NucNews - April 23, 2005
-------- NUCLEAR
-------- accidents and safety
City submits case to bar trains with hazardous cargo
April 23, 2005
By Robert Redding Jr.
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
http://www.washtimes.com/metro/20050422-094945-3650r.htm
The D.C. government yesterday submitted to a federal appeals court its arguments for banning trains carrying hazardous materials from passing through the city.
"The District Terrorism Prevention Act was enacted ... because relevant federal agencies have failed to use ample powers available to them to take action to prevent terrorist attacks against likely targets in Washington, D.C.," the city said in a motion filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals.
The environmental group Sierra Club filed a separate motion supporting the city's position.
On Tuesday, the appellate court granted an injunction to block the city from implementing the ban, which was to have taken effect Wednesday. The court had asked the District to file motions for implementing the ban by 4 p.m. yesterday.
The freight rail company CSX Transportation Inc. and several federal agencies have sought to overturn the ban, saying it would be too costly and would interfere with interstate commerce.
As recently as Thursday, the Justice Department filed arguments supporting CSX's position, saying the ban would disrupt the transportation of hazardous chemicals that are vital to public health.
But also on Thursday, a former deputy administrator for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) said the federal government lacked adequate plans to secure hazardous rail shipments during his tenure.
Stephen McHale, TSA's second-ranking official from 2002 to August 2004, told a panel at the Center for American Progress that he was disappointed with the government's efforts to secure chemicals on railways. Mr. McHale opposes the District's ban.
In its 24-page motion, the city said the federal government has not provided adequate protection to prevent "inevitable collateral damage from a terrorist attack on likely targets," such as rail lines.
"The failure of such protections means that the federal regulations do not pre-empt the operations of the District's law," the motion reads.
On Monday, U.S. District Court Judge Emmet G. Sullivan denied CSX's request to block the ban. He ruled that Congress had given states the authority to regulate areas of railroad safety if the federal government has not taken action to address new risks, such as a terrorist threat.
The appeals court ruling overturned Judge Sullivan's decision.
Neither CSX nor federal agencies -- including Homeland Security -- have fully disclosed plans to secure the rails from a terrorist attack.
CSX spokesman Robert Sullivan has said company officials are addressing community concerns "with maximum effort and attention."
Mayor Anthony A. Williams signed the law in February, citing studies that show a terrorist attack on a rail car containing chlorine could kill as many as 100,000 people.
Other cities, including Baltimore and Philadelphia, are considering similar legislation. CSX fears such action could bring certain shipments to a halt.
The U.S. Court of Appeals is expected to rule on the motions by Monday, officials said.
D.C. officials have said they are prepared to take their fight to the U.S. Supreme Court.
• This article is based in part on wire service reports.
-------- britain
Nuclear power? Yes please, says Blair
By Marie Woolf and Andrew Grice
23 April 2005
http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/story.jsp?story=632254
Downing Street is drawing up secret plans to create a new generation of nuclear power stations as the centrepiece of the Government's drive to combat climate change. Tony Blair wants to avoid discussing the issue until after the election and the No 10 review of Britain's energy needs is not mentioned in the manifesto. But a team in the Strategy Unit, led by Lord Birt, the former BBC director general and one of the Prime Minister's closest advisers, is studying whether nuclear power should play a central role in combating global warming.
The unit will produce a report on climate change and how to protect energy supplies from threats - such as oil shortages and a terrorist attack on Middle East pipelines. "They are carefully framing the questions to get the answer they want. The answer to both questions could be nuclear power," one senior insider said yesterday.
The nuclear industry has already held private discussions with Downing Street about a new generation of power stations. Mr Blair is understood to be sympathetic to the arguments advanced by Sir David King, the Government's chief scientific adviser, who sees nuclear power as the best way to tackle global warming.
They discussed the issue at a meeting late last year, but Mr Blair said any public debate would have to wait until after the election.
The revival of the prospect of nuclear power has split the Cabinet. Margaret Beckett, the Environment Secretary, and Patricia Hewitt, the Trade and Industry Secretary, are believed to have serious reservations. Some figures in the nuclear industry are lobbying for Ms Hewitt to be moved from her department in a post-election reshuffle.
The Cabinet's most senior ministers are thought unlikely to oppose the expansion of nuclear power if Mr Blair proposes it.
Geoffrey Norris, Mr Blair's special adviser on industry matters, is among those said to be promoting the case. "No 10 advisers and people in the Strategy Unit are pushing it very strongly," said one senior source. "John Birt and Geoffrey Norris, who has the ear of Tony Blair, are looking at this."
The DTI and the Environment department believe the Government should concentrate on developing renewable energy, to tackle climate change.
The Government has set a target of meeting 10 per cent of electricity from renewables by 2010. Critics of the nuclear option argue it would not help to achieve the Government's goal of a 20 per cent cut in carbon dioxide levels by 2010 because it would take too long to upgrade plants or build new ones. But supporters say nuclear could help hit the more ambitious target of a 60 per cent cut by 2050.
Backers of the nuclear option are confident of victory but admit the hurdles are formidable. A likely way to finance the move would be a form of public-private partnership but the private sector might demand long-term energy contracts with guaranteed fixed prices, before investing in nuclear.
To limit public opposition, new reactors could be built next to decommissioned nuclear plants.
Yesterday, Mrs Beckett said the construction of new nuclear plants was not the Government's preferred solution for meeting the growing demand for energy in an environmentally-friendly manner. But she said: "We can't close down that option. It is possible that, in the end, for climate change reasons, we would need to reconsider that."
Jean McSorley, senior adviser, nuclear, at Greenpeace, said: "This plan is so far off it is not an adequate response to climate change. There has been a huge amount of lobbying by the nuclear industry over the past year."
-------- depleted uranium
THE TWO-HEADED SERPENT: Depleted Uranium
April 23, 2005 Soldier Tech (Military.com)
http://www.military.com/soldiertech/0,14632,Soldiertech_DU,,00.html
In the race to come up with a projectile with better penetrating capabilities, depleted uranium is currently in the lead. But do the properties that make it effective also make it too dangerous to use?
Over the past 800 years, projectiles have evolved from hand-carved rocks to forged metal penetrators. The name of the game: come up with a shell with better penetrating characteristics, at a reasonable expense.
The latest leader of the pack is depleted uranium (DU), which has unique, explosive properties, to say the least. A heavy metal with very high density (1.7 times heavier than lead), DU has high kinetic energy for its volume. And thanks to its unique properties, DU actually sustains its own combustion when ignited, which enables it to literally melt and "sharpen" as it penetrates armor, increasing its destructive capabilities.
It's bad enough having to deal with the standard 105mm tank shell, which we roughly estimate has the energy of 7 Honda sedans crashing into you at 65 miles per hour -- now imagine that energy "sharpening" as it penetrates your armor and takes you out. Seems an almost unfair advantage.
The U.S. military has certainly made the most of this advantage. The Pentagon estimates that 14,000 shells containing DU were fired by tanks, and another 940,000 30mm rounds containing DU were fired by A-10 "Warthog" jets in support operations, during the 1991 Gulf War alone -- 320 tons total.
So it's clear that DU has been used often, and with impressive results -- but does its radioactive properties mean using it comes at a cost of more than dollars?
From Stones to Iron
The road to the "heavy metal" era of depleted uranium began innocuously enough, with the "rock" age -- rocks and stones, that is. Because of costs of metalworking in medieval times, the earliest cannon balls were nothing more than hand-cut stones originally "built" for use by siege engines. As metalworking improved, and casting became more commonplace, the stone balls were coated with lead to improve the gas seal inside the barrel, which also improved the projectiles' fortress-penetrating capabilities.
It wasn't until the 15th century that forged iron, which was twice as dense as stone and did not shatter easily, completely replaced chiseled stone as the ammunition of choice. Four hundred years later, rifled, forged steel cannons were introduced, along with elongated, as opposed to round, projectiles, which had the effect of increasing not only the cannon's range and accuracy, but its lethality as well.
Prior to World War I, artillery (both cannon and shell) development had basically progressed along the lines of "bigger is better." Improvements in metalworking techniques enabled manufacturers to build larger (and lighter) cannons that could throw increasingly larger shells further and further. Though a number of guns were in the 50mm-80mm range (bore diameter), most field artillery had progressed to the 105mm-170mm range, and siege artillery could be as large as 420mm. In addition, as guns got larger, they had also become less mobile, in effect returning to their medieval role of static siege engines. The introduction of the tank in 1917 changed that.
Enter the Tank -- and Squeeze Guns, Shoe Guns, and Tungsten
The innovation of the tank -- with its improved, thicker armor -- forced a new line of guns to be developed. To defeat tank armor, the shells had to be made of materials that would not shatter on impact (as iron would), and had to possess sufficient kinetic energy to push through the armor. However, as the tank was a tracked, offensive weapon, these new "anti-tank" guns needed to be mobile enough to be able to track effectively with the enemy tank's movement. Thus, to be mobile enough to keep up with the tanks they were trying to destroy, an anti-tank gun could only be so large. Given this relatively inflexible parameter (at this time cannons were being made out of forged steel, as stronger, more exotic metals such as titanium and tungsten were not readily available), research turned to making harder and faster projectiles.
During World War II several concepts were introduced to improve anti-tank performance. One method was to "squeeze" the round as it passed down the barrel. This was accomplished by tapering the bore so that it might be 28mm at the breech, but 21mm at the muzzle (the German sPB-41 28mm AT gun is a good example of this.) Witht this method, more powder could be used to drive a smaller projectile faster, and produce more kinetic energy.
