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NUCLEAR
Time for Arms Talks? Iran, Israel, and Middle East Arms Control
Vintage nuclear bomber up for grabs on Internet auction site
Your Pre-election Reality Check
Weapons Dust Worries Iraqis
India's Reliance Energy Keen To Open Nuclear Power Plants
Iran Votes to Resume Nuclear Work
Iran Would Freeze Enrichment for 6 Months at Most
Hundreds of Iranian students form human chain to back enrichment
Did Iraqi Materials, Experts Escape?
Ehime accepts Shikoku Electric's pluthermal project
North Korea says U.S. talks approach is "crafty trick"
Nuclear Shell Games
The right (nuclear) war, the right time, the right place
On The Horizon: Securing Borders With Information Analysis
Avoiding the Tipping Point
Nuclear Chief Pressures Iran, N. Korea
ElBaradei Presses N.Korea, Iran on Nuclear Threat
On eve of US vote, UN nuclear chief avoids Iraq explosives row
Oconee mishap shows the need for better storage of nuclear waste
MILITARY
U.N. Hostages Seen Alive on Videotape
Lockheed Martin Buys Naval Electronics Firm
Local Contract Stanley Associates Gets Army Software Contract
Contracts Awarded
Rebels vow to use chemical weapons
Looters breached Iraq sarin bunker
Martial Law Declared as Nearly 150 Die in Clashes in Central China
Attack Kills 15 as Allawi Warns Falluja Rebels
American, 5 Others Kidnapped in Iraq
Allawi threatens 'military solution'
Rocket Kills 15 Iraqis at Tikrit Hotel
The Creaky Coalition
Study: Iraq Invasion Has Killed 100,000 Civilians
A Question of Conscience: How Many More?
Arafat possibly poisoned: doctors
Can Pakistan Work? A Country in Search of Itself
ElBaradei Presses N.Korea, Iran on Nuclear Threat
Vietnam veteran seeks Agent Orange benefits
Copters Maxed in Counterinsurgency War
Japanese cities grow uneasy as U.S. military weighs shifting troops
U.N. Court: Milosevic May Defend Himself
POLICE / PRISONERS / COURTS / JUSTICE
Military tribunals to begin for 2 Guantanamo detainees
The Mystery of the Coca Plant That Wouldn't Die
Some Hazmat Trains Rerouted Since March
Major Breakthrough in the Detection of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Thais still forced on to trucks
Disagreement Over Detainees' Legal Rights Simmers
When the Voting Bloc Lives Inside a Cellblock
How Bush Was Offered Bin Laden and Blew It
POLITICS
U.S. Spends Only Small Part of Funds to Help Rebuild Iraq
Party Censors Leave a Chinese City to Speculate on Corruption Scandal
Indymedia Launches Special Election Coverage
Robert Fisk: "Bin Laden's Vote is For George Bush"
New film pokes fun at Bush-speak
GOP expected to hold House; Senate at stake
IRS Investigating NAACP For Criticizing Bush
Foreign policy takes rare role at center stage
Foreign teams set to monitor balloting
Charges of Fraud and Voter Suppression Already Flying
ENERGY
Energy Regulations Costing Consumers Billions;
OTHER
Water, Women, and War
ACTIVISTS
New Initiative Calls for Mass Protest on Nov. 3 if Election is "Stolen"
US whistleblower urges civil servants to leak Iraq secrets
-------- NUCLEAR
Time for Arms Talks? Iran, Israel, and Middle East Arms Control
Arms Control Association
Dalia Dassa Kaye
November 2004
http://armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/Kaye.asp
The Middle East has all it takes to frustrate international arms control regimes. Key regional actors do not recognize one actor's right to exist, let alone share diplomatic relations. Countries in the region perceive their own security as requiring the insecurity of others, leading them to adopt offensive military postures. At the same time, there is virtually no regional arms control culture or constituency.
The ongoing showdown between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iran is a case in point, underscoring the limitations of global nonproliferation norms in addressing regional proliferation. Despite Tehran's stated commitment to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), as well as the IAEA's success in uncovering a pattern of Iranian violations, the violations themselves raise many questions about the adequacy of the NPT in blocking determined states from acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities. Even strengthened verification measures under the Additional Protocol do not address the broader political and security context of proliferation problems in unstable regions such as the Middle East.
Without such consideration, even the best orchestrated international diplomatic efforts will fall short. Because effective arms control follows political relationships and is dependent on the broader security environment, current diplomatic efforts focused on Iran must take place in conjunction with attempts to create a more favorable regional climate for arms control. This will require altering political relationships and establishing new regional processes that focus not just on international disarmament goals but also on regional confidence-building measures.
Although solving current proliferation challenges such as Iran is not dependent on the creation of new regional security structures, strong political support for such processes by the United States and its Western allies could create a more favorable regional climate and provide some cover for regional actors to make concessions in the proliferation area. That said, the creation of a regional security dialogue should be viewed primarily as a long-term process to address the underlying motivations and security vulnerabilities that lead to the type of crises we are facing today with countries such as Iran.
Consequently, the United States and Europe need to work together, preferably in conjunction with Russia and other Western allies such as Japan, on three levels: first, rein in the Iranian nuclear program; second, involve Israel, the one nuclear power in the region, and its Arab neighbors more actively in regional and global nonproliferation efforts; and third, revive multilateral regional security talks. On none of these points are there reasons to be sanguine about the prospects for success, but neither are such efforts futile, particularly if international coordination and willingness to exert political capital on the Middle East proliferation problem increases.
Dealing With Iran
Iran's potential acquisition of nuclear weapons must be addressed quickly and resolutely. No other proliferation challenge would more dramatically disrupt the regional balance of power and escalate the regional arms race, not to mention undermine the credibility of the NPT, than an Iranian nuclear weapons capability. The potential for nuclear breakout among other Middle Eastern states, in addition to the horrifying risks of such technologies reaching terrorists, would create a proliferation nightmare several times worse than previous threats to the NPT regime.
Indeed, the prospect of a nuclear Iran is one of the few issues currently generating transatlantic agreement, even if tactics differ. Compared to the Europeans, the United States considers sanctions against Iran more favorably and prefers a shorter timeline for imposing them if Iran does not comply with IAEA demands. Both sides are in agreement that Iran cannot be allowed to develop its own nuclear fuel cycle, which could enable Iran to produce enough weapons-grade material for a small arsenal within a short period of time.
The specter of Iranian acquisition of nuclear capabilities is so troubling that Israel predictably has not ruled out a preventive military strike. Such a military option would be much more difficult (militarily and politically) than the Israeli strike against Iraq's Osirik facility in 1981. Worse still, it could prompt an Iranian military response, further destabilizing the region.[1] Still, the Israelis are leaving the option on the table, issuing statements and pursuing actions that are preparing the ground for such an attack, even if such preparations are solely for deterrent purposes.[2]
Although the IAEA has postponed a decision on whether to refer Iranian safeguards violations to the UN Security Council until its Board of Governors meeting on Nov. 25, Iran's hard-line position since a September IAEA resolution called on Iran to suspend all enrichment-related activities raises the prospects for escalation. Iran's refusal to fully abide by its previous commitment to the United Kingdom, France, and Germany to suspend all enrichment activity and hints that it might consider withdrawing from the NPT are raising the stakes.
Generating agreement in support of sanctions will be difficult given the importance of Iranian energy supplies to Western countries, particularly with oil prices at an all-time high.[3] Nevertheless, in the face of continuing Iranian defiance, such a course of action is possible, even though it may take place outside the UN Security Council context. Unfortunately, as the India and Pakistan cases demonstrated, international sanctions that are not pursued through a broad multilateral process over a sustained period of time (as was the case with Libya) are not always an effective instrument in persuading determined states to reverse course.
Time is running out, but the contours of a transatlantic approach are apparent, providing some hope for a nonmilitary solution. Such a strategy, most clearly and forcefully outlined by Robert Einhorn, assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation in the Clinton administration, essentially calls for the United States and Europe to switch roles, with Europe becoming the "bad cop" and the United States becoming the "better cop."[4] The idea is to change the cost-benefit analysis of the Iranian leadership to the extent that pursuing the nuclear path will be viewed as too costly.
In practice, this translates into tougher and more credible European threats to isolate Iran politically and economically if it does not reverse course (i.e., using sticks instead of simply the threat of deferred carrots). At the same time, the United States will need to indicate what Iranian nuclear capabilities would be acceptable even under the current regime (e.g., nuclear technology that did not allow for an indigenous fuel-cycle capability and would require the return of all spent fuel to approved third parties). Recent discussions between the United States and the Europeans on a package of incentives for Iran, including imported nuclear fuel, suggest the United States and its allies may be moving in this direction.
Even more significantly, the United States would need to drop its regime-change rhetoric and explore the improvement of bilateral relations, beginning perhaps with limited dialogues focused on issues of mutual concern such as Iraq and Afghanistan.[5] Improved relations with Iran will face tremendous domestic resistance in the United States, but an increasing number of voices are calling for such a shift. Indeed, an altered U.S.-Iranian political relationship is the linchpin for any other efforts to address regional proliferation; rethinking this relationship should be the top priority for whichever U.S. administration comes to office this January. The outlines of a Western strategy to resolve this crisis may be clear, but the political will to carry it out, both in Washington and European capitals, is still questionable.
Israel and Its Neighbors
Diplomatic efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear challenge could gain momentum if other regional parties, particularly Israel, take steps to boost the nonproliferation agenda and improve the regional security environment. Accusations of double standards must be evaluated in the context of the existential threat Israel faces and its belief that nuclear weapons offer a valuable deterrent in warding off any attack. Iran's recent parading of its Shahab-3 missiles, capable of reaching Israel and covered with banners calling for Israel's destruction, only contributes to this security perception, even though Iran's motivations for nuclear weapons capabilities are complex and extend beyond the Israeli factor.[6]
Still, the perception among Arab parties and others in the developing world that the West applies double standards when it comes to "acceptable" and "unacceptable" proliferators is real and needs to be addressed. The recent U.S. focus on the Iranian nuclear threat in the context of the Bush administration's lack of commitment to global arms control treaties such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has only reinforced this perception of double standards.
Some specific steps by Israel could thus improve the climate in the Middle East. Expecting Israel to join the NPT or alter its policy of nuclear ambiguity is a nonstarter; efforts pressuring Israel in this direction will only backfire.[7] Still, Israel could move forward with other arms control measures, such as ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the CTBT (building on its recent signing of a facilities agreement with the CTBT Organization) and joining the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). At the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Israel could also reaffirm its commitment to join the NPT in the future if certain security conditions are met, such as peace treaties with all of its neighbors and the establishment of a verifiable weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-free zone (WMDFZ)-to include long-range missile capabilities-throughout the region.[8] The United States should encourage Israel to take such steps by offering assurances that renewed political attention to regional arms control will extend beyond a focus on the weapons themselves to include the broader agenda of transforming the security environment and nature of political relations in the region.
Moreover, because one cannot divorce nuclear arms control from other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, a comprehensive approach is necessary if arms control is to be a serious endeavor in the region. In particular, Egypt and Syria should be encouraged to join the CWC. Even if Syria is unlikely to move forward on the CWC until Israel's posture on the NPT changes, Syria could take other nonproliferation steps, such as ratifying the BWC and the CTBT and subscribing to the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.
Expectations in Europe that Syria may follow the Libyan model of completely ending its WMD programs may be unwarranted,[9] but the growing European attention to Syria in relation to weapons of mass destruction, especially its chemical weapons program, in conjunction with increasing U.S. pressure should continue. The European refusal to conclude its Trade and Cooperation Agreement with Syria until Damascus accepted the EU's new standard nonproliferation clause is a welcome step.[10] Europe's new Neighborhood Policy, which promises closer economic, political, and security relations with the EU's neighbors in exchange for progress on a variety of "priority" areas including nonproliferation, may also prove a useful lever for European influence on these issues. The Neighborhood Policy, initiated after the EU's enlargement in May 2004, applies to all non-EU participants in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, or Barcelona process, including key actors in the regional proliferation context such as Israel, Syria, and Egypt.[11]
Renewed Regional Security Dialogue
Specific steps taken by individual Middle Eastern actors can improve regional security, but ultimately the region needs a multilateral regional security process to address the interrelated web of security perceptions and vulnerabilities and the underlying sources for proliferation in the region. Such a process should work toward the creation of a WMDFZ in the long run, along the lines of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America. Given the political and security realities in the Middle East at present, however, a more realistic short-term agenda could focus on practical confidence-building measures in areas such as conflict prevention, misperception, and limitation of damage should conflict occur.
