NucNews - December 22, 2004
-------- NUCLEAR
-------- accidents and safety
Life among the invisible in Chernobyl's dead zone
Peasants make home in land they once evacuated
By MARTIN CRUZ SMITH
Dec. 22, 2004, 9:11PM
Houston Chronicle
http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/editorial/outlook/2960534
Outside, a hard winter's afternoon settles on the village, but inside their cottage Nikolai and Nastia lay out a spread: apples from their orchard, pickles from their garden, mushrooms from the woods around and full glasses of samogon, otherwise known as Ukrainian moonshine. Samogon, the locals say, offers protection from radioactivity, a consideration since we are in a "black village" written off for human occupation in 1986 after the explosion of Reactor 4 at the Chernobyl nuclear power station a mere dozen miles away.
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"You grow your own food?" a guest asks.
"All of it," Nastia says.
The guest takes a discreet glance at his dosimeter.
The village is called "black," as in abandoned. But as if to make the name literally true, the neighboring houses have turned black and tilted into a slow slide into the earth. Trees reach in and out the windows. The yards are littered with bureaus, picture frames, chairs. At the beginning of the cleanup, the authorities buried the most radioactive houses, until it dawned on them that they were doing an excellent job of poisoning the groundwater. So the contaminated houses stand. For how long? According to an ecologist at the power station: "In 250 years everything is back to normal. Except for plutonium — that will take 25,000 years."
Nikolai and Nastia's cottage is basically one room around an oven with a built-in shelf to sleep on during the coldest nights.
"It's home," Nastia says. She wears a sweater and shawl permanently. Her smile is bright steel, and her blue eyes shine with delight and a certain sense of collusion. Visitors are rare in the 19-mile-radius Zone of Exclusion around the reactors and, of course, she is not supposed to be there at all. Nastia and Nikolai were evacuated like everyone else, but sneaked like partisans back to their cottage in the woods. So much for zone security.
Since then, the authorities have largely let Nastia and Nikolai alone among the zone's phantom population of returnees, scavengers and poachers. Almost perversely, the wildlife there is flourishing; poachers hunt wild boar, served later in the finest restaurants of Kiev and Moscow. Scavengers cut up abandoned radioactive cars and trucks to sell as parts in the chop shops of Russia.
Nikolai and Nastia aren't on the run, they've just become invisible. They didn't vote in the recent presidential runoff election; there were no polling booths in the black villages. (To vote, they would have had to be bused out of the zone to cast a ballot bearing the address they had been assigned to and escaped from.) Doctors warned Nastia that if she remains in her village, radioactivity will give her cancer in 25 years. Nastia is 75 now. She says she'll take her chances.
Nastia sings a traditional harvest song in a young, birdlike voice. The samogon has brought out a fine sweat on every brow.
What amazes me is not that two elderly peasants have become invisible, but that Chernobyl itself has, as if it were a subject too awful to contemplate. In the rain, the sarcophagus, the 10-story steel-and-concrete box heroically constructed over Reactor 4, leaks like a radioactive sieve into groundwater that drains in the Pripyat River, which feeds the Dnepr, which is the drinking water for Kiev. Ninety percent of the core is still in the reactor, breaking down and heating up, and the station's managers say that the sarcophagus itself could collapse at any time.
How dangerous would that be? Estimates of deaths from the explosion range from 41 to more than 300,000. The Zone of Exclusion is not an area of containment, no more than a circle drawn on the dirt would stop an airborne stream of plutonium, strontium, cesium-137. Seven million people live on contaminated land in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. People around the world carry in their chromosomes the mark of Chernobyl.
We search in Iraq for weapons of mass destruction, while a more likely danger is another explosion at Chernobyl. It may not be a meltdown, but it will be the mother of all dirty bombs. (A better sarcophagus is promised in five years, but at the site there is little sign of activity, let alone urgency.)
And in all the drama of the recent election, the inspiring rallies in Independence Square, the spirited presidential debate on Monday and the apparent triumph of good over evil, the subject of another nuclear disaster rarely came up, and then mostly in nationalist rhetoric: It is an article of faith that the West forced Ukraine in 2000 to close the perfectly good reactors that remained at Chernobyl. The truth is that you have to sympathize with Viktor Yushchenko, the likely winner in the rerun of the presidential runoff on Sunday, because he will have to deal with Chernobyl.
Or not.
So, no wonder we're drinking samogon. The air is yeasty with it. Nastia sings and I picture her and Nikolai plucking apples off their poisoned tree, digging potatoes from their poisoned earth, fishing in their poisoned stream.
Cruz Smith is the author, most recently, of "Wolves Eat Dogs."
-------- asia
Russian-Chinese Joint Military Exercises on the Rise
by Ray McGovern
Wednesday, December 22, 2004 by the Miami Herald
http://www.commondreams.org/views04/1222-22.htm
While President Bush, his neoconservative advisors and centrist Democrats bask in the glow of America's status as ''the one remaining superpower in the world,'' there are mounting signs that other major powers do not intend to hunker down and suspend their own efforts to shape history.
The most striking result of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov's four-day visit to China last week was the agreement to hold ''substantial military exercises on Chinese territory in 2005'' (quote from Russia's Interfax news agency). This was Ivanov's second trip to Beijing this year, and Chinese President Hu Jintao used the occasion to assert that ``Sino-Russian strategic coordination has attained an unprecedentedly high level.''
Improved relations
For those familiar with the acerbic nature of Russian-Chinese relations over the years, the announcement of joint military exercises is stunning. The switch from extreme hostility to rapprochement is a sea change in the broader strategic equation. The fact that the improvement in ties has been incremental makes it no less real -- and no less a potential threat to U.S. interests.
This event, largely ignored by the U.S. media, comes on the heels of Soviet President Vladimir Putin's October visit to Beijing, where he said that bilateral relations had reached ''unparalleled heights.'' Putin then signed an agreement settling the last of the disputes along the 7,500-kilometer border between the two countries, ending the pushing and shoving that had led to armed clashes in the 1960s and '70s. Putin's visit also produced an agreement to jointly develop Russian energy reserves, an agreement that China hopes will help fuel its growing economy.
Sino-Russian bilateral trade has been growing by leaps and bounds. Most important, China has become Russia's arms industry's gold-star customer. This year, the Chinese are spending about $2 billion for weapons. For Russia, these sales are an important source of export earnings and keep key segments of its defense industry afloat. Cut off from arms sales from the West, Beijing has come to rely on Russia more and more for sophisticated arms and technology.
Standing up to the bully
Before 9/11, progress in political, economic and military relations reached a high point with the conclusion of a Sino-Russian treaty signed by Putin and President Jiang Zemin in Moscow in July 2001. That treaty reflected a commitment to collaborate closely in standing up to what they consider the world's big bully. The invasion of Iraq in March 2003 greatly increased the incentive for such collaboration, now made more tangible by the scheduling of joint military exercises.
As for Washington's misadventure in Iraq, the Russians and Chinese look with mixed feelings on the quicksand in which U.S. forces are trying to stay afloat: alarm at what they see as unconstrained, unpredictable U.S. belligerence and schadenfreude at the fiasco brought about by the ineptitude of senior American civilian-defense officials and by careerism among the generals, many of whom know better but lack the spine to tell their superiors that the war in Iraq cannot be ``won.''
What seems clear is that, largely because of the U.S.-U.K. attack on Iraq, China and Russia intend to give each other meaningful political support if Washington embarks on a new military adventure -- against Iran, for example. And watch out. That same assurance of mutual support could embolden the Russians or Chinese to undertake adventurist actions of their own (vis--vis Taiwan or Ukraine, for instance), the more so as U.S. forces appear doomed to thrashing about in Iraq for the near future.
U.S. not main focus
Like subterranean geological plates that shift imperceptibly, changes with immense political repercussions can occur so gradually as to be imperceptible -- until the earthquake. Over the past several years, there has been rather broad consensus among specialists that, despite the gradual rapprochement between Russia and China, both remain more interested in developing good relations with the United States than with each other.
Someone needs to tell U.S. policymakers that this may no longer be the case, help them understand why this is important and warn them that hubris has always been a tragic flaw.
Ray McGovern began his 27-year career with the CIA as the analyst for Soviet relations with China and Southeast Asia. He is on the steering group of Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity.
----
Japan, US to work out new framework of security alliance
TOKYO (AFP) Dec 22, 2004
http://www.spacewar.com/2004/041222125649.bome2bps.html
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said Wednesday that Japan was aiming to work out with the United States a new framework of their security alliance in the face of new threats.
"It is a matter to be discussed hereafter," he said, commenting on a press report that the two countries would issue a joint statement on their security ties, possibly in February.
Koizumi told reporters the two countries were due to have "in-depth discussions" on ways to maintain a deterrence and reduce a heavy concentration of US troops on the southern Japan island of Okinawa.
Japan plans to hold ministerial talks with the United States in February focusing on a realignment of US forces on its soil, a senior Japanese official said on Tuesday.
The Nihon Keizai Shimbun reported Wednesday that the projected joint security statement will outline the manner in which the two Pacific allies address new threats such as terrorism as well as issues concerning China-Taiwan tensions and North Korea.
It reformulates a 1996 security statement credited with giving the Japan-US partnership a new role in the Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War era, the leading business daily said.
The agreement aims to facilitate the realignment of US forces in Japan by re-establishing common security goals, the daily added.
The two sides hope to hammer out the agreement by February when foreign affairs and defense cabinet members from the two sides hope to meet for security-related talks, it said.
Richard Lawless, the US deputy undersecretary of defense, held talks here on Monday and Tuesday focusing on a proposed US military "transformation" in Japan.
Japan has shown reluctance to accept a US proposal to move from the US state of Washington to Camp Zama outside Tokyo a major US army command which covers the "arch of instability" stretching from the Middle East to East Asia.
The transfer of the US Army 1st Corps command could run counter to the bilateral security treaty which limits the use of land and facilities in Japan by US forces for the purpose of peace and stability in the Far East.
-------- depleted uranium
Problems on road to Japan's plans to recycle Uranium
BY TOSHIAKI SATO AND TATSUO NAKAJIMA
The Yomiuri Shimbun Wed, Dec. 22, 2004
http://www.duluthsuperior.com/mld/duluthsuperior/news/world/10479033.htm
TOKYO - (KRT) - The initial test operation that started Tuesday at Rokkashomura, Aomori Prefecture, in preparation for recycling spent uranium faces many hurdles that must be cleared before a nuclear fuel cycle can be established in 2006 as planned.
The test run at the reprocessing plant being built in the Pacific coast village is scheduled to last a year. During this period, Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. will seek to eliminate any problems and develop safety procedures involving an active test that will be conducted using spent nuclear fuel.
The material being used in the first phase of the test is depleted uranium, a low-radioactive by-product of the uranium enrichment processes at a nuclear fuel processing plant in Tokaimura, Ibaraki Prefecture.
The reprocessing plant, scheduled to go online in July 2006, will extract uranium and plutonium from spent nuclear fuel generated at nuclear power plants across the county for reuse as fuel.
Prior to the launch of full-scale reprocessing, a number of preparatory steps must be taken, including the initial test run that started Tuesday. In the first phase of the test run, JNFL will examine the facility's equipment for any defects and problems by conducting an experiment using a dummy fuel assembly and pulverized depleted uranium from Tokaimura, company officials said.
JNFL is jointly owned by the nation's 10 electric power companies that operate nuclear plants and 87 other companies.
The initial test run is of essential importance in identifying potential dangers in reprocessing spent nuclear fuel, which contains high-level radioactive substances, including plutonium and uranium.
The level of radioactivity of the pulverized spent uranium being used for the initial test run is extremely low, about one-millionth that of spent nuclear fuel, JNFL said.
The type of radioactivity emitted by spent uranium is relatively easy to shield against in the event of leakage, meaning that any repairs required during the test run could easily be made.
In advance of the test run, JNFL drew up a list of 190 possible problems, including the leakage of small amounts of radioactive substances from pipe joints and valves, which occurred during similar tests conducted by Britain and France, noting that the initial test is designed to identify possible causes of problems to minimize risks when full-scale operations begin at the Rokkashomura reprocessing plant.
The officials said JNFL had scrutinized about 1,200 accidents and other operational troubles at reprocessing plants in Britain and France.
Following the one-year initial test run, the operation will move on to an active test. This will involve processing spent nuclear fuel using large-scale equipment and devices in a room called a cell, constructed with walls made of one-meter thick ferroconcrete.
The operation of the nuclear fuel recycling plant is extremely complex, with the process being undertaken in four major stages starting with dissolving spent nuclear fuel, which has been cut into tiny fragments after being cooled with water, in nitric acid (as shown in the diagram).
PLUTHERMAL PLAN AT A STANDSTILL
Before Japan can achieve a nuclear fuel cycle, two major problems must be addressed.
One is the cost of building and operating the Rokkashomura reprocessing plant.
Construction on the plant began in 1993 with technological assistance from France. Because of unforeseen expenditures, mostly for increasing safety at the plant, building costs have ballooned to 2.2 trillion yen, three times the initial estimate.
In addition, investigations by the Cabinet's Atomic Energy Commission have revealed that the cost of recycling fuel at Rokkashomura will cost more than simply burying it deep underground .
