first-generation corporate titans Timex and Kodak, time wore on and the systems that were so successful early began to be challengedandthen overwhelmed as all around them progressed. By the late 1980s, it became quite clear that new and extensive information and databases were available to many in the outside world. With the invention and explosion of the Internet in the mid-1990s, "secrets" of the Cold War era simply did not always have the same value they used to have. Today, America now deals with enemies who gleefully post their intentions, strengths and locations on the Web for all to see. So what should the new DNI do about this expanding "information gap?" The Robb-Silberman commission was the latest to recommend the most effective solution -- establish within the intelligence community an Open Source Directorate; a cadre of no more than "50 analysts that could become the intelligence experts in finding and using unclassified, open source information." This would leaven greatly the current stale analysis taking place in the intelligence community. More often than not, the analyst today lives in the rarified air of the classified world -- of human spies and satellite imagery and signals. However, the analyst needs and must fit classified information into an open-source context for it to truly make sense. Moreover, his client the policymaker lives in the real world of so-called "open-source" information. Policymakers must and do develop their own "open-source" information systems through friends, colleagues, advocates and opponents, as well as the usual news sources. The limits on analysts receiving open-source information are often bogged in arcane matters of security -- we don't want "them" to know what we are looking at -- and old technology that does not allow the analyst to access state of the art translation capabilities for news sources and databases world wide. What open intelligence he receives is often a result of his own haphazard research limited by security concerns and language capabilities. This simply is unacceptable in this day and age. As the commission further recommended, technology can over come many of the security concerns and deal effectively with the dense amount of data in the open. A specific office could be set up to "acquire or develop when necessary information technologies" to deal with large amount of information -- the vast majority of which is not in English. A number of prominent private-sector technology companies have been dealing with this issue since the late 1990s. It is perhaps time the intelligence community used some of its recently acquired lucre to advance its analytical capabilities into the 21st century. The analyst and his analysis are the "voice" of American intelligence. But, it is a voice hobbled by outdated ideas and limited information. As Mr. Negroponte moves to quickly make the changes that count, dealing with open-source information is a quick fix that can greatly magnify the power and reach of American intelligence. We cannot allow this information gap to stand. Ronald A. Marks is a 16-year veteran of the CIA and former intelligence counsel to Senate leaders Robert Dole and Trent Lott. -------- us Arnold Schwartzenegger and California politicians to Rumsfeld re base closures April 25, 2005 http://www.governor.ca.gov/govsite/pdf/press_release/Rumsfeld_BRAC_letter.pdf The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld Secretary Department of Defense Washington, DC 20301 Dear Secretary Rumsfeld : As a state, we have been working together to review California's defense infrastructure in anticipation for the next base closure round. California is truly unique in its integrated combination of the nation's best warfighting capabilities, training ranges, research and testing centers, and military schools. Together with our academic centers and defense industry, the state offers more support than any other location for joint operations success and defens e transformation. It is important to understand how Califomia's installations provide such unmatched capability for the 21st century. First, the state is ideally located for response to future threats in the Pacific theater and across Asia. Second, our vast, unencroached, and irreplaceable ranges and our ideal weather conditions provide year round training. No other place in America offers the diversity of haining with the weather to use it. Most importantly, these operations and facilities are interconnected across the state and into the entire southwestern U. S., providing unique jointness of operations and training. One cannot alter segments of this integrated capability without affecting all of the remaining parts. This unique integration of capability is more than just geography and climate. The close proximity of fighting forces to technology centers and experienced human capital enables requirements to quickly become real capability. Further, this integrated capability provides for continued success in recruiting and retention, in developing and providing technologies to sustain our troops and their operations, and in enhancing our country's space and intelligence operations. Our state and its people completely supporthe military's essential and vital role in our national security today and tomorrow. We are committed to support America's military, and believe California provides that support, across the board, better than any other state. To help show this, we have attached the recent report of the California Council on Base Support and Retention, a comprehensive review of the state's vital role in national defense. It provides clear examples of the interconnectedness that makes California so uniquely important to our national security. As the Department of Defense concludes its final review of military installations within the base realignment and closure process, we expecthat California's bases receive the fair and impartial evaluation they deserve in the base realignment and closure process of 2005 and that the results will reflect the importance of the Califomia defense complex. -------- POLICE / PRISONERS / COURTS / JUSTICE -------- terrorism A Protected Friend of Terrorism By Douglas Farah Washington Post Monday, April 25, 2005; A19 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/04/24/AR2005042400893_pf.html The Bush administration is touting the rule of law and democracy as priorities in its effort to create stability and defeat terrorism. Yet it remains curiously apathetic about the activities of one of the world's most notorious indicted war criminals, a man who is also an abettor of al Qaeda and Hezbollah. I am speaking of former Liberian president Charles Taylor, who has not only escaped answering for his crimes so far but who may be given an opportunity to repeat them if the United States does not act. It seems to matter little here that Taylor's efforts to escape justice may well succeed because of U.S. inertia. Indicted on 17 counts of crimes against humanity, Taylor poses a clear and present danger to West Africa and U.S. interests. Yet the State Department continues to respond to congressional inquiries with bland assurances that everything is fine and Taylor is no longer a problem. It's not true. Unless Taylor is turned over quickly to the U.N.-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone to stand trial, he will never face punishment for the crimes he committed in the region at the cost of tens of thousands of dead and hundreds of thousands of lives destroyed. The mandate of the court, largely funded by the United States, expires at the end of the year. It was established to try those "most responsible" for the atrocities in Sierra Leone. Taylor is at the top of the list. Taylor's were brutal, vicious crimes. For more than a decade he presided over forces that murdered, raped and mutilated children; they also abducted children to use them as cannon fodder. He created "Small Boys Units" made up of specially trained children who, while high on amphetamines, were used to raze villages and murder civilians. He trained and supplied the Revolutionary United Front in neighboring Sierra Leone, whose signature atrocity was hacking off the arms, legs and ears of civilians, many of them children. Taylor also hosted diamond buyers from al Qaeda and Hezbollah for several years, allowing the two designated terrorist groups to earn and hide their wealth in an asset that is untraceable and easily convertible to cash. In August 2003, under siege militarily, Taylor fled to Nigeria under an asylum deal backed by the Bush administration and Britain's Tony Blair. The terms of the agreement with Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo were that Taylor not be allowed to participate in "active communications with anyone engaged in political, illegal or governmental activities in Liberia." In return, Obasanjo would not be criticized for harboring an indicted war criminal. Obasanjo promised to turn Taylor over only if the new Liberian government requested it. There is clear evidence -- gathered by the court, U.N. officials in Liberia and European intelligence services -- that Taylor has made a mockery of the asylum agreement, meddling in Liberia's electoral process by phone, e-mail, fax and cash payments. The court has revealed evidence that Taylor funded and planned an unsuccessful January assassination attempt against Lansana Conte, the president of Guinea. An investigation by the Coalition for International Justice has found that Taylor is spending some of the millions of dollars he looted to pay for campaigns of several of Liberia's presidential contenders. His financial empire, built on shell companies and businesses stretching from Nigeria to Europe and the Caribbean, is feeding resources to his longtime business associates and military loyalists. He will have the protection of whoever wins the October election. The new government will then make sure Taylor can return home and never face the court. Once he outlasts the court's mandate, he will have escaped prosecution and will continue to wreak havoc. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan last month told the Security Council that Taylor's "former military commanders and business associates, as well as members of his political party, maintain regular contact with him and are planning to undermine the peace process" in Liberia. David Crane, the court' s chief prosecutor, said that "Taylor is still ruling the country from his house arrest." Yet the Bush administration has offered no support for turning Taylor over to the court. The State Department has, in several recent briefings, equivocated on whether U.S. policy really supports such a move. Part of the reason may be Taylor's long association with U.S. intelligence services. During much of the 1990s, Taylor was close to Moammar Gaddafi, the main financier of Taylor's wars. Taylor regularly reported on his meetings to U.S. intelligence agencies and was paid for the information. While the use of informants is necessary, protecting Taylor in the face of unspeakable atrocities just because of that historical relationship should not be tolerated. Faced with the administration's apathy, a bipartisan group of legislators is taking the lead. Reps. Ed Royce (R-Calif.), Sue W. Kelly (R-N.Y.), Frank R. Wolf (R-Va.), Victor F. Snyder (D-Ark.) and Tom Lantos (D-Calif.) are co-sponsoring a concurrent resolution calling for Taylor's expeditious handover to the court. The congressional action is helpful, but what is really needed is the administration's active support for Taylor's immediate extradition. The administration must acknowledge that Nigeria acted in the best interests of the region by taking him and thank Obasanjo for his help. Britain has already done this. But Obasanjo must have the political cover of public U.S. support to hand Taylor over. If Taylor escapes prosecution, West Africa will be endangered and U.S. moral leadership severely diminished. The writer is a former bureau chief for The Post in West Africa. He is investigating Charles Taylor's financial network for the Coalition for International Justice, a Washington-based group. ----- Disarmament, Terrorism, Global security - Which are the threats to global security? Keynote speech by Dr. Hans Blix Delivered on Friday February 25th, 2005 Kärnvapen http://www.svenskafreds.se/2005nwconference/Speeches.shtml#blix During the Cold War we worried about a possible nuclear duel, in which the US and the Soviet Union would achieve a mutually assured destruction – MAD – and the rest of the world might be wiped out as “collateral damage.” After the end of the Cold War and the arrival of détente in the early 1990s we do not think such a duel is likely. What would they fight about? Insufficient democracy in Russia? With the diminishing fear of big nuclear war the public engagement in the question of global nuclear disarmament regrettably has also diminished. Another fear is now dominating the political agenda, the public debate and the media: weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists or so called ‘rogue states’. The background is obvious. Although the Al Qaeda network headquartered in camps in Afganistan simply used hijacked airplanes, barely trained pilots and boxcutters the horrendous terror action on 11 September 2001 resulted in the tragic loss of thousands of lives and sent a shock wave with the epicenter in Washington. It put the US federal government on war foot. President Bush is reported to have said that 9/11 was the Pearl Harbour of the Third World War. Billions and billions of dollars are devoted to the construction of a shield against missiles from ‘rogue’ states or terrorists, other billions are devoted to intelligence. Let us hope the expenditure will result in more accurate assessments than those that preceded the Iraq war. The pressure in the US for new types of nuclear weapons is increasing. Although we have only seen one case of a – Japanese – group using chemical weapons it would be far from me, as a chairman of an international commission on WMDs to belittle the problem of reckless governments or even terrorists acquiring such weapons. Nevertheless, in assessing the threats and devising means of protection we should keep our feet on the ground and try to see things in perspective. Further, we should not neglect the political means of countering terrorism and dealing with what is sometimes called “states of concern.” Tony Blair said that nothing could do more to counter terrorism than a settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli issue. I agree. What are the risks that WMDs will be used by states? Gas was used in the First World War and on several occasions after the Second World War, including by Iraq. Nuclear bombs were used at the end of the Second World War and have not been used since then. Although there will certainly be more regional armed conflicts and civil wars I am optimistic to believe that there will be no world wars and that the still vast arsenals of nuclear weapons are not likely to be used. Why? When we look back in history we can see that quests for territory have been one of the main causes of war. We can also see that ideological or religious aims have been behind many other armed campaigns. I think these two main causes of armed conflicts between states are disappearing. Whether we want it or not the gradual global integration that is being brought about by the technical, economic, and information evolution is gluing us together. The increased interdependence and proximity will push relations between blocs and continents – I am not talking about limited regions -- toward peace and against the use of nuclear weapons. I admit there is some uncertainty. We can see today