The short-lived history of the only official multilateral security experiment to date in the Middle East-the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group of the Arab-Israeli multilateral peace process-demonstrates that such an agenda is possible.[12] Established with the Madrid peace conference in 1991, the ACRS process accomplished more than many thought was possible in this region, even if it ultimately collapsed in 1995. As the co-sponsor of the group, the United States sought to structure the ACRS group based on previous arms control experience in the European and U.S.-Soviet context, suggesting that incremental approaches to arms control tended to precede formal arms control measures, such as the banning of certain military activities or actual reductions in capabilities.
Consequently, the ACRS group focused on incremental confidence-building measures to encourage cooperative security norms rather than on a more advanced arms control agenda. After the Oslo breakthrough in Israeli-Palestinian relations in 1993, the ACRS group engaged in a number of conceptual and operational confidence-building activities, such as the drafting of a declaration of principles for regional security and arms control; the creation of a regional security center; the establishment of a communications network; the production of a Pre-notification of Certain Military Activities agreement; an Exchange of Military Activities document; and a number of maritime confidence-building measures such as Search and Rescue (SAR) and Prevention of Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) agreements.
Despite this active agenda, the ACRS group's demise was brought about largely by the dispute between Israel and Egypt over the Israeli nuclear issue. Egyptian pressure on Israel to sign the NPT increased tension in the group and essentially held all other activities in the process hostage to this issue. Its progress was also limited by setbacks on the bilateral peace process tracks as well as by the exclusion of key regional parties from the process, most notably Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya.
The ACRS experience underscores that regional security dialogue can be fruitful and confidence-building measures in a variety of areas are possible. Future efforts, however, will need to adequately address Egyptian and other Arab concerns over the Israeli nuclear arsenal while assuring the Israelis that this will not be the sole focus of such discussions. The ACRS process thus demonstrates the need to work both on longer-term disarmament goals as well as shorter-term regional security confidence-building and cooperative activity. Moreover, a renewed regional dialogue must include the actors who were absent from the ACRS group if the process is to be comprehensive and address the full range of regional security relationships and concerns.
After the demise of the ACRS process, the prospects for a renewed, regional arms control dialogue appeared dim, despite a variety of unofficial track-two dialogues.[13] Yet, in the aftermath of the Iraq war, which highlighted weapons of mass destruction and made clear that Iraq desired to maintain a nuclear deterrent even though it did not actually possess such an active weapons program after 1991,[14] attention is once again being focused on a regional arms control agenda. The ongoing crisis with Iran as well as the positive developments with Libya have only further fueled interest in re-establishing some sort of official regional process.
IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei underscored the critical need for a regional security dialogue during his visit to Israel in July 2004. As a result, ElBaradei secured the agreement of regional parties, including Israel, to participate in an IAEA conference this January, which will examine how negotiations established WMDFZs in other regions and what lessons these efforts might offer the Middle East. This meeting is a one-time event, however, and, although useful, cannot replace a more durable regional dialogue process with a broader agenda.
The recent Euro-Med agreement to start a dialogue on weapons of mass destruction is also a positive step. It will include both Israel and Syria, which participate in the Barcelona process. But it cannot replace a dialogue that includes key extra-regional actors such as the United States and critical regional parties in the Persian Gulf that are not part of the Barcelona process. In order to improve understandings of mutual threat perceptions and engage in confidence-building measures in such areas as surprise attack, transparency, conventional stockpiles, and the like, in addition to longer-term disarmament goals, a comprehensive regional security process is essential.
Many will argue that the creation of a multilateral regional security dialogue is impossible absent a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Few can doubt that progress on the Middle East peace process would create a more favorable climate for regional arms control, as occurred in the early 1990s with the ACRS process. A successful Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, for example, could generate momentum and provide political cover for the resumption of a regional arms control process, as would serious Israeli commitment to dismantling settlements deep inside Palestinian territory. Yet, the absence of progress on the peace process also should not provide an excuse for doing nothing. The WMD revelations in Iraq, the recent Libyan decision to dismantle its WMD programs, the growing vulnerability felt by Syria, and the current focus on the Iranian nuclear issue provide an opening for moving a regional arms control agenda forward even in the current environment, as the emergence of recent initiatives suggests.
A new regional security process can work toward a WMDFZ in the long run while maintaining a more pragmatic agenda in the short term. The fact that even under the best political conditions a WMDFZ in the Middle East may never fully transpire should not lead the international community and the region itself to avoid confronting the proliferation crisis and taking steps now to avoid further destabilization. Ultimately, a transformation of political relationships and the creation of a broad, durable, and effective regional arms control process will be key to meeting the proliferation challenges from the Middle East that so threaten stability today.
ENDNOTES
1. For an assessment of the risks regarding a use of force option, see Michael Eisenstadt, "The Challenge of U.S. Preventive Military Action," in Checking Iran's Nuclear Ambitions, eds. Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, January 2004).
2. On statements by Israeli leaders not ruling force out in response to the Iranian threat, see Aluf Ben, "Waiting to Bomb Iran," Ha`aretz, September 29, 2004. On one relevant defense acquisition, a purchase of 500 bunker-busting bombs from the United States, see Maggie Farley, "Powell Denies U.S. Plans to Attack Iran," Los Angeles Times, September 23, 2004.
3. See George Perkovich and Silvia Manzanero, "Plan B: Using Sanctions to End Iran's Nuclear Program," Arms Control Today, May 2004.
4. See Robert J. Einhorn, "A Transatlantic Strategy on Iran's Nuclear Program," The Washington Quarterly 27, no. 4 (Autumn 2004): 21-32.
5. See "Iran: Time for a New Approach," 2004 (report of the Council on Foreign Relations task force co-chaired by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert M. Gates). Ray Takeyh and Nikolas K. Gvosdev similarly argue that, because regime change does not appear imminent, we have the opportunity to engage more pragmatic elements within the conservative camp who might find improved relations with Washington in their interest. See Ray Takeyh and Nikolas K. Gvosdev, "Pragmatism in the Midst of Iranian Turmoil," The Washington Quarterly 27, no. 4 (Autumn 2004): 33-56.
6. See Ray Takeyh, "Iran's Nuclear Calculations," World Policy Journal 20, no. 2 (Summer 2003).
7. Indeed, the International Atomic Energy Agency's revelations regarding Iranian violations and growing capabilities have only reinforced the Israeli rationale for maintaining its current nuclear stance. See Emily B. Landau, "ElBaradei's Message to Israel: Regional Security Dialogue," Tel Aviv Notes, no. 106, July 15, 2004.
8. For a similar list of recommendations, see Universal Compliance: Strategy for Nuclear Security, George Perkovich et al (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2004).
9. See Dalia Dassa Kaye, "Europe, Syria, and Weapons of Mass Destruction," PolicyWatch, no. 824, January 8, 2004, pp. 204-38.
10. In December 2003, the European Union adopted a nonproliferation strategy and has since agreed to include a nonproliferation clause in all agreements with third parties; the Syrians were the first to put this clause to the test. For the text of the nonproliferation clause, see http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/st14997.en03.pdf.
11. For the European Neighborhood Policy, see http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/policy_en.htm.
12. For information on the Arms Control and Regional Security working group, see Bruce W. Jentleson and Dalia Dassa Kaye, "Securing Status: Explaining Regional Security Cooperation and Its Limits in the Middle East," Security Studies 8, no. 1 (Fall 1998).
13. See Dalia Dassa Kaye, "Track Two Diplomacy and Regional Security in the Middle East," International Negotiation 6 (2001): 49-77.
14. For the conclusive report on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, including assessments of Iraqi strategic intentions and perceptions, see "Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD," September 30, 2004, found at http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/.
Dalia Dassa Kaye is currently a visiting professor of political science at the University of Amsterdam. Kaye has published many articles on Middle East security issues and is author of Beyond the Handshake: Multilateral Cooperation in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process.
The Arms Control Association is a non-profit, membership-based organization. If you find our resources useful, please consider joining or making a contribution. Arms Control Today encourages reprint of its articles with permission of the Editor.
Arms Control Association, 1150 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 620 Washington, DC 20036 Tel: (202) 463-8270 | Fax: (202) 463-8273
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Vintage nuclear bomber up for grabs on Internet auction site
LONDON (AFP)
Nov 1, 2004
http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/afp/20041101/tc_afp/britain_auction_internet_041101162128
- A British plane enthusiast has put his vintage nuclear bomber up for sale on the Internet auction site eBay.
"Vulcan bomber XL391 (Complete with engines.) Your chance to own a piece of aviation history," reads the advertisement posted by flying instructor Brian Bateson.
As the plane weighs 40 tonnes and has a wingspan of 100 feet (30 metres), it also points out: "As is, where is. Buyer collects!"
Bateson, who had placed it at the entrance to Blackpool Airport in northwest England for visitors to admire, decided to sell the plane so the airport could expand.
The reserve bid of 6,000 pounds (8,600 euros, 11,000 dollars) was "not dissimilar" to what he paid for it in 1983, Bateson said Monday.
"There's no way it would fit in my hangars and I just hope it goes to a good home," he said. "People in the past have asked to buy bits and pieces of it for spares or memorabilia but I hope it stays in one piece."
Vulcans were built in the 1960s to carry nuclear bombs during the Cold War, but were later converted to carry conventional armaments.
Bateson's plane was stationed on Ascension Island in the South Atlantic during Britain's 1982 conflict with Argentina over the Falkland Islands, but was not called up to the front.
-------- depleted uranium
Your Pre-election Reality Check
Colorado State Collegian
By Ben Bleckley
November 01, 2004
http://www.collegian.com/vnews/display.v/ART/2004/11/01/4185d42497bf2
On the eve of Election Day, it is time for a fair and balanced reality check.
Saddam Hussein is a bad man. He gassed his own people. It is good he is no longer in power.
But the full cost of our involvement in Iraq has yet to be seen.
More than 100,000 civilians have died in Iraq since the United States invaded in 2003, according to a report released by the Lancet Medical Journal Friday. These deaths were mainly attributed to bombings by coalition forces.
A great amount of our ammunition is tipped with depleted uranium, a radioactive material that is twice as hard as lead and capable of piercing armor. When this ammunition explodes, the depleted uranium becomes a fine powder, easily inhaled or dissolved into water.
The World Health Organization states that "inhaled uranium particles, tend to be retained in the lung and may lead to irradiation damage of the lung and even lung cancer if a high enough radiation dose results over a prolonged period" in the report "Depleted uranium: sources, exposure and health effects."
Iraqi officials claim that the use of these same weapons during the Gulf War in 1991 has caused an epidemic of cancer and birth defects.
At home, 42 million people have no health insurance.
The national debt is more than $7 zillion.
As a nation we use 2.5 million barrels of oil each day. Eventually this resource will run dry, if the threat of global warning (which every other nation in the world has accepted as fact) doesn't destroy us first. Our guzzling sport utility vehicles pump harmful pollutants into the air and still we have failed to join the rest of the free world in supporting the Kyoto Protocol. While nations such as Japan produce the most fuel-efficient cars in the world, the current government is focusing on hydrogen fuel cells, a technology that won't be environmentally or technologically feasible for another 15 years.
Nationwide, the price of college has increased 35 percent in the last three years, and I know I'm feeling it. No Child Left Behind has some good ideas, but it has no funding, forcing schools to implement programs they can't fund. Schools are funded partially by property taxes, making suburban schools more well funded and urban schools less so.