The AEC, however, decided in November to maintain the government's nuclear fuel cycle policy to make the most effective use of resources.
A tougher problem is the current moratorium on pushing ahead with the government-envisioned Pluthermal Project for burning plutonium in lightwater reactors in the form of mixed oxides (MOX) of uranium and plutonium. This plan has ground to a halt because of a series of accidents and breakdowns of pluthermal-related systems.
The halting of the project means there is no way to consume reprocessed nuclear fuel produced by the Rokkashomura plant.
Another program for the use of recycled nuclear fuel, using MOX for running a fast breeder reactor, has been on hold since operations of the prototype reactor Monju were suspended in December 1995 following leakage of the reactor's coolant, although there were no casualties in the incident.
Distributed by Knight Ridder/Tribune Information Services.
--------
Rokkasho reprocessor begins tests with depleted uranium
The Japan Times: Dec. 22, 2004
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20041222a1.htm
AOMORI (Kyodo) Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. on Tuesday began tests using depleted uranium at its nuclear-fuel reprocessing plant in Aomori Prefecture, taking a step toward introducing a key component of the nation's nuclear fuel cycle program.
Members of civic groups brave snow to protest attempts to reprocess depleted uranium Tuesday in front of a Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. plant here.
The uranium test to assess operations at the Rokkasho plant is expected to last about a year, after which JNFL will conduct an active test using spent nuclear fuel, company officials said.
JNFL hopes to begin actual operations at Japan's first commercial plant for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel in July 2006.
Opponents of the 20-year-old project have cited safety concerns and the high cost of reprocessing spent fuel, estimated to be 1.5 to 1.8 times costlier than burying the fuel.
The facility will extract uranium and plutonium from spent nuclear fuel generated at nuclear power plants nationwide. The extracted uranium and plutonium can then be reused as fuel. JNFL plans to reprocess 800 tons of spent fuel a year.
In the test that began Tuesday, JNFL intends to find defects and problems in the facility's equipment by using a dummy fuel assembly and pulverized depleted uranium, which were transported from Tokai, Ibaraki Prefecture.
Test activities involve feeding about 800 kg of pulverized depleted uranium into a uranium supply tank.
Based on similar tests in France and Britain, JNFL anticipates a number of problems to arise. It has compiled and made public a list of 190 possible problems, including the leakage of radioactive substances from pipe joints and valves.
The Japan Atomic Energy Commission opted last month to continue pursuing the nuclear fuel cycle program.
It had been under review following a series of accidents and problems, including revelations of faulty construction at the Rokkasho plant and a fatal steam pipe rupture in August at the Mihama nuclear plant in Fukui Prefecture.
JNFL's nuclear-fuel reprocessing plant is a key component in the cycle plan.
Following the commission's decision, JNFL and the governments of Aomori Prefecture and Rokkasho signed a safety agreement on Nov. 22, spelling out ways to ensure the safety of residents and protect the environment during the uranium test as well as to provide prompt notification in the event of an accident.
As the current test uses depleted uranium, which has lower radioactivity than natural uranium, there is no danger of a major nuclear accident. But there is still concern that radioactive material might leak outside the plant.
Local residents are worried about possible accidents and the effect on the area's image, particularly concerning agricultural products.
About 100 protesters gathered Tuesday outside JNFL's main gate to protest the test, shouting, "Stop the uranium test immediately," and "Don't turn Aomori Prefecture into a nuclear garbage dump."
JNFL officials are concerned that if radioactive substances leak outside the plant, it would alarm the residents and make it difficult to win their approval to go ahead with the nuclear-fuel reprocessing plans.
"If we encounter a situation in which (radioactive substances) leak into the environment or multiple workers are exposed to radioactivity, it would become difficult to start full-fledged operation" of the plant, a senior official of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry reckoned.
The Federation of Electric Power Companies asked Aomori to host the plant in 1984. Construction began in 1993, and in 2000, its operator began bringing in spent fuel.
But there have been several operational delays due to a series of problems, including a radioactive water leak from the spent fuel storage pool and revelations of faulty construction.
-------- india / pakistan
India Ruins Pakistan's F-16 Shopping Spree
File image of an F-16 owned by Belgium
New Delhi (UPI) Dec 22, 2004
http://www.spacedaily.com/news/missiles-04zzzl.html
India on Wednesday claimed partial victory in spoiling Pakistan's F-16 jets shopping spree by saying that Belgium had agreed to New Delhi's request not to sell the fighter jets to Islamabad.
The issue of Pakistan's formal request to Belgium to procure F-16 jets was taken up with the Belgian authorities in September 2003, Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee told lawmakers in the parliament on Wednesday.
Given the sensitivity of the geo-political situation in South Asia, the Belgian government took a conscious decision not to sell F-16 fighter aircraft to Pakistan, Mukherjee announced amid thumping of desks by the lawmakers.
The Indian government had been lobbying with the United States and Belgium over the last several weeks not to fuel an arms race in nuclear-armed South Asia by supplying sophisticated weapons and jets to Pakistan.
The range of the F-16s would cover a number of civilian and military facilities of northern India, Mukherjee said, adding, The increase in strength of F-16s with Pakistan would adversely affect the current balance of air power between the Indian and Pakistan Air Forces.
Pakistan has been pressing Washington in the recent months to supply it with the promised fleet of fighter jets.
While Washington has pledged a $1.2 billion arms package to Islamabad, it has not categorically said if the deal would include the F-16 jets.
Last month, the Bush administration had notified Congress of its intention to sell sophisticated weapons to Pakistan, including eight P-3C Orion planes to beef up surveillance of its coasts and borders.
Earlier this month, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was in Indian capital, where he was told by New Delhi that any sale of fighter jets to Pakistan might affect India-U.S. relations.
Washington has to tread carefully in South Asia, where Pakistan is America's launching base in its war against terror in Afghanistan. On the other hand, India is the biggest democracy and home to world's second-largest Muslim population after Indonesia.
While India is lending its hand in rebuilding the war-devastated Afghanistan, it has stayed away from the war on Iraq, which now many Americans feel was not worth fighting.
Last week, the United States tried to placate an incensed India over Washington's impending arms sales to Pakistan by offering to sell more weapons to New Delhi.
The U.S. ambassador to New Delhi, David Mulford, said Washington wants to be a very big supplier of military equipment to India.
We would like to have a very important economic and military relationship with India. We would like to be a big supplier of military equipment to India, Mulford told reporters in the Indian capital.
Mulford dismissed New Delhi's apprehension that arms supplies to Pakistan would have negative impact on bilateral ties as well as on the India-Pakistan peace dialogue.
I don't see why it (arms supply to Pakistan) should have any impact on the dialogue, he said."
Pakistan wants to buy up to 25 F-16s, which cost around $25 million each, to add to its F-16 fleet. The United States has yet to make a decision on the sale. Pakistan has been waiting since 1990 for the planes. The Presser Amendment banned military transfers unless the U.S. administration could certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapons program. Pakistan paid for the undelivered aircraft until 1996 and then demanded the return of about $620 million.
Islamabad had also approached Belgium for two squadrons of used F-16s, a deal that needs U.S. approval under an agreement between Brussels and Washington.
Pakistan, however, had rejected Indian objections as incomprehensible, saying that its modest defense requirements should not irk New Delhi.
A Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman said in Islamabad that India itself had an ambitious arms buying program.
These statements (from India) are disturbing, Foreign Ministry spokesman Masood Khan told a news conference. India's weapons acquisition and weaponization program is very ambitious. They have been buying weapons and sophisticated technology from all over the world.
Khan described Pakistan's program as modest compared to that of New Delhi, which it said spends billions of dollars on weapons. We do not want to match India gun-for-gun, missile-for-missile, aircraft-for-aircraft, he said.
Besides the F-16 jets, Pakistan also wants to acquire P-3 Orion surveillance planes, Phalanx rapid-fire guns, and TOW missiles, but New Delhi says the weapons could also be against India.
The Pentagon, however, argues that the weapons it intends to provide would enhance Pakistan's search surveillance-and-control capability in support of maritime interdiction operations and increase their ability to support the U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom operations.
It's a watershed case for Washington on how to keep Islamabad in good humor without annoying New Delhi.
Washington keeps playing a seesaw game in the region, depending on the timings. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, Washington offered F-16s to Pakistan on an exclusive basis. But in the early 1990s, it imposed restrictions under the Pressler amendment.
After 2000, Washington warmed up to India by offering a next generation strategic partnership. Then, post 9/11, it designated Pakistan a major non-NATO ally, taking India by surprise.
And now, the United States wants to sell deadly weapons to both India and Pakistan.
It's downright foolhardy for Washington both to supply new weapons to India and Pakistan and then expect them to negotiate peace, newspaper columnist Praful Bidwai said in an article. "The logic of the first process - escalation of military preparations and hostility - sharply differs from the logic of dialogue and reconciliation.
Washington's double standards have harmful strategic consequences. They aggravate India-Pakistan rivalry. In particular, they could put a spoke in the current peace process, Bidwai said.
Both India and Pakistan are involved in a series of confidence-building measure to overcome five decades of war, hostility and suspicion. The two have fought three wars since gaining simultaneous independence from Britain in 1947.
----
Indian PM's speech on Pakistan, nuclear policy good move, says analysts
NEW DELHI (AFP) Dec 22, 2004
http://www.spacewar.com/2004/041222101830.4858ui7s.html
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has reaffirmed India as a nuclear power and formally announced the ground rules for peace talks with Pakistan in a move hailed by analysts as a useful clarification of the new government's foreign policy.
Singh made a foreign policy statement to parliament late Tuesday following charges that his coalition government lacks a coherent voice on world affairs.
The statement "was in response to opposition criticism that there is no clarity in foreign policy," said Uday Bhaskar, deputy chief of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis.
The foreign ministry is led by seasoned diplomat Natwar Singh, a former ambassador to Pakistan, but there are other power centers such as National Security Adviser J.N. Dixit, a former foreign secretary, and an active professional bureaucracy.
Since coming to power in May there have been mixed messages on sensitive negotiations with Pakistan, the terms of UN Security Council membership and the country's nuclear arms policy.
Singh seemed to sense the drift and wanted a definitive statement, Bhaskar said.
One of the first issues Singh touched on was peace talks with Pakistan, including their dispute over the scenic Himalayan region of Kashmir.
Initially some foreign policy officials had said the government may consider an October proposal by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf.
Musharraf suggested that parts of Kashmir, which is divided between Pakistan and India and claimed by both, be demilitarised and either placed under United Nations mandate, put under joint control or given independence.
On Tuesday Singh said he had told Musharraf in September that peace talks would not include any "redrawing of boundaries or another partition of the country."
B.G. Verghese, of the Centre for Policy Research, said the prime minister's statement ruling out a redrawing of boundaries, while not new, carried importance because it was made in parliament.
Another foreign policy glitch occurred last week when a number of newspapers quoted unidentified senior officials as saying India could accept a permanent UN Security Council seat without a veto.
Singh said there no "ambiguity" or "confusion" on India's position.
"We do not believe there should be any discrimination in the Security Council and there should be no distinction between permanent members who have the veto and who do not not have the veto, because this position is based on the broadest possible political consensus," the prime minister said.
He also repeated a clarification on India's nuclear policy.
Foreign Minister Singh caused waves with comments to the Korea Times this month that the previous Hindu nationalist government "was responsible for the decision to enter the nuclear standoff with neighboring Pakistan."
"But regret would be futile... you cannot put it back in the tube, it's out," the minister was quoted as saying, as if disowning the 1998 nuclear tests which sparked nationalist pride in India. Pakistan responded with its own tests.
"India is a nuclear weapon state and we are a responsible nuclear power. That sums up our idea. So, there should be no doubt whatsoever," Singh said Tuesday.
-------- iran
Iran says 10 arrested nuclear spies on US, Israeli payroll
TEHRAN (AFP) Dec 22, 2004
http://www.spacewar.com/2004/041222095718.xvhu70k8.html
Ten people arrested on suspicion of spying on Iran's nuclear programme were working for US and Israeli intelligence services, Intelligence Minister Ali Yunessi said Wednesday.
"More than 10 nuclear spies were arrested during the current (Iranian) year," which started on March 20, Yunessi said, quoted by the official news agency IRNA.
"Three of them were working for the (Iranian) Atomic Energy Organization, the rest of them were not public servants ... They were working for the CIA and Mossad. They were arrested in Tehran and Hormuzgan," in southern Iran, he said.
"They are currently in the custody of the revolutionary court, and we will not announce their names before their trials ... There is no prominent person among them," Yunessi added.
In August, Yunessi announced the arrest of a number of spies who sent information on Iran's nuclear programme to foreigners.
He said the People's Mujahedeen, an armed opposition group based in Iraq that the regime in Tehran labels as "hypocrites", had played the central role in the espionage.
The group's political wing, the National Council for Resistance in Iran, in 2002 revealed two nuclear sites Iran had been hiding, including a uranium-enrichment plant in Natanz.
Last month the group alleged Iran was hiding a uranium enrichment facility in Tehran and aimed at getting the atomic bomb next year.
The group also said the father of the Pakistani atomic bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan who has admitted to running an international nuclear smuggling network, delivered bomb designs and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium to Iran.
