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NUCLEAR
Bruce Power shuts Ontario Bruce B nuke station
Brookings Institution president and former US deputy secretary of state
Iran defies U.N. order with plan to enrich uranium
Iran Starts Tests on Uranium for Nuclear Centrifuges
Is U.S. Rhetoric Fuelling Iran's Nuclear Program?
Iran Announces A New Round Of Nuclear Tests
A Defiant Iran Starts Enriching Uranium
Israel challenges Iran's nuclear ambitions
Israel's nukes serve to justify Iran's
Official: NK planning missile test
Russia raps South Korea on nuclear experiments
IAEA to probe Dimona effect in Jordan
US expert sketches nightmare nuclear terrorist attack on major city
Nuclear Terrorism: A Brief Review of Threats and Responses
Liechtenstein Ratifies the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
UC Regents lose control of nuclear weapons program
"Bunker Busters": Sources of Confusion
EPA Hopes to Have New Radiation Standard for Waste Site Early Next Year
MILITARY
Iran's legislators try to limit women's rights
U.S. Now Taking Supporting Role in Iraq, Officials Say
Group Says It Has Killed Another American Hostage
Koizumi vows to keep troops in Iraq
How a Palestinian widow and her trees are a threat to Mofaz
At least 15 wounded during anti-fence protest
Powell praises Syrian redeployment in hills of Beirut as a positive step
Syrian Troop Redeployment Said Meaningless
NATO will set up academy near Baghdad to train Iraqi military officers
NATO Allies OK Increase in Iraq Training
Russia Protest Seeks Leader's Resignation
Spain seeks UK advice over revamp of spy networks
Bush demands U.N. help for Iraq
At U.N., Bush Cites Headway in Iraq
Bush, Annan Speeches Show Divisions on Iraq
Rumsfeld Sold Stakes in Pentagon Contractors
Anti-Prostitution Rule Drafted for U.S. Forces
POLICE / PRISONERS / COURTS / JUSTICE
Budanov Drops Bid for Pardon
3 DeLay Workers Indicted in Texas
Airport screeners missed weapons
Military unit to defend D.C.
U.S. Orders Airlines To Release Fliers' Data
Group Calls for Slowing Intelligence Reform
Ex-Pop Singer Held After D.C. Flight
Cat Stevens Held After D.C. Flight Diverted
POLITICS
Republican Senators tell unpleasant truths
Dyke contributed to his own downfall, counters BBC chief
Iran's nuclear ambitions absent from US presidential debate
ENERGY
U.S. Could Eliminate Oil Use in 50 Years
OTHER
Brownfields Cleanup Progress Slow
ACTIVISTS
Fall Gathering and Gov't Nuke Waste Meetings
Carter: U.S. Presence Fuels Attacks
-------- NUCLEAR
-------- canada
Bruce Power shuts Ontario Bruce B nuke station
REUTERS USA:
September 22, 2004
http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/27277/story.htm
NEW YORK - Bruce Power shut the 3,360-megawatt Bruce B nuclear power station in Ontario by Monday for about a month to inspect the plant's vacuum building, the company said in a statement.
A unique safety feature of CANDU (CANada Deuterium Uranium) reactors, the vacuum building prevents the release of radioactive material to the environment in event of an accident.
A large cylindrical structure, it is connected to the generating station by a pressure relief duct and kept at negative atmospheric pressure to any release of radioactive steam can be sucked into the vacuum building.
The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission requires all CANDU operators to conduct a thorough examination of the structure every 12 years.
CANDU reactors are Canadian-designed pressurized heavy water power reactors that use heavy water (deuterium oxide) for moderator and coolant, and natural uranium for fuel.
Since the vacuum building is a shared safety system, the company will keep all four Bruce B units 5-8 offline during the inspection period. Unit 6, however, shut on Sept. 11 for its biannual inspection program.
Bruce Power expects Units 3 and 4 at the Bruce A to remain at high power throughout the Bruce B vacuum building inspection.
One MW powers about 1,000 homes, according to the North American average.
The 6,660 MW Bruce station is located in Tiverton, on the shores of Lake Huron, about 155 miles (249 km) northwest of Toronto. There are four 825 MW A units and 840 MW B units at Bruce. Units 1 and 2, built in the late 1970s, have not operated since the end of 1999 because they needed extensive upgrades.
The company is conducting a feasibility study to determine whether it makes sense to return units 1 and 2 to service, which could cost hundreds of millions of dollars. The decision to restore the units depends, in part, on changes the Ontario government may make to energy sector regulations.
Bruce Power, one of Ontario's largest power generators, is owned by Cameco Corp. (CCO.TO: Quote, Profile, Research) (31.6 percent), TransCanada Corp. (TRP.TO: Quote, Profile, Research) (31.6 percent), BPC Generation Infrastructure Trust, established by the Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System (31.6 percent), the Power Workers' Union (4 percent) and the Society of Energy Professionals (1.2 percent).
-------- india / pakistan
Brookings Institution president and former US deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott hopes his new book, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb, a revealing and authoritative account of the most sustained talks between India and the United States - prompted by New Delhi's surprise nuclear tests in May 1998 - will be interesting to those who want to know more about India and "of some use to people who are genuine experts" on the subcontinent.
In his first interview after the book was released last month, Talbott, who was President Bill Clinton's pointman for the high-stakes diplomacy with then external affairs minister Jaswant Singh, said he enjoyed recounting this episode in the relationship between the countries "very, very much".
Talbott, who has written nine books and was a correspondent and columnist for Time magazine for 21 years, discussed his latest work with National Affairs Editor Aziz Haniffa of India Abroad, the Indian-American newspaper owned by rediff.com, in Washington, DC. Here's the second and final part of the exclusive interview:
Part I: 'Jaswant achieved more of his objectives than I'
Some critics believe there is an unquestionable pro-India bias in your book vis-à-vis Pakistan. That you sound like an Indophile.
Yes. I plead guilty to being an Indophile. It's a terrific country and immensely admirable, impressive case of an extraordinarily disparate group of people coming together to form not just a viable but a very promising modern State. I have personal as well as professional reasons to have admired at least some of the many, many good things about India.
I found during the course of the dialogue that the Indian side was, while being very, very tough, capable of pursuing a coherent policy - not one the United States entirely agreed with, to put it mildly. But nonetheless it was a coherent policy and allowed us to move forward on a number of fronts.
By contrast with the experience I had with Pakistan during this period - I have lots of good feelings about Pakistan and I have over the years had the opportunity to travel there as a journalist and as a government official and was always received with terrific hospitality and met some extraordinarily admirable people. But two points about Pakistan: I am quite candid about this in the book. I am one of those who have always questioned whether Partition was a good thing for the people of South Asia, and my reasons for that have to do with my belief as an American that a secular, pluralist democracy is the best form of government for most if not all people around the world and Pakistan has gone a different way.
There is a historical issue out there to be debated - I respect the other view in this - but there is also a contemporary issue, which is the extent to which Pakistan has been able to come together as a confident, modern State capable of carrying out straightforward, coherent policy, and the answer has been, not always, and I certainly experienced some of the 'not always' with them.
I found the Pakistani side - while consisting of a number of fine individuals, Shamshad Ahmed being one, who was my principal counterpart - the Pakistani government was constantly wrapped around its axle. It was wrapped around the axle of its insecurities about the United States - where it stood with the United States - and most of all, wrapped around its axle about India.
You have said on several occasions that you consider Jaswant Singh one of the most sophisticated individuals you have met, but in the book you seem to be definitely bothered by his advocacy of the Hindutva philosophy.
I wouldn't say bothered. I listened, very carefully, very respectfully and found myself sceptical about some of what I heard. [But] That wasn't only true of our dialogue on Hindutva, it was also true of our dialogue on non-proliferation and Pakistan.
In any case, on the question of Hindutva, do you believe all this is moot now with the defeat of the BJP and the advent of the Congress party? Is secularism safe, or do you still believe, as you have argued, that it should be a part of the US-India dialogue and on the agenda between the two countries?
I would say the latter. Just because the BJP is no longer the governing party, it doesn't mean it isn't still a powerful force in Indian politics and society. I realise that, like India, the BJP is a pluralistic phenomenon and there are different strains and different versions of Hindutva. But having paid a little bit of attention to other election results besides the national election result, the sentiment is still there and probably not limited to the BJP. Just as there are some aspects of the evolution of American society in politics that should be of interest and concern to all of our friends around the world, so the reverse is true with regard to India.
In Unfinished Business, you end with a call for the non-proliferation aspect of the relationship to be resurrected on the US-India agenda and bemoan the senate's killing of the CTBT, which may have effectively taken this off the table in terms of the bilateral agenda with India. There seems to be some sense of pessimism and a sort of a veiled warning that the Kashmir imbroglio could flare up again and there could easily be a return to the tension a few months before [former prime minister Atal Bihari] Vajpayee's olive branch to Pakistan, and hence the importance that this non-proliferation issue be returned to being a front-burner agenda priority?
I wouldn't call it pessimism. I would call it realism - facing the facts. How many times have we seen, including during the life of the episode I describe in the book, where things seem all of a sudden to be going very well between India and Pakistan and then something untoward happens?
We remember Kargil very well. It was an extraordinarily dangerous and important moment. Would it be prudent for Indians, Pakistanis, Americans, or anybody else to dismiss the possibility of it happening again? No. It wouldn't be in the least prudent.
As for elevating the non-proliferation issue, I would put it differently again. I would say non-proliferation should have its own place of importance as the stakes are so high. It would be a mistake on the one hand to let non-proliferation overshadow other aspects of the relationship and prevent progress in other areas. But it would also be a mistake to sweep it under the rug.
Are you a non-proliferation ayatollah?
I am not any kind of ayatollah [laughing]. I am somebody who has spent, or misspent, an awful lot of my career thinking about problems posed by nuclear weaponry and the precariousness of countries that keep the peace between them through terror - and I don't mean terrorism. I am talking about nuclear terror. I have that vantage point as I grew up during the Cold War. I vividly remember the Cuban missile crisis even though I was 16 years old or whatever. I hate to see good people and entire nations recreate that threat for themselves.
We are at an extremely precarious moment as a global community with respect to non-proliferation. What is very important for Indians that I talk to, to understand, is that by urging and expressing the hope that India will be a leader in the realm of non-proliferation, this isn't because of any lack of confidence in India's ability to be a custodian of its own military power. It is much more to do with the problem of precedence and example.
Because of what happened in the subcontinent in May 1998 and because of what has not happened since - neither India nor Pakistan adhered to the CTBT or found a way to reconcile their positions with the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] - other countries like Nigeria, Brazil, never mind countries like Iran and North Korea, moved a lot closer to positions similar to the ones India and Pakistan took six years ago.
I hope sooner rather than later, India, for reasons based not on anybody pushing them around, but based on their self-confidence and wisdom, would look at the issue of their national defence in global terms. There are ways to do that, ways I detail in the last chapter, that would allow India to maintain the position it took in May 1998, even though I, as an American official at the time, thought that was a mistake.
What's your prognosis for US-India relations in the near term and long term, particularly now with a Congress party-led government?
Even if the BJP had been returned to power, the prospects would have been excellent because the fundamentals are much more close to being right now than they were six or seven years ago.
It would not matter whether it's a second Bush administration or a Kerry administration?
No. The nuances will be different, but the fundamentals of a sound US-Indian bilateral relationship will be there whatever the outcome of the American election.
If it's a Kerry administration, will you return to government?
I cannot conceive going back to government. I had a wonderful experience for eight years. I have more than gotten whatever curiosity or ambition in that regard I had out of my system. I have only been at Brookings for two and a half years. I want to spend a long time here. It's the greatest job I can imagine for myself at this point in my
-------- iran
Iran defies U.N. order with plan to enrich uranium
September 22, 2004
By Nicholas Kralev
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
http://www.washtimes.com/world/20040922-121035-2777r.htm
Iran said yesterday it was preparing to enrich uranium, taking a key step toward the capability of making atomic weapons just three days after the United Nations' nuclear agency demanded that it suspend all such activities.
The announcement came amid renewed speculation that Israel, which feels directly threatened by Iran's nuclear program, might use one of 500 bunker-buster bombs and other military equipment that it has requested from the United States to strike Iran's underground atomic facilities.
"This is not the sort of ordnance needed for the Palestinian front. Bunker busters could serve Israel against Iran, or possibly Syria," an Israeli source was quoted as saying by Reuters news agency.
Maj. Gen. Elyezer Shkedy, chief of staff of Israel's air force, was quoted last week as saying that if the government decides that a military solution to Iran's nuclear development is required, "then the military has to provide a solution."
But Secretary of State Colin L. Powell expressed skepticism about the prospects for such a strike during a meeting last week with editors and reporters at The Washington Times.
"I don't want to get too deeply into this, but based on what I know about the [Iranian nuclear] program, it is not one that lends itself to a simple military solution," Mr. Powell said.
The secretary did not elaborate, but Newsweek reported this week that the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency had conducted war games on a strike at the Iranian program and had been unable to keep the conflict from escalating.
Gholamreza Aghazadeh, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, said yesterday that Iran had started converting 37 tons of raw "yellowcake" uranium for use in nuclear centrifuges - the machines that enrich uranium.
"Some of the amount of the 37 tons has been used. The tests have been successful, but these tests have to be continued using the rest of the material," Mr. Aghazadeh, one of Iran's vice presidents, told reporters in Vienna, Austria, where he was attending a general conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Melissa Fleming, spokeswoman for the IAEA, said the agency was aware of Iran's plans and would monitor its activities.
IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei "continues to call on Iran, as did the board, to suspend such a test as part of their confidence-building measures," she said.
Iran continued to insist yesterday that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes.
"We are determined to obtain peaceful atomic technology, even if it causes the stop of international supervision," said President Mohammad Khatami.
U.S. officials were not surprised by the announcement and their comments echoed previous statements on the subject.
"They have a continuous record of making and then breaking promises, both to the [IAEA] board as well as to others," a State Department official said in reference to the Iranian government.
"This is the pattern of a country that has not made the strategic decision to give up its nuclear-weapons program," the official said.
Both U.S. and Israeli officials declined to comment on an article in the Israeli daily newspaper Ha'aretz yesterday, which said the United States would conclude a $319 million sale of military equipment to Israel, including 500 bunker-buster bombs, after Election Day.
Israel's announcement came after the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible military sale to Israel worth as much as $319 million.
"Israel purchases a wide range of military equipment from the United States on an ongoing basis," one Israeli official said. "We can't confirm specifics of any particular sale."
On June 1, the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a "possible" sale to Israel of "joint direct attack munitions, as well as associated equipment and services." whose "total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $319 million."
As part of the deal, the United States will sell Israel nearly 5,000 smart bombs in one of the largest weapons deals between the allies in years, wire service reports quoted Israeli military officials as saying.
The deal will expand Israel's existing supply of the weapons, said the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
The agency listed the items that the Israeli government had requested, including the bunker-buster bombs.
"This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a friendly country that has been and continues to be an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East," the agency said in June.
"The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not affect the basic military balance in the region," the agency said.
Although U.S. and Israeli officials said the deal in question is no different from many other such sales over the years, Iranian officials were quick yesterday to issue warnings.
An Iranian defense ministry spokesman said a U.S.-Israel deal that targets Iran could be "psychological warfare to test us."
"Our response to any invasive measure will be massive," said Massoud Jazaeri, spokesman for Iran's Revolutionary Guard.
----
Iran Starts Tests on Uranium for Nuclear Centrifuges
REUTERS AUSTRIA:
September 22, 2004
http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/27268/story.htm
VIENNA - Iran has begun tests on a facility that will produce a large amount of material for nuclear centrifuges, a top Iranian nuclear official said yesterday.
Gholamreza Aghazadeh, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, told reporters in Vienna Iran had begun converting 37 tons of raw uranium into material which is fuel for nuclear centrifuges - the machines that enrich uranium.
One nuclear expert has said that, if enriched, that would be enough material for five nuclear weapons. "Some of the amount of the 37 tons has been used. The tests have been successful but these tests have to be continued using the rest of the material," said Aghazadeh, who is attending a general conference of the Vienna-based U.N. nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Iran had told the IAEA a few weeks ago it intended to run the tests. However, the announcement came after the IAEA board of governors passed a resolution on Saturday calling on Iran to halt all activities linked to uranium enrichment.
----
Is U.S. Rhetoric Fuelling Iran's Nuclear Program?
Wednesday, September 22nd, 2004
Democracy Now!
http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=04/09/22/1422231
As Iran announces it is resuming its nuclear program, we speak with Iranian-born author and former diplomat Mansour Farhang about the increasing tensions in the United States towards Tehran. [includes rush transcript] As violence and bloodshed continue on a daily basis in US-occupied Iraq, recent events may be propelling the United States into another confrontation - this time with Iran.
The issues are chillingly similar to those that led to the US invasion of Baghdad 18 months ago. The US is accusing Iran of secretly building nuclear weapons - Iran claims its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes. US intelligence is reportedly considering a preemptive strike against Iran. And again, Washington is in considerable disagreement with key allies, this time Britain included, over how to handle the situation.
Last weekend under European pressure, the United States agreed to defer its demand that the International Atomic Energy Agency refer Iran's stance on nuclear issues to the UN Security Council, where sanctions might be considered.
The IAEA instead adopted a resolution demanding that Iran suspend uranium enrichment and report sensitive nuclear activities. And Chief UN nuclear watchdog Mohamed ElBaradei said Iran's program did not present a "imminent threat."
But yesterday, President Mohammad Khatami announced that Iran had resumed producing a uranium gas for enrichment as a nuclear fuel. Khatami said "We've made our choice: yes to peaceful nuclear technology, no to atomic weapons."
- Mansour Farhang, Iranian-born author and former diplomat. He served as revolutionary Iran's first ambassador to the United Nations and worked as a mediator in the early months of the Iran-Iraq war. He left Iran as a dissident in 1981 and now teaches international relations and Middle Eastern politics at Bennington College, Vermont. He is the co-author of "U.S. Press and Iran: Foreign Policy and the Journalism of Deference" (Univ. of California, 1987) and the author of "U.S. Imperialism: From the Spanish-American War to the Iranian Revolution" (South End Press, 1981).
RUSH TRANSCRIPT
AMY GOODMAN: This is the first part of our interview with you today. Mansour Farhang, can you respond to these latest developments?
MANSOUR FARHANG: The latest development is really the continuation of the U.S. efforts to contain or perhaps end Iranian nuclear activities. On the face of it, the contentious issue between I.A.E.A. and Iran has to do with the fuel for the operation of the Bushehr nuclear facilities. Iran, according to the N.P.T., to which Iran is a signatory, has the right to produce its own enriched uranium. However, producing enriched uranium in any country makes that country potentially capable of making nuclear weapons. Therefore, I.A.E.A. wants Iran to go beyond its treaty obligations and completely relinquish its enrichment activities because of the deep distrust toward Iran by the western world in general, and the United States and Israel in particular.
AMY GOODMAN: Where do you think this standoff will lead?
MANSOUR FARHANG: Well, the Iranians see this pressure as the first step of the Bush administration for regime change. The activities concerning the regime change particularly the close operations between the United States and Israel concerns Iran deeply. And what is happening in Iran is that this pressure on Iran is so far politically working to the benefit of the theocratic order and against the democratic forces. This confrontation enables the Iranian regime to create a sense of xenophobia and benefit from nationalistic sentiment towards the defense of Iranian territory and therefore, what the Bush administration is doing with regard to security issues and the so-called promotion of democracy is in fact helping a deeply anti-democratic regime and making it difficult for the democracy movement in Iran to engage in a meaningful and effective struggle. Therefore, in the short run Iran is the beneficiary of this confrontation in the political sense, but in the long run, if there is an actually a military attack against Iran, it will be another disaster, the consequences of which will be far graver than anything we see in Iraq.
AMY GOODMAN: Last question. U.S. plans to sell Israel $319 million worth of air launch bombs, including 500 bunker busters. Reuters is reporting with an Israeli security source telling Reuters, this is not the sort of ordinance needed for the Palestinian front. Bunker busters could serve Israel against Iran or possibly Syria. We only have a few seconds. Your response.
MANSOUR FARHANG: Exactly. Iran is surrounded by American military presence in the region, and the Sharon government has repeatedly threatened to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities. Therefore, the Iranian regime has concluded that perhaps developing the capability to make nuclear weapons is the only deterrent they have in the face of American and Israeli aggressive attitude toward the regime.
AMY GOODMAN: Mansour Farhang, thank you for joining us. Iranian born author and former diplomat. He's co-author of U.S. Press and Iran: Foreign Policy and the Journalism of Deference.
----
Iran Announces A New Round Of Nuclear Tests
Move Defies IAEA Call for Suspension
By Dafna Linzer
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, September 22, 2004; Page A24
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A37675-2004Sep21.html
NEW YORK, Sept. 21 -- Defying recent requests from the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency, the Iranian government said Tuesday it had begun a new round of nuclear experiments, intensifying concerns of U.N. weapons inspectors and the U.S. government that the Islamic republic has plans to develop nuclear weapons.
The head of Iran's nuclear energy program, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, told reporters in Vienna on Tuesday that scientists were following through on plans to convert nearly 40 tons of raw uranium into a state suitable for enrichment.
Two years ago, Iran enriched low levels of uranium that could be used in a civilian energy program. But once the enrichment technique is mastered, it could be used to produce weapons-grade uranium.
U.S. officials said they viewed the move as proof that Iran has no interest in abandoning its nuclear ambitions or respecting decisions made by the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency last week.
"This clearly indicates Iran is continuing its unrelenting march toward a nuclear weapons capability," said J. Adam Ereli, a State Department spokesman. "Iran knows what it must do to alleviate concerns, but so far it appears determined to ignore the IAEA and proceed with its nuclear weapons program."
IAEA inspectors have not found evidence of a weapons program. But Iranian experiments, concealed for years from the outside world, have fueled suspicion that the Tehran government is determined to build a bomb.
Last Saturday, the United States and other members of the IAEA board called on the Iranian government to suspend enrichment-related activities and provide the agency with a complete history of its nuclear program.
The resolution noted, "with serious concern," that Iran had not "heeded repeated calls from the Board to suspend, as a confidence building measure, all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities." Iran's intention to process the 40 tons of raw uranium into uranium hexaflouride gas "would run counter" to early requests to forgo the work, the resolution stated.
But the IAEA board also noted recent improvements in Iran's cooperation with agency inspectors and recognized its right to develop a peaceful energy source. Iran's president, Mohammad Khatami, indicated in a speech in Tehran on Tuesday that his country was prepared to retain that right at great cost.
"We are determined to obtain peaceful atomic technology, even if it brings an end to international supervision," Khatami was quoted as saying. Iran notified the IAEA weeks ago that it planned to proceed with the conversion experiments, and the agency said it would monitor the work.
It is permissible under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to process uranium for an energy program, as long as the IAEA is informed of the work. But the IAEA has noted that Iran's energy program is at an early stage and as far as 10 years away from needing converted uranium to operate.
The IAEA director general, Mohamed ElBaradei, said that conducting such work now, while international pressure is high, would hurt Iran's credibility and could jeopardize important gains it had made in recent months with IAEA inspectors.
"We have repeated calls on the Iranians to suspend this kind of testing in order for it to build international confidence," said Melissa Fleming, the IAEA spokeswoman.
A secret, 18-year effort by Iran to obtain nuclear technology and know-how was exposed by an opposition group two years ago. Since then, IAEA inspectors investigating Iran's program have uncovered equipment purchased on a black market run by Abdul Qadeer Khan, who guided the development of Pakistan's nuclear bomb. But ElBaradei said last week that there was no evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. Iranian authorities insist their nuclear program is intended solely to generate electricity.
"I'm not sure we are facing an imminent threat," ElBaradei said in an interview with CNN on Sunday. But he said it was clear Iran was acquiring, or has already acquired, "a capability to produce the material that can be used for nuclear weapons should they decide to do that."
Iran has promised several times in the past year to halt enrichment work but then reneged on aspects of those pledges in response to IAEA decisions. Last week, Iranian officials in Vienna said the country would continue a suspension on enrichment but did not specify whether it would halt the processing of uranium hexaflouride gas.
The announcement by Aghazadeh, who is one of Iran's vice presidents as well as head of the country's nuclear energy program, dispelled any doubt on the issue. He said Iran had begun work with some of the 40 tons marked for conversion.
"The tests have been successful, but these tests have to be continued using the rest of the material," Aghazadeh said in Vienna, where he was attending an IAEA conference.
----
A Defiant Iran Starts Enriching Uranium
September 22, 2004
New York Times
By CRAIG S. SMITH
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/22/international/middleeast/22iran.html?hp=&pagewanted=all&position=
PARIS, Sept. 21 - Iran defied the United Nations' nuclear agency on Tuesday, announcing that it had begun converting tons of uranium into gas, a crucial step in making fuel for a nuclear reactor or a nuclear bomb. The International Atomic Energy Agency called Saturday for Iran to suspend all such activities.
Iran's statement, made in Vienna by the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, put the country on a collision course with the United States, which has lobbied vigorously for the international nuclear agency to refer Iran's nuclear program to the Security Council for past breaches of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
The announcement will only add weight to Washington's arguments.
On Saturday, the U.N. agency's 35-nation board passed a resolution calling for Iran to halt all uranium-enrichment activities, but it declined to refer the matter to the Security Council.
The board meets again on Nov. 25. Should the United States prevail, the Council could decide to impose sanctions against Iran, issue a warning or take no action at all.
The nuclear agency's resolutions are not legally binding, and many countries, including Brazil and South Africa, may resist American pressure to sanction Iran for activities they support: the development of a complete nuclear fuel cycle, from mining uranium ore to reprocessing nuclear waste.
Mastering the cycle can make countries nearly independent in fulfilling their energy needs. But it brings them to within months of being able to build nuclear weapons.
Iran, as a signer of the nonproliferation treaty, has the right to convert uranium into a gas and to concentrate the fissile 235 isotope of that gas with high-speed centrifuges, a process called enrichment.
But it began an enrichment program without notifying the I.A.E.A. - a breach of its responsibilities under the treaty - and the agency has used the threat of Council intervention to press it to stop all of the steps leading to the production of enriched uranium.
Uranium with a relatively low concentration of the uranium-235 isotope can be used to fuel a nuclear reactor, but the process can easily be extended to produce the higher concentrations of the isotope necessary for a nuclear bomb.
The agency had expressed alarm at Iran's earlier announced plans to convert more than 40 short tons of uranium oxide, known as yellowcake, into uranium hexafluoride gas.