some friction between the US, long dominant in the Pacific region, and China as the fast rising economic giant of the region. The Taiwan issue is not without danger. Even during the Cold War some agreements were made to reduce the threat of arms: the Partial Test Ban Treaty prevented nuclear testing in the atmosphere and reduced radioactive fallout. The Non Proliferation Treaty (1968) provided a dual bargain under which non-nuclear weapon states committed themselves to remain without these weapons and the nuclear weapon states committed themselves to negotiate toward disarmament. Biological weapons were not believed useful and a convention prohibited production and possession of these weapons. Many bilateral arms control agreements were made between the US and the USSR. After the Cold War the risk of armed conflicts diminished in most parts of the world. Africa and the Middle East are the exceptions. There is continued détente between all big powers. In Europe the role of the military forces is no longer seen to be territorial defense but readiness for peace keeping. In the fields of arms control and disarmament the global détente brought several welcome results, above all the conclusion of the Convention prohibiting for all states the production and possession of Chemical Weapons Convention, the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the expectation that an agreement would be reached to stop all production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for more nuclear weapons (FMCT): the so called ‘cut off’. The most important joint UN action made possible by the climate of détente was, of course, the authorization given to the broad alliance created by President Bush the elder to intervene in 1991 to stop Iraq’s naked aggression against and occupation of Kuwait. The discoveries in Iraq in 1991 undermined the confidence in the NPT Through the UN authorized intervention in Iraq we discovered what détente, cooperation and the notion of collective security could achieve. However, through the IAEA inspectors, who went into Iraq after the cease-fire, we also discovered that Iraq had cheated on its commitment under the Non- Proliferation Treaty and was pursuing a large program for the enrichment of uranium and for the production of nuclear weapons. Later, UNSCOM inspectors brought evidence also of a significant program for biological weapons and even of the testing of B-weapons. These discoveries could not but shake the confidence in the reliability of the NPT and the safeguards inspections, which were meant to deter and detect cheating. When in the same period already the earliest IAEA inspectors in North Korea concluded that the DPRK had not declared all the plutonium it had produced, the question was inevitably asked whether the NPT was like a big Swiss cheese full of holes. Was the world being lulled into false sense of security by signatures under treaties and soft verification regimes? What further unpleasant surprises might there be? Work started to bring about a drastic strengthening of the IAEA safeguards inspections and these efforts that led in 1997 to the adoption of new protocols for much more effective inspection. Nevertheless, these events seem to have weakened the US dedication to and reliance on global arms control agreements and given rise to ideas about a policy of more active unilateral counter-proliferation. The feeling of growing military superiority probably also contributed to an inclination to rely on arms rather than arms control. The concept of counter-proliferation was not – and is not – terribly well defined but it certainly comprised options of special armed operations to stop the development of nuclear weapons capabilities. The Israeli bombing raid destroying the OSIRAK reactor in Iraq in 1981 is the example that comes to mind. Other examples are assassinations of nuclear specialists. The many years during which Saddam Hussein was able to play cat and mouse with UN inspectors presumably further eroded the US confidence that international economic sanctions and inspection would bring credible assurance about the absence of any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. By 9/11 2001 neither the US nor any other members of the Security Council suspected that there was any Iraqi nuclear threat in the foreseeable future. Although there were suspicions that Saddam retained some biological or chemical weapons and missiles, Saddam was, as it was said, “kept in his box”. Even so, to the US, as the rapidly growing only military superpower, Saddam Hussein must have appeared as an intolerable defiance. The temptation to go from containing him to replacing him was there. Regime change was desired but there was no clear reason for war -- no casus belli. How did the non-existent WMDs become the casus belli? We now know that in all likelihood Iraq destroyed most of its weapons of mass destruction in the summer of 1991. Yet, Iraq behaved as if it might still have prohibited weapons. Regardless of what might have been the reason for this behaviour in the 1990s – I shall not go into them -- in 2002 the US and the rest of the world suspected that the Iraqi conduct was linked to the existence of hidden WMDs. These suspicions were fed nourishment by Iraqi defectors, who wished to see US military intervention – not UN inspection. Their contrived information was warmly received by groups in Washington, which were eager to use arms to and secure a US friendly regime in Iraq. The arguments in favour of armed action varied: to some it was important that the stationing of US troops in Iraq could be less problematic than in Saudi Arabia and could be useful as a pressure on Iran. Moreover, the oil reserves of Iraq were the second largest in the region and important for future US imports. Lack of plausible casus belli against IRAQ While the US armed action against Afghanistan had been justified by the Taliban regime’s hosting the authors of the terrorist attacks on 9/11 solid justifications for an armed attack on Iraq were not easily found. The allegations about Iraqi links to terrorists and about the existence of illegal WMD programs never had much substance. However, where the evidence was weak it was spun into virtual reality and intelligence organizations gave the war- bent political leaders in the US and the UK what they looked for, if not explicitly asked for. Too often intelligence abandoned its proper role as coldly seeking, investigating and analyzing information. Today they probably regret it. Who will believe them next time they cry wolf? The period of UN and IAEA inspections in Iraq was not welcomed by all in Washington. Vice President Cheney said simply that inspection was worse than useless and he told Dr. ElBaradei (of the IAEA) and myself that the US would not hesitate to “discredit” the inspections “in favour of disarmament”. When the inspectors reported no finds of ‘smoking guns’ some in the US leadership were so convinced of their own arguments about WMDs that they believed the inspectors were lying. Apparently I and many others were bugged. I wish they would at least have listened better to what I said… There were no smoking guns in my telephone conversations. The US chose to ignore that UN inspections did not confirm US allegations and that we even expressed skepticism against some intelligence information, which we were able to check – including some that Secretary of State Colin Powell presented to the Security Council. However, other members of the Security Council did not ignore what we said. They concluded that the inspections worked and should continue. What was the hurry? Tremendous pressure was exerted on these members of the Council to support armed action. We should appreciate that they stood fast. What would the world have thought of the Council today if it had authorized the war in March 2003? For that matter, what would the world have thought of international inspection, if we had endorsed the intelligence that claimed the existence of WMDs? The unleashing of the war I shall not go into the discussion of the legal and political justifications given for the war. It was unleashed. Some of the implications for the future are nevertheless worth considering. An authorization by the UN Security Council was declared unnecessary and preemptive counter-proliferation action was taken by a few states to eliminate WMDs -- which international inspectors had not found and which – in fact -- did not exist. The Iraq Survey Group (ISG), which was established by the CIA in the summer of 2003 to look for the weapons has recently made it known that no weapons can be found and that it makes no further efforts. Could this happen again? It is hard to resist the reflection that the war and the ISG operation was a very costly way of concluding that there were no WMDs and a very painful way of introducing democracy. The UN inspections cost some 80 million US dollars for a year and involved some 200-300 people. The cost of the war was high in terms of dead and wounded and damage of property. It required hundreds of thousands of men and hundreds of billions of dollars. And it is not over yet. Another reflection: It is welcome that the elections just held were much more successful than many had feared. An early declaration by the United States that it intends to withdraw all military forces and does not have the ambition to seek military bases in Iraq would strengthen confidence that the establishment of an independent, disarmed and democratic government and not the establishment of military bases, was the main aim of the war and occupation. The impact of the IRAQ invasion on the collective security system of the UN From the viewpoint of the collective security system of the UN Charter, the extent to which the United States has claimed that it is free to take armed action is worrisome. Article 51 of the UN Charter recognizes a right of self-defense “when an armed attack occurs”. However, the US has explained that in the era of weapons of mass destruction, long range missiles and terrorist groups, it feels at liberty to take armed action in ‘anticipatory self-defense’ not only where it deems an attack “imminent” but also where it sees a “a growing threat”. What is a ‘growing threat’? Let us try to be understanding. Considering the surprise terror attacks on the United States in 2001 all governments would probably maintain that they would see it as their duty to their own populations to take action – if need be even unilateral armed action – to seek to prevent a terror attack that they learnt was coming. They would not ask for a “permission slip” from the Security Council. There are, however, two crucial problems with the claim of a right to such anticipatory self-defense: · Before an attack has taken place, the knowledge about it is likely to depend upon intelligence. The Iraq affair does not give much confidence about national intelligence as a reliable basis. Where it turns out that the basis is erroneous, then what is meant to be anticipatory self-defense may become a totally unjustified attack. · Although “imminence” may be a severe time requirement, “a growing threat” would be an unacceptably lax criterion. It has been suggested that an effort should be made to reformulate article 51 of the Charter to give some room for preemptive action. The high level panel that has recently reported to Kofi Annan rejects the suggestion. It warns that any widening of the right to self defense will be open to abuse by all states. I agree with this view and find it more likely that an answer to the question when unilaterally decided and executed self-defense is acceptable to the world community will slowly – and perhaps painfully – be given through precedents. In each case the position of the Security Council will prove important. Respect for the Council’s authority will require, as Kofi Annan has noted, that the Council actively consider and monitor any claims of threats brought to it. Members are less likely to take action unilaterally, if they are confident that the threat perceived and presented is taken seriously with a readiness to take or authorize action, where there is convincing evidence of a threat that is significant and near in time. To help the Council continuously to monitor and analyse the possible threats of WMDs the Council might do well to retain the professional services of the expert inspection and analysis group, which I headed for the case of Iraq (UNMOVIC). Will the Council do so? I do not know. Maybe the US will continue to consider the Security Council irrelevant when it does not support the US? Will the US continue to deemphasize reliance on and cooperation through formal treaty alliances and instruments and agreements? It is too early to know. For most of the world it is difficult to understand the disdain – not to say the contempt – which the US has shown the UN. Personally, I do not see why the US could not proceed in conformity with multilateral regimes and norms – including the UN Charter -- which it has, itself, helped to create. When it is argued – by the US as by others -- that the rule of law and respect for it are vital for peace, predictability and prosperity within states, is it not logical that we accept the same argument for relations between states? Where, in some extreme situation, we find the law an unbearable strait-jacket or murky, we may be driven in the international sphere as in the national to disregard it. If our reasons are convincing other governments and world public opinion might exonerate our action. However, we should not be surprised if we stand alone and criticized, if our judgment was not shared by others. Where are we going next? I shall first discuss the WMD threats linked to terrorist groups and thereafter the threats from WMDs in the hands of states. How is the world to meet the threats and actions of terrorist groups? The first point to make, I think, is that terrorists do not live on clouds but must have their feet on the territory of states. It is important that the international community upholds the principle that each government is obliged to ensure that its territory is not used as a base for attacks on other states. It is legally correct and practically and politically sound. If there is a failure in this duty, then the world will endorse forcible intervention – as the UN did regarding the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Second, broad international efforts must contine to ensure the safe keeping of nuclear and other dangerous material and equipment everywhere in the world to reduce the availability of such material and equipment. If the Pakistan government had exercised better control of its nuclear sector, Mr. Khan’s shop for nuclear weapon designs and centrifuges would not have been in its dangerous business. A resolution by the Security Council – Res. 1540 (2004) – urges more cooperation between states and more action by states to prevent proliferation of WMDs. A new interesting feature is that it demands of states not only to take specific action but also to adopt legislation prohibiting non-state actors from acquiring or producing WMDs. Third, what is mostly needed immediately is intensified international cooperation in the day-to-day field work of national intelligence, police and financial institutions of states to trace persons, resources, weapons and dangerous material. The manner in which the world fights terrorism is important. To be sure, the motives of terrorists vary and many will be muddled. However, if reasonable non-armed measures can be taken, which reduce incentives to terrorism, they should be on the agenda. Brutal or illegal response measures are likely to breed further terrorism and attract civilian support for