Tehran insists that its nuclear activities are purely peaceful.
--------
Iran's air force ready to defend nuclear sites: army chief
TEHRAN (AFP) Dec 22, 2004
http://www.spacewar.com/2004/041222122249.na6rh842.html
The Iranian military led by the air force has been ordered to stand ready to defend the country's nuclear sites in case of attack, army chief General Mohammad Salimi said Wednesday.
"The air force has been ordered to protect the nuclear sites, using all its power," Salimi said, quoted by the government daily Iran.
"The air force has temporarily suspended all its maneuvers and focused its means on patroling the sky," he added.
"All our forces including land forces, anti-aircraft, radar tactics ... are protecting the nuclear sites and an attack on them will not be simple," the general said.
American newspapers and the regional press have speculated over a possible US or Israeli attack on the nuclear sites of Iran, which the Jewish state and Washington suspect of working to develop the bomb.
US and Israeli officials have denied any such plans.
----
Iran 'will defend nuclear sites'
Iran denies claims that it wants to build nuclear weapons
BBC: Wednesday, 22 December, 2004
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4118545.stm
Iran's military is on standby in case of an attack against its nuclear facilities, the country's top army commander has said.
Gen Mohammad Salimi said training had been suspended to concentrate on patrols close to potential targets.
Iran suspects that Israel may attack its nuclear sites because of fears that Tehran is developing nuclear weapons.
Iran says it held at least 10 people for allegedly spying on atomic sites for Israel and the US in the past year.
"The air force has been ordered to protect the nuclear sites, using all its power," Gen Salimi told a government newspaper.
"All our forces including land forces, anti-aircraft [and] radar tactics are protecting the nuclear sites and an attack on them will not be simple," he added.
Gen Salimi's comments came amid claims that US military planners have run simulations of a complex attack on Iran's nuclear sites.
The US magazine Atlantic Monthly reported that the Pentagon had simulated a three-stage attack on Iran, beginning with operations against suspected nuclear bases.
'Spies' held
At an Iranian cabinet meeting, Intelligence Minister Ali Yunesi said those arrested for spying had been working in Iran for the CIA and Mossad.
An official said that three of those arrested had been working within the state's nuclear programme itself.
In August, Tehran announced the arrest of a number of spies accused of supplying information to other states.
"More than 10 nuclear spies were arrested during the current Iranian year," Mr Yunesi is quoted as saying by the official Irna news agency.
He said the 10, whom he accused of working for the CIA and Mossad, were arrested in Tehran and Hormuzgan in southern Iran.
The people were being held in the custody of the revolutionary court, he said.
The US accuses Iran of seeking nuclear weapons.
Iran denies this, saying that its nuclear development programme is purely for peaceful, energy-generating purposes.
----
Israeli Defence Minister Calls For Calm Over Rumoured Attack On Iran
One of the many sites the US and Israel would like to shut down include the nuclear reactor facility being built by Russia at Beshehr
Jerusalem (AFP) Dec 22, 2004
http://www.spacedaily.com/news/nuclear-blackmarket-04q.html
Israeli Defence Minister Shaoul Mofaz on Wednesday asked to "calm things down" concerning the possibility of his country striking Iranian nuclear installations.
"We have to calm things down concerning the so-called intentions attributed to Israel" of attacking Iran, Mofaz said in a television interview.
"I think that the way the United States is campaigning against Iranian leaders' desire to produce weapons of mass destruction is the right one," he told Channel 10.
He was responding to declarations made by Iranian army chief General Mohammad Salimi that his country's armed forces had been ordered to prepare to defend its nuclear sites against an attack.
"The air force has been ordered to protect the nuclear sites, using all its power," Salimi said Wednesday, quoted by the government daily Iran.
"The air force has temporarily suspended all its maneuvers and focused its means on patrolling the sky," he added.
"All our forces including land forces, anti-aircraft, radar tactics ... are protecting the nuclear sites and an attack on them will not be simple," the general said.
American newspapers and the regional press have speculated over a possible US or Israeli attack on the nuclear sites of Iran, which the Jewish state and Washington suspect of working to develop a bomb.
US and Israeli officials have denied any such plans.
--------
Iran's Nuclear Energy Program. Part V: From the United States Offering Iran
Uranium Enrichment Technology to Suggestions for Creating Catastrophic Industrial Failure
By Muhammad Sahimi
Payvand's Iran News
12/22/04
http://www.payvand.com/news/04/dec/1186.html
Introduction
In a series of articles that were posted on Payvand in October 2003, the author provided a brief history of Iran's nuclear program (Part I); described the general outline of the arguments that justify for Iran nuclear energy as an economically viable source of energy (Part II), and explained the crisis that was emerging at that time in the relationship between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Part III). In Part IV, posted on Payvand on December 7, 2004, the author presented a detailed economical analysis of Iran's nuclear energy program.
The goal of the present article is twofold:
(a) We describe in detail the key role that the US played in the 1970s in starting Iran's nuclear program. We show that not only did the US push the Shah to buy nuclear power plants (NPPs) from the US, but was also willing to offer Iran the technology for uranium enrichment if Iran agrees to buy eight US-manufactured NPPs. This should be compared with the present state of affairs whereby the US and its European allies are pressuring Iran to refrain from utilizing its uranium enrichment facilities and, instead, import enriched uranium for its NPP.
(b) We then compare what we describe in (a) with the present positions of the US neoconservatives and their sympathizers, which reveal the extent to which they are willing to inflict CIVILIAN casualties and economic damage on Iran to stop it from starting the Bushehr reactor.
Giving wide public exposure to the neoconservatives' and their sympathizers' thinking is, in the author's opinion, particularly important since, as the author has pointed out in his articles over the past three years, Iran's main antidemocratic forces - the monarchists and cultists - have aligned themselves with these groups. Therefore, it is essential to learn more about the fantasies of the neoconservatives and their sympathizers, which in turn will help us become more informed about the true face and colour of their Iranian allies who are willing to do anything to grab power in Iran.
The United States-Iran Nuclear Relations in the 1970s
It was presumably 1955 when the first discussions on developing a nuclear program for Iran took place. The first concrete step, however, was taken in 1957 when the US signed an agreement with Iran [1] on civilian nuclear cooperation. This was promoted as part of the US Atoms for Peace Program that was supposed to provide technical assistance to the signatories, as well as leasing them enriched uranium, and carrying out joint research on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In the same year, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), that consisted of Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq, Britain, and the US moved its Institute of Nuclear Science from Baghdad to Tehran (after General Abdolkarim Ghassem's military coup d'etat in 1958, Iraq withdrew from CENTO).
In 1959 the Shah ordered establishment of a nuclear research center at Tehran University, Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC), and began negotiating with the US to purchase a 5-megawatt (MW) reactor for the Center. To this date, the Center remains one of Iran's main nuclear research organizations.
In the late 1950s the US Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to store nuclear bombs in Iran (presumably due to the victory of the Cuban revolution, the rise of Fiedel Castro to power, and the support that he began receiving from the Soviet Union). In February 1961, shortly after President John F. Kennedy took office, the US State Department opposed the JCOS suggestion; it was never carried out [2].
In September 1967 Iran received from the US 5.54 kgr of enriched uranium, of which 5.16 kgr contained fissile uranium isotopes (which could, in principle, be used in a nuclear bomb), to use in its research reactor at TNRC. In addition, Iran received 112 kgr of plutonium, 104 kgr of which were fissile isotopes [3]. The safeguarded 5 MW nuclear research reactor, a pool-type, water-moderated reactor that was supplied to Iran by the US firm GA Technologies started full operations at TNRC in November 1967, using 5.58 kgr of 93% enriched uranium. The fuel was provided by the US firm United Nuclear Corporation. In addition, the US supplied Iran hot cells which are [4], "heavily shielded rooms with remotely operated arms used to chemically separate material irradiated in the research reactor, possibly including plutonium laden 'targets'." On July 1, 1968, the first day that the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) was opened for signature, Iran signed the Treaty. It was ratified by the Majles (the Iranian parliament) on February 2, 1970.
The US-Iran agreement, Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atoms, that had been signed in 1957 (see above) was extended on March 13, 1969 for another 10 years. The first announcement on Iran's intention for obtaining NPPs was made in December 18, 1972 [5], when Iran's Ministry of Water and Power began a feasibility study for constructing a NPP in southern Iran.
The 1973 war between the Arab countries and Israel, and the subsequent huge increase in the price of oil, provided the Shah's government with considerable resources. In fact, 1974 proved to be a very busy year for Iran's atomic energy program! The Shah had originally envisioned Iran to produce, by 1990, 10,000 MW of electricity by NPPs. However, a 1974 study by the Stanford Research Institute concluded that Iran would need, by 1994, to produce 20,000 MW of electricity by NPPs. Thus, in March 1974 the Shah announced [6] plans for generating 23,000 MW of electricity, "as soon as possible," using up to 23 NPPs, with a target date of 1994. To achieve his goal, the Shah established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), appointed Dr. Akbar Etemad, a Swiss-trained physicist, as its first chief, and announced that the AEOI, like everything else, would be run directly under his command.
The Shah had proposed to the US for many years the establishment of a Joint Economic Commission (JEC) for regulating and expanding Iran's commercial relations between the two countries. Up until 1974, the US had always turned down the Shah's suggestion on the ground that, having a free-market economy, the US government had no role to play in the commercial relations with Iran. Instead, the Shah had established many such JECs with the communist countries. However, after the severe increase in the price of oil during 1973-1974, the US was looking for a way to recoup billions of dollars that it was spending on importing oil and, therefore, it suddenly became very interested in establishing a JEC with Iran! In a SECRET letter, dated April 13, 1974, to Amir Assadollah Alam, the long-time Imperial Court Minister and confidante of the Shah, Mr. Richard Helms, the then US ambassador to Iran, wrote [7]:
"On March 14 and April 4, 1974 I discussed in audience with His Imperial Majesty my Government's genuine interest in finding ways to deepen and broaden the already strong ties between the Imperial Government of Iran and the United States. I am pleased to describe to you in more comprehensive detail my Government's views on ways in which we can mutually enrich the relationships between our Governments. I would Greatly appreciate this message being forwarded to its High Destination..... Secretary [of State Henry A.] Kissinger looks forward yo discussing these matters personally with His Imperial Majesty at a fairly early date...."
Mr. Helms then went on to suggest the establishment of a JEC, the same commission that the US had resisted for years (!):
"There is considerable scope for expanded cooperations between our countries in the economic field. In order to provide proper focus and suitable high-level official guidance, we suggest the establishment of a Joint Economic Commission at the Cabinet level. For our part, we contemplate that the United States member of the Commission would be the Secretary of Treasury...."
Mr. Helms then proposed the formation of several working groups that "could address general areas of concern or specific projects," including technology transfer, petrochemical development, communications, and political and security matters. But the first and most important working group that he proposed was the NUCLEAR ENERGY PRODUCTION GROUP, for which he wrote,
"We have noted the priority that His Imperial Majesty gives to developing alternative means of energy production through nuclear power. This is clearly an area in which we might most usefully begin on a specific program of cooperation and collaboration. Accordingly, we suggest that this be the first working group under our Joint Economic Commission. The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission is prepared at an early date to visit Tehran with a team of experts to discuss ways and means by which we can most actively cooperate in this field based on our own experience."
As pointed out in detail in Part IV of this series, the fact is that constructing NPPs in Iran in the 1970s had no economic justification whatsoever. This had made the Shah very sensitive to the critics' criticism - which had considerable validity - that nuclear contracts were being imposed on Iran by the US. Mr. Alam, the Shah's confidante, also expressed his grave concerns to him by telling him that [8],
"It is not in the interest of Shahanshah's Independent National Policy that such suggestions [Mr. Helm's] be proposed and be called a contract,"
to which the Shah responded [8],
"We will expand our relations that we already have, and nothing more,"
just as Mr. Helms had suggested to the Shah in their private meeting and mentioned in his letter to Mr. Alam (see the next paragraph). Even from the US perspective, although the Shah was its close ally at that time, selling Iran nuclear technology was also a very sensitive subject, hence the secret nature of Mr. Helms' letter to Mr. Alam. The sensitivity can be seen in a paragraph of his letter where, under the title PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS, he stated that,
"In the ordinary course of events, our joint initiatives in the fields mentioned above will naturally receive a certain amount of attention. Some general reference to our expanded cooperation might well take place during Secretary [of State Henry A.] Kissinger's next visit, but it is my personal view that we should handle these joint endeavors as natural outgrowths of the already close and friendly relations between the Imperial Government of Iran and the United States....."
At the end of his letter, Mr. Helms emphasized the US eagerness to participate in Iran's nuclear program:
"The Secretary [of State Henry A. Kissinger] has asked me to underline emphatically the seriousness of our purpose and our desire to move forward vigorously in appropriate ways...."
In May 1974, Dr. D.L. Ray, the Chairman of the US Atomic Energy Commission, travelled to Iran during which he mentioned the possibility of establishing REGIONAL uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities for Iran.
The next month, the Shah declared that Iran will have nuclear weapons, "without a doubt and sooner than one would think" [9]. The Shah first backed off [10], but later on qualified his earlier statement, saying [11] that Iran has
"no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons but if small states began building them, then Iran might have to reconsider its policy"!
