NucNews - December 25, 2004 -------- NUCLEAR -------- accidents and safety Oak Ridge nuclear waste capping project to be complete in 2006 December 25, 2004 (AP) http://www.wate.com/Global/story.asp?S=2733604 OAK RIDGE -- A six-year, $100 million project to cap nuclear waste landfills in Oak Ridge is ahead of schedule and due for completion by mid-2006. That's according to federal contractors. The effort is the largest of its kind in Oak Ridge history. The work is being done on about 130 acres in the Melton Valley. That's where waste from Oak Ridge National Laboratory was buried from 1943 to 1986. Workers are constructing landfill caps with layers of clay, rock and synthetic materials covered by grass to prevent erosion. Ventilation pipes are also being installed to help prevent the buildup of methane or other gases. The idea is to divert rainwater from the old landfills. That would stem a decades old problem in which water flushed radioactive contaminants into nearby creeks and ultimately the Clinch River and downstream reservoirs. -------- europe Sharper watch on nuclear trains Saturday 25th December 2004 (14h03) Bellaciao by Diet Simon http://bellaciao.org/en/article.php3?id_article=4867 After a nuclear waste train ran over and killed the French activist Sébastien Briat nearly seven weeks ago, such trains are under sharper observation, writes the leftwing newspaper, Neues Deutschland. Many environment campaigners are asking themselves whether such an accident could also happen in Germany and what sort of inhibition threshold there might be for careless and inconsiderate driving of such trains. The paper, which was the official mouthpiece of the communist party in former East Germany, picked up on German IndyMedia reporting on a nuclear train than ran last Wednesday (15th Dec). http://germany.indymedia.org/2004/12/101896.shtml It took four Castor caskets of waste from the shut down Stade power station near Hamburg to the plutonium factory at La Hague in Normandy, northern France, a run of several thousand kilometres through the German states of Lower Saxony, North-Rhine Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate and then France. At several locations anti-nuclear activists protested against the radioactive cargo. In a number of places they were even able to stop it. The activists claim to have halted the train for two hours near Buchholz (Nordheide) on Wednesday morning. They say the train raced at 50 to 60 kmh into a “barricade” of logs and branches. It had stopped only after passing the obstacle. This although the activists had thrown “fireworks” on to the track to warn the locomotive driver, the group wrote on “Indymedia”. A second group had drawn attention to the barrier with electric torches and banners. “We are enraged and worried that yet again a Castor transport just keeps going despite alerts,” says their report. In response to several attempts to get a comment, writes Neues Deutschland, the spokesman of the Federal Border Police (BGS) in Hamburg was still saying on Thursday that this had been a “freight train”. Only on Friday the BGS stated that the “freight train” stopped near Tostedt had carried four Castors with highly radioactive waste. According to the BGS the safety of the caskets was not endangered. The thickest branch on the tracks had been only 4 cm across, said a BGS spokesman. In the Mahndorf district of the town they placed grave candles on the rails and the demonstrators themselves lined up alongside the track. After an accompanying helicopter discovered them, the locomotive driver was made to stop his train immediately. Up to this point the police and activist stories basically tally. The forced stop will have consequences for the activists from Bremen. They are under investigation for alleged dangerous interference with rail traffic. Participants in a vigil in Osnabrück reported that the train to La Hague had sped through the unsecured station. But two hours beforehand a helicopter was circling over the city and watching the railway line. There were also protests and vigils against nuclear waste transportation at the stations in Münster-Hiltrup, Hamm and Waltrop. Police and border police were using several helicopters. Castor transports with spent fuel rods from power stations for reprocessing in France and England are due to continue to mid-2005, while return transports to Gorleben and Ahaus for interim storage are to continue for several years more. It’s to be assumed, writes Neues Deutschland, that the nuclear industry and politicians wat these transports to stir as little public attention as possible. A “risky” style of driving that is less concerned that up to now by injured or even dead demonstrators runs counter to that aim, writes the paper’s Reimar Paul. On the other hand, it adds, as in the past the police will do all they can to get these transports to their destination within the allocated time windows. “That can mean a higher speed on parts of the route and the risk of serious accidents if there are protests.” Aktionsbuendnis CASTOR-Widerstand Neckarwestheim Info-tel 07141 / 903363 http://neckarwestheim.antiatom.de -------- india / pakistan Pakistan lays down the agenda for the US By Seema Sirohi, Dec 25, 2004 Asia Times http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FL25Df01.html WASHINGTON - Pakistan, the United States' premier ally in the "war on terrorism", has laid down the agenda for the Bush administration for the next four years on what it expects in exchange for continued cooperation to hunt down al-Qaeda. On the menu is a slew of demands, ranging from continued economic aid to a generous flow of weapons. But above all is the expectation of a long-term relationship, especially in light of what Washington is building with India under the title of the "Next Steps in Strategic Partnership". Jehangir Karamat, Pakistan's new ambassador in Washington, wants no less. He, in fact, chose to dub his first public speech "Next Steps" too, articulating Pakistan's hopes and desires for a partnership that will endure beyond the capture of Osama bin Laden. "We seek sustained and enhanced engagement so that gains continue to be consolidated and pushed further," he said at a well-attended speech in Washington last week. But what was noted by observers was the language he used to deliver the message. He sounded more like a teacher telling a pupil the level of performance he