Another method was to utilize a small aerodynamic penetrator surrounded by a large bore collar. These "Sabot" (French for "shoe") rounds placed far less stress on the cannons firing them than did the squeeze guns, yet transferred the same amount of energy to the penetrator (once the projectile leaves the gun the sabot "petals", as they're called, fall away and the penetrator continues to the target.) However, despite improvements in metallurgy (by the end of World War II, sabot penetrators were made of forged tungsten, at that point the densest, hardest metal available), advances in tank automotive performance, which enabled them to carry more and more armor, had forced anti-tank guns to become so large that they were either too heavy to keep up (if they were towed pieces) or carried too few rounds of ammunition to be efficient in combat (the Soviet built IS-3 heavy tank, equipped with a 122mm cannon, only carried 10 rounds of anti-tank ammunition.) Once again, anti-tank weapons had run up against the non-negotiable size limitation. What was needed was a better material to make bullets.
The Silver Bullet
In the 1970s the Soviet Union began making anti-tank rounds out of a material that had been un-available prior to World War II -- depleted uranium, a by-product of uranium ore processing. Naturally occurring uranium is composed of three chemically identical isotopes of the uranium atom; relatively inert U238 (99.3%), fissile U235 (.71%) and highly radioactive (18,000 times more so than U238) U234 (.0055%). To be usable in nuclear weapons and power plants, uranium must be "enriched" by increasing the concentration of fissile U235. The residue from this enrichment process is a "depleted" U238 compound that has 70% the radioactivity of naturally occurring uranium ore.
DU's metallic properties make it ideal for use in armor penetration applications. First, it is the densest (at 19.3 grams per cubic centimeter, it is 70% denser than lead and 15% denser than tungsten) metal readily available (osmium and iridium are both harder and denser, but are more difficult to work with and are not available in large enough quantities); when alloyed with titanium, it is extremely resistant to deformation.
Second, unlike tungsten penetrators which "mushroom" (flatten and spread out on impact, converting kinetic energy into useless thermal energy) on impact, DU melts and sharpens as it penetrates, actually improving its performance as it heats up. In addition, at high temperatures DU becomes "pyrophoric," which means that super-heated fragments will sustain combustion, further increasing the destructive potential of the material. Finally, not only is DU available in very large quantities (with a half-life of 4.5 billion years, it is literally "not going anywhere") but compared with tungsten, DU is easy to work with, with DU penetrators manufactured for a fraction of the cost it would take to manufacture a similar tungsten penetrator. The first combat use of DU occurred during the 1991 Gulf War, in which American M1A1 Abrams tanks used the 120mm M829A1 APFSDS-T (known as the "Silver Bullet" because of its DU long rod penetrator) while American A-10 Thunderbolt II aircraft used DU cored PGU-14/B API (Armor Piercing Incendiary) in their 30mm cannon.
Green Salt of Death?
Unfortunately, there are a number of potentially serious issues concerning the use of DU in military ordnance. Most notable is that although it is less radioactive than naturally occurring uranium ore, DU is still, nonetheless, radioactive. Individuals exposed to DU dust and fragments run the risk of inhaling it, and exposing their internal organs to low-level radiation. In addition, DU penetrators buried in the soil can potentially contaminate ground water as the penetrator decomposes, potentially exposing large numbers of people to indirect DU contamination.
Though only slightly radioactive, studies have shown that prolonged exposure to low level doses of Alpha and Beta type radiation (which is mostly what DU emits) has a mutagenic effect (that is, produces mutations) on genetic material, and could lead to cancer. In addition, as it is a heavy metal, if you ingest DU, it will migrate towards the kidneys and large bones, possibly damaging both. On the other hand, numerous studies conducted to evaluate the long-term effects of DU exposure have either been inconclusive or have shown that even prolonged exposure from deeply embedded fragments, has not resulted in any notable medical problems. Even so, the use of DU has become a politically charged issue, with several countries discontinuing its use, and many others calling for its outright ban. That DU is reshaping the battlefield (both politically and combatively) cannot be denied; the question to be answered is, "Is it worth it?" The answers may have to wait as more research is collected.
Photos:
Small but deadly: The M829 APFSDS (Armoured Piercing Fin-Stabilised Discarding Sabot) in action, as the "dart" of depleted uranium detaches from its sabot casing. The 9.41 pound, 1.06" diameter, 24" long, depleted uranium "dart" has an effective range of about 3000 meters, and has a muzzle velocity of about 1670 meters/second -- just imagine the power generated by 7 Honda Accords smashing into you at 65 miles per hour.
http://www.military.com/pics/SoldierTech_DU4.jpg
An evolutionary step: A German 28mm bore gun, which "squeezes" the round as it fires down the barrel.
http://www.military.com/pics/SoldierTech_DU3.jpg
The sabot: A diagram for the firing of a training mortar demonstrates how a penetrator "separates" from a sabot (C) and the sabot falls away (D).
http://www.military.com/pics/SoldierTech_DU4.gif
Cutaway of the composition of an M829A1 projectile, with DU rod.
http://www.military.com/pics/SoldierTech_DU1.jpg
Depleted Uranium: Fast Facts
Depleted uranium is 70% more dense than lead, and 15% more dense than tungsten (the other metal commonly used for projectiles) -- this gives it more kinetic energy when fired. As a comparison, the amount of depleted uranium that would fill a 12-ounce can of Coke would weigh over 14 pounds.
Depleted uranium burns and melts as it penetrates steel, becoming 'sharper' rather than blunting, resulting in increased destructive power.
Projectiles made from depleted uranium are cheaper to manufacture than those made from tungsten because it can be cast easily.
Depleted Uranium's Current Uses:
Army
- 120 mm or 105 mm caliber projectiles used by the M1 Abrams and M60A3 tanks
- 25mm projectiles used by the M242 mounted on the M2 Bradley and the LAV-AT
- Some Abrams tanks have DU rods as reinforcements as part of its armour plating
Navy
- 20mm CIWS and 25mm Mk38 machine gun
Air Force
- 30mm caliber projectiles used by A-10 Thunderbolt II
Marine Corps
- 25 mm projectiles used by AV-8B Harrier
- 20mm projectiles for electric Gatling gun mounted on AH-1 helicopter gunships
Related Links
How Bunker Busters Work
Includes basic info on depleted uranium.
http://science.howstuffworks.com/bunker-buster.htm/printable
World Health Organization Factsheet
Overview of WHO regulations on depleted uranium.
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs257/en/print.html
Depleted Uranium Munitions
DoD overview on the military uses of DU.
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2002training/wakayama2.pdf
[Have opinions on this article or equipment? Go to the Discussion Forum to sound off.]
http://forums.military.com/1/OpenTopic?a=frm&s=78919038&f=3101927042
--------
How Bunker Busters Work
by Marshall Brain, HowStuffWorks, Inc., April 23, 2005
http://science.howstuffworks.com/bunker-buster.htm/printable
There are thousands of military facilities around the world that defy conventional attack. Caves in Afghanistan burrow into mountainsides, and immense concrete bunkers lie buried deep in the sand in Iraq. These hardened facilities house command centers, ammunition depots and research labs that are either of strategic importance or vital to waging war. Because they are underground, they are hard to find and extremely difficult to strike.
The U.S. military has developed several different weapons to attack these underground fortresses. Known as bunker busters, these bombs penetrate deep into the earth or right through a dozen feet of reinforced concrete before exploding. These bombs have made it possible to reach and destroy facilities that would have been impossible to attack otherwise.
In this article, you will learn about several different types of bunker buster so you understand how they work and where the technology is heading.
Conventional Bunker Busters
During the 1991 Gulf war, allied forces knew of several underground military bunkers in Iraq that were so well reinforced and so deeply buried that they were out of reach of existing munitions. The U.S. Air Force started an intense research and development process to create a new bunker-busting bomb to reach and destroy these bunkers. In just a few weeks, a prototype was created. This new bomb had the following features:
* Its casing consists of an approximately 16-foot (5-meter) section of artillery barrel that is 14.5 inches (37 cm) in diameter. Artillery barrels are made of extremely strong hardened steel so that they can withstand the repeated blasts of artillery shells when they are fired.
* Inside this steel casing is nearly 650 pounds (295 kg) of tritonal explosive. Tritonal is a mixture of TNT (80 percent) and aluminum powder (20 percent). The aluminum improves the brisance of the TNT -- the speed at which the explosive develops its maximum pressure. The addition of aluminum makes tritonal about 18 percent more powerful than TNT alone.
* Attached to the front of the barrel is a laser-guidance assembly. Either a spotter on the ground or in the bomber illuminates the target with a laser, and the bomb homes in on the illuminated spot. The guidance assembly steers the bomb with fins that are part of the assembly.
* Attached to the end of the barrel are stationary fins that provide stability during flight.
The finished bomb, known as the GBU-28 or the BLU-113, is 19 feet (5.8 meters) long, 14.5 inches (36.8 cm) in diameter and weighs 4,400 pounds (1,996 kg).
Deep Penetration
From the description in the previous section, you can see that the concept behind bunker-busting bombs like the GBU-28 is nothing but basic physics. You have:
* An extremely strong tube that is:
o very narrow for its weight
o extremely heavy
The bomb is dropped from an airplane so that this tube develops a great deal of speed, and therefore kinetic energy, as it falls.
When the bomb hits the earth, it is like a massive nail shot from a nail gun. In tests, the GBU-28 has penetrated 100 feet (30.5 meters) of earth or 20 feet (6 meters) of concrete.
In a typical mission, intelligence sources or aerial/satellite images reveal the location of the bunker. A GBU-28 is loaded into a B2 Stealth bomber, an F-111 or similar aircraft.
The bomber flies near the target, the target is illuminated and the bomb is dropped.
The GBU-28 has in the past been fitted with a delay fuze (FMU-143) so that it explodes after penetration rather than on impact. There has also been a good bit of research into smart fuzes that, using a microprocessor and an accelerometer, can actually detect what is happening during penetration and explode at precisely the right time. These fuses are known as hard target smart fuzes (HTSF). See GlobalSecurity.org: HTSF for details.
