NucNews - December 2, 2004 -------- NUCLEAR Evidence on Cold Fusion Remains Inconclusive, New Review Finds By KENNETH CHANG Published: December 2, 2004 NY TIMES http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/02/science/02fusion.html In a new review of cold fusion - the claim that energy can be generated by running electrical current through water - the Department of Energy released a report yesterday that says the evidence remains inconclusive, echoing a similar report 15 years ago. Over the past several months, 18 scientists reviewed research in cold fusion, and two-thirds of them did not find the evidence for nuclear reactions in the experiments convincing. Almost all of them, however, said that aspects of cold fusion merited consideration for further research. "I think the new review has shed some light on the status of research that has been done over the last 15 years," said Dr. James F. Decker, deputy director of the science office in the Energy Department who agreed to the review at the request of several scientists involved with cold fusion research. Dr. Decker said the department was open to proposals for cold fusion research, but added that was not new. "We have always been open to proposals that have scientific merit as determined by peer review," he said. "We have never closed the door to cold fusion proposals." Cold fusion briefly appeared to promise an unlimited energy source in 1989 when Drs. B. Stanley Pons and Martin Fleischmann of the University of Utah announced that they had generated fusion - the same process that powers the sun - in a tabletop experiment using a jar of water containing deuterium, a heavier version of hydrogen. They claimed that an electrical current running through the water pulled deuterium atoms into two palladium electrodes, generating heat. The speculation was that the heat was coming from the fusion of the deuterium atoms. Other scientists, however, had trouble reproducing the findings, and at the end of 1989, a review by the Energy Department recommended against a specific cold fusion research program, although it did support further investigation into some aspects. After that, most scientists regarded cold fusion as a discredited farce, but a small group of scientists continued work in the field. Measurements have become better, but cold fusion experiments still produce heat at best half of the time. At the end of last year, several cold fusion scientists approached Dr. Decker, asking for a review. Dr. Decker agreed. In the review, nine scientists chosen by the Energy Department considered a paper submitted by the cold fusion scientists. Another nine listened to oral presentations by cold fusion scientists in August. "This was a very, very scientific, very level-headed, review by everybody," said Dr. Kirby W. Kemper, vice president for research at Florida State University and one of the reviewers of the oral presentations. But Dr. Kemper said, "I don't think we've made much progress since '89 in really nailing down the parameters that make it reproducible." He said there were interesting scientific questions on the behavior of hydrogen within metals that merited research, and he said his comments tried to offer a future research path. Dr. Michael McKubre, a scientist at SRI International, one of the scientists who approached Dr. Decker last year, said the conclusions were at least "mildly positive" in endorsing consideration of further research. "All we set out to demonstrate was there were serious issues of science that had to be developed further," Dr. McKubre said. "If you look through the materials, the majority, if not the entirety, agree on that point." -------- accidents and safety Planned Cleanup for Dirty Bombs Called Lax By H. JOSEF HEBERT December 2, 2004 Associated Press http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/apwashington_story.asp?category=1152&slug=Dirty%20Bomb WASHINGTON -- Standards for cleanup after a "dirty bomb" terrorist attack would permit long-term radiation levels that pose cancer risks many times greater than those acceptable at Superfund sites, nuclear waste dumps and commercial reactors, according to a draft of a government proposal. The Homeland Security Department is expected to issue the proposed guidelines, which have been developed over the last two years, within a few weeks, probably before the end of the year. They would become final after a 60-day comment period. The draft acknowledges that the consequences from a dirty bomb, a device that spreads radioactive material using conventional explosives, "may range from a very small, localized area ... to conceivably many square miles." And it says that if there is widespread contamination from a dirty bomb or an "improvised nuclear device" - where there actually would be a crude nuclear detonation - areas may have to be put off limits permanently. In such cases "existing land uses may not be practicable," the document says. As a result, the interagency task force developing the guidelines decided against issuing specific numerical radiation levels to guide long-term cleanup goals, although an earlier draft written last year contained specific allowable radiation levels proposed by different agencies. The latest version says cleanup efforts should be guided by radiation benchmarks established by various advisory groups, such as the International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP) and the Health Physics Society, as well as federal agencies. "They basically punted," said Daniel Hirsch, head of an anti-nuclear advocacy group, Committee to Bridge the Gap. Hirsch said the ICRP benchmark would allow long-term levels of radiation from 100 millirems to as much as 10,000 millirems, a level equivalent to as many as 50,000 chest X-rays over a 30-year period. The benchmark levels from the Health Physics Society would allow an area to continue to emit 100 millirems to 500 millirems per year, the equivalent of as many as 2,500 chest X-rays over 30 years. A 500 millirems-per-year radiation exposure is estimated to produce about 1 additional cancer for every 80 people exposed, according to government cancer-risk calculations, said Diane D'Arrigo of the Nuclear Information and Resource Service, a nuclear industry watchdog group. By comparison, the Environmental Protection Agency requires cleanup standards at Superfund toxic waste to assure an additional cancer risk no greater than 1 in 10,000 people exposed, said D'Arrigo. The government plans to limit the maximum radiation exposure to the public at the proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste site to no more than 15 millirems per year. A typical chest X-ray exposes a person to 6 millirems. Normal background radiation is about 300 millirems per year. The draft says the guidelines are "not intended to define `safe' or `unsafe' levels of exposure or contamination" but represent "the approximate levels at which the associated protective actions are justified." The contents of the so-called "interim final" draft document were first reported by an independent newsletter, Inside EPA. Copies of the draft, as well as an earlier version dated July 18, 2003, were obtained and provided Thursday by the Nuclear Information and Resource Service. Don Jacks, a spokesman for the Federal Emergency Management Agency, said he could not comment on the contents of the draft. He said the document could still change as it goes through the final approval process at FEMA, the White House Office of Management and Budget and the Homeland Security Department and after the planned public comment period. "Trying to interpret (the guidelines) now is way ahead of the curve," said Jacks. ---- Drunken Pilot Who Buzzed Plant Sentenced By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS Published: December 1, 2004 Filed at 6:15 p.m. ET http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/national/AP-Plane-Diverted.html?oref=login NORRISTOWN, Pa. (AP) -- A drunken pilot who buzzed his plane near a nuclear power plant and came near six commercial airliners was sentenced to six to 23 months in prison on Tuesday. John V. Salamone had a blood alcohol level of 0.15 percent when he landed the plane after an erratic, four-hour flight on Jan. 15 over the Philadelphia region, authorities said. The legal limit for pilots, set by the Federal Aviation Administration, is 0.04 percent, half the amount for drivers in Pennsylvania. Salamone, 44, who faced up to nine years in prison, must also serve five years probation and undergo alcohol counseling, a Montgomery County judge ordered. Salamone was convicted of risking a catastrophe and reckless endangerment after prosecutors learned the initial state charge of driving under the influence does not apply to pilots. Lawmakers have since tried to rectify the legal loophole, passing a bill -- now awaiting the governor's signature -- that makes flying drunk a crime. Salamone, flying a single-engine Piper Cherokee, meandered into New Jersey and flew into forbidden airspace. He flew as low as 100 feet and within a quarter mile of the Limerick nuclear power plant, officials said. A Philadelphia police helicopter helped force the plane down. Officials acknowledged at the time there was little they could do, physically, to bring the plane down after the North American Aerospace Defense Command concluded it was not a terrorist threat. ------ Lax dirty bomb cleanup standards decried Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2004 17:29:07 -0500 From: Michael Mariotte COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP NUCLEAR INFORMATION & RESOURCE SERVICE for immediate release DECEMBER 2, 2004 Contacts: Daniel Hirsch, CBG (831) 332-3099 Diane D’Arrigo, NIRS (202) 328-0002 x16 GROUPS CRITICIZE HOMELAND SECURITY PLANS TO RELAX RADIATION CLEANUP STANDARDS FOR A “DIRTY BOMB” OR TERRORIST NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE Doses Equivalent to Tens of Thousands of Chest X-rays Could be Allowed, Officially Estimated to Cause Cancer in Up to a Quarter of Those Exposed WASHINGTON, DC - More than 50 public policy organizations today called on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to halt plans to dramatically weaken requirements for cleaning up radioactive contamination from a terrorist radiological or nuclear explosive. The groups disclosed that DHS is about to release new guidance that could permit ongoing contamination at levels equivalent to a person receiving tens of thousands of chest X-rays over thirty years. Official government risk figures estimate that as many as a quarter of the people exposed to such doses would develop cancer. In a letter to outgoing DHS Secretary Tom Ridge, the groups said, “An attack by a terrorist group using a ‘dirty bomb’ or improvised nuclear device would be a terrible tragedy. . . .But should such a radiological weapon go off in the U.S, our government should not compound the situation by employment of standards for cleaning up the radioactive contamination that are inadequately protective of the public.” “Far from protecting us from the potentially catastrophic health effects of a terrorist dirty bomb, by permitting such high radiation levels to remain without cleanup, Homeland Security would actually be increasing the casualty count,” said Diane D’Arrigo, Radioactive Waste Project Director at Nuclear Information and Resource Service. “Approval of this guidance would also set a dangerous precedent to weaken the already inadequate cleanup standards for nuclear-contaminated sites across this country.” ”Benchmark” cleanup standards contemplated in the DHS guidance are up to 2500 times less protective than the risk levels considered by EPA as barely acceptable for cleanup of Superfund toxic and radioactive sites. “We recognize that response actions in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist incident may require extraordinary measures and doses,” said Daniel Hirsch, President of the Committee to Bridge the Gap and initiator of the group letter, “However, it is unacceptable to set final cleanup goals so lax that long-term cancer risks are hundreds of times higher than currently accepted for remediation of the nation’s most contaminated sites.” In a parallel letter to Environmental Protection Agency, the groups urged Administrator Michael Leavitt to resist any effort to establish cleanup standards that permit public risks significantly outside EPA’s longstanding legally allowable risk range. Signers include Committee to Bridge the Gap, Nuclear Information and Resource Service, Union of Concerned Scientists, Sierra Club, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Public Citizen, and Greenpeace. The full letters to Ridge and Leavitt and supporting attachments will be available on NIRS’s website on Friday afternoon, December 3, 2004. -------- britain Cracked reactors may force closure of nuclear plants Terry Macalister Thursday December 2, 2004 The Guardian http://www.guardian.co.uk/nuclear/article/0,2763,1364265,00.html British Energy could be forced to close some of its ageing nuclear generators due to cracking inside the core reactors. Such a move would throw the UK's energy supply into disarray as BE at present generates more than 20% of the country's electricity. The cracking problems cover all eight of the company's advanced gas cooled gas reactors, or AGRs. Only one BE site - at Sizewell in Suffolk - is not affected because it is a water-cooled design. Hartlepool and Heysham 1 power stations are already closed for repairs of a range of difficulties and BE admits it needs to spend £250m a year to bring others up to scratch. But the more critical problems are centred on the splitting of graphite bricks are used to "slow" the speed of neutrons in the AGR equipment. BE admits in a document prepared for stock market investors it is "not aware" of any technique for eliminating the problem. "The potential impact of the risk is that currently assumed nuclear power station lifetime may not be achieved, particularly at Hinckley Point B, Hunterston B, Heysham 2 and Torness, and extensions to station lifetimes at those stations may not be possible,"it said. "Our plants may require more frequent inspection to support our safety cases which could result in prolonged statutory or unplanned outages or a refusal by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate [NII] to permit us to operate a particular reactor." Nuclear power stations are generally thought to have a 25- to 35-year lifespan but Hinckley B and Hunterston B have been in service for nearly 30 years while Heysham 2 and Torness have been operating for about 20 years. The company declined to comment on the specific graphite problem, saying it had made its position clear in the prospectus. John Large, an independent consulting engineer who specialises in the nuclear sector, said he was aware graphite cracking had become a serious issue in the nuclear sector. "I don't think this is a political trick [by BE] to win permission to build new reactors or an accounting trick, it's a genuine problem. "But I am not surprised. The performance of graphite was always one of the industry's imponderables," he explained. The NII said it was unable to comment at this time but the Department of Trade and Industry argued that Britain was not dependent on one source of supply and did not expect a worst possible scenario. "You can always say that about anything. No decision has been taken to extend the lives of nuclear plants and we have always aimed for a diverse energy mix," said a spokesman for the DTI. But government plans for the future of nuclear energy were in serious trouble last night after the European commission launched an investigation into Britain's decommissioning strategy. The commission said it had opened a formal investigation "to check whether the establishment of the Nuclear Decommissioning Agency [NDA] ... complies with treaty rules requiring that state aids should not distort or threaten to distort competition." The move is a blow to the government, which is said to have told environmental groups in July it was not anticipating any such inquiry. The DTI sent details to the commission of its strategy for dismantling nuclear stations and dealing with waste nearly 12 months ago and believed it was in the clear, with