The resolution passed Saturday said the agency "considers it necessary" that in order for Iran to "promote confidence" - a veiled reference to the threat of a referral to the Security Council - it must "immediately suspend all enrichment-related activities," including the production of uranium hexafluoride gas at a plant built near Isfahan with Chinese technology and opened last year.
That plant is monitored by the international agency, but it declined to say Tuesday whether gas had been produced there since Saturday.
"Some of the amount of the 37 [metric] tons has been used," Mr. Aghazadeh was quoted as saying Tuesday by Reuters. Mr. Aghazadeh, one of Iran's vice presidents, was attending a general conference of the nuclear agency, which is based in Vienna. "The tests have been successful, but these tests have to be continued using the rest of the material," he said.
Though Iran calls the yellowcake a test amount, experts say the 40 short tons could produce enough fissile material for several weapons.
Iran argues that its uranium-enrichment program is intended to produce low-enriched uranium for use in a 1,000-megawatt nuclear power plant that it began constructing in the 1970's.
It has offered to accept any safeguards imposed by the agency to ensure its enrichment activities do not go beyond the 3.5 percent concentration of the uranium-235 isotope needed for its power plant and six others it plans to build.
But the United States and other countries say they believe the program is part of an effort to develop a capacity for nuclear weapons.
Some American analysts warn that there is only a year or so left to stop Iran from achieving nuclear self-sufficiency. After that, they say, the country will have the means to create a nuclear arsenal without outside help, forever altering the Middle East balance of power.
One concern is that Israel, an I.A.E.A. member that has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and has nuclear weapons, may decide to take the matter into its own hands if diplomacy fails to deter Iran.
The Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported Tuesday that Israel was planning to buy 500 so-called bunker-busting bombs capable of penetrating six feet of concrete.
Those bombs could be used to destroy Iran's underground nuclear facilities. While analysts say such a pre-emptive strike is unlikely, in 1981 Israel bombed a nuclear reactor in Iraq to stop that country from developing nuclear weapons.
Iran argues that it is being unfairly penalized and that it has repeatedly proposed keeping the Middle East free of nuclear weapons.
The nuclear agency is trying to force Iran to accept limits on what it can do under the nonproliferation treaty without causing Iran to withdraw from the treaty.
Iran argues that discrimination among signatories is prohibited under the treaty and that accepting any limits would set a dangerous precedent for other treaties it has signed.
On Sunday Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Hassan Rowhani, warned in Tehran that Iran might drop out of the treaty if its case were sent to the Security Council. The treaty permits any country to withdraw on three months' notice. North Korea withdrew in 2001.
"We have made our choice: yes to peaceful nuclear technology and no to nuclear weapons," Iran's president, Mohammad Khatami, said in Tehran on Tuesday at a military parade featuring the Shahab-3 missile, with a range that could reach Israel. Missiles at the parade were draped with banners that read "Crush America" and "Wipe Israel Off The Map," according to The Associated Press and Agence France-Presse.
"We will continue on this path even if it means cutting off international supervision," he said.
Greg Myre contributed reporting from Israel for this article.
-------- israel
Israel challenges Iran's nuclear ambitions
By Anton La Guardia, Diplomatic Editor
22/09/2004
UK Telegraph
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/09/22/wnuke22.xml&sSheet=/portal/2004/09/22/ixportaltop.html
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/09/22/wnuke22.xml&sSheet=/portal/2004/09/22/ixportaltop.html
Israel admitted yesterday that it is buying 500 "bunker-buster" bombs, which could be used to hit Iran's nuclear facilities, as Teheran paraded ballistic missiles as a warning against attack.
The BLU-109 bombs, which can penetrate more than 7ft of reinforced concrete, are among "smart" munitions being sold to Israel under America's military aid programme.
The US and Israeli governments did not comment publicly but Israeli security sources said the deal would go through. "This is not the sort of ordnance needed for the Palestinian front. Bunker busters could serve Israel against Iran, or possibly Syria," an Israeli source said.
The Israeli newspaper Haaretz said the sale would take place after the November presidential election.
Israel regards Iran as its greatest strategic enemy and has issued thinly-veiled threats of military action to try to stop Teheran's nuclear programme if diplomatic efforts fail to halt it.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) last week gave Teheran an informal deadline to halt all aspects of its controversial uranium enrichment programme by November - and answer all outstanding nuclear questions - or face referral to the United Nations for possible sanctions.
However, Iran has denounced the resolution as "illegal" and defiantly announced that it would continue converting 37 tonnes of yellowcake - milled uranium oxide - into uranium hexafluoride, the feed-material for uranium enrichment.
Teheran said it may renege on a promise to Europe to "suspend" enrichment. It says it seeks to make nuclear fuel for its planned electricity-generating reactors but the West fears that the same process could make material for weapons.
Western diplomats believe that America, or Israel, could resort to air strikes against nuclear facilities. Israel's bombing of Saddam Hussein's Osirak reactor in 1981, which set back Iraq's nuclear programme, is held up as a model of "pre-emptive action".
Iran has placed some of its facilities, such as the large Natanz enrichment plant, in protected underground sites. Teheran has vowed to retaliate against any attack, and at one point said it might launch pre-emptive strikes if it felt threatened.
Seeking to underline the point, Iran showed off its ballistic missiles at an annual military parade in Teheran near the mausoleum of Iran's revolutionary leader, Ayatollah Khomeini. A banner proclaiming "Israel must be wiped off the map" was draped on the side of a 450-mile Shahab-2 missile. Another saying "We will crush America under our feet" graced a trailer carrying a 930-mile Shahab-3 missile.
"The Shahab-3 missiles, with different ranges, enable us to destroy the most distant targets," said the commentary.
Speaking at the parade, President Mohammad Khatami said Iran would not give up its "natural and legal right" to nuclear know-how, but he also tried to reassure the West.
"We've made our choice: yes to peaceful nuclear technology, no to atomic weapons," he said.
----
Israel's nukes serve to justify Iran's
Jonathan Power
IHT
Wednesday, September 22, 2004
http://www.iht.com/articles/539860.html
Deterring the deterrents
LONDON The more nuclear arms are lying around, the more the chances of them being used. So to persuade Iran to forgo nuclear weapons is a laudable objective. But for the United States, Britain and France to insist on it is hypocritical.
These Western powers have argued convincingly for decades that nuclear deterrence keeps the peace - and themselves maintain nuclear armories long after the cold war has ended. So why shouldn't Iran, which is in one of the world's most dangerous neighborhoods, have a deterrent too?
And where is the source of the threat that makes Iran, a country that has never started a war in 200 years, feel so nervous that it must now take the nuclear road? If Saddam Hussein's Iraq, with its nuclear ambitions, used to be one reason, the other is certainly Israel, the country that hard-liners in the United States are encouraging to mount a pre-emptive strike against Iran's nuclear industry before it produces bombs.
The United States refuses to acknowledge formally that Israel has nuclear weapons, even though top officials will tell you privately that it has 200 of them. Until this issue is openly acknowledged, America, Britain and France are probably wasting their time trying to persuade Iran to forgo nuclear weapons.
The supposition is that Israel lives in an even more dangerous neighborhood than Iran. It is said to be a beleaguered nation under constant threat of being eliminated by the combined muscle of its Arab opponents.
There is no evidence, however, that Arab states have invested the financial and human resources necessary to fight the kind of war that would be catastrophic for Israel. And there is no evidence that Israel's nuclear weapons have deterred the Arabs from more limited wars or prevented Palestinian intifadas and suicide bombers.
Nor have Israel's nuclear weapons influenced Arab attitudes toward making peace. In the 1973 Arab war against Israel and in the 1991 Gulf war, they clearly failed in their supposed deterrent effect. The Arabs knew, as the North Vietnamese knew during the Vietnam War, that their opponent would not dare to use its nuclear weapons.
Israelis say that they need nuclear weapons in case one day an opportunistic Egypt and Syria, sensing that Israel's guard is down, revert to their old stance of total hostility and attack Israel. But, as Zeev Maoz has argued in the journal International Security, these countries keep to their treaty obligations.
Egypt did not violate its peace treaty with Israel when Israel attacked Syria and Lebanon in 1982. Syria did not violate the May 1974 disengagement agreement with Israel even when its forces were under Israeli attack. Nor did Egypt, Jordan and Syria violate their treaty commitments when the second Palestinian intifada broke out in September 2000.
Since its 1979 peace treaty with Israel, Egypt has reduced its defense spending from 22 percent of its gross national product in 1974 to a mere 2.75 percent in 2002. Syria's has fallen from 26 percent to 6.7 percent. The combined defense expenditures of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon amount to only 58 percent of Israel's. It is the Arabs who should be worried by Israel's might, rather than the other way round.
Israel's nuclear weapons are politically unusable and militarily irrelevant, given the real threats it faces. But they have been very effective in allowing India, Pakistan, Libya, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, North Korea and now Iran to think that they, too, had good reason to build a nuclear deterrent.
Four of these nations have dismantled their nuclear arms factories, which shows that nuclear policies are not cast in stone. The way to deal with Iran is to prove to its leadership that nuclear weapons will add nothing to its security, just as they add nothing to Israel's.
This may require a grand bargain, which would mean the United States offering a mutual nonaggression pact, ending its embargo over access to the International Monetary Fund and allowing American investment in Iran. It would also mean America coming clean about Israel's nuclear armory and pressuring Israel to forgo its nuclear deterrent.
If Western powers want to grasp the nettle of nuclear proliferation, they need to take hold of the whole plant, not just one leaf.
Jonathan Power is a commentator on foreign affairs.
-------- korea
Official: NK planning missile test
Associated Press
September 22, 2004
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/09/22/nkorea.missile.ap/index.html
TOKYO, Japan (AP) -- Japan has received intelligence indicating that North Korea may be preparing to test launch a short-range missile, an official said Thursday.
Information from spy satellites and radio waves has shown North Korea beefing up troops and equipment around missile launch bases, said Shigemi Terui, a spokesman at the prime minister's office.
The government has set up an emergency task-force team to help gather more information, Terui said.
The communist country test fired short-range anti-ship missiles into the ocean on several occasions last year during an international standoff over its nuclear weapons program.
Japanese media earlier reported North Korea was preparing to test launch a short-range Nodong missile.
Nodong missiles have a range of about 1,300 kilometers (810 miles) and would be capable of striking parts of Japan's main islands, major Japanese daily the Yomiuri Shimbun said.
Officials estimate that it could take about two weeks before a possible launch, it said.
Japan dispatched an Aegis-equipped destroyer and other surveillance equipment to the Sea of Japan Tuesday evening following the discovery, the Yomiuri said.
A Maritime Self-Defense Forces spokesman, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the Aegis destroyer Myoko had left port for training. He was in Maizuru, the home port of the vessel identified in the Yomiuri report.
Another official at Sasebo naval base, home port to Japan's MSDF ships, said he had been instructed not to speak to the media about the report.
Officials are also preparing for the possibility of a longer-range, Taepodong ballistic missile launch, the Yomiuri said.
North Korea launched a Taepodong missile over Japan's main island and into the Pacific Ocean in 1998, demonstrating that virtually any target in Japan was within its range.
It also test-fired short-range anti-ship missiles into the ocean on several occasions last year.
The communist country sometimes stages high-profile military actions in an apparent attempt to gain leverage over its perceived enemies.
----
Russia raps South Korea on nuclear experiments
MOSCOW (AFP)
Sep 22, 2004
http://www.spacewar.com/2004/040922192053.lsfengvo.html
Russia rapped South Korea on Wednesday over its recently disclosed secret nuclear experiments, calling on Seoul to cooperate fully with international experts investigating them.
In a statement, the Russian foreign ministry said the atomic experiments in South Korea as recently as four years ago were discussed in a meeting of diplomats on the sidelines of President Roh Moon-hyun's visit to Russia.
"The Russian side stressed our interest in ensuring that the Republic of Korea cooperates in an open and transparent manner with the IAEA" in its investigation of the experiments, the statement said.
The statement came a day after Russian President Vladimir Putin called on neighboring North Korea to resume six-party talks on its own nuclear weapons program and reiterated Moscow's support for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.
"Perspectives for the negotiations to settle North Korea's nuclear problem" were also on the agenda of Wednesday's Russo-South Korean talks, the foreign ministry said.
Russia however has unique ties with North Korea -- Putin is among the few leaders to have met North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il -- and the statement sought to present Moscow as an even-handed broker on Korean peninsula security.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Mohamed ElBaradei has voiced "serious concern" over the South Korean activities and IAEA investigators are due to report on them by November after talking to the scientists involved.
North Korea meanwhile has balked at returning to the negotiating table before the end of this month as hoped and has said it would not discuss its nuclear arms program at all until the South Korean experiments were clarified.
The South Korean government revealed earlier this month that its scientists had secretly enriched uranium in 2000 and had also extracted a small amount of plutonium in 1982. Seoul has however reiterated pledges not to develop nuclear weapons and described those incidents as one-off experiments.
Putin and Roh had a private three-hour dinner on Monday followed by summit talks at the Kremlin on Tuesday, and both leaders afterwards were full of praise for each other and promises of stronger Russia-South Korea bonds in the future.
The upbeat tone of Roh's three-day visit changed subtly on Wednesday when, in addition to the Russian foreign ministry statement, Roh admitted that ties between Seoul and Moscow were still tainted by Cold War-era suspicion.
"We have not yet completely overcome mutual mistrust" of the Cold War, Roh said in an address to students at Moscow State University.
Despite praising Russia on Tuesday as a force for security in northeast Asia, Roh said Wednesday that the first order of business was the consolidation of economic links, before security cooperation could be boosted.
"We need to create an economic union based on free trade across borders" in northeast Asia, Roh said. "Once this economic union is created, we can work more closely together in the area of security."
The South Korean leader was quoted by Russia's RIA Novosti news agency as saying that his discussions with Putin had been valuable.
"We didn't hide any cards from one another," the agency quoted him as saying.
-------- mideast
IAEA to probe Dimona effect in Jordan
Israel's Dimona N-plant is at the centre of a radiation dispute
Saturday 25 September 2004,
AFP
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/8D55C51B-B4AC-473C-8215-F06E9E3F75E5.htm
The UN nuclear watchdog has said it will send experts to Jordan to verify whether the Dimona nuclear plant in Israel is emitting high levels of radiation.
"We have received a request from the Jordanian Government to assist them in monitoring the radiological situation," Mark Gwozdecky, spokesman for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said on Saturday.
He added, "We agreed to send a fact-finding mission in the coming weeks to help them determine whether there is any radiological incident."
The request came from Jordan's parliamentary health and environment committee after former Israeli nuclear scientist Mordechai Vanunu warned that the plant, built in the late 1950s with the help of France in the southern Negev desert, could become a "second Chernobyl".
Vanunu, a former technician, served an 18-year prison sentence in Israel for revealing secrets about the plant.
Chernobyl was a nuclear plant that exploded in the then Soviet republic of Ukraine in 1986, causing the world's worst ever civilian nuclear accident.
'No evidence'
But a diplomat based in Vienna, where the IAEA is headquartered, said there is no proof of any contamination from the Dimona plant.
"There is no evidence of radiation ... nobody has ever gotten near Dimona," he said.
Jordan said in August it was preparing to invite UN experts from the IAEA to carry out independent surveys in the kingdom to eliminate any fear of contamination from the plant in neighbouring Israel.
However, Jordan Government spokeswoman Asma Khadr has insisted the country is free of any contamination from the ageng Israeli reactor and reiterated that radiation levels are normal.
The IAEA said it had had no similar request from Israel, which maintains a high level of secrecy around its nuclear programmes.
-------- terrorism
US expert sketches nightmare nuclear terrorist attack on major city
VIENNA (AFP)
Sep 22, 2004
http://www.spacewar.com/2004/040922155147.53hqtnsm.html
A trained nuclear engineer using material the size of an orange could build an atomic bomb to fit into a van, proliferation expert Laura Holgate said Wednesday, sketching a nightmare scenario of a terrorist attack on a major city.
She recalled that terrorists had attacked the World Trade Center in New York in 1993 with a van loaded with conventional explosives.
Holgate told reporters at a meeting in Vienna of the UN nuclear watchdog International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it was "not widely shared and understood" how risky the current situation is, especially since terrorists would not necessarily need top-level scientists to build a bomb.
The nuclear threat remains the big one, and all too real, said Holgate, a senior member of the Washington-based Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) think tank and a former US Department of Energy official for disposal of plutonium.
She said the "raw material for nuclear terrorism is housed in hundreds of facilities in dozens of countries and inadequately secured."
"That's the central point of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative" which the United States and Russia have launched to repatriate highly enriched uranium (HEU) and to convert nuclear research reactors from HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU) use.
"We know nuclear theft is happening already," she said, saying that one institute in Russia has documented "23 attempts over eight years to steal nuclear bomb-making materials."
"We know these failed. We don't know how many succeeded and went undetected," Holgate said.
She also said she did not think terrorists had yet a nuclear weapon. "If terrorist organizations had been able to do this (obtain one), they would have used it by now," Holgate said.
The stakes are high.
"A nuclear device going off in any large city around the globe is going to kill millions of people," she said.
"The economic damage can be in the trillions (of dollars) and it can also be global," she said.
"This is in contrast to a dirty-bomb threat that tends to be hyped," she said about concern that terrorists could use conventional bombs with radioactive materials, contaminating areas with radiation rather than destroying them with the blast of an atomic bomb.
Holgate said a problem in making sure that nuclear materials are not lying where terrorists can get them is that there is "lack of acceptance" within the Russian government that "their material is not adequately secured and that there is a relationship between terrorism and these materials."
But she said the Russians seemed to be more aware of the threat since the Beslan school tragedy and a recognition of "weaknesses" in the Russian system, due to bribes and poor security.
The United States and Russia have produced most of the highly radioactive material now spread throughout the world.
Holgate said the United States and the then-Soviet Union gave out 20 tonnes of HEU in the 1950s and 1960s as part of the Atoms for Peace program for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
"Keeping track of where this HEU is now kilogram by kilogram is difficult." she said.
In addition, over 1,000 tonnes were created by the United States and the Soviet Union for their weapons programs, and there is no minute accounting for this.
William Potter, from the Monterey Institute of International Studies, a California-based think tank, said that in addition the Soviet Union and now Russia have some seven icebreaker ships which use nuclear fuel enriched to about 60 percent, Potter said.
HEU is uranium enriched to over 20 percent, but weapons grade uranium starts at 80 percent enrichment for the U-235 isotope.
Holgate said terrorists could do without the sophistication needed for small bombs. "A truck size is probably a more relevant size," since such a bomb could be made with lower levels of HEU.
----
Nuclear Terrorism: A Brief Review of Threats and Responses
September 22, 2004
Congressional Research Service - The Library of Congress
Jonathan Medalia Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32595.pdf
Summary
It would be difficult for terrorists to mount a nuclear attack on a U.S. city, but such an attack is plausible and would have catastrophic consequences, in one scenario killing over a half-million people and causing damage of over $1 trillion. Terrorists or rogue states might acquire a nuclear weapon in several ways. The nations of greatest concern as potential sources of weapons or fissile materials are widely thought to be Russia and Pakistan. Russia has many tactical nuclear weapons, which tend to be lower in yield but more dispersed and apparently less secure than strategic weapons. It also has much highly enriched uranium (HEU) and weaponsgrade plutonium, some said to have inadequate security. Many experts believe that technically sophisticated terrorists could, without state support, fabricate a nuclear bomb from HEU; opinion is divided on whether terrorists could make a bomb using plutonium. The fear regarding Pakistan is that some members of the armed forces might covertly give a weapon to terrorists or that, if President Musharraf were overthrown, an Islamic fundamentalist government or a state of chaos in Pakistan might enable terrorists to obtain a weapon. Terrorists might also obtain HEU from the more than 130 research reactors worldwide that use HEU as fuel.
If terrorists acquired a nuclear weapon, they could use many means in an attempt to bring it into the United States. This nation has many thousands of miles of land and sea borders, as well as several hundred ports of entry. Terrorists might smuggle a weapon across lightly-guarded stretches of borders, ship it in using a cargo container, place it in a hold of a crude oil tanker, or bring it in using a truck, a boat, or a small airplane.
The architecture of the U.S. response is termed "layered defense." The goal is to try to block terrorists at various stages in their attempts to obtain a nuclear weapon and smuggle it into the United States. The underlying concept is that the probability of success is higher if many layers are used rather than just one or two. Layers include threat reduction programs in the former Soviet Union, efforts to secure HEU worldwide, control of former Soviet and other borders, the Container Security Initiative and Proliferation Security Initiative, and U.S. border security. Several approaches underlie multiple layers, such as technology, intelligence, and forensics. Many policy options have been proposed to thwart or respond to nuclear terrorism, such as developing new detection technologies, strengthening U.S. intelligence capability, and improving planning to respond to an attack. Congress funds programs to counter nuclear terrorism and holds hearings and less-formal briefings on the topic. Many Members have introduced bills in this area.
This report is intended for background, not for tracking current developments. It will be updated occasionally. Radiological terrorism is a separate issue not covered here; see CRS Report RS21766, Radiological Dispersal Devices: Select Issues in Consequence Management, and CRS Report RS21528, Terrorist 'Dirty Bombs': A Brief Primer.
Contents
Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Weapon Acquisition . . . . . . . 2
Weapon Delivery . . . . . . . . . 4
Responses . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Threat Reduction Programsin the
Former Soviet Union . . . . . . . 8
Efforts To Secure HEU Worldwide . 9
Control of Former Soviet and Other Borders . . . . . . . . . . 10
Container Security Initiative . . 10
Proliferation Security Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . 10
U.S. Border Security . . . . . . 11
Supporting Capabilities . . . . . 11
Options and Implications for U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Role of Congress . . . . . . . . 14
Threats
It would be difficult for terrorists to attack a U.S. city using a nuclear weapon, but such an attack is plausible and would have catastrophic consequences. A report of June 2004 by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States found that even though an attempt by al Qaeda in 1994 to purchase uranium failed, "al Qaeda continues to pursue its strategic objective of obtaining a nuclear weapon."1 A book by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies emphasizes the urgency of taking steps to reduce the risk that terrorists could obtain nuclear weapons or materials.2 A May 2004 report by Harvard University's Project on Managing the Atom finds that a nuclear attack "would be among the most difficult types of attacks for terrorists to accomplish," but that with the necessary fissile materials, "a capable and well-organized terrorist group plausibly could make, deliver, and detonate at least a crude nuclear bomb capable of incinerating the heart of any major city in the world."3 An earlier report by the same group estimated the consequences of a tenkiloton weapon (two-thirds the yield of the Hiroshima bomb) detonated at Grand Central Station in Manhattan as over a half-million people killed immediately, hundreds of thousands injured, the possibility (depending on wind direction) of having to evacuate all of Manhattan, much of lower Manhattan permanently destroyed, direct costs of well over $1 trillion, indirect costs several times that, and the prospect for nationwide panic and economic chaos if terrorists subsequently claimed to have another bomb.4 The latter two reports, and a companion website,5 provide detailed data on U.S. threat reduction programs and argue that there is an urgent need to accelerate these programs.
This report divides the threat into two aspects, the acquisition of a bomb and its delivery to a target. The former could involve acquisition of a nuclear weapon, or acquisition of fissile material and its subsequent fabrication into a bomb. Delivery involves a different, much less sophisticated, and much more common set of skills needed to move the weapon covertly by stages toward its target.
Weapon Acquisition
Experts have raised concerns that terrorists might try to acquire two types of nuclear weapons. In the simplest, a "gun-type" weapon, a mass of uranium highly enriched in the fissile isotope 235 (highly enriched uranium, or HEU) is shot down a tube (resembling an artillery tube) into another HEU mass, creating a supercritical mass and a nuclear explosion. The Hiroshima bomb used this approach; its designers had such high confidence in it that they did not test this type of weapon prior to using it. The second type, an implosion weapon, typically uses weapons-grade plutonium (WGPU, composed mainly of the isotope 239). A shell of WGPU is surrounded by chemical explosives arrayed to produce a symmetrical inward-moving (implosion) shock wave that compresses the plutonium enough to be supercritical. The Nagasaki bomb was of this type. It is much more complex in design and manufacture than a gun-assembly weapon. An implosion device was tested in New Mexico prior to use on Nagasaki. A National Academy of Sciences report asserts, "Crude HEU weapons could be fabricated without state assistance."6 Some experts believe that terrorists could create an implosion weapon;7 others disagree.8
Terrorists or rogue states might acquire nuclear weapons or fissile materials in various ways. The source of greatest concern is Russia.9 It has much fissile material. A National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) document shows that considerable work remains for the disposition of this material,10 and a National Academy of Sciences report states that the risk of diversion of special nuclear material (SNM, or fissile material) from Russia is "high" because "large inventories of SNM are stored at many sites that apparently lack inventory controls, and indigenous threats have increased."11
A related concern is that Pakistan might be the source of nuclear weapons or materials for terrorists under several scenarios: (1) Islamists in the armed services might provide such assistance covertly under the current government; (2) if that government were overthrown by fundamentalists, the new government might make weapons available to terrorists; or (3) such weapons might become available if chaos, rather than a government, followed the overthrow.
Other nations are seeking nuclear weapons. According to press reports, Iran has a program to produce HEU, North Korea has reprocessed WGPU from spent nuclear fuel, and "there is little disagreement inside the [U.S.] government over the intelligence indicating North Korea has been secretly building uranium enrichment capability in violation of the 1994 accord."12 The prospect that some nations might provide such materials to other states or to terrorists is a source of concern. A.Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan's atomic bomb, ran a covert operation for many years that reportedly provided Libya, North Korea, and Iran with equipment for making HEU and plans for making an atomic bomb.13 Such nations might use these weapons themselves, or leak or sell weapons, material, or expertise to terrorist groups. Nuclear research reactors offer still another route to obtaining a weapon.
Securing the Bomb states, "More than 130 research reactors still use HEU as their fuel, in more than 40 countries. Most of these facilities have very modest security - in many cases, no more than a night watchman and a chain-link fence."14 A more recent Government Accountability Office report stated that as of July 30, 2004, "39 of the 105 research reactors targeted by DOE [for conversion from HEU to low- enriched uranium, or LEU] have converted to LEU fuel."15 Six of these reactors are reportedly on U.S. university campuses.16
A gun-assembly weapon need not be particularly large. The Hiroshima bomb, according to one source, weighed 8,900 pounds and was 10 feet long and 28 inches in diameter.17 Much of that size and weight, however, was taken up by an armored steel shell and stabilizing fins, as well as by arming, fuzing, and firing devices.18 The gun barrel - the actual nuclear explosive device - measured 6 feet in length by over 6 inches in diameter and weighed about a half-ton.19 Simple improvements might shrink size and weight. A terrorist-made implosion weapon or a weapon stolen from a nation's arsenal could be smaller. In short, a weapon could fit in a car, boat, or small airplane, and would occupy a small corner of a shipping container.