The GBU-27/GBU-24 (aka BLU-109) is nearly identical to the GBU-28, except that it weighs only 2,000 pounds (900 kg). It is less expensive to manufacture, and a bomber can carry more of them on each mission.
Depleted Uranium
To make bunker busters that can go even deeper, designers have three choices:
* They can make the weapon heavier. More weight gives the bomb more kinetic energy when it hits the target.
* They can make the weapon smaller in diameter. The smaller cross-sectional area means that the bomb has to move less material (earth or concrete) "out of the way" as it penetrates.
* They can make the bomb faster to increase its kinetic energy. The only practical way to do this is to add some sort of large rocket engine that fires right before impact.
One way to make a bunker buster heavier while maintaining a narrow cross-sectional area is to use a metal that is heavier than steel. Lead is heavier, but it is so soft that it is useless in a penetrator -- lead would deform or disintegrate when the bomb hits the target.
One material that is both extremely strong and extremely dense is depleted uranium. DU is the material of choice for penetrating weapons because of these properties. For example, the M829 is an armor-piercing "dart" fired from the cannon of an M1 tank. These 10-pound (4.5-kg) darts are 2 feet (61 cm) long, approximately 1 inch (2.5 cm) in diameter and leave the barrel of the tank's cannon traveling at over 1 mile (1.6 km) per second. The dart has so much kinetic energy and is so strong that it is able to pierce the strongest armor plating.
Depleted uranium is a by-product of the nuclear power industry. Natural uranium from a mine contains two isotopes: U-235 and U-238. The U-235 is what is needed to produce nuclear power (see How Nuclear Power Plants Work for details), so the uranium is refined to extract the U-235 and create "enriched uranium." The U-238 that is left over is known as "depleted uranium."
U-238 is a radioactive metal that produces alpha and beta particles. In its solid form, it is not particularly dangerous because its half-life is 4.5 billion years, meaning that the atomic decay is very slow. Depleted uranium is used, for example, in boats and airplanes as ballast. The three properties that make depleted uranium useful in penetrating weapons are its:
* Density - Depleted uranium is 1.7 times heavier than lead, and 2.4 times heavier than steel.
* Hardness - If you look at a Web site like WebElements.com, you can see that the Brinell hardness of U-238 is 2,400, which is just shy of tungsten at 2,570. Iron is 490. Depleted uranium alloyed with a small amount of titanium is even harder.
* Incendiary properties - Depleted uranium burns. It is something like magnesium in this regard. If you heat uranium up in an oxygen environment (normal air), it will ignite and burn with an extremely intense flame. Once inside the target, burning uranium is another part of the bomb's destructive power.
These three properties make depleted uranium an obvious choice when creating advanced bunker-busting bombs. With depleted uranium, it is possible to create extremely heavy, strong and narrow bombs that have tremendous penetrating force.
The problem with depleted uranium is the fact that it is radioactive. The United States uses tons on depleted uranium on the battlefield. At the end of the conflict, this leaves tons of radioactive material in the environment. For example, Time magazine: Balkan Dust Storm reports:
NATO aircraft rained more than 30,000 DU shells on Kosovo during the 11-week air campaign… About 10 tons of the debris were scattered across Kosovo.
Perhaps 300 tons of DU weapons were used in the first Gulf war. When it burns, DU forms a uranium-oxide smoke that is easily inhaled and that settles on the ground miles from the point of use. Once inhaled or ingested, depleted-uranium smoke can do a great deal of damage to the human body because of its radioactivity. See How Nuclear Radiation Works for details.
Tactical Nuclear Weapons
The Pentagon has developed tactical nuclear weapons to reach the most heavily fortified and deeply buried bunkers. The idea is to marry a small nuclear bomb with a penetrating bomb casing to create a weapon that can penetrate deep into the ground and then explode with nuclear force. The B61-11, available since 1997, is the current state of the art in the area of nuclear bunker busters.
From a practical standpoint, the advantage of a small nuclear bomb is that it can pack so much explosive force into such a small space. (See How Nuclear Bombs Work for details.) The B61-11 can carry a nuclear charge with anywhere between a 1-kiloton (1,000 tons of TNT) and a 300-kiloton yield. For comparison, the bomb used on Hiroshima had a yield of approximately 15 kilotons. The shock wave from such an intense underground explosion would cause damage deep in the earth and would presumably destroy even the most well-fortified bunker.
From an environmental and diplomatic standpoint, however, the use of the B61-11 raises a number of issues. There is no way for any known penetrating bomb to bury itself deeply enough to contain a nuclear blast. This means that the B61-11 would leave an immense crater and eject a huge amount of radioactive fallout into the air. Diplomatically, the B61-11 is problematic because it violates the international desire to eliminate the use of nuclear weapons. See FAS.org: Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons for details.
For more information on the GBU-28, the B61-11 and depleted uranium, check out the links on the next page.
Lots More Information
Related HowStuffWorks Articles
* How Nuclear Bombs Work
* How Dirty Bombs Work
* How Smart Bombs Work
* How E-Bombs Work
* How Nuclear Radiation Works
* How Stealth Bombers Work
* How MOAB Works
More Great Links (add your link)
http://science.howstuffworks.com/contact.php?s=hsw&ct=addlink
* FAS.org: Guided Bomb Unit-28 (GBU-28)
* GlobalSecurity.org: Guided Bomb Unit-28 (GBU-28)
* South Florida Sun-Sentinel: Attacking bunkers - good animation
* csmonitor.com: New push for bunker-buster nuke
* CNN.com: U.S. Air Force seeks deeper penetrating "bunker-buster" weapon
* CLW.org: GBU-28/B "Bunker Buster"
* Lockheed Martin: BLU-109
* FAS.org: Hard and/or Deeply Buried Target Defeat Capability (HDBTDC) Program
* DTIC: Fuzing Overview - PDF
* ChicagoTribune.com: Caves can't hold back U.S. forces, analysts say
* CLW.org: Nuclear Bunker Busters: Unusable, Costly, and Dangerous
* LASG.org: B61-11 Concerns and Background
* Wired.com: Nuke 'Em from on High
* FAS.org: Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons
* Military use of depleted uranium: Known and suspected DU weapon systems - PDF
* Wired.com: U.S. stocking Uranium-rich bombs?
* U238 physical properties
* Depleted uranium FAQ
* NATO: Depleted Uranium
* FAS.org: Depleted Uranium
* DOD: Depleted Uranium Information Page
* Dan's History: Laser Guided Bombs LGBs, GBU-27, GBU-28
* Sandia Lab News: How TTR Helped the Air Force Ready a New Bomb
----
Depleted uranium (WHO Fact Sheet)
World Health Organization Fact sheet N°257
Revised January 2003
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs257/en/print.html
Uranium
* Metallic uranium (U) is a silver-white, lustrous, dense, weakly radioactive element. It is ubiquitous throughout the natural environment, and is found in varying but small amounts in rocks, soils, water, air, plants, animals and in all human beings.
* Natural uranium consists of a mixture of three radioactive isotopes which are identified by the mass numbers 238U (99.27% by mass), 235U (0.72%) and 234U (0.0054%).
* On average, approximately 90 µg (micrograms) of uranium exists in the human body from normal intakes of water, food and air. About 66% is found in the skeleton, 16% in the liver, 8% in the kidneys and 10% in other tissues.
* Uranium is used primarily in nuclear power plants. However, most reactors require uranium in which the 235U content is enriched from 0.72% to about 1.5-3%.
Depleted uranium
* The uranium remaining after removal of the enriched fraction contains about 99.8% 238U, 0.2% 235U and 0.001% 234U by mass; this is referred to as depleted uranium or DU.
* The main difference between DU and natural uranium is that the former contains at least three times less 235U than the latter.
* DU, consequently, is weakly radioactive and a radiation dose from it would be about 60% of that from purified natural uranium with the same mass.
* The behaviour of DU in the body is identical to that of natural uranium.
* Spent uranium fuel from nuclear reactors is sometimes reprocessed in plants for natural uranium enrichment. Some reactor-created radioisotopes can consequently contaminate the reprocessing equipment and the DU. Under these conditions another uranium isotope, 236U, may be present in the DU together with very small amounts of the transuranic elements plutonium, americium and neptunium and the fission product technetium-99. However, the additional radiation dose following intake of DU into the human body from these isotopes would be less than 1%.
Applications of depleted uranium
* Due to its high density, about twice that of lead, the main civilian uses of DU include counterweights in aircraft, radiation shields in medical radiation therapy machines and containers for the transport of radioactive materials. The military uses DU for defensive armour plate.
* DU is used in armour penetrating military ordnance because of its high density, and also because DU can ignite on impact if the temperature exceeds 600°C.
Exposure to uranium and depleted uranium
* Under most circumstances, use of DU will make a negligible contribution to the overall natural background levels of uranium in the environment. Probably the greatest potential for DU exposure will follow conflict where DU munitions are used.
* A recent United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) report giving field measurements taken around selected impact sites in Kosovo (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) indicates that contamination by DU in the environment was localized to a few tens of metres around impact sites. Contamination by DU dusts of local vegetation and water supplies was found to be extremely low. Thus, the probability of significant exposure to local populations was considered to be very low.
* A UN expert team reported in November 2002 that they found traces of DU in three locations among 14 sites investigated in Bosnia following NATO airstrikes in 1995. A full report is expected to be published by UNEP in March 2003.
* Levels of DU may exceed background levels of uranium close to DU contaminating events. Over the days and years following such an event, the contamination normally becomes dispersed into the wider natural environment by wind and rain. People living or working in affected areas may inhale contaminated dusts or consume contaminated food and drinking water.
* People near an aircraft crash may be exposed to DU dusts if counterweights are exposed to prolonged intense heat. Significant exposure would be rare, as large masses of DU counterweights are unlikely to ignite and would oxidize only slowly. Exposures of clean-up and emergency workers to DU following aircraft accidents are possible, but normal occupational protection measures would prevent any significant exposure.