the new agency set to start operations on April 1. Energy minister Mike O'Brien said he was confident of having his plans approved but had contingency plans to assure the NDA started on time, regardless. "We believe the NDA is compatible with EC state aid rules," he said. -------- iran Iran Reportedly Hides Work on a Longer-Range Missile By DOUGLAS JEHL Published: December 2, 2004 http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/02/international/middleeast/02iran.html WASHINGTON, Dec. 1 - Iran is secretly developing a longer-range ballistic missile than it has publicly acknowledged, with the capacity to strike targets as far away as Berlin, an opposition group plans to assert publicly on Thursday. The group says the missile, which it says could have the capacity to carry nuclear warheads, is being developed with help from North Korean scientists, even as Iran has agreed to curbs on its nuclear program in a new pact with three European countries. The dissident group says the new missile would have a range of more than 1,500 miles, hundreds of miles longer than the most advanced missiles now in Iran's arsenal, an upgraded version of the Shahab-3 that was tested in the summer. The group, the National Council of Resistance, is the political arm of the People's Mujahedeen, and is listed by the United States as a terrorist organization. It has had a mixed record of credibility about developments in Iran. But several of its disclosures have proved accurate and have played a significant role in unearthing secret Iranian nuclear activities. Iran's defense minister, Ali Shamkhani, said in early November that the country could "mass produce" its Shahab-3 missile, a weapon capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. The versions of those missiles now in Iran's arsenal have a range of 800 miles to 1,000 miles but Mr. Shamkhani said his country recently upgraded that range to 1,250 miles. In remarks on state-run television, however, he rejected reports that Iran was seeking to produce a longer-range missile. But in an unclassified report issued last month, the Central Intelligence Agency said that Iran "is pursuing longer-range ballistic missiles" than the Shahab-3 and its follow-on versions. In public testimony last February, George J. Tenet, then the director of central intelligence, said that Iran could begin flight testing those longer-range missiles "in the mid- to latter part of the decade." Neither Iran nor the United States government has publicly described the new missile that the Iranian group says is being developed. Officials of the group said they believed the weapon is known as the Ghadr, which means capable or powerful, and would operate on solid-fueled engines, meaning it could be launched much more quickly than the liquid-fueled, medium-range missiles now in Iran's arsenal. Officials of the People's Mujahedeen, which is based in Paris, provided a detailed written outline of their contentions and discussed them in telephone interviews on Wednesday. One senior official, Muhammad Mohaddessin, said the group believed Iran could conduct test flights of the new missile within months. In New York, Morteza Ramandi, a spokesman for the Iranian Mission to the United Nations, denied that Iran was developing a ballistic missile with a range greater than 1,250 miles. A C.I.A. spokesman said Wednesday that the agency would add nothing to its previous public statements about Iran's missile program. Iran has long sought to become self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles, and the C.I.A. said in the report issued last month that North Korea, China and the former Soviet Union had helped it toward that goal. In recent years, North Korea has been the most important source of Iranian missile technology. Mr. Mohaddessin said in a telephone interview that he believed the development of the new missile showed that Iran had "to a good extent become self-sufficient." While North Korean scientists were providing aid, he said, "the most important role is now played by the Iranians themselves." He said the group believed that the missile was being developed in close conjunction with efforts to design a warhead capable of carrying a nuclear weapon. -------- Arms Inspectors Said to Seek Access to Sites in Iran By WILLIAM J. BROAD, DAVID E. SANGER and ELAINE SCIOLINO Published: December 2, 2004 http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/02/international/middleeast/02nuke.html VIENNA, Dec. 1 -International inspectors are requesting access to two secret Iranian military sites where intelligence suggests that Tehran's Ministry of Defense may be working on atomic weapons, despite the agreement that Iran reached this week to suspend its production of enriched uranium, according to diplomats here. The inspectors at the International Atomic Energy Agency base their suspicions on a mix of satellite photographs indicating the testing of high explosives and procurement records showing the purchase of equipment that can be used for enriching uranium, the diplomats said. Both are critical steps in the development of nuclear arms. The suspicions were aired here as an Iranian opposition group was preparing to release what it called new information that Iran was secretly developing a nuclear-capable missile whose range is significantly greater than what the Iranians have publicly acknowledged to date. Iran has insisted that its uranium enrichment program is entirely for civilian nuclear energy production, but the areas the I.A.E.A. wants to visit are all in secure military bases. Traditionally, such facilities are considered off limits to the agency, whose primary mandate is to monitor civilian nuclear programs, unless there is strong evidence of covert nuclear activity at the military sites. Weapons experts cautioned that the equipment purchases and other activities could have nonnuclear purposes. Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the I.A.E.A., said in an interview here on Wednesday that he had repeatedly asked Iran for access to the two sites, but that it had not yet been granted. "We are following every credible piece of information," he said. Understanding the exact significance of what is happening at the two military sites is "important," he added. "We still have work to do, a lot of work." He estimated that even with full Iranian cooperation, it would take at least two years to resolve all of the outstanding questions surrounding the country's nuclear program. "We're not rushing," he said. "It takes time." The deal the Europeans signed with Iran, which the United Nations atomic agency blessed on Monday, was designed to defuse the most urgent problem, Tehran's enrichment of uranium at civilian sites, which could have given it quick access to the raw material for making bomb fuel. With that problem at least temporarily under control, inspectors and the United States are now turning to the question of whether Iran has a parallel military nuclear program that it has not declared. Last year, the country admitted to inspectors that it had hidden critical aspects of its civilian program for 18 years. The inspectors now want to examine the military sites to see whether secret nuclear work is under way. Much of the equipment needed for centrifuges - which spin at supersonic speeds to purify uranium for reactors and bombs - is "dual use," meaning it could be used for peaceful purposes as well. Some officials close to the atomic agency said a last-minute disagreement over centrifuges in Iran's civilian program, which emerged before this week's accord was signed, may have been designed as a diversion by Tehran to take attention away from the agency's request for access to its military bases. An Iranian official who was one of the negotiating delegation dismissed the idea of opening up the military sites, saying Tehran had no responsibility to do so. "There is nothing required for us to do," he said. "They should have evidence that there are nuclear activities, not just 'We heard from someone that there is dual-use equipment that we want to see.'" Diplomats and weapons experts here said in interviews that the intelligence on Iran's military activities came from several sources, including nations that are members of the United Nations nuclear agency. One of the suspect military sites under investigation by the I.A.E.A. is a huge, decades-old facility southeast of Tehran, the Parchin military complex. Inspectors believe Iran's military may be testing conventional high explosives at the site, of a type used to detonate nuclear weapons. If their suspicions are correct, inspectors say it could explain what Secretary of State Colin L. Powell was referring to nearly two weeks ago when he disclosed new American intelligence suggesting that Iran is working to shrink a nuclear device to a size that could fit atop the country's missiles. While the United States has declined to discuss the intelligence Mr. Powell saw, the American representative to the I.A.E.A.'s board of governors, Jackie W. Sanders, at a meeting of the board on Monday, raised questions about Iranian efforts to obtain equipment "in the nuclear military area" and demanded a specific list of Iran's purchases "so we can make our own decisions about Iran's intentions." But because there is no hard evidence now of actual nuclear material at Parchin, the international agency is left in the awkward position of asking Iran to admit its monitors to the site voluntarily, to prove what one European diplomat called "the absence of nuclear material." The second site is a relatively new facility, called Lavisan II, built in northeastern Tehran, near the site of an older facility that was dismantled within the past year. The existence of the new facility was highlighted last month by an Iranian opposition group, the National Council of Resistance, the political front for the People's Mujahedeen. Even though the State Department has called the group a terror organization, American officials have been intrigued by the intelligence it has gathered on Iran's program. Inspectors say they now possess procurement records showing that the military ordered a long shopping list of high-tech equipment for the Lavisan facilities - including specialized power supplies that smooth electrical currents to meet the exacting requirements of centrifuges. A European diplomat who is dealing with the Iranian government on nuclear issues, said of the array of ordered equipment, "We believe it's related to enrichment and uranium conversion." He added that "it's something they need to explain for us." The diplomat called the equipment orders "a little bit of everything" short of actual centrifuges. Each of the technologies on the order list, the expert said, had plausible uses both for nuclear and nonnuclear programs, making them "dual use" items. "But when you combine them all together," he said, "it looks like a shopping list for an enrichment program." He said it would make no sense for the military to buy the equipment on behalf of a civilian program. The more likely explanation, he said, was that the military itself "did the experiments," which would undercut Iran's argument that it has solely civilian nuclear projects under way. The Parchin military complex has hundreds of bunkers, buildings and test sites scattered over a vast area about 20 miles southeast of Tehran. For decades, it has developed and made such things as ammunition, rockets and high explosives. In September, the Institute for Science and International Security, an arms control group in Washington, issued a report claiming that Parchin contained "an isolated, separately secured site which may be involved in developing nuclear weapon s." The European expert on the Iranian program said that Parchin had helped develop Iran's long-range missiles and that evidence from satellite photographs and other sources suggested that some of its explosives work now centered on perfecting nuclear arms. "If you go for nuclear weapons development, you need those places at a fairly early stage of your program," he said. International inspectors, he said, need to inspect the site rule out such work and "assure the absence of nuclear material." Iran has so far refused to allow access to the military sites, even while denying that it has any hidden military program to develop nuclear arms. European experts and diplomats said they remained hopeful that the Iranians might eventually permit access to the disputed military sites, citing past cooperation. In October, 2003, they noted, Iran let the I.A.E.A. visit three locations at an industrial complex in Kolahdouz in western Tehran that the military controls. Despite rumors to the contrary, the inspectors found no work at those locations that could be directly linked to the enrichment of uranium. Moreover, the results of environmental sampling showed no signs of any use of nuclear materials. One European official said the Iranians might be stalling for time to clean up the sites and remove all evidence of nuclear research. -------- Iran nabs another nuclear 'spy': reports TEHRAN (AFP) Dec 02, 2004 http://www.spacewar.com/2004/041202124320.uk3n6ozp.html Iran's intelligence ministry has announced the arrest of a "spy" accused of setting up a fake nuclear company as part of a bizarre international plot to damage the Islamic republic's reputation, press reports said Thursday. "Asghar C., who has a past of spying for foreigners, was seeking to make centrifuges with a fictitious contract and under the name of a false company," the intelligence ministry was quoted as saying in a statement.. By pretending to manufacture centrifuges, the machines that can enrich uranium to make both fuel for a civilian reactor or the explosive core of a nuclear device, "this individual was trying to damage Iran's international commitments." The statement said the man "was arrested and handed over to the courts." It said the United States has put into action a bizarre plan so it can "accuse Iran of not respecting international conventions and past accords and in this regard certain individuals are taking actions to facilitate these accusations." Iran is a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and is obliged to report all of its nuclear activities to the UN's nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Agency (IAEA). This week Iran escaped the threat of being referred by the IAEA to the UN Security Council for possible sanctions after it agreed to suspend its controversial work on the nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment. The United States accuses Iran of having violated the NPT and of seeking to develop nuclear weapons. Iran insists it only wants to produce nuclear fuel to generate electricity, and says it has declared all of its nuclear activities to the IAEA. The case is the latest announcement of action against nuclear spies. Last month four Iranians accused of spying on nuclear facilities for foreign governments reportedly went on trial in Tehran. In August, Intelligence Minister Ali Yunessi announced the arrest of a number of "spies" who allegedly sent information on Iran's nuclear programme to foreigners. He said the People's Mujahedeen, an armed opposition group based in Iraq that the regime in Tehran labels as "hypocrites", had played the central role in the espionage. The group's political wing, the National Council for Resistance in Iran, in 2002 revealed two key nuclear sites Iran had been hiding, including an uranium-enrichment plant in Natanz. ----- Lack of "unrestricted access" hindering UN nuclear inspection of Iran VIENNA (AFP) Dec 02, 2004 http://www.spacewar.com/2004/041202184943.db0lqz1a.html A clause dropped from a UN resolution on Iran this week calling for "unrestricted access" is now haunting UN inspectors as they investigate Tehran's nuclear program, diplomats and analysts said Thursday. The problem is that access is often restricted. Iran is still refusing to give allow inspectors from the UN International Atomic Energy Agency to visit the Parchin military site where there may have been nuclear weapons technology testing, diplomats told AFP. And UN inspectors have legal restrictions in checking out buildings at a location in Tehran known as Lavizan-II where Iranian resistance spokesmen said secret