According to Dr. Akbar Etemad (the first Chief of the AEOI from 1974 to 1978), the TNRC carried out experiments in which plutonium was extracted from spent fuel using chemical agents [12]. Note that the most important use for plutonium is in a nuclear bomb. It is also believed that the Shah had assembled at the TNRC a nuclear weapon design team. According to Mr. Alam [13], in the mid 1970s the Shah ordered the establishment of a ``University of Military Sciences and Technology.'' The mission of this university, which was supposed to be in Esfahan and controlled solely by Iran's armed forces, was to carry out research and development in the area of chemical and nuclear weapons. The Shah had even authorized stealing the necessary science and technology from other countries, if need be, in order for Iran to fully acquire the know-how of making chemical and nuclear weapons. None of these activities did, of course, provoke any reaction by the US.
On March 3, 1975, Iran and the US signed an agreement worth about $15 billion, according to which the US was, among other things, to build EIGHT NPPs in Iran with a total capacity of about 8,000 MW. The agreement was signed by the US Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, and Iran's Finance Minister Mr. Houshang Ansari. The fuel for the reactors was to be supplied by the US.
On March 14, 1975, in National Security Study Memorandum 219 signed by Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, President Gerald R. Ford directed [14]
"a study of the issues involved in reaching an acceptable agreement with the Government of Iran which would allow nuclear commerce between the countries - - specifically, the sale of the U.S. nuclear reactors and materials, Iranian investment in the U.S. enrichment facilities, and other appropriate nuclear transactions in the future."
About a month later, President Ford instructed the US negotiators to offer Iran uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities. Specifically, National Security Decision Memorandum 292, dated April 22, 1975 and signed by Mr. Kissinger, stated [15] that the US shall
"- - Permit U.S. materials to be fabricated into fuel in Iran for use in its own reactors and for pass-through to third countries with whom we have Agreement."
In addition, the US was willing to allow Iran to invest in the US uranium enrichment facility (Iran had proposed investing $2.75 billion in an enrichment facility in the US [16]). This is stated in the Memorandum [15]: The U.S. shall
"- - Agree to set the fuel ceiling at a level reflecting the approximate number of nuclear reactors planned for purchase from the U.S. suppliers. We would, as a fallbak, be prepared to increase the ceiling to cover Iran's full nuclear reactor requirement under the proviso that the fuel represents Iran's entitlement from their proposed investment in an enrichment facility in the U.S...."
The US was also willing to allow Iran to reprocess the spent fuels [15] (whic produce plutonium): The US shall
"Continue to require U.S. approval for reprocessing of U.S. supplied fuel, while indicating that the establishment of a multinational reprocessing plant would be an important factor favoring such approval...."
Around the same time, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology signed a contract with Iran for providing training for Iranian nuclear engineers. At that time, the AEOI had a staff of about 150 nuclear physicists, about half of whom were from Argentina. The Shah increased the 1976 budget of Iran's AEOI to $1 billion from about $31 million in 1975.
In National Security Decision Memorandum 324, dated April 20, 1976 and signed by General Brent Scowcroft, President Ford authorized the following negotiation position for the US with Iran. The US side should [17]:
"Seek a strong political commitment from Iran to pursue the multinational/binational reprocessing plant concept, according the U.S. the opportunity to participate in the project....."
Note that when President Ford was offering Iran such nuclear concessions, Dick Cheney, the present Vice President, was the White House Chief of Staff, and Mr. Donald Rumsfeld was the US Defence Secretary. Therefore, the same Donald Rumsfeld who was closely involved with pursuing a nuclear deal with Iran in the 1976, and the same Donald Rumsfeld who went to Baghdad in December 1983 to inform Saddam Hussein that the US, although officially neutral in the Iran-Iraq war, was going to tilt towards Iraq (after which the US provided strong military and intelligence support to Saddam Hussein), now has a leading role in the invasion of Iraq and threatening Iran with military strikes.
Around the same time, Mr. Jeffrey Eerkens, a US uranium enrichment expert, travelled to Iran to obtain funding for an invention of his for a special laser that could be used for uranium enrichment. In fact, Mr. Eerkens obtained in 1978 a license from the US Department of Energy to sell four lasers to Iran [18]. The lasers were shipped to Iran in October 1978 (only five months before Islamic Revolution's victory!). The IAEA reported recently that Iran had experimented with this technique about 10 years ago. However, apparently, the Eerkens lasers proved to be unworkable as a uranium enrichment instrument [19].
On April 12, 1977, Iran and the US signed an agreement to exchange nuclear technology and cooperate in nuclear safety. In an address to the symposium [20], "The US and Iran, An Increasing Partnership," held in October 1977, Mr. Sydney Sober, a representative of the US State Department, declared that the Shah's government was going to purchase EIGHT nuclear reactors from the US for generating electricity.
During his now-famous trip to Tehran on January 1, 1978, President Jimmy Carter and the Shah reached a new bilateral agreement for nuclear cooperation. The US agreed to grant Iran "most favored nation" status for reprocessing of spent nuclear fuels. Iran agreed to buy 6-8 light-water nuclear reactors from the US (subject to approval by the US Congress).
On July 10, 1978 (only 7 months before the Islamic Revolution's victory) the draft of the US-Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement was signed. The agreement was supposed to facilitate cooperation in the field of nuclear energy and to govern the export and transfer of equipment and material to Iran's nuclear energy program. Iran was also to receive American technology and help in searching for uranium deposits [21]. On October 18, 1978, James R. Schlesinger, the US Energy Secretary, sent the agreement to President Carter for his signature. By then, however, Islamic Revolution had swept Iran, and the Shah had informed the US Ambassador Richard Sullivan that his plans for NPPs were on hold. Finally, in early 1979, the US stopped its supply of highly enriched uranium to Iran. Since Iran started its nuclear energy program in the early 1980s, the US has been completely hostile towards it.
The Neoconservatives' Fantasies for Dealing with Iran's Nuclear Program
We now move the clock forward for about 30 years to the present times to see what the neocons and their sympathizers are saying about Iran's nuclear energy program. We begin with a quote about the neocons [22]:
"The neocons hate two things: To be wrong and to be ignored."
It is now an indisputable fact that Iraq did not have any weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. But, that never stopped the neocons and their sympathizers from advocating invasion of Iraq, which ultimately succeeded when the invasion began in March 2003. The disaster in Iraq has not, however, discouraged the necons and their sympathizers. They now have fantasies about Iran as if Iranians are not already suffering enough in the hands of Tehran's right wing. Too many articles are being published by the necons and their sympathizers describing their fantasies about Iran. All one has to do is taking a look at what such publications as the Weekly Standard, the National Review, the editorial pages of the Wall Street Journal, the Times of London, the Washington Times, and many other publications and websites contain about Iran, or do a Google search on Messrs Michael Ledeen, Michael Rubin, Reuel Marc Gerecht, and others. The goal of this part of the article is not to review what they write about Iran - it will take books to do so - but only to provide clues to neocons' and their sympathizers' thinking and their "action plans" for Iran's nuclear energy facilities, and compare them with the US policy towards Iran's nuclear program in the 1970s.
Before doing so, however, the author would like to point out that, having been a member of the Union of Concerned Scientists for nearly two decades - an organization dedicated to educating the public about the dangers of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons - he is only too aware of the danger that such weapons pose against the world, if they are in the hands of extremists. Therefore, the question is NOT whether Iran, under its present political conditions, should or should not have nuclear weapons. Rather, the point of this part of the article is to give wider public exposure to the neocons' and their sympathizers' fantasies about Iran, particularly among Iranians. Since they know very well that Iran is not Iraq to be overrun, and because they were bitten by "allies" such as Ahmad Chalabi and are well-aware that their Iranian allies - the monarchists and cultists - have no base of support inside Iran, they have begun having fantasies!
Exposing the neocons' and their sympathizers' fantasies is also important from another perspective: When it comes to opposing the spread of nuclear weapons (and it is not even certain yet whether Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons), the US has a double standard. Aside from Israel's arsenal (which includes biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons) which no US politician dares to question or even officially acknowledge, the US does not oppose Pakistan's nuclear arsenal - an immense threat to the stability of that part of the world, because Pakistan is an essentially failed State in a chaotic state. Its nuclear-armed military, populated by Islamic extremists, created the Taliban and still shields many of its leaders. Osama bin Laden could not have hidden for so long without the support of at least some elements of Pakistan's military. Pakistan has a sectarian war in which its majority sunni population has been murdering the shiite minority, and its schools teach Islamic radicalism. Abdul Ghadeer Khan, the founder and owner of Pakistan's nuclear supermarket, could not have operated freely for so long without the support of at least some elements of Pakistan's military. Even now, Pakistan does not allow any foreigners, including experts and inspectors of the IAEA, to interview Mr. Khan. However, instead of trying to alleviate this dangerous situation, the US has granted Pakistan "special friend" status.
But, the US double standards do not end with Israel and Pakistan. The US has exported nuclear technology to China; has offered a non-aggresion pact and economic incentives to North Korea, and never objected to Argentine and South Africa (which developed 16 nuclear bombs in the 1980s) acquiring nuclear technology and know-how. It was recently announced that South Korea and Taiwan both have been involved with enriching uranium, producing plutonium, and even nuclear bomb making, yet the revelation did not provoke any reaction by the US. Brazil, a signatory to the NPT, had until very recently refused to allow the IAEA full inspection of its uranium enrichment facilities that are under construction, yet, although Brazil provided nuclear materials to Saddam Hussein's regime in the 1980s, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell declared on October 5, 2004, that Brazil's behavior "does not concern the US."
Here, we review the positions of two pundits regarding Iran's nuclear energy program. They are not at the American Enterprise Institute, the hotbed of neoconservatism, and may not consider themselves as neoconservative pundits. However, as we show below, their positions resonate nicely with those of the neocons.
The first pundit whose "positions" regarding Iran's nuclear energy facilities we would like to discuss is Mr. Michael Eisenstadt, a senior fellow at The Washington Institute. In a recent book chapter [23] entitled, "The Challenges of U.S. Preventive Military Action," Mr. Eisenstadt suggested the following covert actions, among others, against Iran's nuclear facilities (see pages 121 and 122 of Ref. [23]) (the emphasis with capital letters is mine):
"harassment or MURDER of key Iranian SCIENTISTS or technicians;"
"introduction of FATAL DESIGN FLAWS into critical reactor, centrifuge, or weapons components during their production, to ensure CATASTROPHIC FAILURE DURING USE;"
"introduction of destructive viruses into Iranian computer systems controlling the production of components or the operation of facilities;"
"damage or destruction of critical facilities through SABOTAGE..."
There are at least three important aspects of the above covert options to consider:
(a) One wonders whether Mr. Eisenstadt's suggestion for murdering Iranian scientists or technicians is not tantamount to state-sponsored terrorism. If so, it appears that in Mr. Eisenstadt's view terrorism is committed only by weaker countries or groups against powerful nations!
(b) Likewise, it appears that Mr. Eisenstadt does not consider sabotage as either state-sponsored terrorism, or against international laws. It appears that in his view, international laws are good only so long as they advance the interests of powerful nations!
(c) It is completely clear that Mr. Eisenstadt has no notion of what constitutes a catastrophic failure in an industrial complex. We are talking about a system which includes nuclear reactors and nuclear materials. Any catastrophic accident or system failure in any large-scale industrial complex, let alone a nuclear complex, is one that has immense consequences in terms of loss of lives, long-term health problems, human suffering, and economic and environmental damage. We only need to recall what happened in Bhopal, India - a non-nuclear accident - and in Chernobyl, Ukraine - a nuclear accident - to see the consequences of a catastrophic industrial failure. The people of those areas are still paying with their lives the cost of those accidents, with Chernobyl's total casualty reaching over 30,000.
To further boost his case for the type of covert actions he was proposing, Mr. Eisenstadt stated that [23],
"it might not be possible for Iranian authorities to determine, for instance, whether the death of a scientist was due to natural or un-natural causes, or whether damage to a critical facility was due to an industrial accident or sabotage."
Consider the reasoning: Mr. Eisenstadt seems to be of the opinion that the people who run Iran's nuclear program know nothing about anything. He appears to have forgotten that the same Iranian authorities managed to set up the complete cycle for enriching uranium over a period of 18 years and hide it from the world.
It came to the author's attention that Mr. Eisenstadt, in an e-mail that he sent to the panelists of the panel, "Assessing the Iranian Nuclear Program: Technical Capabilities and Intent," which was part of a workshop entitled, "Iran's Nuclear Program" (held on Tuesday November 9, 2004, at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.), tried to put a spin on what he had stated in his article quoted above. In that panel Mr. Eisenstadt's proposal for creating a catastrophic failure was questioned and criticized by Professor Najmedin Meshkati of the University of Southern California, an internationally-recognized authority on safety of nuclear reactors. In response to Professor Meshkati's criticism, Mr. Eisenstadt stated the following [24] in his e-mail:
"Had I been there [in the panel] I would have pointed out that the term 'catastrophic failure' is used in industry to describe 'failure, often sudden and without warning, that jeopardizes the acceptable performance of an entire system or assembly.' (This definition is from the ChemIndustry.com website, which describes itself as the worldwide search engine of the chemical industry). "Catastrophic" refers to how the failure affects the operation of the system, not its impact on the people operating the facility or living in its vicinity. There are no doubt ways to sabotage a nuclear power plant (if one were inclined to do so and had appropriate access) to prevent reactor start-up or to force it to shut-down without creating a hazard to the work force or the peoples of the region."