expected from the Americans, said diplomatic observers. He seemed to be drawing a clear parallel between payment and delivery, which led to questions whether the changes in policy that Pakistan has pursued post-September 11, 2001, have been made because they are good for Pakistan, or because they bring US arms and aid. The administration of President George W Bush is currently in the process of dispensing US$3 billion in economic and military aid, apart from having written off nearly $2 billion in Pakistani debt. An arms package approved by Congress worth $1.2 billion includes eight P-3C naval reconnaissance planes, 2,000 TOW missiles, and other weapons, which has raised serious concerns in New Delhi because they counter specific Indian capabilities. New Delhi has told Washington that large-scale delivery of arms to Pakistan will jeopardize the composite dialogue between India and Pakistan. But Karamat, a former chief of army staff, said that the US largess, both monetary and material, "must" continue. He turned India's reasons for opposing the weapons package on its head, arguing that it is the United States' "tilt" toward India that makes peace in South Asia elusive. "The conventional defense capability must continue to be built up because an unacceptable tilt in the balance of power makes meaningful India-Pakistan dialogue difficult," Karamat declared. Among other "musts" for Washington to carry out are a free-trade agreement, or alternative arrangements, and bilateral investment initiatives in Pakistan to "influence public opinion". "US support must continue to give us access to international financial institutions," Karamat added. "The US support for Pakistan's counter-terrorism effort must continue and capabilities must continue to be enhanced. We need to work with the US to change perceptions based on past happenings and create perceptions based on current policies and future projections," he said. As for his side of the bargain, Karamat said that "Pakistan will of course continue to address US concerns. The present cooperative and unambiguous relationship will help to do this as everything is on the table." Karamat's categorical tone left some US officials a little embarrassed, for they are not used to ambassadors laying down the line in Washington. "Even Tony Blair's ambassador won't use that tone in public," said one observer. Some others said that Pakistan prescribing the agenda was a case of the tail wagging the dog. Meanwhile, what surprised some was Karamat's dismissive tone about the A Q Khan affair, which he labeled a "proliferation episode" while denying any government complicity in it. "There was no government sanction, approval, or any kind of government connection with what went on," he said flatly. But Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, in his 11-page confession reported in the US press in February, named Karamat, former chief of army staff General (retired) Mirza Aslam Beg and President General Pervez Musharraf as the men on top who were aware of what was going on. As the chief of army staff from 1996-98, Karamat was directly responsible for the safety and security of the nuclear program. But Karamat declined to elaborate how something so big could happen on his watch, saying that too much had already been written about the Khan affair. Karamat's main objective in the speech appeared to be to move the debate in Washington from Pakistan's past to Pakistan's future and Washington's commitment. He said Pakistanis are worried that they will never be let off the hook, because the past is always being dredged up to color policy. Even though the Bush administration has embraced Pakistan as a key and indispensable ally in its "war on terrorism" and publicly defended Musharraf on every issue - from the Khan affair to the re-emergence of the Taliban to his refusal to relinquish his post as army chief as promised - the US media and many congressmen and senators have repeatedly raised questions about Pakistan's commitment to the United States. Editorials in respected newspapers have questioned the reliability of Pakistan as an ally, and whether the US is giving Musharraf a pass despite the many problems. It is Karamat's job to change this perception, and he took a big leap forward with his first speech. Crafted well and delivered with ease, he presented Pakistan, its role and its indispensability to Washington with flair, said many in the audience. He said Pakistan had changed "strategic directions" and is now suffering the consequences. "From a policy of active interference and destabilization of Afghanistan, Pakistan is working with the US for a stable and friendly Afghanistan. From a policy of hostility and confrontation with India, Pakistan now has a policy of dialogue and conflict resolution. From a policy of appeasement and political expediency with extremist religious elements, Pakistan has moved to confronting them to end their negative influence and activities. From a clandestine nuclear program with proliferation consequences, Pakistan has moved to a regime of command, control and international cooperation," he said, giving an overview of the "new" Pakistan in progress. "This is a major strategic reorientation of the country. And, as in all such strategic turnarounds, there is a price to be paid. This price is paid in terms of the blowback, the resistance and the retaliation to the changes." Reaction to Karamat's presentation was mixed. His host, senior South Asia analyst Stephen Cohen, was full of praise for his candor. "I had never heard a Pakistani official so systematically and bluntly go over the errors of past governments, including one in which they served. Of course his government, and the army, did things that were wrong at the time, and have come to regret, but Pakistan officials have promulgated a new benchmark that the world can hold them to. This is not trivial," said Cohen. But others, speaking on background, were more critical of Karamat's rosy picture. One US official who is familiar with South Asian issues said the ambassador's storyline was overly optimistic. Regardless, there is little doubt that the US-Pakistan partnership is fraught with potholes that will take more than a smart presentation to fill up. Seema Sirohi is a Washington-based correspondent. -------- korea The troubled Russia-North Korea alliance By Andrei Lankov, Asia Times Dec 25, 2004 