uranium enrichment was allegedly going on, they said. A Western diplomat said the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency"can't just go on fishing expeditions. It has to demonstrate some kind of nexus between a facility and nuclear equipment". In plain English, this means the IAEA has to show reason to believe there is nuclear material at a site before it can check it out. This is because the IAEA mandate "is to track nuclear equipment and nuclear material," not weapons, the diplomat said. Thus the IAEA can not check out Lavizan-II in Tehran because it does not yet have the hard nuclear evidence it needs to be allowed a visit, a diplomat close to the IAEA said. This limited access is spelled out in the Additional Protocol to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a protocol which actually was drawn up in 1997 to give IAEA inspectors wider powers. The powers fall far short of unrestricted access, said David Albright of the Washington think tank the Insitute for Science and International Security. Albright said South Africa and Libya, two states which have dismantled their nuclear weapons programs, had given the IAEA access even to sites involved in testing or development but where there was no atomic material. But Iran, which insists its nuclear activities are civilian and peaceful, refuses this, insisting that a resolution adopted Monday at a meeting of the IAEA's 35-nation board of governors in Vienna keep to the terms of the Additional Protocol. A first version of the British-French-German resolution had called for "unrestricted access to all sites as deemed necessary by the agency." But the resolution as adopted, in a watered-down form to reward Iran for agreeing to a full freeze of uranium enrichment activities, spoke only of "any access deemed necessary by the agency in accordance with the Additional Protocol." This leaves the IAEA handicapped in trying to trace possible atomic weapons development. A diplomat close to the agency said the IAEA's legal authority was "quite limited when you get into the area of nuclear weapons related activity" since actual nuclear material may not be present. But even when such material is alleged things can move slowly. The IAEA in October sent a "note outlining modalities" for a visit to Parchin, where Iran's Defense Industries Organization (DIO) does work in explosives, but has still not been allowed to go, diplomats said. US officials have said the Iranians may be testing in Parchin "high-explosive shaped charges with an inert core of depleted uranium" as a dry test for how a bomb with fissile material would work. One diplomat said the IAEA "has some nuclear evidence (for Parchin), some reasons to ask, or otherwise it wouldn't ask to go there." But "the obstacles increase when one is trying to visit a military site," the diplomat said. -------- Inspectors Said to Seek Access to Sites in Iran The New York Times By WILLIAM J. BROAD, DAVID E. SANGER and ELAINE SCIOLINO December 2, 2004 http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/02/international/middleeast/02nuke.html?pagewanted=1&ei=5094&en=090819bd04b6ace2&hp&ex=1102050000&partner=homepage VIENNA, Dec. 1 -International inspectors are requesting access to two secret Iranian military sites where intelligence suggests that Tehran's Ministry of Defense may be working on atomic weapons, despite the agreement that Iran reached this week to suspend its production of enriched uranium, according to diplomats here. The inspectors at the International Atomic Energy Agency base their suspicions on a mix of satellite photographs indicating the testing of high explosives and procurement records showing the purchase of equipment that can be used for enriching uranium, the diplomats said. Both are critical steps in the development of nuclear arms. The suspicions were aired here as an Iranian opposition group was preparing to release what it called new information that Iran was secretly developing a nuclear-capable missile whose range is significantly greater than what the Iranians have publicly acknowledged to date. Iran has insisted that its uranium enrichment program is entirely for civilian nuclear energy production, but the areas the I.A.E.A. wants to visit are all in secure military bases. Traditionally, such facilities are considered off limits to the agency, whose primary mandate is to monitor civilian nuclear programs, unless there is strong evidence of covert nuclear activity at the military sites. Weapons experts cautioned that the equipment purchases and other activities could have nonnuclear purposes. Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the I.A.E.A., said in an interview here on Wednesday that he had repeatedly asked Iran for access to the two sites, but that it had not yet been granted. "We are following every credible piece of information," he said. Understanding the exact significance of what is happening at the two military sites is "important," he added. "We still have work to do, a lot of work." He estimated that even with full Iranian cooperation, it would take at least two years to resolve all of the outstanding questions surrounding the country's nuclear program. "We're not rushing," he said. "It takes time." The deal the Europeans signed with Iran, which the United Nations atomic agency blessed on Monday, was designed to defuse the most urgent problem, Tehran's enrichment of uranium at civilian sites, which could have given it quick access to the raw material for making bomb fuel. With that problem at least temporarily under control, inspectors and the United States are now turning to the question of whether Iran has a parallel military nuclear program that it has not declared. Last year, the country admitted to inspectors that it had hidden critical aspects of its civilian program for 18 years. The inspectors now want to examine the military sites to see whether secret nuclear work is under way. Much of the equipment needed for centrifuges - which spin at supersonic speeds to purify uranium for reactors and bombs - is "dual use," meaning it could be used for peaceful purposes as well. Some officials close to the atomic agency said a last-minute disagreement over centrifuges in Iran's civilian program, which emerged before this week's accord was signed, may have been designed as a diversion by Tehran to take attention away from the agency's request for access to its military bases. An Iranian official who was one of the negotiating delegation dismissed the idea of opening up the military sites, saying Tehran had no responsibility to do so. "There is nothing required for us to do," he said. "They should have evidence that there are nuclear activities, not just 'We heard from someone that there is dual-use equipment that we want to see.' " Diplomats and weapons experts here said in interviews that the intelligence on Iran's military activities came from several sources, including nations that are members of the United Nations nuclear agency. One of the suspect military sites under investigation by the I.A.E.A. is a huge, decades-old facility southeast of Tehran, the Parchin military complex. Inspectors believe Iran's military may be testing conventional high explosives at the site, of a type used to detonate nuclear weapons. If their suspicions are correct, inspectors say it could explain what Secretary of State Colin L. Powell was referring to nearly two weeks ago when he disclosed new American intelligence suggesting that Iran is working to shrink a nuclear device to a size that could fit atop the country's missiles. While the United States has declined to discuss the intelligence Mr. Powell saw, the American representative to the I.A.E.A.'s board of governors, Jackie W. Sanders, at a meeting of the board on Monday, raised questions about Iranian efforts to obtain equipment "in the nuclear military area" and demanded a specific list of Iran's purchases "so we can make our own decisions about Iran's intentions." But because there is no hard evidence now of actual nuclear material at Parchin, the international agency is left in the awkward position of asking Iran to admit its monitors to the site voluntarily, to prove what one European diplomat called "the absence of nuclear material." The second site is a relatively new facility, called Lavisan II, built in northeastern Tehran, near the site of an older facility that was dismantled within the past year. The existence of the new facility was highlighted last month by an Iranian opposition group, the National Council of Resistance, the political front for the People's Mujahedeen. Even though the State Department has called the group a terror organization, American officials have been intrigued by the intelligence it has gathered on Iran's program. Inspectors say they now possess procurement records showing that the military ordered a long shopping list of high-tech equipment for the Lavisan facilities - including specialized power supplies that smooth electrical currents to meet the exacting requirements of centrifuges. A European diplomat who is dealing with the Iranian government on nuclear issues, said of the array of ordered equipment, "We believe it's related to enrichment and uranium conversion." He added that "it's something they need to explain for us." The diplomat called the equipment orders "a little bit of everything" short of actual centrifuges. Each of the technologies on the order list, the expert said, had plausible uses both for nuclear and nonnuclear programs, making them "dual use" items. "But when you combine them all together," he said, "it looks like a shopping list for an enrichment program." He said it would make no sense for the military to buy the equipment on behalf of a civilian program. The more likely explanation, he said, was that the military itself "did the experiments," which would undercut Iran's argument that it has solely civilian nuclear projects under way. The Parchin military complex has hundreds of bunkers, buildings and test sites scattered over a vast area about 20 miles southeast of Tehran. For decades, it has developed and made such things as ammunition, rockets and high explosives. In September, the Institute for Science and International Security, an arms control group in Washington, issued a report claiming that Parchin contained "an isolated, separately secured site which may be involved in developing nuclear weapons." The European expert on the Iranian program said that Parchin had helped develop Iran's long-range missiles and that evidence from satellite photographs and other sources suggested that some of its explosives work now centered on perfecting nuclear arms. "If you go for nuclear weapons development, you need those places at a fairly early stage of your program," he said. International inspectors, he said, need to inspect the site rule out such work and "assure the absence of nuclear material." Iran has so far refused to allow access to the military sites, even while denying that it has any hidden military program to develop nuclear arms. European experts and diplomats said they remained hopeful that the Iranians might eventually permit access to the disputed military sites, citing past cooperation. In October, 2003, they noted, Iran let the I.A.E.A. visit three locations at an industrial complex in Kolahdouz in western Tehran that the military controls. Despite rumors to the contrary, the inspectors found no work at those locations that could be directly linked to the enrichment of uranium. Moreover, the results of environmental sampling showed no signs of any use of nuclear materials. One European official said the Iranians might be stalling for time to clean up the sites and remove all evidence of nuclear research. ----- U.S. told of Iranian effort to create nuclear warhead THE WASHINGTON TIMES By Bill Gertz December 02, 2004 http://www.washtimes.com/national/20041201-114749-5010r.htm Recent intelligence shows Iran has been working to produce a missile re-entry vehicle containing a small nuclear warhead for its Shahab missiles and has encountered problems developing a reliable centrifuge system for uranium enrichment, U.S. officials said. The officials, who discussed the intelligence on the condition of anonymity, said Iran's new nuclear warhead program includes what specialists call the basic "physics package" for fitting a nuclear bomb inside the nose cone of a missile. The officials provided details on the program after Secretary of State Colin L. Powell disclosed Nov. 17 that Iran was developing delivery systems for nuclear missiles. Iran has since agreed to halt uranium enrichment under pressure from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and three European governments, a deal the Bush administration views skeptically. The warhead is based on an indigenous Iranian design and is not being built from design information supplied by the covert nuclear network headed by Pakistani technician Abdul Qadeer Khan, who has admitted supplying nuclear goods to Libya, Iran and North Korea, the officials said. "They are moving ahead with a design for a warhead," one official said. Mr. Powell two weeks ago told reporters traveling with him to Santiago, Chile, that the intelligence shows that Iran is "actively working on [nuclear delivery] systems." "You don't have a weapon until you put it in something that can deliver a weapon," he said. Other officials said the intelligence revealed that Iranians belonging to the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran were conducting research and testing on development of a nuclear warhead for a missile. The information came from reliable intelligence sources and was not provided by an Iranian opposition group, they said. In November, the governments of France, Germany and Britain negotiated an agreement with Iran that calls on Tehran to suspend all uranium enrichment. In exchange, Iran received assurances that it will not be brought before the U.N. Security Council for potential sanctions. Iran demanded that it be allowed to keep 20 centrifuges for research. The IAEA said it will monitor the machines. U.S. officials said privately that the Iranians appear to be trying to buy time to continue covert work on nuclear weapons. The Bush administration wants to take the issue to the United Nations, where sanctions can be imposed on Iran. A U.S. official said the Iranians learned from Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq not to put all their nuclear programs in a single location. "They have multiple locations that can be used in case one facility is lost," the official said. A CIA report made public last week said the U.S. government "remains convinced that Tehran has been pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program." The program is based on making a nuclear fuel cycle "ostensibly for civilian purposes but with clear weapons potential," the report said. Regarding Iran's uranium enrichment program, the officials said Tehran is having problems with developing a reliable centrifuge "cascade," a series of hundreds or thousands of machines that spin uranium hexaflouride gas into highly enriched uranium — the key fuel for nuclear bombs, the officials said. However, the design work is close to completion and once testing is finished on a successful machine, the Iranians will begin large-scale production of centrifuges, they said. "They just need to make one machine that doesn't explode when it spins at 7,000 rpm, and then they'll go into large-scale production," one official said. Iran has deployed at least six 620-mile-range Shahab-3 missiles, said the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies. U.S. officials think these missiles and future long-range versions will be the main system for the nuclear warheads. The IAEA, the watchdog group of the United Nations that has been dealing with the Iranian nuclear problem, announced Monday that it has verified most of Iran's claims about its nuclear material, after months of dissembling by Tehran. IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei, in a report to the board made public Monday, said Iran has been working on nuclear activities since the 1980s at various locations and is using several methods for making nuclear fuel. The report said Tehran has not fully cooperated in