Abstinence-only education is the only federally funded sex education program. According to www.plannedparenthood.org, "when (students) do become sexually active, they often fail to use condoms or other contraceptives. Meanwhile, students in comprehensive sexuality education classes do not engage in sexual activity more often or earlier, but they do use contraception and practice safer sex more consistently when they become sexually active." Currently, 35 percent of school districts require that abstinence is taught as the only sexual option for unmarried couples.
Lawmakers are attempting to divide our nation and restrict the rights of at least 10 percent of our citizens by passing a Federal Marriage Amendment. They seem to be concerned with preserving the values of the American family. I, for one, am not concerned about being lured away by a male from my fianc?e's side. Maybe others feel differently.
While I'm sure his heart President Bush's heart is in the right place, his policies are not. While Sen. John Kerry would not be my first choice for president, he has the best chance of replacing our president. To preserve our nation and move us forward to tomorrow, vote for John Kerry this Tuesday.
Ben Bleckley is a junior English major. His column runs every Monday in the Collegian.
On the eve of Election Day, it is time for a fair and balanced reality check.
Saddam Hussein is a bad man. He gassed his own people. It is good he is no longer in power.
But the full cost of our involvement in Iraq has yet to be seen.
More than 100,000 civilians have died in Iraq since the United States invaded in 2003, according to a report released by the Lancet Medical Journal Friday. These deaths were mainly attributed to bombings by coalition forces.
A great amount of our ammunition is tipped with depleted uranium, a radioactive material that is twice as hard as lead and capable of piercing armor. When this ammunition explodes, the depleted uranium becomes a fine powder, easily inhaled or dissolved into water.
The World Health Organization states that "inhaled uranium particles, tend to be retained in the lung and may lead to irradiation damage of the lung and even lung cancer if a high enough radiation dose results over a prolonged period" in the report "Depleted uranium: sources, exposure and health effects."
Iraqi officials claim that the use of these same weapons during the Gulf War in 1991 has caused an epidemic of cancer and birth defects.
At home, 42 million people have no health insurance.
The national debt is more than $7 zillion.
As a nation we use 2.5 million barrels of oil each day. Eventually this resource will run dry, if the threat of global warning (which every other nation in the world has accepted as fact) doesn't destroy us first. Our guzzling sport utility vehicles pump harmful pollutants into the air and still we have failed to join the rest of the free world in supporting the Kyoto Protocol. While nations such as Japan produce the most fuel-efficient cars in the world, the current government is focusing on hydrogen fuel cells, a technology that won't be environmentally or technologically feasible for another 15 years.
Nationwide, the price of college has increased 35 percent in the last three years, and I know I'm feeling it. No Child Left Behind has some good ideas, but it has no funding, forcing schools to implement programs they can't fund. Schools are funded partially by property taxes, making suburban schools more well funded and urban schools less so.
Abstinence-only education is the only federally funded sex education program. According to www.plannedparenthood.org, "when (students) do become sexually active, they often fail to use condoms or other contraceptives. Meanwhile, students in comprehensive sexuality education classes do not engage in sexual activity more often or earlier, but they do use contraception and practice safer sex more consistently when they become sexually active." Currently, 35 percent of school districts require that abstinence is taught as the only sexual option for unmarried couples.
Lawmakers are attempting to divide our nation and restrict the rights of at least 10 percent of our citizens by passing a Federal Marriage Amendment. They seem to be concerned with preserving the values of the American family. I, for one, am not concerned about being lured away by a male from my fianc?e's side. Maybe others feel differently.
While I'm sure his heart President Bush's heart is in the right place, his policies are not. While Sen. John Kerry would not be my first choice for president, he has the best chance of replacing our president. To preserve our nation and move us forward to tomorrow, vote for John Kerry this Tuesday.
Ben Bleckley is a junior English major. His column runs every Monday in the Collegian.
-----
Weapons Dust Worries Iraqis
Provisional Government Seeks Cleanup; U.S. Downplays Risks
November 1, 2004
The Hartford Courant
By THOMAS D. WILLIAMS
http://www.ctnow.com/news/health/hc-ducleanup1101.artnov01,1,7556418.story?coll=hc-headlines-health
Despite assurances from the U.S. military that depleted uranium from exploded munitions does not pose a significant health threat, Iraq's provisional government is asking the United Nations for help cleaning up the low-level radioactive, metal dust spread across local battlefields by U.S. and British forces during the Persian Gulf wars.
The request comes as the United States continues to defend depleted uranium weaponry - prized for its tank-piercing and bunker- or cave-smashing ability - against strong opposition by other countries, scientists and veterans organizations.
Great Britain, a major partner in the coalition now fighting in Iraq, has provided the U.N. with the coordinates where its forces used depleted uranium, also known as DU, in southern Iraq, but the United States has not. Britain and Germany are supplying money to train Iraqis in environmental science. The United Nations plans to survey for DU hot spots from both wars in Iraq and says it needs the coordinates for an effective survey.
Neither British nor U.S. authorities have offered to augment the $4.7 million donated mainly by Japan to the United Nations to evaluate sites of wartime contamination that health experts say threaten the well-being of Iraqi civilians.
In late October, Army Lt. Col. Mark Melanson said a five-year, $6 million Defense Department study of a simulated DU tank explosion shows "the chemical risks of breathing in uranium dust are so low that it won't cause any long-term health risks," even for the tank crew.
Health Concerns Remain
Concern about the health effects of depleted uranium is not limited to overseas countries. The Defense Department's contention that depleted uranium has not been shown to affect health adversely and therefore doesn't need to be cleaned up is contrary to its own rules for handling it. Those rules mirror the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's treatment of depleted uranium as an environmental hazard and danger to public health. Federal regulators have shut down some U.S. nuclear weapons and uranium processing and munitions plants, found to be contaminated by depleted uranium. Billions of dollars are being spent on its cleanup in the United States.
Depleted uranium, or U-238, is a toxic, heavy metal byproduct of uranium enrichment that gives the world uranium suitable for use in nuclear weapons and reactor fuel. It is also used in munitions, ballast for airplanes, tank armor and other products. It has a half-life of 4.5 billion years.
In 2002 at the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute in Bethesda, Md., researchers found that even though the alpha radiation from depleted uranium is relatively low, internalized DU as a metal can induce DNA damage and carcinogenic lesions in the cells that make up bones in the human body.
Depleted uranium was first used widely in combat in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The material in armor-piercing munitions ignites and burns on impact at temperatures of several thousand degrees Celsius. While burning, tiny particles, or dust, of uranium oxide aerosol are created. Wind can carry these considerable distances.
Since 1991, the cancer rates in Iraq have risen sharply in areas where depleted uranium was used, according to Iraqi medical studies reviewed by scientists from other countries. In addition, more than 230,000 of the 697,000 U.S. soldiers who served in that war have filed disability claims for various maladies, the majority of which fall under the broad category of gulf war syndrome.
With many of the causes of these illnesses still eluding researchers, several lawmakers, at the urging of veterans groups, pushed for legislation to study depleted uranium further, to see if there is a connection with gulf war and other wartime illnesses. It called also for cleaning up depleted uranium munitions firings.
In the Republican-controlled Congress, the measures quietly died this fall inside the House Health Subcommittee. Congress and three presidential administrations have either remained silent on the dispute or have dismissed the environmental and health concerns raised.
Council Urges Ban
U.N.-related organizations, citing studies showing more cancers and birth defects among civilians and soldiers in countries where depleted uranium munitions have been used, have pressed for more studies and a ban on their use until the effects are better understood. The Council of Europe, Europe's oldest inter-governmental organization of 46 nations, has called for a ban on the production, use, testing and sale of munitions containing depleted uranium or plutonium.
But U.S. political leaders in Congress and at the White House have refused to acknowledge that depleted uranium might seriously harm soldiers and civilians.
At home, the United States has spent billions of dollars cleaning up depleted uranium - at former munitions factories, military firing ranges and nuclear fuel production sites. A General Accounting Office report in 2000 put the cost of cleanup at the uranium enrichment plant in Paducah, Ky., where DU is processed for use in weapons and nuclear reactors, at $1.3 billion. By December 2003, the cost of cleaning up and closing the plant, estimated to take until 2070, was up to $13 billion
Cleaning up DU contamination in Iraq, experts say, would come with a multibillion-dollar price tag.
Any money spent on cleaning up depleted uranium in Iraq would be in addition to the estimated $225 billion that the United States will be spending on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan if Congress approves the Bush administration's estimated $70 billion in emergency funding request early next year.
Frederick Jones, a spokesman for the National Security Agency, said the United Nations has not asked the Department of Defense or State Department for assistance in cleaning up depleted uranium in Iraq.
The U.N. Environmental Programme's chairman, Pekka Haavisto, however, said his organization has kept the State Department informed of those needs.
Since 1991, the United States and Britain have fired hundreds of tons of DU munitions during four wars - in the Balkans, Afghanistan and twice in Iraq.
U.N. environmental spokesman Michael Williams said the United States has not supplied coordinates on the sites where DU munitions were fired in Iraq or offered to clean it up. Haavisto added: "U.S. government has the information that if field assessments will be done, exact DU coordinates are needed."
Bill Dies Quietly
Last year, Rep. Jim McDermott, D-Washington, a U.S. Navy psychiatrist during the Vietnam War, sponsored a bill to pay for a definitive study of the health effect of DU munitions and to clean up dust and fragments after their use. The bill was referred to the House Armed Services and Energy and Commerce committees and then to the committee's Health Subcommittee, where it died.
McDermott's spokesman, Mike DeCesare, said the Republican leadership blocked the bill's passage. But a spokesman for the Health Subcommittee said the committee counsel could find no "aggressive action" by McDermott to get a hearing for it. DeCesare insisted, however, that if McDermott is re-elected, he intends to reintroduce the bill, which was supported by Connecticut Rep. Chris Shays, R-4th District.
"Depleted uranium is a potential health hazard for the Iraqi people and we need to do all we can to make sure that as Iraq is rebuilt, we help the new Iraqi government mitigate any public health threats," Shays said.
The debate over DU has not made much of an impact on the presidential race. President Bush sides with the Pentagon. The Democratic nominee, Sen. John Kerry of Massachusetts does not have a position on the use of depleted uranium munitions, his communications director, Andy Davis, said recently.
Independent candidate Ralph Nader, a Connecticut native, said DU munitions are environmentally dangerous and should never have been used in the first place.
"The denial and cruel coverup has gone on too long," Nader said. "These soldiers and civilians who suffered [adverse health from exposure to DU] deserve the truth and respectful assistance. The first step is to admit the problem. The second step is to measure the size of the problem and then clean up the environmental toxins. The next step is to stop using depleted uranium munitions."
But the Bush administration, which insists DU poses little environmental risk so cleanup is not needed, takes the Pentagon's advice on such matters.
"If the [Defense Department] indicated to us that the DU rounds or explosions were a cause of concern, and they have not done so, a study or inquiry of their use would be warranted," said Bush's National Security Council spokesman Frederick Jones. "Then we would be faced with that decision. The [Defense Department] has not contacted us, nor to the best of my knowledge has any international body contacted us." Jones said.
Kuwait Cleanup
There have been many instances when the military directed depleted uranium cleanups overseas.
For example, a private contractor working for the Department of Defense was paid $3.5 million to cleanup DU-contaminated military equipment and a practice firing range in Kuwait. MKM Engineers Inc. based in Stafford, Texas, performed a limited cleanup in Kuwait from February 2003 to June 2004. The company recovered 22 tons of DU fragments and 75 pieces of non-DU ordnance scrap. The unexploded DU ordnance was destroyed with Kuwaiti assistance. MKM also cleaned military hardware, including tanks, and wrapped them to contain surface contamination before sending them back to the United States.
The U.S. Army Material Command, responsible for the Kuwaiti project, described the work as retrieval of equipment and munitions, not a clean up.
The Department of Defense "does not clean up DU once it leaves a U.S. weapons system such as a Bradley Fighting Vehicle and hits an enemy building, or vehicle," said Melissa Bohan, an Army public affairs official. Army regulations require the clean-up and proper handling of U.S. equipment hit by depleted uranium munitions.