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/FL25Dg01.html SEOUL - Back in the 1970s, when I was a teenager in the then Soviet Union in my native Leningrad, many barbershops stocked copies of Korea magazine, a lavishly illustrated North Korean propaganda monthly. What was such a publication doing in the barbershops? The answer, I suspect, would be quite embarrassing for its editors: it was subscribed to in order to amuse the patrons who were waiting for a haircut. The magazine was heavily subsidized by Pyongyang, so its annual subscription rate was dirt-cheap while its content was both bizarre and funny. Thus the magazine, which was published to inspire worldwide love and admiration for the Great Leader and his son and successor, the Dear Leader, was often (I would say from my experience, in most cases) subscribed to by people who saw it as a laughingstock and opened its pages only to make fun of the Great Men. The North Korean propaganda appeared very weird to the Russians - not least because it looked like a grossly exaggerated version of their own official propaganda. The grotesquely bad Russian translation of the texts also provided unintended comical effects. This remarkable magazine is warmly remembered by ex-Soviet people of middle age, many of whom still can easily quote more weird sentences from memory. Sets of this venerable monthly are kept by some Russian families, and there are even a couple of Russian websites where sarcastic webmasters have collected particularly bizarre and/or comical quotations from Korean propaganda materials (see, for example, http://kimirsen.by.ru and http://www.aha.ru/~zentsov/korea.htm). All this took place in the 1970s when the Soviet press still occasionally extolled the virtues of the "easternmost socialist country". But this was an official policy. Common people had quite different opinions on this matter - and, for a change, their views were not that much different from the actual views of the government, even if grand strategy made the usual diplomatic lies unavoidable. Of course, nobody could do research on how foreign countries were perceived by the Soviet public: in a communist society everybody was supposed to adore the official allies and hate the official enemies, switching one's emotions according to ever-changing international alliances. Nonetheless, it is possible to provide a brief and impressionistic review of how the Soviet/Russian view of North Korea has evolved from 1945 to 2004. In a nutshell, North Korea's image evolved from that of a "heroic country" to that of a "comical and weird Stalinist theme park" - and then went halfway back. Until 1945, Korea was not well known in Russia. It began to feature prominently in Soviet media only after 1945, when a number of Soviet journalists were dispatched to North Korea to write about a newly acquired junior ally. The journalists produced the usual set of sugary stories about the great gratitude the Koreans allegedly felt toward their Soviet liberators as well as about the enthusiasm with which they were engaged in the socialist construction. The Korean War, of course, boosted interest in things Korean. According to the official Soviet version, the war was started by the "US imperialists and their South Korean puppets", and North Korea was portrayed as a victim of international aggression. Horror stories about US atrocities flooded the press as well. The participation of Soviet military pilots in dogfights over Korea was not admitted at that time, but rumors about their deeds circulated widely and inspired much admiration for "our boys" (as a matter of fact, the Soviets believed - and Russians still sincerely believe - that they had the upper hand in the air war in Korean skies and "taught the Yankee a good lesson"). Few if any Soviet people had sympathy for the Americans, seen as "aggressors". However, most Soviet people did not care much about Korea, unless they were afraid that the Korean War would lead to an all-out nuclear confrontation. In spite of all the officially professed internationalism, the average Soviet man or woman was not terribly interested in the "Orient", and treated it with a measure of paternalistic arrogance. Soon after the end of the Korean War, references to North Korea nearly disappeared from the Soviet press. This silence had political explanations: from the late 1950s, Kim Il-sung was building his "juche-style" Stalinism while the original Stalinism was being dismantled in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Moscow was unhappy about such developments, but was unwilling to express its disapproval openly since critical statements would have led to further deterioration of its already strained relations with Pyongyang. The government-controlled press could write neither bad nor good things about North Korea. Thus newspapers largely remained silent and only occasionally published something positive about, say, a new Pyongyang stadium. In spite of this official blackout, rumors about North Korea circulated widely among educated Soviet people. They were aware of Kim Il-sung's deification, police omnipresence, and strained relations with Moscow. To a large extent, the North Koreans damaged their own standing by flooding the USSR with exceptionally bad propaganda, the above-mentioned Korea monthly being the most notorious. After Josef Stalin's death and Nikita Khrushchev's reforms of the late 1950s, the Soviet people began to discuss political and social questions again - not in the press, of course, but in the privacy of their kitchens and bedrooms. A new generation of Soviet intellectuals looked at North Korea with great unease. For them, Pyongyang embodied everything that was wrong about the communist system. It appeared a caricature of the USSR. Unlike the West, where many intellectuals toyed with Maoism and similar versions of the extreme left, virtually nobody in Soviet intellectual circles of the 1960s or 1970s felt positive toward either Mao Zedong nor Kim Il-sung. The memories of Stalin's terror were too fresh to make the East Asian Stalinists appear attractive. Of course, the Soviet intellectual world of the 1960s and 1970s did not consist of liberal-minded intellectuals alone, even if the latter dominated educated discourse. There were also hardliners and nationalists, hawkish admirers of a strong state. In this group, however, North Korea also did not enjoy much popularity. The