explaining its nuclear programs, although Mr. ElBaradei said he has accepted most of Tehran's explanations for discrepancies. The White House has disagreed. "Iran has time and time again deceived and denied, deceived the international community," White House spokesman Scott McClellan said Tuesday. The IAEA report said that Iranians had provided false statements and conflicting responses to questions about the program, and that unanswered questions remain about Iran's uranium enrichment and its importation of centrifuges. ----- Why Iran wants its own nuclear deterrent The Christian Science Monitor By Dan Murphy December 02, 2004 http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1202/p04s01-wome.html CAIRO – Iran's declaration Tuesday that suspension of nuclear enrichment is only temporary shows how far European powers and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) remain from substantially slowing Iran's move toward a nuclear bomb. The problem, analysts say, is the apparent belief of Iran's leaders that the benefits of obtaining a nuclear bomb now outweigh the drawbacks. With President Bush having branded them "evil" and with US forces deployed in Iraq to their west and Afghanistan to their east, the Iranians seem to be gambling that their best interests lie in having their own nuclear deterrent. The Europeans - Britain, Germany, and France - are unable to provide Iran with what it wants most: a guarantee against US military action. Without that, analysts say, Iran is likely to continue a diplomatic game of alternating concessions and declarations of nuclear intent until there's direct engagement by the US. "They've been attacked by [weapons of mass destruction] in the past and the international community not only did nothing, but turned a blind eye," says Rob Malley, director of the International Crisis Group's Middle East and North Africa project. "They're in a regional environment where other countries have nuclear capacity, and they're surrounded by countries with a strong US military presence, so they feel finding their own independent means of deterrent is critical." The issue of national pride for Iran also looms large in discussions of a nuclear weapon. "They see themselves of the France or Great Britain of the Persian Gulf," Mr. Malley says. "They feel they should have the bomb." Malley argues that the only diplomatic solution would require that the US come to the table and "create the sense that [Iran is] no longer under siege and that their regime is not threatened." On Tuesday, Iran's top nuclear negotiator, Hassan Rohani, sought to paint Iran's agreement - which headed off possible UN Security Council sanctions - as a temporary step that is a major diplomatic victory over the US. Iran "has not renounced the nuclear fuel cycle [and] will never renounce it,'' he told reporters. "We have proved that ... we are capable of isolating the United States." The US has been skeptical of the accord, saying it amounts to little more than a first step. "The Iranians agreed to suspend - but not terminate - their nuclear-weapons program. Our position is that they ought to terminate their nuclear weapons program," President Bush said. Sam Gardiner, a retired US Air Force colonel who used to teach at the National War College, recently conducted a simulation for The Atlantic Monthly about American military options against Iran as it moves towards a nuclear bomb. The assessment of the team he put together was that the use of force would not work, or would come at too high a cost. "The thing I think people don't realize is how much leverage the Iranians have over us right now,'' says Mr. Gardiner. "We have limited military options particularly when we're in Iraq. Iran has the leverage to make things go very badly for us there." Other analysts point to Iran's ties to Hizbullah, and the chance the terror group could be used as a proxy to strike out at Israel in the event of an attack. The ICG's Malley says the best bet now is for the US to use the current interlude - assuming the temporary halt in uranium enrichment is confirmed by the IAEA - to get involved and put offers on the table that address many of Iran's concerns. He says that probably will not be enough for Iran to give up its hopes of obtaining a nuclear weapon, but may help rally members of the international community behind the US to consider other options. "If you don't have the feeling that a good faith effort was made, therefore you want be able to coalesce a group of countries against Iran,'' he says. "Before you get to something more drastic you need to exhaust diplomacy, or you're going to get into a go-it-alone situation again." Even sanctions now are a weak option, with Iran's important role in the global oil market. Analysts suspect the country has had a windfall of $20 billion over budgeted oil revenue this year, thanks to high prices caused by the war in Iraq. Mr. Gardiner says Iran's ability to drive prices even higher could do severe damage to the developed economies. -------- Diplomats: U.N. Lacks Right to Inspect Sites in Iran By REUTERS Published: December 2, 2004 Filed at 6:51 a.m. ET http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/news/news-iran-nuclear-inspectors.html VIENNA (Reuters) - Inspectors from the U.N. nuclear watchdog would like to visit a secret military site in Iran that an exile group said was a nuclear weapons site, but they lack the legal authority to go there, U.N. diplomats told Reuters. Iran, which insists its nuclear program is solely for electricity generation, earlier this week escaped possible U.N. Security Council economic sanctions after agreeing to freeze all activities which could be used to make bomb-grade material. The New York Times reported Thursday that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) believes satellite photographs show that high explosives are being tested and that procurement records show equipment has been bought that can be used for making bomb-grade uranium, citing unnamed diplomats. The intelligence came from several sources, including nations that are members of the IAEA, the Times reported. But the military sites the inspectors would like to inspect -- the Parchin military complex southeast of Tehran and Lavizan II in northeastern Tehran -- are legally off limits to the IAEA, which only has the right to monitor civilian nuclear programs. ``The IAEA simply has no authority to go to sites that are not declared nuclear sites,'' a diplomat close to the IAEA inspection process told Reuters. He said that the IAEA had not asked to inspect Lavizan II, although they would like to. Last December, Iran signed the IAEA's Additional Protocol, granting the agency more authority to conduct short-notice, intrusive inspections. Although the protocol has not been ratified, Tehran has been acting as if it was in force. However, this extended authority is only limited to declared sites. Additional access to locations like Parchin and Lavizan II has to be negotiated with the country under inspection. The diplomat described it as ``depressing'' that the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an Iranian exile group with a history of revealing hidden nuclear sites in Iran, said recently that Lavizan II was a secret atomic weapons site and then days later reported that it was being stripped clean. ``TERRIBLE BLOW'' TO IAEA INSPECTIONS ``If a country has a strategy for hiding its nuclear program, then the Additional Protocol is of little use,'' a U.N. diplomat said, adding that the IAEA would not have been able to prove that Libya had an atomic arms program if Muammar Gaddafi had not confessed and handed over his atom bomb designs. He said that if Iran was hiding a nuclear weapons program, as Washington believes, the IAEA would probably never find it without additional inspection authority. Diplomats and weapons experts said that the IAEA inspection process had been dealt a severe blow this week when France, Britain and Germany gave in to Iranian demands that a clause demanding Iran grant the IAEA ``unrestricted access'' to sites in Iran be removed from a draft resolution. The resolution passed by the IAEA board only calls on Iran to grant access ``in accordance with the Additional Protocol.'' ``It was a terrible blow to this effort to find these potential nuclear weapons sites,'' David Albright, a former U.N. weapons inspector and head of a Washington-based think-tank, told Reuters. IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei has asked Iran many times for access to another military site called Parchin, also suspected to be a location for nuclear weapons activity. But a November report by the IAEA said it had received no response from Tehran. ElBaradei has said that it could take at least two years to resolve all the issues surrounding Iran's nuclear program, even if the country fully cooperates, because of the fact that its program was concealed for nearly two decades. -------- There are worse things than a nuclear Iran International Herald Tribune Borut Grgic December 2, 2004 http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/12/01/opinion/edgrgic.html Nuclear standoff II LJUBLJANA, Slovenia With so much attention now focused on Iran's nuclear potential and intentions, the bottom-line assumption is that Europe and America cannot tolerate a nuclear Iran. But that may not be the worst option. Convincing Iran to stay on the no-nukes track is an important trans-Atlantic security objective, and Washington and Europe should work together to ensure that the mullahs adhere to the deal presented to the International Atomic Energy Agency this week. The question is: What if they don't? Should Europe and America opt for the military card? Probably not. For one, the threat from a nuclear Iran is not immanent, particularly in light of the available deterrence option. Second, the goal of the Euro-American strategy for Iran should be a transformed, democratic, integrated Iran, and not necessarily a nonnuclear one. This means that if the price for a democratic Iran is Tehran's being allowed to develop limited nuclear capabilities, then so be it. Europe and American can afford it. There are also no good military options. For one, a military strike against Iran would probably not receive Security Council authorization - Russia and China, and most likely France, would not support it. Another use of force without UN approval would only further weaken the value of the multilateral approach to international crisis management. And what would come after an attack? The invasion of Iraq is a reminder that a top-down approach to democracy and a free-market economy is not necessarily the best way to transform decades of political stagnation and economic underdevelopment in an Islamic country. At this point, neither Europe nor the United States has the necessary staying power to see through a full transformation of Iran. A military strike short of an invasion would do little in terms of extinguishing what is in fact a national obsession in Iran to develop a nuclear bomb. It would, however, isolate the reformist camp and strengthen the hand of the radical mullahs. The transformation and democratization of the Middle East as a whole would also be undermined. A strike on Iran would only further enrage the Islamists and significantly complicate efforts to move the Palestinian-Israeli peace process forward. The opportunity to capitalize on Yasser Arafat's death and establish a Palestinian state would be lost. The central challenge for an effective Euro-American strategy on Iran is to preserve the reform process inside Iran, ensuring that reform continues and that pro-Western forces are strengthened. With oil prices shooting through the roof, sanctions against Iran, let alone force, would damage the world economy. Europe can't afford to lose Iran's natural gas supplies when that would only strengthen Russia's hand over the EU energy market, and the U.S. economy is too weak to lose Iranian oil. Finally, China, desperate for energy, would oppose sanctions. The Bush administration, it seems, has decided that it will not tolerate a nuclear Iran. The perception in Washington is that the medium-term risks that come with Tehran's developing a bomb are higher than the longterm benefits associated with supporting and nurturing the democratic process. But what if the real risk comes from the Islamic radicals, whose power will swell in the event of a military attack? In this case, Washington is off the mark in its threat assessment, and Europe needs to find a way to preserve a common European approach. Another split inside Europe would be bad news for the future of a common European security and defense policy. Europe should avoid such a split, and agree ahead of time on a long-term strategy for Iran. (Borut Grgic is director of the Institute for Strategic Studies in Ljubljana.) -------- israel India, Israel wind up counter-terrorism talks NEW DELHI (AFP) Dec 02, 2004 http://www.spacewar.com/2004/041202133656.iphp52k9.html India and Israel Thursday wound up four days of talks on strategies to combat terrorism and held the maiden round of discussions on nuclear disarmament issues, officials here said. Indian foreign ministry officials said the talks were part of ongoing contacts between members of a joint working group set up by India and the Jewish State in 2000 to strengthen cooperation in their fight against terrorism. "Both sides reaffirmed their unequivocal condemnation of all acts of terrorism," an Indian government statement said following the talks in New Delhi. "They reviewed the global campaign against terrorism and discussed ways and means by which the fight against terrorism by the international community can be made more effective and how India and Israel can contribute to this," it added. Indian officials, however, said the two sides for the first time held talks on issues of nuclear disarmament. "On talks on disarmament, India and Israel exchanged views on current issues on the global agenda and decided to continue the dialogue in the future," the Indian statement said. India, which conducted a string of nuclear tests in May 1998, says it will only sign pacts like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty if permanent members of the UN Security Council -- Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States -- agree to a time-frame for disarmament and ban simulated atomic explosions. Israel has remained silent on its nuclear weapons capability, but is widely believed to have a nuclear weapons arsenal. The Indian statement said the two sides agreed to meet early next year to "expand inter-sessional exchanges in specific professional areas". Despite New Delhi's deep reservations on Israel's military actions in the Gaza strip, New Delhi and the Israel have forged close military bonds over the past six years. Israel has offered its latest counter-terrorism hardware including unmanned aerial vehicles, night-vision devices, and sensors to monitor cross-border infiltration in Kashmir, as well as communication equipment and the Phalcon airborne early warning system, an advanced radar system. India, on its part, has allowed Israeli personnel access to some of its classified sites for training in anti-terror measures, sources say. As leader of the non-aligned movement during the Cold War, India shunned Israel. But in 1992, New Delhi established diplomatic ties amid hopes of Middle East peace. The ties warmed dramatically after then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's Hindu nationalists took office in 1998. -------- korea US calls for N Korean nuclear talks by first week of January TOKYO (AFP) Dec 02, 2004 http://www.spacewar.com/2004/041202002228.kvthf87a.html Washington hopes to hold a new round of talks to solve the North Korean nuclear issue by the first week of January, US State Department number two Richard Armitage said in an interview published Thursday. "We all hope to get the talks started again, maybe sometime in December or the first week of January," the mass-circulation Yomiuri Shimbun quoted Armitage as saying in the interview in Washington on Tuesday. China said Tuesday North Korea was waiting for a change in US policy towards Pyongyang before agreeing to a date for another round of six-party talks involving