MKM referred to some of its work in Kuwait as a cleanup. And, the Defense Department has a low-level radioactive waste cleanup program, whose goal is "the safe and compliant disposal of low-level radioactive waste," including depleted uranium. It includes the Army Contaminated Equipment Retrograde Team, which supervises cleanup of low-level radioactive contamination of Army equipment worldwide.
Military regulations require immediate medical tests and treatment for any soldiers exposed to dust and fragments from depleted uranium shell explosions. Some nuclear scientists studying the health effects of those inhaling DU believe even a speck of the dust in the lungs or bloodstream can eventually cause cancer or kidney disease in adults or cancers or deformities in babies if even one parent has been exposed.
Marion Fulk, 83, a former nuclear chemical physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory who was involved with the Manhattan Project's development of the atomic bomb, said that even nano-size particles of DU in the blood and lungs are a serious destructive force.
Others who support the Defense Department position say only inhalation of large quantities creates serious health problems.
-------- india / pakistan
India's Reliance Energy Keen To Open Nuclear Power Plants
Asia Pulse/(PTI)
November 1, 2004
http://au.news.yahoo.com/041101/3/rgue.html
MUMBAI, Nov 1 Asia Pulse - Reliance Energy (BSE:RLEN) is looking at the possibility of setting up nuclear power stations to fulfil the baseload requirements of the country.
However, Dr V K Chaturvedi, the newly appointed director of the New Power Initiative of Reliance Energy said at the weekend this would require a lot of support from the government. It would also be the first time a private company would be entering into India's nuclear power market, he added.
Chaturvedi, who was the former company managing director of the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL), said, "It will be necessary to have technical support from the Department of Atomic Energy and NPCIL".
As soon as the amended Atomic Energy Act on private participation in the nuclear energy production is cleared by parliament, Reliance Energy will be the first company to come forward to set up nuclear power plants, Chaturvedi claimed.
The idea is to meet the high energy demand of the country in view of the depletion of fossil fuels in the coming years, he said.
To meet the country's expected demand of 600 to 700 gigawatts of electricity by 2050, "the new resources should be looked into without any delay," he said.
Reliance Energy is working on other renewable energy sources such as wind and solar energy to cater for the requirements of isolated places where there is no connection to the main grid.
-------- iran
Iran Votes to Resume Nuclear Work
November 1, 2004
By NAZILA FATHI
The New York Times
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/01/international/middleeast/01iran.html?pagewanted=all
TEHRAN, Oct. 31 - The hard-line Iranian Parliament unanimously approved a bill on Sunday supporting the resumption of uranium enrichment. The vote comes as talks with European countries over Iran's nuclear activities have so far failed to produce an agreement.
The measure was supported by all 247 lawmakers who were present in the 290-member body, with some chanting "Death to America" and "God is great." The session was carried live on the national radio.
The bill requires the government "to make use of scientists and the country's facilities'' to "enable the country to master peaceful nuclear technology, including the nuclear fuel cycle," ISNA, a news agency, reported.
Iran contends that its nuclear program is entirely for peaceful purposes. The United States contends that it could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations' monitoring agency, has called on Iran to give up its enrichment program before Nov. 25 or its case will be sent to the Security Council, where Iran could face the imposition of penalties.
Germany, Britain and France have taken the lead in trying to negotiate with Iran to persuade it to suspend its nuclear activities.
No agreements have been reached so far between Iran and the three European countries. Iran has rejected the offer to give up its fuel cycle in return for aid for its nuclear technology and imports of fuel.
The Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hamid Reza Assefi, sounded more conciliatory on Sunday, saying there has been progress in the talks with the European negotiators. A week ago, he described their proposal as unbalanced.
"Offering Iran a supply of fuel is a positive step, which we welcome, but this must not deprive Iran of its right to nuclear technology for peaceful reasons," he said.
The bill passed Sunday must be approved by the Guardian Council, a group also dominated by hard-line leaders, before it becomes law. But the bill does not set a date for the government to resume uranium enrichment.
The speaker of the Parliament, Gholam Ali Haddad Adel, said the vote was a message to the world.
"The message of the absolute vote for the Iranian nation is that Parliament supports national interests," he said. "And the message for the outside world is that Parliament will not give in to coercion."
The leader of the Parliament's commission for national security and foreign policy, Aladdin Boroujerdi, said that sanctions had been in place against Iran for 25 years, and that Iran was not convinced that the Europeans would fulfill any commitments they made in the talks.
Nevertheless, talks with the Europeans are to resume on Friday in Paris. Mr. Assefi said Sunday that Iran was expecting a schedule from the Europeans to show how they would carry out their commitments.
"We expect that in the course of this meeting the Europeans will specify their precise commitments, concrete and clear, and the Islamic Republic will make the best decision in line with its own interests," he added.
Political analysts in Tehran said Parliament's action on Sunday was largely symbolic.
"What they did was merely political, to strengthen the position of Iranian negotiators ahead of the Paris meeting," said Saeed Leylaz, a political analyst and journalist in Tehran. "The country's supreme leader is the sole decision maker over nuclear activities and the Parliament or government have no power in this regard. Parliament wanted to send a message that this is our real stance even if the negotiators reach a compromise."
--------
Iran Would Freeze Enrichment for 6 Months at Most
Nov 1, 2004
TEHRAN (Reuters)
By Parisa Hafezi
http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=topNews&storyID=6675850&pageNumber=0
- Iran could agree to freeze uranium enrichment for six months at most and only provided the European Union abandons its demand that Tehran scrap enrichment for good, a senior Iranian security official said on Monday.
Tehran risks being reported to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions if it does not freeze enrichment before the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) board meets on Nov. 25.
Iran says it wants to enrich uranium to produce fuel for atomic power reactors generating electricity. But the same process can also be used to make atomic bombs.
The EU says the enrichment suspension should be indefinite. Iran wants its duration linked to Iran-EU negotiations on a package of incentives aimed at resolving the nuclear dispute.
Asked how long Iran would be prepared to freeze enrichment for, Hossein Mousavian, foreign policy committee secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, told Reuters:
"We can agree to a period of two to three months, maximum six months, to finalize the package."
But he said that if the EU maintained its position that Iran must scrap its nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, "then, if not now, in some months we will reach a confrontation."
EU and Iranian negotiators are due to meet in Paris on Friday for a third round of talks over Iran's nuclear program.
The EU is offering Iran a number of incentives including guaranteed supply of imported nuclear fuel, help with a light-water power reactor and a resumption of trade talks if Iran agrees to scrap enrichment for ever.
50 PERCENT CHANCE OF A DEAL
Mousavian said the chances of reaching a compromise before the IAEA meeting were currently 50-50.
"The cessation of uranium enrichment is already rejected. It is our red line and if it is the Europeans' condition then it is better to leave the talks now."
"(But) if the Europeans' concern is to be assured that Iran's (uranium) enrichment will never in the future be diverted from peaceful purposes ... there's a very good chance of reaching a compromise."
Mousavian has said Iran is ready, if necessary, to defend itself in the U.N. Security Council and thinks it unlikely sanctions would be imposed on Tehran over the nuclear issue.
As a signatory of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran is entitled to mine, process and enrich uranium to make reactor fuel under IAEA supervision.
While IAEA inspectors have found several instances of potentially weapons-related research and activities in Iran they have found no clear evidence it is trying to make atom bombs.
Iran's hard-liner-dominated parliament on Sunday approved a bill which calls on the state to continue to develop a civilian nuclear energy program, including the full nuclear fuel cycle.
Asked whether the bill could force the government to resume enrichment as some deputies have demanded, Mousavian said:
"No, it just means that Iran's rights should be respected and there should be no discrimination against it."
Analysts say there is widespread support for the nuclear program across the Islamic state's normally divided political spectrum.
Around 1,000 students and clerics gathered outside Iran's Atomic Energy Organization headquarters in Tehran on Monday to call on officials not to give in to EU demands.
"Nuclear technology is our legitimate right," they chanted. "We don't want atomic bombs, we are atomic bombs!"
--------
Hundreds of Iranian students form human chain to back enrichment
TEHRAN (AFP)
Nov 01, 2004
http://www.spacewar.com/2004/041101135510.cz3cunn2.html
Hundreds of Iranian university students on Monday created a human chain around Islamic Republic's atomic organization headquarters backing the resumption of uranium enrichment.
"Enrichment is our natural right," the university students shouted, along with the habitual "Death to America".
Most of them also wore headbands showing their readiness for "martyrdom".
On Sunday, Iranian lawmakers, passed a bill backing the resumption of uranium enrichment, as the government left the door open for further negotiations with Europe over the controversial practice.
The motion was also passed to calls of "Death to America."
Iran's parliamentary speaker, Gholam Ali Hadad Adel described the vote as a "message addressed to foreign countries that parliament will not give in to intimidation". The text tells the government "to take action for the country to master civilian nuclear technology, especially in the fuel production cycle".
-------- iraq / inspections
Did Iraqi Materials, Experts Escape?
Paul Kerr
November 2004
armscontrol.org
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/Iraqi_Materials.asp
The unstable security conditions that have reigned in Iraq since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion may have allowed both unconventional weapons experts and weapons-related equipment to escape, according to U.S. and international officials.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei wrote in an Oct.1 letter to the UN Security Council that the agency is "concerned about the widespread and apparently systematic dismantlement that has taken place at sites previously relevant to Iraq's nuclear program." Manufacturing equipment and related materials that could assist another country's nuclear weapons efforts have been removed, the letter said, adding that entire buildings containing such equipment have been dismantled.
A Western diplomat told Arms Control Today Oct.19 that the removal of the equipment and buildings took place "at least through the entirety of 2003," a period during which the United States exercised formal control over Iraq prior to the establishment of an interim government this past June. At that time, the United States removed nuclear material that posed a potential proliferation threat from Iraq's Tuwaitha nuclear complex. (See ACT, September 2004.)
ElBaradei's letter also points out that Security Council resolutions oblige Iraq to report inventory changes at sites subject to agency monitoring, but neither Iraq nor the United States has submitted such reports.
ElBaradei wrote a similar letter to the Security Council in April (see ACT, May 2004), but an IAEA official indicated in an Oct. 19 interview that new evidence has emerged suggesting that the removal of equipment and related materials was "apparently widespread and systematic."
Tuwaitha contained nuclear material subject to routine IAEA agency safeguards prior to the invasion. The agency has visited the site twice since the invasion, but no proliferation-sensitive material has been found missing.
In addition, Iraq notified the IAEA Oct. 10 of the disappearance after April 2003 of more than 340 metric tons of dual-use conventional high explosives that were subject to agency monitoring prior to the invasion. The explosives can be used in implosion-type nuclear weapons to compress a core of plutonium or uranium to start a nuclear chain reaction. The IAEA last inventoried the stockpiles in January 2003 and spot-checked a portion of them in March 2003.
Other reports from UN inspectors have described in detail the export of materials from Iraq, including missile engines that were associated with Baghdad's past weapons programs. (See ACT, October 2004.)
Department of State spokesperson Richard Boucher acknowledged during an Oct. 12 press briefing that Washington is concerned that "some material might have gotten out into the market immediately after the war." However, he added that IAEA visits and Iraq's development of export controls should "prevent any further leakage."
Iraq's interim science and technology minister, Rashad Omar, told the Associated Press Oct.13 that Iraq now has control over its former weapons sites.
Scientists
The ongoing insurgency in Iraq has also slowed U.S. efforts to redirect Iraqi scientists and other personnel previously associated with Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs. A State Department official told Arms Control Today Oct.18 that these efforts are "progressing more slowly than we would like them to" because of the adverse security conditions.
David Kay, former CIA special adviser to the U.S.-led weapons inspectors, told Arms Control Today in March that some scientists with whom Washington wanted to speak had left the country.
According to the State Department official, the programs have the "overwhelming majority" of relevant Iraqi personnel "identified and engaged."
Several efforts are underway to redirect former Iraqi weapons personnel. The State Department is in the process of setting up an Iraqi International Center for Science and Industry. That center is tasked with identifying relevant Iraqi personnel and facilitating the development and funding of projects designed to aid Iraqi reconstruction efforts. The center was initially funded with a $2 million grant from the State Department's Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund and has access to an additional $2 million. (See ACT, January/February 2004.)