it. States and WMDs Even though there is some concern that terrorist groups might get hold of and employ nuclear weapons, the concern is much more acute regarding nuclear weapons in the hands of states. A case that is not much discussed but should perhaps deserve more attention, is Pakistan. A change in government in Pakistan might risk bringing us a fundamentalist regime in control of a nuclear arsenal. I think we should wish President Musharaff success and long life. I think the uncertain stability of Pakistan is also an excellent reason for the Governments of India and Pakistan to proceed energetically with their efforts to solve the long and infected Kashmir issue. Cases which come readily to mind as ‘states of concern’ are the DPRK, Iraq and Libya, which have all violated or tried to violate their commitments under the NPT. The last case is Iran, which has been suspected of moving to a nuclear weapon but denied any such intention and insisted on its right under the NPT to enrich uranium to make fuel for power reactors. Are there other cases of concern? Syria? Saudi Arabia? For the foreseeable future, no! I think we should be skeptical about suggestions that even now the world is milling with states edging to acquire nuclear weapons but I agree that failure to solve the North Korean problem would risk to have dangerous domino effects. How should the world community tackle these questions? It is Iran and North Korea (DPRK) that today make us hold our breath and that raise a host of difficult questions. Both countries have acted in disregard of their safeguards obligations. The DPRK, which has renounced the NPT, has claimed – ambiguously – that it has nuclear weapon capability and is ready to deter foreign attacks but it has also declared that it is ready to “scrap” its capability, if some conditions are fulfilled, including guarantees about security from attack. Iran has signaled that while it cannot accept being deprived of the right to enrich uranium it might consider voluntarily suspending some activities, including enrichment, if the quid pro quo was sufficient. In both cases a number of states are at the present time seeking solutions through negotiations. This is welcome. The war that was waged in Iraq is not a model that many want to see followed. In my view, solutions for the DPRK and IRAN must aim at ensuring that both states renounce the nuclear activities which raise justified suspicions about an intention to produce bomb grade material – production of hexafluoride and enrichment, any reprocessing and the construction of a heavy water research reactor. Any solution would also require that the DPRK and Iran accept comprehensive verification. The minimum in that regard would be full acceptance of the additional safeguards agreements of the IAEA. Although it is also relevant, I leave aside what may be needed to create confidence that the two states do not develop or possess biological and chemical weapons. While there are great differences between the two cases, the DPRK and Iran will require some attractive quid pro quo to accept such commitments and verification. As regards the DPRK I suggest it might be wise to make the economic part of the package attractive by constructing it in a way that would help the country to gradually exit from the system that has brought it to misery and starvation. China would be the model. The economic part of a longer term agreement with Iran will need to cover trade and investment relations, perhaps support for WTO membership. If Iran is to forego the investments it has made in infrastructure for an indigenous production of enriched uranium for use in power reactors a multilateral assurance of supply of uranium fuel at market prices must evidently be given. It seems, indeed, to be on the table. It is my belief, further, that both in the case of Iran and the case of the DPRK some guarantees may need to be given about security against attacks from the outside. Neither country’s regime is likely to forego the de facto nuclear weapon option, which its technological capacity gives it, and accept far-reaching verification, if there are constant background noises about military strikes and regime change. Rightly or wrongly they may see a nuclear weapon as a deterrent. This, of course, is what all nuclear weapon states say it is. The diplomatic game is still on – which is better than seeing it off. Let us hope that all sides feel the seriousness of the situation. Concluding remarks: the way forward On the broader issue of arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament, I confess I see dangers on the road traveled in the last few years by the US administration. Further exploration of new types of American nuclear weapons will not, I think, induce others to disarm and to renounce weapons options that are technically open to them. There may be more weapons and conflicts rather than less on this road. A further development of the shield against incoming missiles might well set off countermeasures by China and Russia. The experts of these countries fear the longer term purpose of the shield is to allow the US to threaten with missiles without risking retaliation. A resumption of the kind of leadership that the US used to exercise in the arms control and disarmament fields would, I think, be greeted with enthusiasm by the whole world and could slowly lead all away from WMDs and toward greater security. The US used to be a lead wolf – not a lone wolf. I shall suggest some actions that I think would lead out of the current stalemate: * More attention should be devoted to solving the political and security problems that almost invariably underlie the development or acquisition of WMDs; this is true for Iran and the DPRK. * US ratification of a comprehensive test ban treaty would be likely to have a positive domino effect, including China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and Israel. It would make the development of new types of nuclear weapons much more difficult. Continued non-ratification could have high costs. * The conclusion of a verified cut off of the production of fissionable material for weapons combined with agreements on reductions in the number of weapons would gradually reduce the deadly arsenals. * A greater reliance on independent and professional international inspection with broad rights to access on the ground and with some intelligence supplied by national authorities, would give governments, governing boards and the Security Council unbiased assessments. UNMOVIC, which I headed, might be given further functions by the Security Council in the Council’s proposed stronger engagement to counter WMDs. For instance, as a subsidiary and advisory body of the Council perhaps it could perform analytical and monitoring functions and challenge inspections in the fields of biological weapons and missiles, where no inspection mechanisms exist. * Lastly, as someone who has been responsible for the operation of verification and inspection, may I say that in foreign affairs, as in medicine, you cannot have successful operations unless you make correct diagnoses. You need to apply keen and competent observation and critical thinking to get such diagnoses. If you choose instead to create a virtual reality that reality may collide with the reality you meet on the ground. This, in my view, is what happened in Iraq. Hans Blix is Chairman of the international Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC) and Former Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, verification and Inspection Commission for Iraq (UNMOVIC) - Panel discussion Panel discussion chaired by Alyson Bailes (Director of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) with Dr. Hans Blix (Chairman of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission) and Felicity Hill Dr. Rebecca Johnson (Director of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy) was unable to participate as originally scheduled. Merav Datan replaced Rebecca Johnson on the panel. Speech by Merav Datan It is a very special honor to be here tonight. It is also a special challenge to try to take the place of my colleague and friend Rebecca Johnson. I know better than to try to be Rebecca, so instead I will bring in Rebecca’s voice and observations in the remarks that follow. To be honest, it is actually hard to imagine a discussion about nuclear disarmament that has not been informed by Rebecca’s input and analysis. The last time I was in Sweden as it happens I was on a panel with Rebecca where I had been asked to speak about nuclear norms, and my observation at the time was that the norms relating to nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament were in a state of flux. We could identify some positive trends, including a framework of arms control and non-proliferation treaties that seemed to lay a foundation for nuclear disarmament. We could also identify negative challenges that have their roots in concepts of security based on the threat or use of force, and in the vested interests of the nuclear weapons establishment. Today this tension between positive and negative trends is even more striking. We can point to elements of the normative foundation for nuclear disarmament that have been eroded: treaties that have been abandoned or promises made during the NPT 2000 Review Conference that have already been broken. We have seen the unilateral use of force against Iraq, that is – irony of ironies – a war in the name of disarmament, a war that took place despite the stated wishes of most of the world and in breach of international law on the threat or use of force. Many of use have felt discouraged by these developments. The challenges to nuclear disarmament are more obvious than ever. But they are not necessarily new. They reflect interests, perceptions, and political philosophies that existed even during periods of progress on nuclear disarmament. They have risen more visibly to the surface since January 2001, and even more visibly since September 2001. But the key point is that they existed earlier as well. One of the ways to counter these challenges, I believe, is to address directly the interests, perceptions, and political philosophies that support the continued existence of nuclear weapons. Before considering each of these in turn, let us briefly review where we stood on nuclear disarmament until recently. Nuclear Norms at the Close of the Twentieth Century A typical dictionary definition of a norm is “an authoritative standard” or “a principle of right action binding upon the members of a group and serving to guide, control or regulate proper and acceptable behavior.” Norms have both a legal meaning and a societal meaning, reflecting underlying values and principles. For our purposes, legal norms such as treaties and customs regarding nuclear weapons, their production, potential use, and maintenance reflect underlying societal norms and political forces. Nuclear-related policies, practices, actions, and decisions that include competing voices or inherent contradictions are evidence of norms undergoing change, norms in flux. Throughout the 1990s and 2000 there were significant political developments, reductions in nuclear arsenals, and authoritative statements in support of complete elimination of nuclear weapons and security policies that depend on nuclear weapons. The NPT review process appeared to be going well. As Rebecca Johnson succinctly summarized: In 1995, the non-nuclear-weapon states insisted that the agreement on indefinitely extending the NPT had to be accompanied by decisions on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and on strengthening the review process. The League of Arab States succeeded in getting a resolution on the Middle East sponsored by the depositary states and adopted at the same time. Among other things, this called for ‘a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons, as well as other weapons of mass destruction’. The decisions in 1995 paved the way for the successful strategy of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden) at the 2000 Review Conference, at which a far-reaching plan of action for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation was negotiated with the nuclear-weapon powers and eventually adopted as part of a consensus final document. The Thirteen Steps were meant to be a roadmap towards the full implementation of the Article VI disarmament obligations, and so covered a host of issues, including: the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals; entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and a moratorium on nuclear testing; progress on a fissile materials ban and the disposition of fissile materials; putting the CD back to work on disarmament issues; commitments to irreversibility, transparency and accountability including reporting and verification; reducing the role of nuclear weapons in doctrine, policy and in operational status; and further unilateral steps, deeper bilateral cuts in the American-Russian arsenals and in nonstrategic nuclear weapons, plurilateral P5 engagement and multilateral negotiations. Despite these very real achievements, the political bodies and interests that drove the Cold War did not disappear. They continued to support the existence of nuclear weapons and to maintain security policies that depend on them. The tension between these positive and negative strands meant a period of norms in flux for the decade following the formal end of the Cold War. Developments since January 2001 (that is, the first George W. Bush administration) appear to be undermining the pro-disarmament norms, reversing post-Cold War progress towards disarmament as well as incorporating new nuclear weapons and policies. This suggests that fundamental Cold War norms—basing security on the threat of overwhelming destruction and/or military superiority—have prevailed for the time being, in new and expanded forms. The pro-disarmament norms, however, have not evaporated (otherwise we would not be here tonight), but they have been marginalized. They are still part of the discourse of non-governmental organizations and middle power states. We may not have direct policy-making capacities when it comes to nuclear weapons (except for opting not to develop or depend on them) but we can still seek to influence the evolution of nuclear norms. Interests, Perceptions, and Political Philosophies Interests, perceptions, and political philosophies have a direct bearing on societal norms. The nuclear weapons establishment, like any institution, has a vested interest in maintaining itself. Speaking from my experience in the 1980s as a university physics student in the United States and as a graduate physics student in Israel, and drawing on the observations of colleagues and friends I think it is safe to say that the nuclear weapons establishment does not have the moral authority necessary to sustain itself. Weapons scientists are more often than not “tricked” into weapons work. There is a lack of transparency about the research opportunities and outcomes of weapons-related work. One former physicist who left physics because of lack of future non-military option had professors who spoke of having to do “a stint on the dark side” in order to be able to afford to continue teaching physics. By the time most weapons scientists wake up to the meaning and application of their work, they are too deeply immersed to change direction. Even their resumes are classified. They would need to start new careers completely if they were to leave, and when they have families depending on them this does not seem like an option. What does this tell us about societal norms? It tells us that even the nuclear weapons establishment