the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the United States. The North has accused the United States of adopting a "hostile" policy towards the reclusive country. "I believe they're looking to see if a new Bush administration may have some softer people in it, to see if they can get a better deal. It's a mistake," Armitage was quoted as saying. "I don't think the North Koreans have yet to come to a decision on what to do," he added. Three rounds of multilateral talks to end North Korea's nuclear ambitions have taken place since the standoff erupted in October 2002. North Korea boycotted a fourth round of talks scheduled for Beijing in September in order to wait out the November US presidential elections, according to many analysts. Washington has called for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of the North's nuclear weapons program. ----- Blair Holds Talks with South Korean President Scotsman.com By Andrew Woodcock 2 Dec 2004 http://news.scotsman.com/latest.cfm?id=3831852 Prime Minister Tony Blair will welcome South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun to 10 Downing Street today for talks expected to be dominated by concerns over the nuclear ambitions of Seoul’s neighbour to the north. International moves to defuse tension over North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme are currently stalled after Pyongyang signalled earlier this week that it was not ready to rejoin six-nation talks on the issue. Britain has sought to build bridges with the secretive North Korean regime in recent years, in the hope of persuading it to engage with the international community on issues like weapons proliferation. Diplomatic ties were restored in 2002 and Foreign Office minister Bill Rammell visited in September. Today’s meeting will give Mr Blair and Mr Roh – making the first state visit to the UK by a South Korean head of state – an opportunity to take stock of the situation and discuss how to bring Pyongyang back to the negotiating table. Six-nation talks involving both North and South Korea, along with the US, Russia, China and Japan, came to a halt when Pyongyang failed to return to the table in September following a summer break. Reports this week suggested dictator Kim Jong-Il is now waiting for President George Bush’s State of the Union address in January to assess the USA’s stance towards his regime before deciding whether to resume negotiations. Concern was sparked in 2002 when Pyongyang expelled international nuclear watchdogs and heightened in April last year, when it announced it had constructed an actual bomb. Iraq is also certain to be on the agenda at today’s meeting. South Korea has been a staunch supporter of the war to oust Saddam Hussein, and with 3,000 troops on the ground is the fourth-largest contributor to the multi-national forces. Mr Blair and Mr Roh will also discuss Anglo-Korean co-operation in the financial field, science, technology and trade, before appearing together at a joint press conference at the Foreign Office. South Korea was itself rebuked last week over uranium and plutonium enrichment programmes which could have led to the development of nuclear weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency criticised Seoul’s failure to report the activities, in which a tiny amount of uranium was enriched to a level close to that usable in an atomic weapons. But it was not referred to the UN Security Council for possible sanctions, because there was no evidence the experiments were continuing. Mr Roh was also opening a high-technology forum in London, as well as meeting chief executives of leading British investors in his country at Buckingham Palace. In the evening, he will attend a banquet at the Guildhall hosted by the Lord Mayor of London. -------- missile defense Touchy question of ballistic missile defence raised in Bush-Martin talks (CP) December 2, 2004 http://canadaeast.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20041130/CPN/50820027 OTTAWA - Ballistic missile defence, which has become an anti-American touchstone for many Canadians, wasn't supposed to be discussed when U.S. President George W. Bush visited Tuesday. But it was - and that's likely to stoke the political fires under the controversial issue. Talks between Bush and Prime Minister Paul Martin were to have covered a range of topics, from mad cow disease to border security. But missile defence wasn't on the list outlined by officials. Bush said however that it did come up. "We also discussed ways to strengthen the security partnership that for more than six decades has helped to keep this continent peaceful and secure," he told a news conference following his meeting with Martin. "We talked about the future of Norad and how that organization can best meet emerging threats and safeguard our continent against attack from ballistic missiles." A Canadian spokesman said later that the president simply outlined why he backs missile defence and didn't link it to Norad, the 50-year-old Canada-U.S. defence pact. "He also indicated that he understands that there's a debate taking place in Canada and that he respects that," the official said on condition of anonymity. "The prime minister, for his part, essentially said, 'There is a debate taking place. We've made a commitment that we will consult Parliament and then we'll move forward or not on that basis'." The official said Bush understands there's a political debate over the issue in Canada and that he wasn't trying to push for a decision on whether Canada would join the program. A senior Bush administration official said the president raised NORAD's potential role in any missile defence system with Martin. "What the President was trying to do was share his views on missile defense . . . and recognizing that this is a Canadian decision, but also recognizing that ultimately our missile defense program is going to extend a security umbrella across North America, and that it was important that the Canadians understand his point of view." Martin has long downplayed missile defence. He says there is no U.S. pressure for Canada to join the missile shield plan. Nor, he says, is there any deadline for a decision. But the project was clearly on Bush's agenda. Missile defence has prompted demonstrations, speeches in Parliament and books and articles galore over the past year or so. The United States is in the process of deploying a handful of interceptor missiles in Alaska and California, which together with powerful radars in Alaska, Greenland and Britain, are the heart of the system. They say it's designed to protect North America against an accidental launch of a nuclear missile or against a deliberate, small-scale strike from some "rogue" nation. Opponents condemn the idea. They say it's too expensive, it won't work and will promote a new arms race leading inevitably to weapons in space. Supporters, and even some on the fence, express doubts about all or some of these concerns. But the issue has become highly political. The NDP and the Bloc Quebecois are solidly opposed. Even some in Martin's own caucus are dubious about the idea. The Conservatives, while generally supportive of closer ties with the United States, say they want to see the details of a missile-defence agreement before taking a stand. The government has promised a vote in the Commons on the issue, but it's not clear when that might be and it won't be binding on the government. -------- russia Rosatom Chief Rumyantsev letter reveals specific amounts of nuke usable material, but raises many questions bellona.no Charles Digges 2004-12-02 http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/nuke_industry/36391.html In what are the most specific data yet available, Rosatom Chief Alexander Rumyantsev essentially declassified nearly exact amounts of decommissioned weapons-grade nuclear materials outside nuclear weapons to be housed at the Mayak Fissile Materials Storage Facility (FMSF) in a letter to Russian nuclear analyst Lev Maximov, a copy of which was obtained by Bellona Web. The amount of fissile material slated for storage had remained a tightly guarded secret as the figures reveal Russia’s strategic nuclear capability, as well as the fact that they had, by the end of the Cold War, achieved near nuclear parity with the United States. The United States declassified information on its own nuclear weapons programme output some years ago, indicating that it had produced 662 tonnes of nuclear bomb grade material—112 tonnes of which was plutonium and 550 tonnes of which was uranium—since 1945. Rumyantsev’s letter to Maximov, dated November 19th 2004, was a response to an open letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin regarding security concerns surrounding the FMSF, which is being built by the US Pentagon-Run Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme. In it, Rumyantsev disclosed that Russia produced between 599 and 626 tonnes of weapons grade plutonium and uranium currently outside of nuclear wepaons produced during the arms race. The total figure for weapons-grade uranium produced by the Soviet Union is estiamated on average by various western experts to be around 1050 to 1200 tonnees. Letting the cat out of the bag According to Maximov, the facility presents a dire national threat to Russia, both in terms of concentrating so much weapons-usable material in one place, making it vulnerable to terrorist attacks, and because the FMSF—CTR’s longest running project to date—gives the Pentagon an inside view at, and the ability to cripple, Russia’s nuclear defence capabilities But Rumyantsev’s response let the cat out of the bag: Of that, 599 and 626 tonnes of weapons-grade nuclear material, 533 tonnes is highly enriched uranium (HEU) and between 66.6 tonnes and 93.3 tonnes of it is plutonium, Rumyantsev wrote. In the letter, Rumyantsev specifies that the FSMF, initially conceived in 1992 as a two part structure, is envisioned to house 50,000 containers holding more than 600 tonnes of fissile material—more than 100 tonnes over the early 90s 500-tonne estimates—extracted from decommissioned warheads. In particular, Rumyantsev wrote that the construction of the FMSF—one of the US Defence Department Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme’s longest running projects—would take place in two stages. “The volume of the two-stage storage facility is 50,000 containers of fissile material,” Rumyantsev wrote. “It is envisioned that each storage facility will hold [in 25,000 containers per facility] 8.333 containers of plutonium and 16,667 containers of uranium. Of those containers, some will hold not more than 4 kilograms of alpha-stage plutonium, others 5.6 kilograms of delta-stage and yet others 16 kilograms of uranium (the 90 percent enriched uranium-235 isotope).” Much of this material, he indicated in his November letter, would be stored in metallic form, whereas the additional 1.2 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium still being produced annually by Russia’s three remaining plutonium production reactors in Seversk and Zheleznogorsk, would be stored in oxide, or power, form. Some 9 more tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium will be produced before these reactors are shut down within the next decade. The United States Department of Energy is currently financing the closure of those reactors. CTR’s initial plans for the FMSF Rumyantsev’s comments make surprising revelations and raise several questions. First, the current FMSF—which was officially opened with a ribbon-cutting in December 2003, but still has at least a year of additional construction before it can begin accepting nuclear material—is designed to hold only 50 tonnes of plutonium and 200 tonnes of HEU. It was initially planned in 1992 that CTR would help finance and construct two such facilities that would conceivably hold some 500 tonnes of fissile material. But that notion of building two identical facilities—one in Seversk and the current one at the Mayak Chemical Combine in the southern Urals—was unilaterally scrapped by Rumyantsev himself in a 2003 letter to his US CTR counterparts. Rumyantsev announced in the 2003 letter that the one wing of the FMSF at Mayak would house only 25 tonnes of plutonium in immobilizes form and no HEU, all of which would be diverted to the US-Russia HEU-LEU programme, via which Russia down-blends its excess HEU and sells the resultant low enriched uranium (LEU) to the United States for use in civilian reactors there. As a result, the current FMSF will operate only at quarter of its current facility and at an eighth of the initially-planned two wing approach. Why no second FMSF? Rumyantsev’s rationale for the decision not to build a second wing to the FMSF apparently hinged on the currently stalled 2000 US-Russia Plutonium Disposition Agreement, in which Washington and Moscow agreed to destroy 34 tonnes of surplus weapons grade plutonium. The dispositioning of this plutonium is to take place in mixed plutonium and uranium oxide (MOX) fuel to be burned in specially retrofitted commercial reactors in Russia and the United States. This surplus plutonium, initially declared at 50 tonnes, was later cut back to 34. No progress has been made on the MOX programme since last spring, however, because Russia and the US Department of State are locked in a heated liability over the project that could eventually kill it. While the infrastructure for the MOX programme was being built, the surplus plutonium was to be stored at the FMSF. But because both the United States and Russia agreed to destroy only 34 tonnes of surplus weapons-grade plutonium, Rumyantsev calculated that by slashing the 50 tonnes slated for storage at Mayak, and adding the 9 tonnes left over from the production reactors, we would meet his 34 tonne surplus plutonium obligation to the United States. No official agreement between the United States and Russia regarding the actual form and structure of the FMSF was ever signed, so Rumyantsev was technically free to issue this edict. Rumyantsev’s answers raise more questions Questions, therefore, still shroud Rumyantsev’s responses and which could not be cleared up by Rosatom. For instance, Rumyantsev writes in his letter to Maximov as if the 1993 two-wing FMSF was still on the boards. The 599 to 626 tonnes of weapons grade material that were apparently to have been put into storage could have been accommodated for in the initial two-wing plan, the CTR and Rosatom officials concurred. But Rumyantsev while writing makes no mention of the fact that he himself had abandoned that plan. Likewise, he makes no allusion to any Russian plans to build a second wing to the FMSF in the future. Such an option has been inconclusively discussed at high levels in the past, according to Rosatom officials. Nikolai Shingaryov, Rostatom’s chief spokesman said he was unaware of Rumyantsev’s letter to Maximov and could not confirm or deny any information or figures that it contained. He said, though, that he was not acquainted with any plans to deviate from Rumyantsev’s 2003 directive to store only 25 tonnes of weapons grade plutonium and divert 200 tonnes of HEU to the HEU-LEU programme. Another source in Rosatom’s fuel cycles division, who asked not to be further identified, confirmed that the 599 to 626 tonne figure was accurate. “I am not able to say to the kilogram how much material there is, but between 599 and 626 tonnes would be a very specific estimate—more specific than we have seen before” he said. An official CTR, who requested his name not be used, was surprised by Rumyantsev’s apparent candor. “Naturally, the original two wing plan for the FMSF gave the US some basic estimates of [Russia’s] Cold War nuclear output, but I have never heard of anyone so high ranking as Rumyantsev naming such specific figures before,” the official said in a telephone interview from Washington. “Granted, 599 to 626 tonnes is not pin-pointing it, but it’s by far the narrowest spread I have heard from them.” Many Western nuclear analysts in the past months have suggested that the current FMSF could hold significantly more material than even the initial 50 tonnes of plutonium and 200 tonnes of HEU it was slated to house. But the Rosatom source “doubted seriously” that the current facility could house anything near 626 tonnes of fissile material. “Conservatively, you could perhaps pack another 100 tonnes of fissile material into the FMSF, but nothing like what Rumyantsev suggests.” The CTR official concurred. He said the Mayak FMSF was constructed in such a way as it could handle more material that it was initially slated to take. “But the extra 305 to 376 Rumyantsev suggests wouldn’t be feasible without another facility, as was initially planned.” Both the CTR and the Rosatom official said they were unaware of any unilateral Russian plans to build a second wing for the FMSF, but the Rosatom official did say that such plans had been casually discussed in the corridors of the Ministry of Atomic Energy, Rosatom’s precursor. ‘But nothing, to my knowledge, was every put into official form,” said the Rosatom official. So where is this extra material going? The fate of the extra 305 to 376 tonnes of surplus weapons-grade material mentioned by Rumyantsev and that will not fit into the current structure of the FMSF remains a matter of speculation. It is doubtful that Rumyantsev and a close group of officials are planning on building a second wing to the FMSF with their own money for the simple fact that Rosatom has given every indication that it intends to pursue plutonium fueled reactors called breeders, for which this excess plutonium would be the backbone. -------- treaties Saddam's stunning strategy of nuclear bluff The Daily Herald Kenneth Adelman December 02, 2004 http://www.harktheherald.