In addition, the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has a similar program to be implemented by an international group of scientists. The NNSA announced in June that the project has completed a survey of Iraq's "science and technology priorities." NNSA spokesperson Kim Krueger told Arms Control Today Oct. 25 that two pilot projects concerning water resources and public health are to be completed before the end of the year. (See ACT, April 2004.)
Another program, the Iraqi Nonproliferation Programs Foundation, was set up by the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in June. According to the CPA order establishing the program, the foundation was created to develop and finance projects to provide former Iraqi weapons of mass destruction personnel with "opportunities to redirect their expertise to transparent peaceful civilian activities." The foundation's mission has not yet been "entirely defined," the State Department official said.
The foundation received $37.5 million from the Development Fund for Iraq, which the UN Security Council set up for Iraqi reconstruction.
--
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-------- japan
Ehime accepts Shikoku Electric's pluthermal project
Kyodo News
November 1, 2004
http://www.japantoday.com/e/?content=news&cat=4&id=317464
TOKYO - The Ehime prefectural government approved on Monday a pluthermal project by Shikoku Electric Power Co. to burn plutonium-uranium mixed oxide fuel at one of its nuclear reactors in Ikata. The town of Ikata has already given the go-ahead.
The utility has briefed local residents on the project at the Ikata nuclear power plant's No. 3 reactor in a bid to reassure them about the project's safety. Pluthermal, or plutonium-thermal power generation, is designed to use plutonium-uranium MOX fuel, which makes use of spent fuel at nuclear reactors for power generation, as well as to unload a growing volume of spent nuclear fuel. (Kyodo News)
-------- korea
North Korea says U.S. talks approach is "crafty trick"
SEOUL (Reuters)
Nov 1, 2004
http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml;jsessionid=2S3NZYQYV1F5GCRBAEKSFEY?type=topNews&storyID=6671442
North Korea brushed aside on Monday Washington's suggestion that Pyongyang had much to gain from returning to talks on its nuclear programmes, saying the U.S. approach was a "crafty trick" to win presidential election votes.
North Korea has held three rounds of talks on its atomic ambitions with China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the United States but has ruled out fresh talks despite appeals from the other participants to come to the table.
Last week, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell visited the region. A South Korean government spokesman in Seoul quoted him as saying North Korea could expect "to get a lot of things" if it rejoined the talks.
"The Bush group's claim that the DPRK will gain much for coming out to the six-party talks does not reflect its intention to lead the talks to any solution to the problem but is nothing but a crafty trick to attain sinister political and military purposes by employing a delaying tactics," said Rodong Sinmun, the main North Korean newspaper.
DPRK is short for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
In comments reported by the North's official KCNA news agency, Rodong Sinmun said the U.S. aim was to give the impression it had tried everything to encourage North Korea and thus win votes in Tuesday's presidential election.
"If the U.S. truly wishes a solution to the nuclear issue through the six-party talks and peace on the Korean peninsula it should drop its hostile policy toward the DPRK and set forth a realistic alternative proposal," the newspaper said.
That was a nod to China and South Korea's suggestions last week to Powell to consult with allies and come up with what South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon said should be a "creative and realistic proposal" to entice the North back to negotiations.
Pyongyang rejected a June 23 U.S. proposal for a three-month freeze of North Korean nuclear programmes and the North's agreement to verifiable measures to dismantle those programmes in exchange for U.S. security guarantees and fuel oil from South Korea and Japan.
North Korea says it wants aid in return for a freeze.
Washington suspects North Korea is holding back from restarting the talks to see who wins the election, President George W. Bush or Democratic challenger John Kerry. The North denies this.
----
Nuclear Shell Games
Whatever the history of South Korea's nuclear experiments, it doesn't bother the U.S. Why not?
Time
BY DONALD MACINTYRE
Monday, Nov. 01, 2004
http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/article/0,13673,501041108-749478,00.html
The nuclear intentions of Iran and North Korea have been a major source of global angst for more than a year, and the Bush Administration is set to keep the pressure on both countries. Stopping in Seoul last week during a swing through Asia to revive talks on the North Korean nuclear crisis, Secretary of State Colin Powell said the world badly needed to get Pyongyang back to the negotiating table. North Korea "is a danger to every one of its neighbors," he said.
Powell expressed far less concern about recent revelations that South Korea, a U.S. ally, has been secretly tinkering with the ingredients for atomic weapons. The South Korean government in September admitted it had failed to tell the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about its experiments with bomb-usable materials including plutonium, sparking an investigation by the agency into possible violations of Seoul's nonproliferation commitments. Although the IAEA is not due to report its findings until Nov. 25, Powell, in an interview on Korean television, said the case was as good as closed. "I'm quite sure that the IAEA will see it as a minor problem with experimentation," he said, "and not anything for the international community to be worried about."
Compared with its northern neighbor, South Korea certainly poses no threat to peace on the Korean Peninsula. But that doesn't mean the country is innocent of breaking its nuclear promises. Seoul signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1975, agreeing not to pursue bomb-making technology and to submit to IAEA monitoring so that techniques and materials used in nuclear-power plants are not converted to military use.
Seoul insists its scientists were not conducting weapons research and that it has fully disclosed its activities. But there is nagging evidence that the country has for decades periodically carried out clandestine experiments to gain know-how that would allow it to quickly develop atomic weapons, specifically through the production of plutonium and enrichment of uranium. (Much of the controversy surrounding Iran's nuclear program concerns efforts to enrich uranium.) Although those radioactive elements can be found in peaceful nuclear programs (with 19 reactors supplying 40% of its electricity, South Korea relies heavily on nuclear power), Seoul agreed not to produce either enriched uranium or plutonium without notifying the IAEA because the materials are essential to atom bombs. Now, the IAEA is trying to determine the truth. Among the incidents being investigated:
• A 1982 experiment in which a minute quantity of plutonium was separated from uranium. IAEA inspectors first became suspicious in 1997 when a swab at a research reactor near Seoul picked up traces of plutonium that shouldn't have been there. For years, Seoul offered no explanation, saying the paperwork had been lost. Finally, in September, the president of the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), Chang In Soon, said the traces were residual material from a "one-off test" in which fuel was taken from a reactor and dissolved in chemicals, allowing the plutonium it contained to be extracted. A confidential Ministry of Science and Technology report obtained by TIME states that five fuel rods were involved and that testing took place over two months. More ominously, the test material was "depleted" uranium imported from the former West Germany in 1976. That was a red flag for the IAEA, because depleted uranium is no good for power-plant fuel and creates more plutonium when it decays than does ordinary uranium. When the agency found out, "it really got people bent out of shape," says Mark Hibbs, Asia and Europe editor at industry publication Nucleonics Week. "That made them very keen to explore more about it."
• The IAEA is also investigating an experiment carried out in 2000 at a sophisticated lab on KAERI's sprawling campus south of Seoul. Earlier this year, after South Korea ratified a new protocol giving the IAEA broader inspection powers, Seoul told the agency that scientists at the institute had used lasers to enrich uranium. Uranium used in fuel rods is lightly enriched, usually less than 5%. During the 2000 experiment, however, researchers produced uranium that was 77% enriched, or nearly weapons grade. Seoul characterized the laser experiment as independent research carried out by curious scientists who then neglected to report it. But TIME has been told by two sources that one of the scientists involved in the 2000 experiment was Lee Jong Min, a vice president at KAERI at the time and one of the country's top laser experts. Lee's office did not respond to requests by TIME for comment.
Standing beside Powell last week, Foreign Minister Ban Ki Moon insisted his government had nothing to hide. "We're handling this in a transparent manner," he said. Officials and lawmakers in Seoul are seething over the international scrutiny, saying their country is the victim of a double standard because their ancient rival Japan is allowed to enrich uranium and separate plutonium to run reactors. "Every nation that pursues the full use of nuclear technology inevitably gets close to weapons technology," says Kim Tae Woo, a nuclear analyst at the government-run Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. "So what is wrong with that?"
The answer is easy. If a U.S. ally is allowed to get away with nuclear transgressions, there's every chance that Tehran and Pyongyang will scream bloody murder-and be less inclined to scale back their own plans. Seoul's murky nuclear history didn't seem to disturb Powell. That's a judgment he may yet come to regret.
From the Nov. 08, 2004 issue of TIME Asia Magazine
-------- terrorism
The right (nuclear) war, the right time, the right place
ROANOKE.COM By
Dr. Reginald Shareef
November 01, 2004
http://www.roanoke.com/columnists/shareef/13021.html
Graham Allison is the like the man in the old Smith Barney commercials -- when he speaks, you need to listen. And he is speaking loudly in his new book, ìNuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe.î I heard him give a presentation last Sunday night on C-SPAN2 and spent the rest of the evening extremely uncomfortable with what he said: nuclear terrorism is a preventable threat but elected officials are doing precious little to prevent a nuclear attack from terrorist organizations.
Allison is the former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard and is now the director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at KSG. He has been writing increasingly alarming articles warning that the former Soviet Unionís nuclear arsenal remains inadequately secured and is vulnerable to theft by criminals or poorly paid military guards. Either group would reap a handsome profit by selling nuclear materials to organizations like Al Qaeda that desperately want to get their hands on WMDs. The new book means to shock the American public into putting pressure on either a Republican or Democrat administration to take action on this most pressing threat to national security.
If we maintain the status quo on this issue, Allison predicts a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States within the next decade.
For Allison, the Bush administrationís inaction on controlling the spread of ìfissile materialî (enriched uranium and plutonium) is hard to understand because prevention of nuclear terrorism is simply a matter of physics: without fissile material, you canít have a nuclear bomb; thus, no nuclear bomb, no nuclear terrorism. Moreover, the technology exists for keeping these materials from terrorist groups -- Russia does not lose items from the Kremlin Armory nor does the United States from Fort Knox. This should, consequently, be the operational model for controlling the spread of fissile material: storing these materials in Fort Knox-type structures. In the book, Allison proposes a comprehensive strategy for combating the threat of nuclear terror called the ìThree Noísî -- no loose nukes, no new nascent nukes, and no new nuclear states.
He strongly criticizes the Bush administration for not:
Assigning a nuclear terrorism czar to be responsible for preventing the spread of WDM material.
Furthermore, Allison believes that if the U.S. takes the lead in this initiative, we will find a willing ally in Russian leader Putin. Consequently, Great Britain, France and China will follow suit. He also believes that China can influence recalcitrant states like Pakistan and North Korea to come on board. The European states will likely have the same kind of influence over Iran.
Allisonís proposal is complicated, expensive and would require difficult trade-offs between the U.S. and enemies like Iran and North Korea.
The alternative? The same amount of enriched uranium (as fertilizer) packed in a van like that used by Timothy McVeigh in the Oklahoma City bombing and detonated in Manhattan would make that section of New York City completely disappear. More than 500,000 people would be killed immediately. The wind would carry the radiation far beyond NYCís city limits.
Once built, getting a nuclear weapon inside the country is not difficult. For instance, only 2 percent of the cargo containers that arrive at U.S. ports this year will be opened for inspection. Human ìmulesî can carry softball size balls of enriched uranium across our porous borders with Canada and Mexico. After 9-11, President Bush received word that a nuclear device was in NYC and sent VP Cheney and other ranking officials into secure, underground bunkers in case an attack was imminent. Other national security personnel then attempted to figure out if the report was true and how a nuclear device could have gotten into the country. The grim joke of the day was that it could have been packed into any of the pounds of marijuana that are delivered daily to The Big Apple.
Add to this the chilling desire for an ìAmerican Hiroshimaî by radical terrorist groups. Allison quotes an Al Qaeda spokesman who has publicly stated that the group aspires to kill 4 million Americans, including 1 million children, in response to the causalities supposedly inflicted on Muslims by the United States and Israel. Thus, Allison concludes that President Bush is correct in asserting that if Al Qaeda gets nuclear weapons, it would use them against the U.S. in a ìheartbeat.î
Yet, neither President Bush or Sen. Kerry addressed this issue during the presidential campaign. Allison is not the only one concerned about nuclear terrorism. The presidentís political party colleagues, and Kerryís Senate brethren, Richard Lugar and (former senator) Sam Nunn have also been sounding the alarm about nuclear terrorism since the fall of the Soviet Union. Still, neither the president nor Kerry has articulated a policy for keeping these materials out of the hands of terrorist groups whose stated goals is to kill Americans.