The author has been involved with the chemical and petroleum industry for thirty years. In addition to being a professor of chemical engineering, carrying out research (funded by leading funding agencies in the US) and publishing extensively (over 220 papers and 4 books) in these areas, the author has also been, and currently is, a consultant to many industrial coorporations. Mr. Eisenstadt's "clarification" is, in the author's opinion, nothing but hair spiting and distorting what is widely known, and does nothing but adding insult to the injury of his original suggestions. The suggestion that one can cause catastrophic failure in a nuclear facility "without creating a hazard to the work force or to the peoples of the region" is absolutely outrageous.
Perhaps one of the best responses to the "clarification" of Mr. Eisenstadt, and his claim that he was only discussing some possibilities, was given by Dr. Guive Mirfendereski, an international laws expert and a frequent commentator on Iran and the Middle East. In an e-mail to Mr. Eisenstadt, Dr. Mirfendereski wrote [25]:
"You are not in a scientific conference where all manner of theories are proposed, or in a sci-fi convention. Since the conditions of flawlessness of execution are never met, a catastrophic failure will produce catastrophic consequences. To even suggest such a thing in theory is reckless and without regard to the human toll that it will engender. Assume that the catastrophic failure occurs in Bushehr and before you know it the Iranians [who work there] fail to manage the failure properly - the Bhopal or Chernobyl style cloud or waterborne contamination then begins to waft over into the Persian Gulf and the neighboring countries, which include Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Iraq, where we [the US] have troops and will have for a foreseeable future. Will you then stand up and say, oops we goofed, the intel was faulty? Instead of coming up with Agent-Orange type solution inspired by an over-exaggerated sense of Bond-esque machismo, maybe the time has come for you and your cohorts to talk about befriending a country without whose friendship in the past twenty-odd years we [the US] have managed to screw up everything we touched in the Middle East - ironically to the ultimate detriment of the welfare of the citizens of a certain country that wags our [the US'] national policy."
The depth of Mr. Eisenstadt's lack of understanding of what is happening in the Middle East and what his proposals might do to that region can be seen where he states in his article that [23]:
"Successful U.S. prevention would require exceptionally complete intelligence; near flawless military execution; and deft post-strike diplomacy to mitigate an anti-American nationalist backlash, deter retaliation, and, most importantly, ensure that military action does not poison pro-American sentiment or derail the movement for political change in Iran. The complex, daunting, and somewhat contradictory nature of these challenges (e.g., successful prevention could harm short-term prospects for political change and complicate long-term prospects for rapprochement with a new Iran) only underscores the importance of exhausting diplomatic options before giving serious consideration to military action."
In other words, Mr. Eisenstadt believes that the US can cause a catastrophic failure in Iran's nuclear energy facilities, with unforeseen human, economic, and environmental consequences, but if the US only has "deft post-strike diplomacy" it can prevent a backlash and piosoning of pro-American sentiment, or derailment of the movement for political change in Iran. What Mr. Eisenstadt is saying is, in fact, rehashing of what all the neocons have been saying: That the reason for the anti-US feelings in the Middle East is just bad public relations, and has nothing to do with what the US has actually been doing there. In other words, as a Bush Administration official recently stated, the US should "create reality" as it goes ahead with its policies in the Middle East.
The second pundit whose position regarding Iran's nuclear energy facilities we discuss is Mr. Patrick Clawson. He is deputy director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a pro-Israel think tank. Similar to Mr. Eisenstadt, Mr. Clawson has been advocating sabotage, and creating industrial accidents in Iran's nuclear energy facilities. In a recent article Mr. Clawson stated that [26]:
"In an ideal world, the United States could disrupt Iran's nuclear program through covert means, such as corrupting software programs."
In another recent article [27] Mr. Clawson was quoted as going further, stating that:
"The idea that the only contingency plan available is to use U.S. air raids is not true. Given the shoddy design of the Russian nuclear plants whose blueprints Iran is using for its facilities, one could well imagine that there could be catastrophic industrial accidents."
However, it was in the Workshop in Washington (mentioned above) that Mr. Clawson stated his position most "eloquently." His remarks followed up Mr. Henry Sokolski's response to Professor Najmedin Meshkati's inquiry about suggestion for sabotaging Iran's nuclear system and Mr. Eisenstadt's written statements quoted above. The following remarks were transcribed verbatim from the C-SPAN live and then re-broadcast of the Workshop on Iran's Nuclear Program. Mr. Clawson said (the emphasis with capital letters are the author's) [28]:
"Look, if we could find a way in which we could introduce computer viruses which caused the complete shutdown of the Bushehr system before it became operational, that would be DELIGHTFUL."
"If we could find ways in which these very complicated centrifuges, which are spinning at such high speeds, could develop stability problems and fly apart, and the cascade [of the centrifuges] could be DESTROYED, I think that would be DELIGHTFUL."
The readers surely note that empty centrifuges do not spin! They only spin at high speeds when they contain uranium hexafluoride which is in gaseous state. So, destroying the cascade of the centrifuges only implies rapidly spreading the uranium compound everywhere, from which Mr. Clawson would derive delight. He continued:
"And, indeed, if we could find a way to create an industrial accident of the scale of the Three Mile Island which did not cause a single fatality, which would prevent Bushehr from becoming operational, I think that would also be very HELPFUL."
So, the contention is that a nuclear accident of the type and scale of the Three Mile Island would not cause any fatality! Clearly, Mr. Clawson has not done his homework. The author invites Mr. Clawson and the interested readers to watch the award-winning video, "Three Mile Island Revisited" [29]. To quote, the video
"directly challenges the claim of the nuclear industry and government that 'no one died' from the core meltdown of the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in 1979, America's worst nuclear disaster. Through the testimony of area residents and scientific experts, the documentary presents compelling evidence that cancer deaths and birth defects increased in the area surrounding the Pennsylvania plant."
The author also suggests that Mr. Clawson and the interested readers read, "People Died at Three Mile Island," chapter 14 of a seminal book [30] to learn about the chilling facts about this nuclear accident, from birth defects and increased rate of child mortality, to increased cancer deaths in that area.
Mr. Clawson then continued,
"So, there are a whole variety of mechanisms that could be used to stop Iran's nuclear program, that would be much less dangerous than some of the other methods that we are talking about. We are talking about military strikes. I hate to tell you this, but military strikes kill people, and that fact we have to take into consideration."
So, Mr. Clawson was apparently worried about loss of human lives as a result of military strikes. But he immediately revealed his true colour (if he already had not by making the statement about a Three Mile Island-type of accident):
"If we could find ways to bring about industrial accidents, that offer good prospects of not endangering human life, but may UNFORTUNATELY CAUSE SOME COLLATERAL DAMAGE, then that's a plan that we have to consider."
Therefore, Mr. Clawson immediately contradicted himself and conceded that industrial accidents of the type he is talking about do cause some (how much?) collateral damage.
After the 1995 agreement was signed by Iran and Russia for completing the Bushehr reactor, the Clinton administration began charging that the plutonium that one can extract from the nuclear waste that the reactor would produce could be used by Iran for making nuclear weapons. However, this issue was addressed by Iran and Russia, when they negotiated an agreement by which the nuclear wastes from the Bushehr reactor would be returned to Russia. In fact, the Bushehr reactor, at which most of Messrs Eisenstadt and Clawson fury and covert plans are aimed, is believed by many experts to be incapable of producing plutonium suitable for making a nuclear bomb. For example, according to Thomas Stauffer [31],
"The reactor at Bushehr is the wrong kind of nuclear reactor for producing weapons-grade fissile material. It will produce the wrong kind of plutonium.... It can be operated only in the wrong way with regard to yielding plutonium, and it is the wrong kind of reactor as well, in the sense that a facility such as Iran's is easily amenable to close surveillance, not lending itself at all to any covert diversion - of even the wrong kind of plutonium."
However, the neocons and their sympathizers would have none of these. The only thing that would satisfy this group is the complete destruction of Iran's nuclear energy facility, regardless of its human, environmental and economic consequences. Thus, having "successfully" completed their "Project for the New Iraqi Century," the neocons and their sympathizers have begun having fantasies about Iran. We already have neocons among Iran's right wing in Tehran who have been trying to suppress Iran's democratic movement. We should look forward to seeing Iranian neo-monarchists and neo-cultists as well, the US neocons' natural allies.
Conclusion
It is clear that the Frankstein that the US now calls Iran's nuclear program was conceived by the Shah and his government, with the direct assistance and strong encouragement (many believe pressure) by the US. Not only did the US want the Shah to develop nuclear infrastructure and build nuclear reactors (hence inspiring him to start the work for building nuclear bombs), but also offered him uranium enrichment technology, the main point of contention between the US and its European allies, and Iran. That was, of course, because the Shah was the US' dictator, having put him in power after he had been run out of Iran in 1953. The present reactionary right wing in Tehran is home grown. That appears to be the main difference between the Shah and his regime and Tehran's present right wingers.
Nearly 27 years ago, when the author moved to the US for his graduate studies at the University of Minnesota in Minneapolis, the neocons and pundits such as Messrs Clawson and Eisenstadt were considered as belonging to fringe groups on the far right. Today, such groups are gradually becoming the "mainstream" of the American politics. With the neocons being in power for the next four years, we may have to develop new meanings for "fringe groups," "far right," etc. In that case, the author shudders at the thought of what the new "fringe groups" or the "far right" may constitute, if the lunatic neocons represent the "mainstream."
References:
[1] US Department of State, "Atoms for Peace Agreement with Iran," Department of State Bulletin 36 (April 15, 1957).
[2] G.A. Morgan, "The Current Internal Political Situation in Iran," in Digital National Security Archive, secret internal paper dated February 11, 1961. http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com
[3] Digital National Security Archive, January 29, 1980, "US Supplied Nuclear Material to Iran." http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com
[4] D. Albright, "An Iranian Bomb?," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol. 51, No. 1 (January 1995).
[5] "Nuclear Plant Study Started," Kayhan International (December 19, 1972).
[6] Tehran Magazine (March 18, 1974), page 2.
[7] A.A. Alam, "Alam's Diaries", Volume 4, edited by A. Alikhani (Maziar Press, Tehran, 2001), pp. 54-58. Mr. Alam had left a copy of the letter with his diaries, which is reprinted in the book. These documents may also be found in, "Issues and Talking Points: Intensified Bilateral Cooperation," Department of State Briefing in Digital National Security Archive; nsarchive.chadwyck.com
[8] A.A. Alam, "Alam's Diaries", Volume 4, edited by A. Alikhani (Maziar Press, Tehran, 2001), page 7.
[9] "More Fingers on Nuclear Trigger?" Christian Science Monitor (June 25, 1974).
[10] According to Ref. [9], Iran's embassy in France issued a statement, denying that the Shah made that statement.
[11] Der Spiegel, February 8, 1975.
[12] A. Etemad, "Iran," in, "European Non-Proliferation Policy," edited by H. Mueller (Oxford University Press, London, 1987), page 9.
[13] A.A. Alam, "Alam's Diaries", Volume 1, edited by A. Alikhani (Maziar Press, Tehran, 2001), page 107.
[14] See President Gerald R. Ford's Presidential Documents at www.ford.utexas.edu/library/document/nsdmnssm/nssm219a.htm
[15] See President Gerald R. Ford's Presidential Documents at www.ford.utexas.edu/library/document/nsdmnssm/nssm292a.htm
[16] Department of State Secret Report, "Current Foreign Relations: US-Iran Commission cements bilateral ties; Iran and Iraq agree to settle differences." See, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.
[17] See President Gerald R. Ford's Presidential Documents at www.ford.utexas.edu/library/document/nsdmnssm/nssm324a.htm
[18] L.S. Spector, "Going Nuclear: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1986-1987" (Ballinger Publishing, Cambridge, 1987), page 46.
[19] L.S. Spector and J.R. Smith, "Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1989-1990" (Westview Press, Boulder, 1990), page 205.
[20] A. Etemad and N. Meshkati, "The US-Iran Nuclear Dispute: Dr Mohamed ElBaradei's Mission Possible to Iran," Iran News (July 13, 2003).
[21] Department of State Memorandum, "Iran: The US-Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement," October 20, 1978.
[22] This beautiful and insightful quote is not the author's. He read it in an article but, unfortunately, could not locate its original source. The author would be grateful to any reader who can provide him with the original source of the quote.
[23] "Checking Iran's Nuclear Ambitions," edited by H. Sokolski and P. Clawson (Carlisle, PA, U.S. Army War College, 2004). The document can be accessed on-line at: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdffiles/00359.pdf. Those readers who may feel depressed after reading Mr. Eisenstadt's chapter in this book, may consider reading the chapter by Mr. Rob Sobhani for some relief and entertainment. (That chapter is, however, the subject of a forthcoming article by the author.)