at some level recognizes that most of humanity’s instinct is to reject nuclear weapons. This is true even in the United States, where the media and Hollywood glorify nuclear weapons. On the matter of perceptions, Dr. Blix has observed that “problems of non-proliferation and of reduction and elimination of weapons of mass destruction are almost invariably linked to perceptions of security.” I would like to underline this point, and to observe that security is a highly subjective notion. In fact, it is difficult for me to imagine a concept more subjective and more personal than security, yet defense planners tend to present security as if it is an absolute and objective concept. It is obvious to the point of absurdity, however, to point out that a policy of security based on the threat of mass destruction (eg, nuclear deterrence), specifically a policy that requires a credible – that is, physical – threat, is going to create perceptions of insecurity in others, regardless of how often the threatening state insists that its weapons of mass destruction are only in self-defense. Against this background, how can we regard notions of security as somehow objective, let alone absolute? Let me give an example of the relativity of security. It is a generalization but probably a safe one to say that women are accustomed to security as a relative notion. We do not expect absolute personal security, ever. We weigh the risks every time we put our personal security in danger. I know from riding the subways in New York at all hours that there are certain hours when there are almost no women on the trains. This is a direct result of personal calculations regarding security and risk. Extending this example, it is easy enough to see that all human beings at some level recognize security as relative. Nor do we think of pursuing personal security by “eliminating the risk.” Why then do we allow our political leaders to speak of security in absolute terms? This impossibility of absolute security matters. The United States used the lack information forthcoming from Iraq and the absence of a “smoking gun” resulting from UN inspections to argue that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction undiscovered by the inspections. But in fact the UNMOVIC inspectors had been professional and responsible in not claiming absolute security, which would require confidence that every possible metaphorical gun in Iraq had been inspected for smoke. Although the inspectors made no such claim of absolute certainty, today we know that the inspections had in fact worked. On the matter of political philosophies in the context of nuclear weapons, it is the school of political realism that prevails in nearly all if not all security policymaking. But realism is only one of many possible approaches, and in many of the US circles it is actually a selective and distorted view of realism that prevails. “Realism” in the context of international relations is a school of thought associated most directly with Hans Morgenthau, who is often referred to as the “father of realism.” In 1960 Morgenthau had the following to say about nuclear disarmament: The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union...is being fought on two levels: on the superficial level of disarmament and on the fundamental level of the struggle for power. On the level of disarmament, the conflict resolves itself into a controversy between two theoretical conceptions: security first, disarmament later vs. disarmament first, security later. On the level of the struggle for power, the conflict is posed in terms of competition for military advantage, each side trying, at worst, to maintain the existing distribution of power and, at best, to change it in its favor. Of this competition, the controversy about nuclear disarmament is merely an outward expression, following the contours of the conflict as the cast of clay follows the shape of the form into which it is molded. As the cast can only be changed by changing the mold, so the problem of nuclear disarmament can only be solved through a settlement of the power conflict from which it has arisen. According to the realist view, therefore, nuclear weapons are a symptom of the fundamental power struggle that defines relations between states, and nuclear disarmament is a superficial manifestation of this power struggle. In this view disarmament proposals are designed by states either to advance their own national power in relative terms, or to maintain the status quo. It would appear from this analysis that elimination of nuclear weapons is a totally unrealistic goal. But the analysis here and the more general claims about “realistic” approaches to security and disarmament do not take into account the moral authority and wishes of the majority of the world’s states and – according to polls – the majority of people within the nuclear weapon states themselves. This moral authority can challenge both the symbols of power and the structures of power as these are understood by today’s “realists.” Realists see power expressed in military and economic terms, and states as driven to maintain the status quo or improve their standing. Realism may be useful as a descriptive framework, helping to understand the dynamics of state relations, but it is not necessarily helpful as a normative framework. A normative approach – in contrast to a realist approach – grounds power in societal and legal norms, that is, in values and principles expressed through informed moral and democratic choice. The measure of the legitimacy of power is the consent of those that grant it. If the goal is international peace and security, then power is legitimately granted through not to the state. Unequivocal demands for the elimination of nuclear weapons directly challenge the notion of nuclear weapons as a symbol of power. Nuclear weapons as a symbol of power are in direct conflict with the notion of the legitimate power of humanity based on norms. Moreover, the international and transnational nature of the desire and demand for nuclear disarmament defies the notion that the struggle for state power – specifically through military means – is the essence of international relations. On the contrary, the shared goal of nuclear disarmament cuts across national lines, even as it serves the self-interest and security interests of each state. (In this sense we are not contradicting the claim that states are largely driven by self-interest but reinterpreting this self-interest in accordance with evidence indicating that most of the citizens’ of most of the world’s countries want nuclear disarmament.) Therefore the call for nuclear disarmament is a direct challenge to notions of security and international relations as essentially a struggle for state power expressed largely through military means. The arguments for nuclear disarmament – familiar political, legal and moral arguments – are not new. As many have said, there is nothing new to say here, though frustration with lack of progress leads us to look for new arguments. But the demand for disarmament is as valid as ever and the arguments as sound as ever. We do not need new arguments. We need policymakers to accept new notions of the symbols of power and the structures of power in order to address today’s realities and incorporate the political will and moral authority of the world’s citizens. Merav Datan at the Women's League for International Peace and Freedom (WILPF) is an international lawyer and the principal drafter of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention. Portions of this presentation are based on “Nuclear Norms: Prohibition, Positivism, and Realism” in Reframing the Security Agenda: The Cases of Fissile Material, Landmines, Nuclear Weapons, Small Arms and Light Weapons, S. Brem and K. Rutherford, eds., Praeger Publishing, 2003 - Speech by Felicity Hill Delivered on Friday February 25th It’s a great honour to be here with you all, and quite overwhelming to be on this panel with Mr. Blix. I have carried signs about you and I will even sing some chants that we sang about you later if you will listen. I’m especially pleased to see you in one piece! Your unwillingness to be a puppet of the US Administration has inspired Hollywood to provide some kind of therapy for Mr. Wolfowitz, it’s a very, very sad puppet show. Don’t bother seeing “Team America; well actually, we have already seen it. It has been running since 1945. Tonight I have been asked to offer some hopeful words. So I’m going to talk about the good news and the bad news and how we might juggle these at the moment. Some of us may feel that, today, things have never looked bleaker and more discouraging. The NPT meeting coming up is going to be a tough one, there is a lot of impatience and a lot of evidence that nuclear weapons in the hands of some create the desire and justification for proliferation. Now there are nine nuclear weapons possessing states, states possessed by nuclear weapons, and that is because of the symbolic and political power given to nuclear weapons by the radioactive 5: that is why there has been proliferation. Space is being militarized, treaties are being ignored, evaded and belittled, instead of decisions and action we are getting procedural Olympics or unkept promises and there is resentment and anger brewing at this bad faith and at the normalization of nuclear weapons in the hands of some. Military spending is beyond the absurdity of Cold War levels, a nuclear supermarket has been running out of Pakistan, new nuclear weapons are being developed by the US the Bunker Buster or “Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator” and the New York Times on the 7th of Feb and the International Herald Tribune of the 8th of Feb revealed that around 100 specialists at the three US nuclear weapons laboratories – Lawrence Livermore in California, Los Alamos in New Mexico and Sandia in Texas – are involved in an initial $9 million project, one that is planned to develop into a full-scale programme capable of producing designs for completely new weapons within the next five-to-ten years. We have irrational fanatics in control of a few governments and nuclear arsenals, and some of them can’t even pronounce the weapons they wield. Friends, I don’t need to tell you, there is more bad news than good news right now, but there is good news! A few years ago the peace movement staged the biggest demonstration the earth has ever seen, there is a network and a movement, public opinion is not just a focus group, it is on the side of peace and disarmament. Just yesterday for example, the Canadian government said it wasn’t going to continue believing in this farcical idea of missile defence, and has pulled out of cooperation on it. About time; but good news, nonetheless. Until recently, I worked at the UN, what I like to call the REAL project in Manhattan. Another good bit of news, in 2000 the Security Council passed a resolution about Women, Peace and Security acknowledging for the first time that women exist, and that war affects them differently, and that it’s about time for security decision making to be less male dominated. In response women’s organizations have been very busy on many issues, and one of the strong recommendations they have made might be interesting to this audience. They have called on the Security Council to do the job they were given 60 years ago in the Charter. The UN Charter, in Article 26 instructs the Security Council to deliver a plan for the least diversion of the world’s human and economic resources to armaments. We are still waiting for this plan 60 years later. Women’s organizations have realized that if the Security Council Permanent Radioactive 5 done this job of making “a plan for the least diversion of our human and economic resources to armament”, rather than being the chief profiteers in the weapons trade and prancing about with their nuclear weapons, then the world would look very different. Why are women working on this as a women’s issue? Well, while the main characteristic of nuclear weapons is that they kill indiscriminately no matter what your sex, class, race or creed, a gender lens reveals a lot. Lets consider the biological affects: scientists and researchers have found that women are more at risk of developing a fatal cancer than are men when exposed to the same ionizing radiation exposure. Dr. Rosalie Bertell attributes this to two factors: first, that women’s breast and uterine tissue is at high risk for cancer, and second, that women’s longevity provides for longer development time for tumors. Women’s reproductive health is especially susceptible to the effects of radiation released from nuclear testing. The landmines campaigners had very vivid images to jolt the world into action, we have a harder time making the epidemic of cancer visible. It is currently estimated that one in 20 women in the US alone will be diagnosed with breast cancer at sometime in her life. Nuclear testing has a lot to answer for here, as the National Cancer Institute study told us, radioactive isotopes from the testing have been found in every COUNTY of the US, every county. Many babies of Pacific Islander women living “downwind” from nuclear testing are born boneless and with transparent skin – they’re called jelly babies. And what about the inability to conceive, a phenomena that is happening amongst women living near Chelyabinsk right now - where only 1 of every 10 pregnancies actually results in a healthy human. Weapons involve human beings operating in their social and political environment. To understand the context of disarmament it is absolutely necessary to ask the question of who the players are: who owns the weapons? Who has access to policy and decision-making power? Men have been systematically over-represented in the science, research development, and decision-making on weapons of mass destruction issues. YES there are some women, and some women in high positions, but you can’t rub out the almost complete gender segregation, and testosterone in the very high 90 percentile with the words Margaret Thatcher, sorry, that’s not an argument, that’s an exception that does not disprove the rule. In the 10 years between 1992 and 2002 33 women headed delegations to the six world review conferences of the NPT, compared to 660 men in that role. During the same period at the General Assembly First Committee on Security and Disarmament, women headed only 7% of country delegations. Out of 88 Ambassadors in the Security Council between 1992 and 2005, only 4 have been women. Nuclear weapons decision-making is clearly undemocratic – and not only on the gender front. Every major decision taken by those governments that developed nuclear weapons was done in the absence of even full cabinet knowledge, let alone approval of the population, that is, undemocratically. The decision to develop nuclear weapons was in each case undemocratic. Because of the secrecy and clandestine research and human experimentation undertaken, it must be acknowledged that nuclear weapons are intrinsically corrosive and corruptive of democratic rule. In the economic sphere also, men are disproportionately represented in the trade in weapons and natural resource exploitation associated with nuclear weapons, ie. uranium mining and nuclear power plants. However, while the economic implications of conflict are enormous, an economic analysis alone neglects some of the most powerful ideological and private processes that perpetuate nuclear militarism. Carol Cohn did a study of defense intellectuals and the language they use, the complexity of which I can’t do justice to here, but in her essay, Wars, Wimps and Women: Talking Gender and Thinking War, she reveals the symbolic