Intake of depleted uranium
* Average annual intakes of uranium by adults are estimated to be about 0.5mg (500 ?g) from ingestion of food and water and 0.6 ?g from breathing air.
* Ingestion of small amounts of DU contaminated soil by small children may occur while playing.
* Contact exposure of DU through the skin is normally very low and unimportant.
* Intake from wound contamination or embedded fragments in skin tissues may allow DU to enter the systemic circulation.
Absorption of depleted uranium
* About 98% of uranium entering the body via ingestion is not absorbed, but is eliminated via the faeces. Typical gut absorption rates for uranium in food and water are about 2% for soluble and about 0.2% for insoluble uranium compounds.
* The fraction of uranium absorbed into the blood is generally greater following inhalation than following ingestion of the same chemical form. The fraction will also depend on the particle size distribution. For some soluble forms, more than 20% of the inhaled material could be absorbed into blood.
* Of the uranium that is absorbed into the blood, approximately 70% will be filtered by the kidney and excreted in the urine within 24 hours; this amount increases to 90% within a few days.
Potential health effects of exposure to depleted uranium
* In the kidneys, the proximal tubules (the main filtering component of the kidney) are considered to be the main site of potential damage from chemical toxicity of uranium. There is limited information from human studies indicating that the severity of effects on kidney function and the time taken for renal function to return to normal both increase with the level of uranium exposure.
* In a number of studies on uranium miners, an increased risk of lung cancer was demonstrated, but this has been attributed to exposure from radon decay products. Lung tissue damage is possible leading to a risk of lung cancer that increases with increasing radiation dose. However, because DU is only weakly radioactive, very large amounts of dust (on the order of grams) would have to be inhaled for the additional risk of lung cancer to be detectable in an exposed group. Risks for other radiation-induced cancers, including leukaemia, are considered to be very much lower than for lung cancer.
* Erythema (superficial inflammation of the skin) or other effects on the skin are unlikely to occur even if DU is held against the skin for long periods (weeks).
* No consistent or confirmed adverse chemical effects of uranium have been reported for the skeleton or liver.
* No reproductive or developmental effects have been reported in humans.
* Although uranium released from embedded fragments may accumulate in the central nervous system (CNS) tissue, and some animal and human studies are suggestive of effects on CNS function, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions from the few studies reported.
Maximum radiation exposure limits and their limited application to uranium and depleted uranium
The International Basic Safety Standards, agreed by all applicable UN agencies in 1996, provide for radiation dose limits above normal background exposure levels.
* The general public should not receive a dose of more than 1 millisievert (mSv) in a year. In special circumstances, an effective dose of up to 5 mSv in a single year is permitted provided that the average dose over five consecutive years does not exceed 1 mSv per year. An equivalent dose to the skin should not exceed 50 mSv in a year.
* Occupational exposure should not exceed an effective dose of 20 mSv per year averaged over five consecutive years or an effective dose of 50 mSv in any single year. An equivalent dose to the extremities (hands and feet) or the skin should not surpass 500 mSv in a year.
* In case of uranium or DU intake, the radiation dose limits are applied to inhaled insoluble uranium-compounds only. For all other exposure pathways and the soluble uranium-compounds, chemical toxicity is the factor that limits exposure.
Guidance on exposure based on chemical toxicity of uranium
WHO has guidelines for determining the values of health-based exposure limits or tolerable intakes for chemical substances. The tolerable intakes given below are applicable to long-term exposure of the general public (as opposed to workers). For single and short-term exposures, higher exposure levels may be tolerated without adverse effects.
* The general public's intake via inhalation or ingestion of soluble DU compounds should be based on a tolerable intake value of 0.5 µg per kg of body weight per day. This leads to an air concentration of 1 µg/m3 for inhalation, and about 11 mg/y for ingestion by the average adult.
* Insoluble uranium compounds with very low absorption rate are markedly less toxic to the kidney, and a tolerable intake via ingestion of 5 µg per kg of body weight per day is applicable.
* When the solubility characteristics of the uranium compounds are not known, which is often the case in exposure to DU, it would be prudent to apply 0.5 µg per kg of body weight per day for ingestion.
Monitoring and treatment of exposed individuals
* For the general population, neither civilian nor military use of DU is likely to produce exposures to DU significantly above normal background levels of uranium. Therefore, individual exposure assessments for DU will normally not be required. Exposure assessments based on environmental measurements may, however, be needed for public information and reassurance.
* When an individual is suspected of being exposed to DU at a level significantly above the normal background level, an assessment of DU exposure may be required. This is best achieved by analysis of daily urine excretion. Urine analysis can provide useful information for the prognosis of kidney pathology from uranium or DU. The proportion of DU in the urine is determined from the 235U/238U ratio, obtained using sensitive mass spectrometric techniques.
* Faecal measurement can also give useful information on DU intake. However, faecal excretion of natural uranium from the diet is considerable (on average 500 ?g per day, but very variable) and this needs to be taken into account.
* External radiation measurements over the chest, using radiation monitors for determining the amount of DU in the lungs, require special facilities. This technique can measure about 10 milligrams of DU in the lungs, and (except for souble compounds) can be useful soon after exposure.
* There are no specific means to decrease the absorption of uranium from the gastrointestinal tract or lungs. Following severe internal contamination, treatment in special hospitals consists of the slow intravenous transfusion of isotonic 1.4 % sodium bicarbonate to increase excretion of uranium. DU levels in the human, however, are not expected to reach a value that would justify intravenous treatment any more than dialysis.
Recommendations
* Following conflict, levels of DU contamination in food and drinking water might be detected in affected areas even after a few years. This should be monitored where it is considered there is a reasonable possibility of significant quantities of DU entering the ground water or food chain.
* Where justified and possible, clean-up operations in impact zones should be undertaken if there are substantial numbers of radioactive projectiles remaining and where qualified experts deem contamination levels to be unacceptable. If high concentrations of DU dust or metal fragments are present, then areas may need to be cordoned off until removal can be accomplished. Such impact sites are likely to contain a variety of hazardous materials, in particular unexploded ordnance. Due consideration needs to be given to all hazards, and the potential hazard from DU kept in perspective.
* Small children could receive greater exposure to DU when playing in or near DU impact sites. Their typical hand-to-mouth activity could lead to high DU ingestion from contaminated soil. Necessary preventative measures should be taken.
* Disposal of DU should follow appropriate national or international recommendations.
For more information contact:
WHO Media centre
Telephone: +41 22 791 2222
Email: mediainquiries@who.int
-------- israel
Israel Guns for Iran
by Jude Wanniski
April 23, 2005
http://www.antiwar.com/wanniski/?articleid=5708
When Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon visited President George Bush at the White House on 11-12 April, the news coming out of the meetings should have been dominated by the president's displeasure with Sharon permitting the expansion of settlements in the West Bank.
Instead, the New York Times headline on 13 April was Sharon Asks US to Pressure Iran on Nuclear Arms.
In other words, the best defense is a good offense. Sharon, of course, knew his decision to permit expansion of a West Bank settlement near Jerusalem by 3500 units would be seen in Washington as a contravention of the road map in the peace process.
Washington diplomats were stunned, seeing it as a move practically calculated to undermine the authority of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, who is trying as hard as he can to believe that Sharon is acting in good faith.
That issue will remain alive as Washington waits to see if Sharon goes ahead with the expansion despite expressions of disapproval from Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.
Aerial photographs
Meanwhile, the artful Sharon succeeded in changing the subject by spreading out aerial photographs purported to show secret Iranian installations, where he alleges nuclear weapons are being developed.
In briefing the press, the White House made it clear there was "nothing startling or new" in the aerial photos.
It could have been pointed out, though, that Tehran not only has agreed with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it will permit inspections of sites suspected of housing weapons programs, but also that the sites shown in Sharon's photos have already been visited by IAEA inspectors, with nothing found.
Israel waves aside the repeated findings of Iranian compliance with the terms of the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty by Mohamed ElBaradei, the IAEA's director.
Sharon's assertion is that, as long as Iran is permitted to enrich uranium for the nuclear power plants it is building and plans to build in the future, it can acquire the capability of producing highly enriched uranium (HEU).
Iraq bombing
This was the same rationale Israel used in 1981 when it bombed the almost-complete Osiraq nuclear power plant outside Baghdad.
Israeli officials acknowledged at the time that IAEA inspectors would have control of the fissile material at Osiraq and that there was no evidence Iraq had a weapons program in violation of the NPT. But it insisted, as Sharon does now regarding Iran, that it could not be permitted to develop the technical ability to do so.
What now worries observers is not that Israel will conduct preemptive bombing attacks against the sites in the aerial photographs and the Bushehr power plant that has been under construction for decades and is now being completed by Russian contractors.
The Israeli Air Force does not have the capability of delivering bombs big enough to destroy the installations because they are limited in how far they can fly.
The pressure on the United States by Sharon is not to persuade President Bush to bomb Iran for Israel's security, as he knows this would never happen.
Neocon conspiracy
The plan of the neoconservatives in the Bush administration, who work closely with Sharon, instead, aim at changing the terms of the NPT when the countries that are party to the treaty will gather in New York City in May for the 1970 treaty's Seventh Review Conference.
The members, practically every nation on earth, meet every five years to assess how things are going.
Actually, things have been going very well, as evidenced by the fact that the IAEA has been proven correct in its assessment that Saddam Hussein had no nuclear program and would be incapable of building one. Its assessment was made before the president decided we had to go to war anyway, just to make sure.
The neocons, who essentially control Vice President Dick Cheney and his office, have already made great strides in persuading the president that the NPT is outmoded and must be modernized. His statements in support of the NPT say that he likes it so much he wishes it to be strengthened.