hardliners were probably quite happy by Kim's Stalinist policies, but they did not like his intense nationalism or his anti-Russian tendencies. Officialdom, including a majority of diplomats and Leonid Brezhnev himself, was not fond of Pyongyang either: they disapproved its brutal and inefficient Stalinism and they also saw it as an unreliable, costly and scheming ally. From around 1970, more daring journalists even made hints at more sensitive topics - such as Kim's personality cult or lingering militarism. The hints had to be subtle, but when a Soviet television audience of the late 1970s saw how North Korean kindergarten kids enthusiastically performed a dance called "My Heavy Machine-Gun", the bizarreness of the situation was for everybody to see. No doubt such an effect was intended by the producers of that documentary. The official "wall of silence" collapsed around 1988, but this did not result in much surprise or shock. People knew already. The press basically reran the stories that had circulated as rumors since long before. Moscow's foreign policy in the first post-Soviet years was based on the assumption that Russia should join the Western world unconditionally, and thus North Korea was seen as a partner both doomed and embarrassing. Its immediate collapse was widely expected. Kim Il-sung died a peaceful death in 1994, and the widely expected violent collapse of his regime never happened, but even this non-event produced some good literature in Russia. Lev Vershinin, a historian and a good writer, authored Endgame, a novel that described a violent collapse of an imaginary communist dictatorship. The country of the novel had features that reminded readers of Romania, Cuba and North Korea at the same time. Even geographic names were deliberately mixed against all laws of linguistic history, so that the capital of this imaginary country had the Korean-sounding name of T'aedongan and the place of the Stalinists' last stand was called Munch'on. Around the same time, Igor Irteniev, arguably the most popular Russian satirical poet of the 1990s, mockingly wrote of an event everybody expected to take place soon: "I still cannot sleep without a sedative / in the darkness of the night / when I imagine what happens to Kim Il-sung / in the blood-stained hands of the executioners." But this mood began to change around 1995 when new voices came to be heard in Russia as well. These voices presented a more positive approach to North Korea. This reflected the general change of mood in Russia. A large and increasing part of its population began to see the US-led West not as a friendly force but as a crafty rival, preying on Russia's weakness. The pro-Western enthusiasm of the early 1990s waned and was replaced by deep suspicions - not only in government offices but also in the popular psyche. Thus the geopolitical opponents of the West, the assorted "pariah states", began to attract some sympathy in Russia, and unabashed national egoism came to be seen as the only rational strategy. Official policy toward North Korea also began to turn around. By 1997-98 it became clear that Pyongyang would not collapse any time soon, so the restoration of working relations with North Korea was a necessity, especially against the backdrop of Russia's efforts to develop a more independent political line. In academic articles, the critique of North Korea was toned down and augmented with a critique of the alleged Western insensibilities in dealing with this very peculiar society. It's worth noticing that the human-rights issue does not play a major role in Russian foreign policy. A period of idealistic enthusiasm in the early 1990s proved to be short, so few people in Russia take seriously statements about human rights. Neither the Russian government nor the Russian public shows any enthusiasm for crusades in the name of human rights in distant lands. It is well known that North Korea is notorious for its disregard for human rights, but Russians could not care less. Their position is simple: first, it is North Korea's internal affair; second, if North Koreans themselves live under such a regime, who are we to pass judgments on their behalf? And there are of course people who are sincere admirers of the Kims' regime, even if their numbers are small. For some Russian leftists, the regime is seen as a living example of communist resilience. They did not question the right of the government to starve half a million or a million people to stay in power. They either deny the facts (half a million dead? Washington's propaganda, of course!) or present the deaths as voluntary sacrifices made by the patriotic Korean people. But actually Korean domestic politics is not very important to the Russian Pyongyang-worshippers: it is the "anti-imperialist" stance of North Korea that really matters for the Russian left. Fortunately, the general Russian public is still skeptical of the North Korean regime and does not harbor many illusions about its true nature. But nobody in Russia wants to build policy on the basis of ideology these days. Russians have had enough of ideology over the past century, so now they prefer interests, pure and simple. And to remind themselves of the past, many people still look through old, slightly yellowed pages of Korea monthly. Dr Andrei Lankov is a lecturer in the faculty of Asian Studies, China and Korea Center, the Australian National University. He graduated from Leningrad State University with a PhD in Far Eastern history and China, with emphasis on Korea, and his thesis focused on factionalism in the Yi Dynasty. He has published books and articles on Korea and North Asia. He is currently on leave, teaching at Kookmin University, Seoul. ---- Report: N. Korea Won't Invade S. Korea By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS December 25, 2004 Filed at 5:40 a.m. ET http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/international/AP-Koreas-War-Threat.html?oref=login&pagewanted=print&position= SEOUL, South Korea (AP) -- North Korea's leader Kim Jong Il has said his communist country has no intention of invading the South, an official North Korean news report said Saturday. The North's media have often said a second Korean war would not be triggered by North Korean provocation but by an attack from the South. Nonetheless, it's highly unusual for them to attribute such a statement to Kim, said South Korea's official news