system in which certain ideas, concerns, interests, information, feelings and meanings are marked in national security discourse as feminine and soft, devalued as weak, as wimpish, as unsufficiently macho. Consider the code words used to tell Truman of the successful first nuclear test, "It's a boy" and if was unsuccessful, he would have been told, “it’s a girl.” The first nuclear weapon was called "Fat Man". And the overt gender references continue, after the1998 nuclear tests in India one leader said that “we have proved that we are not eunuchs any more,” even though we all know that radiation has a terrible effect on the health and effectiveness of testicles too. Carol Cohn gives one example of a man who told her, “At one point, we remodeled a particular attack, using slightly different assumptions, and found that instead of there being thirty-six million immediate fatalities, there would only be thirty million, and everyone was sitting around nodding saying, “oh yeah, that’s great, only thirty million,” when all of a sudden, I heard what we were saying. And I blurted out, “Wait, I’ve just heard how we’re talking – Only thirty million! Only thirty million human beings killed instantly?” Silence fell upon the room. Nobody said a word. They didn’t even look at me. It was awful. I felt like a woman.” The physicist added that henceforth he was careful to never blurt out anything like that again. This is internalized self-censorship, leaving out a whole range of inputs from deliberations, because they are wimpish, because they are marked as feminine and soft and therefore don’t belong where hard security issues are on the table. So at this more hidden level, the question of how masculinities and femininities, relations, inequalities and perceptions shape and are shaped by armament and disarmament policies and practice is also essential to take into consideration. We are going to spend this whole weekend thinking together, and thinking deeply about strategies. One of our discussions surely has to be about these narratives that normalize and legitimize nuclear weapons – such as the argument that SOME weapons of mass destruction in the hands of SOME are very, very bad, but that others can be trusted with them. I think that states trying to sell this line should be called Rouge States, they should be blushing with embarrassment about the stupidity of this argument, and we should be doing a lot more to expose the contradictions this narrative, holding up the mirror to all states that have Weapons of Mass Destruction and saying “Yes, WMD are REALLY bad, and that’s why we need a MDW – a Mass Destruction of Weapons! We need to rearrange that acronym every time we hear it! We are going to talk about how to approach the NPT, how to build our movement, how to better educate a population in denial without instilling fear, how to anticipate and amplify what will be an extremely important report, and of course I’m talking about the WMD Commission led by Mr. Blix. We need to stand ready to translate the ideas of that report for our various constituencies, the doctors will no doubt pick it up and make it digestible and actionable for doctors, the feminists will also raise the awareness of the women’s NGOs, environmentalists, scientists, educators really must do the same. This will be a very important date in our calendars, an important opportunity to rethink, to refocus, and it will also be an educational moment in the world because of the credibility and the moral authority of Mr. Blix and his fellow Commissioners. There is also the Human Security Report coming out very soon which we should read carefully. There is useful and important work to be doing, even though the next four years do look like they will be quite hard. Something else to look forward to: Jonathan Dean, a former US nuclear weapons negotiator, is soon bringing out a book, and he gives several reasons for optimism. His words have really heartened me and I hope will lift you all a bit too. For thousands of years, he says, and I agree, the dominant trend in most societies was celebration of war and warrior virtues. But suddenly, in the early nineteenth century, after thousands of years of conflict and relatively little effort to stop it, (and I would add, a tedious habit of claiming that war is human nature and inevitable), there emerged large-scale public opposition to war as such, in the form of citizens associations against war in Europe and America and later throughout the world. He documents the history in detail, but what happened was that within decades, these developments led to intergovernmental conferences to limit wartime military activities and armaments and to intergovernmental agreements on these topics. Jonathan Dean gives six reasons for why this happened (1) First is the fact that the combination of increasingly destructive military technology with large conscript armies resulted in mass bloodshed in the Napoleonic Wars, far exceeding the carnage of all past wars. There was widespread revulsion to this and millions lost friends and relatives; (2) The onset of modern communications in the form of professional journalists, the daily press, and the telegraph rapidly brought coverage of this mass bloodshed to the world public; (3) Rising levels of education, income, and leisure time for pursuits other than work created the opportunity for involvement in social causes; (4) Increasing involvement of women, always the main losers in war, in politics and political issues of war and peace was important; (5) The emergence of democratic government in the United States, the UK, and Western Europe brought active electorates and organized public opinion recognized by governments as important political forces -- and also interest on the part of the governments themselves in avoiding the risks and costs of war; (6) The sixth factor was the existence of common values about the sanctity of human life, the value of each individual, and on reconciliation of conflict. These values arose mainly from the organized religions, but also from the humanistic tradition of the Renaissance and classical antiquity. He points out how important to realize that the impact of each of these factors has continued and has greatly intensified over the past twentieth century. “That century brought aerial bombs, rapid fire artillery, heavy machine guns, and enormously destructive nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, swift, long-range means of delivering them, and fatalities in the millions. But it also brought enormous development of communications, including television and the internet, the further development of democracy, including universal suffrage and women’s voting rights; and greatly increased levels of education, income and free time, with immense growth of civil society institutions. The huge increase of human population in the last two centuries has required new organizations and cooperative structures of increasing complexity. The values which organized religion promoted have been absorbed in secular society and have become guiding values. Taken together, these social and economic changes have motivated stronger, broader and more numerous efforts to control armed violence. The web of preventive measures and constraints on war will continue to grow and to become more comprehensive and detailed. It will prevent many conflicts and will reduce the frequency and duration of those conflicts that do erupt. Step by step, this process will lower the level of armed conflict throughout the world.” Notice that Jonathan Dean emphasizes the cumulative effect of the work of civil society movements and organizers. The endurance and persistence of these civil society movements and efforts made an impact. Sometimes that’s not the most inspirational reason to keep going, sometimes it’s hard to believe that our work does have that cumulative effect, but it does. How can the peace movement affect history the way it has done in the past? What is the rallying call for today? We will talk about all of these things over this weekend, big questions, but questions we are big enough for. Things are bad now, but we have things to look forward to, we have plans and important events to hook our efforts to, and we need to remember, that history is on our side. Ted Taylor who died last year would have agreed. Ted spent his career trying to design smaller and more powerful nuclear weapons at the Los Alomos Lab in the US, Instead of being with his wife when his daughter was born, he was at work drawing circles over maps of Red Square to see the damage that would result from explosions at various heights. Years later, long after he had given up weapons work he visited Red Square and emotion overtook him, “I cried,” he wrote, “yes my work at Los Alomos had been so intellectually stimulating, so compelling, but so insane.” He said the work of disarmament is not as intellectually stimulating, but the rewards are far greater.” President Truman’s chief of staff said when this nuclear age began, that the ethical standard adopted by the state that invented nuclear weapons was “common to the barbarians of the dark ages.” That’s true. The development and existence of nuclear weapon are an embarrassing lapse in our evolution; after all they are suicidal, genocidal and ecocidal weapons, not to mention econocidal. I am not alone in believing that we will evolve from this. We will stop calling a balance of terror stability, we will stop entertaining absurd double speak notions such as security being obtainable through mutual insecurity. The theory of nuclear deterrence will be recognized for what it is: intimidation, threat and coercion. We will look back and laugh at the strange intellectual gymnastics that calls the capacity to blow the world up 6 times over rational or realism, when it’s actually psychotic. Future generations will look back on these times and they will wonder at the mystifications around killing and maiming, the investment made in weapons of mutilation and violence and, bewildered, they will ask themselves, “did those people really believe in those gods?” And if they dig deeper, future generations will be able to say, “no, not all of them did believe, and that’s why we’re still here.” Felicity Hill is currenntly at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University. Before studying at Uppsala University, Felicity Hill worked as a Peace and Security Adviser for the UN’s Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). She is also former director of WILPF's (Womens International League for Peace and Freedom) United Nations Office. - Expert panel I Presentation by Rhianna Tyson Delivered on Saturday February 26th Status and the Future of the NPT Many governments, analysts and activists around the world are decrying what they perceive to be a crisis of faith in the NPT. Amidst the panic over suspected horizontal proliferation by Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), we are equally plagued with mounting evidence of vertical proliferation- that is, the modernization and increase of already existing stockpiles of the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS)- the US, UK, Russia, China and France. In addition, universality, the reigning in of the De-Facto Nuclear Weapon States (D3) - Israel, Pakistan and India- seems to have fallen off the global agenda. Finally, some NNWS which can boast impeccable nonproliferation compliance records, become ever more fearful that their “inalienable right” to nuclear technology, enshrined in Article IV of the Treaty, is becoming increasingly under attack, thereby threatening their economic development and detracting some of the lure of the carrot by which they remain committed to the Treaty. All of this is exacerbated by the paralysis of multilateral disarmament machinery in which nothing can be agreed and no progress is made. Many of these challenges are largely due to the fact that some agreements can be ignored, undermined or negated only a few years after reached- witness the US rejection and denial of the 13 Practical Steps. The good news is that many of these same governments, analysts and experts have all offered various proposals for strengthening the NPT and renewing global faith in the oft-cited “cornerstone of disarmament.” The Review Conference, commencing just two months from now, is a grand opportunity for these proposals to be fleshed out, debated, rejected or adopted in the form of a Final Document, one which reflects all States parties’ concerns, priorities and needs. What developments have occurred that have rendered the Treaty in such a perceived “crisis”? What political climate haunts the international disarmament machinery? What proposals will be debated at this all-important Review Conference? What other issues should be discussed as a way to strengthen the global nonproliferation and disarmament regime? What are the prospects for agreement? Recent developments Horizontal proliferation Early in 2003, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) announced their withdrawal from the Treaty. After two years of abysmally ineffective diplomacy, the DPRK announced that it has successfully manufactured its first nuclear weapons. New diplomatic efforts must now start at square one; by this time the DPRK won’t even agree to some of its own previous demands, such as bilateral talks with the US or even six-party talks involving China, Japan, South Korea and Russia. Whether or not North Korea actually has nuclear weapons or the delivery systems needed to pose a threat to Europe or the US, its undeniable nuclear capabilities and the arguments it is advancing for acquiring a nuclear arsenal are serious threats to the nonproliferation regime as a whole. US accusations regarding Iran’s nuclear program will undoubtedly be one of the most prominent issues at the Review Conference, overshadowing almost all other proliferation concerns. NPT States parties still lack a coherent strategy toward addressing the situation in Iran. Meanwhile, the US continues to make grumbling noises over Syria’s suspected WMD programs as well, using the recent situation in Lebanon as the impetus for further disintegrating US-Syrian relations. Questionable activities in other NNWS, albeit with far less media and political attention than those countries less-than-friendly with the US, have also been revealed. Previously undisclosed evidence of programs in Brazil, South Korea and Egypt, if not evidence of secret nuclear weapon programs, point to gaps in the regime and decrease global faith in the treaty to halt proliferation effectively. Progress on Disarmament Verifiable, irreversible disarmament has all but halted. In some NWS, the process has actually been reversed, effectually amounting to vertical proliferation. China, France and the UK all continue to modernize their forces. Russia, while undertaking some deep cutbacks, has reversed some disarmament decisions and continues to produce Topol-Ms, the one many analysts believe will be the one equipped with Maneuverable Re-Entry Vehicles (MARV) Russia boasted of producing last year. The Moscow Treaty, which the US relies upon as evidence of its commitment to disarmament, lacks any of the necessary principles of irreversibility, transparency or verifiability. The Nuclear Posture Review and other documents directly contrast its negative security assurances (NSA) granted under Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 984. The Bush administration is seeking to develop new nuclear weapons, as well as new capabilities for existing weapons. Nuclear laboratory watchdog groups such as Western States Legal Foundation report that enhanced staffing, equipment and training in weapons labs and the Nevada Test Site