Weapon Delivery
The United States has many thousands of miles of land and water borders, as well as several hundred sea, land, and air ports of entry - 317 by one count - giving terrorists many pathways to smuggle a nuclear bomb into this nation.20 There are many types of borders, as the following table shows - oceans (tropical to temperate to Arctic), land and river borders with Mexico and Canada, and the Great Lakes. Each poses its own set of opportunities for smugglers.
Legal and illegal crossings into the United States also present terrorists with different risks and opportunities. Legal crossings are points, such as seaports, airports, and border stations on roads entering the United States. Illegal crossings are lines - the thousands of miles of unguarded stretches of coasts and land borders.
Securing points poses different requirements from securing lines. Points have an immense volume of traffic, almost all of it legal, and a corresponding concentration of people and resources of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The task of CBP is to find the needle in the haystack while expediting legal traffic. Attempts to smuggle a nuclear weapon through a legal crossing would run the risk that the weapon might be detected by computerized screening of cargo manifests, imaging devices (similar to x-rays), neutron activation devices, or physical inspection, as discussed below. That risk is reduced by the need for CBP agents to process huge numbers of vehicles, vessels, and passengers, leaving little time or attention for those not raising suspicions, and by the low radioactivity of fissile uranium-235 - approximately one hundred-millionth that of radioactive material that might be used in a "dirty bomb."21
Length of U.S. Borders (miles)
Alaska coast (6,640)
Atlantic coast (2,069)
Hawaii coast (750)
Great Lakes (970)
Pacific coast excluding Alaska and Hawaii (1,293)
Alaska-Canada border (1,538)
Border with Mexico (1,933)
Border with Canada excluding Alaska and Great Lakes (3,017)
Gulf of Mexico coast (1,631)
Total (19,841)
Source: The World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1998. Mahwah, NJ, World Almanac Books, 1997.
World Book page and source for each border segment are as follows: U.S. coasts, p. 541, U.S.
Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; Great Lakes, p. 598,
U.S. Department of Commerce, National Ocean Service; border with Canada excluding Alaska and
Great Lakes, p.543, Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, and p. 598, U.S. Department of Commerce, National Ocean Service; Alaska-Canada border, p. 543, no source given; and U.S.-Mexico border, p. 543, listed as "approximately," referenced to 1963 boundary agreement. Note that measurements of the U.S. coasts vary sharply, depending on such things as the length of the "yardstick" used and how far up inlets and rivers the seacoast is measured. See also CRS Report RS21729, U.S. International Borders: Brief Facts, by Marilyn Nelson and Barbara Salazar Torreon.
CBP resources are spread much more thinly along lines. Attempts to smuggle a nuclear weapon across an unguarded section of border would avoid the risk that the weapon might be detected, but CBP agents would only need to detect the smugglers, not the weapon: anyone or anything entering the United States across lines is illegal.
On the other hand, risk to smugglers is reduced because CBP faces an immense task in patrolling the vast stretches of borders.22
Terrorists could avoid the risks attendant to smuggling across both points and lines if they could place a weapon on board an airplane or ship bound for the United States and detonate it before it could be inspected, such as in the air above a city or as it entered a seaport.
Scenarios for smuggling a nuclear weapon across unguarded coasts or borders are similar to those for smuggling bales of marijuana, many of which are reportedly flown in, brought by small boats, or carried across land borders; the difficulty of patrolling the borders makes such scenarios feasible. A key difference between smuggling marijuana and a nuclear weapon is that in the former case, losses due to interception by CBP are expected and are viewed as a cost of doing business.
Terrorists attempting to smuggle a nuclear weapon into the United States, in contrast, would presumably have only one or a few weapons and would have to go to great lengths to succeed. Conversely, because of the great value of a nuclear weapon to terrorists, methods that create a substantial probability of detecting an attempt to smuggle a weapon into the United States might deter such an attempt.
Another scenario commonly discussed is smuggling a nuclear weapon in a shipping container.23 These metal boxes, typically 8 by 8 by 20 feet or 8 by 8 by 40 feet, are used to transport vast quantities of goods ranging from clothes to computers to automobile engines. Some 7 million containers enter the United States by ship each year;24 container ships may carry several thousand containers. From seaports, they are transported by truck or rail throughout the country. The concern is that if terrorists could place a bomb in a container overseas, they could ship it into the United States and transport it anywhere in the country. Under the Container Security Initiative (CSI), discussed below, CBP agents and their foreign counterparts screen containers being loaded onto container ships at certain foreign ports, and the foreign agents inspect containers that the screening identifies as suspicious, based on ports of call, manifest data, shipping company, etc. Terrorists, however, might try to circumvent CSI by acquiring a trusted shipping company to avoid suspicion, falsifying manifest data, infiltrating CSI ports, shipping from non-CSI ports. A nuclear explosion in a U.S. port from a bomb in a shipping container would have not only direct effects, but could also have far-reaching effects on the world economy because of its dependence on container traffic, an effect magnified by industry's use of "just-in-time" deliveries. According to Robert Bonner, Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection.
Simply put, the shipping of sea containers would stop. The American people, for one, would not likely permit one more sea container to enter the United States until there was a significantly greater assurance - such as 100% inspections - that no additional terrorist weapons would be smuggled into the country. Governments in other major industrial countries would no doubt adopt a similar policy, thus bringing the global economy to its knees.25
Stephen Flynn, an authority on U.S. vulnerabilities to terrorist attack, cites John Meredith, group managing director of Hutchison Port Holdings, which Flynn describes as "the world's largest [port] terminal operator," as "worried about the cascading consequences ... should the U.S. government close its ports for two to three weeks [after a terrorist attack], Meredith warned, the entire system would go into gridlock."26
Another possible scenario is the use of an oil tanker to transport a nuclear weapon. The Middle East is the dominant source of anti-American terrorism, the United States imports an average of more than 2 million barrels of crude oil a day from Persian Gulf nations,27 this crude oil is transported by ship, and it would be very difficult to detect a bomb inside a supertanker.
Part of the difficulty of detecting a bomb inside a floating vat of crude oil would arise from the sheer size of supertankers, which carry 100,000 deadweight tons or more of crude oil.28 For example, two supertankers built in 2003 for COSCO (China Ocean Shipping) Group were 330 meters (almost a quarter-mile) long and 60 meters in beam, and had a capacity of about 300,000 deadweight tons.29 There are even larger tankers that carry 500,000 deadweight tons of crude oil, and have a length of 396 meters and a beam of 71 meters.30 On land, some detection devices use gamma rays (high-energy x-rays) to peer inside a shipping container and create an x-ray-type image, but the size of a supertanker and the thickness of the steel (especially with the use of double hulls) make this technique unworkable. Another possible means of detecting a nuclear weapon is neutron activation, in which a burst of neutrons is sent into the item to be examined, such as a shipping container; neutrons that strike uranium-235 (or other radioactive material) will cause some atoms to fission, releasing neutrons and gamma rays. Any neutron coming back as a result of neutron bombardment would be suspicious. The gamma rays produced by the disintegration of each isotope have a unique set of energies, creating a "fingerprint" that permits identification of the isotope. However, neutrons sent into the oil and any produced by fissioning of uranium would be absorbed (forming deuterium or tritium) or scattered by the hydrogen atoms in crude oil, and the large volume of oil would attenuate any gamma rays produced, defeating this form of detection. At the same time, designing a means to detonate a bomb inside a tanker could prove a technical challenge for terrorists.
A bomb in a tanker could devastate an oil port by the blast and by secondary fires in nearby refineries and oil storage tanks. A tanker bomb might be used against other maritime targets, such as the Panama Canal. And if a bomb in a shipping container could lead to the shutdown of container traffic, seriously damaging the world economy, a tanker bomb might by the same token lead to the suspension of crude oil shipments, with similar results.
Responses
At this point, three years after the attacks of September 11, the components of the U.S. and global response have become clearer. The response is often termed "layered defense," reflecting the idea that terrorists would have to proceed through many steps to acquire a nuclear weapon and smuggle it into the United States, and that attempting to thwart them at each step has a higher likelihood of success than trying to block one step only.31 Whether layered defense is an overarching strategy, as is the case in ballistic missile defense, or simply a name given to what would have happened anyway as many agencies with different capabilities contribute in the ways each is able to, or some of both, is another matter. In any event, many programs have been established to deal with nuclear terrorism since 9/11, and others created well before then have acquired new urgency. The following six categories of programs are presented in the order in which they bear on a terrorist or rogue state effort to acquire and deliver a nuclear weapon.
Threat Reduction Programs in the Former Soviet Union. The Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 (P.L. 102-226, Title II), also known as the Nunn-Lugar Amendment, authorized a Department of Defense (DOD) program to assist in the destruction of Soviet nuclear and other weapons. The United States now funds threat reduction and nonproliferation programs through three agencies: DOD runs the Cooperative Threat Reduction program to secure and dismantle former Soviet nuclear and other weapons; the Department of Energy (DOE) runs several programs within its Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account, such as International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation and Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production, to secure nuclear weapons materials and knowledge; and the Department of State runs such programs as Science and Technology Centers in Russia and Ukraine to provide weapons scientists with grant funding or employment on nonweapons projects.32
Efforts To Secure HEU Worldwide. HEU is used in many research reactors around the world. The United States and the Soviet Union provided this material to many nations years ago. As noted above, much is said to be poorly guarded. It is a concern because acquiring a suitable quantity of HEU would be the most difficult step for terrorists intent on making a nuclear bomb. Efforts to secure some of this material have been ad hoc rather than part of a comprehensive plan. For example, in 1994 Project Sapphire reportedly removed from a "poorly guarded warehouse" in Kazakhstan enough HEU to make 20-50 nuclear weapons and brought it to the United States.33 In August 2002, Project Vinca reportedly removed enough HEU for two nuclear weapons from a research reactor in Serbia and flew it to Russia, where it had originated.34 Securing the Bomb asserts that the pace of securing fissile material has slowed since September 11, 2001, and suggests a "global cleanout" of HEU.35 On May 26, 2004, responding to such concerns, Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham announced a new Global Threat Reduction Initiative to secure Russianorigin fresh HEU by the end of 2005; to secure spent fuel of Russian/Soviet origin by 2010, and of U.S. origin within a decade; to convert the cores of civilian research reactors using HEU to be able to use uranium with a concentration of uranium-235 too low to be used in a nuclear weapon, and to try to identify and secure other nuclear and radiological materials that may pose a threat.36 For this effort, Secretary Abraham said, the United States plans to dedicate more than $450 million. Other DOE personnel indicated that sum is the approximate cost to complete the program, that the funds would probably be spent over more than 10 years, and that most of the funds would be for already-existing programs.37
There are also concerns about the security of any Iranian and North Korean HEU, as discussed above, and Pakistani HEU. A discussion of diplomatic efforts to secure such material goes beyond the scope of this report.38
Control of Former Soviet and Other Borders. While some programs discussed earlier seek to secure former Soviet nuclear weapons and fissile materials, DOE's Second Line of Defense (SLD) and the State Department's Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) Program provide assistance to Russia and other countries to prevent nuclear materials from being smuggled out through their borders. DOE states that SLD "deploys radiation detection monitors at strategic transit and border crossings and at air and sea transshipment hubs."39
Container Security Initiative. CSI was started in January 2002 by the former U.S. Customs Service, now a part of CBP in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).40 Shipping containers account for 90 percent of all world cargo; some 7 million are offloaded in U.S. seaports annually. Terrorists might attempt to ship a nuclear weapon to a U.S. port in a container and detonate it before the container was inspected. Accordingly, CSI screens containers in overseas ports before they are loaded onto U.S.-bound ships. CSI was operational in 18 ports as of March 2004, with another 20 in earlier stages of CSI implementation. Participating ports have U.S. CBP agents who work with host country officers to decide which containers to target for inspection; host country officers inspect suspicious containers using non-intrusive inspection devices such as gamma-ray imaging machines or using physical inspection. A portion of DOE's SLD program, Mega-Ports, supports CSI by equipping some foreign seaports that are part of CSI with radiation detection equipment, and providing the necessary training, to "screen cargo for nuclear and radioactive materials that could be used in a weapon of mass destruction or a RDD (dirty bomb) ..."41
Proliferation Security Initiative. PSI began in May 2003; by August 2004, 16 nations had joined.42 The participants seek to interdict sea or air shipments of WMD or WMD-related materials to or by states "of proliferation concern" trying to acquire or transfer such items. Shipments could be interdicted at ports, in territorial waters, on the high seas, or in national airspace. According to press reports, the first interdiction under PSI was of the German ship BBC China in October 2003; the seizure of its Libya-bound cargo, thousands of parts for special centrifuges of value for enriching uranium, may have been influential in convincing Libya to abandon its WMD programs.43
U.S. Border Security. The final line of defense tries to keep terrorists from smuggling a nuclear weapon across U.S. borders. It involves border patrols, barriers, remote sensors, radiation monitors, Customs inspections, seaport security, and the like, generally within the purview of CBP. Yet as noted in "Weapon Delivery," above, there are great difficulties in securing the many "points" through which people and goods may enter legally, and the thousands of miles of "lines," thinly-guarded stretches of coasts and land borders across which entry is illegal. These difficulties illustrate the importance of the other defensive layers noted earlier in this section and show why it would be unwise to rely solely on border security.
Supporting Capabilities. Technology, intelligence, and forensics cut across and support the foregoing steps to keep terrorists or rogue states from acquiring and delivering a nuclear weapon.
Technology Development. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107- 296, Sec. 302) makes the DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology responsible for "coordinating the Federal Government's civilian efforts to identify and develop countermeasures to" terrorist WMD threats. DHS is charged with coordinating efforts by many agencies, including DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration and the Department of Commerce's National Institute of Standards and Technology, to develop technology for homeland security. DHS has proposed various technology programs for FY2005.44 U.S. national laboratories (including the three nuclear weapons labs, Los Alamos, Livermore, and Sandia), U.S. and foreign corporations, universities, and others have been conducting R&D for new technologies to detect smuggling of nuclear materials and weapons. Detection of HEU and WGPU is difficult because, as noted, they are not highly radioactive.
Various technologies are in use,45 such as radiation portal monitors, which passively detect radiation emitted by a source,46 and active imaging systems, like the Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS), which operate like x-ray machines.47 More advanced systems are being developed. For example, Livermore is developing a neutron-interrogation system to screen containers. It bombards a container with neutrons, producing nuclear fissions in such material as HEU and WGPU.48 The fissions produce gamma rays with specific energy levels unique to each substance, permitting identification. Detecting illegal movement across U.S. borders, in contrast, does not require detecting fissile material; relevant technologies include surveillance sensors and data analysis software.49
Intelligence. The possibility that terrorists could evade any of the layers described above necessitates an enhanced intelligence capability to complement other means of detecting movement of nuclear materials and warheads. Such a capability could also focus the efforts of particular defenses, whether alerting a Russian facility that a smuggling plan was in the works or indicating that a particular cargo container might hold a nuclear weapon. Improving and organizing intelligence for homeland security have been sharply debated.50
Nuclear Forensics. The ability to glean information from nuclear weapon debris and other radioactive material lies at the intersection of technology and intelligence. During the Cold War, the United States obtained much information by analyzing fallout from Soviet nuclear weapon tests. For example, analysis confirmed that the Soviet Union had conducted its first atomic bomb test, and analysis of fallout from the first Soviet hydrogen bomb test revealed many details about that weapon's design.51 Even minute samples are of value.52 With the current moratorium on nuclear testing, forensic studies are applied to verifying the safety of U.S. nuclear warheads, detecting signs of nuclear proliferation, and thwarting illicit trafficking of nuclear materials.53 In the event of a terrorist nuclear attack, forensics might be able to identify the nation that originated the fissile material or weapon, and determine whether terrorists had fabricated the weapon on their own or obtained it from a nation's stockpile. This information would aid efforts to prevent further leakage. The ability to attribute a weapon or material to a nation might also deter a nation from providing such items to terrorists by holding the prospect of a military response. Further, if a terrorist nuclear weapon were found, forensic analysis could contribute to an understanding of the weapon's design, which could help determine whether it could be moved and how best to disable it.
Other issues that bear on nuclear terrorism include missile defense, export controls, and nuclear nonproliferation efforts more generally. Many organizations and other groups are involved, such as the U.N., the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Group of Eight.54
Options and Implications for U.S. Policy
In combating nuclear terrorism, the standard for success for the United States is daunting - zero nuclear detonations, which may require stopping every terrorist or rogue state attempt to acquire and deliver a nuclear weapon - while a single nuclear detonation in the United States would constitute a terrorist success. Measured against that binary standard, it is impossible to determine the extent to which, or even if, the initiatives discussed above have increased U.S. security. Nonetheless, studies have shown many potential weaknesses in U.S. ability to thwart nuclear terrorism. The main response of policymakers has been to strengthen, consolidate, coordinate, or initiate a wide array of programs. A Government Accountability Office report, for example, notes a number of recommendations that it and congressionally chartered commissions have made for defending against catastrophic threats.55 Categories of recommendations include
! "Enhanced or clarified federal or state authority to manage a terrorist incident involving Weapons of Mass Destruction"
! "Improvements to incident planning, management, and response capabilities for dealing with a WMD terrorist incident"
! "Better management and more resources for research and development of technologies to prevent or respond to terrorist WMD incidents" and
! "Laws, cooperative agreements, and regulatory regimes to better control the precursors to WMD."
Many policy options are available to counter nuclear terrorism, including (1) accelerate the safeguarding of Russian fissile materials; (2) broaden that effort to a global cleanout of HEU, such as at research reactors; (3) expand CSI to more ports; (4) strengthen the Coast Guard, such as through its Integrated Deepwater Systems program, which would, among other things, improve its ability to conduct interdictions for PSI;56 (5) develop new detection technologies, such as the neutron interrogation system; (6) strengthen capabilities to detect and disable terrorist nuclear devices, such as Nuclear Incident Response Teams of DOE and the Environmental Protection Agency; and (7) strengthen U.S. intelligence capability. Two books released in the summer of 2004 provide detailed policy options.57
Role of Congress
Congress funds programs to counter nuclear terrorism through several authorization and appropriations bills. The annual National Defense Authorization and Department of Defense Appropriations Acts fund DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction programs; the annual National Defense Authorization and Energy and Water Development Appropriations Acts fund DOE Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and nuclear weapons programs. The annual Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Acts fund the DHS Directorate of Science and Technology; for FY2005, the authorizing bills for that directorate are H.R. 4141 and S. 2295, Border Infrastructure and Technology Integration Act of 2004. Other agencies, funded by other bills, also conduct R&D. The FY2005 requests for Cooperative Threat Reduction, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, and DHS Directorate of Science and Technology are $409.2 million, $1,348.6 million, and $1,039 million, respectively. Congress also holds oversight hearings, establishes specific legislative requirements and restrictions on programs, and calls public attention to these issues.
Other bills introduced in the 108th Congress that bear on nuclear terrorism include the following. All show the latest major action as of September 15, 2004.
H.R. 795 (Deutsch). Would amend the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 to require the Secretary of Energy to develop a plan to decrease the threat resulting from the theft or diversion of highly enriched uranium (HEU). The plan would provide, as appropriate, for monitoring HEU supplies at certain companies, assisting those companies with security measures, accelerating the blend-down of HEU to low enriched uranium, purchasing HEU, etc. Referred to House Energy and Commerce Committee on February 13, 2003, and to that committee's Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality on March 17, 2003.
H.R. 1010 (Nadler). Port Protection Act of 2003. Would amend title 46, United States Code, to require inspection of cargo destined for the United States. The bill would require, effective January 1, 2005: inspection outside the United States of all U.S.-bound cargo containers; inspection of all noncontainerized cargo entering by means other than a vessel or airplane to verify that it is not carrying a chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon; and physical inspection of each U.S.-bound cargo vessel at least 200 miles from the United States to ensure that containers have not been tampered with and that the vessel itself is not carrying a chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon. Referred to the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure's Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, and on March 17, 2003, to the House Ways and Means Committee's Subcommittee on Trade. H.R. 1389 (Crowley). Homeland Emergency Response Act of 2003. Finds, among other things, that "[a] new, long-term grant program by the Federal Government needs to be established to enhance the ability of first responders to respond to incidents of terrorism, including weapons of mass destruction, such as biological, chemical and nuclear attacks," directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish such a program, and provides details on this program. Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary's Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, May 5, 2003.
H.R. 3173 (Nadler). To provide for the purchase by the Secretary of Energy of excess Russian plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Referred to the House Committee on International Relations, September 24, 2003. H.R. 4212 (Schiff). A bill to promote U.S. security by facilitating the removal of potential nuclear weapons materials from vulnerable sites around the world. Would establish within DOE a Task Force on Nuclear Material Removal "to ensure that potential nuclear weapons materials are entirely removed from the most vulnerable sites around the world as soon as practicable." Referred to House Committee on International Relations on April 22, 2004. (S. 2310 is a related bill.) H.R. 4965 (Lantos). Nuclear Black-Market Elimination Act. Would "impose sanctions on foreign entities that engage in certain nuclear proliferation activities." Referred to the House Committee on International Relations, July 22, 2004. S. 6 (Daschle). Comprehensive Homeland Security Act of 2003: Title IX, Weapons of Mass Destruction, would provide assistance for the International Atomic Energy Agency to improve safeguards at nuclear facilities abroad and to counter nuclear terrorism; strengthen border security, export controls, and nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere; accelerate the program for the disposition of Russian HEU; develop a program with Russia to secure or dismantle Russian tactical nuclear weapons; and permit Cooperative Threat Reduction funds to be used outside the former Soviet Union. Referred to Senate Judiciary Committee on January 7, 2003.
S. 1147 (Boxer). High-Tech Port Security Act of 2003. Under this act, the Secretary of Homeland Security would establish standards for certifying equipment to screen cargo containers for radioactive and explosive material; require "every cargo container carried by a vessel entering the United States [to] be screened for radioactive and explosive materials before the container leaves the port"; require all cargo containers entering the United States to be blast resistant; and ensure (including by providing grants to ports) that the 20 largest U.S. ports and other highly vulnerable U.S. ports (and later other ports) have deployed screening equipment. Referred to Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on May 23, 2003. S. 2279 (Hollings). Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2004. Among other things, the measure directs DHS to conduct R&D to strengthen port security, such as on equipment to detect nuclear or radiological material. Measure reported from the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (S.Rept. 108- 274) on May 20, 2004, with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, and placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar.
S. 2310 (Feinstein). A bill to promote U.S. security by facilitating the removal of potential nuclear weapons materials from vulnerable sites around the world. Would establish within DOE a Task Force on Nuclear Material Removal "to ensure that potential nuclear weapons materials are entirely removed from the most vulnerable sites around the world as soon as practicable." Referred to Senate Committee on Armed Services on April 8, 2004. (H.R. 4212 is a related bill.)
1 U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. "Overview of the Enemy," Staff Statement No. 15, c. June 2004, p. 12. Available at [http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing12/staff_statement_15.pdf].
2 Charles Ferguson and William Potter, with Amy Sands, Leonard Spector, and Fred Wehling, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, Monterey, CA, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2004, 378 p. Available at [http:// cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040618.htm].
3 Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action, Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, May 2004, p. vii. Available at [http:// www.nti.org/e_research/analysis_cnwmupdate_052404.pdf].
4 Matthew Bunn, Anthony Wier, and John Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, March 2003, p. 18-23. Available at [http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/ cnwm.pdf].
5 Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials," available at Nuclear Terrorism: A Brief Review of Threats and Responses [http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/cnwm_home.asp].
6 National Academy of Sciences, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism, Washington, National Academies Press, 2002, p. 45. Available at [http://books.nap.edu/books/0309084814/html/45.html].
7 See, for example, Carson Mark, Theodore Taylor, Eugene Eyster, William Maraman, and Jacob Wechsler, "Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?", Nuclear Control Institute, n.d. Available at [http://www.nci.org/k-m/makeab.htm].
8 Robert Gallucci, Dean, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, wrote, "I do not believe that al-Qaida could build a nuclear weapon with a plutonium core, that is, a weapon with an implosion design." Personal correspondence, August 26, 2002. For a detailed explanation of why it would be much harder for terrorists to build an implosion weapon than a gun-type weapon, see Ferguson et al., The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, p. 135-138.
9 See CRS Report RL32202, Nuclear Weapons in Russia: Safety, Security, and Control Issues, by Amy Woolf.
10 U.S. Department of Energy. Office of Management, Budget and Evaluation/CFO. FY 2005 Congressional Budget Request. Vol. 1, National Nuclear Security Administration. DOE/ME-0032, February 2004, p. 477-490. Available at [http://www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/ 05budget/content/defnn/nn.pdf].
11 National Academy of Sciences, Making the Nation Safer, p. 44.
12 Regarding Iran's HEU program, see Peter Slevin and Dafna Linzer, "U.N. Agency Rebukes Iran on Nuclear Activity," Washington Post, June 19, 2004: 15. Regarding North Korean WGPU, see David Sanger, "Diplomacy Fails to Slow Advance of Nuclear Arms," New York Times, August 8, 2004: 4. The quote on North Korean uranium is from Glenn Kessler, "Chinese Not Convinced of North Korean Uranium Effort," Washington Post, January 7, 2004: 16.
13 David Sanger and William Broad, "Pakistani's Nuclear Earnings: $100 Million," New York Times, March 16, 2004: 8.
14 Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb, p. viii.
15 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors, GAO-04-807, July 2004, Highlights page.
16 Matthew Wald, "Uranium Reactors on Campus Raise Security Concerns," New York Times, August 15, 2004: 19.
17 Robert Duff, Director of Classification, DOE, letter to David Rosenberg, December 4, 1980, quoted in Thomas Cochran, William Arkin, and Milton Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. 1: U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities, Cambridge, MA, Ballinger, 1984, p. 32. Another source uses slightly different figures: length 10.5 feet, diameter 29 inches, and weight 9,700 lb. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1986, p. 701.
18 Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, p. 701-703.
19 Duff, letter to David Rosenberg, quoted in Cochran et al., Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. 1: U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities, p. 32.
20 The figure was provided to CRS by the Customs and Border Protection Office of Congressional Affairs, April 22, 2004, and is referenced in CRS Report RL32399, Border Security: Inspections Practices, Policies, and Issues, by Ruth Ellen Wassem et al., p. 2 of update of August 2, 2004. See also CRS Report RL31539, Nuclear Smuggling and International Terrorism: Issues and Options for U.S. Policy, by Rensselaer Lee.