In making the case for the war against Sadaam Hussein, the president argued, ìIf the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of uranium a little bigger than a softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year.î The fact that no WMDs have yet to be found in Iraq has effectively stopped both men from talking about nuclear terrorism. It shouldnít have. A nuclear explosion on U.S. soil -- not dirty bombs or planes flying into tall buildings -- represents the ultimate terrorist attack.
This is definitely the right time, and the presidential campaign was the right place, to talk about the war against nuclear terrorism.
An earlier book by Graham Allison on the Cuban Missile Crisis outlined how ìgroupthinkî between President Kenney and his advisors nearly lead to nuclear war in October 1962. The groupthink phenomenon was so discussed in management/policymaking circles and academic journals that the concept became archaic. That is, until the 9-11 Commission revealed that the Bush administration had been victimized by this cognitive pathology as well (see Defeating Groupthink, August 2004).
Again, Allison has warned of the hazards of only listening to the reinforcing views of members comprising a tightly closed circle. The desire to be members of the ìin-groupî precludes perspectives contrary to the groupís norms and worldview. Additionally, it is not a uniquely Republican or Democrat neurosis. Allison believes it will take several more deadly terrorist attacks before any administration will get serious about preventing a nuclear attack by terrorists.
--------
On The Horizon: Securing Borders With Information Analysis
Risk-assessment and supply-chain analysis are paramount to safety.
Nov. 1, 2004
informationweek.com
By Bradford C. Brown
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=51201661
A trade disruption could "paralyze the economy," according to a report by Forrester Research. It cites the estimated $2 billion-per-day cost of the 2002 shutdown of West Coast ports and asks, "Are our supply chains less vulnerable now?"
Cargo containers move 80% to 90% of the world's freight. The federal government is moving toward screening all containers for radioactivity, yet ABC News has twice shipped a 6.8-kilogram cylinder of depleted uranium across the world and smuggled it into the United States undetected by port security. "It's simply not possible to open every container," Elaine Dezenski, director of cargo and trade policy at the Department of Homeland Security, said last month ("Ports Spend Millions On New Tech To Protect Borders And Waterways," Oct. 8, 2004).
The Bush administration has launched initiatives to identify more effectively high-risk freight. "Information is the key to improving many of our border and transportation systems," said Asa Hutchinson, undersecretary for border and transportation security at Homeland Security in a press release.
Forrester conjectures that "the next terrorist attack is likely to be staged though a supply chain." If that's the case, then risk assessment and analysis of the supply chain would seem paramount.
As a result, the federal government is attempting to maximize the technology it has available, integrating new hardware and software while hardening systems. However, it's doing this in a political environment, not really a business environment. The focus isn't truly on business-technology optimization, but rather on government-technology optimization. That's different in a number of ways. Government-technology optimization means more than making the most of IT. It means trying to make transformations within the culture of a bureau that's managed under the umbrella of a national policy agenda. Structural and cultural issues that historically have made it difficult for the federal government to make optimal use of technology and related information analysis include a lack of continuity across administrations; management silos; budget concerns; a dysfunctional procurement process resulting in a jumble of systems; lack of information analysis and sharing among agencies; and changes in the structure of agencies and the creation of new ones.
The battle is against the clock. Can the federal government make the necessary changes to optimize technology and make better use of information, or will we have another terrorist incident first?
Business-technology optimization is a key part of delivering business value. No matter how much we would like to see the government managed like a business, there will always be broader political concerns. Securing the homeland through risk management, vulnerability assessment, technology optimization, and analysis has to be a priority. Yet success in the federal government is measured by the political case. The flip side of Forrester's supply-chain question asked repeatedly throughout the presidential campaign is, since the events of 9/11, "are we more secure?"
The short answer to both questions is yes, but there's a lot more that needs to be done.
Bradford C. Brown is chairman of the National Center for Technology and Law at the George Mason University School of Law. Reach him at bbrown2@gmu.edu. (Any opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the George Mason University School of Law.)
-------- treaties
Avoiding the Tipping Point
armscontrol.org
Thomas Graham Jr.
November 2004
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/BookReview.asp
In 1958, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan made clear the reason the United Kingdom acquired nuclear weapons. Referring to the British nuclear-weapon program, Macmillan said in a television interview that "the independent contribution [i.e., British nuclear weapons]...puts us where we ought to be, in the position of a great power."
Likewise, in a November 1961 speech, French President Charles de Gaulle said that "a great state" that does not have nuclear weapons when others do "does not command its own destiny." After the May 1998 Indian nuclear test, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced with pride, "We have a big bomb now, India is a nuclear-weapon state." Although it is a historical accident, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) are the five nuclear-weapon states sanctioned by the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The belief held by many of the 182 NPT non-nuclear-weapon states that some nuclear-weapon states cling to nuclear weapons as their political claim to great-power status is not without foundation.
Indeed, in the early 1960s, there were predictions that there could be as many as 25-30 nuclear-weapon states within a couple of decades. President John F. Kennedy feared that nuclear weapons would sweep all over the world. If this had happened, there would be a large number of nuclear-weapon states in the world today: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei said in September that "40 countries or more now have the know-how to produce nuclear weapons." If they had all chosen to exploit this capability, it would be impossible to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorist organizations and rogue states.
Yet, there has been very little actual nuclear weapons proliferation since the entry into force of the NPT in 1970, far from what Kennedy feared. Beyond the five NPT nuclear-weapon states, Israel and India were already far along in their programs in 1970. The only additional states truly to acquire and maintain nuclear weapons since that time are Pakistan and probably North Korea. Reversing years of nuclear abstention would be long and difficult. Nevertheless, if a perception that the NPT regime has collapsed beyond repair takes hold, other countries could decide that they must join the nuclear bandwagon.
Many books have been written on the nuclear policies of the states that never subscribed to the NPT-India, Pakistan, and Israel-as well as those countries that have threatened the NPT from within-Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Yet, there has not been the same attention to the nuclear policies of states that have been stalwart in their observance of the provisions and principles of the NPT and who are central to the continued viability of the regime. This makes The Nuclear Tipping Point a most timely and valuable publication. This important volume edited by Kurt Campbell, Robert Einhorn, and Mitchell Reiss-all highly prominent and respected nonproliferation experts who also contribute to the book-examines in detail the cases of Egypt, Syria, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
These countries together have provided a cornerstone of the NPT regime: an assurance to the pact's many non-nuclear-weapon states that their regional neighbors will not acquire nuclear weapons. When the NPT was negotiated in the late 1960s, some of the negotiating parties were worried that this implicit pledge would not hold and so supported limiting the NPT initially to 25 years rather than granting it permanent status. By 1995 the NPT's success had been demonstrated to the point that states-parties agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely.
A crucial underpinning for these actions has been provided by the United States: the nuclear "umbrella" it used to shelter its allies in Europe (most importantly, Germany) and Asia (Japan and South Korea). During the Cold War, U.S. allies could enjoy the protection of nuclear deterrence without building nuclear arsenals and without creating a nuclear weapons infrastructure that would be politically difficult to dismantle. Giving up nuclear weapons, or any other means of strength and security, is not a natural action for states, but it is far easier to forswear them than to eliminate them once an arsenal is in place.
Even more important has been the international norm against nuclear-weapon proliferation established by the NPT. In 1960, after the first French nuclear-weapon test, there were banner newspaper headlines, "Vive La France." Yet, by the time of the first Indian nuclear explosion in 1974, the test was done surreptitiously, India received worldwide condemnation and New Delhi hastened to explain that this had been a "peaceful" test. What had intervened was the NPT. It converted the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a state from an act of national pride in 1960 to an act contrary to international law in 1974.
The NPT is based on a central bargain: the NPT non-nuclear-weapon states agree never to acquire nuclear weapons and the NPT nuclear-weapon states in exchange agree to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to pursue nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals. To use the words of a former Indian foreign minster, the NPT was not designed to establish "nuclear apartheid," permanently authorizing great-power status and nuclear weapons to a small group of states and assigning the rest of the world to permanent second-class status. Maintaining both ends of this central bargain is vitally important to the long-term viability of the NPT.
In the view of many of the NPT non-nuclear-weapon states, however, the NPT nuclear-weapon states have not lived up to their disarmament commitments. Most importantly, the nuclear "have-nots" point to the failure by the nuclear "haves," principally the United States, to put a permanent ban on nuclear-weapon testing in place-the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was finally opened for signature in 1996, but it is unlikely to come into force in the foreseeable future-and the political value of nuclear weapons remains as high as it was during the Cold War. The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review of 2001 explicitly contemplated the use of nuclear weapons not only against Russia and China, but also against Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Libya-at the time, all NPT non-nuclear-weapon states. If the possession of a nuclear arsenal retains its high political value to NPT nuclear-weapon states, particularly the United States, the ability to persuade states not to acquire these weapons may diminish.
Add to that the withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT in 2003 and its likely acquisition of at least several nuclear weapons; the increasingly suspect Iranian nuclear program; and the disclosure of an illegal secret network of nuclear technology supply headed by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the "father" of the Pakistani program; and many are saying that the NPT is broken and must be fixed or, worse, is irrelevant. Heightening these concerns about the NPT is the threat of international terrorism and the possibility that terrorists may somehow come into possession of a nuclear weapon and actually use it against a large city somewhere. The NPT regime appears fragile, and many fear for its long-term viability.
The news from the states whose nuclear policies are analyzed in The Nuclear Tipping Point is essentially good as long as the NPT regime remains reasonably healthy. The book's editors conclude that the NPT regime remains much stronger than some believe it is and that reversing years of nuclear abstention would be long and difficult. Germany, for example, is deeply committed to remaining a non-nuclear-weapon state, according to Jennifer Mackley and Walter Slocombe.
Nevertheless, if a perception that the NPT regime has collapsed beyond repair takes hold, other countries, such as Japan, could decide that they must join the nuclear bandwagon.
As Kurt Campbell and Tsuyoshi Sunohara point out in their essay, many experts already consider Japan a "virtual" nuclear-weapon state because of its technological capability and the large amount of plutonium it possesses. Some of Tokyo's senior diplomats complain that they have been treated like a second-class nation in the international arena because Japan does not have nuclear weapons. Further, Japanese officials have grown increasingly concerned by what they view as a deterioration in the NPT regime, including the recent U.S. moves and, most disturbingly, the way North Korea has been able to pursue nuclear weapons from within the NPT and the nuclear threat Pyongyang poses.
In some ways, the most timely and foreboding essay is written about South Korea by Jonathan Polack and Mitchell Reiss, now the Department of State's policy planning director. A few weeks ago, news reports claimed that South Korea had conducted uranium-enrichment experiments as recently as a year ago, thereby indicating that its nuclear infrastructure is alive and well. (See ACT, October 2004.)
Polack and Reiss point out that China is increasingly the principal economic and political partner for South Korea and under no conceivable circumstance would South Korea ever countenance force by the United States against North Korea to eliminate its nuclear-weapon program. They posit the question in conclusion whether, after the ultimate disappearance of the regime in the North and an eventual successful reunification of the Korean peninsula, Korea would wish to remain a non-nuclear-weapon state or rather might the Korean people decide to retain the nuclear weapons they inherit from the North and emboldened by the end of a century of humiliation and division conclude that nuclear weapons are essential to security in a still dangerous world.
To prevent slippage in the nonproliferation regime, the editors offer a number of policy recommendations: stop Iran and North Korea (if this remains possible) from becoming nuclear-weapon states; alleviate security concerns by strengthening alliances; raise barriers to nuclear acquisition by discouraging independent fuel-cycle capabilities and securing fissile material in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere; strengthen verification and intelligence, in part by wider adherence to the IAEA Additional Protocol for verification; and follow a long-term strategy to devalue the role of nuclear weapons in the international system. As it is with many things, the NPT regime is affected by politics as much as security. The possession of a nuclear arsenal still significantly affects the status of a state. For the NPT regime to succeed long-term, this high political value of nuclear weapons must recede into the past. For this to happen, the United States must lead by example. No example would be stronger than U.S. ratification of the CTBT.