are signs of an intended return to nuclear testing. In effect, disarmament has become an empty, rhetorical word for the governments of the NWS, despite the mounting threats to our collective security that these weapons pose. In direct contradiction to Step 9.e of the 13 Practical Steps, by which all NWS pledged to work toward a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies, we continue to see a reliance on nuclear weapons as a central element to the NWS’ national security strategies, thereby hindering further efforts at strengthening the non-proliferation regime; the continued reverence of nuclear weapons as a necessary security measure will inevitably prompt others to emulate the same source of security. Political context All of these challenges result in an interminably damaging de-linkage of disarmament from non-proliferation. Despite much rhetoric regarding “two sides of the same coin”, States parties find themselves polarized into two unnaturally separate camps of disarmament or non-proliferation, thereby miring most all of our multilateral machinery in a stalemate. The absence of multilateral-based, effective and verifiable nonproliferation measures will remain a serious impediment to disarmament by the NWS. Without verifiable, irreversible disarmament, the treaty is doomed to failure. Proposals to Strengthen the Treaty The NWS maintain that a “new security environment”- including horizontal proliferation and the threat of terrorist acquisition of WMD- is their justification for retention of their bloated arsenals. In response, they and their allies have put forth several proposals for strengthening the non-proliferation side of the NPT bargain. We must make it clear to the NWS that NGOs and NNWS will only support their proposals in direct exchange for concrete, accountable and progressive steps toward verifiable, irreversible disarmament. Therefore, it is vital that we understand the proposals on the table, which countries support which proposals and the arguments for and against them. We must be able to speak their language if we are to engage the NWS in serious disarmament talks. Additional Protocol The IAEA Model Additional Protocol is quickly becoming the standard in verification, a standard supported by many, including Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway, (in a joint working paper (PC.III/WP.25), the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, and others. Some, such as New Zealand , the UK , Australia, Luxembourg , Japan and Turkey , are calling for ratification of the Additional Protocol as a condition for supply of nuclear fuel. Yet others are not as supportive of elevating the Additional Protocol to a mandatory level. Some Nuclear Supplies Group (NSG) countries that have not yet ratified an Additional Protocol, such as Argentina and Brazil, do not support making nuclear trade contingent upon Additional Protocol ratification, a view reportedly held also by Russia. Fuel Cycle International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohamed ElBaradei continues to advocate for multilateral controls over the nuclear fuel cycle. The expert group appointed by the Director-General to study the possibilities for such multinational control published their report just this week. Some States have already expressed reservations concerning the proposal to “multilateralize” the fuel cycle, believing it to be a threat to state sovereignty and control over its energy sector. Others believe that such an approach may lead to a further spread of nuclear technologies, thus increasing the proliferation risk. On 7 January 2005, ElBaradei also proposed a five year moratorium on the part of all States on the construction of new facilities for uranium enrichment and nuclear reprocessing; last June the G8 had agreed to a one-year moratorium on new transfers of these technologies to those which do not already possess the capability. Still others are calling for a moratorium, not just on the construction of new facilities, but on the production of weapons-grade fissile materials. Some States remain wary of these proposals to regulate the fuel cycle, however, citing an exacerbation of the “nuclear divide.” Without a global plan to phase out nuclear energy completely, a codified nuclear divide, where a majority of countries must forevermore purchase their nuclear fuel from a small handful, is unlikely to amass major support. However, the very real proliferation threat stemming from indigenous fuel cycle capabilities is already convincing some “nuclear have-nots” of the viability of this proposal, nuclear chasm or not. Fissile Materials Treaty The negotiation of a Fissile Materials Treaty (FMT), one of the agreed-upon 13 Practical Steps, will also be revisited at this Review. The US’ assertion that an FMT will not be verifiable has halted, if not reversed, progress in this area. Many understand that the Seventh Review Conference cannot simply throw the FMT ball back into the court of the CD. If a program of work cannot be agreed upon in Geneva, some are already thinking of an alternative forum to be recommended in the Final Document. Export Controls Some States are looking at ways to further strengthen export controls further to those already required by Security Council resolution 1540. Some envisage an eventual global nuclear export control system based on the current principles of the Zangger Committee including France, which presented this idea in a working paper to the 2004 PrepCom (PC.III/WP.22). Germany suggested that the IAEA define a certain minimum standard for nuclear export controls addressing nuclear and non-nuclear or dual-use items (PC.III/WP.14), whereas the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change suggested that the Security Council define the minimum standards. Germany also suggested that the IAEA dispatch teams of nuclear control experts to countries requesting or perceived as needing export control assistance to report confidentially on the country’s export control system to the IAEA and recommend improvements. Again, the major concerns with these proposals center on “exacerbating the nuclear divide.” Other NNWS that can cite impeccable records of compliance insist on their “inalienable right” to technology and balk at their exclusion from the nuclear trade. Others are also hesitant to place such a high emphasis on export controls, which are mostly informal, non-binding agreements among States, though legislated or imposed by regulation within States. Formalizing Agreements Many of the demands from the NNWS are not new; in fact, some of them have already been implicitly or explicitly agreed to by the NWS, such as the 13 Practical Steps. In such a precarious security environment, however, informal agreements and political declarations are no longer sufficient, and NNWS are looking to concretize some of these hard won agreements. Many NNWS will also be pushing Russia and the US to engage in a wider process of control of their non-strategic weapons, through formalization and verification of the 1991-1992 initiatives. They will also be looking for ways to concretize crucial principles of disarmament contained in the 13 Practical Steps, such as verification, irreversibility and transparency. NNWS will be seeking NWS commitment to decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems (de-alerting), with the goal of a global stand-down by the 2010 Review Conference. One of the most pressing priorities for many NNWS at this Review Conference will be their continued demand for Negative Security Assurances (NSAs), codified assurances from the NWS that they will not use nuclear weapons against those which do not possess them. The NWS have been consistently arguing that existing assurances, such as those contained in Security Council resolution 984, remain sufficient. The national security strategies of the NWS, however, run contrary to UNSCR 984; and with the NWS clamoring to strengthen the nonproliferation side of the bargain, (through measures such as those explained above) the NNWS find themselves with additional bargaining chips in their pursuit of NSAs. Review Process Canada’s proposal (contained in PC.III/WP.1) to restructure the Review Process will be discussed further, though few States publicly declared support for or rejection of it. Canada proposed to replace PrepComs with annual, week-long General Conferences endowed with decision-making power. Such power, Canada suggests, could address questions of non-compliance more quickly and effectively, perhaps even pre-emptively. Others, specifically the UK, believe that existing mechanisms to handle proliferation non-compliance, such as the IAEA and the Security Council, are sufficient. Withdrawal Canada had put forth this proposal after the announced withdrawal from the DPRK in 2003; such a restructured Review Process, Canada believes, would enable States parties to more effectively address further cases of withdrawal. Germany, too, submitted a working paper last year, (PC.III/WP.15), recommending several measures in dealing with a State withdrawal, including: 1. requiring States contemplating withdrawal to submit to other NPT States a “written information setting out the concerns that led it to contemplate withdrawing,” 2. requiring States “to conduct prior consultations with NPT-state parties before exercising its right” to withdrawal, 3. developing a possible list of criteria defining the “extraordinary event” that would allow a State to withdraw, and 4. determining that withdrawal cannot be exercised when a State is judged in non-compliance with the Treaty. Regarding States’ responses to withdrawal, Germany suggested, inter alia: 1. encouraging countries supplying nuclear fuel or other materials and equipment to stipulate in their delivery agreements that the items supplied remain under IAEA safeguards if a State withdraws, 2. reaffirming the understanding that transfers under Article IV remain restricted to peaceful uses only and subject to safeguards, 3. encouraging supplier countries and the IAEA to consider establishing the right to restitute supplied nuclear items from a State withdrawing, 4. enacting a provision calling for the shutdown of nuclear facilities in States that withdraw, and 5. deciding that “a state withdrawing from the NPT is still accountable for breaches or acts of non-compliance committed while still being a party to the NPT.” France supported (PC.III/WP.22) many of these points, and further affirmed the Security Council as “the relevant international framework for taking decisions in such a context.” ElBaradei also proposed in May 2004 the creation of a UN Security Council “response mechanism” to deal with countries that withdraw from the NPT, remarking that, “[a]t a minimum, notice of NPT withdrawal should prompt an automatic review by the Security Council.” The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change also supported this idea, stating that “a State’s notice of withdrawal from the (NPT) should prompt immediate verification of its compliance with the Treaty, if necessary mandated by the Security Council. The IAEA Board of Governors should resolve that, in the event of violations, all assistance provided by (the) IAEA should be withdrawn.” (134) Global Inventory Another idea that has amassed much support from both sides of the nuclear chasm, as well as from nongovernmental and intergovernmental sources, is the proposed global inventory of fissile materials. Germany proposed this idea in their working paper submitted to the 2002 PrepCom (PC.I/WP.4). A more limited, but still useful database would be the one envisaged in the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), announced by United States Secretary of Energy Abraham in Vienna in May 2004. The GTRI calls for a comprehensive database of research reactors replete with an assessment of “materials and sites relative to vulnerability to sabotage, theft, or terrorist attack.” Proponents of this proposal assert that, in order to secure all nuclear materials and prevent their acquisition by non-state actors, we must first undertake a comprehensive accounting of them. Likewise, the irreversibility of disarmament would be enhanced with the tool of such an inventory. Reaching Critical Will offers an annual Shadow Report, which uses publicly available sources to catalogue all nuclear materials, both military and civilian. This report, “Accountability is Democracy, Transparency is Security,” is one of the most comprehensive databases available today, and demonstrates the feasibility of this undertaking, as well as highlights the possibilities of greater engagement with NGOs by governments. Increased NGO access and participation The quinquennial Review Conference also allows us an opportunity to reassess NGO participation in and access to the review process. Many states have already recognized the invaluable contribution that NGOs have provided in the campaign to eliminate nuclear weapons. New Zealand, in their statement to the General Debate at the 59th session of the First Committee noted “the tireless and often unpaid work (of NGOs) in keeping information and debate flowing about these issues, and for keeping up the pressure on governments to take practical steps toward disarmament.” NGOs are the critical players in generating public awareness and education on the issues, engaging the media, academia and the grassroots networks of activists. When we are engaged on the international diplomatic level, we are able to contribute much needed impetus and fresh ideas to the debate, and provide support for progressive proposals by smaller States or coalitions of States, such as we did in 2000, thus effectively shoring up support for the 13 Practical Steps. With a far greater degree of access and participation, NGOs in arenas outside of nuclear disarmament fora have demonstrated a reciprocal measure of utility and success. In human rights fora, for example, NGOs engage with delegations on a daily basis- a stark contrast to the one, three-hour session granted to nuclear disarmament-focused NGOs. The Secretary-General reflected the potential of increased interaction with NGOs when, in his response to the Cardoso panel, he acknowledged the “need for a more organized and sustained dialogue with the NGO community”, recognizing that “(m)ore effective engagement with NGOs… increases the likelihood that United Nations decisions will be better understood and supported by a broad and diverse public.” Civil society also contributes the necessary human perspective in a debate that has grown far too esoteric and full of empty rhetoric. We include doctors who understand the disastrous effects of the nuclear age, from mining to testing to actual use. We are composed of indigenous peoples who have suffered for more than 60 years. We include women who have given birth to jellyfish babies, whose radioactive environment ate away at their bones before they could fully develop in their mothers’ wombs. We also comprise scientists and engineers, whose ingenuity that brought about the nuclear age, can help devise ways of getting the genie back into the lamp and create verifiable mechanisms for keeping him there. All governments should be urged to recognize, as Croatia has, “the growing beneficial role that civil society plays in the field of disarmament... (which) may give additional impetus to initiatives to break the deadlock and finally move the multilateral disarmament agenda forward.” If the Review Conference is to avoid the type of stalemate that has mired so much else of the disarmament machinery, any additional impetus is needed more than ever. The Future…? It has now become a truism to state that the NPT stands at one of its most critical crossroads in its thirty-five year history. There are several possibilities for the future of the NPT: 1. The NWS continue to believe, as US Undersecretary of State John Bolton stated at last year’s PrepCom, that the Review Conference “cannot divert attention from the (nonproliferation) violations we face by focusing on Article VI issues that do not exist.” If attention to Article VI is not sufficiently paid by the NWS, NNWS, in turn, may not lend support to nonproliferation proposals advocated by the Nuclear 5. The end result will be a stalemated RevCon without a Final Document. In this scenario, we must be very careful not to allow the NWS to blame the NNWS and the NGOs for a “failed” Review Conference, rather we must make it clear which governments were the obstinate, uncompromising parties, and which are threatening our global security with their genocidal, suicidal and ecocidal weapons. 