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=41546&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0 Throughout history, world leaders have hidden their treaty violations and lied about it. No surprise there. But Saddam Hussein broke new ground in the world of strategic gamesmanship when he hid treaty compliance and lied about it. It may sound weird, but the Duelfer Report documents that the weird was true. Since the 1991 Persian Gulf war, Hussein actually complied with the U.N. resolutions that prohibited him from producing weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, he brazenly acted as if he were violating those resolutions. It was the mother of all deceptions, and he succeeded nicely (until the moment he was overthrown, that is). We never, for a moment, suspected he was a clandestine complier. Such behavior may seem inexplicable. Persuading the world's only superpower that you are not only a psychopath but that you are armed with the most dangerous weapons imaginable (when in fact you're not) seems, at the very least, counterintuitive. But not so fast. Instead of clinical psychologists, perhaps Hussein would be better analyzed by nuclear strategists. Because he may have created a stunning, new nuclear strategy. After all, if a Third World country cannot be a nuclear power, there might be some value to being a nuclear bluffer. This might work almost as well -- and without the cost of buying all those centrifuges and aluminum tubes clandestinely, and without the mess of dealing with dangerous uranium and plutonium. Like a nascent nuclear power, a nuclear bluffer (or a nation that bluffs about having chemical and biological weapons) can frighten its neighbors, thereby deterring any aggression on their part (which is, after all, a key objective of nuclear strategy). It can reap gobs of attention on the world stage. It can encourage the richer countries to offer aid, nonaggression pacts and increased trade -- if only the errant country would forgo the nuclear option (which, in fact, it isn't really pursuing). Look at North Korea. It's a failed state by any measure, and it would receive about the same amount of attention as Burkina Faso if not for its nuclear program. Pyongyang's building and exporting medium-range missiles was bad enough. But its nuclear program jumped this despotic nation to the top of foreign policy priorities. Envoys from the United States, Japan, China, Russia and South Korea arrive on a regular basis to beg this pipsqueak country to be their negotiating partner. That North Korea has an active nuclear program is deemed fact. U.S. intelligence reckons it already has a handful of bombs. But, then again, we were convinced of Iraq's nuclear program too. How do we really know? Could it be that Kim Jong Il is nothing but a shrewd nuclear bluffer, like Saddam? After all, North Korea is the most shrouded, secretive state on Earth, where facts about even the most mundane aspects of life are kept secret. It's to be expected therefore that the country's nuclear program -- a subject that is shrouded even in the most open of countries -- would be an especially dark hole. Especially because North Korea's program violates the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Yet on April 23, 2003, a top North Korean official -- the aptly named Li Gun -- took aside our assistant secretary of State, Jim Kelly, to "blatantly and boldly" announce that North Korea had at least one nuclear weapon, according to news reports. Li Gun popped the big question -- "Now what are you going to do about it?" -- and boasted that his guys would "prove" they had such weapons "soon." Well, that was a year and a half ago. Nothing more has been proved. But the United States, Japan, China, Russia and South Korea continue dangling aid, trade, contacts and other stuff before North Korea for nuclear cooperation. Could North Korea be a clandestine complier -- not a nuclear power but a nuclear bluffer? I suspect not. Moreover, I wouldn't want to take the risk of presuming these villains were bluffing when they were actually proliferating. But even I have to wonder. These tyrants -- Saddam, the leaders of North Korea, the leaders of Iran -- often seem like kids in their "terrible twos." They like all the attention reaped from bad behavior, more than any reward they'd reap from stopping such behavior. But under our new theory, perhaps these adults aren't really bad at all. They're just acting as if they were being bad. Then how should we deal with them? As you can see, this new nuclear strategy swiftly gets mind-bending. But don't all nuclear strategies? It's no more mind-bending than Robert McNamara's Mutual Assured Destruction (a.k.a. MAD), which presumed that the Cold War nuclear standoff was a good thing because neither Russia nor the United States would dare attack the other for fear of ultimately annihilating itself. Just wait until game theorists model a world of six or more nuclear bluffers. Saddam -- the first and trickiest of clandestine compliers -- may rejuvenate the field of nuclear strategy, just when we figured it had played out its last mind games. Kenneth Adelman, a U.N. ambassador and arms control director under President Reagan, is co-host of TechCentralStation.com, an online think tank. -------- u.s. nuc facilities Robert Bacher obituary: Nuclear physicist who helped to keep the Manhattan Project under civilian control and spoke up in defence of Oppenheimer The Times December 02, 2004 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,60-1383457,00.html THE experimental physicist Robert Fox Bacher was a key member of the Manhattan Project, the team of scientists who developed the atom bomb during the Second World War. He directed the experimental physics division at the Los Alamos Laboratory, New Mexico, a division known as the “G” division (G being for gadgets). When the operation reached the bomb production stage he became head of the bomb physics division. Bacher was born in 1905 in Loudonville, Ohio. In 1926 he graduated with a bachelor’s degree from the University of Michigan. In 1930 he was awarded a PhD and given an appointment as a National Research Council Fellow at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech). In 1934 he went to Columbia University. He moved on to the physics department of Cornell University in 1935, where he became Professor of Physics and Director of the Laboratory of Nuclear Studies. When the Second World War started he was affiliated with MIT, where he conducted research into radar. In 1943 he joined the hundreds of other young scientists working on the Manhattan Project. He urged J. Robert Oppenheimer, the director of the Manhattan Project, not to place the enterprise under military control in order to increase secrecy and security. At the time, the Los Alamos Laboratory was officially classified as a military establishment, but Bacher strongly believed that, to be effective as scientists, the team needed to be able to think independently. The project remained under civilian control. Bacher was a member of the team that assembled the weapon for the first nuclear explosion, on July 15, 1945 at Alamogordo in the New Mexico desert. The test, at a site called Trinity, was a test of a weapon of the design that destroyed Nagasaki on August 9 that year. The nuclear weapon dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, used highly-enriched uranium instead of plutonium. The uranium design was so straightforward that the scientists were confident that it would work without testing. The plutonium bomb was much more complex, and so a test was scheduled. By early July 1945, the Manhattan scientists had produced only enough plutonium for two weapons, and sufficient highly-enriched uranium for one. It was, therefore, possible to test a plutonium weapon and have just enough fissile material left over for the weapons dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. The core of the weapon used for the Trinity test consisted of a sphere of plutonium, surrounded by a mass of high explosives to compress the sphere to obtain the nuclear explosion. The plutonium weighed 6.2 kilograms (13 lb 9 oz). The core was assembled at the George McDonald ranch house, two miles from ground zero. It was then transported to the base of the 30 meter-high (100 ft) steel tower on which the bomb was to be exploded. The core was inserted into the weapon with some difficulty. On the first try it stuck, as the plutonium was hotter than the rest of the assembly. Plutonium is radioactive, and the heat produced during the radioactive decay processes heated the core. After a little while, the temperatures of the plutonium and the casing equalised and the core slid neatly into place, much to the relief of Bacher and the others in the assembly team. The entire bomb was hoisted to the top of the tower. It worked perfectly, exploding with an explosive power equivalent to that of 20,000 tonnes of TNT. When the extent of the destruction at Hiroshima and Nagasaki became clear, Bacher was concerned about the huge destructive power of such weapons. He believed that it would have been better if the threat of nuclear attack could somehow have been used to persuade the Japanese to end the war without the destruction of the two cities. Bacher was a staunch friend and supporter of Oppenheimer, who had considered resigning from the Manhattan Project when difficulties arose over the production of plutonium. Bacher persuaded him to stay, knowing that, if he quit, the project would be seriously delayed. Oppenheimer’s loyalty was questioned during the anti-Communist witch hunts, with a “trial” beginning on April 12, 1954, in an AEC Building in Washington. This bizarre episode began on November 7, 1953, when a former executive director of the Congressional Joint Atomic Energy Committee wrote to J. Edgar Hoover accusing Oppenheimer of being “an agent of the Soviet Union”. Given Oppenheimer’s role as “the father of the atomic bomb”, it is hardly surprising that the accusation was taken seriously. Bacher testified in his colleague’s defence, saying that, in his opinion, Oppenheimer was not a security risk. This was a very brave thing to do during the hysterical days of the McCarthy inquisition. The AEC verdict went against Oppenheimer. Bacher became one of the first members of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. As a commissioner, he testified before a joint congressional committee about the state of America’s nuclear weapons programme. After an investigation at Los Alamos, Bacher was surprised and shocked at how few nuclear weapons were in America’s arsenal. In 1945, six weapons were produced and three were used. During 1946, five more were produced. American nuclear weapon production increased soon afterwards as a result of technical improvements in the production of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium. At the end of 1950, the arsenal contained more than 360 nuclear weapons. -------- idaho DOE picks Idaho over Oak Ridge for plutonium project Associated Press Dec 02, 2004 http://www.volunteertv.com/Global/story.asp?S=2640449 OAK RIDGE, Tenn. A government project to produce a plutonium isotope used to power deep-space probes once headed to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory is now destined for Idaho. Three years ago, the Department of Energy announced it would use the Oak Ridge research facility to process plutonium-238 for space power sources and other defense purposes. But D-O-E has now changed its mind and wants to consolidate the plutonium work at the agency's Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory at Arco, Idaho. D-O-E says the change will significantly increase security, reduce risks associated with transporting nuclear materials across the country and reduce costs. Plutonium-238, a sister to plutonium-239 that's used in nuclear weapons, is considered an ideal power source for spacecraft too far from the sun to use solar panels. -------- new mexico Los Alamos specifications announced San Francisco Chronicle Keay Davidson December 2, 2004 http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2004/12/02/BAGDLA4RAA1.DTL The U.S. Department of Energy has issued a draft version of specifications for those who would compete for the contract to run Los Alamos National Laboratory, the nuclear weapons lab in New Mexico. Officials at the University of California, which has run the lab without competition for six decades, have been on pins and needles for months, awaiting the Energy Department's release of the request for proposals, or RFP. UC officials and regents have not yet decided whether to compete for the next contract to run the lab. The present contract expires Sept. 30, 2005. After the document was issued Wednesday, UC Vice President S. Robert Foley issued a statement saying that UC officials "are reviewing the draft request for proposals, and we will submit comments to the U.S. Department of Energy after a thorough review is completed." "The final decision regarding (whether UC joins the) competition will be made by the University of California Board of Regents," Foley added. "We are pleased that the draft RFP has been released and that the competition process will now start in earnest." The draft request for proposals may be modified in response to comment from the public and potential contract competitors. UC's management of the lab has been bitterly controversial since 2002, following allegations of financial, managerial, security and safety screw-ups. Last year, the Energy Department and Congress ordered competitive bidding on future contracts to run Los Alamos -- where the atomic bomb was born in 1945 -- and certain other national labs. UC officials are still trying to decide whether to join the Los Alamos competition. They're delaying a decision partly because they're waiting to see if the final request for proposals will contain favorable terms; partly because of their frustration and embarrassment over the recent scandals; and partly over concern that at a time of state budget crisis, the state can't afford to pay for such a competition -- costing perhaps $25 million, according to one estimate. Potential competitors include the giant University of Texas system and private firms such as Battelle. The draft is available online at www.doeal. gov/lanlcontractrecompete/DraftRFP.htm. Public questions and comments can be sent to LANLRecompeteHelp@doeal.gov. "The final RFP will be issued after comments are addressed," says an Energy Department statement. Contract proposals "will be due ... 