agency, Yonhap, which monitors the North's media. ``Greater Leader Kim Jong Il has pointed out that in the South today, there is a fuss over the non-existing threat of invasion from the North. But in reality, the only existing threat of invasion is not from the North but from the South,'' said North Korea's state-run Pyongyang Radio. Pyongyang Radio relayed Kim's comment at the head of its commentary accusing the South of an arms buildup. Yonhap carried the excerpts of the commentary. The 1950-53 Korean War started with a North Korean invasion of the South. After three years of fighting between U.N. forces led by the United States and North Korean troops backed by China, the war ended with a truce -- not a peace treaty -- leaving the divided Korean Peninsula technically still in a state of war. For years, North Korea has said the United States and its ``cannon-fodder'' South Korean troops plot to invade the North. It adheres to such rhetoric amid an international standoff over its nuclear weapons programs. North Korea keeps a 1.1 million-member military, the world's fifth largest, which faces off with South Korea's 650,000 military across the world's most heavily armed border. About 34,000 U.S. troops are stationed in the South to help guard against the North. -------- missile defense Little Room for Error in Catching a Missile By Charles Piller Los Angeles Times Staff Writer December 25, 2004 http://www.latimes.com/news/science/la-sci-boost25dec25,0,2580078.story?coll=la-home-headlines The first line of defense in America's next antimissile system fails or succeeds in a window of 90 seconds. That's all the time there is, designers estimate, for a satellite to detect the flash of an enemy launch, determine that it is real and send off a counter-missile from the ground. It all happens too fast to include a human in the loop. "Time is of the essence," said Craig van Schilfgaarde, the Northrop Grumman Corp. engineer in charge of the project. Known as "boost-phase" interception, it is designed to be the first "layer" of defense, firing rockets at enemy missiles just after launch, when they are most vulnerable. The military has already deployed parts of the two other layers in the missile defense system — one targeting missiles as they cruise through space in midflight and the other aimed at descending warheads when they are just above their targets. The three layers are the cornerstone of President Bush's plan to defend the country against rogue nations, such as North Korea and Iran, that are gradually developing the ability to produce weapons with global reach. But the system has already faced serious problems. The midcourse missile failed a test Dec. 15 when it shut down before leaving its silo at the Ronald Reagan Test Site at Kwajalein Atoll in the central Pacific Ocean. It was the second failure in a major test in two years. On Dec. 17, the Pentagon announced it was dropping plans to activate the existing pieces of the missile defense system this year because it had not completed full "shakedown" testing. The boost phase reaches into an even more complex realm of design, in part because of the speed with which it must identify and destroy an enemy missile. The payoff could be big. Terry Little, executive director of the government's Missile Defense Agency, said the boost-phase interceptors could destroy 80% to 90% of enemy ICBMs, leaving the other layers to take care of the rest. But a recent Congressional Budget Office technical report suggested that the boost-phase system, scheduled for deployment in 2011, would press the far edge of what was physically possible in an antimissile system. Philip Coyle, who headed the Pentagon's testing office during the Clinton administration, said the design of the boost-phase system was already buckling under its own complexity. "The [congressional] analysis confirmed that boost-phase missile defense isn't practicable," Coyle said. "You can't fool mother nature." Today's missile defense programs were inspired by President Reagan's promise to end "nuclear blackmail" with his Strategic Defense Initiative, a plan to shield the nation against an all-out nuclear attack using satellite-fired interceptors. Dubbed "Star Wars" by opponents in Congress, Reagan's program fell victim to technical dead-ends, cost overruns and concerns that it would violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which banned nationwide missile defense systems. Missile defense languished until 2002, when Bush withdrew from the treaty, which he considered a Cold War-era anachronism. Instead of trying to defend against all-out nuclear attack by a major power, today's plan targets the less-advanced arsenals of emerging nuclear states. The entire system is budgeted at about $50 billion over the next five years and is likely to cost several times that amount to build, deploy and maintain. In July, the Missile Defense Agency began deploying the midcourse interceptors in Alaska. A second battery is scheduled for deployment next year at Vandenberg Air Force Base in Santa Barbara County. Mobile Patriot antimissile systems, a key part of the descent layer (also known as the terminal layer), have been deployed. A year ago, Northrop won a $4.5-billion contract to develop the boost-phase interceptors. Congress has approved $348 million for the current fiscal year. Boost defense "would never be able to handle every situation that anybody could conceive of," said Little of the Missile Defense Agency. "But we could handle enough that we could look at ourselves as an 80% or 90% solution." The allure of striking enemy missiles in the boost phase is that they are easily identified by their plumes just after launch and, because they are ascending, cannot use their full bag of tricks to dodge and deceive. So far, the only part of the boost-phase system that has been built is a single camouflaged launcher with dual launch tubes. The 30-foot-long trailer is parked beside a pile of scrap metal outside a Northrop warehouse near Baltimore. Little said that the system would not need the technical leaps that Star Wars required. "The technology is in hand," he said. "It does not hinge on any kind of a technology breakthrough." The trick is getting the pieces to work together — all in the space of a few minutes at most. To destroy a missile in the boost-phase requires an unprecedented coordination of space-based sensors, signal-analysis