2. The NWS pay much lip service to addressing the disarmament deficit, and win NNWS support for nonproliferation proposals by agreeing to weakened, non-legally binding political commitments. This path would result in a feel-good Final Document, completely void of concrete, accountable and verifiable measures to strengthen the NPT as a whole. In this scenario we will witness subsequent loss of faith in the international legal regime as well as, possibly, expedited proliferation programs, both horizontally and vertically. 3. States parties continue to study the proposals already put forth on the table, and arrive at the Conference prepared to support or modify proposals in order to negotiate a strong Final Document which will reinstate the global community’s faith in the cornerstone of disarmament All of these paths are available to the Review Conference. Which one they choose may effectually determine the future, not just for the NPT, but for the security of us all. If the Conference is allowed to dissipate into a prostrated, ineffective talk shop, polarized by diverging, narrow concepts of national security, it will ensure security for no one. Both NWS and NNWS- as well as NGOs- must work to reinstate the primacy of the grand bargain: nonproliferation in exchange for disarmament. Delegates to the Review must not pit one of the twin goals against the other; rather, they should utilize the opportunity to engage with civil society, high-level governmental representatives and each other in order to ostracize the nuclear weapons, rather than those who seek them, as the threat to global security that they are. Fulfilling this potential of the RevCon will take concerted effort from all, most especially from those already in possession of these deadly arsenals. As Dr. Ron McCoy, President of the Nobel prize-winning NGO, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, stated on behalf of more than 70 NGOs at the 2004 PrepCom, “When we ask you to consider the human implications of the choice between proliferation and non-proliferation, between disarmament and a perpetual enslavement to nuclear weapons, we are really presenting you with the choice between two futures. Only one of these futures is acceptable or worth pursuing. The NPT will only be an effective tool in that pursuit if the States Parties commit themselves to the urgent task of revitalizing the Treaty as both a non-proliferation and a disarmament agreement. At its heart, this is a choice between hope and hopelessness. We submit to you that we can no longer put off making this choice.” Rhianna Tyson is Project Manager of Reaching Critical Will at the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom rhianna@reachingcriticalwill.org ---- Facing the City, Potential Targets Rely on a Patchwork of Security By DAVID KOCIENIEWSKI May 9, 2005 NY TIMES http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/09/nyregion/09homeland.html?pagewanted=print Correction Appended KEARNY, N.J., May 7 - It is the deadliest target in a swath of industrial northern New Jersey that terrorism experts call the most dangerous two miles in America: a chemical plant that processes chlorine gas, so close to Manhattan that the Empire State Building seems to rise up behind its storage tanks. According to federal Environmental Protection Agency records, the plant poses a potentially lethal threat to 12 million people who live within a 14-mile radius. Yet on a recent Friday afternoon, it remained loosely guarded and accessible. Dozens of trucks and cars drove by within 100 feet of the tanks. A reporter and photographer drove back and forth for five minutes, snapping photos with a camera the size of a large sidearm, then left without being approached. That chemical plant is just one of dozens of vulnerable sites between Newark Liberty International Airport and Port Elizabeth, which extends two miles to the east. A Congressional study in 2000 by a former Coast Guard commander deemed it the nation's most enticing environment for terrorists, providing a convenient way to cripple the economy by disrupting major portions of the country's rail lines, oil storage tanks and refineries, pipelines, air traffic, communications networks and highway system. Since 9/11, those concerns have only been magnified. Law enforcement officials have warned of the need to prepare for an assault on one of the four major chemical plants in the area or an attempt to ship nuclear or biological weapons through its two port complexes. Trying to safeguard more than 100 potential terrorist targets in two miles surrounded by residential communities, industrial areas and commuter corridors has proved a daunting challenge. Federal, state and local officials have spent hundreds of millions of dollars to install gates, roadblocks and security cameras and to provide additional patrols, surveillance and intelligence operations. But even those in charge of the effort say the job is incomplete, bogged down by obstacles that are a microcosm of the nation's struggle against potential terrorist threats. After distributing tens of billions to state and local governments since 9/11, the federal Department of Homeland Security cut New Jersey's financing this year to about $60 million from $99 million last year. Many security experts have complained that the formula - which provides Montana with three times as much money per capita as New Jersey - is guided more by politics than by the likelihood of an attack. Meanwhile, security at Newark Airport, while more rigorous and time-consuming for passengers, has been marred by embarrassing breakdowns, as screeners have repeatedly failed to prevent federal officials from sneaking weapons and fake bombs onto planes. The time and expense of screening shipping containers has slowed attempts to tighten security at Port Newark and Port Elizabeth, where customs officials say their radiation screening devices are ineffective and need replacement. The private companies that own 80 percent of the most dangerous targets have given varying degrees of cooperation, officials said, and the chemical industry has effectively blocked attempts in Washington to mandate stricter regulations. As a result, many of the most crucial security tasks are left to local police departments, some of which say they are too understaffed and poorly equipped to mount a proper counterterrorism effort. "They tell us to patrol, do this, do that, but don't give us the money or equipment," said Sgt. Michael Cinardo of the Kearny Police Department, one of several law enforcement agencies responsible for patrolling around the chlorine plant. He said the department requires patrol officers to stop by the plant at least five times each shift. Security against terrorism is a particularly sensitive issue in New Jersey. More than 700 people killed on 9/11 lived there. And, in October 2001, the first major bioterrorism attack on United States soil was launched from a New Jersey post office when a series of anthrax-laced letters were mailed to members of Congress and the news media. The State Health Department's muddled response came to symbolize the nation's need to prepare itself to face new threats. Since then, New Jersey officials have spent more than $350 million in state tax money on counterterrorism, building an apparatus that is run by seasoned law enforcement experts and is generally well regarded. New Jersey's Homeland Security Department, established in 2002, has helped to train, coordinate and increase staffing at local law enforcement and emergency medical agencies; assembled a 1,000-person task force to focus on urban areas; and purchased boats, decontamination suits, radio systems and a computerized intelligence network so federal agents and the New Jersey State Police can share information with all 566 municipalities. In the most dangerous two miles, they have erected concrete barriers outside hospitals and office buildings and put fences along elevated highways that pass chemical plants. The State Police patrol the skies, highways and coastal waters, and federal officials have used various surveillance techniques. On the New Jersey Turnpike, troopers try to check any vehicle that stops for as little as five minutes. But given the sheer number of vulnerable sites - three major oil and natural gas pipelines, heavily traveled rail lines and more than a dozen chemical plants - many security experts acknowledge that the response is inadequate. In the months after 9/11, government officials routinely refused to discuss the most mundane aspects of security, saying that they did not want to offer inside information to potential enemies. Now, said Sidney J. Caspersen, the director of the state's Office of Counterterrorism, there is more risk in remaining silent. "The terrorists already know what's out here," Mr. Caspersen said. "They have been found with blueprints of our buildings, and a lot of the information is available over the Internet or at a public library. The only question is whether we will find a way to protect these targets before they find a way to attack them." The answer to that question will depend largely on the ability to operate with limited money and a tangle of bureaucracies. In several instances, counterterrorism money sent to the state has been used for questionable purposes: the city of Newark spent $300,000 on two air-conditioned garbage trucks, and New Jersey Transit has proposed using $36 million in security money to overhaul the Hoboken Ferry terminal. Even groups like Taxpayers for Common Sense say that places like New Jersey, Houston and Long Beach, Calif., deserve more federal dollars. As for the ports, the federal Homeland Security Department's inspector general's office recently criticized the agency for directing much of its $517 million in port security money to relatively low-risk sites in places like Kentucky and Tennessee, and not giving enough to busy, vulnerable facilities like Port Newark. Although the Port of New York and New Jersey recently received an additional $42 million for counterterrorism efforts, Port Newark lacks the up-to-date equipment now used to search cargo at ports like Hong Kong. "We put more resources into securing the average large bank in Manhattan than we do for the entire security of Port Newark," said Stephen Flynn, a former Coast Guard commander who is now a security analyst for the Council on Foreign Relations and who conducted the study that first identified this part of North Jersey as the nation's most terror-prone two miles. "That's just irresponsible." Some New Jersey officials have hoped that the newly appointed secretary of homeland security, Michael Chertoff, will be sympathetic to the state's situation because he is a native of Elizabeth. But when he visited New Jersey during a terror drill last month, Mr. Chertoff was noncommital about restoring cuts. "Frankly, it's not a matter of spending a great lot of money," he said. "It's a matter of taking resources we have and having a plan in place so we use them effectively." New Jersey officials say that the cuts will force them to reduce surveillance of possible targets, cancel training sessions for first responders and counterterrorism experts, and forestall the purchase of equipment to detect chemical, nuclear or biological agents. The state has said it will also have to scale back plans to fortify storage facilities and rail lines near the Pulaski Skyway, an area known as "chemical alley." Even if New Jersey were to receive more money, however, its counterterrorism effort would still face other difficulties. At Newark Airport, which handles 32 million passengers a year, the federal government and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey have spent tens of millions of dollars on high-tech baggage screening equipment, more guards and other security improvements. But Transportation Security Administration employees failed to detect weapons or fake bombs in about a quarter of the 81 tests conducted between last June and September. In December, when a machine detected a simulated explosive, baggage screeners lost track of it and it was loaded onto a flight to Holland. Meanwhile, even less has been done to secure the nation's greatest vulnerability to terror attacks, its 15,000 chemical plants, 123 of which pose a threat to at least 1 million people, according to the Environmental Protection Agency. A spokeswoman for the Chemistry Council, an industry group representing 150 of the nation's largest chemical plants, said its members had already invested $2 billion in improved security and were working with Congress to establish federal safety guidelines. "We want to work with the Department of Homeland Security and Congress to make these plants safer in a way that works for everyone," Kate McGloon, the spokeswoman, said. Michelle Petrovich, a Department of Homeland Security spokeswoman, said agency officials had visited more than half the nation's 300 most dangerous plants and urged the companies to enhance perimeter security and switch to less hazardous chemicals and processes. As a result, Ms. Petrovich said, she believes North Jersey is "one of the safer areas because it has received the most attention in terms of protective measures." But Richard A. Falkenrath, a former deputy homeland security adviser to the White House, said that effort has done little to make the public safer. "Saying that you're doing something doesn't mean you're actually making a difference," said Mr. Falkenrath, who recently testified before Congress, urging tighter regulation of the chemical industry. Since 2001, at least two major efforts to bolster chemical plant security have been stalled, in part by industry lobbyists. The latest proposal to tighten security at chemical plants, which appears to be gaining support in Congress, would establish safety guidelines. But Senator Jon S. Corzine said that it is only a half measure because it would not mandate that plants in densely populated areas stop using highly dangerous chemicals like chlorine gas and switch to more benign alternatives, like sodium hypochlorite. The plants use such chemicals to make antiseptics for water purification plants. For those who live in the shadow of these plants, there is little expectation that the federal government will mount a more vigorous security response. Carolyn M. Chapluske of Kearny, who has lived in North Jersey all her life, said, "People pay taxes and deserve to be protected. But they probably won't. It's just the way things work." Correction: May 13, 2005, Friday: A front-page article on Monday about lapses in security at dozens of potential terror targets in New Jersey that are close to Manhattan gave an incorrect attribution for a statement that the federal Department of Homeland Security is encouraging operators of chemical plants to use safer substances and processes. It was