How? By removing from its provisions the "inalienable" right of signatory nations to enrich uranium to the 4% potency required for power plants, but not the 90% required for nuclear weapons. To accomplish this, the president has named John Bolton to be UN ambassador.
In his position at the State Department in the first Bush term, Bolton has been open in his disdain for the IAEA's ElBaradei and has done everything he can to have him removed.
Deliberate confusion
The reason the treaty is outmoded, Bolton and his underlings insist, is because it has become too easy for NPT members to violate the terms of the treaty and get away with it.
An American expert in nuclear weapons, Gordon Prather, says Bolton has deliberately confused "failure to fully comply with an IAEA Safeguards Agreement" with "violations" of the NPT.
So far as the IAEA has been able to determine, no country subject to the NPT-IAEA-safeguards regime (except Iraq of course) has "violated" the NPT.
"It is outrageous that Bolton deliberately obfuscates the difference between 'failure to fully comply with an IAEA Agreement' with 'violations of the NPT' or of the even more deliberate obfuscation 'failure to comply with its NPT obligations.'"
What Prather is saying is that many countries, including the US, have not fully complied with the safeguards regime, which actually preceded the NPT and which simply means that they were found to have done something that they were obliged to report to the IAEA and failed to do so, for example moving material from Building A to Building B.
Most recently, both Egypt and South Korea were found to have "not fully complied" with safeguard, but there is no evidence that they or Iran or North Korea ever violated the terms of the NPT.
Iraq did, but what Bolton hates to point out is that the NPT was strengthened when that clandestine effort was discovered after the Gulf War.
The new protocols, to which Iran has agreed, permit intrusive, perpetual inspections, not by IAEA snoops coming in now and then, but with on-site cameras and sensing devices that would permit ElBaradei's team in Vienna to monitor Iran's program day and night.
Sharon's ploy
The great danger in this neocon game plan is that when the members refuse to alter the NPT at its meeting in New York in May – as they surely will – the argument will be made that the US can no longer support the NPT and will abandon it as a mechanism for preventing non-proliferation.
It is conceivable to experts like Prather, who was the US army's chief scientist during the Ronald Reagan administration, that further argument will be made that action against Tehran must be taken to force it to abandon any effort to enrich uranium.
What happens then would, of course, increase tensions, not only between Washington and Tehran, but also between Washington and the rest of the world, most especially China and Russia.
At the very least, it would be a perfect time for Sharon to announce that Israel will permit the expansion of the settlement in question, probably "in order to strengthen" the road map to peace.
Originally run on al-Jazeera, reprinted with the author's permission.
----
Putin reassures Israel over Iran
Mr Putin says Iran should be allowed to use modern technology
Saturday, 23 April, 2005, 00:31 GMT 01:31 UK (BBC)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4475445.stm
Russian President Vladimir Putin has said that the nuclear collaboration between his country and Iran is merely for "peaceful uses" of atomic energy.
Mr Putin was talking to Israel's Channel 1 ahead of a historic trip to Israel - the first by a Russian leader.
He also said Russian missiles sold to Syria would not fall into the hands of anti-Israeli militants.
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is expected to express his concerns over the weapons during Mr Putin's visit.
"Our position on nuclear non-proliferation is consistent and strict - we are categorically against proliferation of nuclear weapons and categorically against any kind of military nuclear programmes in Iran," the president said.
He went on to say that the programme was being monitored by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), and that agreements had been amended "to make sure that our partners are not using this cooperation for military purposes".
But he also stressed the need to respect Iran's right to develop peaceful modern technology and to safeguard "their scientific and economic interests".
"Iran must not feel itself discriminated insofar as modern scientific achievements and technologies are concerned," he said.
Monitoring the weapons
Israel and the US oppose a Russian-Iranian project to build a nuclear power plant at Bushehr, in southern Iran, for fear the facility might be used to build nuclear weapons.
Mr Putin also dismissed concerns that short-range, anti-aircraft missiles sold by Moscow to Syria might be used by Palestinian groups or the Lebanese guerrilla group Hezbollah against Israel.
"(The weapons) cannot be transferred to terror organisations without someone finding out," he told Israeli television.
"We have the capabilities to monitor them."
Mr Putin then admitted that the missiles would make it difficult fly over Syria's presidential residence at low altitude.
"These systems can hit a target within the visibility range. They are mounted on vehicles and cannot be secretly passed on to terrorist organisations.
"But I am not sure that these flights are correct if all of us, including Israel acting in the interests of its own people, want to create a favourable atmosphere for the further peace process," Mr Putin was quoted as saying by Russia's Itar-Tass news agency.
-------- japan
Beijing welcomes Tokyo's apology for war atrocities
April 23, 2005
By Kenji Hall
ASSOCIATED PRESS
http://www.washtimes.com/world/20050422-094943-1736r.htm
TOKYO -- Japan sent mixed signals to China yesterday, offering a ?heartfelt apology? for its World War II aggressions to try to repair tattered ties -- but blunting that message when Japanese lawmakers visited a war shrine critics say glorifies Tokyo's militaristic past.
A Chinese official welcomed the apology but added that 'what's of much more importance is the action. You have to make it a reality.'
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's expression of 'deep remorse' at a summit of Asian and African leaders in Indonesia's capital broke no new rhetorical ground.
But the rare appeal before world leaders was a clear attempt to reverse the worst erosion of ties between Tokyo and Beijing since diplomatic relations were established in 1972.
'In the past, Japan through its colonial rule and aggression caused tremendous damage and suffering for the people of many countries, particularly those of Asian nations,' Mr. Koizumi said at the opening ceremony for the summit in Jakarta, conveying Tokyo's 'deep remorse and heartfelt apology' for its conquests.
'Japan squarely faces these facts of history in a spirit of humility,' he said.
Mr. Koizumi's choice of showing contrition at an international forum overseas put him squarely before many former victims of Japan's atrocities, which include mass sex slavery and germ warfare.
It also marked the first statement of remorse from a Japanese leader since 1995 and the first outside of Japan since Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu apologized for wartime brutalities in Singapore in 1991.
However, Mr. Koizumi's remarks were a far cry from what many Asian nations have long clamored for: a strongly worded official statement of apology endorsed by parliament.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan said, '60 years of history has caused great harm to China and Asia.'
'That ... Koizumi expressed this attitude in this arena is welcome. We welcome it,' Mr. Kong told reporters at the summit. 'But to express it is one aspect. What's of much more importance is the action. You have to make it a reality.'
He said Japan had to do more to 'face up to history.'
Relations between Japan and China have sunk to their lowest point in decades, aggravated by anti-Japan protests in China in recent weeks as well as disputes over the U.N. Security Council, natural gas resources in disputed seas and new Japanese textbooks that critics say minimize Japan's wartime offenses.
Beijing also has objected to Mr. Koizumi's annual visits to Yasukuni shrine, which honors Japan's 2.5 million war dead -- including convicted war criminals who ordered Tokyo's brutal invasion of Asia in the first half of the 20th century.
The shrine's symbolism came into sharp focus yesterday: Just hours before Mr. Koizumi's speech, dozens of members of parliament made a pilgrimage to Yasukuni.
Mr. Koizumi said he hopes to hold a one-on-one meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao in Jakarta today, Kyodo News agency reported. China said it was considering the proposal.
-------- korea
US believes North Korea plans nuclear bomb test: report
Fri Apr 23, 2005 (AFP)
http://www.spacewar.com/2005/050423003126.p43xt1o4.html
The United States believes North Korea is planning to test a nuclear weapon and has asked China to intervene to block the test, the Wall Street Journal reported Friday on its website from South Korea.
In an emergency communication sent yesterday, Washington warned Beijing that Pyongyang was possibly planning a test nuclear explosion, an unidentified US official told the Journal.
The report comes after Pyongyang declared in February that it had nuclear weapons for self-defense.
The Journal reported that the US told China it "believes the North Korean nuclear program is advanced enough that a test could come with little or no warning."
"It's clear the North Koreans want the world to think that they are moving quickly and rapidly toward a nuclear test," the official told the Journal.
The official said that US spy satellites have detected increased activities at North Korean sites where underground nuclear tests could be carried out.
The US State Department said it was "following closely all information about activities in North Korea" but declined specific comment on the reported planned nuclear test.
"Consistent with longstanding policy however we do not comment on reports about intelligence matters," department spokeswoman Darla Jordan told AFP.
The department does not have any "new assessment" to offer regarding North Korea's nuclear weapons program, she said.
"We remain in regular close contact with our partners in the six-party talks on how to resolve our shared concerns about North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons," Jordan said.
The Journal quoted the official as saying that the true intent of the increased activities at North Korean sites where underground nuclear tests could be carried out was difficult to ascertain.
Another official told the newspaper that similar warnings were being sent to South Korea and Japan.
According to reports earlier this week, North Korea recently shut down its only functioning nuclear reactor and told a visiting US specialist that it planned to unload spent nuclear fuel from the plant and reprocess it into weapons-grade plutonium.
Two years ago, North Korea said it reprocessed enough spent fuel from the reactor to produce plutonium for six to eight atom bombs.
US intelligence believes the country could already possess one or two crude nuclear bombs based on fuel reprocessed in previous decades.
Six-party talks between the Pyongyang regime and the US, South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan aimed at ending North Korea's nuclear arms ambitions stalled last year after three inconclusive rounds.
The United States has been concerned about recent "provocative North Korean statements and have shared these concerns with our partners in the six-party process," State Department spokeswoman Jordan said.
"We continue to believe such statements do nothing to bring this issue to a resolution. On the contrary, they serve only to further isolate the north," she said.
North Korea has repeatedly said that it planned to build more atomic bombs after declaring itself a nuclear-armed state in February.
The United States has been trying to use China's influence to rein in North Korea but have been unable to get the hardline regime to the negotiating table.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said this week that US forces present a "significant deterrent" against any nuclear threat from Pyongyang, and she may yet seek UN Security Council sanctions against it.