[24] The author is grateful to Professor Najm Meshkati for sharing with him the e-mail on December 6, 2004.
[25] The author is grateful to Dr. Guive Mirfendereski for granting him permission, on December 6, 2004, to quote him here.
[26] P. Clawson, "How to Rein in Iran Without Bombing It," the Los Angeles Times (Friday October 15, 2004).
[27] S. Efron, "U.S. Options Few in Feud With Iran," the Los Angeles Times (Monday December 13, 2004).
[28] The author is grateful to Professor Najm Meshkati for his invaluable help with transcribing what Mr. Clawson stated.
[29] The video was produced by Steve Jambeck and Karl Grossman, and is about 30 minutes long.
[30] H. Wasserman and N. Solomon (with R. Alvarez and E. Walters), "Killing Our Own, the Disaster of America's Experience with Atomic Radiation" (Dell Publishing Co., New York, 1982).
[31] T.R. Stauffer, "Unlike Dimona, Iran's Bushehr Reactor Not Useful for Weapons-Grade Plutonium," Washington Report on Middle East Affairs (September 2003), p. 28; see, http://www.washington-report.org/archives/sept03/0309028.html.
About the author:
Muhammad Sahimi is Professor & Chairman of Chemical and Petroleum Engineering at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles. In addition to several other scientific organizations, since 1986 he has been a member of the Union of Concerned Scientists and a member of its Partners for Earth Program. He has been a visiting professor in Australia, Europe, and the Middle East, and a consultant to many energy firms around the world. Portions of this article and a shortened version of Part IV will appear in the Fall issue of Harvard International Review.
-------- japan
US Supplied Uranium Used to Test New Japanese Plutonium Reprocessing Plant
From: Viviane Lerner
Date: Wed Dec 22, 2004 0:42am
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
DECEMBER 21, 2004
9:52 AM
CONTACT: Greenpeace
Atsuko Nogawa, Greenpeace Japan Nuclear Campaigner +81-90-3654-4035
Shaun Burnie, Greenpeace International - in the UK +44-1557 814 195
Tom Clements, Greenpeace International - in Washington DC +1 202 319
2411
Keiko Shirokawa, Greenpeace Japan Media Officer +81-90-3470-7994
US Supplied Uranium Used to Test New Japanese Plutonium Reprocessing
Plant
WASHINGTON -- December 21 -- 150 Greenpeace activists and over 300
people from all over Japan protested at the Rokkasho plutonium
reprocessing plant this morning. The protests started as Japanese
Nuclear Fuel Limited started to load uranium, including a shipment from
the USA, into the plant for the first time (1).
"These tests must be cancelled and plans for full operation abandoned.
Rokkasho could produce as much as 8000 kilograms of plutonium a year,
enough to build more than 1000 nuclear weapons. Japan has no
justification to produce weapons-usable plutonium and has no peaceful
use for it," said Greenpeace Japan Nuclear Campaigner, Atsuko Nogawa.
"Japan already has 40 tonnes of plutonium and has failed in efforts to
use it as nuclear fuel. The Bush administration has given the green
light to start-up the plant, even though it knows the dangers of
nuclear proliferation in the region," said Ogawa.
Two years ago Greenpeace challenged the Bush administration to review
Rokkasho, particularly the impact it will have on the growth in
plutonium stocks, and on non-proliferation in North East Asia. No such
review has been conducted (2).
There are only two commercial reprocessing plants currently in
operation worldwide - British Nuclear Fuel Limited's Sellafield plant
in the UK, and Cogema's La Hague facility in France. These state-owned
facilities have proved to be the most contaminating nuclear facilities
in operation, and a failure on economic, environmental and
proliferation grounds. The French plant, operated by Areva/COGEMA, has
failed to secure contracts with its national electric utility, EDF,
beyond 2007. The UK media has reported that reprocessing will end at
Sellafield by 2010.
The Rokkasho nuclear reprocessing plant is estimated to have cost $US
20 billion, more than the GDP of Fiji, Mongolia or Belize. Based on
French technology, it has taken 20 years to construct and is a relic
before it has even opened.
"This plant is an expensive failure and a monument to the risks of
proliferation of nuclear weapons materials. Both the Japanese
government and US administration need to rethink their dangerous plans
and close it down," concluded Nogawa.
Greenpeace is an independent campaigning organisation that uses
non-violent creative confrontation to expose global environmental
problems to force solutions that are essential to a green and peaceful
future.
Protestors from Greenpeace, and other NGO's, demonstrate in a blizzard
at the gates of the Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited Rokkasho Reprocessing
Plant. The proest is against the tests and reprocessing of Depleted
Uranium.
Protestors from Greenpeace, and other NGO's, demonstrate in a blizzard
at the gates of the Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited Rokkasho Reprocessing
Plant. The proest is against the tests and reprocessing of Depleted
Uranium.
Notes to Editor:
1 - The uranium will be used to test equipment over the next 12 months,
and will be followed by spent fuel tests, scheduled for December 2005.
Given the many problems experienced over the years during construction
of the plant, it is expected that there will be further problems and
delays.
2 - Greenpeace is opposed to the Rokkasho plant on non-proliferation,
environmental, and human health grounds. Since the USA approved the
uranium export, it has been disclosed that South Korea has conducted
plutonium and enriched uranium tests, while the crisis over North
Korea's nuclear weapons program has remained unresolved. The letter
from Greenpeace to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission is available on
request.
-------- korea
South Korea says 2005 a crossroad for North Korea nuclear stand-off
BEIJING (AFP) Dec 22, 2004
http://www.spacewar.com/2004/041222065329.ides9c0c.html
South Korea acknowledged Wednesday that little had been achieved in three rounds of talks to end the impasse over North Korea's nuclear drive and said 2005 would prove a crossroads year for the issue.
"Unfortunately real negotiations to settle the North Korea nuclear issue have not begun yet," South Korean Unification Minister Chung Dong-Young said in a speech at Beijing University.
"In 2005 we will be at a crossroad: we can either find a breakthrough in resolving the matter or we can face a crisis situation."
Chung, also head of the National Security Council, is in Beijing as President Roh Moo-Hyun's special envoy as the two sides seek ways to restart stalled multinational talks on North Korea's nuclear ambitions.
He said the main obstacle was the lack of trust between North Korea and the United States.
"North Korea doesn't trust the outside world -- that is to say the United States -- and America doesn't trust North Korea. This is the main reason why we haven't started the negotiations," he said through a Chinese translator.
The reclusive Stalinist state vowed Monday to strengthen its deterrent if the United States holds on to its "hostile" policy on the communist country.
Chung said it was crucial that North Korea works towards normalising relations with the United States and Japan.
"What is most important is the normalisation of relations between North Korea and the United States, and the North should also establish diplomatic relations with Japan," he said.
Pyongyang must also abandon its nuclear plans, become part of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and accept inspections from the International Atomic Energy Agency, he said.
In return, the United States needed to "safeguard" North Korea's political system, lift economic sanctions against the country and establish diplomatic ties, said Chung.
"Only then will the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula, which formed during the Korean War, be dismantled."
It was South Korea and China's job to build trust between the two countries, he said, and reiterated that military threats should play no part in resolving the crisis.
Chung said a window of opportunity still existed for North Korea, officially called the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), to prove that 2005 could be "an historical point of transition".
"We hope and expect the parties involved in the six-party talks, including the DPRK and the US, to make a historic choice and decision."
North Korea has been under growing pressure to return to the six-party negotiations which also include South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States.
The sides have held three rounds of talks since the standoff began in October 2002. North Korea boycotted a fourth round scheduled for Beijing in September, citing what it called a hostile US policy and other issues.
It has indicated it would take no steps until it was sure what shape US policy would take under the second administration of President George W. Bush, who will be officially inaugurated on January 20.
--------
Minister Urges US, NK to Make 'Historic Choice' Over Nukes
12-22-2004 16:59 (Yonhap)
http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/200412/kt2004122216580810230.htm
BEIJING - A South Korean presidential envoy called on North Korea and the United States Wednesday to compromise to end the ongoing global standoff over the North’s nuclear weapons program.
The envoy, Unification Minister Chung Dong-young, discussed the tension over the North's nuclear program in a speech at Beijing University. He said that 2005 will be a watershed year for resolving the dispute.
``The North's nuclear issue will be at a crossroads next year,’’ Chung said. ``We expect North Korea, the United States and other participants in six-way talks to make a historic choice and decision.’’
Chung, who arrived in Beijing on Tuesday for a four-day visit, discussed the issue when he met with parliamentary speaker Wu Bangguo and other top Chinese officials. He was scheduled to meet more Chinese officials, including State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan and Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, before returning home on Friday.
Chung had no plan to meet Chinese President Hu Jintao but he passed a letter to him from South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, said South Korean officials accompanying him.
Three rounds of six-way talks, which involve the two Koreas, the U.S., China, Japan and Russia, have failed to make a breakthrough. The North boycotted a scheduled meeting in September to protest Washington’s ``hostile’’ policy.
While North Korea and the U.S. are the two main players in the negotiations, Chung stressed the importance of efforts by all parties involved in the negotiations to create ``conditions’’ for North Korea to make concessions.
``The window of opportunity to resolve the North's nuclear issue is still open,’’ Chung said, adding that South Korea opposes the use of any forceful means, economic or military, to resolve the dispute.
North Korea has vowed not to return to the negotiating table unless the United States alters its ``hostile’’ policy toward it and is threatening to bolster its ``deterrent force’’ against a possible U.S. invasion.
The term ``deterrent force’’ is a euphemism often used by North Korea to refer to its nuclear weapons capabilities.
Chung said that no country can force another to change its system or culture on the basis of its own standards in what appeared to be a thinly veiled attack on U.S. hard-liners who call for regime change in the North.
The chief South Korean negotiator with North Korea also said his government was ready to help its communist neighbor open up and become a full member of international society.
``What is the most important for this is the normalization of relations between North Korea and the United States, along with the establishment of formal ties between North Korea and Japan,’’ he said.
On Tuesday, U.S. President George W. Bush told reporters in Washington that he would continue to try to resolve the 26-month standoff through the six-party dialogue.
The nuclear row erupted in 2002 when U.S. officials said North Korea had admitted to having a uranium-based nuclear arms program in addition to its plutonium-based one. The North has denied making the confession.
-------- missile defense
Bush's spending cuts won't include Star Wars
Domestic programs will be slashed to support bogus missile defense
Joe Conason
The New York Observer
12.22.04
http://www.workingforchange.com/article.cfm?itemid=18281
After allowing his Republican friends in Congress to spend without restraint for four years -- fearing no veto -- George W. Bush took official notice of the federal deficit on Dec. 20. The President warned that from now on, he will "maintain strict discipline in spending tax dollars" with the aim of cutting the $500 billion annual deficit by half within five years.
"We will submit a budget that fits the times. It will provide every tool and resource to the military, will protect the homeland and meet other priorities of the government," he explained.
The President will reveal further details when he sends his 2006 budget message to the Capitol next February, although the intention has been clear since last spring. What we can anticipate is the usual slashing of domestic programs. This conservative pattern dates back to the Reagan era: spend big on the military and tax breaks for the wealthy, then cut back on school lunches, Medicaid, veterans' health care and clean water.
Soon we'll be hearing sonorous speeches from Republican leaders -- including Mr. Bush himself, no doubt -- about all the "wasteful spending" they so fervently oppose.
Such declarations would be more credible if only these politicians could curb their profligate enthusiasm for missile defense -- a truly wasteful program that proved again last week how badly this government manages our money and our security.
In case anyone missed the news, the latest test staged by the Defense Department's Missile Defense Agency concluded in an embarrassing failure on Dec. 15. The target rocket launched on schedule from Alaska, but the interceptor rocket never left its pad in the Marshall Islands for their planned rendezvous in space. The cause, according to the Missile Defense Agency, was "an unknown anomaly," which in plain English means that the Pentagon, after spending roughly $100 billion over the past two decades on this system, has no idea why it still doesn't work.
According to newspaper reports, the test had been postponed several times due to "bad weather," so apparently we must hope that our enemies choose a nice sunny day to attack. In fact, the interceptor hadn't been tested for two years, because the previous test in December 2002 was also a disastrous failure. On that occasion, the "kill vehicle" didn't separate from the booster rocket, missed the target by hundreds of miles and finally incinerated in the earth's atmosphere.
There are many sound scientific and technical reasons why this particular version of missile defense may never function as advertised, no matter how many staged experiments are performed. Previous tests have been carefully rigged by placing a homing beacon on the target, by launching the target repeatedly along the same course, and by programming complete information about the timing and trajectory of the target to the interceptor. The enemy not only has to attack on a sunny day, but they had better tell us exactly when and how, too.
Even if the Pentagon's engineers can someday launch an interceptor rocket that meets an incoming target, the enemy missile is likely to deploy simple countermeasures that can divert the "kill vehicle." Missile defense isn't nearly ready for realistic testing, and won't be for years, if ever.
But the President and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld have long ignored those discouraging facts and insisted that they would "deploy" the system before the end of Mr. Bush's first term. To fulfill that pledge, the Pentagon recently installed six interceptor missiles in Fairbanks, Alaska. The purpose is obviously symbolic, since they can't actually shoot down an enemy missile. (Incidentally, there are cheaper ways to cope with North Korean nuclear missiles -- like destroying them on the launch pad as soon as they're erected.)