21 Half-life is the time it takes for half the atoms of a radioactive isotope to decay, by emitting radiation, into another isotope. As such, it is a rough measure of how radioactive an isotope is. The half-life of uranium-235 is about 700 million years, while the half-life of cobalt-60 is 5.3 years. That of plutonium-239 is about 24,000 years. U.S. Department of Energy. Office of Environmental Management. Integrated Data Base Report - 1996: U.S. Spent Nuclear Fuel and Radioactive Waste Inventories, Projections, and Characteristics, revision 13, December 1997, Table B.1, "Characteristics of Important Radionuclides," available at [http://web.em.doe.gov/idb97/tabb1.html].
22 See CRS Report RL31019, Terrorism: Automated Lookout Systems and Border Security Options and Issues, by William Krouse and Raphael Perl.
23 See CRS Report RS21293, Terrorist Nuclear Attacks on Seaports: Threat and Response, by Jonathan Medalia.
24 Information provided by CBP staff, January 30, 2004.
25 [Then] U.S. Customs Commissioner Robert C. Bonner, Speech Before the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., January 17, 2002. [http:// www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/commissioner/speeches_statements/archives/ jan172002.xml
26 Stephen Flynn, America the Vulnerable: How Our Government Is Failing to Protect Us from Terrorism, New York, HarperCollins, 2004, p. 81, 83.
27 U.S. Department of Energy. Energy Information Agency. "Table 3.7: United States - Oil Imports (Most Recent 12 Months)" for May 2003-April 2004. Available at [http:// www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/ipsr/t37.xls].
28 Schlumberger Corp., "Oilfield Glossary," [http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/ Display.cfm?Term=tanker]. A deadweight ton is 2,240 pounds of carrying capacity.
29 COSCO (China Ocean Shipping) Group, at [http://www.cosco.com.cn/en/fleet/] and click on "tanker"; statistics are for Cosgreat Lake and Cosbright Lake. For comparison, Nimitzclass aircraft carriers, the type currently under construction in the United States, have a length of 332.85 meters, a beam of 40.84 meters, and a displacement, fully loaded, of about 97,000 tons. U.S. Navy. "Fact File: Aircraft Carriers - CV, CVN," updated January 14, 2004. [http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/ships/ship-cv.html].
30 Mark Huber, Tanker Operations: A Handbook for the Person-in-Charge (PIC), fourth edition. Centreville, MD, Cornell Maritime Press, 2001, p. 20.
31 For discussions of layered defense, see Flynn, America the Vulnerable, p. 68-71, and Ferguson et al., The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, pp. 80-83.
32 See CRS Report RL31957, Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union, by Amy Woolf.
33 Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Kazakhstan: Project Sapphire," last updated September 28, 2001; available at [http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/kazakst/fissmat/sapphire.htm].
34 Nuclear Threat Initiative, "International Response: Weapon-Grade Uranium Exits Yugoslavia," Global Security Newswire, August 23, 2002. Available at [http:// www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2002/8/23/3s.html].
35 Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb, p. xii, 47. See also Bunn and Wier, "Faster Pace Needed on Uranium Removal," Boston Globe, September 23, 2003, available at [http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2003/uranium_removal_092303.htm].
36 U.S. Department of Energy. "Remarks Prepared for Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham," International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, May 26, 2004. Available at [http:// www.energy.gov/engine/content.do?PUBLIC_ID=15949&BT_CODE=PR_SPEECHES&TT_CODE=PRESSSPEECH].
37 DOE briefing, July 8, 2004.
38 Regarding efforts to control these nuclear programs, see CRS Report RS21592, Iran's Nuclear Program: Recent Developments, by Sharon Squassoni; CRS Issue Brief IB91141, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program, by Larry Niksch; and CRS Report RL31589, Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan, by Sharon Squassoni.
39 Department of Energy, FY 2005 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 1, p. 454. Regarding EXBS, see U.S. Department of State. "The EXBS Program: Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance," available at [http://www.state.gov/t/np/export/ ecc/20779.htm].
40 For information on CSI, see U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Customs and Border Protection. "Container Security Initiative (CSI)." Available at [http://www.cbp.gov/ xp/cgov/enforcement/international_activities/csi/]. See also CRS Report RL31733, Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues for Congress, by Jonathan Medalia. For DHS organization, see CRS Report RS21366, Department of Homeland Security: Organization Chart, by Sharon Gressle.
41 Department of Energy, FY 2005 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 1, p. 454.
42 See CRS Report RS21881, "Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)," by Sharon Squassoni; CRS Report RL32097, Weapons of Mass Destruction Counterproliferation: Legal Issues for Ships and Aircraft, by Jennifer Elsea; and U.S. White House. Office of the Press Secretary. "Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles," September 4, 2003; available at [http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/23764.htm].
43 Robin Wright, "Ship Incident May Have Swayed Libya," Washington Post, January 1, 2004: 19.
44 Dr. Charles McQueary, Under Secretary for Science and Technology, Department of Homeland Security, "Statement for the Record Before the U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research & Development," February 25, 2004. Available at [http://hsc.house.gov/files/Testimony%20McQueary.doc].
45 See David Bodenheimer, "Technology for Border Protection: Homeland Security Funding and Priorities," Journal of Homeland Security, August 2003, [http:// www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/displayArticle.asp?article=95].
46 See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, "Radiation Portal Monitors Safeguard America from Nuclear Devices and Radiological Materials," at [http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/enforcement/port_activities/rad_portal1.xml].
47 See Science Applications International Corporation, "Mobile VACIS Inspection System," at [http://www.saic.com/products/security/mobile-vacis/].
48 "Screening Cargo Containers to Remove a Terrorist Threat," Science and Technology Review, May 2004: 12-15, at [http://www.llnl.gov/str/May04/pdfs/05_04.2.pdf].
49 See also CRS Report RS21270, Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism Research and Development: Funding, Organization, and Oversight, by Genevieve Knezo, and CRS Report RL31914, Research and Development in the Department of Homeland Security, by Daniel Morgan.
50 See CRS Report RL31292, Intelligence to Counter Terrorism: Issues for Congress, and CRS Report RS21283, Homeland Security: Intelligence Support, both by Richard Best.
51 Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1995, p. 372, 525.
52 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Chemistry and Materials Science. Forensic Sciences. "Forensic Science Sleuthing." Available at [http://www-cms.llnl.gov/st/ forensic_str.html] on September 10, 2004.
53 Regarding these applications, see Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, "Forensic Science Sleuthing"; "Forensic Science Center," Energy and Technology Review [a publication of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory], March 1994, p. 2 and European Commission, Joint Research Centre, "Developing Nuclear Forensic Science," JRC in Action, April 2002, [http://www/jrc.cec.eu.int/more_information/jrc-in-action/issue01/feature.htm]; respectively.
54 For discussions of the topics in this paragraph, see CRS Report RL31111, Missile Defense: The Current Debate, by Steven Hildreth; "The Role of Export Controls," by Ian Fergusson, in the CRS Terrorism Electronic Briefing Book; CRS Issue Brief IB10091, Nuclear Nonproliferation Issues, by Carl Behrens; and CRS Report RL31559, Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status, by Sharon Squassoni, Steven Bowman, and Carl Behrens.
55 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security: Selected Recommendations from Congressionally Chartered Commissions and GAO, GAO-04-591, March 2004, p. 15- 16. Available at [http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04591.pdf].
56 See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Coast Guard, "Integrated Deepwater System." Available at [http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-a/deepwater/default.htm] and CRS Report RS21019, Coast Guard Deepwater Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
57 Ferguson et al., The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism; and Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, New York, Times Books, 2004.
-------- treaties
Liechtenstein Ratifies the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
22 September 2004
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2004/09/ctbt092204.html
Vienna - Liechtenstein has deposited its instrument of ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) with the United Nations Secretary-General on 21 September 2004, bringing the total number of Treaty ratifications to 116. The number of ratifying States in the North America and Western Europe geographical region now stands at 26.
The CTBT bans all nuclear weapon test explosions. Drafted at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and adopted by the General Assembly on 10 September 1996, the Treaty was opened for signature on 24 September 1996 at the United Nations headquarters in New York.
To enter into force, the CTBT must be signed and ratified by the 44 States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty. These States formally participated in the work of the 1996 session of the Conference on Disarmament and possessed nuclear power or research reactors at that time. To date, 32 of the Annex 2 States have ratified the Treaty. Fourteen of the 15 Annex 2 States in the North America and Western Europe geographical region have ratified the Treaty.
- The 116 States that have deposited their instruments of ratification of the CTBT are Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria#, Argentina#, Australia#, Austria#, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh
# States whose ratification is required for entry into force.
For further information contact: Daniela Rozgonova, Chief, Public Information T +43 1 26030-6200 F +43 1 26030-5823 E info@ctbto.org I http://www.ctbto.org
-------- u.s. nuc weapons
UC Regents lose control of nuclear weapons program
Five admirals, Carlyle Group and Rand take over
San Francisco Bay View series - Part 2,
September 22, 2004
by Leuren Moret
http://www.sfbayview.com/092204/nuclearweapons092204.shtml
As Admiral George P. Nanos, appointed director of the Los Alamos lab in January 2003, and Admiral S. Robert Foley Jr., appointed UC vice president for laboratory management in November 2003, sat down at the table where the UC Regents waited, I began to wonder how many more admirals were involved and why. It did not take long to find out.
Admiral Foley informed the regents about the missing CREM, computer storage devices with classified data, and acknowledged that the security lapse damaged the university's chances of retaining its Los Alamos contract. "This erodes your position, without any question at all," he said. "It's about as bad as it could be when you're trying to prepare for a re-competition."
He announced that Jack Killeen had been appointed to the UC President's Office as special assistant for Los Alamos security: "Jack's our guy. He was with Wackenhut, and he's our guy."
Wackenhut has ties to (Lockheed) Martin-Marietta - 70 percent of Lockheed is now owned by the Carlyle Group - going back to 1958. By 2001, Wackenhut's revenues topped $2.8 billion as the leading provider of security at U.S. national defense sites, with a global presence on six continents. Among nuclear weapons lab employees, Wackenhut was better known for "wacking" radiation whistleblowers like Karen Silkwood and attempting to run Dr. Rosalie Bertell off the road. The story of Karen Silkwood's courageous life and mysterious death are told in the 1983 movie "Silkwood," starring Meryl Streep. Dr. Bertell, a Catholic nun, is a world renowned scientist and humanitarian and winner of the 1986 Right Livelihood Award, the environmental Nobel Prize.
Wackenhut has a well-deserved reputation for being a nasty outfit (see "Eye on Wackenhut" in the reference list below). President Bush and his brother, Gov. Jeb Bush, are known to spend time together hanging out with cronies at the Wackenhut "country club" in Florida.
Admiral Nanos continued, complaining that employees simply would not follow the security and safety rules. When Foley chimed in that there were going to be more security incidents and lapses at the lab in the future before they got it straightened out, it began to look like a setup.
Regents Blum, Parsky, Connerly and a few more leaned forward and demanded to know how it was possible, and stated it was unacceptable, that there would be more security lapses. The regents should have fired Foley on the spot when he himself predicted that he would fall down on the job.
It was obvious that Nanos and Foley were there to blame the employees, justify the management change and discourage the regents from competing for the contract. They were presenting a good excuse for "cleaning house" and removing the "old guard" who would stand in the way of changes now planned for "ramping up" the nuclear weapons program.
Admiral Nanos calls Los Alamos staff 'cowboys' and 'butt-heads'
The decision by Admiral Nanos, director of Los Alamos, to suspend classified work at Los Alamos in July 2004 following the UC Regents meeting is an over-reaction which has hurt the nation, according to Brad Lee Holian, a physicist and 32-year lab veteran. Holian believes the reason for misplaced classified data is probably "insufficient attention paid to inventory procedures" rather than loss of the data or espionage.
There has still been no explanation or mention of real espionage by high level Mossad agent Robert Maxwell, who sold PROMIS software to Los Alamos with a "back door" in the software for Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, to spy on the lab (see "Robert Maxwell").
Quoted in the San Francisco Chronicle Sept. 18, Holian said, "The damage to Los Alamos National Laboratory and to the country from this shutdown could be incalculable." In a 1,500 word article he submitted to Physics Today, he says a two-month shutdown is the "squandering of hundreds of millions of tax dollars" and "the climate of blame and 'zero tolerance for errors' has been devastating to the morale of the scientists" (see "Los Alamos crackdown").
Holian said that at earlier meetings, Admiral Nanos used colorful language and referred in harsh terms to certain staff members as "cowboys" and "butt-heads" and was "yelling or slamming down viewgraphs onto the projector." This kind of conduct by the most senior staff member at the lab will put a chill on recruiting young scientists, and young staffers are so disheartened that some are already leaving, as well as older staff, who are taking early retirement. Holian reported that a recruiter he knows was told by young students, "We're not sure we want to put our careers in jeopardy by going to a place like Los Alamos."
DOE culture at the labs: the fox guarding the henhouse
An editorial in the Oakland Tribune the day before the UC Regents' meeting on Aug. 17 remarked that the NNSA (the National Nuclear Security Administration) was established by the Department of Energy in 1999 after the Wen Ho Lee scandal but had failed to address real security lapses since. NNSA is in bed with the lab administrators, which it supposedly is overseeing.
This had been exactly my experience at Livermore in 1991 when I reported graft, fraud, corruption, contractor overcharges and health and safety violations on the Yucca Mountain Project in Nevada, and the Superfund Project at Livermore, to Richard Berta, the Western Regional Inspector in the DOE Inspector General's office for the nuclear weapons labs, Site 51 and the Nevada Test Site. After bringing two DOE and EPA inspectors to my house and recording my testimony, he reported to Duane Sewell, the "secrets keeper" at the lab, and Bert Hefner, lab PR person.
When I called Berta a month later to inquire about the outcome, he said, "We found no basis to your allegations ... and I got a new office with a view and new oak furniture from Sewell." I told him I was not surprised, that my allegations had been reported many times to the FBI by other more senior lab staff and they were ignored as well. I informed him that he had "missed out" on the teak furniture, given to the really important "players" at the lab.
The Oakland Tribune editorial concludes: "NNSA failed miserably in its policing responsibilities. It should be reorganized or axed, and Brooks and other top officials should be replaced with more independent, less-compromised leadership."
The regents' meeting ended before Dr. Walter Kohn, a Nobel Prize-winning physicist representing the UC faculty opposed to UC management of nuclear weapons labs, was able to speak before the regents. Regent Sherry Lansing, CEO of Paramount Pictures, stood up and announced in a loud voice, "Oh, Walter, I want to hear your presentation (at a future meeting), but I have a plane to catch," and she crossed the room to give him a big kiss. By this time, I had decided to investigate the UC Regents and their ties to the defense industry.
Later that evening, a friend told me, "They ARE the Carlyle Group!"
University of Texas students and the Fiat Pax website
Right after the regents' meeting, I contacted a group of University of Texas students and Texas State Rep. Lon Burnam, who are opposed to the University of Texas' bid for the nuclear weapons management contract. A student told me about Fiat Pax, a website put together by UC Santa Cruz students listing the top 50 university recipients of defense funding for research and their ties to corporations (see "Fiat Pax" below).
The UC Regents with ties to the defense industry were listed with detailed bios. Regents Chair Gerald Parsky is the top fundraiser - after Ken Lay - for George W. Bush in both his 2000 and 2004 presidential election bids and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Vice Chair Richard Blum is tied to the Carlyle Group, invested in URS Corp., a leading contractor with the Defense Department, and Korea First Bank - Carlyle is moving into Korea and taking over banks - and sits on the board of Northwest Airlines. A document obtained under the Freedom of Information Act (see "FOIA" below) revealed in 2001 that Northwest was the first airline to collaborate with NASA to install mind-reading technology in U.S. airports to catch "terrorists."
Regent Sherry Lansing was a trustee of the RAND Graduate School, a branch of the RAND Corp., which had been involved in war-gaming nuclear wars between the U.S. and the USSR and acts as a bridge between U.S. universities and the military.
I also learned that the Carlyle Group manages large amounts of endowment funds for the University of Texas.
CalPERS, the California state workers' pension fund, which, at nearly $1 trillion, is the largest in the nation, owns 5.5 percent of Carlyle with a $730 million investment and an outrageous 20-30 percent annual return (see CalPERS). CalPERS has an option to buy another 5 percent in a few years, giving them 10 percent ownership of Carlyle (see "Carlyle Documentary Video").
For decades, many politicians and corporate interests have tried to loot the CalPERS pension fund. This could be the takeover that finally grabs the CalPERS pot of gold.
Fiat Pax sums it up: "The University of California's system wide finances are incredibly entangled with weapons manufacturers. The UC's retirement plan portfolio is invested in dozens of military-industrial contractors through stock purchases. At least five corporations within the UC retirement portfolio conduct virtually no business other than weapons manufacturing and military subcontracting, these are: General Dynamics with a UC investment of $21,471,120, Northrop Grumman for $16,125,200, Raytheon for $16,818,200, TRW for $8,327,650, and Lockheed Martin for a staggering $33,046,370. ...
"It is through these informal personal, formal institutional, and financial exchanges that universities serve the warfare state and its corporate allies. Personal relationships connect military, corporate, and university personnel while bridging the divide between these institutions. Formal institutional links establish cooperation and coordination across the military-industrial-academic complex. Be they research institutes, labs, and centers, or personal relationships spanning industry-university-military, the web of connections far exceeds any attempts to quantify."
Business journalist Dan Briody's book, "The Iron Triangle: Inside the Secret World of the Carlyle Group" (2003), reveals that the Carlyle Group is one of the most powerful and well-connected private equity firms in the world. Their incredible profits are due to investments primarily in defense and aerospace industries. Briody says the Carlyle Group "operates within the so-called iron triangle of industry, government, and the military" and that it "leaves itself open to any number of conflicts of interest and stunning ironies." This is precisely what President Eisenhower warned against as he was leaving office over 40 years ago.
And then I knew that the admirals, and the vested regents, were the kiss of death to the UC contract bid.
References for Part 2
1. "Robert Maxwell Was a Mossad Spy: New claim on tycoon's mystery death" by Gordon Thomas and Martin Dillon, Daily Mirror (UK), July 10, 2004, http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/allnews/page.cfm?objectid=12419168&method=full&siteid=50143.
2. "A Career in Microbiology Can Be Harmful to Your Health: Death Toll Mounting as Connections to Dyncorp, Hadron, PROMIS Software and Disease Research Emerge," Michael Davidson and Michael C. Ruppert, Feb. 14, 2002, http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/02_14_02_microbio.html.
3. "Eye on Wackenhut: Know the Facts About Wackenhut," http://www.eyeonwackenhut.com.
4. Media coverage of Los Alamos security lapse, July 2004, http://www.4law.co.il/lanl1.htm.
5. "NASA plans to read terrorists' minds at airports" by Frank J. Murray, Washington Times, Aug. 17, 2002, http://www.washtimes.com/national/20020817-704732.htm.
6. Air Travel Privacy FOIA Documents: "NASA Ames Research Center Northwest Airlines Briefing December 10-11, 2001," Electronic Privacy Information Center, http://www.epic.org/privacy/airtravel/foia/foia1.html.
7. Stop Carlyle! website, http://isuisse.ifrance.com/stopcarlyle/enindex.htm.
8. "Our Opinion: NNSA must share blame for Los Alamos mistakes," Oakland Tribune, Aug. 16, 2004, http://ucnuclearfree.org/articles/2004/08/16_oped_nnsa-must-share-blame.htm.
9. "CalPERS, Carlyle profit from Afghan war" by David Lazarus, San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 2, 2001, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2001/12/02/BU172807.DTL.
10. "Carlyle Documentary Video," Dutch documentary on the Carlyle Group, updated 2004 version: rtsp://streams2.omroep.nl/tv/vpro/tegenlicht/bb.20040125.rm (200 MB, 500 kbps), rtsp://streams2.omroep.nl/tv/vpro/tegenlicht/sb.20040125.rm (100 kbps); Dutch documentary on the Carlyle Group, original 2003 version: rtsp://streams2.omroep.nl/tv/vpro/tegenlicht/bb.20030516.rm (180 MB, 500 kbps), rtsp://streams3.omroep.nl/tv/vpro/tegenlicht/sb.20030516.rm (100 kbps).
11. "Los Alamos crackdown imperils U.S., lab physicist warns: Director accused of overreacting" by Keay Davidson, San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 18, 2004, p.A-4, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2004/09/18/MNGMF8R34I1.DTL.
12. Fiat Pax - Let There Be Peace, a Resource on Science, Technology, Militarism and Universities, http://www.fiatpax.net. "Defense Funding at 50 Universities," http://www.fiatpax.net/profiles.html. "The University Web of Corporate Power," http://www.fiatpax.net/dohe/universitynetwork.htm. "UC's retirement fund investments," http://www.fiatpax.net/iilinks2.html.
13. "The Iron Triangle: Inside the Secret World of the Carlyle Group" by Dan Briody, Wiley, 2003.
To read Part 1 of this series, go to http://www.sfbayview.com/091504/ucregents091504.shtml. The rest of this exposé will appear in the Bay View in the coming weeks. Leuren Moret, a geoscientist who worked at the Livermore nuclear weapons lab where she became a whistleblower in 1991, has survived 13 years of retaliation from the Livermore lab and the University of California and has lived firsthand the experiences of Karen Silkwood. A radiation specialist, she works around the world educating citizens, the media and lawmakers about the impact of radiation globally on the health of the public and the environment. She assisted with Al-Jazeera's recent report on depleted uranium weapons which quickly became one of the most read articles produced by the website. "DU: Washington's Secret Nuclear War" can be read at http://www.mindfully.org/Nucs/2004/DU-Secret-Nuclear-War14sep04.htm. She is an independent scientist, an environmental commissioner for the City of Berkeley, and can be reached at leurenmoret@yahoo.com.
Carlyle and Bechtel are watching
Shortly after Part 1 of this story, "UC Regents lose control of nuclear weapons program: Five admirals, Carlyle Group and Rand take over," appeared on the Bay View website, these email messages were sent to writer Leuren Moret and the Bay View by the Carlyle Group and Bechtel Corp. Both were discussed in the story.
From the Carlyle Group
Subject: Message From The Carlyle Group Date: Fri, 17 Sep 2004 16:52:11 -0400 From: "Christopher Ullman" <Christopher.Ullman@carlyle.com> To: leurenmoret@yahoo.com
Dear Leuren,
Greetings. I saw your article in the SF Bay View. Your claim that Carlyle is taking over management responsibility for a nuclear facility in Texas is completely false. How could you print such a thing without first contacting us? Where did you hear of this?
Please call me to discuss.
Chris Ullman
Christopher W. Ullman V.P. for Corporate Communications THE CARLYLE GROUP 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 220 South Washington, DC 20004 Tel: 202.729.5450 Fax: 202.347.5550 Mobile: 202.641.2234 christopher.ullman@carlyle.com http://www.carlyle.com
From Bechtel
From: "Martinez, Debbie" <dymartin@bechtel.com> To: "'leurenmoret@yahoo.com'" <leurenmoret@yahoo.com> Subject: UC Regents lose control of nuclear weapons program. Date: Fri, 17 Sep 2004 09:49:14 -0700
Hi Leuren
Please e-mail parts 2-4 of this article to me I would like to use it in my report. Thank you
--------
"Bunker Busters": Sources of Confusion in the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Debate
September 22, 2004
Congressional Research Service The Library of Congress
Jonathan Medalia Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RL32599.pdf
Summary
The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), often called a "bunker buster," is at present the subject of a cost and feasibility study to determine if either of two nuclear bombs, the B61 and the B83, could be modified, mainly by adding a heavy, pointed case, so as to be able to penetrate perhaps 10 meters into earth or rock. This penetration would increase the weapon's ability, by a factor of 20 to 50, to destroy hardened and deeply buried facilities. The Department of Defense has expressed concern that potential U.S. adversaries are using such facilities because the 1991 and 2003 wars in Iraq demonstrated that U.S. precision conventional weapons can readily destroy facilities that are above the surface or buried at shallow depth. If the study shows RNEP to be feasible and affordable, and if the President and Congress approve, RNEP could move from a study to development and, perhaps, deployment. The RNEP debate has received much attention and spawned much confusion.
This report examines sources of confusion in this debate. Part of the difficulty in analyzing this debate is that the RNEP study raises large and complex issues. Should the United States improve its ability to destroy buried targets, or are there offsetting reasons not to? What would be the targets for RNEP, and by what measures should its military effectiveness be judged? How reliable are estimates of collateral damage resulting from RNEP?
"Urban myths" have grown up around RNEP. Some commentators seem to combine several true statements into an erroneous one. Congress lifted the ban on R&D on sub-5-kiloton nuclear weapons at the Administration's request, and nuclear earth penetrators could destroy some hardened and deeply buried targets. But it is incorrect to assume that sub-5-kiloton bunker busters could destroy such targets; they could not because they have insufficient explosive force. Similarly, a kernel of truth may become transmuted through a misunderstanding of science or policy, or through a logical but unwarranted inference, into one not supported by the facts.
The debate involves some claims that are irrefutable - because they cannot be proven one way or the other. For example, supporters claim RNEP is just a study, while critics fear that it will lead to development, deployment, and perhaps testing and use. If the study finds RNEP feasible and affordable, the Administration might press to deploy the weapon. On the other hand, the study could raise doubts about RNEP, and there are reasons to question whether Congress would approve it.
Terminology adds to confusion. Protagonists debate whether RNEP will lower the nuclear threshold and make nuclear use more likely. The threshold may be seen as criteria that must be met for the President to order nuclear weapon use. RNEP would arguably not lower this threshold because it would not change these criteria. It could make nuclear use less likely if it deters actions that meet this threshold; if it does not, it could make such use more likely because RNEP, like other nuclear weapons, would expand the circumstances in which these weapons might be used. This report will not be updated.
Contents
Complicated Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Facts, Myths, and Morphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Irrefutable Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Simply Study vs. "Slippery Slope" . . . . . . . . . . 7
Security Through Deterrence or Nonproliferation? . . 8
Confusing Terminology and Competing Story Lines . . . 9
Threshold vs. Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Pointillism vs. Connect-the-Dots . . . . . . . . . . 9
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
"Bunker Busters": Sources of Confusion in the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Debate 1
The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, or RNEP, often called a "bunker buster," has received much attention in Congress and elsewhere this year. It has also spawned much confusion. This report discusses five sources of confusion in this debate: complex issues; facts that morph into myths; irrefutable claims; unclear terminology; and competing story lines. By way of background, RNEP is at present the subject of a study to determine if one of two existing nuclear bombs could be modified - mainly by using a heavy, pointed, hardened case - so as to penetrate several meters underground to increase by a factor of 20 to 50 its ability to destroy buried targets.2 RNEP has attracted attention for several reasons. Critics assert that it is the first new weapon to implement the Administration's nuclear policies, and that a related program, the Advanced Concepts Initiative (ACI), is developing a low-yield "mininuke," the second such weapon. (ACI is a program to conduct early-stage weaponsrelated research; its FY2005 request is $9 million.) They express concern that RNEP's budget will grow sharply. Politically, each side of the debate gets to stress themes that resonate with its base, portraying itself as the defender of American security and common sense and the other side in less glowing terms. Issues at stake include how to maintain national security and the role of nuclear weapons in that effort. Do we still need nuclear weapons, and if so, what types, how many, and for what missions?