"Now we reserve the right and the possibility of going to the Security Council, should it be necessary, of putting other measures in place, should it be necessary," she said.
----
North Korea seen readying its first nuclear arms test
April 23, 2005
By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
http://www.washtimes.com/national/20050422-111144-5643r.htm
U.S. intelligence agencies have detected activity at facilities in North Korea indicating Pyongyang may be preparing to conduct its first nuclear test in the near future, according to U.S. officials.
The Bush administration has made a private diplomatic appeal to the Chinese government to use its influence with the North Koreans to head off any test.
A North Korean nuclear test would bring the communist state into the exclusive club of nations that are declared nuclear powers.
Any test also would increase tensions in the region and possibly spur Japan or other nations to seek their own nuclear weapons.
The suspected test-related activity was detected by U.S. spy satellites in the past several days, said officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity. It was reported by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, which is in charge of analyzing satellite photographs.
North Korea is believed to have underground facilities for its nuclear activities at several locations across the country.
One U.S. official familiar with the issue said the intelligence on test preparations is "ambiguous."
Other officials said the intelligence included indications related to testing activity that for other nuclear powers normally includes a site where a device is placed in a deep hole and the monitoring equipment is deployed nearby.
Little is known about North Korea's covert nuclear efforts, which triggered a crisis in October 2002 that led to the current stalled talks on the issue.
North Korea's known nuclear facilities include the Yongbyon complex, where a reactor recently was shut down in what officials think could be preparation for additional reprocessing of spent fuel into bomb-making material.
A second official said North Korea could be at the point of testing a nuclear device.
North Korea is believed to have enough nuclear fuel for one or two weapons and could have enough seed material for up to eight bombs, according to U.S. officials.
The second official said North Korea in recent weeks has declared openly that it has nuclear weapons and that "a test would be the next step."
White House National Security Council spokesman Frederick Jones declined to comment on the North Korean activity or the appeal to China. Mr. Jones said he could not discuss "our diplomatic conversations or intelligence matters."
In September, U.S. intelligence agencies detected a mushroom cloud in a remote region near North Korea's border with China that at first was thought to have been the result of a possible nuclear test.
It later was found to have been an unusual cloud formation, and no radiation was ever detected near the cloud from the U.S. sensors that monitor North Korea.
Those sensors include special "sniffer" equipment that can detect nuclear material in the atmosphere.
A CIA report made public in November said that North Korea threatened to "demonstrate" its nuclear weapons or to "transfer" weapons abroad.
The threat was made at the April 2003 talks and again in August 2003, the CIA report said.
Administration officials said the threat was first made by North Korean negotiator Li Gun during a meeting with James Kelly, assistant secretary of state for East Asia, during a closed-door meeting in Beijing.
Mr. Li told Mr. Kelly that the communist state would "export nuclear weapons, add to its current arsenal or test a nuclear device," according to an official familiar with the exchange.
• Sharon Behn contributed to this report.
----
Signs Stir Concern North Korea Might Test Nuclear Bomb
Diplomat in Asia to Confer With Officials
By Glenn Kessler
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, April 23, 2005; Page A13
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A10477-2005Apr22?language=printer
U.S. officials are increasingly concerned that North Korea may be preparing its first test of a nuclear weapon, though they warn that the information is sketchy and not definitive.
A top U.S. diplomat, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill, flew to the region yesterday to consult over the weekend with officials in Beijing, Tokyo and Seoul about the signs that a test may be in the works. Officials especially want China, North Korea's main patron, to use its leverage with Pyongyang to stop it from conducting a test.
Since withdrawing from nuclear disarmament talks two months ago, Pyongyang has declared that it has nuclear weapons and has made increasingly provocative announcements. Recently, it said it would strengthen its nuclear arsenal, citing the need to counter what it called hostile U.S. policy.
One U.S. official said the concern about Pyongyang's intentions was heightened by signs of increased activity at missile sites and other places that could be used for underground tests. U.S. spy satellites observed the activity, but it is extremely difficult to interpret, as the mistakes regarding alleged weapons of mass destruction in Iraq demonstrated.
"We see these things," he said, speaking on the condition of anonymity because he was discussing intelligence matters. "But much of what we see is open to interpretation."
The Wall Street Journal first reported yesterday in its online edition that North Korea may be preparing a test, sending stocks tumbling and oil prices soaring.
North Korea also shut down its nuclear facility at Yongbyon about 10 days ago, indicating that it may be preparing to remove nuclear-fuel rods so the weapons-grade plutonium inside the rods can be extracted. U.S. intelligence analysts believe that North Korea reprocessed enough plutonium two years ago for as many as half a dozen weapons.
But there is a strong debate within the administration about whether North Korea would actually detonate a nuclear bomb. Since the impasse over North Korea's nuclear ambitions began in 2002, China has been able to maintain that there is no definitive proof that North Korea has such weapons. A test would shatter that diplomatic ambiguity and make it more difficult for China to block sanctions at the United Nations.
"It would take them off the edge," another U.S. official said.
But other officials believe North Korea has concluded that a nuclear test would be the only way to convince the world that it has joined the nuclear club. Although many nations would condemn the test, North Korea may have concluded that the consequences would eventually fade away. The administration, for instance, recently decided to restart F-16 fighter-jet sales to Pakistan, which were suspended 15 years ago because of that country's illicit nuclear activities.
U.S. analysts had previously detected signs of a possible test, but none has occurred. North Korea is known to enjoy putting on a show for U.S. spy satellites. Two years ago, Pyongyang laid out missiles near a parade route so they could be seen by satellites, but it did not display them publicly during the parade to avoid riling diplomatic sensitivities.
----
North, South Korean leaders discuss nuclear crisis in rare meeting
JAKARTA (AFP) Apr 23, 2005
http://www.spacewar.com/2005/050423105750.v74aq4t4.html
North and South Korean leaders Saturday continued their highest-level talks for five years, but made little progress in exploring ways to revive a stalled six-party dialogue on Pyongyang's nuclear crisis.
In a second day of discussions South Korean Prime Minister Lee Hae-chan tried to persuade Kim Yong-nam, North Korea's number two leader, that his country should reopen six-nation dialogue over its atomic ambitions.
Although they bore little fruit, the talks on the margins of a summit in Jakarta were the most senior exchanges between the two countries since 2000 when then South Korean President Kim Dae-jung visited the North's leader Kim Jong-Il.
"We are trying to persuade North Korea to come back to the six-party talks, that's what we are doing at the moment," South Korea's deputy foreign minister, Lee Tae-Shik, told reporters after the 40-minute discussion.
Talks between Pyongyang and the US, South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan aimed at ending North Korea's nuclear arms ambitions stalled last year after three inconclusive rounds.
Efforts to revive the dialogue have taken on a new urgency after the North shut down its only working nuclear reactor and told a visiting US specialist that it planned to use spent nuclear fuel to make weapons-grade plutonium.
Two years ago, North Korea said it unloaded and reprocessed spent fuel from the reactor, producing enough plutonium for six to eight atom bombs.
Concerns have been further heightened by claims that the Stalinist country is planning to test a nuclear weapon.
The Wall Street Journal reported on Friday that the United States believes Pyongyang is possibly planning a test nuclear explosion that would confirm earlier claims that it had nuclear weapons for self-defence.
Kim said Saturday that North Korea may be willing to resume dialogue, but not unconditionally.
"It is necessary (for other participants) to give us some reasons to take part in the six-party talks. If conditions are ripe, we will return," he said, according to South Korea's Yonhap news agency.
In his address to the summit on Friday, Kim said Pyongyang was committed to resolving the nuclear crisis, but warned that any resolution would require Washington to remove its "military threat" from the Korean peninsula.
"Denuclearizing the Korean peninsula is the strategic goal of the DPRK (North Korean) government, and the DPRK remains unchanged in its principle position to resolve the nuclear issue peacefully," Kim said.
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, speaking to reporters at the Jakarta summit, said diplomatic approaches were being made to resolve the crisis, which he hoped would avert the need for the involvement of the UN's Security Council.
"Attempts are being made to resolve the issue diplomatically through the six-party talks and I hope that the talks will resume in the not too distant future," he said.
"I hope they will be able to succeed and dissuade North Korea not to continue on its current path."
According to foreign ministry spokesman Lee, efforts to reopen a bilateral dialogue at a ministerial level between North and South were also addressed by the two leaders, a move positively received by Kim.
Talks between the governments of the two Koreas were suspended by North Korea 10 months ago after Pyongyang blasted Seoul for airlifting more that 400 North Korean defectors to South Korea from Vietnam.
"Both the North and the South should make joint efforts to open a new phase in the inter-Korean relations as this year will mark the fifth anniversary of the historic June 15 declaration," Kim said, according to Yonhap.
At the end of the inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang in June 2000, Kim Jong-Il said he would come to Seoul for a second summit but this pledge never became a reality because of mounting tensions over the nuclear issue.
-------- treaties
Nations to Address Nuclear Treaty Issues
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
April 23, 2005
Filed at 1:37 p.m. ET
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/international/AP-Future-of-Nukes.html?pagewanted=print&position=
UNITED NATIONS (AP) -- Nuclear ''haves'' and ''have-nots,'' at odds over the lingering hold of atomic weapons on the world, risk reaching little more than noisy deadlock at an upcoming conference reviewing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
North Korea, Iran, a fear of nuclear terrorism, U.S. talk of new weapons -- all give delegates from more than 180 treaty nations a host of issues to confront at a tense, troubled time internationally. A panel of U.N. experts warns of a ''cascade'' of nuclear proliferation if NPT controls erode further.
But diplomats haven't even settled on an agenda yet, a week before the May 2-27 meeting in New York, chiefly because of differences between Washington and non-nuclear states.