made by Kate McGloon, a spokeswoman for the Chemistry Council, not by Michelle Petrovich, a spokeswoman for the department. -------- ENERGY -------- alternative energy Tennessee Buys Renewable Energy for State Parks NASHVILLE, Tennessee, April 25, 2005 (ENS) http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/apr2005/2005-04-25-09.asp#anchor6 Tennessee State Parks will purchase green power for every park where green power is available, making Tennessee one of the first state parks systems in the nation to utilize green power, Governor Phil Bredesen announced on Friday. "There’s no better day than Earth Day to focus on the benefits of increased use of renewable energy sources," Bredesen said. "Reducing traditional power production through increased use of green power lessens impacts on the environment, which is especially important to help improve air quality in Tennessee." Forty-four of Tennessee’s 54 state parks will have access to green power through the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA) Green Power Switch program. Green power is generated from renewable resources such as wind, solar and methane gas. Green power is purchased in 150 kilowatt hour blocks at a cost of $4 per block. The state parks will purchase a combined total of 1,149 blocks per month. The additional investment of the state parks system in green power will cost $55,150 per year. Environment and Conservation Commissioner Jim Fyke said the financial investment in green power is being offset by energy efficiency measures implemented at state parks including lighting and cooling improvements at Norris Dam, Sycamore Shoals, Fall Creek Falls and Pickwick Landing State Parks and other energy efficiency improvements at Henry Horton and Pinson Mounds. "Along with potential cost savings of over $190,000 that our parks improvements are predicted to achieve, we estimate that more than 3.4 million pounds of greenhouse gases and other pollutants will be averted from the atmosphere," Fyke said. "Now we’re coupling that with the environmental benefits that will be achieved by meeting some of the state parks’ energy demands through green power." "The renewable resources used to generate green power are free, but the technology required to harness them costs a little more," explained Jim Keiffer, senior vice president of marketing for TVA. "As the demand for green power increases, however, that will help drive down the cost of these cleaner technologies." Keiffer explained that TVA, a federal utility, receives power from the Buffalo Mountain Wind Park, the only commercial-scale wind-generating site in the southeast, which is located in Oliver Springs, Tennessee. The park recently expanded its capacity from three windmills to 18. Ten of TVA’s 16 solar generating sites are located in Tennessee. TVA also operates a methane co-firing project located in Memphis, powered by the methane waste by-product from the city of Memphis’ wastewater treatment facility. The state of Tennessee currently purchases green power for the Executive Residence and state buildings in downtown Nashville. Fyke said the state parks’ purchase equates to the environmental benefits of planting 418 acres of trees. Four dogwood trees, symbolizing the environmental benefits of planting the 418 acres of trees, were provided by the Iris Fund and will be planted in four state parks. The Iris Fund uses funds generated by the state parks specialty license plate for native planting projects in Tennessee State Parks. For more information about the Green Power Switch program, visit http://www.tva.gov/greenpowerswitch. To learn about the Iris Fund, visit http://www.state.tn.us/environment/specplates. -------- energy Massachusetts Democrat Takes Aim at Energy Bill April 25, 2005 — By Lolita C. Baldor, Associated Press http://www.enn.com/today.html?id=7593 WASHINGTON — The energy bill that passed the House on Thursday will raise gasoline prices and subsidize oil companies but fail to reduce the country's dependence on foreign oil, Rep. Edward Markey, D-Mass., said Saturday. Markey, who tried unsuccessfully to force changes in the bill during House debate, said the legislation will make the United States more dependent on foreign oil because it fails to require cars and sport utility vehicles to be more fuel-efficient. "We cannot afford to continue to pursue such a failed energy policy," Markey said in his party's weekly radio address. "If we fail to reduce our dependence on OPEC oil, we remain beholden to events in dangerous, unstable parts of the world. ... If we fail to reduce the cost of energy, businesses will suffer, farms will fail and families find it more difficult to make ends meet." The bill, which passed the House by a 249-183 vote, reflects many of President Bush's energy priorities. It would open an Alaska wildlife refuge to oil drilling and provide $12 billion in tax breaks and subsidies to traditional energy industries, including oil, natural gas, nuclear and coal producers. But opponents said it does little to foster less energy use and will damage the environment. While this is the fifth time in four years the House has passed an energy bill, the measure has stalled in the Senate, and it's future there is still uncertain. The bill, said Markey, gives billions of dollars in tax breaks to profitable oil companies such as ExxonMobil and immunizes those companies from any legal liability connected with water supplies contaminated by the gasoline additive MTBE. Markey, a member of the House Energy Committee, said Democrats "offered a more hopeful vision of our energy future." That plan, he said, would move away from an oil-dependent past and into a "technologically advanced and renewable energy future." "We lose when we resort to desperate drilling schemes that despoil our most precious wildlife and wilderness areas," Markey said. "We win when we invest in renewable technologies such as solar and wind energy." -------- ACTIVISTS The Persecution of Mordechai Vanunu By URI AVNERY Tel Aviv, Israel April 25, 2005 COUNTERPUNCH http://www.counterpunch.org/avnery04252005.html An Iranian technician called Jalal-a-Din Taheri, who had been working at the nuclear reactor at Bushehr, managed to defect to Europe, where he disclosed the Ayatollahs' plans for producing nuclear bombs. Taheri was acclaimed a hero throughout the world. A number of organizations nominated him for the Nobel Peace Price. President Bush praised his courage. Ariel Sharon invited him to come and live in Israel, even calling him one of the Righteous of the Nations. The Ayatollahs denounced him as a traitor, infidel, Crusader and Zionist. This is, of course, an entirely fictitious story. But it corresponds exactly to the story of Mordechai Vanunu, who is considered by almost all Israelis as a despicable traitor - proving once again that treason, like pornography, is a matter of geography. This week I used my privilege as a former Member of the Knesset to attend a session of the Knesset Committee for "the Constitution, Law and Justice", in which the Vanunu affair was discussed. In the course of the session, Knesset members cursed each other in the language of fishmongers (by which I mean no offence to fishmongers). Two Likud members, Ronie Bar-On (who once served for several hours as Attorney General before being ignominiously removed) and Yehiel Hazan shouted that Vanunu had no human rights, since he was not a human being. It should be mentioned in all fairness that the chairman of the committee, Michael Eytan, also a Likud member, strongly condemned these utterances. Vanunu, who in 1986 disclosed to a British newspaper some of Israel's nuclear secrets, was kidnapped soon after by the Mossad, smuggled back to Israel and put on trial. He served his sentence: 18 years in prison. For most of the time he was held in total isolation. (He told me that, in order to keep his sanity, he would read the New Testament in English out loud, over and over again, and in this way improved his command of this language, which he now insists on using instead of Hebrew.) On his release, he was placed under severe restrictions: he is forbidden to go abroad, forbidden to move inside the country without prior notification of the authorities, forbidden to speak with foreigners, forbidden to give interviews. The Supreme Court has upheld these constraints. Vanunu has violated most of them, and some weeks ago he was indicted for these violations. The restrictions were initially imposed for one year, which came to an end this week. The Knesset committee was about to discuss the possibility of their being extended, but a few hours before the session, the Minister of the Interior, Ophir Pines (Labor Party) signed an order extending for another year the prohibition of leaving the country, and the Army Commander of the Home Front signed an order to extend the other constraints (under Emergency Regulations). At the committee meeting, the representative of the Attorney General set out the government arguments for this extension: (a) Vanunu still "holds in his head" dangerous secrets, (b) He has a "phenomenal" memory, (c) If given the opportunity, he will disclose these secrets abroad. What is the evidence to support this? (a) In one of the letters he wrote in prison, Vanunu told his correspondent abroad that he was in possession of many more secrets, which he had not yet disclosed. He announced his intention of revealing these secrets at the first opportunity. (b) Two years before his release - that is to say, 16 years after his work in the nuclear installation - he drew in his cell, purely from memory, detailed and amazingly exact blueprints of the production process. These drawings were found among the more than a thousand documents seized in his cell. These facts are more than strange. An inmate who sends letters from prison knows, of course, that they are censored. Vanunu was bound to know that not only the prison authorities, but the intelligence services, too, would read them. When he made the blueprints, he certainly knew they would be seized. All this indicates that he intended to provoke his tormentors and show them that he was not broken. It is difficult to take the documents seriously, as the Supreme Court did, eight months ago, when it confirmed the restrictions. A person who intends to disclose dreadful secrets does not announce this in advance to the authorities, and does not prepare blueprints for his persecutors. Concerning the matter itself: (a) Does he "hold in his head" secrets that he has not disclosed in the past? Unlikely. First of all, Vanunu's knowledge concerns processes as they were 18 years ago. Can such knowledge be useful today? Hard to believe. As Knesset Member Zehava Galon (Yahad) remarked at the session: "It is terrifying to imagine that nothing has changed in Israel's nuclear techniques for 19 years!" Secondly, before the British paper published his disclosures, Vanunu was cross-questioned for two whole days by one of the world's leading nuclear scientists. It is hard to believe that after that he still had any undisclosed secrets left. Thirdly, it borders on paranoia to think that he was so sophisticated as to decide, 18 years ago, to "hold in his head" secrets in order to publish them 20 years later. Fourthly, Vanunu is no scientist. He worked at the reactor as a technician. Even if he has a "phenomenal" memory, and even if his blueprints are uncannily exact, it is hard to believe that they have any remaining significance today. If this is the case, how to explain the renewal of the restrictions? The Attorney General's representative insisted that their purpose is not to punish him for things he has done in the past, which would be illegal (since he has already been tried and served his full sentence), but to prevent new crimes (the disclosure of further secrets). I doubt this. One cannot silence Vanunu. The whole world is interested in him, and the more he is persecuted, the more this interest will grow. Vanunu cannot be deterred - he is simple undeterrible (to coin a word). Quite the contrary. Also, it is impossible to prevent him from coming into contact with foreigners. (Some months ago, I was sitting in the evening in the garden of the fabulous American Colony hotel in East Jerusalem, chatting with the British actress Vanessa Redgrave, a tireless campaigner for Israeli-Palestinian peace. Suddenly I noticed Vanunu strolling by. I called him over. Vanessa Redgrave was very interested in his experiences in prison. How can one prevent this sort of things happening?) There remains only one explanation: Revenge. Yehiel Horev, the chief of the Internal Security Division of the Ministry of Defense, cannot forgive Vanunu for making a mockery of his security arrangements by wandering around the parts of the installation in which he had no business to be, freely taking photos in Israel's most secret installation and smuggling them abroad. That is indeed infuriating. But vengeance, too, must have its limits. The more so as the Attorney General's man, answering a query from Knesset Member Etti Livni, admitted that the same arguments voiced now will also be valid in another year's time, as well as in five and ten years. In other words, the constraints may be lifelong. As for my personal opinion about the substance of the matter: Nuclear weapons are a threat to all of us. It is impossible to prevent indefinitely the acquisition of nuclear weapons by more countries in the Middle East - with Iran in the lead. Other categories of Weapons of Mass Destruction (chemical and biological) do already exist in neighboring countries. For years, Israel has enjoyed a nuclear monopoly in the region. My friends and I have warned that this monopoly is temporary, and that we must use the time to achieve peace. The hubris of our leaders has prevented this. Now, the aim must be to free the whole region from weapons of mass destruction, under strict international and mutual inspection, as part of a comprehensive peace settlement. That is both possible and practical. When Vanunu rings the bells, he contributes to the public awakening. His action is also important for another reason: for the first time, he has drawn the attention of the Israeli public to the real danger inherent in the old reactor, which is now more than 40 years old. Several former employees have now sued the government, claiming that they have contracted cancer (and some have died) because of safety failures. What will happen in the case of a Chernobyl-like disaster? Or an earthquake, or a missile strike? Who is thinking about this? Whose responsibility is it? Who oversees those responsible? Vanunu rings the bells to call attention to a real danger. The question is not whether he is a pleasant person, whether his views are popular or what he thinks about the State of Israel, after 12 years of solitary confinement. The question is whether he is doing a good job. I, for one, believe he is. ----- A-bomb survivors call for elimination of nuclear weapons Monday, April 25, 2005 at 07:14 JST Japan Today http://www.japantoday.com/e/?content=news&cat=1&id=335270 BOSTON — Atomic-bomb survivors appealed to the global community to eliminate nuclear arms at a symposium held near Boston on Saturday ahead of the 60th anniversary of the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Five "hibakusha," or atomic-bomb victims, delivered speeches on the second day of the symposium entitled "Hiroshima-Nagasaki 2005: Memories and Visions," held at Tufts University. The five said the threat of nuclear weapons is not an illusion of the past, telling the audience that their families would have the same tragedy as experienced by citizens in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in a nuclear conflict. (Kyodo News)