RNEP is one of a potential class of earth penetrator weapons (EPWs). Some such weapons could have different yields than RNEP, or different penetration capabilities, or other differences. Congress has expressed interest in EPWs generally as well as RNEP specifically, such as by calling for the National Academy of Sciences to study EPWs and other weapons.3 Accordingly, this report considers EPWs as well as RNEP.
Complicated Issues
Confusion on technical and military topics clouds debate on these larger issues. One source of confusion is simply that issues linked to RNEP are complicated. Here are some examples.
1. Should the United States improve its ability to destroy buried targets? According to a report by the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Energy (DOE), "The Intelligence Community (IC) suspects with reasonable certainty that there are over 10,000 potential HDBTs [hard and deeply buried targets] worldwide and their numbers will increase over the next 10 years."4 RNEP's proponents claim that we must be able to hold these targets at risk in order to deter or, if necessary, defeat an enemy. We may be self-deterred from using Cold War weapons, the argument goes: because their yield is so high, they would kill an unacceptable number of civilians.5 An earth penetrator of a given yield would have the same effect on a buried target as a weapon with a much higher yield detonated on the Earth's surface. As a result, earth penetration greatly reduces the yield needed to destroy a buried target or, with higher yield, could destroy buried facilities that we could not reach even with our highestyield weapons. Critics respond that we could use nonnuclear weapons and forces to destroy or disable buried targets.6 Target nations could thwart earth penetrators by digging deeper, dispersing WMD stockpiles, or moving leaders to undisclosed locations. Some critics doubt that we would use nuclear weapons at all, while others fear that reduced-collateral-damage weapons would make it more likely that we would use nuclear weapons; critics use both arguments against RNEP. Regarding self-deterrence, candidate RNEP weapons are the B61 and B83 bombs, weapons of substantial yield, so self-deterrence may still apply. Critics state that development of RNEP would undermine the U.S. position that other nations should not acquire nuclear weapons.7
2. What are the targets of an EPW? Some call these weapons "bunker busters," but that shorthand term might convey the notion of a World War IIstyle bunker. Is the target a single chamber buried just below the Earth's surface, or an extensive tunnel complex inside a mountain, or something else? Are many of these facilities likely to be vulnerable to an EPW?
3. How would an EPW affect buried targets? The effects of a nuclear weapon detonated in the air are easy to visualize; everyone has seen the pictures. Ground shock is harder to visualize, and that may contribute to confusion over EPWs. In trying to understand the effects and effectiveness of EPWs, it would help to know the shape of the underground volume within which an EPW of specified yield can destroy a buried target of specified characteristics; how ground shock attenuates with distance or in different media; and how an increase in yield translates into an increase in ability to destroy HDBTs. Regarding earth penetration, it would help to know if any foreseeable technical advances would enable substantially deeper penetration than is possible at present, and consequences of deeper penetration for military effectiveness and collateral damage.
4. What is military effectiveness for an EPW? In an attack on an HDBT, must the target be destroyed, or is it sufficient to disable it, and if the latter for how long? In an attack on a facility housing chemical or biological agents, is it enough to collapse the facility, or must the weapon physically destroy these agents? Is it sufficient to destroy 75 percent of the bioagent in a facility? 95 percent?
5. What requirements must be met to achieve military effectiveness? For the weapon, these include yield, accuracy, depth of penetration, and speed and angle of impact. For the target facility, they are more complicated. How might likely variations in the geology above the facility affect how the shock wave would propagate? How deeply is the facility buried? How extensive is it? How is it laid out? Where in the facility are the key assets that must be destroyed? Might they be dispersed throughout the facility? Does it have features to increase its hardness, such as heavy springs or blast doors? Are there countermeasures, such as granite boulders above the facility or decoy facilities? The decision to use a nuclear weapon would have to be made on the basis of intelligence. Do the intelligence misses at the macro level in Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Libya, and the failure to detect Indian preparations for nuclear tests in 1998, reduce our confidence in intelligence at the micro level? RNEP, a modified bomb, would be delivered by aircraft. If the target nation got wind of the impending attack, it might have time to clear key facilities of their most important assets, such as leaders or WMD, or to launch missiles. Could we be confident of our ability to deny warning to the enemy?
6. How would EPWs affect the ability of U.S. military personnel to carry out battle damage assessment, or BDA? BDA is important to military operations in order to determine whether a target was destroyed, or if it still poses a threat and must be attacked again. Clearly, the Army would not send soldiers into a tunnel complex that had been struck by a nuclear weapon, and would probably be reluctant to send troops into a complex used for production or storage of chemical or biological weapons - whether struck by nuclear or conventional EPW - because of the high risk. However, other methods may be available for BDA. Existing sensors carried by airplanes or implanted in the ground might detect signs of activity coming from a complex. As a related matter, if the United States proceeds with RNEP and decides that it must do BDA of facilities thus attacked, should new BDA sensor technologies be developed in parallel with RNEP development?
7. Perspective can affect judgments on weapon effectiveness. In studies calculating the effectiveness of nuclear weapons to destroy bioagents, physicist Hans Kruger of Livermore and physicist Michael May and mathematician Zachary Haldeman of Stanford used "physicist-friendly" scenarios: they assumed a target - a large area on or near the surface holding many barrels containing anthrax in aqueous solution - that was vulnerable to nuclear attack and that permitted ready calculation of the effects of gamma rays, neutrons, and neutron-induced gammas on the target material.8 The calculation was that these effects were reliably lethal to aqueous anthrax to perhaps 10 to 50 meters for a 10-kiloton (kt) weapon. But Jonathan Tucker, an expert on biological weapons with the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, raised problems with the scenario.9 Aqueous anthrax, he said, would not be stored for a long time because after several months the spores clump together and become much less useful militarily. A nation that could manufacture aqueous anthrax would therefore probably not have huge quantities sitting in a warehouse waiting to be attacked, but might manufacture it close to the time of use. On the other hand, a nation that had the more advanced technology to produce dry powdered anthrax, which could be stored for longer periods, would need far less of the material and could easily disperse it. It is thus important to have experts from several disciplines cross-examine such scenarios.
8. How reliable are estimates of collateral damage? A B61 or B83 bomb - the two weapons being considered for RNEP - detonated a few meters underground, as would be the case for RNEP, would cause a very large amount of fallout. A calculation cited in the debate is that this fallout could kill many thousands of civilians.10 Yet there is the risk of a numbers game. Key uncertainties affect collateral damage estimates, everything from wind and rain to depth of detonation, type of rock or soil, population distribution, ability of the population to move rapidly away from the contaminated area, and how many people live near the target. The number of fatalities for an attack might vary by a large factor, depending on something as simple as which way the wind blows. A related issue is whether a nuclear earth penetrator could be designed that would reduce the radioactivity of the fallout, perhaps by reducing the amount of fissile material used or adding neutron-absorbing material to the heavy case around the nuclear explosive.
9. Would collateral-damage estimates affect a decision to use RNEP? RNEP, if used, could cause massive collateral damage. Yet, some would argue, a President who felt RNEP was the only way to stop an imminent threat to the United States might decide to use that weapon regardless of collateral damage.
Facts, Myths, and Morphs
Uncle Remus said that it's not what you don't know that gets you in trouble - it's what you knows for sure that ain't so. Many "urban myths" have grown up around the EPW issue, leading to misunderstandings, uncertainties, and contradictions. Some of these myths seem to flow from the mixing together of four true statements. (1) The Administration sought, successfully, in the FY2004 budget cycle to have Congress lift the ban on R&D on low-yield (sub-5-kiloton) nuclear weapons. (2) Nuclear earth penetrators could be used to destroy some hardened and deeply buried targets. (3) Some in DOD and DOE have suggested using nuclear weapons to destroy chemical and biological agents. (4) It is desirable to minimize collateral damage and, for attacking HDBTs, a low-yield earth penetrator will produce less fallout than a surface-burst weapon of yield high enough to have equivalent effectiveness.
Combining statements 1 and 4, one could conclude that RNEP would be a lowyield weapon, and that fallout from it will be totally contained underground. This is not the case. John Gordon, then Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), said in 2002 that the emphasis is on "a more standard yield system called an enhanced penetrator ...There's no design work going on low-yield nuclear weapons."11 In June 2004, NNSA Administrator Linton Brooks said, "it became part of the conventional wisdom that there were Administration plans to develop new, low yield weapons. There are no such plans."12 Further, there is no way that fallout from even a low-yield nuclear earth penetrator could be contained. Combining statements 2 and 3, one could arrive at the idea that nuclear earth penetrators could destroy biological weapons housed in HDBT. However, the intervening earth and rock would shield HDBTs from neutrons and gamma rays produced by the detonation that would be lethal to bioagent. Combining statements 1 and 2, one may conclude that sub-5-kt EPWs could destroy HDBTs - but much more yield would be needed. Combining statements 1 through 4, one may arrive at the idea that RNEP is a low-yield weapon that can destroy bioagent in HDBTs with no collateral damage.
Many erroneous statements have entered the debate. Where did they come from? One possible explanation is that a kernel of truth becomes transmuted through a misunderstanding of science or policy, or through a logical but unwarranted inference or extrapolation - a "morph chain." Here are five examples. Each chain ends with an assertion made in the debate, then looks backward to start with a kernel of truth, then posits a logic train leading from the fact to the assertion.
! Penetration matters - > penetration matters, not yield - > the key is to make nonnuclear penetrators burrow deeper into the earth - > nonnuclear bunker busters can be as effective as nuclear weapons in destroying HDBTs. (Flaws: yield matters; there are severe limits on depth of penetration; increasing depth of penetration of a nuclear weapon buys little in terms of target destruction.)
! The Administration sought to lift the ban on sub-5-kiloton R&D - > The Administration sought to lift this ban in order to develop sub- 5-kt weapons - > ACI does some early-stage weapons-related research - > ACI would be the program to develop new weapons - > ACI is developing sub-5-kt mini-nukes. (Flaw: NNSA states that the United States is not conducting R&D on low-yield nuclear weapons.13)
! In the past, new nuclear weapons were tested - > Putting an existing physics package14 in a different case and using it for a new mission creates a new weapon - > RNEP and mini-nukes will require testing - > The Administration wants to reduce the time needed to conduct a test in order to pave the way for testing RNEP and mini-nukes. (Flaws: RNEP is intended not to require testing; modifying the B61-7 bomb into the B61-11, the current U.S. nuclear EPW, did not require testing; no mini-nuke is under development.)
! ACI and RNEP spur technical innovation - > These programs are essential for technical innovation. (Flaw: stockpile stewardship, an NNSA program to maintain U.S. nuclear weapons without testing, is a $6.6-billion program (FY2005 request); technical innovation would continue even in the absence of two programs totaling $36.6 million.)
! Nuclear weapons could destroy chemical and biological agents - > These agents might be hidden in HDBTs - > Earth penetrators could destroy chemical or biological agents in HDBTs - > Chemical and biological agents in HDBTs are intended targets of RNEP. (Flaws: chemical and biological agents are not targets of RNEP; RNEP could not destroy such agents buried deep underground.)
This last point merits emphasis because it is frequently misunderstood. The official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense responsible for developing (in collaboration with other agencies) the HDBT-defeat mission area, which includes RNEP as an option, stated that the goals for RNEP's effects have always been to defeat functions and operations protected by hard and deeply buried complexes.15 The specific neutralization of any WMD agent - chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear - has never been a part of these objectives because, under some attack scenarios, it could not be expected to be fully accomplished. The RNEP concept has been intended solely to be among options to defeat HDBTs and their operations, not to destroy WMD agents they may contain.
Collapsing a buried facility likely would prevent enemy operators from using any WMD in that facility but might not destroy WMD agents themselves. The difference could be consequential. For example, under certain circumstances WMD might escape, such as chemical or biological agent seeping to the surface through fissures created in the ground by the weapon's explosion. As another example, if a large underground complex were targeted but the attack did not collapse a specific chamber containing WMD (perhaps because it was buried deeper than expected or hardened more than expected, or because attack planners chose an incorrect aim point), operators in other parts of the complex might be able to access the chamber and retrieve the WMD. Accordingly, attack planners, when targeting a facility, must address intelligence uncertainties about details of the facility that could result in an attack that was less than fully successful.
Irrefutable Claims
A couple of irrefutable claims are made in the debate on RNEP. They are irrefutable because they can't be proven one way or another.
Simply Study vs. "Slippery Slope". In 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld said that RNEP "is a study. It is nothing more and nothing less."16 Congress included a provision in the FY2004 defense authorization act (P.L. 108-136, sec. 3117) barring DOE from starting engineering development, or subsequent development phases, of RNEP "unless specifically authorized by Congress." Secretary Abraham has said about RNEP, "We are doing the research on that, nothing more, and would require congressional endorsement to move to an engineering level."17 Critics see the RNEP study as leading down a more dangerous path, expressing concern that it will lead to development and deployment of a new generation of nuclear weapons, and perhaps to nuclear testing and nuclear use.18 Critics might ask, why spend $71 million or so on a four-year study if a favorable outcome does not lead to development of the weapon? And why spend perhaps hundreds of millions of dollars developing the weapon without planning to deploy it? Supporters might respond that the study could find that RNEP would be less effective or more costly than anticipated. Potential adversaries might counter RNEP in various ways, as discussed in Complicated Issues, above. Nor is there any assurance that Congress would approve its development. While the House and Senate defeated amendments to the FY2005 defense authorization bill to eliminate RNEP and ACI funds, the vote was close in the House, 214-204, and the same House voted 370-16 to approve the FY2005 energy and water development bill largely as reported by the House Appropriations Committee, with no funds for ACI or RNEP.
Security Through Deterrence or Nonproliferation? Supporters focus on RNEP's role in deterrence, asserting that deterrence must adjust to changing threats. They view HDBTs as an increasing threat; adversaries may use them to shelter leaders, key communications nodes, or WMD facilities. RNEP would enable us to hold at risk these targets, which we cannot now do. Supporters believe that weapons like RNEP must be usable; as Representative Mac Thornberry said, "we do not deter anybody if they know we are not going to use a weapon."19 Supporters believe further that failure to update the deterrent would have serious consequences. As Senator Wayne Allard said, "if the United States does not show that it is serious about ensuring the viability of our entire military capability, including our weapons of last resort, we might not be able to dissuade potential adversaries from developing weapons of mass destruction and deter those adversaries from using those weapons they already have."20
Critics question the deterrent value of RNEP. They argue that it cannot deter terrorists because they have no fixed address, and rogue states could counter an EPW by deeper burial, camouflage, or dispersal. They see RNEP as an ineffective deterrent because, as Representative Thomas Allen stated, "In the real world, no President or operational commander is going to be launching a nuclear device to strike a deep bunker."21 Even continuing to develop RNEP, critics believe, will undercut worldwide cooperation on nonproliferation, weakening our security. Senator Frank Lautenberg asked, "How can we credibly ask North Korea and Iran to stop their own nuclear programs while at the same time we develop mini nukes and bunker busters?"22
An open question is the strength of the link between deterrence and proliferation on the one hand, and RNEP and ACI on the other. Regarding proliferation, most may find it hard to imagine countries "going nuclear" on grounds that the United States is continuing RNEP, which is at present just a cost and feasibility study on modifying an existing warhead into a second EPW. Yet most may find it equally hard to imagine North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, or India giving up its nuclear program because we stop RNEP. Developing a nuclear program takes decades and vast sums of money. India conducted a nuclear test in 1974, and North Korea has been working on its nuclear programs since at least the 1960s. Nations make this investment for reasons of their own security. It is also possible that the U.S. debate may be imputing to other nations the intense detail of analysis typical of the United States even though other nations may simply not make such calculations.
Confusing Terminology and Competing Story Lines
Threshold vs. Use. Critics claim that RNEP will lower the nuclear threshold and make it more likely that nuclear weapons will be used. Yet it is important to differentiate between threshold and use. The nuclear threshold may be seen as a set of criteria any one or more of which must be met in order for the President to order the use of nuclear weapons. Examples include a nuclear attack on the United States, and perhaps an attack on U.S. allies with nuclear weapons, a biological-agent attack on the United States, or positive intelligence that an attack by terrorists or a rogue state was imminent. The existence of RNEP would not lower the nuclear threshold because the weapon arguably would not change the criteria that would merit a nuclear response. But RNEP could affect the likelihood that nuclear weapons would be used. If RNEP turned out to be a deterrent, as its supporters suggest, then it would reduce the likelihood of nuclear use. The same nuclear threshold criteria would exist, but fewer events would meet these criteria because those events would have been deterred. On the other hand, if RNEP turns out not to have a deterrent effect, then nuclear use would be more likely. RNEP could arguably be used in more circumstances than existing nuclear weapons. If RNEP did not add capabilities beyond those of the current U.S. nuclear arsenal, thus expanding the envelope of circumstances in which nuclear weapons could be used, what would be the point of building it?
Pointillism vs. Connect-the-Dots. Pointillism was a style of painting in which the artist used dots or points of differing colors to form an image. The Administration has presented decisions on low-yield R&D, ACI, RNEP, and nuclear test readiness as four separate dots. As Administrator Brooks put it in regard to the low-yield ban, ACI, RNEP, and the possibility of U.S. preemptive attacks to head off WMD attacks, "some concluded these separate things were part of an overall strategy; that we were emphasizing 'nuclear preemption' in U.S. military doctrine. I assume you all understand this is nonsense."23 Instead, the Administration and other RNEP supporters used the following arguments. (1) The low-yield ban barred R&D that could lead to production of a sub-5-kiloton nuclear weapon. Because this wording could be read as covering R&D on weapons even above 5 kilotons, it had a "chilling effect on scientific inquiry."24 (2) NNSA intends to use ACI funds "to investigate new ideas, not necessarily new weapons."25 It will also be "very helpful in training the new [weapons] designers.26 (3) Regarding RNEP, "the current inventory [of nuclear weapons] inventory only has a limited capability for holding hardened underground facilities at risk. The country's only nuclear earth penetrating weapon, the B61, Mod 11, cannot survive delivery into certain types of terrain in which such facilities may be located."27 (4) Our current nuclear test readiness posture is unacceptable. As Secretary Abraham said, "if some day in the future it were determined that we had uncertainty, it would take us a minimum of 3 years to conduct a test to determine whether or not the stockpile was reliable. That is too long."28
In contrast, these elements seem to have fused, among critics, into the following proposition: The Administration sought to lift the low-yield ban in order to develop low-yield battlefield weapons - "mini-nukes" - through ACI. The Administration is developing RNEP to destroy chemical and biological weapons in hard and deeply buried targets. Because RNEP and the mini-nukes are new weapons, they will require underground nuclear tests. These tests will release radioactive fallout that will threaten citizens much as the atmospheric tests of the 1950s and early 1960s did. These weapons will make nuclear use more likely by lowering the nuclear threshold. Each element of the above proposition could be questioned. Nonetheless, it is a more compelling story line to say the dots are connected than to say they are not, and, as the preceding statements show, the Administration has not connected the dots to form its own story. Unlike pointillism, separate dots do not form an image; connected dots do. As a result, one could argue that the critics' story line appears more credible. The critics' story line also links to the deepest public fears in the nuclear arena - nuclear-weapon use and radioactive fallout. It gains added traction because public trust on things nuclear was shattered by the government, decades ago, downplaying concerns over fallout. The bitter residue from that breach of trust persists to this day. In part because of constituent concerns, Senator Robert Bennett of Utah had planned to offer an amendment to the FY2005 defense authorization bill to require specific congressional authorization for a full-scale underground nuclear test of RNEP,29 and Representative Jim Matheson of Utah introduced a bill, H.R. 3921, to protect public health and safety should U.S. nuclear testing resume. This issue has particular resonance among residents downwind from the Nevada Test Site, the only U.S. nuclear test site. Representative Matheson himself has stated, in introducing his bill, that his father died "from a type of cancer associated with exposure to radioactive fallout."30
Some argue that not only has the Administration not connected the dots, but also that it seems to have some uncertainty as to what the dots are. Congressional staff have provided examples of disconnects between DOD and DOE, and within DOD, about earth penetrators in general, and RNEP in particular. They have indicated that some in DOD think of RNEP as low yield, while others think of it as high yield. On at least one occasion, a DOD official told staffers that RNEP would be low yield so as to contain fallout, while there is no evidence that DOE has ever claimed that any feasible EPW would be able to contain fallout. Congressional staff stated that some in DOD and DOE told them that the ability to destroy biological agents is a rationale for RNEP, while the DOD official associated with the RNEP program, cited earlier, stated that the goal of RNEP is to destroy HDBTs.
Conclusion
Decisions on nuclear weapons made by Congress and the Administration have always been consequential because they affect international perceptions of the United States, deterrence, the ability to respond to threats, and thus the security of the nation.
While it is the case that the Administration requested FY2005 RNEP funds only for a study, RNEP is closely watched, and serious issues are at stake. The many misperceptions embedded in the debate, however, may impair our ability to make informed policy on this issue. Strengthening the factual and analytic foundation on which policy rests can only result in a stronger structure.
1 This report is modified from a presentation by the author to a National Academy of Sciences symposium, "Post-Cold War U.S. Nuclear Strategy: A Search for Technical and Policy Common Ground," Washington, DC, August 11, 2004.
2 For history and technical aspects of RNEP, see CRS Report RL32130, Nuclear Weapon Initiatives: Low-Yield R&D, Advanced Concepts, Earth Penetrators, Test Readiness. For current budget and plan, see CRS Report RL32347, Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Budget Request and Plan, FY2005-FY2009 . The National Nuclear Security Administration provided CRS with the estimate of a 20- to 50-fold increase in effectiveness on August 5, 2004. An article by four nuclear weapons scientists from Los Alamos National Laboratory states that "a 1 kt [kiloton] nuclear explosive detonated 7 or more meters below the surface will achieve the same ability to destroy a buried facility as a 50 kt warhead detonated at the surface." Brian Fearey, Paul White, John St. Ledger, and John Immele, "An Analysis of Reduced Collateral Damage Nuclear Weapons," Comparative Strategy, October/November 2003, p. 315.
3 P.L. 107-314, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (H.R. 4546, 16 Stat. 2458), Section 1033.
4 U.S. Departments of Defense and Energy. Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets, Submitted by the Secretary of Defense in Conjunction with the Secretary of Energy in Response to Section 1044 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, PL 106-398, July 2001, p. 8.
5 U.S. Secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy. An Assessment of the Impact of Repeal of the Prohibition on Low Yield Warhead Development on the Ability of the United States to Achieve Its Nonproliferation Objectives, Report Submitted to Congress in Response to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Public Law No. 108-136, Section 3116, March 2004, p. 2.
6 Regarding the use of fuel-air explosives or chemicals to kill biological agents, see "Written Statement of Michael A. Levi, Science and Technology Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution, before The National Academy of Sciences Study on the Effects of Nuclear Earth-Penetrator Weapon and Other Weapons," April 27, 2004, p. 8-11.
7 See, for example, colloquy by Senator Dianne Feinstein on Senate Amendment 3263 to the FY2005 National Defense Authorization Bill, S. 2400, in U.S. Congress. Congressional Record, June 3, 2004: S6427.
8 See H. Kruger, Radiation-Neutralization of Stored Biological Warfare Agents with Low- Yield Nuclear Warheads, UCRL-ID-140193, August 21, 2000, p. 1-4, [http://www.llnl.gov/ tid/lof/documents/pdf/238391.pdf]; and Michael May and Zachary Haldeman, "Effectiveness of Nuclear Weapons against Buried Biological Agents," May 2003, p.13-15, [http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/mam09/mam09.pdf].
9 Personal communication, September 30, October 1, and October 4, 2003.
10 "A one kiloton earth-penetrating 'mininuke' used in a typical third-world urban environment would spread a lethal dose of radioactive fallout over several square kilometers, resulting in tens of thousands of civilian fatalities." Robert Nelson, "Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons," Science and Global Security, 10: 2002, p. 1.
11 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Hearing: Nuclear Posture Review. February 14, 2002, n.p. Transcript prepared by eMediaMillWorks, Inc.
12 Linton F. Brooks, Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, "U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policies and Programs," address presented to the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, Washington, D.C., June 21, 2004, p. 8.
13 David Ruppe, "U.S. Has No Plans to Research Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons, Brooks Says," Global Security Newswire, May 12, 2004.
14 The "physics package" is the explosive component of a nuclear weapon, as distinct from its aerodynamic case, arming and firing systems, and the like.
15 Personal communication, September 1, 2004.
16 U.S. Department of Defense, "DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers," May 20, 2003. At [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030520 -secdef0207.html].
17 Testimony of Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham, in U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. "FY2005 Department of Energy Defense-Related Activities Budget Request," hearing held March 23, 2004, transcript by FDCH e-Media, Inc., p. 16.
18 Colloquy of Senator Edward Kennedy on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, in U.S. Congress. Congressional Record, June 15, 2004: S6751-S6752.
19 Colloquy of Representative Mac Thornberry on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, in U.S. Congress. Congressional Record, May 20, 2004: H3416.
20 Colloquy of Senator Wayne Allard on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, in U.S. Congress. Congressional Record, June 15, 2004: S6753.
21 Colloquy of Representative Thomas Allen on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, in U.S. Congress. Congressional Record, May 20, 2004: H3417.
22 Colloquy of Senator Frank Lautenberg on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, in U.S. Congress. Congressional Record, June 15, 2004: S6757.
23 Linton Brooks, "U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policies and Programs," p. 8.
24 Ibid.
25 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development. Energy and Water Development Appropriations for 2005. Hearings, 108th Congress, 2nd Session, 2004; testimony of Linton Brooks, p. 141.
26 Linton Brooks, response to a question submitted by Representative Peter Visclosky for the record, in ibid., p. 291.
27 Bryan Fearey et al., "An Analysis of Reduced Collateral Damage Nuclear Weapons," p. 312.
28 Spencer Abraham, Secretary, U.S. Department of Energy, statement before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, March 11, 2004.