The Bush administration wants to keep the focus on Iran, which it contends is cheating on the treaty and secretly planning to build nuclear arms.
''We think the main issue to be discussed at the Review Conference is the problem of noncompliance with the NPT,'' Stephen G. Rademaker, a top U.S. arms control official, said in an interview.
But many other governments want equal emphasis on speeding up what they see as the weapons states' slow pace toward nuclear disarmament, to which they are committed under the 1970 treaty.
''It is bitterly disappointing,'' Tim Caughley, New Zealand's ambassador on arms control, said of the continuing failure to open broad disarmament talks.
The conference's Brazilian president is working hard to find middle ground. ''Before the conference starts, I hope I will find agreement among the members,'' said Sergio de Queiroz Duarte.
Whether it starts with a fully agreed agenda or not, observers see potential stalemate at the review, convened every five years to assess how well treaty obligations are being met.
''It's going to be very difficult for states to come together on a forward-looking program on all these issues,'' said Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the private Arms Control Association in Washington.
The NPT, flawed but vital centerpiece of arms control, is essentially a global bargain: States without nuclear weapons pledge not to pursue them, and five with the weapons -- the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China -- pledge to move toward eliminating them.
Although India, Pakistan and Israel, treaty nonmembers, have also developed atomic weapons, the NPT is credited with having prevented a wider nuclear free-for-all in the world. But the treaty has its loopholes.
North Korea utilized one when it declared in 2003 it was withdrawing from the NPT and was building a nuclear arsenal -- all with no repercussions under international law. Some at the upcoming conference are expected to propose tightening NPT rules to make it harder to withdraw, and to threaten sanctions against those who do and who make weapons.
Many see a third ''pillar'' of the NPT bargain as another flaw: the guarantee that non-weapons states have access to technology for peaceful nuclear energy, the same fuel technology -- uranium-enrichment gear, for example -- that can build atom bombs.
Washington claims, and Tehran denies, that Iran used this NPT cover to assemble equipment for planned nuclear arms. President Bush now proposes banning future sales of nuclear-fuel technology to any nation other than the dozen or so that have it. Mohamed ElBaradei, chief of the U.N. nuclear agency, proposes a less discriminatory approach: putting fuel production under multilateral control, by regional or international bodies.
It's a sensitive issue involving treaty guarantees, national pride and commercial interests.
''Inevitably, there will be discussion of this at the Review Conference,'' said Rademaker, an assistant U.S. secretary of state. ''Whether we can get agreement at a conference like this remains to be seen.''
''The NPT parties do have to start having this debate,'' said Rebecca Johnson, British editor of the periodical Disarmament Diplomacy. But she and other arms-control advocates also side with governments that say the Americans, Russians and other nuclear powers must answer at the conference for still holding an estimated 27,000 nuclear warheads, down barely 25 percent since the NPT took effect 35 years ago.
In the conference lead-up, the Bush administration sought to play down the ''13 Steps'' toward disarmament agreed to at the 2000 review, steps that include activating the treaty to ban nuclear tests and downgrading nuclear weapons in military doctrine.
Since then, the Bush administration has rejected the test-ban treaty, withdrawn from the anti-ballistic missile treaty, pushed research on new nuclear weapons and talked of potential use of nuclear arms against non-nuclear countries -- all steps viewed by critics as contrary to the NPT's commitment to disarmament.
John R. Bolton, controversial U.S. undersecretary of state, dismissed such criticism at last year's preparatory meeting for the 2005 conference, calling them ''issues that do not exist.''
Conference president Duarte disagrees, saying the nuclear powers have done ''poorly'' in meeting their NPT obligations. A ''bare minimum'' next month, he said, ''would be a rededication of the parties to the objectives of the treaty.''
-------- u.s. nuc facilities
-------- nevada
Yucca: Death by e-mails
Editorial: LAS VEGAS SUN
WEEKEND EDITION
April 23 - 24, 2005
http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/text/2005/apr/22/518649633.html
Last month the Energy Department, in charge of the project to bury the nation's high-level nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain, disclosed the existence of damning internal e-mails written between 1998 and 2000. They contain admissions from several scientists associated with the project that some of the work to verify the mountain's safety was falsified. The disclosure launched multiple investigations that remain ongoing.
On Friday the Las Vegas Sun disclosed the contents of other incriminating e-mails, which were culled from millions of Energy Department documents contained on a public database. They were discovered by a law firm hired by the state of Nevada to fight the opening of Yucca Mountain. The e-mails prove that scientists working on the project determined by 1997 that the mountain could never meet a critical specification set forth by Congress.
In 1982 Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, which placed the Energy Department in charge of disposing of the waste from nuclear power plants, and also established the criteria that a disposal site must meet. Congress was clear -- the site's own geology must be capable of preventing any escape of radiation into the environment.
The latest e-mails uncovered, though, prove that scientists recognized that Yucca's geology could never meet that standard. One scientist wrote in a 1997 e-mail: "The answer is clearer than ever. Engineering has to do the job." Another e-mail that year from one scientist to another said, "I know you are trying to dodge the geologic disposal problem ... but the simple fact is that the only purpose of the natural system now is to provide a benign environment for the engineering." These, and other e-mails, show that it was clearly understood that Yucca's own geology cannot protect against radiation leaks. Man-made protections were going to have to be engineered.
About the time these e-mails were written, the Energy Department departed from the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and declared that its nuclear dump at Yucca -- just 90 miles from Las Vegas -- would be a combination of natural and man-made barriers. The whole reason Yucca Mountain was selected in 1987 as the sole site to be studied for a disposal site was because it was thought to be geologically safe. Now we're learning conclusively that it isn't.
The disclosure of these e-mails over the past two months is another compelling reason for permanently dropping the notion that high-level nuclear waste can ever be safely buried at Yucca Mountain.
-------- MILITARY
-------- prisoners of war
Top Army Officers Are Cleared in Abuse Cases
One General Will Likely Get Reprimand Over Abu Ghraib
By Josh White
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, April 23, 2005; Page A01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A10546-2005Apr22?language=printer
An Army inspector general's report has cleared senior Army officers of wrongdoing in the abuse of military prisoners in Iraq and elsewhere, government officials familiar with the findings said yesterday.
The only Army general officer recommended for punishment for the failures that led to abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison and other facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan is Brig. Gen. Janis L. Karpinski, who was in charge of U.S. prison facilities in Iraq as commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade in late 2003 and early 2004. Several sources said Karpinski is expected to receive an administrative reprimand for dereliction of duty.
Karpinski, who has said she would fight such a charge, did not return calls yesterday. Her attorney, Neal A. Puckett, has not seen the report but said other general officers share responsibility for shortfalls. "I don't think it's fair, and it continues to make her the scapegoat for this entire situation, which has been her feeling all along," Puckett said.
The investigation essentially found no culpability on the part of Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez and three of his senior deputies, ruling that allegations they failed to prevent or stop abuses were "unsubstantiated." A military source said a 10-member team began the investigation in October and based its conclusions on the 10 major defense inquiries into abuse and interviews with 37 senior officials, including L. Paul Bremer, who led the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. The report has not been released.
Of those 10 major inquiries, the inspector general's was designed to be the Army's final word on the responsibility of senior leadership in relation to the abuses. It was the only investigation designed to assign blame, if any, within the Army's senior leadership. Questions about Sanchez's and other senior leaders' role in approving harsh interrogation tactics -- including the use of military working dogs to intimidate detainees -- have swirled since photographs of abuse at Abu Ghraib surfaced almost exactly a year ago.
Army officials said yesterday that they have identified 125 soldiers and officers who were either tried at courts-martial or issued administrative punishments for detainee abuses in Iraq and Afghanistan. So far, seven low-ranking soldiers have faced the most serious charges in the sexual humiliation and physical abuse cases arising out of Abu Ghraib; five have pleaded guilty or have been found guilty, and two have courts-martial scheduled for next month. Spec. Charles A. Graner Jr., who was characterized as the ringleader of the abuses there, was sentenced to 10 years in prison.
The administrative reprimand Karpinski is expected to receive is the kind of punishment that can end a military career, and officials said it is possible she could be relieved of her command as a result.
Sources close to the investigation said two high-ranking military intelligence officers who worked at Abu Ghraib -- Col. Thomas M. Pappas and Lt. Col. Steven L. Jordan -- could face criminal charges or disciplinary measures for their roles at the prison. Both supervised interrogations, and Sanchez ultimately gave them responsibility for the entire Abu Ghraib operation.
"The dereliction happened at the brigade level and below," said one defense official familiar with the report.
In a statement released by the Army yesterday, Brig. Gen. Vincent K. Brooks, the top Army spokesman, did not comment on the inspector general's findings but said the Army has thoroughly investigated the abuses. In the 10 major investigations, more than 1,700 people have been interviewed and more than 15,000 pages of documents assembled, according to the Army.
"We will not rush to judgment in these cases or in any others," Brooks said. "The recommendations and decisions are consistent with, and appropriate to, the findings of these very thorough investigations."
Top-level investigations into the abuses have largely stopped short of calling them systemic, but some found major problems with the way detention operations in Iraq were conducted after President Bush declared major combat in Iraq over in April 2003. A lack of planning and resources, the reports generally agreed, led to the U.S. detention system getting overwhelmed and fostered frustration with a lack of actionable intelligence with which to fight the insurgency. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have since proposed an overhaul of the military's wartime detention operations.
Previous inquiries have addressed the roles of distinct military disciplines at the prisons. Some of the probes identified senior leadership as being indirectly responsible for the climate that led to abuses but made no findings on culpability. Responsibility for such findings was given to the Army inspector general.
A comprehensive report about Abu Ghraib by Maj. Gen. George R. Fay concluded that there were failures at the highest levels, mainly in oversight lapses. He found that Sanchez and his deputy "failed to ensure proper staff oversight of detention and interrogation operations" and "reacted inadequately" to warnings that abuse was occurring.