Yet the President plans to continue this bizarre pretense -- at an estimated cost of $55 billion -- by further bloating the missile-defense budget each year between now and 2010. When he starts cutting domestic programs next year, remember that he will be spending billions more on missiles that don't fly.
Joe Conason writes for the New York Observer and Salon.com, and is the author of Big Lies: The Right-Wing Propaganda Machine and How It Distorts the Truth.
Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space
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http://www.space4peace.org
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-------- russia
Russia test fires ballistic missile
MOSCOW (AFP) Dec 22, 2004
http://www.spacewar.com/2004/041222104335.1lvzlg6l.html
Russia successfully test fired a RC-20B ballistic missile Wednesday from a silo in the southern Orenburg region, news agencies reported.
The missile, known to NATO as an SS-18 Satan, was launched at 11.30 am (8H30 GMT) and reached its target in the far eastern Kamtchatka peninsula some 6,000 kilometres (3,720 miles) away, Interfax reported.
"This launch confirmed the principal technical characteristics of the flight of the missile which represents a significant part of the combat potential of Russia's strategic forces," General Nikolai Solovtsov, the head of Russia's nuclear force, was quoted as saying.
It was the first test of that type of missile since 1991.
Russia's stocks of old Soviet-era missiles are expected to remain in service for the next 10 to 15 years, Itar-Tass reported.
President Vladimir Putin put the world on alert last month with an announcement that Russia has conducted tests on new nuclear systems, believed to include land-mobile missiles.
-------- treaties
Australia, Indonesia to co-host bio-weapons meeting next year
SYDNEY (AFP) Dec 22, 2004
http://www.spacewar.com/2004/041222065621.ya81om48.html
Australia and Indonesia will co-host a regional conference early next year aimed at preventing terrorists from using biological weapons, Defence Minister Robert Hill announced Wednesday.
Hill said the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) regional meeting would be held in Melbourne in February.
"There are increasing concerns about the possibility of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including biological weapons, and we see a valuable role for this workshop and follow-up activities in reducing the possibility of bioterrorism in our region," Hill said in a statement.
"By holding this workshop, Australia and Indonesia continue to demonstrate their strong commitment to stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and keeping our region free of biological weapons," he said.
"Australia and Indonesia have worked together closely in the past to promote effective implementation in our region of various arms control and disarmament treaties including the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention," he said.
The BWC bars signatory states from producing, stockpiling or acquiring biological weapons or their delivery systems.
-------- u.s. nuc weapons
Northrop Grumman To Modernize Guidance Systems On US Nuclear Missiles
The end of the world will begin with a precise and accurate fireworks display
Clearfield UT (SPX) Dec 22, 2004
http://www.spacedaily.com/news/icbm-04g.html
The U.S. Air Force has awarded Northrop Grumman Corporation a $153 million contract to continue full-rate production of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) Guidance Replacement Program (GRP).
This program is a key modernization effort that will upgrade the guidance-system electronics in the Minuteman III ICBM to extend the missile's service life through 2020.
This is the sixth of eight production awards from the Air Force ICBM Systems Program Office at Hill Air Force Base, Utah. The overall GRP program is valued at $1.6 billion over the eight production awards and is expected to be complete by 2009.
"The guidance replacement effort has been an extremely successful program," said John Clay, vice president and general manager, ICBM Prime Integration Contract, Northrop Grumman Mission Systems.
"We are on schedule with approximately 250 missiles left to equip with the upgrades. The exceptional performance of our guidance system is a tribute to the continued dedication and hard work of our team."
Northrop Grumman's GRP teammate, Boeing Electronic Systems Missile Defense produces the missile guidance sets for the program under subcontract to Northrop Grumman. Honeywell Space Systems Division is a major subcontractor to Boeing and provides the system's computer.
Northrop Grumman Mission Systems is the Air Force's ICBM prime integration contractor charged with maintaining alert readiness of the United States' ICBM weapon system through 2020.
As part of the contract, Northrop Grumman manages nine modernization efforts, including the Guidance Replacement Program, to maintain viability of the United States' ICBM fleet.
The 15-year prime contract was awarded in December 1997 and is currently valued at $4.5 billion with a total projected value of more than $6 billion. Northrop Grumman manages a team consisting of four principal teammates and more than 20 subcontractors.
-------- u.s. nuc facilities
-------- iowa
Alliant Unit to Sell Nuclear Plant Stake
Alliant Energy Plans Sale of 70 Percent Stake in Iowa Nuclear Generating Plant
Wednesday December 22, 9:26 am ET Associated Press
http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/041222/ip_l_sale_5.html
CEDAR RAPIDS, Iowa (AP) -- Interstate Power & Light Co., a utility subsidiary of Alliant Energy Corp., said Tuesday it plans to sell its 70 percent stake in a nuclear generating plant near Paola.
IP&L expects to enter a definitive agreement with a prospective owner within six months and will then seek to obtain all appropriate state and federal regulatory approvals.
The company said it is pursuing a sale at this time to allow a buyer to seek renewal of the operating license for Duane Arnold Energy Center, a 583-megwatt facility.
Through the sale, IP&L expects to reduce customer and shareholder financial and operational uncertainty associated with nuclear generating facility ownership and operations.
-------- vermont
State’s nuclear response plan flawed
By Kathryn Casa | Vermont Guardian
Posted December 22, 2004
http://www.vermontguardian.com/local/0904/NuclearPlan.shtml
BRATTLEBORO — Vermont’s radiological emergency planning has for years been in such disarray that state officials would be unable to monitor radiation fallout resulting from an emergency at Vermont Yankee. Nor could the decontamination center in Bellows Falls adequately protect thousands of southern Vermont residents evacuated there, according to internal state memos and copies of e-mails obtained by the Vermont Guardian.
The 32-year-old reactor “poses the single greatest ‘event’ threat to Vermont,” according to a May 2004 e-mail from Larry Crist, director of the Health Department’s Health Protection Division, to Albie Lewis, head of Vermont Emergency Management — a threat that is heightened by a proposed power increase at the plant, he wrote.
“To be inadequately prepared because we did not have sufficient resources is going to be considered a crime should an event actually occur,” Crist wrote.
It is unclear why the state has annually signed off on the emergency plan required by the Federal Emergency Management Agency as a component of Vermont Yankee’s operating license. Calls to the governor’s office about that issue were not returned at press time.
Lewis said this week that he was “not familiar” with the documents, which include a five-page memo from Crist citing critical shortcomings in the state’s Radiological Emergency Response Plan, and a warning from VEM’s Lew Stowell that the state can expect to fail a major FEMA drill next spring.
In Brattleboro Dec. 22 for a follow-up meeting on a failed Dec. 16 school evacuation drill, Lewis also refused to look at the documents when presented with them in person.
Crist said “a huge amount” has transpired since last spring, when he wrote the communiqués. “At long last we have set the stage for the creation of a professionally staffed and trained … team,” he said in a Dec. 23 phone interview.
But one member of the state’s Ingestion Pathway team — which would collect samples of soil, water, and agriculture products after a radiation release — concluded in a damning post-training critique obtained by the Vermont Guardian that the state is “not ready for a radiological emergency.”
Team members were outfitted with brittle gloves, ill-fitting dust masks, 1950s-era survey equipment “prone to dead batteries, loose wires and stuck gauges,” and “thin, cheap Grand Union kitchen trash bags” in which to collect irradiated samples, the state employee wrote after participating in training Nov. 4-5.
Trainers talked about “side-stepping safety requirements” by referring to team members as “volunteers,” he wrote.
The state has never had adequate personnel to carry out the emergency response plan, Crist wrote in February, and for years has played something of a shell game, juggling a “bare minimum” of some 11 qualified personnel where at least 60 are necessary.
“This was the same strategy employed for all other facets of the plan and was successful because FEMA never tested all components of the plan simultaneously,” according to Crist’s memo. “The flaw in this approach was that had there been a real event, the state would have been faced with the impossible task of assigning 11 trained health personnel to cover some 60 different roles simultaneously.”
Since the documents were written, 20-25 members of the state hazardous materials team have been designated as the state plume team, which is responsible for mapping the radiation plume footprint immediately following a release, Crist said in the interview.
However, with 25 people in place and 60 needed for both teams, the state appears to remain short-staffed, and it would take HAZMAT team members up to six hours to reach the “hot zone.”
Crist said Dec. 23 that three state departments, Health, Agriculture, and the Agency of Natural Resources, will supply a total of 14 employees for the Ingestion Pathway team. He said that all employees have been designated, but not all have been trained.
As recently as late October, internal e-mails between ANR employees indicated that the state continues to seek volunteers for the team, and is considering altering job descriptions to require state employees to staff the teams critical to the plan.
The e-mails also indicated that the employees were considering filing a grievance with their union over a possible change in their job descriptions.
Although planning has moved forward since the series of high-level memos and e-mails were exchanged last spring, preparation appears to remain inadequate as Vermont Yankee owner Entergy Corp. proceeds with a proposal to increase, or uprate, power output by 20 percent.
In May, Crist wrote to Lewis: “Given the recent events at … Vermont Yankee (stress cracks in piping, missing spent fuel rod pieces) and the real possibility of similar events in the future ( … the uprate will stress the physical facility even more than it currently is being stressed) it’s imperative that the administration understand our potential vulnerability.”
The e-mail continues: “For over five years now we have attempted to get both Vermont Yankee and the Legislature to recognize that our level of preparedness, although steadily improving, has not met the requirements contained in the [Radiological Emergency Response Plan]. We are now at the point where we can no longer gloss over our shortcomings in the hope that ‘things will get better next year.’”
Asked if he believed the plan was now sufficiently staffed and funded to handle an emergency, Lewis said that “the RERP is a living document. We are constantly looking at ways to improve the entire plan.”
As better technology becomes available, the state seeks to employ it, he said.
“There is a certifiable plan in place,” Crist insisted on Dec. 23. “The challenge is to make sure you have the resources, both monetary and personnel, to meet the requirements in that plan. That’s a very tough challenge.”
Crist’s February memo also identified serous problems at the reception center in Bellows Falls, to which residents of the emergency planning zone, including preschoolers, schoolchildren, and the elderly and infirm, would be evacuated.
The center failed a 2001 FEMA drill, but passed during a follow-up retest of portions of the drill. Crist wrote that, since the 2002 retest, “In short, we have a reception center that is not meeting basic readiness requirements and, more importantly, is staffed by local officials who do not appear to believe that they are accountable to either Health or VEM.”
He recommended that responsibility for the center be shifted either to Entergy or to the local communities.
Crist said on Dec. 23 that problems at the reception center stem from the fact that “it has never been completely clarified who actually is responsible” for the center’s overall operation. He noted that the center, which would be set up at Bellows Falls high school, is designed to handle only 15 to 20 percent of the population of the 10-mile emergency planning zone. The expected number of cars alone would overwhelm parking capacity, he acknowledged.
The state hopes to resolve the problems by establishing a second reception center to the west, possibly in Bennington, Crist said.
One anti-nuclear activist called the planning problems “a dereliction of responsibility to the people of Vermont.”
“To permit the plant to continue running when these emergency response measures are not in place is a huge hypocrisy,” said Ray Shadis, technical advisor to the New England Coalition, which closely monitors Vermont Yankee. “They treat it as if they’ve got all the time in the world to pony up some kind of fill-in-the-blanks, demonstrable plan, but looking at the facts, you cannot say they’re serious.”
-------- MILITARY
-------- africa
Ethiopian army deserters seek asylum in Kenya
NAIROBI (AFP) Dec 22, 2004
http://www.spacewar.com/2004/041222073520.7u7zh90k.html
Seven Ethiopian soldiers are seeking refuge in Kenya after surrendering to authorities over the weekend in the northern border town of Moyale, Kenyan police said Wednesday.
"We are questioning the seven army officers to establish why they left their homeland to seek refuge in Kenya," Eastern Province police commander Thomas Chigamba told AFP by phone from the regional capital Embu.
"According to international law, at the end of the day if we find that they did not do any crime at home, we shall hand them over to UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees) to screen them," he explained.
In May, Kenya repatriated some 350 Ethiopian students who fled their country alleging they were target of government intimidation.
-------- arms
Metal Storm Robot Will Demostrate Urban Warfare Capabilites For DARPA
The project design plan includes provision for the integration of Metal Storm weapons with sensors and targeting capabilities to allow the UGVs to act as the eyes and ears of the combat force when operating in hostile urban areas.
Arlington VA (SPX) Dec 22, 2004
http://www.spacedaily.com/news/unmanned-combat-04f.html
Metal Storm announced today that DARPA, the central research and development organization for the US Department of Defense, has selected the company's proposal titled 'Metal Storm Weapons for Urban Environments' for a contract award, subject to successful completion of contract negotiations.
This DARPA project is designed to provide a feasibility demonstration of a Metal Storm weapon mounted on an Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) in direct support of troops in military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) scenarios.
The project design plan includes provision for the integration of Metal Storm weapons with sensors and targeting capabilities to allow the UGVs to act as the eyes and ears of the combat force when operating in hostile urban areas.