29 The text of Senate Amendment 3403 to S. 2400 is in U.S. Congress. Congressional Record, June 7, 2004: S6565. Colloquy concerning Senator Bennett's decision not to offer the amendment is in Congressional Record, June 22, 2004: S7274-S7275.
30 "Cong. Matheson Introduces Safety from Nuclear Weapons Testing Bill," press release, March 9, 2004; available at [http://www.house.gov/matheson/pr040309.html].
-------- us nuc waste
EPA Hopes to Have New Radiation Standard for Waste Site Early Next Year
September 22, 2004
By H. Josef Hebert,
Associated Press
http://www.enn.com/today.html?id=67
WASHINGTON - Trying to overcome a possibly crippling court decision, the Environmental Protection Agency hopes to have a proposal by early next year on new radiation exposure limits at a proposed nuclear waste site in Nevada.
Jeffrey Holmstead, chief of EPA's air and radiation programs, told a panel of scientists this week that a wide range of options is being considered that would not require Congress to intervene in the politically charged issue.
The future of the waste project at Yucca Mountain in the Nevada desert was put into jeopardy when a federal appeals court rejected an EPA radiation exposure standard in July that was tied to 10,000 years into the future, even though some of the waste will be at its most dangerous thousands of years later.
The court said EPA failed to take into account a 1995 National Academy of Sciences recommendation that the standard be set at periods of peak-radiation, although Congress required that the recommendations be followed. Opponents of the project have argued that the design of the waste site as it is now contemplated cannot meet a standard set that far into the future.
Members of the Board of Radioactive Waste Management, a part of the National Academy of Sciences, examined the implications of the court case and possible options for future action. The board frequently offers a forum to examine waste-management issues.
Robert Fri, chairman of the National Academy panel that wrote the 1995 report cited by the court, suggested the EPA satisfy the court's objections only by significantly altering its standard more in line with what his group had recommended.
That would involve going well beyond 10,000 years, but not necessarily so far into the future that risk modeling, or even the proposed Yucca design, might be useless, Fri suggested.
EPA would have to adopt a less conservative approach to determining public risks from exposure, said Fri, a scholar at the environmental think tank Resources for the Future.
Holmstead said the EPA is "at the beginning of the process of determining what options might be" available but would not discuss specific proposals. Going beyond 10,000 years for a radiation standard "is a real challenge," he conceded.
A panel member, Norine Noonan, dean of the School of Science and Mathematics at the College of Charleston in South Carolina, asked whether EPA might assume a standard based on risk that was envisioned in the 1995 National Academy study. Holmstead said it was an option on the table with others.
After the session, Holmstead told reporters that the agency is working as quickly as it can to develop a standard to meet the court's misgivings, and it would be possible to have a standard ready by early next year.
Congress also could intervene by passing legislation to free the EPA from having to take into consideration the 1995 National Academy recommendations.
Sam Fowler, the senior Democratic staff member on the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, told the scientists such a move could appear to the public as Congress "trying to dumb down the standard" for political reasons. Strong opposition to the Yucca project by Nevada's senators, a Democrat and a Republican, also would make it difficult to pass such legislation.
Whether the impasse over an acceptable radiation standard eventually could scuttle the Yucca Mountain project remains to be seen. Nevertheless, supporters acknowledge it casts serious doubt on the Energy Department's plan to open the waste site by 2010.
Trying to establish public risks tens of thousands of years into the future is a staggering undertaking, scientists acknowledged at Monday's meeting.
More than 45,000 tons of used reactor fuel already are in temporary storage at commercial power plants and defense facilities in 34 states awaiting shipment to a central repository.
"What do you do if the very best solution you can think of doesn't meet the (radiation) standard?" environmental scholar Fri asked. "The stuff is not going to go away."
-------- MILITARY
-------- iran
Iran's legislators try to limit women's rights
NYT Nazila Fathi
September 22, 2004
http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?file=540024.html
TEHRAN The hard-liners who won Iran's parliamentary elections in February have focused on women's rights in their efforts to reverse some of the liberalization carried out under the moderate president, Mohammad Khatami.
After the legislative session began in June, the 290-member Parliament, including all 12 of the women, abruptly rejected proposals to expand the inheritance right of Iranian women and to adopt the United Nations convention that bans discrimination against women. They also backed away from previous efforts to make "gender equality" a goal of the country's next four-year development plan.
Instead, the new Parliament has called for placing more restrictions on women's attire and social freedoms.
Since the 1979 Islamic revolution, women have been forced to cover their heads and wear long, loose coats in public. But many have defied the restrictions since Khatami's election in 1997 and started wearing tighter and more colorful coats and showing more hair.
In recent months, though, newspapers have reported that scores of women have been arrested in Tehran and around the country because they were wearing what the authorities considered to be un-Islamic dress.
Members of Parliament have called for segregating men and women at universities and for other limits on women's activities. Hard-liners have held protests to call for a crackdown on freedoms for women and have contended that women ridicule religious sanctities by violating the dress code.
The previous Parliament, dominated by moderates, embraced more legal rights for women and - despite opposition by hard-liners - expanded women's rights to divorce and child custody.
Eshrat Shaegh, a conservative woman who has a seminary education and is one of the women elected to Parliament in the sweep by hard-liners, wrote a letter to Khatami in July that called for an end to the mixing of unmarried young men and women in public places.
"How do you intend to resolve problems by allowing half-nude women to mingle and party with men who dress like women?" she asked in her letter, referring to women who in the hard-liners' view show too much hair and men who wear colorful clothes. "It is very obvious that the new Parliament would like to impose a strict model of covering for women, but they will not succeed," said Ahmad Zeidabadi, a political scientist and journalist in Tehran. "The more they put pressure, the more they get a reaction, because people simply do not think such restrictions can solve their more basic needs."
Imposing restrictions on women's dress has been a barometer - showing how far the authorities are willing to go to allow social freedom and give more rights to women.
Nearly two-thirds of Iran's population is under 30, and more than 60 percent of university students are women. Women have become more vocal, and they demand equal rights. They want jobs and more legal rights within the family structure.
"The general trend in this country is moving toward reforms," said Haleh Anvari, a political analyst in Tehran. "These restrictions are like putting a little stone in front of a huge storm that is going for reform."
Women who have been pressing for expanded rights were infuriated when in August a 16-year-old girl was hanged for adultery in the northern city of Neka while the man with whom she was accused of having a sexual relationship received 100 lashes. Amnesty International said the young woman was not thought to be mentally competent.
Women also reacted when Fatimeh Aliya, a hard-line member of Parliament, suggested that polygamy was a way to improve the lot of poor women. Iranian law allows men to marry up to four permanent wives and an unlimited number of temporary wives. But polygamy is despised by most Iranians, and those who engage in polygamy usually practice it secretly.
Most of the female hard-liners in Parliament are members of a women's group called the Zeinab Society. Aliya said the group received its financing from Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the feminist magazine Zanan reported.
Unlike women in the previous Parliament, who became known for their outspokenness, the new hard-line members have sought to keep a low profile. They have not accepted positions on the presiding board, and they drew a curtain around themselves in Parliament's dining area so that they would not be seen by their male colleagues.
"Giving women noneconomic and nonpolitical positions in parliamentary committees illustrates the ideal society the conservatives favor," Zanan wrote in an editorial last month. "They prefer that women remain in these sections."
-------- iraq
U.S. Now Taking Supporting Role in Iraq, Officials Say
Concern Surrounds Whether Power Shift Is Too Late
By Robin Wright and Rajiv Chandrasekaran
Washington Post Staff Writers
Wednesday, September 22, 2004; Page A01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A39916-2004Sep21.html
Three months after the handover of power, the interim government of Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi is making most key decisions politically and militarily, while the new U.S. Embassy is increasingly deferring and acting in a supporting role, according to Iraqi and U.S. officials.
U.S. diplomats and military experts say the United States is now doing what it should have done a year ago: ceding authority to Iraqis; focusing on smaller, labor-intensive reconstruction projects to generate jobs rather than big ventures by U.S. companies; and assuming a low profile.
Allawi's interim government, meanwhile, is consolidating control over Iraqi ministries once tightly managed under former U.S. administrator L. Paul Bremer, officials say. Iraqis, for example, are allocating the nation's oil income, overseeing the struggle to restore basic government services and guiding distribution of U.S. aid.
The U.S. military is conducting fewer patrols and raids and turning over more day-to-day operations to newly trained Iraqi forces, even as the security situation deteriorates. Insurgents said yesterday they had executed a second American hostage in as many days.
"The changes, they're fundamental. Ambassador Bremer had a veto. . . . Now you have sovereign government," Finance Minister Adel Abdel-Mehdi said. "Of course, it's a weak sovereign government. But even so, the relationship has changed. There's a clear shift. Now the government is taking the initiative."
Yet, as Allawi arrives tonight in Washington for talks at the White House and Congress, Iraqi and U.S. officials express increasing concern on two counts. They are nervous about whether the recent shift is too late. "We've dug a pretty deep hole," said a Marine colonel who served in Iraq. They also are worried about whether Allawi, who was appointed by U.N. and U.S. envoys, has sufficient legitimacy among Iraqis to pull off this second phase of the transition.
"Obviously, Iraqis do not embrace this government as authentic or representative of them. From the beginning, they have tolerated it as something better than the occupation and as a bridge to an elected, more legitimate government," said Larry Diamond of Stanford University, an expert on democracy who served in the U.S.-led occupation. "Allawi may be an able man or the best politician around, but the fact that he was America's man seriously diminishes his legitimacy."
Some critics also charge that the U.S. Embassy has not relinquished control on sensitive issues involving U.S. interests, such as Iraq's amnesty offer to end the insurgency -- even to Iraqis who killed Americans. The plan was scrapped. Others suggest Washington has ceded to Allawi because he is a puppet doing its bidding. The talking points by President Bush and Allawi at the United Nations yesterday echoed each other.
The new assertiveness of the Iraqi government was prominent, U.S. officials say, when rebel cleric Moqtada Sadr's militia seized the sacred Shiite shrine in Najaf last month, a move comparable to taking over the Vatican. At crisis talks in Najaf, Allawi and the local governor mapped out a strategy. The top U.S. military official in Iraq, Gen. George W. Casey Jr., and senior U.S. diplomat Robert Ford were not invited to the table and instead sat along the wall, silent. Only afterward did the governor notice Ford and acknowledge him.
It was a far cry, Iraqi and U.S. officials say, from the 14-month occupation, when Bremer ruled with singular power and Iraqis served as advisers, at best.
"When it comes to calling the plays on the field, especially on sensitive military operations, there's only one quarterback, and his name is Allawi," U.S. Ambassador John D. Negroponte said in an interview yesterday. "Obviously, they need a lot of help, but we're working on reducing that reliance and building up their capacity. . . . In the meanwhile, there's no question who's taken the lead in terms of political leadership or with respect to military operations."
U.S. troops are still the main security force, but they are now effectively accountable to Iraqis, U.S. officials say. Casey and U.S. diplomats attend the national security meetings as "invited guests," Negroponte said in an earlier interview. And the top U.S. diplomat in Iraq attends the meetings only "occasionally," he added.
Retired Marine Lt. Col. Frank Hoffman, who recently reviewed Marine operations in western Iraq, said: "It's a real change," and unlikely to revert back.
In Samarra, a hotspot in the Sunni Triangle, the U.S. military has held back to allow Allawi to make overtures to tribal sheiks and resistance leaders. U.S. troops went in to check on police stations and help reseat the city council, missions conducted with the interim government's approval.
U.S. advisers at Iraq's ministries have also decreased -- and they now act as consultants, rather than running the ministries under the guise of advisory roles, as during the occupation, State Department officials say. The interim government now determines how to spend as much as $70 million a day generated by oil, assuming a role of Bremer's office. Adm. David Nash coordinates the revised reconstruction agenda with Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih so more money is channeled faster into creating jobs.
The interim government still has a long way to go to gain full control, Iraqi and U.S. officials say.
Allawi's credibility is also still on the line, despite an early August poll indicating varying degrees of support from more than 60 percent of Iraqis. Some Iraqis are already expressing frustration with his leadership.
"Allawi is a good and strong figure. . . . [But] I think he failed in maintaining security and that led people to lose their trust in him," said Suhail Jasim, 35, who owns a supermarket in Baghdad.
With the first democratic elections four months away, timing is critical while political and military obstacles are mounting.
"The Iraqi government has taken a lot of positive steps -- and if only we had done this 18 months ago. But the problems are so big and we've allowed them to fester for 18 months, while Iraqi expectations have continued to rise," said Kenneth M. Pollack, a former National Security Council official now at the Brookings Institution's Saban Center for Middle East Policy. "There are now real questions about whether there are enough resources to make a difference in the time frame Iraqis are expecting."
Chandrasekaran reported from Baghdad. Staff writer Thomas E. Ricks contributed to this report.
--------
Group Says It Has Killed Another American Hostage
British Colleague Will Be Next, Web Site Statement Warns
By Steve Fainaru
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, September 22, 2004; Page A21
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A38276-2004Sep21.html
BAGHDAD, Sept. 22 -- A group led by a Jordanian militant, Abu Musab Zarqawi, said Tuesday that it had executed a second American hostage in two days and threatened to kill a British man who was abducted with the Americans last week.
A statement posted on an Islamic Web site by the group Monotheism and Jihad asserted that it had killed Jack Hensley, 48, a civil engineer from Marietta, Ga., and would soon post a video of the slaying on the site. The claim could not be independently verified, however, and the video had not been posted as of 3:30 a.m. local time Wednesday.
On Monday, the same group posted a video of what it said was the beheading of Eugene "Jack" Armstrong, 52, a Michigan native. The video appeared on the Internet about one hour after a statement announcing Armstrong's slaying.
The group said Tuesday that it intended to kill Kenneth Bigley, 62, a British engineer, unless authorities released all Muslim women from two U.S.-run prisons in Iraq, but it set no deadline.
Hensley's killing would be the fifth in the past 48 hours involving a hostage in Iraq, where insurgents in recent months have not only abducted scores of foreigners and Iraqis but staged frequent attacks with bombs, mortars and firearms.
An estimated 300 people have been killed and hundreds injured here during the past two weeks, as a deteriorating security situation has hampered reconstruction efforts and threatened to derail the process of establishing democratic rule in Iraq, starting with nationwide elections planned before the end of January.
Two U.S. Marines were killed Tuesday in separate attacks in the western province of Anbar, and four soldiers were injured when a car bomb exploded near a convoy on the perilous road to Baghdad International Airport, the U.S. military reported.
The abductions carried out by Zarqawi's organization have been particularly confounding because of the elusive and perhaps unattainable demands of the kidnappers. After seizing Armstrong, Hensley and Bigley on Thursday, the group said they would be killed unless all Muslim women were released from two prisons run by the U.S. military: Abu Ghraib outside Baghdad and Camp Bucca in southern Iraq. The U.S. military says only two women are being held by U.S.-led forces and neither is confined at those prisons.
"The Lions of Monotheism and Jihad have slaughtered the second American hostage after the deadline lapsed," the statement on the Web site said. It added, "The British hostage will meet the same fate if the British government does not do what must be done to release him."
Zarqawi has been described by U.S. officials as an associate of al Qaeda and is perhaps the most wanted man in Iraq. U.S. forces have set a $25 million reward for information leading to his capture and staged repeated airstrikes on the city of Fallujah, where the U.S. military suspects that Zarqawi has his base of operations.
The video of Armstrong's killing identified Zarqawi as the hooded assailant who is shown reading a statement and then severing the contractor's head with a large knife. Last April, Zarqawi asserted responsibility for the beheading of another American contractor, Nicholas Berg, whose slaying was also depicted in an Internet video.
Hensley, who would turn 49 on Wednesday, earned a degree in mathematics from the University of North Carolina at Charlotte, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution reported Tuesday. He worked as a substitute teacher from October 2002 to May 2003, a spokesman for the Cobb County, Ga., school system told the paper.
Hensley's younger brother, Ty Hensley, told the Journal-Constitution that Hensley had gone to Iraq to earn extra money for his family. "He took the job primarily to get his family above water," Ty Hensley said. "When he went over there, no one had been decapitated."
Many American contractors have been drawn to Iraq by opportunities to make at least twice as much as they can in the United States -- and often more -- tax free. Private firms pay up to $12,000 a month for jobs in construction, civil engineering and maintenance.
Hensley, Armstrong and Bigley all worked as civil engineers for Gulf Supplies and Commercial Services Co., a construction company based in the United Arab Emirates. They were helping to renovate the Taji military base north of Baghdad, which is used by the reconstituted Iraqi army.
The three men shared a two-story house in the affluent Mansour neighborhood of south-central Baghdad. Neighbors said as many as 10 gunmen pulled up to the house on Thursday in a minivan, barged in and abducted the men without firing a shot. Two security guards who normally protected the house were not there, the neighbors said.
Relatives of Hensley and Bigley had gone on television in the United States and Britain to plead for the men's lives in the hours before Hensley was reported to have been killed. Hensley's wife, Pati, told CNN: "I understand their political agenda, but what I need them to understand is the man who I have been with for 23 years, who is the father of our 13-year-old daughter, who does not understand this situation, why someone would want to hurt her father. I would plead with them to please realize this man does not deserve this fate."
In London, the family of Bigley appealed to Prime Minister Tony Blair to meet the group's demands.
"I ask Tony Blair personally to consider the amount of bloodshed already suffered," Craig Bigley, 33, said in a videotaped statement. "Please meet the demands and release my father -- two women for two men. . . . Only you can save him now. You have children, and you will understand how I feel at this time."
Philip Bigley, the hostage's brother, said: "We are begging you not to kill them. We are begging you to find a solution, a compromise, that will help to save two lives, innocent lives."
Blair condemned the kidnappings at a news conference but gave no indication he would give in. "Our response has got to be to stand firm," he said.
--------
Koizumi vows to keep troops in Iraq
AFP
Peter Alford
September 22, 2004
JAPAN is preparing to extend its humanitarian troop deployment to Iraq after its current commitment expires on December 14.
The undertaking -- which Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi offered to Iraq's interim prime minister Iyad Allawi on Monday and was to confirm to US President George W. Bush last night -- is a much-needed morale booster for the beleaguered coalition effort.
Though its Self-Defence Forces troops are restricted to non-military activities, renewal of Japan's commitment follows the early withdrawal of Spanish and Philippine troops and the return home of a succession of other small national contingents as their commitments finished in the increasingly dangerous theatre.
Mr Koizumi, who has already expended considerable political capital at home with his support of the American-led coalition, now runs the risk that his renewed support will attract retribution from Iraqi resistance fighters and Islamic terror groups.
Dutch troops, who have been providing security for the non-combatant Japanese contingent in the southern city of Samawa, have come under mortar fire several times in recent months and their Government has decided to withdraw them next March.
Mr Koizumi controversially dispatched 800 Japanese soldiers in January to undertake civil reconstruction work under UN authorisation. About 600 of them remain in Samawa now.
Japan's "war-renouncing" constitution forbids Japanese troops from engaging directly in armed peacekeeping but Mr Koizumi's Government passed a special law in 2003 authorising the deployment.
The law, which remains in force for four years, allows him to extend the deployment.
Ahead of last night's meeting between Mr Koizumi and Mr Bush, Japanese officials were coy about the specific nature of the renewed commitment but the authoritative Nihon Keizai newspaper reported yesterday that cabinet had resolved before the Prime Minister left for New York that the SDF would stay in Iraq for "a year or so".
Government spokesman Hiroyuki Hosada told reporters in Tokyo that a final decision would be made only after the Government completed an assessment of its total assistance to Iraq and the security situation.
"If conditions remain as they are now, we are now thinking that our continued participation is necessary," Mr Hosada said.
Dr Allawi was also due to arrive in Washington overnight, after vowing in London at the side of British Prime Minister Tony Blair that elections in Iraq would go ahead in January as planned.
The Iraqi Prime Minister could take heart that after the brutal murder on Monday of US contractor Eugene Armstrong, and the expected executions of his colleagues Kenneth Bigley and Jack Hensley, that at least one kidnapping had ended without bloodshed.
Eighteen Iraqi national guardsmen, who had been threatened with death in retaliation for the arrest of a key lieutenant of radical Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, were freed by their captors, a Sadr aide said.
A Turkish company confirmed that 10 of its employees had been taken hostage, but declined to say whether it would end its Iraq operations to save their lives.
A Turkish truck driver was killed and another wounded in the main northern city of Mosul, while in a separate ambush another four Turks -- two journalists and two aid workers -- were injured, police and Turkish diplomats said.
Three Lebanese and their Iraqi driver were also reported missing, among the more than 100 abductions of foreigners since April last year.
-------- israel / palestine
How a Palestinian widow and her trees are a threat to Mofaz
haaretz.com
By Arnon Regular
September 22, 2004
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/480110.html
"I have nothing to say to Mr. Mofaz. Only once in the last 18 months have I visited the grove and that was a week ago. Now all I can do is pray that Allah won't let them cut it down. We are peace loving people and the grove was always the apple of my eye - and there is no justice in the decision to uproot it." Zuheira Morshad is a 72-year-old childless widow, who lives alone in the village of Kafr Jammal, about two kilometers from the Green Line. A High Court of Justice hearing will tomorrow decide what will happen to her grove of 150 trees that, unfortunately for her are on the Palestinian side of the Green Line - and 30 meters from Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz's home in upscale Kochav Yair.
Three weeks ago, an IDF office handed an order signed by Maj. Gen Moshe Kaplinski to a shepherd the officer came across near the grove, instructing him to give the order to the owner of the grove. The order was similar to many handed out every day by the army in the territories. It said the commanding military officer had decided "on the basis of the belief that the matter is necessary for military purposes and in light of the special security conditions now prevailing in the area, to cut down the trees."
The order said the grove owner is entitled to appeal the decision and to get compensation - though as a Palestinian, she is unable to accept compensation because it would mean recognition of the legitimacy of the military decision.
Zuheira Morshad's grove is a 1.5 dunam bloc at the far end of a 12-dunam plot owned by her extended family. She inherited it from her husband, who left her, remarried and passed away in the Gulf several years ago.
The grove is her main source of livelihood and consists of orange, tangerine and guava trees. And unfortunately for her, it is next to the guardhouse built for the guards who protect the defense minister's home, part of the security fence around Kochav Yair.
The grove is located in an area known as Bir Alhuma, which is in enclave between the separation fence, which is about half a kilometer east, and the Green Line, and therefore, the Palestinian access to the enclave is subject to a very strict regime of permits to enter the area, with only residents from the area allowed in.
A small sign on the separation fence details the permits that Palestinian owners of the groves inside the enclave must have to gain access to their property and when they can enter - "From 6:30 A.M to 8 A.M., 12:30 P.M. to 1:30 P.M. , and 5:30 P.M. to 7:00 P.M." An IDF patrol comes by when the gate is supposed to be open, to check the Palestinians, but it often is late or early.
"When they finished building the fence everyone got passes and I got one and I went into to the grove with workers, but as soon as I climbed a tree to pick oranges armed guards came from the guardhouse next to Mofaz's house," said the woman. "One of them aimed a gun at me and sent me and the workers away and we haven't been back since."
Morshad doesn't bother any more to go to the district liaison office in Qalqiliyah to ask for an entry permit and she and her family refrain from going anywhere near their property.
Some of the trees in the plot have gone dry since then and some are green and bearing fruit that nobody can go pick. According to Morshad, the workers refuse to go to the plot and she is also afraid to go.
In the wake of the order, Morshad's lawyer Viyam Shavita contacted the legal advisor of the Judea and Samaria command, notifying them of her intention to appeal against the plan to cut down the grove. Shavita wrote that the destruction of the grove would be profoundly harmful to Morshad, and there is no justification for such serious harm to her property and livelihood.
Her lawyer noted that the area is under IDF supervision and that there had been no untoward incidents in the family plot during the four years of intifada. he proposed that instead of chopping down the trees, the area be fenced off - at the expense of the defense ministry - and the family would guarantee that no strangers would be allowed inside.
After that letter, Lieutenant Harel Weinberg of the legal advisor's office responded with a letter that dropped the term "cut down" and began referring to the need to "prune" the trees. "There is no intention to order uprooting the trees," wrote the lieutenant.
"The military commander decided only to prune the trees that would enable them to grow but while minimizing as much as possible harm to your property ... the trees meant for pruning are right next to Kochav Yair and the defense minister's home and the underbrush could serve as cover for potential attackers and collecting intelligence about the settlement for the purpose of a terror attack ... that threat was actualized in the past when a firebomb was thrown at the settlement from inside the grove."
But the army lawyer forgot to note that the firebomb he mentioned was thrown during the first intifada, more than a decade ago. But the lawyer did claim that "the trees meant for pruning have not borne fruit for a long time and are not being tended to," seemingly deliberately ignoring the fact the woman and her family have been banned from entering their property.
Despite Weinberg's claim that only pruning is planned, the actual order announcing plans to uproot the entire grove remains in effect. In the wake of the Shavita petition to the High Court, the court issued an temporary injunction forbidding any cutting of trees until a final decision is reached.
The IDF Spokesman's Office said last night: "The grove is near Kochav Yair and the defense minister's home in a way that could threaten the houses nearby. The trees could serve as cover for potential terrorists, a threat that took place in the past when a fire bomb was thrown at homes in the settlement from the grove.
"In light of the threats to the defense minister's life, particularly in the last half year in the wake of the assassinations of Ahmed Yassin and Abdel Azziz Rantisis, it was decided to prune a dunam and a half of dried trees.
"The decision to prune will enable the trees to grow back, and was made after examining alternatives in an attempt to minimize the damage to the landowners and to provide proper security for the defense minister's home and its environs.
"The decision was made by virtue of the authority of the commander of military forces in Judea and Samaria, which has often been ratified in the past by the Supreme Court. Despite professional assessors estimates that the trees had not been tended in several years and cannot be rehabilitated, the security authorities are prepared to compensate the landowners."
-----
At least 15 wounded during anti-fence protest
Haaretz
September 22, 2004
By Arnon Regular, Amos Harel and Nir Hasson
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/480040.html
Some 15 Palestinians, a number of police officers and an Israel Defense Forces officer were wounded Wednesday morning in clashes during a protest against the construction of the separation barrier in the West Bank village of Budrus located near Modi'in. Palestinians reported five of the casualties suffered head wounds, including a small boy. The IDF officer and a number of police officers were lightly wounded by Palestinian stone throwers.
The clashes broke out after dozens of Palestinians and Israeli left-wing activists demonstrated against construction of the barrier. The protestors began throwing stones at security forces, who responded with rubber bullets and tear gas.
Troops thwart attack near Erez Israel Defense Forces troops thwarted a terror attack Wednesday morning inside Israel near the northern Gaza Strip, Army Radio reported.