Strong U.S. leadership, the editors say, is needed to harness partners and institutions and to keep countries away from the nuclear tipping point where proliferation becomes inevitable and uncontrollable. They assert we are not near the tipping point now, nor are we necessarily destined to reach it, but they note that, once the tipping process becomes identifiable in the NPT regime, it may be very difficult to stop.
Thomas Graham Jr. is a former Special Representative of the President for Arms Control, Nonproliferation, Disarmament. In this and other senior capacities he participated in every major arms control/nonproliferation negotiation in which the United States took part from 1970 to 1997. Ambassador Graham is the author of Disarmament Sketches (University of Washington Press, 2002), Cornerstones of Security with Damien LaVera (University of Washington Press, 2003), and Common Sense on Weapons of Mass Destruction (University of British Columbia Press, 2004).
-------- u.n.
Nuclear Chief Pressures Iran, N. Korea
November 1, 2004
By EDITH M. LEDERER
Associated Press Writer
http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/UN_NUCLEAR_AGENCY?SITE=DCTMS&SECTION=HOME
UNITED NATIONS (AP) -- U.N. nuclear chief Mohamed ElBaradei urged Iran on Monday to suspend uranium enrichment and called on North Korea to dismantle its weapons program or at least allow inspectors to ensure it is "exclusively peaceful."
He also stressed the importance of resuming U.N. nuclear inspections in Iraq "as soon as the security situation permits" to ensure that items with both civilian and military applications are not being used in weapons programs.
In his annual report to the U.N. General Assembly and in comments to reporters, ElBaradei said Iran and North Korea highlight the need for stepped-up global efforts to ensure that declared nuclear material is not diverted "for non-peaceful purposes" and that "no undeclared nuclear material or activities exist."
ElBaradei said the International Atomic Energy Agency is "making progress" in Iran but Tehran needs to restore confidence with the global community by suspending its enrichment program after previously providing the IAEA with information "that was at times changing, contradictory, and slow in coming."
On Sunday, Iranian lawmakers shouting "Death to America!" unanimously approved the outline of a bill that would force the government to resume uranium enrichment. But Iran's top nuclear negotiator, Hossein Mousavian, said a compromise was possible.
He held out the prospect of Iran suspending the construction of additional facilities to enrich uranium into nuclear fuel if European countries provide fuel for its planned power plants.
Noting that negotiations between Iran and the Europeans are still under way, ElBaradei said, "I think Iran is - I hope - ready to suspend."
"Whether that will be ultimately a total suspension, or something else, I think this very much depends on the kind of framework to be agreed with the Europeans," he told reporters.
Asked whether there could be a partial suspension, ElBaradei said, "I think at this stage we need a suspension," but he indicated that whether it would be indefinite or not would be part of the negotiations.
"We need to strike a balance between the right of Iran to use nuclear technology and the concern of the international community that any nuclear program is a peaceful one," he said.
"And I think the idea that Iran will be offered technology, including reactor technology, I think is a step in the right direction. We need to satisfy Iran's technological needs, we need to satisfy Iran's security needs," ElBaradei said.
"But also we need to ask Iran to do its utmost to create the transparency and confidence-building required for the international community to believe this program is a peaceful one," he said.
Uranium enriched to a low level can be used to produce nuclear fuel, but if enriched further, it can be used to make nuclear weapons. Iran is not prohibited from enriching uranium under its obligations to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but it faces growing international pressure to suspend such activities as a good-faith gesture.
ElBaradei said he will report to the IAEA board this month, and wouldn't speculate on whether the issue might be referred to the U.N. Security Council, which could impose sanctions.
"We're still working within the agency," he said. "I hope that we will be able to reach a settlement agreed to everybody."
As for North Korea, he said he was "a bit frustrated" at the slow pace of six-party talks to press Pyongyang to dismantle its nuclear weapons programs in exchange for economic benefits and security guarantees. Pyongyang refused to show up for talks scheduled for September.
"I'm telling the North Koreans again that the international community is ready to look into your security concerns, ready to look into your economic and humanitarian needs, but a prerequisite is for them to commit themselves to full, verifiable, dismantlement of their weapons program - as they say they have a weapons program," he told reporters.
He said North Korea should agree to "a comprehensive verification by the IAEA to assure ourselves that this program is exclusively peaceful."
In his report to the General Assembly, ElBaradei emphasized "the need for a comprehensive settlement of the Korean crisis through dialogue," and stressed the importance for any settlement to include the return of North Korea to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Elsewhere, he said, IAEA inspectors confirmed that "for many years, Libya pursued an undeclared nuclear program which aimed to enrich uranium, and which included the receipt of nuclear weapons design documents."
While the IAEA's initial assessment indicates that Libya's statements on its program are consistent with available information, ElBaradei said more investigation is needed "to verify the completeness and correctness of Libya's declarations."
--------
ElBaradei Presses N.Korea, Iran on Nuclear Threat
(Reuters)
Nov 1, 2004
By Evelyn Leopold
http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/nm/20041101/wl_nm/nuclear_un_dc_3
UNITED NATIONS - The head of the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency on Monday pressed North Korea to come clean on its nuclear program, told Iran to suspend uranium enrichment and said U.N. inspectors should return to Iraq (news - web sites).
In his annual speech to the U.N. General Assembly, Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said North Korea continued "to pose a serious challenge to the nuclear nonproliferation regime" and that the IAEA could not "provide any level of assurance about the non-diversion of nuclear material."
U.S. officials say Pyongyang has one or two nuclear weapons already plus material for another six bombs.
The latest crisis over North Korea's nuclear ambitions began in October 2002 when U.S. officials said Pyongyang had admitted to pursuing a secret uranium-enrichment program.
North Korea now denies having such a program, and has demanded energy aid and diplomatic concessions in return for freezing an older, plutonium-based nuclear arms program.
In Iran, ElBaradei said that the IAEA had made some progress but that Tehran needed to suspend all uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities as a confidence-building measure.
"I have continued to stress to Iran that, in light of serious international concerns surrounding its nuclear program, it should do its utmost to build confidence through these voluntary measures." ElBaradei said, adding that Iran's cooperation had improved "appreciably."
"We agree completely and we hope his assessment that they will comply is right," Richard Grenell, spokesman for U.S. Ambassador John Danforth, told Reuters.
Mehdi Danesh-Yazdi, Iran's deputy U.N. ambassador, said Tehran's program was aimed at producing fuel for atomic reactors generating electricity.
The same process can be used to make atomic bombs and
Tehran risks being reported to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions if it does not freeze enrichment before an IAEA board meeting on Nov. 25.
In Tehran, a senior official told Reuters on Monday that Iran could agree to freeze uranium enrichment for six months at most and only if the European Union abandons its demand that Tehran scrap enrichment for good.
Danesh-Yazdi said Tehran would cooperate with the IAEA but said actions against Iran were politically motivated. He also said it was "plausible" that contamination found in Iran had not resulted from uranium enrichment.
MONITORING IN IRAQ
ElBaradei also said Iraq should again be placed under U.N. monitoring, as it was under former President Saddam Hussein.
He did not mention directly the controversy over missing explosives in Iraq, which has featured in the U.S. election campaign after he reported that nearly 380 tons of high explosives monitored by the IAEA were no longer at a military facility south of Baghdad.
This fueled accusations against President Bush that he had mishandled military operations after last year's U.S.-led invasion.
ElBaradei expressed hope that the IAEA would be allowed to resume monitoring in Iraq as soon as security allowed "particularly in view of the dual-use items that have been under IAEA custody in Iraq that would be susceptible to misuse"
He said the IAEA, had "found no evidence of the revival of nuclear activities," a statement he also made before the Iraq invasion. "Naturally, the international community is reassured that these findings have since been validated," he added.
The Bush administration based its case for the invasion partly on an assertion, now been shown to be false, that Iraq had was aggressively pursuing nuclear arms.
In response Grenell said, "Hindsight is always 20-20. We would remind the IAEA that the Security Council had 17 resolutions demanding Iraq account for missing weapons materials."
--------
On eve of US vote, UN nuclear chief avoids Iraq explosives row
UNITED NATIONS (AFP)
Nov 01, 2004
http://www.spacewar.com/2004/041101192942.7l5jbp3z.html
The head of the UN nuclear watchdog steered clear of the controversy over missing explosives in Iraq on Monday, declining to raise the issue at the United Nations on the eve of the US election.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Mohammed ElBaradei said UN inspectors should return to Iraq but stayed away from the explosives issue, which emerged in the final weeks of the close election race.
Last month, ElBaradei had reported that hundreds of tonnes of explosives had vanished from a depot in Iraq after the invasion of US troops that caused the ouster of Saddam Hussein.
The announcement led Democratic challenger John Kerry to accuse US President George W. Bush of incompetence in the handling of Iraq after Saddam's departure, with fears the explosives could fall into the hands of insurgents.
Some Bush supporters fired back that the revelation was made in October to undermine his bid for re-election, amid suggestions ElBaradei had been angered by US opposition to him holding a third term as IAEA director.
In his annual address to the UN General Assembly, ElBaradei said that his agency's mandate from the UN Security Council was still in effect despite the departure of UN inspectors in March 2003 just before the Iraq war.
"We had found no evidence of the revival of nuclear activities prohibited under relevant Security Council resolutions. Naturally, the international community is reassured that these findings have since been validated," he said. "It is clearly important to bring the whole question of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq to closure as early as possible," ElBaradei said, calling for UN inspectors to return to Iraq -- a move so far blocked by Washington.
Bush had cited Saddam's alleged weapons of mass destruction as a main reason for launching the war but none have been found. US voters will cast their ballots on Tuesday in what polls suggest is a very close presidential race.
The New York Sun reported on Monday that US Secretary of State Colin Powell called ElBaradei on Friday and warned him not to bring up the missing explosives in his General Assembly speech.
A leading columnist for the New York Times meanwhile said ElBaradei had used "exquisite political timing" in sending Iraq a letter on October 1 recalling the IAEA's "interest" in the missing explosives.
An Iraqi letter of reply indicated the explosives, which had been placed under IAEA seal when UN inspectors were still working in Iraq, were now missing, which set off the media reports.
Times columnist William Safire said that letter had been leaked to a US television network, which he said had planned to report on the revelation on Sunday, just 36 hours before polls were to open for the presidential election.
But the Times went ahead and reported the story of the missing explosives last week.
Safire, one of the few openly pro-Bush voices at the newspaper, accused ElBaradei of trying to manipulate the US election -- and compared such a move to last week's release of a new Osama bin Laden videotape.
-------- us nuc waste
Oconee mishap shows the need for better storage of nuclear waste
Spartanburg
Herald-Journal
November 01, 2004
http://www.goupstate.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20041101/NEWS/411010304/1022/OPINION
An accident at the Oconee Nuclear Station shows the need for better storage and disposal of high-level nuclear waste.
The nation does not have a solution for disposing of high-level nuclear waste such as spent fuel rods from nuclear power plants. Without a better alternative,that spent fuel ends up stored at the plants.
The problem is that the plants are not designed for permanent storage of this high-level nuclear waste. They aren't sited in the proper locations or designed for that purpose.
That can be seen in the incident at Oconee Nuclear Station. A valve was left open during a water transfer procedure, and 10,000 gallons of water were allowed to drain off the spent fuel rods into a storage tank.
It's not an incident that posed danger to anyone, but it points out that stockpiling this dangerous material at nuclear power plants is not a situation that this country should maintain.
Instead, the government should proceed with plans to open the disposal facility at Yucca Mountain in Nevada. This facility is sited and designed for the permanent disposal of high-level nuclear waste. The material will be safe there for at least 10,000 years, much safer than it is in temporary holding containers at nuclear power plants.
But Yucca Mountain isn't even supposed to open until 2010. And it is a contentious political issue, fought over by politicians and lawyers. There is little hope that the controversies will be settled and the facility will be opened on time.