computers, interceptor agility and enough sheer thrust to lift a 10-ton object to about 20 times the speed of sound in less than a minute. Each interceptor consists of a two-stage booster, followed by a liquid-fuel rocket that steers the kill vehicle on the last leg of its journey to the target. It would travel at about 13,400 mph. After infrared sensors on satellites detect the enemy launch, interceptors would be directed to the target by terrestrial command stations that constantly update the target's flight path. Onboard sensors would take over at close range. The interceptor's goal is to strike the enemy missile before the warhead separates from its rocket, usually at an altitude below 300 miles. The interceptors gain speed and agility because they don't have to haul a heavy explosive warhead. Instead, they are designed to destroy their target with the force of collision. This "kinetic" attack — described as hitting a bullet with a bullet — demands uncanny accuracy. "What is the precision required? I would characterize it as within less than a meter" over hundreds of miles traveled, he said. To catch an ICBM streaking across the sky, interceptors would be placed about 600 miles back from the target's launch site on land or sea. The military also is developing an airborne laser to shoot down ICBMs as they ascend. "These guys are very, very immature in their development," said Northrop's Van Schilfgaarde, referring to the missile programs of North Korea and Iran. Even if their technology improves, he said, "we have tremendous flexibility." Even before it has gotten off the drawing boards, the boost-phase system has drawn criticism from a variety of scientists and engineers, who see it as technological hubris. It's a needlessly costly and complicated system for a threat that could, for example, be more easily neutralized with preemptive strikes, said Theodore A. Postol, a missile expert at MIT. The agency's boost-phase plan faces a conundrum that has plagued missile defense since World War II: Technology advances tend to favor offense over defense. The Missile Defense Agency said that 27 nations, including several with unstable governments, have ballistic missiles. No rogue nation can deliver a nuclear or chemical warhead to the United States, but each is striving to improve its technology. And proliferation is accelerating. The technical challenges of boost-phase defense are best captured in the problem of Yazd, an ancient city of about 500,000 in the geographic center of Iran. To down a missile launched from Yazd and other potential Iranian launch sites, up to seven interceptor batteries would be needed in such areas as Iraq, Turkmenistan and the Gulf of Oman — areas that might be hard to reach or secure. "If you can't get in close, you don't have a boost-phase capability," Van Schilfgaarde acknowledged. The Congressional Budget Office report said that defending against missiles from large countries might require interceptors that travel up to 22,000 mph — beyond today's technology. One of the most complex parts of the boost-phase interception is its sensing and targeting system. Launch commands would have to be automated because the launch window would close long before a human being could evaluate sensor data, particularly if several ICBMs were fired at once. Yet spy satellites that would direct the action are far from foolproof. "Sensors are subject to huge [signal] noise problems, so you have to be careful not to launch too soon," said David Mosher, an antimissile expert with the Rand Corp. in Arlington, Va. "Even bonfires are a problem," said Coyle, the Clinton Pentagon official. "If you make them hot enough with chemicals, to our satellites at first glance they look like a rocket going off." Bigger doubts involve interceptor accuracy. Midcourse missiles, which use a similar kinetic attack, have a spotty record. They have hit targets in five of nine tests; succeeding only under what Coyle regards as rigged conditions. During the recent test in Alaska, the rocket failed to leave its silo. Even against slower-moving short- and medium-range rockets, antimissile systems have been troubled. Patriot interceptors failed to hit nearly all of their targets during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, according to a congressional investigation and an analysis by outside scientists. In the Iraq war, Patriots mistakenly downed two coalition aircraft. For boost phase, a glancing blow could prove worse than a simple miss. If the interceptor hits the missile body — an error of a couple of feet over hundreds of miles traveled to the target — an Iranian weapon aimed at San Francisco, for example, could end up in Russia. The Missile Defense Agency regards the risk as unfortunate but acceptable. "Everything else being equal, a warhead not hitting its intended target is a good thing," Little said. As bad as it would be to destroy another populated area, he added, "what's the alternative? It's worse." The interceptors could also be mistaken as hostile missiles by nearby nations. "The interceptor trajectories from North Korea are generally to the northwest," noted a critical 2003 report from the American Physical Society, a leading scientific organization. "An interceptor fired in defense runs the risk of triggering retaliatory action by China or Russia." Little said critics' concerns and a funding cut by Congress prompted his agency to restructure the development program for the boost-phase missiles. Now a preliminary system will be produced before full development. If Northrop can't demonstrate that the components work within three more years, the agency may rethink or cancel the contract. But the alternatives are also problematic. Some advocates of missile defense in Congress insist that only a space-based system — a new Star Wars — could provide sure global coverage. But an orbital defense would pose even more formidable technical challenges and cost up to $224 billion, the congressional report said. To mount a credible orbital system against North Korea and Iran, up to 10,909 interceptors, together weighing more than 1,000 metric tons, would be needed, the congressional report said. That would be more than twice the projected weight of the completed International Space Station, the largest space assembly in history. -------- russia Russian Electric Utility to Be Broken Up in Deregulation By BLOOMBERG NEWS Published: December 25, 2004 http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/25/business/worldbusiness/25power.html The Russian government approved plans to break up Unified Energy System, the world's largest electric utility, in an effort to deregulate the country's power market to attract foreign investment and reduce costs for manufacturers. "The shareholders will get all the assets," the company's chief executive, Anatoly Chubais, said yesterday in Moscow. President Vladimir V. Putin, who is widely thought to be extending state dominance of the oil industry through the maneuverings involving Yukos Oil, is cutting the government's role in power production to end household subsidies. The industry minister, Viktor Khristenko, said the utilities would be split into generation, sales and grid companies, with Russia holding 52 percent of the generating businesses. Russia needs to spend as much as $50 billion to upgrade its aging generators and power grid, much of it dating from the Soviet era, Mr. Chubais, said. Yesterday's decision may attract international investors to Russia's generation industry, said Vadim Kleiner, head of research at Hermitage Capital Management, which has U.E.S. shares among $1.6 billion in Russian assets. "During the restructuring process, they are building pretty big companies, which we believe will be of market interest and can be run as sustainable businesses," said Mr. Kleiner, who also sits on the restructuring committee that advises the U.E.S. board. Russia's plan seeks to end nearly 60 billion rubles ($2.2 billion) in subsidies that reduce home electricity prices at the expense of manufacturers, hurting their ability to compete against international rivals, the government said in a statement. Power producers formed from the breakup of regional utilities will be transferred to U.E.S. shareholders in return for their stock by the end of 2006, the government said. "The government will have a dominant stake in the hydropower plants," though all thermal holdings will be sold, Mr. Khristenko said. "It will own 100 percent of nuclear power companies." -------- u.s. nuc facilities -------- california Desalination plans focus on San Onofre By Jose Luis Jiménez SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE STAFF WRITER December 25, 2004 Water officials in San Diego and Orange counties have determined there are no unsurmountable obstacles that would prevent construction of a desalination facility near the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station. Encouraged by the conclusions of an early study, conducted jointly by the San Diego County Water Authority and the Municipal Water District of Orange County, officials are turning toward getting other stakeholders to support the project. They include Camp Pendleton, which owns the site; Southern California Edison, which operates the San Onofre plant; and state regulators, who will issue the permits. The desalination plant could supply southern Orange County, San Diego County and Camp Pendleton with up to 100 million gallons of potable water daily. Should all parties agree to a more detailed study, it would be at least a decade before water could be produced at the site. There are significant obstacles to overcome before the ocean water could be poured into a drinking glass. They range from persuading Camp Pendleton to permit the plant to be sited on the base to the public's perception about the quality of the water and the nearby nuclear power plant. Additionally, environmentalists are wary of plans to develop desalination projects next to power plants. Some answers might be forthcoming in about 60 days when a decision will be made on moving forward with a detailed feasibility study. Water districts are drawn to the San Onofre site because of the decommissioning of the Unit One nuclear reactor, which went online in 1968 and was shuttered in 1992. The pipes used to draw in seawater to cool the reactor could be used in the desalination process, lowering the cost of constructing the desalination plant by tens of million of dollars. Two potential sites have been identified. One is east of Interstate 5 and about a mile north of the nuclear facility. The second is on state park land just south of it. Officials at Edison and Camp Pendleton are neutral on the project, but they have expressed some concerns. For Edison, the project cannot impede the ongoing decommissioning process and the power plant's current operations. Once the Unit One reactor is removed, the site will be used to store nuclear waste until a permanent dump opens at Yucca Mountain in Nevada, said Ray Golden, an Edison spokesman. Edison, however, is expected to remove the cooling pipes as part of the decommissioning process, but the utility is trying to convince state regulators it would be environmentally sound to leave the pipes in place. The state is conducting an environmental impact report on that matter. Units two and three, which generate enough power for 2.2 million homes, have permits good through 2022 and an option for a 20-year extension, Golden said. For Camp Pendleton, the issue is one of compatibility. Any plan that does not further Pendleton's primary mission – to train Marines – is greeted with skepticism, said Edmund Rogers, a civilian who represents the base on the water authority's board of directors. In addition to the desalination plant, there is talk of developing sea ports off Camp Pendleton to handle liquefied natural gas and car imports. "The purpose of Camp Pendleton is to train Marines to win wars," Rogers said recently. "Anything that detracts from that, Marines look at it negatively." Environmentalists, meanwhile, might be seen siding with the military in this matter. San Diego Baykeeper, though not yet taking a stand, has reservations about putting a desalination project next to a coastal power plant. Placing a desalination facility next to an aging power plant is likely to extend the operating life of the electricity producer, increasing the danger to the environment, said Bruce Reznik, Baykeeper's executive director. "The desalination facility itself may not be a big polluter," Reznik said. "But the environmental damage by these power plants can be devastating." Fish are inevitably killed when water is drawn in to cool the generators, Reznik said, and the warm water that is returned to the ocean affects the immediate environment. Baykeeper would like