A Palestinian terrorist carrying a bomb attempted to approach the fence surrounding Kibbutz Erez under cover of heavy morning fog.
Soldiers from a combat engineering unit who spotted the Palestinian opened fire and killed him.
Islamic Jihad identified the dead man as one of its members.
In the southern Gaza Strip, Palestinians fired an anti-tank missile at the Rafiah Yam settlement on Wednesday morning. There were no casualties and IDF troops returned fire.
IDF troops opened fire on two armed Palestinians spotted near an army outpost adjacent to the Neveh Dekalim settlement in the Gush Katif area of Gaza. Troops verified the armed men were hit but were unable to determine the extent of their wounds. The wounded militants were evacuated from the scene by other Palestinians.
Palestinians fire mortar at Jewish settlement in northern Gaza Palestinians fired a mortar Wednesday morning at a Jewish settlement in northern Gaza. According to reports, IDF troops fired back There were no casualties or damage reported.
In a seperate incident in the central Gaza Strip, Palestinians fired gunshots at a convoy of civilian vehicles. The IDF force accompanying the convoy shot back at the gunmen. No casualties or damage were reported.
In the West Bank, security forces arrested 15 wanted Palestinian terror suspects overnight in Hebron, including nine from Hamas. Five other wanted men were arrested in other locations around the West Bank.
Palestinian militants opened fire overnight on IDF troops in Jenin a number of times. There were no casualties and no damage caused.
IDF places Ramallah under closure The IDF placed the West Bank city of Ramallah under closure on Tuesday evening, Army Radio reported. Troops were reportedly carrying out searches in the city, where Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat has been confined in his offices for over two years.
Earlier Tuesday, police called off an alert that had been in effect along the Green Line around Rosh Ha'ayin. Forces went on alert after receiving warnings that a terrorist was planning to carry out an attack in the area.
Police set up roadblocks in the Triangle area of the north, Rosh Ha'ayin, Kafr Qassam, Shoham and Petah Tikva following the warnings. Roadblocks were set up on Route 6, the Trans-Israel Highway, and Route 5, the trans-Samaria highway and forces were beefed up at the entrance to cities and towns in the Sharon-area of the country.
The alert was lowered later Tuesday evening, and the roadblocks were removed.
Also Tuesday, IDF troops in Jenin arrested Abdel Rahman Zubeidi, the brother of Tanzim commander Zakariya Zubeidi. According to Palestinian sources reported that the leading militant's brother is not involved in terrorism but was nevertheless arrested by Israel in order to place pressure on Zakariya Zubeidi. Two of Zubeidi's cousins were also arrested.
Four Qassams land in Israel Palestinians fired four Qassam rockets at Sderot and into an open area in the western Negev region on Tuesday morning. The rockets were launched from the Beit Hanun area of the northern Gaza Strip. There were no casualties and no damage was caused.
-------- mideast
Powell praises Syrian redeployment in hills of Beirut as a positive step
AP BARRY SCHWEID
September 22, 2004
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/news/archive/2004/09/22/international1441EDT0643.DTL
In a marked change of tone, Secretary of State Colin Powell praised Syria on Wednesday for dismantling military camps in the hills near Beirut, Lebanon. He said Syria has offered to cooperate with allied forces in Iraq and its interim government.
Less than a month ago, the State Department sharply criticized Syria for meddling in Lebanon's politics to permit pro-Syrian president Emile Lahoud to remain in power for three more years.
And in the past, the Bush administration has accused Syria of allowing militants to cross its border into Iraq to kill U.S. soldiers and said Syria was aggressively seeking to acquire and develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.
But Powell, at a news conference after a 45-minute meeting Wednesday with Foreign Minister Farouk al-Shaara, called the redeployment of Syrian troops a "positive step."
Also, Powell said Syria was anxious to work with the coalition forces in Iraq and with Iraq's interim government. He said he expected Prime Minister Ayad Allawi to pay a visit soon to Damascus for talks.
Still, Powell said Syria, which has controlled Lebanon for decades with some 20,000 troops, was obliged to end the occupation under a U.N. resolution. And he said the United States had other "issues" with Syria, including weapons programs and providing offices for militant groups.
But overall, his account of U.S. relations with Syria seemed more upbeat than in a long time.
Syria may withdraw 3,000 to 4,000 troops from Lebanon, said a senior State Department official later in talking to reporters on condition of anonymity.
Last month, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said Syria's pressure in behalf of Lebanon's pro-Syrian president was "an affront to Lebanon's sovereignty and political independence."
In early September, the U.N. Security Council narrowly adopted a U.S.-backed resolution urging Syria to relax its hold on Lebanon. The resolution also objected to Syria's role in Lebanese politics, but Lahoud was able to keep his job.
In Lebanon on Wednesday, about 3,000 Syrian troops were to redeploy from around Beirut to eastern Lebanon, probably to the Bekaa Valley near the Syrian border, where most of Syria's 20,000 troops in Lebanon are located.
-----
Syrian Troop Redeployment Said Meaningless
Sep 22, 2004
Associated Press
By LAURIE COPANS
http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=540&ncid=736&e=10&u=/ap/20040922/ap_on_re_mi_ea/israel_syria
JERUSALEM - Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon (news - web sites) reacted skeptically on Wednesday to a redeployment of Syrian troops in Lebanon, saying that the move did not mean any real change in Syrian policy.
Syria, the main power broker in Lebanon, on Tuesday began moving about 3,000 troops from the hills surrounding Beirut.
The redeployment was aimed at appeasing a U.N. Security Council order that all 20,000 Syrian troops in Lebanon leave the country. A senior Lebanese official said, however, the Syrian troops were moving away from Beirut, but not out of Lebanon.
Speaking on Israel Radio, Sharon said the Syrian move was not a concrete change.
"We don't at this point see a change in Syria's position," he said. "Syria is under U.S. pressure these days because it is helping Iraqi terrorists ... They have an interest in taking steps that will take off or weaken the pressure."
Sharon repeated an Israeli demand that Syria crack down on Palestinian militant groups that operate from its territory.
Syria must also allow Lebanon to deploy troops along its southern border with Israel to reduce tensions there, he said.
Israel in 2000 pulled out of an area in southern Lebanon that it occupied for 18 years. It said the occupation was needed to prevent cross-border attacks.
The Hezbollah guerrilla group continues to operate in southern Lebanon, sometimes attacking Israeli soldiers in border outposts.
"We don't have even a small sign that their (Syrian) intentions are real," Sharon said.
Israel would consider reopening peace talks with Syria if it complied with these demands, Sharon said.
Israel captured the Golan Heights from Syria in the 1967 Mideast war, and has since annexed the strategic plateau. Syria wants a full Israeli withdrawal in exchange for peace, a demand Sharon has rejected.
Sharon also accused Syria of allowing Iran to ship weapons equipment through Syrian territory. Israel has repeatedly warned that Iran is developing nuclear arms.
Iran revealed this week that it started converting tons of raw uranium as part of a process that could be used to make nuclear arms. The International Atomic Energy Agency has demanded that Iran freeze all uranium enrichment.
-------- nato
NATO will set up academy near Baghdad to train Iraqi military officers
Associated Press
PAUL AMES, Writer
September 22, 2004
NATO allies agreed Wednesday to expand the alliance's training mission for Iraqi armed forces after allaying French concerns which had delayed the plans for a week.
NATO is expected to send about 300 officers into Iraq to set up and run a military academy outside Baghdad, broadening the mission that began last month with the deployment of 40 NATO instructors.
"Today's decision by NATO to establish a major collective training program marks a major step by the alliance," said Nicholas Burns, the U.S. ambassador to NATO. "The United States is proud to undertake with its allies a significant expansion of the mission."
The agreement represents a compromise between the United States, which wanted NATO to shoulder more of the burden of building up Iraq's armed forces, and France, which initially objected to any alliance presence in Iraq, then sought to keep the mission low profile.
Allied officials could not say yet when the mission will start or how many Iraqi officers would be trained at the academy.
While most allies accepted the plan Friday, France and Belgium insisted on more guarantees that costs of the operation would be mostly borne by countries that participate in the mission. Belgium dropped its objections Tuesday.
France, Belgium, Germany and Spain already have said they will not send instructors to Iraq.
NATO spokesman James Appathurai said the alliance would coordinate training of Iraqi officers outside the country, which Germany has said it will do in the United Arab Emirates.
In delaying the agreement, France wanted to strictly define the role of the instructors and any NATO soldiers sent to protect them to ensure they would not become embroiled in combat operations beyond self defense.
"The aims of this mission ... are training, equipment and technical assistance, not combat," Appathurai said. He added that it would have "robust" protection from the U.S.-led coalition.
The NATO mission will be headed by U.S. Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, who also heads the much bigger U.S. operation to rebuild Iraq's armed forces.
"This choice will provide unity of command and will ensure NATO avoids duplication and meets the Iraqi security forces' targeted needs," said U.S. State Department spokesman Adam Ereli.
Diplomats played down the significance of the French delays and rejected parallels with the NATO crisis in 2003 when France, backed by Germany and Belgium, led opposition within the alliance to the war in Iraq. France incurred U.S. wrath then by delaying the dispatch of NATO reinforcements to guard Turkey's border with Iraq.
"Once again, the alliance showed it can come together to meet the most urgent security challenges of our times," Burns said. "The mission demonstrates NATO's resolve ... to reach beyond its traditional area of operation up to the front line of the war on terrorism."
Despite insisting that it would prefer any NATO training to be kept outside Iraq, France lifted its objections to an alliance mission in July, allowing about 40 NATO instructors to deploy to Iraq in August.
Allies earlier rejected wider plans for NATO to take on much more of the training of Iraq's new security forces, which are scheduled to grow to 250,000. The bulk of the training will be done by troops from the U.S.-led coalition.
Although most NATO allies have individually deployed soldiers to join the coalition, objections from France and Germany previously prevented the alliance from taking any collective role in Iraq, apart from offering logistical support to a Polish-led multinational force of 6,000 troops in central Iraq.
Also Wednesday, NATO member Portugal said it might make a new contribution to building up Iraq's security forces, an exception to a generally muted international response to President Bush's appeal Tuesday to the U.N. General Assembly for help in rebuilding the country.
Portuguese Prime Minister Pedro Santana Lopes said his government, which supported the war and has sent about 120 police officers to Iraq, was considering providing instructors to help train Iraq's security forces.
--------
NATO Allies OK Increase in Iraq Training
Associated Press
By PAUL AMES
September 22, 2004
BRUSSELS, Belgium (AP) -- NATO allies agreed Wednesday to expand the alliance's training mission for Iraqi armed forces after allaying French concerns which had delayed the plans for a week.
NATO is expected to send about 300 officers into Iraq to set up and run a military academy outside Baghdad, broadening the mission that began last month with the deployment of 40 NATO instructors.
"Today's decision by NATO to establish a major collective training program marks a major step by the alliance," said Nicholas Burns, the U.S. ambassador to NATO. "The United States is proud to undertake with its allies a significant expansion of the mission."
The agreement represents a compromise between the United States, which wanted NATO to shoulder more of the burden of building up Iraq's armed forces, and France, which initially objected to any alliance presence in Iraq, then sought to keep the mission low profile. Allied officials could not say yet when the mission will start or how many Iraqi officers would be trained at the academy.
While most allies accepted the plan Friday, France and Belgium insisted on more guarantees that costs of the operation would be mostly borne by countries that participate in the mission. Belgium dropped its objections Tuesday.
France, Belgium, Germany and Spain already have said they will not send instructors to Iraq.
NATO spokesman James Appathurai said the alliance would coordinate training of Iraqi officers outside the country, which Germany has said it will do in the United Arab Emirates. In delaying the agreement, France wanted to strictly define the role of the instructors and any NATO soldiers sent to protect them to ensure they would not become embroiled in combat operations beyond self defense.
"The aims of this mission ... are training, equipment and technical assistance, not combat," Appathurai said. He added that it would have "robust" protection from the U.S.-led coalition.
The NATO mission will be headed by U.S. Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, who also heads the much bigger U.S. operation to rebuild Iraq's armed forces.
"This choice will provide unity of command and will ensure NATO avoids duplication and meets the Iraqi security forces' targeted needs," said U.S. State Department spokesman Adam Ereli.
Diplomats played down the significance of the French delays and rejected parallels with the NATO crisis in 2003 when France, backed by Germany and Belgium, led opposition within the alliance to the war in Iraq. France incurred U.S. wrath then by delaying the dispatch of NATO reinforcements to guard Turkey's border with Iraq.
"Once again, the alliance showed it can come together to meet the most urgent security challenges of our times," Burns said. "The mission demonstrates NATO's resolve ... to reach beyond its traditional area of operation up to the front line of the war on terrorism."
Despite insisting that it would prefer any NATO training to be kept outside Iraq, France lifted its objections to an alliance mission in July, allowing about 40 NATO instructors to deploy to Iraq in August.
Allies earlier rejected wider plans for NATO to take on much more of the training of Iraq's new security forces, which are scheduled to grow to 250,000. The bulk of the training will be done by troops from the U.S.-led coalition.
Although most NATO allies have individually deployed soldiers to join the coalition, objections from France and Germany previously prevented the alliance from taking any collective role in Iraq, apart from offering logistical support to a Polish-led multinational force of 6,000 troops in central Iraq.
Also Wednesday, NATO member Portugal said it might make a new contribution to building up Iraq's security forces, an exception to a generally muted international response to President Bush's appeal Tuesday to the U.N. General Assembly for help in rebuilding the country.
Portuguese Prime Minister Pedro Santana Lopes said his government, which supported the war and has sent about 120 police officers to Iraq, was considering providing instructors to help train Iraq's security forces.
-------- russia / chechnya
Russia Protest Seeks Leader's Resignation
Sep 22, 2004
By SERGEI VENYAVSKY
Associated Press Writer,
http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/R/RUSSIA_PROTEST?SITE=DCTMS&SECTION=HOME
ROSTOV-ON-DON, Russia (AP) -- Hundreds of protesters demanding that a local leader step down clashed with riot police Wednesday in an impoverished region of southern Russia, authorities said.
Riot police beat protesters with truncheons and riot shields and dragged people away in scuffles that injured as many as 15 people in the remote Kalmykia region. Police arrested more than 85 people, authorities said.
More than 2,000 protesters marched into the central square of the region's capital, Elista, demanding that President Kirsan Ilyumzhinov step down. The protesters were angered by high unemployment and accuse the president of violating human rights and stifling dissent.
Video on Russian television showed protesters breaking through police barriers and throwing rocks.
"I have never before seen such a horrifying beating," said Semyon Ateyev, president of the Kalmykia Human Right Center and one of the protest organizers.
"They pounded everybody they saw ... including women and kids. Then they started chasing people around the town," Ateyev told The Associated Press from a hospital where he was taken after being beaten by police.
Regional officials said most of those detained in the protest were drunk and would not face criminal charges.
"The main reasons that brought us together were high unemployment in Kalmykia, the falsification of election results and severe violations of federal legislation by Kirsan Ilyumzhinov," said Valery Badmayev, chairman of the executive committee of the Extraordinary Council of the Kalmyk Peoples, which organized the demonstration.
Ateyev said the protest was part of a civil disobedience campaign aimed at ousting Ilyumzhinov, whom they view as authoritarian and incompetent.
Ateyev said Ilyumzhinov spends most of his time abroad "visiting kings and monarchs" and does not spend more than several days a month in his home region. "He is a disgrace on our republic and even on the federal authorities." Ilyumzhinov, a millionaire who also is the president of the world chess body federation, has ruled Kalmykia since 1993. Kalmykia is a barren region in southern Russia, populated in part by descendants of Mongol nomads who settled there in the 17th century. Half of the region's 300,000 residents are Buddhists.
Kalmykia was the site of massive anti-government rallies in December 2003, when people took to the streets to protest what they called rigged legislative elections, in which two liberal parties were voted out of parliament.
-------- spies
Spain seeks UK advice over revamp of spy networks
September 22 2004
Financial Times
By Jimmy Burns and Mark Huband in London, and Leslie Crawford in,Madrid
http://news.ft.com/cms/s/9f2197d4-0c37-11d9-8318-00000e2511c8.html
Spain has begun to overhaul its spy networks in the wake of the March 11 train bombings in Madrid and is hoping to learn from the UK on how to improve co-ordination among intelligence agencies.
Spanish officials are in London this week looking closely at the UK's Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, with a view to using it as a model for centralising and processing information.
JTAC is the UK's sole centre for analysing the terrorist threat.
It groups the terrorism analysis functions of the UK's security and intelligence services, Ministry of Defence and law enforcement agencies, aiming to minimise the likelihood of information falling down the cracks between departments.
Spain is planning to open a similar centre in Madrid next month, though initially on a smaller scale than JTAC, which has 100 staff.
A Spanish parliamentary inquiry into the train bombings, which killed nearly 200 people, has revealed a glaring lack of co-ordination between the security networks run by the police force, the paramilitary civil guard, the defence ministry and the Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI), Spain's secret service.
Spanish security sources say that the train bombings may have followed a failure in sharing accurate intelligence about attacks being planned by Islamic terrorists of Moroccan origin.
Jorge Dezcallar, director of the CNI at the time of the Madrid bombings, told the inquiry that his agency had been caught off-guard because of its "obsession with Eta", the Basque separatist movement.
"Eta was our problem. Whereas we believed al-Qaeda was using Spain as an operational base we did not think Spain itself would be a target.
"We were guilty of giving the government wrong advice," he said.
According to a Spanish security official, Spain's counter-terrorism centre will group representatives of the CNI and the police counter- terrorist unit.
Foreign ministry officials may also join at a later stage. The official said the centre was aimed at breaking down traditional rivalries between these departments.
-------- un
Bush demands U.N. help for Iraq
September 22, 2004
By Joseph Curl
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
http://www.washtimes.com/national/20040922-122840-7281r.htm
NEW YORK - President Bush yesterday demanded that the United Nations step up to help rebuild Iraq, telling foreign leaders "the liberty that many have won at a cost must be secured."
The president also urged Israel to impose a settlement freeze, dismantle unauthorized outposts and "end the daily humiliation of the Palestinian people," while criticizing Palestinian leaders who "intimidate opposition, tolerate corruption, and maintain ties to terrorist groups."
In a 25-minute speech to a somber chamber packed with leaders from the 191 U.N. member nations, the unapologetic president again scolded the world body for failing to confront Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein for his repeated violations of U.N. resolutions demanding that he disarm or face "serious consequences."
"The Security Council promised serious consequences for his defiance. And the commitments we make must have meaning. When we say 'serious consequences,' for the sake of peace, there must be serious consequences," Mr. Bush said.
"And so a coalition of nations enforced the just demands of the world," he said, directly rebutting Secretary-General Kofi Annan's recent charge that the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was "illegal."
Mr. Bush's speech, which received polite applause only at its conclusion, followed one by Mr. Annan, who warned that "rule of law" is at risk around the world but did not single out the U.S. president's action in Iraq.
On the first day of his two-day stay in New York, Mr. Bush also met with Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, who praised the president for his "courage" to do what the United Nations would not and urged foreign leaders to help his nation.
The Iraqi leader also said that despite a recent surge in violence in Iraq, it is "very important for the people of the world really to know that we are winning, we are making progress in Iraq, we are defeating terrorists."
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell yesterday echoed those words, saying, "This sort of attitude that we are on the verge of defeat is absolutely wrong."
"We knew it was going to be tough. ... We have faced these kinds of difficult moments before. And this is the time to not take counsel of our fears and say everything's falling apart," Mr. Powell said on a morning talk show.
For his part at the United Nations, Mr. Bush sternly told the leaders 11 times what they "must" do, including his assertion that "peaceful nations must stand for the advance of democracy."
Sen. John Kerry immediately criticized Mr. Bush's speech, saying the president misled the United Nations in the four-month lead-up to war and charging that he "does not have the credibility to lead the world."
"This president chose, personally, each time to spurn the United Nations, to spurn the help of other people, to make this more expensive for the American people. Not to tell the truth," the Democratic presidential nominee said in his first press conference since Aug. 9.
"The president really has no credibility at this point. He has no credibility with foreign leaders who hear him come before them and talk as if everything is going well, and they see that we can't even protect the people on the ground for the election" in Iraq, which is scheduled for January.
Mr. Bush made the same "credibility" charge against Mr. Kerry, criticizing the many positions he has taken on Iraq, from his Senate vote in favor of authorizing the use of force to oust Saddam to his most recent charge that the conflict is "the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time."
"My opponent has taken so many different positions on Iraq that his statements are hardly credible at all," Mr. Bush said in a brief session with reporters.
Noting that Mr. Allawi agrees that "the world is better off with Saddam Hussein sitting in a prison cell," Mr. Bush said: "That stands in stark contrast to the statement my opponent made yesterday when he said that the world was better off with Saddam in power. I strongly disagree."
At the United Nations, Mr. Bush proposed a new "democracy fund" within the world body, which he said would help countries lay the foundations of democracy by instituting the rule of law, independent courts, a free press, political parties and trade unions.
"Money from the fund would also help set up voter precincts and polling places and support the work of election monitors," he said, noting that the United States will make an initial contribution and urging all nations to contribute.
In his speech, Mr. Bush sternly told the United Nations - whose Security Council voted 15-0 on Nov. 8, 2002, to give Iraq a final chance to comply with its disarmament obligations before facing "serious consequences" - that the future of the free world is at stake and Mr. Allawi needs help.
"All civilized nations are in this struggle together, and all must fight the murderers. ... Nations must stand for the advance of democracy," he said.
"The U.N. and its member nations must respond to Prime Minister Allawi's request and do more to help build an Iraq that is secure, democratic, federal and free," Mr. Bush said.
Mr. Allawi agreed, saying that "the war now in Iraq is really not only an Iraqi war, it's a war for the civilized world to fight terrorists and terrorism."
"They want to undermine us in Iraq and to move from Iraq to undermine the region," he said. "And once they do this, they will hit hard at the civilized world - in Washington and New York and London and Paris and Ankara and Geneva and elsewhere - everywhere in the civilized world."
Mr. Annan mostly took veiled shots at Mr. Bush. For example, he made parallel references to Abu Ghraib prison abuse and the videotaped beheadings and other killings by terrorists of Americans and other foreigners.
"In Iraq, we see civilians massacred in cold blood, while relief workers, journalists and other non-combatants are taken hostage and put to death in the most barbarous fashion," Mr. Annan said. "At the same time, we have seen Iraqi prisoners disgracefully abused."
Iraq's Mr. Allawi won notice by shaking the hand of Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom and exchanging pleasantries with him at yesterday's General Assembly meeting, the foreign minister told the Associated Press.
The two countries were seated next to each other, in alphabetical order. Iraq's U.N. mission said it had no information about the encounter.
In his speech, Mr. Bush called on Israel to impose a freeze on Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, taking a new, harder line against Israeli plans introduced last month to build about 1,530 more settler homes in the disputed region.
A "road map" to peace has been stalled since new violence erupted in the Middle East, and Mr. Bush urged Israel to "avoid any actions that prejudice final negotiations."
His criticism of Palestinian leaders, however, was far more harsh.
"Palestinian people deserve better. They deserve true leaders capable of creating and governing a free and peaceful Palestinian state," he said. "And world leaders should withdraw all favor and support from any Palestinian ruler who fails his people and betrays their cause."
In a day of meetings with other world leaders, Mr. Bush conferred with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and reiterated U.S. support for Tokyo's bid for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, a Japanese official told Kyodo News Agency.
Japan issued a joint statement with Brazil, Germany and India saying all should have permanent seats on an expanded Security Council, and that an African nation should also have permanent representation.
--------
At U.N., Bush Cites Headway in Iraq
'I Am Optimistic We'll Succeed,' He Says
By Dana Milbank and Colum Lynch
Washington Post Staff Writers
Wednesday, September 22, 2004; Page A01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A38139-2004Sep21?language=printer
UNITED NATIONS, Sept. 21 -- President Bush brushed aside concerns about violence and disorder in Iraq and told world leaders assembled here on Tuesday that the country is making progress against insurgents.
Bush's upbeat assessment of world affairs in general and Iraq in particular contrasted sharply with assessments of diplomats and world leaders gathered for the annual meeting of the U.N. General Assembly. While others lamented spreading violence and a breakdown of the rule of law, Bush asserted that times have improved.
"During the past three years, I've addressed this General Assembly in a time of tragedy for my country and in times of decision for all of us," he told the delegates, who listened quietly and applauded respectfully. "Now we gather at a time of tremendous opportunity for the U.N. and for all peaceful nations."
Later, in an appearance with Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, Bush dismissed questions about two Republican senators' calls for a more candid assessment of the Iraq situation, and about a CIA report that warned that Iraq is in danger of further disorganization and possibly civil war.
"The Iraqi citizens are defying the pessimistic predictions," Bush told reporters, adding: "Iraqi citizens are seeing a determined effort by responsible citizens to lead to a more hopeful tomorrow, and I am optimistic we'll succeed."
Allawi echoed Bush's buoyant theme. "It's very important for the people of the world really to know that we are winning, we are making progress in Iraq, we are defeating terrorists," he said. "Unfortunately, the media have not been covering these significant gains in Iraq."
Earlier Tuesday, Allawi took the unusual step of greeting Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom with a handshake -- a risky gesture for a leader in the Arab world.
The president said he was hoping that the visit by the pro-America Iraqi leader -- Bush will meet with Allawi at the White House on Thursday -- will convince Americans that "progress is being made" in Iraq despite grim television images of violence there.
Bush spoke a day after terrorists in Iraq posted a gruesome video of an American being beheaded and before the group said it had slain a second U.S. hostage. More than 30 car-bomb attacks have occurred in Iraq this month, as the number of U.S. troops dead in the Iraq conflict has recently exceeded 1,000. Large parts of Iraq remain under the control of insurgents.
The upsurge in violence in Iraq -- which Bush said would likely intensify as the country's January elections approach -- has returned the subject to the center of the U.S. presidential campaign with the election six weeks away. Democratic presidential nominee John F. Kerry on Tuesday said that Bush "needs to live in the world of reality, not in a world of fantasy spin."
Bush's speech to the General Assembly played down his administration's past differences with the United Nations, only briefly revisiting the Security Council's refusal to authorize war in Iraq. Noting that the Security Council had vowed "serious consequences" for Saddam Hussein's failure to comply with its resolutions, Bush said "a coalition of nations enforced the just demands of the world."
In his speech, the president tied the Iraq war to the war in Afghanistan and the broader struggle against terrorists. "Not long ago, outlaw regimes in Baghdad and Kabul threatened the peace and sponsored terrorists," he said. "Today the Iraqi and Afghan people are on the path to democracy and freedom. . . . And this progress is good for the long-term security of all of us."