Meanwhile, spent nuclear fuel continues to pile up in temporary holding facilities at power plants. The chances for an accident are higher at these facilities. And the security is not as tight as it would be at Yucca Mountain. The nation would be better able to keep track of this material and keep it away from terrorists if it were in one secured federal facility.
Washington leaders should stop trying to score political points with Yucca Mountain. They should acknowledge that the nation needs a permanent disposal solution for spent fuel rods and open the facility as soon as possible.
-------- MILITARY
-------- afghanistan
U.N. Hostages Seen Alive on Videotape
Group Sets Deadline for Demands
By Keith B. Richburg
Washington Post Foreign Service
Monday, November 1, 2004; Page A13
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A13486-2004Oct31.html
KABUL, Oct. 31 -- Three kidnapped U.N. election workers appeared frightened but otherwise well in a videotape aired Sunday on the al-Jazeera satellite television network. Their kidnappers, in telephone calls to news agencies, threatened to kill the hostages in 72 hours unless U.N. and foreign troops withdrew from Afghanistan, and Taliban and al Qaeda prisoners were freed from U.S. military jails.
The three hostages -- Annetta Flanigan of Northern Ireland, Shqipe Habibi of Kosovo and Angelito Nayan, a Philippine diplomat -- were shown huddled together and sitting cross-legged on a floor.
The three were abducted on Thursday afternoon by several men in military uniforms brandishing AK-47 assault rifles, in the first such abduction of foreigners in Kabul since an American bombing campaign drove the Taliban from power nearly three years ago.
The kidnappings prompted a massive security review for the estimated 2,000 Westerners here, as fears mounted that the abductions could presage a deadly new phase in the ongoing, low-level insurgency that has included suicide bombings in the capital and roadside bombs and ambushes in the southern and eastern regions of the country.
Jaish-e-Muslimeen, or Army of Muslims, a splinter group of the ousted Taliban government, issued a set of four demands in telephone calls to various news agencies. The group called for the United Nations to cease operations in Afghanistan and condemn the "attacks and invasion of Afghanistan by foreign forces." It also demanded that the United States free all prisoners held at its detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and U.S. prisons in Afghanistan.
The group also appealed directly to the home countries of the hostages. A spokesman said one demand was that Britain and Kosovo "withdraw their forces immediately" from Afghanistan -- even though Kosovo, a province of Serbia currently under U.N. protection, has no troops in the country. In its final demand, Jaish-e-Muslimeen said the Philippine government must "condemn the invasion of foreign forces in Afghanistan."
The demands were issued separately by a spokesman for Jaish-e-Muslimeen, Mohammed Ishaq, who contacted the French news service Agence France-Presse, and by a commander of the group, Sayed Mohammed Akbar Agha, who telephoned the Reuters news agency.
Ishaq said that if the governments involved did not meet the group's demands, they would "witness the deaths of their nationals in three days."
The United Nations appealed for the release of the hostages, saying all three suffered unspecified ailments. "We call on those holding them not to harm them," said a U.N. spokesman, Manoel de Almeida e Silva. "All three require medical attention, and the best response to such a situation is their immediate release." He declined to give further details.
A senior official with Afghanistan's Interior Ministry, Shah Mahmoud Miakhel, in an interview confirmed that the hostages were in the hands of Jaish-e-Muslimeen but said he was "one hundred percent certain" that they had been seized initially by a criminal gang, perhaps hired by the group.
Miakhel confirmed reports that commander Akbar Agha several months ago broke away from Taliban leader Mohammad Omar because of disagreements over how best to continue the insurgency and whether to disrupt the Oct. 9 presidential election through violence. Omar, along with Osama bin Laden, is being hunted by U.S. troops in Afghanistan's mountainous regions.
Miakhel said Akbar Agha's faction is relatively small and lacked the logistical structure in Kabul to carry out the kidnappings. "He doesn't have a network."
A spokesman for Omar's Taliban faction disavowed any connection with the kidnappings. "We have no comment about the issue," the spokesman, Hamid Agha, told Reuters. "It is their work, and we are not involved in it."
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Lockheed Martin Buys Naval Electronics Firm
Monday, November 1, 2004
Washington Post
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A14654-2004Oct31.html
Defense contractor Lockheed Martin of Bethesda agreed to buy Sippican Holdings, a supplier of naval electronics systems, from the private equity firm Carlyle Group and Sippican's management.
Terms of the transaction were not disclosed.
Sippican, of Marion, Mass., develops and makes surface-ship countermeasures, anti-submarine warfare training and submarine communications systems as well as weather and oceanographic instrumentation. Lockheed Martin said the purchase enhances its global capabilities in naval warfare, unmanned underwater vehicles and low-cost manufacturing.
"Sippican's diverse product portfolio, engineering and manufacturing expertise and unique technologies will add a new set of innovative capabilities to the Lockheed Martin team," said Lockheed Martin president and chief executive Bob Stevens.
Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors in Manassas will manage the Sippican business.
MARYLAND
Chindex International, a small Bethesda-based provider of Western health care products and medical services in China, appointed A. Kenneth Nilsson as chairman, a position held by Roberta Lipson, who will continue as president and chief executive. Nilsson has been an independent director since 1996 and is chairman of the audit committee. He was president of Cooper Laboratories Inc.; managing director of Pfizer-Taito Ltd.; president of Max Factor Japan; and chairman of the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
Mobile Media, a Rockville provider of wireless games and other interactive entertainment, bought mobile service and distribution company Viva Technologies AS. Terms were not disclosed. The purchase follows the acquisition of leading U.S. mobile services and distribution company Telenor Interactive. Viva's operations will be consolidated into Mobile Media, based in Oslo.
First Potomac Realty Trust, a Bethesda real estate investment trust that buys and operates industrial buildings in Washington, Virginia and Maryland, said it recently agreed to buy $100 million of property. It completed the acquisition of two flex properties in Norfolk and an industrial property in Haymarket, Va. It has also agreed to acquire two flexible and industrial properties in suburban Maryland and agreed to sell its Ammendale Road property in Beltsville.
American Capital Strategies, a Bethesda investment company, invested $15 million in Pelican Products Inc., a global leader in the design and manufacture of unbreakable watertight protective cases and technically advanced professional flashlights. American Capital's investment is in the form of a second lien loan and supports Behrman Capital's acquisition of Pelican. A syndicate led by GE Capital, a unit of General Electric, is providing a revolving credit facility, senior term loans and a second lien loan. Behrman Capital and Pelican management are investing in equity.
WASHINGTON
The partners behind Sam & Harry's and other local restaurants popular with business people are splitting up. Larry Work and Michael Sternberg created the steakhouse's two locations in downtown Washington and at Tysons Corner, the similarly plush Caucus Room steakhouse downtown and the more casual Harry's Tap Room in Arlington. Work is taking the three high-end steakhouses and Sternberg has taken over Harry's Tap Room -- which has big expansion plans -- and restaurant software company GuestMetrics.
Danaher said a federal judge ordered the tripling of damages awarded against a Danaher subsidiary in a patent infringement lawsuit concerning sighting technology for infrared thermometers. According to a Securities and Exchange Commission filing, a federal jury found the subsidiary liable and awarded the plaintiff about $8 million in damages. The filing didn't name the Danaher subsidiary or the plaintiff involved in the lawsuit. Danaher said it would appeal.
VIRGINIA
Gannett of McLean, which publishes USA Today and 100 other daily newspapers, said its board authorized repurchase of an additional $500 million worth of its common stock. The company said "a substantial portion" of the $1 billion authorized for repurchases under a program announced July 13 had been used.
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Local Contract Stanley Associates Gets Army Software Contract
By William Welsh
The Washington Post
Monday, November 1, 2004; Page E04
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A14645-2004Oct31.html
Stanley Associates Inc. of Alexandria has won a $10.3 million contract from the U.S. Army Field Support Command to provide software support for two logistics systems that help the Army deploy weapons and equipment.
The one-year contract, with four one-year options, extended the company's previous work on the systems and may be worth more than $50 million if all options are exercised.
Stanley will provide software development, maintenance and contingency operations support for the Army War Redeployment and Automated Battlebook systems. About 90 employees are to perform the work in Alexandria as well as at Army installations worldwide.
Military personnel responsible for tracking and maintaining weapons and equipment use the War Redeployment System to post information about the condition and location of the materiel. Commanders use the Automated Battlebook System to download this information as they prepare to deploy their units abroad.
Development of the systems was part of the rapid deployment and force modernization initiatives begun by the Army after the Desert Shield and Desert Storm operations in 1991. The new systems are being used in the Iraq war to deploy forces more quickly.
"Operation Iraqi Freedom was a big test for us because there had never been that large of a deployment with the new policies, doctrine and systems," said Greg Denkler, Stanley's senior vice president of corporate operations.
The success of the systems in the Iraq war had a direct bearing on the contract renewal, he said.
Logistics Management Resources Inc. of Hopewell, a provider of automated logistics services, is a subcontractor on the project.
The contract was previously awarded to Stanley without competition, but this time the contract was competitive, Denkler said. "This is a very strong customer reaffirmation of the quality of work we've done through a very difficult time -- the war," he said. "In terms of morale and momentum, it is a big plus for all of the people who have worked on it."
In addition to the Army Field Support Command contract, the company provides related support to the Army Reserve Command through the Army Reserve Storage and Maintenance System project, Denkler said.
Stanley provides a range of information technology services, including software development, network design and implementation, systems engineering and consulting to the government and commercial sectors. The company has more than 1,500 employees and annual sales of $179 million.
William Welsh is a staff writer with Washington Technology. For more details on this and other technology contracts, go to www.washingtontechnology.com
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Contracts Awarded
Washington Technology
Washington Post
Monday, November 1, 2004; Page E04
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A14644-2004Oct31?language=printer
Mind Over Machines Inc. of Baltimore won a five-year, $15 million contract with the National Institutes of Health to perform programming and database development.
Northrop Grumman Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Co. of Newport News won a $25 million contract from the Naval Sea Systems Command for advance planning to provide drydock availability for the USS George Washington.
Kellogg Brown & Root Services of Arlington won three contracts for $9 million, $6 million and $5 million from the Naval Facilities Engineering Command to repair damage caused by Hurricane Ivan at the Naval Air Station at Pensacola, Fla.
Science Applications International Corp. of McLean won contracts for $13.6 million and $5.6 million from the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center to provide scientific engineering, analytical and technical system support services in Saudi Arabia for the Royal Saudi Naval Forces' Command, Control and Communications.
BAE Systems Applied Technologies Inc. of Rockville won a $7.93 million contract from the Naval Air Systems Command Aircraft Division for technical and engineering services to support air traffic control and landing systems.
Honeywell Technology Solutions Inc. of Columbia won a $7.53 million contract from the Naval Air Systems Command Aircraft Division to provide engineering and logistics services to support a light airborne multipurpose system data link.
Integral Systems Inc. of Lanham won a $7.33 million contract from the Air Force Headquarters' Space and Missile Systems Center to support an upgraded capability to command and control the Air Force's communications satellites.
ASR Analytics, LLC of Potomac won a $5.8 million contract from the General Services Administration for management, organizational and business improvement services.
CODA Inc. of Silver Spring won a $95.2 million contract from the Health and Human Services Department for research and development services.
AllWorld Language Consultants of Rockville won a $3.73 million contract from the Justice Department to provide translation and transcription services for the Caribbean Field division.
Louis Berger Group Inc. of Washington, IBM Business Consulting Services of Bethesda, Booz Allen Hamilton of McLean, Bearing Point (Barents Group) of McLean, Development Alternatives Inc. of Bethesda, International Business Initiatives of Arlington, and Nathan Associates Inc. of Arlington won the opportunity to share in a contract with a $2.4 billion ceiling from the Agency for International Development, for macroeconomic policy, poverty alleviation and economic institutions and analysis technical assistance services under the support for economic growth and institutional reform project.
Segura Consulting LLC of Bethesda, the Institute for Public-Private Partnerships, Inc. of Washington, Carana Corp. of Arlington, and Bearing Point (Barents Group) of McLean won the opportunity to