to see more water conservation and recycling before desalination plants are considered. But water officials say conservation alone won't solve the region's water problems. Scarce supplies and the expense of getting new sources have them considering the desalination facility. Officials are focused now on determining whether it is a pipe dream or realistic. Jose Jimenez: (619) 593-4964; jose.jimenez@uniontrib.com -------- MILITARY -------- iraq Rumsfeld says defeating the insurgency is an Iraqi, not American, problem Saturday December 25, 2004 By ROBERT BURNS AP Military Writer http://cbsnewyork.com/international/Rumsfeld-ExplainingIr-ai/resources_news_html BAGHDAD, Iraq (AP) In his Christmas eve encounters with U.S. military commanders and hundreds of their troops, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld heard and said little about armor or troop shortages, issues that have made him a political target in Washington among both Democrats and Republicans. His main message over a four-city tour was quite different: that the insurgency has staying power and a seemingly endless supply of weapons, and the time has come for ordinary Iraqis to realize that they not the Americans will ultimately decide who prevails in this conflict. During a visit to U.S. troops in Kuwait earlier this month, Rumsfeld was challenged by several soldiers on issues like lack of vehicle armor, pay and troop deployments. Some saw his responses as callous, triggering calls by some in Congress for him to resign, just days after President Bush had decided he wanted the 72-year-old Rumsfeld to stay for a second term at the Pentagon. On his Iraq trip, Rumsfeld faced no such challenges. Instead, he emphasized his personal support and understanding of the sacrifices troops make, especially around the holidays. ``You face a determined and vicious enemy,'' Rumsfeld said in dinner remarks Friday to hundreds of 1st Cavalary Division soldiers at a post near the Baghdad International Airport, where they feasted on a holiday meal of prime rib, fried shrimp and chicken, mashed potatoes and all the fixings. Underscoring Rumsfeld's point, just hours after he left, the death toll grew as a suicide bomber blew up a gas tanker in the upscale Mansour district of Baghdad, home to many foreign missions as well as top Iraqi government officials. During his visit, Rumsfeld said it would be unrealistic to predict that the level of violence will recede once the Jan. 30 elections are held. In the end, he said, it will be a ``uniquely Iraqi solution,'' not American. Earlier in Fallujah, the restive city that had been the insurgents' main haven until U.S. forces overran it last month and are still rooting out holdout fighters Rumsfeld used a simple analogy to explain his view that the time is arriving for Iraqis to take responsibility for their own security. Faced with a chore like digging a ditch, a typical American, he said, will grab a shovel and start digging. In Iraq now, however, the task is to step aside and get the Iraqis to dig their own ditches. He warned against allowing the Iraqis to become too dependent on the U.S. military. More independence is what's needed, he said. ``That's the only way,'' Rumsfeld said during a meeting with top U.S. commanders in Tikrit, at the northern tip of the so-called Sunni Triangle that had been deposed President Saddam Hussein's bedrock of support. He called it the key to eventually getting the 151,000 U.S. troops out of Iraq. In that meeting, Lt. Gen. Thomas Metz, the senior ground commander in Iraq, made a similar point. He said Maj. Gen. John Batiste, whose 1st Infantry Division essentially rules north-central and northeastern Iraq, and who was sitting in the same meeting, must stop thinking of that as his area of responsibility and instead get local Iraqi commanders to take it as their own. Batiste agreed and said that within six months he expects an Iraqi National Guard division headquarters, with 15 battalions of guardsmen, to be ready to take control of his area. There already are 11 battalions in place, he said. ``We're on the verge of something great here,'' Batiste said. In his session with Metz and Batiste, Rumsfeld pointedly noted that some in Washington keep saying that American commanders in Iraq feel they need more troops, or that they're not getting the resources they need. He asked Metz: What has Batiste told you he needs that he has not received? Metz made no mention of troop levels, but he said Batiste could use more specialized drone aircraft used for surveillance and reconnaissance, and that he needs more linguists because many of them have succumbed to the tactics of intimidation used by insurgents. Batiste described intimidation as a highly effective tool of the insurgents, and he estimated that 90 percent of the insurgent violence is directed by former loyalists to Saddam Hussein. He said death threats are delivered to the mail boxes of Iraqis who cooperate with the Americans or are otherwise circulated in ways that make it difficult to maintain Iraqi loyalty in the face of threats to their families. He showed Rumsfeld a photograph of what he called a hand-written death threat that was among weapons and other materials recovered during a raid Thursday night. -------- ACTIVISTS Nuclear whistleblower Vanunu freed after arrest for Bethlehem entry bid Sat Dec 25, 9:45 AM ET AFP http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/afp/20041225/wl_mideast_afp/mideastisraelnuclearvanunu_041225144556 JERUSALEM (AFP) - Nuclear whistleblower Mordechai Vanunu was released by Israeli police after being arrested trying to enter the West Bank town of Bethlehem to attend midnight mass, police sources said. Vanunu was forced to post bail of 50,000 shekels (11,500 dollars) and ordered to remain at his residence at St George's Anglican cathedral in east Jerusalem where he has been living since his release in April. As part of the terms of his release after serving an 18-year sentence for lifting the lid on the inner workings of the Dimona nuclear plant, severe restrictions were placed on his movement. Vanunu converted to Christianity shortly before he was arrested, fuelling accusations among Israelis that he is a traitor to the Jewish state. Jerusalem police spokesman Shmuel Ben Ruby said Vanunu had been arrested while wearing a Father Christmas hat while travelling in a vehicle that was marked up as a press vehicle.