60 days after the final RFP is issued." E-mail Keay Davidson at kdavidson@sfchronicle.com. ----- Draft Guidelines for Lab Bid Released Department of Energy Blueprints Focus on Better Management Practices for Los Alamos Laboratory dailycal.org By JOSH KELLER December 2, 2004 Daily Californian http://www.dailycal.org/article.php?id=17127 A draft of guidelines governing the adminstration of the Los Alamos National Laboratory released by the U.S. Department of Energy yesterday emphasize reliable management in the wake of several scandals at the lab during UC management. UC must show it can clean up its tarnished record—including the loss of classified documents and enriched plutonium and the misuse of lab funds—of running the lab if it wants to keep its contract. The incidents prompted Congress to put the lab—as well as the other two UC-run labs, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory—up for competitive bidding last year for the first time in UC’s 61-year stewardship. “We want the winner of the contract to be able to demonstrate that they’re using benchmark business practices, things that will cause the day-to-day activities to be run in the best possible way,” said Al Stotts, spokesperson for the National Nuclear Security Administration, a department in the DOE that oversees the bidding process. The lab—the birthplace of the atomic bomb—is New Mexico’s largest employer and a hub for the country’s national security research. The lab has an annual budget of $2.2 billion a year. The guidelines, which will be open for public comment until Jan. 7, would encourage more independent audits of lab activities in place of federal oversight. The department will release a final request for proposals sometime next year and a winner could be announced by July 1, according to a preliminary time line released by the nuclear administration in October. Although the UC Regents will not vote on whether it will enter a bid until the final guidelines are released, the university has signaled that it will likely pursue a bid. “I believe we will be in excellent position to submit a strong and winning proposal should the UC Board of Regents make the final decision to compete,” said Robert Foley, UC vice president for lab management, in a statement. Under the draft guidelines, the winner of the bid would be awarded a five-year contract starting in September 2005—when UC’s contract expires—with the possibility of a 15-year extension for “superior performance.” All lab employees, excluding the director and senior managers, would keep their jobs along with comparable pay and benefits regardless of who runs the nuclear weapons facility, according to the draft request for proposals. At least two other universities— University of Texas and Texas A&M—have expressed interest in competing for the lab, along with at least 12 private contractors, according to nuclear administration. UC and University of New Mexico are discussing a partnership, according to UC officials. UC is also exploring the possibility of teaming up with private industry to run the lab, lab Director Pete Nanos said at the last UC Regents meeting. Despite the string of security blunders under UC’s management, New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson urged the regents to enter a bid with a corporate partner to secure the contract. -------- south carolina New plant means jobs are coming Augusta Chronicle By James Gallagher and Adrian Burns December 2, 2004 http://www.augustachronicle.com/stories/120304/met_2728427.shtml A nuclear containment systems company is building a production facility in Aiken County and could bring 800 jobs with it. The facility will be used to design, manufacture, install and maintain nuclear containment equipment, according to Flanders' Aug. 24 filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. "GCS is ready to facilitate the requirements of the scheduled projects at Savannah River Site and other national laboratories and nuclear facilities worldwide," chief executive Robert Amerson said in the filing. "We are excited about the progress being made at the Savannah River National Laboratory and other sites to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and to develop a safe and efficient nuclear energy." The market for nuclear containment is a growing one that will be worth about $2 billion over the next 10 years, the filing says. Local officials confirmed that 600 to 800 jobs might be created once the plant is fully operational. They are still unsure how long that process will take. Officials also were uncertain about the size of the property purchased but confirmed that there is room for expansion. The plant will be an economic boon for the area, which has suffered as SRS has downsized. "A lot of surrounding communities right near the site, be it Jackson or New Ellenton, have seen economic stagnation from the downturn," said Scott Singer, the Aiken County councilman who represents New Ellenton. "I think we can see a multiplier effect for those two communities." Fred Humes, the executive director of the Aiken/Edgefield Economic Development Partnership, would not discuss details. "We will wait to Dec. 8 and make our announcements then," he said. Will Folks, a spokesman for Gov. Mark Sanford, said the governor will be in the Aiken area next week. Flanders, whose products include air filters for Lysol and Arm & Hammer, has more than 2,100 employees in 13 facilities worldwide. The company has been expanding its product line to handle the needs of precision manufacturers in the semiconductor and pharmaceutical industries. South Carolina Bureau Chief Jim Nesbitt contributed to this story. What's Next: An official announcement for the plant will be Wednesday, and South Carolina Gov. Mark Sanford is scheduled to attend. Flanders Corp. Location: Based in St. Petersburg, Fla., the company has 13 production facilities in 11 states and two nations. Products: Flanders creates air filtration products for commercial and industrial customers. Employees: About 2,200 History: Flanders was founded in 1950 in Riverhead, N.Y., to produce filters for ventilation systems at atomic power and nuclear fuel manufacturing facilities. Since then, the company has broadened its product line to include consumer, industrial and hazardous waste applications. It is publicly owned and trades on NASDAQ under the symbol FLDR. Sources: www.flanderscorp.com, www.hoovers.com. Reach James Gallagher and Adrian Burns at (706) 724-0851. --From the Friday, December 3, 2004 printed edition of the Augusta Chronicle -------- SRS's future lies in tritium Augusta Chronicle By Josh Gelinas December 2, 2004 http://www.augustachronicle.com/stories/120304/met_2728470.shtml AIKEN - Amid all the uncertainties over the future at Savannah River Site is a mission that scientists there have been refining for half a century and will be working on long into the future. Although there are no plans to increase the nation's stockpile of nuclear weapons, the site will continue to recycle or produce new tritium for at least the next 40 years to maintain the current arsenal. It must continue the process because the powerful gas loses its potency after about 12 years. "As long as we have thermonuclear bombs in our stockpile, we'll need tritium," said Mal McKibben, the executive director of Citizens for Nuclear Technology Awareness. "The scope is going down, but it will not go away." Scientists at SRS say they prefer to leave the nation's policy on nuclear weapons to the politicians. "That's not our business," said Tom Foster, chief engineer of defense programs for Westinghouse Savannah River Co., the private contractor that runs SRS for the Department of Energy. U.S. Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., like President Bush, has said the country should consider new weapons such as "bunker-buster" bombs that can penetrate deep into mountainous regions such as those in Afghanistan. But moderates, including U.S. Rep. David Hobson, R-Ohio, the chairman of a key House subcommittee that sliced millions from SRS' budget for next year, have opposed expanding the arsenal. During a recent visit to SRS, Mr. Hobson said nuclear weapons work "isn't the future" for the federal nuclear reservation. Mr. McKibben and other SRS supporters disagree. Mr. Foster is part of a team that recently finished $142 million of work to modernize the site's recycling of tritium, allowing the Energy Department to close an outdated 72,000-square-foot building in 2005. For 37 years, the site had used cryogenic distillation equipment about 20 feet high to purify tritium, a process that used large amounts of energy to cool the gas to minus 424 degrees Fahrenheit. The site now uses a separation process that involves a system about the size of two 30-gallon drums, Mr. Foster said. The tritium is purified, recharged and stored in metal hydride beds, then shipped back to the U.S. Department of Defense for use in nuclear weapons. "We're trying to be more efficient," said Bob Rabun, a senior technical adviser for defense programs. The site also is building a $506 million tritium-extraction facility, which will receive irradiated rods from the Tennessee Valley Authority and produce tritium for the first time since 1988. It is scheduled to open in 2007. It will take 100 people to run the new extraction facility. Those positions are likely to be filled with employees from the existing staff of about 580, a Westinghouse spokesman said. powerful punchThe Savannah River Site is investing more than $640 million to build new facilities needed to create and recycle tritium, a radioactive form of hydrogen used in the nation's thermonuclear weapons. Reach Josh Gelinas at (803) 648-1395, ext. 113, or josh.gelinas@augustachronicle.com. --From the Friday, December 3, 2004 printed edition of the Augusta Chronicle -------- us nuc waste Judge blocks Hanford waste initiative By SHANNON DININNY ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER Thursday, December 2, 2004 · Last updated 6:49 p.m. PT http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/apus_story.asp?category=1110&slug=Hanford%20Initiative YAKIMA, Wash. -- A judge Thursday temporarily blocked a voter-approved initiative that bars out-of-state shipments of radioactive waste to the most contaminated nuclear site in the nation. Washington voters last month overwhelmingly approved Initiative 297, which forbids the Department of Energy from sending more radioactive waste to the Hanford nuclear site until all existing waste there is cleaned up. The initiative was to have taken effect Thursday. But the federal government went to court in hopes of blocking the law, calling it a "draconian" measure that also violates federal laws governing interstate commerce and nuclear waste. Hanford, a federal site, is immune from state regulation, the government argued. The government also warned that some cleanup would stop and workers would be idled if the initiative were to take effect. Lawyers for the state, however, had given assurances that officials were still reviewing the initiative and would not begin to implement it in the next 60 days. Judge Alan McDonald sided with the federal government Thursday in granting a temporary restraining order, citing the importance of continuing clean-up activities at Hanford. A hearing on a preliminary injunction was set for Dec. 13. Sheryl Hutchison, spokeswoman for the state Ecology Department, said the ruling was not unexpected. "We're satisfied that shipments will not be coming in, and over the next 10 days we will prepare a vigorous defense," she said. More than 10,000 people work at the 586-square-mile reservation, which was created in World War II as part of the top-secret Manhattan Project to build the atomic bomb. It remains the most contaminated site in the nation, with cleanup costs expected to total $50 billion to $60 billion. -------- MILITARY -------- africa Uganda puts troops on border to bar rebels Washington Times December 02, 2004 http://www.washtimes.com/world/20041201-093740-3957r.htm KAMPALA, Uganda — The Ugandan army announced yesterday that it had deployed an unspecified number of troops along its border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo to prevent incursions by "negative elements" based there. "We have made a precautionary deployment along the border on our side, especially in areas we think are possible crossing points for some negative elements based in eastern Congo," army spokesman Maj. Shaban Bantariza told Agence France-Presse, referring to Ugandan rebel groups purportedly based in eastern Congo. During a devastating 1998-2003 war in Congo, neighboring Rwanda and Uganda sent thousands of troops there to back rebels. Referring to the Ugandan rebels in Congo, Mr. Bantariza said: "They are not a great threat, but we are following them and picking up some of them one by one." The Ugandan government says a new rebel group — the People's Redemption Army (PRA), said to have been formed by renegade Ugandan army officers — was preparing to attack Uganda from eastern Congo. "They have taken advantage of the nonexistence of the state in much of eastern DRC to move around, though we have not got any information that they have bases there and that they are in any military formation that points to an attack," he added. Last week, the army paraded captives it said were PRA members arrested in northern Uganda. Soon afterward, a Rwandan diplomat accused of working with the PRA was expelled from Uganda, prompting Rwanda to throw out a Ugandan official working in the embassy in Kigali. Also yesterday, a spokesman in Kinshasa for President Joseph Kabila said the Congolese leader, after meeting the ambassadors to Congo of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, has decided to send additional soldiers to the troubled eastern part of the country. "10,000 extra men from the DRC army will be deployed in the coming days in North Kivu," spokesman Kudura Kasongo said. Mr. Kasongo said the troops would maintain security along the DRC's sprawling eastern borders by preventing Hutu rebels from neighboring Rwanda from entering Congolese territory and by dealing with other contingencies. Eastern Congo is an ethnic powder keg that was volatile before and after the 1998-2003 war that claimed an estimated 3 million lives through conflict, famine and disease. -------- business Boeing Deal Is Example of Ties Among Military Services, Defense and Congress E-Mails Provide a Glimpse Into 'Iron Triangle' Washington Post By R. Jeffrey Smith December 2, 2004 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A26464-2004Dec1.html "Everyone's nervous," Acting Undersecretary of Defense Michael W. Wynne warned in a confidential e-mail to Air Force Secretary James G. Roche on July 8, 2003. It was two days before the Bush administration was to send its first detailed report to Congress about a controversial Air Force plan to lease refueling tankers from the Boeing Co., and a few days after a fierce backroom struggle over its language between critics of the plan and Air Force enthusiasts. Wynne's anxiety, it turned out, was well-founded. Rather than solidifying congressional support, the report's release sparked more intense scrutiny of the most costly government lease in U.S. history, and ultimately helped end the government careers of some of those involved in preparing the report. From a program initially seen by Boeing and the Air Force as a clever way to acquire a new tanker fleet without having to budget for it and buy the planes outright, the lease has now developed a reputation as the most significant military contracting abuse in 20 years, according to a letter sent to the Pentagon last month by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John W. Warner (R-Va.) and two other committee members. Three Boeing officials have resigned in connection with the controversy; two have pleaded guilty in federal court to ethics violations. Wynne has been unable to win confirmation as an undersecretary of defense, as a result of the "hold" placed by Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) on most defense promotions to gain leverage in McCain's continuing battle for access to the Pentagon's internal communications about the deal. Air Force Gen. Gregory S. Martin, chief of the Air Force Materiel Command, withdrew from consideration for a more senior post after tussling publicly with McCain about the gravity of the ethics violations. Roche and Marvin Sambur, his