Sanchez's top intelligence adviser, Maj. Gen. Barbara Fast, learned of abuses in late 2003 after commissioning an independent investigation, but the Abu Ghraib abuses did not get command attention until January 2004, when a soldier turned over digital photographs of some of the abuses.
Fast, who recently assumed command of the Army's intelligence center at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., also was cleared of wrongdoing.
An overarching, independent analysis of the abuses by James R. Schlesinger said senior leadership should bear responsibility. "Commanders are responsible for all their units do or fail to do, and should be held accountable for their action or inaction," the report said.
Although the Army has not officially announced the results of the investigation, senior members of the Senate Armed Services Committee staff were briefed on the results this week, Hill staff members said. Sen. John W. Warner (R-Va.), chairman of the committee, attended a portion of the briefing. Staff members with Sen. Carl M. Levin's (D-Mich.) office were briefed, but a spokesperson for Levin declined to comment on the issue.
Warner has been adamant about getting to the bottom of senior leadership responsibility, and he issued a statement yesterday in which he said it is "absolutely essential to determine what went wrong, up and down the chain of command, both civilian and military."
Warner did not specifically address the findings, but he vowed to have another Armed Services Committee hearing about detainee abuses after the reviews are complete, saying that he wants "to examine the adequacy of those reviews, and to offer the opportunity to senior Department and military leadership to address the issue of accountability."
-------- POLICE / PRISONERS / COURTS / JUSTICE
-------- courts
U.S. Yields In Anthrax Lawsuit Standoff
Some Questioning Allowed on Leaks
By Henri E. Cauvin
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, April 23, 2005; Page A11
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A10510-2005Apr22?language=printer
A federal judge ordered the Justice Department yesterday to begin providing testimony to attorneys for Steven J. Hatfill, the former Army scientist who is suing the government for identifying him as "a person of interest" in the anthrax investigation.
For months, the Justice Department had opposed Hatfill's attempts to begin deposing government witnesses, citing the sensitive nature of the investigation. Hatfill's attorneys said that stalled their efforts to identify the source of leaks in the massive probe.
Until yesterday, U.S. District Judge Reggie B. Walton deferred to the government's concerns. But Walton also said that Hatfill must eventually have an opportunity to explore the subject, and the Justice Department told the judge that it is now willing to permit some questioning.
Hatfill filed suit in 2003, alleging that then-Attorney General John D. Ashcroft and other federal officials defamed him and violated his privacy. No one has been arrested for the anthrax-laced mailings that killed five people and sickened 17 in the fall of 2001, and Hatfill has said that he had nothing to do with the crime.
Earlier this week, in a significant shift, the government notified Walton that it was willing to permit the questioning of some witnesses on Hatfill's claim that the leaks violated the Privacy Act. Yesterday, Walton ordered government lawyers to immediately start laying the groundwork to set up the depositions.
Hatfill, a physician and bioterrorism expert, worked from 1997 to 1999 in the Army's infectious diseases laboratory at Fort Detrick. He did not attend yesterday's hearing at the federal courthouse in Washington.
The government, in its written submission to the court and in its statement yesterday, sought to preclude Ashcroft and other individual defendants from being deposed because the judge is still considering their claims of immunity.
But Hatfill's attorney, Thomas G. Connolly, objected, saying the exclusion of such key witnesses would further delay the case. Walton agreed and ordered the process to go forward, with some limitations.
It was unclear from the court filings and statements what led to the government's turnabout. Last year, Walton expressed doubts that authorities were on the verge of solving the case. The government said in a filing this week that the investigation into the anthrax attacks is "active and ongoing." But law enforcement sources, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said there have been no significant new developments.
Hatfill's ability to question government officials could have broader implications. Thwarted until now in his effort to obtain the testimony of federal law enforcement officials, Hatfill had subpoenaed reporters from several news organizations, including The Washington Post, seeking information about their sources for stories concerning Hatfill and the investigation.
But yesterday, Connolly told Walton that the change in the government's position could resolve, for the time being at least, Hatfill's standoff with the news media, which have sought to quash the subpoenas. He said he was in talks with attorneys for the news organizations and hoped to notify the court soon of a resolution.
Staff writer Allan Lengel contributed to this report.
-------- death penalty
Moussaoui Pleads Guilty in Terror Plot
Defendant Says Bin Laden Ordered Post-Sept. 11 Attack on White House
By Jerry Markon
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, April 23, 2005; Page A01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A9271-2005Apr22?language=printer
Zacarias Moussaoui pleaded guilty yesterday to taking part in a broad al Qaeda conspiracy that resulted in the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, saying Osama bin Laden personally instructed him to fly an airplane into the White House.
In a hushed federal courtroom in Alexandria, the French citizen launched into the kind of heated monologue that has often marked his court appearances. He vehemently denied that he was planning to be one of the Sept. 11 hijackers and said his attack on the White House was to come later.
The balding, bearded Moussaoui, 36, dressed in a green Alexandria jail jumpsuit, blasted his attorneys, calling one of them a "Judas," and said he expects "no leniency from the American" when his case comes to the sentencing phase. As he was being led from the courtroom by a team of security officers, he shouted in a thick accent, "Lord! God curse America!"
The guilty plea, while marking the first conviction in a U.S. case stemming from the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon that killed nearly 3,000 people, did little to bring the nation closer to understanding the worst terrorist strike on American soil. A court document Moussaoui signed said only that he had participated in a general al Qaeda plot to fly airplanes into U.S. buildings and that bin Laden approved Moussaoui's planned attack on the White House.
Yet Moussaoui's plea did much to resolve a case that has alternately fascinated and perplexed Americans since he became known as the man with the menacing look who sought flying lessons before Sept. 11 and did nothing while in custody to stop the attacks. Moussaoui was charged in December 2001, but his trial was delayed repeatedly by thorny legal issues. His decision to plead guilty, sources close to the case have said, came only in recent weeks.
The Bush administration hailed the plea as vindication of its decision to try Moussaoui in the criminal courts instead of before the military -- and to stick with the case through countless delays and appeals and a circuslike atmosphere caused by the defendant's courtroom outbursts.
"Moussaoui and his co-conspirators were responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocents on September 11th, each one a son or daughter, father or mother, husband or wife," Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales said. "We have acted fairly and patiently to bring Moussaoui to justice."
Yet the complications that have prolonged the case of Moussaoui -- who is still the only person charged in the United States in connection with the Sept. 11 plot -- are far from over. U.S. District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema in Alexandria is likely to set a death penalty trial at which a jury would decide whether Moussaoui should be executed. And Moussaoui, while indicating that he had initially asked for a sentence of death, yesterday vowed to fight to save his life.
"I have significantly changed my position following the advice I receive from you," he told Brinkema. "I will not apply for death. . . . No, Moussaoui will fight every inch against the death penalty."
His declaration set the stage for at least a partial airing of the terror attacks. Prosecutors have been planning to introduce testimony from family members of Sept. 11 victims at a sentencing trial.
Though Brinkema did not indicate yesterday how she will proceed, she asked attorneys in the case to come up with a briefing schedule for motions about the death penalty generally. Under federal law, there would be a sentencing trial unless Moussaoui and the government agreed to waive it. Sources close to the case said it was unlikely the government would agree to a waiver. Without a jury trial, Brinkema would decide whether Moussaoui is executed. But Brinkema has made several rulings indicating that she thinks execution is not appropriate in this case.
Brinkema said yesterday that the issue that stopped the case in its tracks for more than two years -- whether Moussaoui could gain access to top al Qaeda detainees -- is likely to emerge again at his death penalty trial.
Moussaoui's desire to interview the detainees, who he said could clear him, pitted his constitutional rights against the government's national security needs. Eventually, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit in Richmond ruled that Moussaoui could not interview the captives.
But Brinkema said yesterday that the witness-access issue is "highly relevant to the sentencing phase" and constitutes "mitigating evidence" that could help spare Moussaoui's life. If she orders prosecutors to produce the detainees, as she did before, the government is almost certain to appeal.
"They could be back in the 4th Circuit before you even have the sentencing phase trial," said Peter White, a Washington lawyer and former federal prosecutor in Alexandria and the District.
Experts generally agreed that the case's long and tortured path had been worth the judicial effort. "It shows that the ordinary criminal justice system, though slow and unwieldy, eventually can secure convictions," said Mark A. Drumbl, a law professor at Washington and Lee University in Lexington, Va. "In the end, the system clumsily worked."
Moussaoui was arrested more than three weeks before Sept. 11, 2001, when his behavior aroused suspicion at a flight school in Minnesota. In the statement of facts he signed yesterday, Moussaoui admitted that he "lied to federal agents to allow his al Qaeda 'brothers' to go forward with the operation to fly planes into American buildings."
In 2002, the case was thrown into turmoil when Moussaoui fired his court-appointed attorneys, who were later restored to the case, and began firing off a long series of blistering, handwritten motions from jail that insulted the judge, the Justice Department and his lawyers.
But yesterday, some of that vitriol was gone.
"Mr. Moussaoui is an extremely intelligent man. He has, actually, a better understanding of the legal system than some lawyers I've seen in court," Brinkema said.
As soon as Moussaoui was led into the courtroom, Brinkema asked whether he still intended to plead guilty, and he responded, "Indeed."
Then, one by one, Moussaoui pleaded guilty to six conspiracy counts. Four of the counts carry a potential death sentence.
Some of the Sept. 11 families attended the proceeding and seemed pleased. "I'm elated. It's an ironclad plea," said Debra Burlingame of Westchester County, N.Y. Her brother, Charles Burlingame, was the pilot of American Airlines Flight 77, which crashed into the Pentagon.
Speaking of Moussaoui, she said: "It was strange hearing him talk about flying a plane into the White House in such a mundane manner."
Staff writer Steven Ginsberg contributed to this report.