Ian Gillespie, Metal Storm's Acting Chief Executive Officer, said, "This proposal selection underlines the value to our company of the significant engineering and technical effort that we have built up this year. We are very pleased to have our technology proposal selected by DARPA in support of their effort to provide revolutionary war-fighting improvements for the urban environment.
"One of Metal Storm's primary technical and commercial objectives is to develop low pressure weapon products for use on unmanned vehicles. Selection in this project will further advance the significant technical progress we have already made towards weaponizing unmanned ground and air vehicles," he said.
"We are already underway with our planning for this DARPA project and propose to initiate discussions shortly with major defense contractors in relation to the provision of supporting integration packages which complement our capabilities", said Mr Gillespie.
The project contract details will be negotiated with DARPA shortly. It is expected that the initial feasibility demonstration will be completed inside the next 12 months.
-------- business
Citing security, U.S. contractor pulls out of rebuilding project in Iraq
By Del Jones, USA TODAY
12/22/2004 11:27 PM
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2004-12-22-contractors-iraq_x.htm
A Virginia company this week became the first large contractor to withdraw from the multibillion-dollar Iraq reconstruction drive, saying work there was too dangerous and costly.
Contrack International, which had a $325 million contract overseeing a consortium rebuilding roads, bridges and railways in Iraq, said it was pulling out because of skyrocketing security costs.
Other contractors and reconstruction experts said they don't expect a major exodus unless conditions deteriorate severely. "I can't imagine that happening unless something really changed," said Don Lassus, a manager for Houston-based Parsons E&C, which has more than 100 employees in Iraq.
Most international humanitarian aid groups have left the country out of concern for the safety of their workers. Russian President Vladimir Putin said this month that Iraq remains too dangerous for Russian companies.
On Wednesday, Contrack, awarded one of 12 large reconstruction projects, said it was abandoning its job. The Los Angeles Times reported that in eight months, Contrack had collected about $30 million.
Iraq expert Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution, a think tank in Washington, said there is little likelihood that Contrack's move will spark a stampede.
"The bigger (contractors) are invested financially and politically, and they don't want to be seen abandoning the troops," O'Hanlon said. They might reconsider if they had trouble recruiting workers, but there is no sign of that, he said.
The Financial Times of London reported Wednesday that Orascom, the Egyptian parent of Iraq's main mobile phone provider, also was considering a pullout. "I'm not into the business of putting the lives of my people in danger. If (the violence) goes on, they won't find anyone willing to work in Iraq," said Orascom Chairman Naguib Sawiris.
At least 192 foreign contractors and subcontractors have been killed in Iraq since the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime in April 2003, according to Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, a Web site that tracks fatalities. An Egyptian driver working for Contrack was kidnapped, and his bullet-ridden body was found near a construction site several months ago.
Lt. Col. Eric Schnaible of the Pentagon's Project and Contract Office in Baghdad told the Associated Press that Contrack's departure was a mutual decision and doesn't signal a trend. "Some parts of the country are a whole lot more permissive than others," he said.
----
Military Satellite Project Hits Additional Snags
Lockheed Contract Already Over Budget
By Renae Merle
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, December 22, 2004; Page E05
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A18139-2004Dec21?language=printer
The Air Force said yesterday that a Lockheed Martin Corp. military satellite program has fallen another year behind schedule and that the cost of the program will grow by at least $800 million.
The Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite system, known as Advanced EHF, was designed to replace the military's Cold War-era Milstar satellites, providing 10 times as much bandwidth to transmit voice, data and video between soldiers and command centers.
But from the beginning the program has encountered technical problems and delays. The latest difficulties were caused by the slow delivery to Lockheed of government-furnished equipment to encrypt satellite transmissions, the Air Force said in a written statement. The program also required more testing and the replacement of electronic equipment, according to the statement.
The cost of the $5.3 billion program is expected to increase about $800 million because of the difficulties, said Alicia Garges, a spokeswoman at the space and missile center at Los Angeles Air Force Base. But an Air Force statement said the increase would be 20 percent, or $1 billion. It was not known late yesterday why the figures differed. The program had been expected to cost about $2.6 billion.
The launch of the first of three satellites in the system will be postponed until 2008, a year behind schedule.
A Lockheed statement did not address the delays but said the company is "completely dedicated to achieving mission success on this critical program to ensure this much-needed communications infrastructure is delivered expeditiously to our troops and allies worldwide."
The program's problems are not a surprise, since developing a satellite system is "a hard thing to do," said John E. Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org. "There was an enormous amount of unrealism built into aerospace contracting in the late 90s" when the Air Force launched the program.
-------- space
U.S. Air Force Plans for Future War in Space
By Leonard David
Senior Space Writer
posted: 10:00 am ET
22 February 2004
http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/technology/higher_ground_040222.html
The U.S. Air Force has filed a futuristic flight plan, one that spells out need for an armada of space weaponry and technology for the near-term and in years to come.
Called the Transformation Flight Plan, the 176-page document offers a sweeping look at how best to expand America’s military space tool kit.
The use of space is highlighted throughout the report, with the document stating that space superiority combines the following three capabilities: protect space assets, deny adversaries’ access to space, and quickly launch vehicles and operate payloads into space to quickly replace space assets that fail or are damaged/destroyed.
From space global laser engagement, air launched anti-satellite missiles, to space-based radio frequency energy weapons and hypervelocity rod bundles heaved down to Earth from space – the U.S. Air Force flight plan portrays how valued space operations has become for the warfighter and in protecting the nation from chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosive attack.
Now to far-term needs
A number of space-related transformational capabilities are described in the document. While some of these are seen as needed in the near-term (until 2010), others are described as mid-term efforts in 2010-2015, while some efforts are viewed as far-term, beyond 2015.
Among a roster of projected Air Force space projects:
Air-Launched Anti-Satellite Missile
* : Small air-launched missile capable of intercepting satellites in low Earth orbit and seen as a past 2015 development.
Counter Satellite Communications System:
* Provides the capability by 2010 to deny and disrupt an adversary's space-based communications and early warning.
Counter Surveillance and Reconnaissance System:
* A near-term program to deny, disrupt and degrade adversary space-based surveillance and reconnaissance systems.
Evolutionary Air and Space Global Laser Engagement (EAGLE) Airship Relay Mirrors:
* Significantly extends the range of both the Airborne Laser and Ground-Based Laser by using airborne, terrestrial or space-based lasers in conjunction with space-based relay mirrors to project different laser powers and frequencies to achieve a broad range of effects from illumination to destruction.
Ground-Based Laser:
* Propagates laser beams through the atmosphere to Low-Earth Orbit satellites to provide robust, post-2015 defensive and offensive space control capability.
Hypervelocity Rod Bundles:
* Provides the capability to strike ground targets anywhere in the world from space.
Orbital Deep Space Imager:
* A mid-term predictive, near-real time common operating picture of space to enable space control operations.
Orbital Transfer Vehicle:
* Significantly adds flexibility and protection of U.S. space hardware in post-2015 while enabling on-orbit servicing of those assets.
Rapid Attack Identification Detection and Reporting System
* : A family of systems that will provide near-term capability to automatically identify when a space system is under attack.
Space-Based Radio Frequency Energy Weapon
* : A far-term constellation of satellites containing high-power radio-frequency transmitters that possess the capability to disrupt/destroy/disable a wide variety of electronics and national-level command and control systems. It would typically be used as a non-kinetic anti-satellite weapon.
Space-Based Space Surveillance System:
A near-term constellation of optical sensing satellites to track and identify space forces in deep space to enable offensive and defensive counterspace operations.
Rapid launch needs
The newly issued Air Force document makes the following point: "The U.S. space capability rests on the foundation of assured access." There is need to deploy, replenish, sustain, and redeploy space-based forces in minimum time to allow them to accomplish the missions assigned to them - through all phases of conflict.
In this regard, the Air Force is exploring various future system concepts to launch, operate, and maintain space assets responsively. These include the Air Launch System, a dedicated, weather avoiding, on-demand (within 48 hours) system that can rocket into the sky at a wide variety of trajectories and can loft a Space Maneuver Vehicle, Common Aero Vehicle, or a conventional payload.
As explained in the Air Force document, a Space Operations Vehicle (SOV) enables an on-demand spacelift capability with rapid turnaround. This SOV can be one of the vehicles that could deploy the Space Maneuver vehicle – a rapidly reusable orbital vehicle capable of executing a range of space control missions. In addition, the SOV can be utilized to deploy the Common Aero Vehicle, or CAV.
The CAV is an unpowered, maneuverable, hypersonic glide vehicle deployed in the 2010-2015 time period. The CAV could be delivered by a range of delivery vehicles such as an expendable or reusable small launch vehicle to a fully reusable Space Operations Vehicle. It can guide and dispense conventional weapons, sensors or other payloads world wide from and through space within one hour of tasking. It would be able to strike a spectrum of targets, including mobile targets, mobile time sensitive targets, strategic relocatable targets, or fixed hard and deeply buried targets. The CAV’s speed and maneuverability would combine to make defenses against it extremely difficult.
Directed energy beams
Given the growing number of nations that utilize space, Air Force strategists see that trend as worrisome.
"The ability to deny an adversary’s access to space services is essential so that future adversaries will be unable to exploit space in the same way the United States and its allies can. It will require full spectrum, sea, air, land, and space-based offensive counterspace systems capable of preventing unauthorized use of friendly space services and negating adversarial space capabilities from low Earth up to geosynchronous orbits.
The focus, when practical, will be on denying adversary access to space on a temporary and reversible basis," the document states.
Air Force scientists and technologists are busy in the labs exploring the possibility of putting a warning energy "spot" on any target worldwide that could be rapidly followed with varying levels of effects.
A possible breakthrough, the document adds, deals with a solid-state directed energy beam systems, operating at 100-kilowatt levels. "If the generation of large quantities of heat could be managed, the Air Force could develop highly effective, cheap, high power energy weapons."
For example, Air Force researchers are looking at ways to collect or generate large quantities of energy on orbit in order to rely on space-based platforms for more missions and provide a greater degree of true global presence. "This would change many equations about traditional ideas of rapid response," the document explains.
Sensor-to-shooter
The report emphasizes that space capabilities are integral to modern war fighting forces, providing critical surveillance and reconnaissance information, especially over areas of high risk or denied access for airborne craft.
Space capabilities also provide weather and other Earth observation data, global communications, precision position, navigation, and timing to troops on the ground, ships at sea, aircraft in flight, and weapons en route to targets.
Space assets are critical to achieving information superiority as they enable predictive and dominant battlespace awareness. As a result there can be a reduction in the "sensor-to-shooter" cycle to minutes or even seconds, the document explains.
Real-time picture of the battlespace would involve an initial space-based Ground Moving Target Indicator capability.
This capacity provides U.S. global strike forces with the ability to identify and track moving targets anywhere on the surface of the Earth. Also desirable is the ability to detect, locate, identify, and track a wide range of strategic and tactical targets that the United States currently has minimal capability to detect. These include weapons of mass destruction, hidden targets, and air moving targets.
A real-time picture of the battlespace enables a commander to know where all friendly forces are, not only to better coordinate operations and avoid fratricide -- accidentally injuring or killing your own troops.
Roadmap to the future
In a February 17 press statement issued from the office of the Secretary of the Air Force, the public document on Air Force transformation is described as "a roadmap to the future".
The Air Force flight plan is a reporting document that enables the Secretary of Defense to evaluate and interpret the Air Force's progress toward transformation.
"Transformation is using new things and old things in new ways, and achieving truly transformational effects for the joint warfighter," said Lt. Gen. Duncan McNabb, Air Force director of plans and programs.
The newly issued, publicly releasable report is the one unclassified document that presents an overarching picture of Air Force transformation, added Lt. Col. James McCaw, from the plans and programs directorate's transformation branch.
"It will help the reader understand where the Air Force is going, and why we chose this path," McCaw concluded.
-------- spies
Ex-spy says CIA trapped in Cold War mode
By John Diamond, USA TODAY
12/22/2004 10:50 PM
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-12-22-cia-book_x.htm
WASHINGTON — In 1999, a year after the CIA's director declared war on al-Qaeda, the agency was still training its spy recruits in the art of working embassy cocktail parties and giving James Bond-esque classes in evasive driving, according to a book by a woman who spent five years in the CIA's clandestine service.
Even after the Sept. 11 attacks, wrote Lindsay Moran in her forthcoming book, Blowing My Cover: My Life as a CIA Spy, the CIA was slow to change espionage tactics. Sept. 11, she wrote, "sent everyone at Headquarters into a tailspin" trying to understand the intelligence failures that let the terrorist plot go undetected.
But when Moran, then stationed in Macedonia, developed a source who claimed to know Islamic extremists, her overseers at the CIA's Directorate of Operations cabled her that because "Subject may at one time have had terrorist ties," Moran should "cease and desist from any further contact with Subject."
Two years later, after a stint working on Iraq issues before the U.S.-led invasion, Moran resigned from the CIA. She says she was frustrated with the crimp her career had put on her personal life and was disillusioned by CIA bureaucracy.
Her account is the latest in a series of critiques that have portrayed an agency slow to respond to new kinds of threats in countries that don't have U.S. embassies and where cocktail