top acquisition manager, announced their resignations from the government two weeks ago, just before McCain splashed some acerbic and revealing internal Air Force e-mails (quoted portions of which appear in italics below) about the plan into the Congressional Record. Roche said he never intended to serve longer; Sambur said he stepped aside partly to help ease tensions with Congress, which blocked the leasing plan this summer. The significance of the $30 billion tanker program to its supporters is reflected in the extreme language Roche and Sambur used in the e-mails to describe what they believed was at stake. The two were deeply invested in its success, and although it was principally an Air Force -- rather than a Defense Department -- initiative, they worried that any setback would be ruinous for them and others at the Pentagon. I will not give your enemies the tools to bury us! Sambur told Roche on June 25, 2003, during a dispute over the wording of the report to Congress. Two weeks later, Roche accused dissenting government officials in an e-mail on July 8, 2003, of wanting me to sign a suicide note. BUT I WILL NOT. This whole drill has gotten out of hand! Roche, a former executive at the Northrop Grumman Corp., is well-known for his take-no-prisoners political style. In one e-mail, he compared himself to World War II Navy Fleet Adm. William F. Halsey Jr., whose motto he quoted as: "Strike fast, strike hard, strike often." Both Roche and Sambur, a former executive at ITT Defense with a similar style, have said the lease was a good deal because it allowed the Air Force to acquire the planes faster than if they were purchased. But the e-mails indicate they saw themselves as primarily allied with Boeing and its congressional supporters in the dispute, rather than others in the Bush administration who considered the deal a costly rip-off and violation of federal procurement rules. Their missives, as a result, provide an unusual glimpse into part of what scholars described more than 20 years ago as the "Iron Triangle" -- the enduring alliance between the military services, the defense industry and their congressional advocates. Roche and former Northrop executive Ralph Crosby were once rivals at the firm, said sources who know them both. When Crosby was appointed in August 2002 as the head of the U.S. office of the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Co. -- the parent of Airbus, a fierce Boeing rival with its headquarters in France -- Roche sent an e-mail to William Bodie, his top public relations aide, saying: Well, well. we will have fun with Airbus. Roche's hostility to Airbus was also reflected in an e-mail debate on April 16, 2003, between Wynne and Roche about inviting Crosby to lunch. Wynne opened the discussion by telling Roche and Sambur that he wanted Crosby to say how much a refueling tanker built by Airbus would cost. Wynne explained: They came in a couple of weeks ago and offered to build the majority [of the tankers] here in America. . . . I am not sure where this will lead, but the benefits of competition may be revealing. Roche replied: Mike, you must be out of your mind!!! Crosby has lots of baggage, as does Airbus. We won't be happy with your doing this. Wynne replied with a reference to Pentagon rules against sole-source contracting: But where will the competition come from? Roche replied by invoking U.S. anger over France's failure to support the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq: Neither you nor I can attend the Paris Air Show, we are getting into a possible flap over inviting the chief of the FAF [French Air Force] to a gathering next September, and you are inviting them to lunch? Hello? Within minutes of the invite, Crosby most likely used your call to butter his personal croissant in Paris, and EADS would then inform the [French presidential office] . . . in seconds. Be careful! Airbus was not the leasing program's only enemy, according to Roche's and Sambur's e-mails. Sometimes top Pentagon officials, such as Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, caused problems by deviating from the Air Force orthodoxy that replacing the tankers was urgent. Reacting to an interview with Myers published on April 9, 2002, in which Myers said that the existing tanker fleet was adequate for future needs, Gen. John P. Jumper, Air Force chief of staff, told Roche: I don't think there was malice. . . . We just have to articulate the problem we are trying to fix. In the summer of 2003, the Pentagon's office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) also stoked Air Force pique by dissenting from its claim that leasing would essentially cost the same as buying the planes. In fact, said PA&E director Ken Krieg in a memo on June 20, 2003, to Wynne and others, lease costs would exceed purchase costs by $1.9 billion to $6 billion, depending on the accounting method used. He said the deal violated Pentagon procurement rules. Roche sent Wynne -- the more junior official, according to Pentagon protocol -- an e-mail two days later, warning that the bureaucrats who opposed the 767 lease have come out of the woodwork to kill it. . . . Ken Krieg's memo . . . is a cheap shot, and I'm sure has already been delivered to enemies of the lease on the Hill. It was a process foul. And Ken needs to be made aware of that BY YOU! Roche went on to say that PA&E was trying to set the Air Force up to be destroyed by Sen. McCain. . . . As you might imagine, I won't give them the chance, but I will make it clear who is responsible to Don [Rumsfeld]. I refuse to wear my flak jacket backwards to protect against friendly fire. Wynne then sent Krieg an angry note, and Krieg responded by suggesting a face-to-face meeting with Roche to clear air. He explained in an e-mail that: I am trying to get the strategy to drive the deal; the deal and contract to set the numbers; the numbers [price] to be reopened . . . without a lot of hype. Roche gave no ground in his reply: Kenny, I love you, and you know that. I think you have been had by some members of the famous PA&E staff. You never should have put what you put in writing. It will now be used against me and Don Rumsfeld. Roche and Sambur also resented an effort by analysts at the Office of Management and Budget to insert into a July 10, 2003, Pentagon report to Congress a single paragraph confirming that leasing the refueling tankers could cost at least $1.9 billion more than buying them. Sambur e-mailed Roche on July 8 of that year: What they are forcing us to say is that IF Congress gave us permission to PURCHASE under the same [terms] . . . then the lease is DUMB financially. Robin [Cleveland, a senior OMB official] wanted it in the text and Mike [Wynne] got her to accept it as a footnote. Sambur added that he had spoken the previous week to Rep. Norman D. Dicks (D-Wash.), whose district includes Boeing offices: Dicks told me to hold firm and not to go along with Robin. Roche, apparently alarmed by Wynne's willingness to accept the insert, also sent an e-mail to Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz's top political aide, warning that OMB's attempt to include the paragraph was a bureaucratic trick to make a fool out of Don [Rumsfeld] as well as the Air Force. Roche also told Wynne in an e-mail: McCain and others who oppose the lease will leap to this number! Why is this so hard for you to see, Mike? But Wynne defended his decision the following day: I believe that addressing this point in this fashion takes the teeth out of their criticism. This will not embarass at all the Secretary [of Defense]. . . .This followed one full week of negotiation to remove it from the text and get it to only footnote status. . . . I think you . . . are letting a minor math point get in front of a major policy win. In the run-up to these discussions, OMB's Robin Cleveland had sent the résumé for her brother, Peter, then a law student, to Roche on May 9, 2003, saying: I would appreciate anything you can do to help with NG [Northrop Grumman]. Within an hour, Roche forwarded the e-mail to Stephen Yslas, a senior Northrop lawyer, at the firm's Los Angeles headquarters: STEVE -- I know this guy. He is good. His sister (Robin)is in charge of defense and intell at OMB. . . . If Peter Cleveland looks good to you, PLS add my endorsement. Be well. Roche then forwarded a copy of his e-mail to Cleveland, saying: Be well. Smile. Give tankers now (Oops, did I say that?. . .). Cleveland, for her part, congratulated her brother a week later on getting a job interview with Northrop, telling him in an e-mail: Hope it works before the tanker leasing issue get[s] fouled up. Northrop in the end did not hire Cleveland's brother, and by July 8, the Air Force was less solicitous of her. Sambur on that day sent Roche an e-mail saying: It is worth a shot speaking to Robin, or are you like me in that you would rather take poison? Cleveland declined to comment through OMB spokesman Chad Kolton. He said that after the e-mail exchange about the job was discovered and shared with Senate investigators two months ago, OMB Director Joshua B. Bolton sent it to the Justice Department to check for compliance with conflict-of-interest statutes; no result has been announced. Various e-mails make clear that leasing enthusiasts repeatedly assured top Pentagon officials that the deal was cost-effective and untainted by scandal. Despite the internal budget critiques, a special assistant to the defense secretary, Richard Greco Jr. -- now the Navy comptroller -- said in a January 2003 memo to Wolfowitz that the price is essentially neutral to a buy. After Boeing fired executive Darleen A. Druyun on Nov. 24, 2003, for violating its ethics rules -- but before she pleaded guilty in court to raising the tanker price as a gift to Boeing while serving as Sambur's principal deputy -- Sambur told Air Force Undersecretary Peter Teets that a thorough review of the Darlene situation had been completed, and . . . there was no way Darlene had had any influence on the leasing plan, according to an e-mail on Nov. 27, 2003, from Teets to Roche. When asked about the controversy at a news conference last week, Rumsfeld laid most of the blame on Druyun and the fact that she had "very little adult supervision above, below or on the side" while she steered contracting benefits to Boeing. He added, "I'm told that when Secretary Roche and Assistant Secretary Sambur came in, they looked at that situation, were uncomfortable with it, and began taking authorities away from her and trying to reestablish a different arrangement. "Obviously," Rumsfeld added, "there's something needs to be changed." -------- chemical weapons OPCW gives go-ahead for Libyan chemical weapons factory conversion THE HAGUE (AFP) Dec 02, 2004 http://www.spacewar.com/2004/041202202410.j3pganew.html A request by Libya to convert chemical weapons production facilities into a pharmaceuticals plant has been given the go-ahead by an international weapons watchdog. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) said on Thursday it had approved a scheme to covert the facilities into a plant that could produce low-cost medecine against AIDS and malaria for the African market. "These vaccines are urgently required in the treatment of AIDS/HIV, malaria and tuberculosis," a statement by the organization, which is based in the Dutch capital, said. The plant at Rabta produced about 100 tonnes of sulphur mustard gas and other nerve agents in the 1980s. It was closed in 1990 after the United States and others accused Libya of using the facility for nefarious purposes and hinted at action to stop it. Libya on January 6 agreed to adhere to the Chemical Weapons Convention following Tripoli's decision to give up its weapons of mass destruction development programme. -------- europe China to tell Schroeder and EU to lift embargo, but to expect no concessions BEIJING (AFP) Dec 02, 2004 http://www.spacewar.com/2004/041202122456.qz92ry5f.html China made clear Thursday it would make no concessions in upcoming meetings with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and the European Union where it will urge a lifting of the EU arms embargo. "Of course during these meetings and talks, the two sides will also touch on some problems, including the early lifting of the ban," foreign ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue said. "This is high time for the final resolution of this question." But she said Beijing should not be expected to prove its human rights record had improved or to make any concessions. "This is a very solemn, serious political issue. We think it's for the EU to make an early and appropriate decision. ... It's not for the Chinese side to make any concessions," she said. Schroeder will make a five-day visit to China and then Japan on December 5-10, his office announced Monday. In China, he will meet with President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. Following Schroeder's visit, Wen will travel to the Netherlands to hold an annual China-EU meeting on December 8. The EU embargo was imposed on China after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, but some EU states -- notably France and Germany -- argue that it is outdated. China, unable to purchase advanced weapons from the United States, wants to buy them from Europe and countries such as France and Germany are believed to want to cash in on such trade. The Chinese government spends heavily on military hardware. European countries are also eager to boost trade ties with China, the largest market in the world. Germany also wants Beijing's support in its hopes of gaining a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Several EU countries, however, cited China's poor human rights record as a concern. The European Parliament voted last month to maintain an EU arms sales embargo against China until it improves its human rights record. Zhang argued Thursday that China and the EU have had "fruitful and effective" dialogue on human rights. It was "natural" for the two sides to have differences on human rights but those differences could be resolved through dialogue instead, she said. The ban was "incompatible with the reality of our strategic partnership" and resolving the issue will benefit the development of China-EU relations, she said. ----- EU takes over Bosnia peacekeeping from NATO SARAJEVO (AFP) Dec 02, 2004 http://www.spacewar.com/2004/041202150820.ohivhc3g.html The European Union launched its biggest military operation Thursday, taking over peacekeeping duties in Bosnia from NATO, nine years after the bloody inter-ethnic war in the former Yugoslav republic. EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana and NATO head Jaap de Hoop Scheffer attended the ceremonial transfer of power from the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) to the EU's 7,000-strong EUFOR at Camp Butmir in Sarajevo. "Today the EU assumed a new responsibility in your country ... that will be done with the same spirit and with the same efficiency as our predecessors from NATO," Solana said. A 60,000-strong North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mission, including 20,000 US troops, was deployed in Bosnia-Hercegovina to keep the peace after the 1992-95 war and was gradually scaled down to 7,000. "Although NATO's role is changing today, its commitment to Bosnia-Hercegovina's future development remains as solid and resolute as ever," de Hoop Scheffer said. "In the safe and secure environment that NATO's presence has created, Bosnia-Hercegovina has made considerable progress. The citizens of this country no longer live in fear. State institutions have been established and human rights are now respected." His words were echoed by Borislav Paravac, the Serb chairman of Bosnia's tripartitite presidency. "This undoubtedly confirms another big step for Bosnia-Hercegovina in building a lasting peace on its path to European integration," Paravac said. The handover had little logistical significance as the majority of the NATO soldiers already deployed in the country will simply change their badges and armbands to become members of the EU's so-called "Althea" force. It is the EU's third military operation after a small security mission in Macedonia and a French-led force in the Democratic Republic of