Bush made no specific requests for help in Iraq but called on the United Nations and its members to "do more to help build an Iraq that is secure, democratic, federal and free."
Bush also urged action on a range of issues that have been less polarizing at the world body: a ban on human cloning, a clampdown on human trafficking and efforts to fight AIDS, poverty and corruption.
He decried the "terrible suffering and horrible crimes" in Sudan's Darfur region and called on Israel to "impose a settlement freeze," while urging new Palestinian leadership. Bush also proposed a new "democracy fund" within the United Nations that would help with elections and other democratic processes.
Later, asked by reporters about calls from GOP Sens. John McCain (Ariz.) and Chuck Hagel (Neb.) for a more candid assessment about the Iraq situation, Bush replied that both men "want me elected as president. We agree that the world is better off with Saddam Hussein sitting in a prison cell. And that stands in stark contrast to the statement my opponent made yesterday, when he said that the world was better off with Saddam in power." Kerry has said he would not have waged war in Iraq if he had been president but has asserted that "the world is better off" without Hussein in power.
Bush also played down the significance of a CIA report forecasting more difficulty in Iraq. "The CIA laid out several scenarios and said life could be lousy, life could be okay, life could be better, and they were just guessing as to what the conditions might be like," he said.
The confidential August report to policymakers, according to an administration official who described it yesterday, outlined three scenarios over the next 18 months: a period of "tenuous stability," a time of "further fragmentation and extremism" or a period of "trending to civil war."
Bush's rosy assessment of Iraq came after other leaders and diplomats offered more somber accounts in recent days. Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih, in an interview Monday with al-Arabiya television, said: "The past week has witnessed an escalation in the security problems, undoubtedly."
Tuesday, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, who recently riled the administration by calling the Iraq war "illegal," offered milder criticism than he had in the past. But he warned that "the rule of law is at risk around the world," and that "at times even the necessary fight against terrorism is allowed to encroach unnecessarily on civil liberties."
Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who addressed the assembly before Bush, warned that "mankind is losing the fight for peace," adding: "The necessary fight against terrorism cannot be conceived strictly in military terms."
European leaders claimed some vindication of their view that Security Council approval was necessary for the Iraq war to succeed. "In hindsight, experience shows that actions taken without a mandate which has been clearly defined in a Security Council resolution are doomed to failure," President Joseph Deiss of Switzerland told the General Assembly.
But Bush received friendly words on Iraq from other quarters. Georgia's President Mikheil Saakashvili said his country cannot "afford to look the other way" and offered "to send fresh troops to Iraq to serve in the special protection force for the U.N. mission."
In a closed-door meeting with Annan, Bush underscored the importance of pressing for elections in Afghanistan and in Iraq during a discussion that also covered the Middle East conflict, Congo and Haiti. Annan has warned that the United Nations may not be able to endorse elections in Iraq if the violence continues at the current pace.
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, who attended the meeting, also told Annan that United Nations must move more aggressively to ensure the deployment of thousands of African Union monitors in Darfur.
Staff writer Walter Pincus contributed to this report.
--------
Bush, Annan Speeches Show Divisions on Iraq
Sep 22, 2004
Los Angeles Times
By Maura Reynolds and Maggie Farley
http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=2026&ncid=2026&e=2&u=/latimests/20040922/ts_latimes/bushannanspeechesshowdivisionsoniraq
UNITED NATIONS - For the second time in two years, President Bush (news - web sites) on Tuesday defended the invasion of Iraq (news - web sites) before the U.N. General Assembly and appealed to other countries to join the United States in spreading "freedom" and "human dignity" in Iraq and Afghanistan (news - web sites). But in a pointed rebuke, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan (news - web sites) warned that countries that hoped to instill the rule of law must first abide by it themselves.
The two addresses at the opening session of the 59th annual meeting invoked values such as democracy and the rule of law, and both Bush and Annan only briefly mentioned the schism of the last two years over the invasion of Iraq. But the war was the clear context for both leaders' remarks, as it was last year, and the two sides seemed not to have moved closer in the interim.
"When we say 'serious consequences' for the sake of peace, there must be serious consequences," Bush said, referring to language in a Security Council resolution warning Iraq to eliminate any weapons of mass destruction. "And so a coalition of nations enforced the just demands of the world."
Annan insisted that "every nation that proclaims the rule of law at home must respect it abroad." Although the secretary-general did not name the United States, to the scores of world leaders listening in the vaulted chamber, the target of his comments was obvious.
"Those who seek to bestow legitimacy must themselves embody it," he said, "and those who invoke international law must themselves submit to it."
That comment was a reference to Bush's challenge to the U.N. in 2002 to enforce its numerous resolutions demanding that Iraq rid itself of illicit weapons. The U.S. eventually invaded without the explicit approval of the Security Council, and last week, Annan called the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq "illegal" - the most direct expression yet of his opposition to the attack.
Annan delivered one direct strike at Washington on Tuesday. Listing a "few flagrant and topical examples" of shameless disregard for law, Annan mentioned "Iraqi prisoners disgracefully abused" along with atrocities in Sudan, beheadings in Iraq and the bloody school takeover in Beslan, Russia.
In the chamber, response to both speeches was polite but not enthusiastic. After three consecutive years in which Iraq has dominated the opening of the General Assembly, the response from many delegates was tepid.
Leaders such as interim Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi and Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who depend heavily on U.S. support, lauded Bush's remarks. Leaders of Germany and Spain sided more with Annan.
"Peace is a task that demands more determination, more heroism than war," said Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, who pulled his country's troops out of Iraq after winning election in March. "For that reason, my government decided not to have a military presence in Iraq."
German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer said: "I think it's very important what Kofi Annan said about the rule of law in the 21st century, so I don't want to go more into the details because this would be very unpolite."
And French President Jacques Chirac, who after last year's General Assembly opening met with Bush and tried to paper over their differences about the Iraq invasion, skipped the event altogether.
Democratic presidential nominee Sen. John F. Kerry (news, bio, voting record) said that Bush, in his speech, "barely talked about the realities at all in Iraq" and that he "missed an opportunity" to persuade world leaders to help rebuild and stabilize the country.
"You don't just stand up in front of folks in the midst of a sort of running-through-all-the-issues speech and pretend that that's the way you lead people to the table," Kerry said in Jacksonville, Fla., where he was campaigning. "You have to engage, I said, in a summit. That you ought to pull those people to the table and come out with a unified agreement as to what you're going to do.... The president has not engaged in that kind of diplomacy and summitry."
Although the threat from Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (news - web sites)'s alleged weapons of mass destruction was the primary rationale for the U.S. war in Iraq in 2003, Bush on Tuesday presented his decision to invade and occupy the country as part of a campaign to promote democracy and human dignity around the world. And he urged other countries to join in.
"For decades, the circle of liberty and security and development has been expanding in our world," the president said. "Now we have the historic chance to widen the circle even further, to fight radicalism and terror with justice and dignity, to achieve a true peace, founded on human freedom."
Taking note of the Sept. 11 attacks as well as the March train bombings in Madrid and this month's school siege in Russia, Bush said terrorists believed that the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Bill of Rights, and every charter of liberty ever written, are lies, to be burned and destroyed and forgotten."
"The security of the world is found in the advancing rights of mankind," Bush said. "These rights are advancing across the world - and across the world, the enemies of human rights are responding with violence."
Bush cited the surge of violence in Iraq as evidence of progress, saying: "We can expect terrorist attacks to escalate as Afghanistan and Iraq approach national elections.... But these difficulties will not shake our conviction that the future of Afghanistan and Iraq is a future of liberty. The proper response to difficulty is not to retreat. It is to prevail."
Bush also presented U.S. policies as part of an international "compassion" agenda that includes fighting AIDS (news - web sites) and human trafficking as well as seeking debt reduction for poor countries. He proposed establishing an international "democracy fund" to support such work as election monitoring, but he gave few specifics and did not say how much the U.S. would contribute to such a project.
Annan also used his remarks to respond to critics, including many in the Bush administration, who contend that the United Nations (news - web sites) is too ponderous to be effective.
"Today, more than ever, the world needs an effective mechanism through which to seek common solutions to common problems. That is what this organization was created for," he said. "Let's not imagine that, if we fail to make good use of it, we will find any more effective instrument."
Bush's appeal for other countries to join the U.S. efforts in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan didn't result in any immediate public offers of troops or other assistance. But his most important business was conducted behind closed doors in a suite at the Waldorf-Astoria hotel, where he met with leaders from India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Japan.
Bush had no planned meetings with European heads of state.
With the U.S. presidential election six weeks away, Bush's remarks Tuesday appeared to be aimed as much at the American public as at the international leaders gathered in New York.
A few hours after his speech to the General Assembly, Bush met with Allawi and said the U.S. would continue to support the Iraqi government.
"The American people are seeing horrible scenes on their TV screens," Bush said, apparently referring to footage of the American hostage who was beheaded Monday in Iraq. "And the prime minister will be able to say to them that in spite of the sacrifices they made, in spite of the fact that Iraqis are dying and U.S. troops are dying as well, that there is a will among the Iraqi people to succeed. And we'll stand with them."
Administration officials have sought to stress that Iraq is making progress toward democracy, even as violence continues throughout much of the country and car bombings, ambushes, assassinations and kidnappings remain a threat.
Well over 1,000 U.S. troops have died in the war, and both Republicans and Democrats in Congress have voiced growing concern about Iraq.
A highly classified National Intelligence Estimate assembled by some of the government's most senior analysts this summer provided a pessimistic assessment about the future security and stability of Iraq. Contents of the report were recently made public.
On Tuesday, though, Bush said the CIA (news - web sites) was "just guessing" when it said in the report that Iraq was in danger of slipping into civil war.
"The CIA laid out several scenarios. It said that life could be lousy, life could be OK, life could be better," the president said during a photo session with Allawi. "And they were just guessing as to what the conditions might be like."
At a raucous rally in Orlando, Fla., on Tuesday night, Bush's Democratic opponent expressed incredulity at the president's statement that the CIA was "guessing" when it laid out scenarios for success in Iraq.
"Ladies and gentleman, does that make you feel safer?" Kerry asked an indoor stadium crowd estimated at 11,000.
"No!" the audience shouted.
"Does that give you confidence that this president knows what he's talking about?" the candidate asked.
"No!" the crowd responded.
"The CIA was just guessing?" Kerry continued. " ... The CIA and the nation deserve a better assessment than that by the president of the United States of America."
-------- us
Rumsfeld Sold Stakes in Pentagon Contractors
(Reuters)
By Jim Wolf
Sep 22, 2004
http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=politicsNews&storyID=6308610
WASHINGTON - Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld sold stakes this summer in at least five companies after they were identified as doing business with the Pentagon, according to his latest financial disclosure form, made available on Wednesday.
Sold were all his shares in Millennium Chemicals Inc., St Paul Companies Inc., Sonoco Products Co., VF Corp. and Zebra Technologies Corp., according to an aide's handwritten note on the disclosure report.
The note, dated June 28, said the companies had been "identified as DoD defense contractors." The Pentagon did not immediately respond to a query about the threshold for such identification, nor about the reasoning behind the sale.
The 20-page form, released by the Office on Government Ethics in response to a request from Reuters, showed Rumsfeld's assets, liabilities and transactions for the year ended Dec. 31, 2003.
Described in ranges rather than exact amounts, his largest holdings included a trust in his name valued at $25 million to $50 million, farm land in New Mexico valued in the millions and a stake in Gilead Sciences Inc. worth $5 million to $25 million.
Rumsfeld served as chairman of Gilead Sciences, a Foster City, California, biotechnology company, before being sworn in as President Bush's defense secretary on Jan. 20, 2001.
As of July 27, Rumsfeld's designees were "in discussions" about divesting his shares in Community Health Systems Inc., which also was identified as a Pentagon contractor, according to the Pentagon's Standards of Conduct Office, which reviewed Rumsfeld's report for any perceived conflicts of interest. Community Health Systems was held via a venture called FLC Partnership.
Rumsfeld appeared to be under no legal requirement to sell the shares of any of the companies identified as Pentagon contractors, according to Alex Knott of the Center for Public Integrity, a Washington-based government watchdog.
"It appears as though Secretary Rumsfeld wanted to hold himself to a higher ethical standard when it comes to public perceptions," he said.
The form showed Rumsfeld accepted no gifts, reimbursements or travel expenses big enough to meet the government's modest thresholds for reporting. Among these are a requirement to report gifts from one source totaling more than $260.
(Additional reporting by Andrea Shalal-Esa)
----
Anti-Prostitution Rule Drafted for U.S. Forces
By Pauline Jelinek
Associated Press
Wednesday, September 22, 2004; Page A13
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A39746-2004Sep21.html
U.S. service members stationed overseas could face a court-martial for patronizing prostitutes under a new regulation drafted by the Pentagon.
The move is part of a Defense Department effort to reduce the possibility that service members will contribute to human trafficking in areas near their overseas bases by seeking the services of women forced into prostitution.
In recent years, "women and girls are being forced into prostitution for a clientele consisting largely of military services members, government contractors and international peacekeepers" in such places as South Korea and the Balkans, Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-N.J.) said yesterday at a Capitol Hill forum on Pentagon anti-trafficking efforts.
Defense officials have drafted an amendment to the manual on courts-martial that would make it an offense for service members to use the services of prostitutes, said Charles S. Abell, a Pentagon undersecretary for personnel and readiness.
If approved, the amendment would make it a military offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice to have contact with a prostitute, Lt. Col. Ellen Krenke, an Abell spokeswoman, said later. The draft rule is open to 60 days of public comment after being published in the Federal Register, she said.
Officials also are developing a training program for service members and contractors, to be distributed in November. The program will explain trafficking, department policy on it and possible legal action against violators, Abell said in a written statement.
Additionally, the military is reviewing regulations and procedures for placing off-limits those businesses where such activities take place and working with Justice Department officials to tighten rules on contractor misconduct.
Gen. Leon J. LaPorte, commander of the 37,000 U.S. service members in South Korea, said another initiative started on the peninsula has been to "make on-base military life a more desirable experience, and attempt to diminish the seductive appeal of many of the less wholesome off-duty pursuits."
That effort includes offering expanded evening and weekend education programs, band concerts, late-night sports leagues and more chaplain activities.
All new arrivals to duty in South Korea are instructed against prostitution and human trafficking, and the military is working with South Korean law enforcement agencies, he said.
NATO officials in July outlined new guidelines adopted to ensure alliance peacekeepers do not encourage sex trafficking gangs by seeking the services of women forced into prostitution.
-------- POLICE / PRISONERS / COURTS / JUSTICE
Budanov Drops Bid for Pardon
The Moscow Times
September 22, 2004
http://www.moscowtimes.ru/stories/2004/09/22/015.html
GROZNY -- Former colonel Yury Budanov, who was convicted last year of kidnapping and murdering a Chechen woman, on Tuesday withdrew his request for a pardon after it drew outrage and protests in Chechnya and opposition from prosecutors and human rights groups.
Hundreds of people rallied in Grozny on Tuesday to demand that President Vladimir Putin refuse to pardon Budanov.
-------- courts / tribunals
3 DeLay Workers Indicted in Texas
Aides Charged in Fundraising Probe
By Sylvia Moreno
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, September 22, 2004; Page A01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A39563-2004Sep21?language=printer
AUSTIN, Sept. 21 -- Three top political aides to House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-Tex.) were indicted Tuesday on charges of illegally raising political funds from corporations in 2002, much of which was funneled into the Republican takeover of the Texas legislature.
Corporate contributions to state legislative candidates are illegal in Texas. A Travis County grand jury indicted DeLay political aide Jim Ellis, fundraiser Warren RoBold and John Colyandro, the executive director of DeLay's political action committee, Texans for a Republican Majority, known as TRMPAC. Eight corporations also were indicted for illegal political contributions.
The grand jury never questioned DeLay or sought records from him. But the panel's actions could rattle his supporters and embolden his critics because the three men indicted include some of his closest and most loyal allies. Moreover, the targeted fundraising activities were at the heart of one of DeLay's most cherished, high-profile endeavors of the past several years: giving Republicans control of the Texas legislature so the state's 32 U.S. House districts could be redrawn in a way likely to send more Republicans to Congress.
That is what the legislature did last year, and DeLay has often cited the redistricting effort as a key reason he expects the Nov. 2 election to expand the GOP House majority.
Ellis, 47, of Arlington, Va., and Colyandro, 40, of Austin, were indicted on one count each of money laundering -- specifically taking $190,000 in corporate money raised by TRMPAC and giving it to the Republican National Committee, which, in turn, had the Republican National State Elections Committee contribute to seven Texas House candidates. In all, about 20 Republican candidates were helped by TRMPAC activities to win Texas House seats.
Colyandro was indicted on 13 counts of unlawfully accepting $425,000 in corporate political contributions. RoBold, 48, of Middletown was indicted on nine counts of unlawfully soliciting and accepting $250,000 in corporate political contributions.
The indictments follow a 21-month investigation by three different grand juries into the activities of TRMPAC. The result of that inquiry, said Travis County District Attorney Ronnie Earle, was an "outline of an effort to use corporate contributions to control representative democracy in Texas."
Since 1905, Texas law has prohibited the giving or receiving of political contributions from corporations and labor unions to candidates.
At a news conference, Earle, a Democrat, said that although the three-month term of the latest grand jury expires Sept. 30, the investigation has not ended. "This is a continuing investigation into allegations of criminal activity related to the 2002 Texas elections," he said.
Those elections resulted in the Republican takeover of the Texas House for the first time since Reconstruction. With the legislature dominated by the GOP, Republican Tom Craddick of Midland was elected Texas House speaker last year and the Texas congressional districts were then redrawn to send more Republican lawmakers to Congress, strengthening DeLay's base as majority leader. The Washington Post has previously reported that Craddick's role in disbursing money to candidates from TRMPAC was being scrutinized by the grand jury, but he has not been charged and he was not named in Tuesday's indictment.
DeLay was not named as a target of the grand jury's investigation, but documents disclosed in the inquiry indicate that DeLay was central to creating and overseeing the political fundraising in Texas. When asked whether the continuing probe could lead to allegations of wrongdoing against DeLay, Earle said: "My response has been consistent, in that anyone who has committed a crime is a target."
In Washington, DeLay said the legal case in Texas would not affect him.
"This has been an investigation that has been underway for nearly two years, and 40 days before the election, suddenly they've taken action," DeLay said in a statement issued by his office. "You do the political math."
"I'll reiterate what I've said before and today's action emphasizes: I have not been subpoenaed; I have not been asked to testify; and I have not been called as a witness. They've made clear this investigation is not about me."
The indictments came less than 24 hours after the House ethics committee postponed a decision on a complaint against DeLay that includes allegations involving TRMPAC. The complaint, filed by Chris Bell, a Democratic lawmaker from Houston, alleges that DeLay was involved in the PAC's actions and decisions to the point that he is no less culpable than Ellis, Colyandro or RoBold.
The ethics committee, evenly divided between Republicans and Democrats, typically takes a wait-and-see posture when grand juries or law enforcement agencies pursue issues. That DeLay was not indicted, his supporters said, supports the argument that he has done nothing wrong. Public interest groups, however, called on the ethics panel to appoint an outside investigator. Some House Democrats say privately they would be surprised if the ethics committee took strong action against DeLay if a grand jury stops short of implicating him.
In Texas, an attorney for Colyandro also called the release of the indictment politically motivated and said that Colyandro sought advice from lawyers specializing in campaign finance law on how to raise and spend money from corporations. "So, clearly, he did not knowingly violate the law," Joe Turner said.
J.D. Pauerstein of San Antonio, an attorney for Ellis, said, "We are disappointed that the grand jury decided to find against Mr. Ellis on one count, and we are confident he will be exonerated."
RoBold's attorney in Austin, Wayne Meissner, did not return a phone call.
The businesses indicted were Sears, Roebuck and Co. of Illinois; Bacardi USA Inc. of Miami, a subsidiary of the Bermuda-based liquor producer; Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, a subsidiary of CBRL Group Inc. in Lebanon, Tenn., that operates restaurants and retail operations in 41 states; Westar Energy Inc., an electric utility company in Topeka, Kan.; Diversified Collection Services Inc., a debt collection company in San Leandro, Calif.; Williams Companies Inc., a natural gas company in Tulsa; the Alliance for Quality Nursing Home Care Corp., an umbrella organization of some of the nation's largest nursing home operators; and Questerra Corp. of Charlottesville, a subsidiary of MeadWestvaco Corp.
They allegedly made illegal corporate political contributions ranging from $20,000 to $100,000.
Staff writer Charles Babington and researcher Lucy Shackelford in Washington contributed to this report.
-------- homeland security / national intelligence
Airport screeners missed weapons
USA TODAY
By Mimi Hall
9/22/2004
http://www.usatoday.com/travel/news/2004-09-22-weapons_x.htm
WASHINGTON - Undercover investigators were able to sneak explosives and weapons past security screeners at 15 airports nationwide, according to a government report on aviation security. The government watchdog for the Department of Homeland Security, Clark Kent Ervin, delivered the results of the tests in a classified report to members of Congress. "The performance was poor," said Ervin, the department's inspector general, in releasing a less detailed version Wednesday.
The tests were done during the second half of 2003. But they highlight ongoing vulnerabilities in the nation's aviation security system, particularly in detecting explosives such as those that Russian authorities say were used to bring down two airliners last month.
Rep. John Mica, R-Fla., chairman of a House aviation subcommittee, confirmed that the longer, classified report showed weapons and explosives got by screeners. He said the results on weapons were "bad enough," but the results on explosives were "absolutely horrendous."
An earlier report in 2003 by the Government Accountability Office had found that undercover agents were able to slip guns, knives and box cutters past screeners.
In the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks, the government installed explosive-detection machines in airports nationwide for checked baggage. But it has not installed equipment to check for explosives on all passengers and their carry-on bags. They are sent through metal detectors and only occasionally checked by explosive trace detection equipment.
"Unfortunately, it may take some horrific wake-up call to get attention," Mica said.
Ervin's report blamed poor training and management of the thousands of screeners who work for the Transportation Security Administration, a division of the Homeland Security department. It also cited the need for better equipment and technology.
Rep. Peter DeFazio, D-Ore., the top Democrat on the House aviation panel, said: "You're not going to find plastic explosives with a metal detector, no matter how hard you try."
TSA officials said improvements have been made since Ervin's tests, which were done from July to November 2003. Walk-through explosive-detection machines are now being tested at five airports. Machines that can detect trace amounts of explosives on documents are being tested at four airports. And airport screeners recently were given more authority to conduct "pat-downs" of passengers in an effort to detect explosives hidden under clothing.
"We're aggressively pursuing all the solutions available to us," TSA spokeswoman Yolanda Clark said.
Mica and other members of Congress are promoting the use of low-radiation X-ray machines that reveal what is under passengers' clothes. DeFazio said privacy concerns have slowed their development.
The lack of explosive-detection technology at passenger checkpoints nationwide "absolutely drives me out of my mind," Mica said. "It's so frustrating."
-----
Military unit to defend D.C.
September 22, 2004
By Robert Burns
ASSOCIATED PRESS
http://www.washtimes.com/metro/20040921-093107-8762r.htm
The Pentagon has established a new military headquarters with the mission of defending the nation's capital and assisting civil authorities in responding to a terrorist attack here.
The Joint Forces Headquarters for the National Capital Region is based at Fort McNair, a small Army post in the District on the banks of the Anacostia River, whose fortifications did not stop the British from invading in 1814 and burning the White House and U.S. Capitol.
The idea of the new Joint Forces Headquarters is not to fend off foreign armies but to prevent if possible - and respond to, if not - surprise attacks by terrorists who are using nuclear, chemical, biological or other unconventional means, Army Maj. Gen. Galen B. Jackman said Monday.
"There are vulnerabilities in the nation's capital," he said without being specific.
One of those vulnerabilities is the proximity of the White House, the Capitol and other government buildings to commercial air traffic, as shown by the September 11 attack on the Pentagon.
Gen. Jackman is commander of the new headquarters. The deputy commander is Rear Adm. Jan Gaudio, who also is commandant of the Naval District of Washington, which provides support services to naval installations within a 100-mile radius of the Pentagon.
Gen. Jackman and Adm. Gaudio briefed reporters on Monday about the arrangement and the new operations center, where they can monitor a broad range of information from the FBI and other government agencies.
The new outfit also has a mobile command center - a $3.2 million truck chock-full of computer, telephone, TV and other communication to enable Gen. Jackman or others to travel to an emergency and remain in touch with the secretary of defense and other agencies.
The idea is to improve the military's ability to coordinate a post-attack response, as well as complicate a potential attacker's planning by varying the placement and visibility of security measures, Gen. Jackman said.
Before September 11, the military organizations in Washington focused largely on ceremonial activities such as presidential inaugurations and installation management.
Now they are being asked to focus also on homeland defense. Even the U.S. Army Band is now trained to provide administrative medical support in the event of an attack.
A wide range of military forces is based in the Washington area, but none in large numbers. The Army has its 3rd Infantry Regiment, the famed "Old Guard" best-known for sentry duty at the Tomb of the Unknowns at Arlington National Cemetery, and its 12th Aviation Battalion, which has 18 Black Hawk helicopters based at Fort Belvoir.
Also in the area is an Army engineer company with special training in rescuing people from collapsed buildings and a bomb-disposal unit at McNair that is trained to respond to nuclear, chemical, conventional and improvised explosive incidents anywhere in the capital region.
Gen. Jackman's organization is subordinate to U.S. Northern Command, a military headquarters in Colorado set up after the September 11 attacks to coordinate land defense. Air defense is the responsibility of the North American Aerospace Defense Command.
The only area of the country with a joint force headquarters devoted specifically to its defense is Washington.
A ceremony today will mark the official activation of Joint Forces Headquarters for the National Capital Region, but it already has been put to work several times in recent months. It set up a joint task force to respond to the discovery of the deadly poison ricin February on Capitol Hill, for example.
--------
U.S. Orders Airlines To Release Fliers' Data
Passenger Records To Be Used in New Screening System
By Sara Kehaulani Goo
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, September 22, 2004; Page A03
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A38578-2004Sep21.html
The federal government said yesterday that it will order airlines to turn over millions of passenger records by November so it can begin testing a vast computer program that will hunt for suspected terrorists seeking to board commercial aircraft.
The proposed program, known as Secure Flight, is the government's latest attempt to create an effective computer-assisted passenger screening system. Airlines and privacy advocates fought off previous attempts to develop a system known as CAPPS II, arguing it would violate passengers' privacy. Yesterday, privacy advocates said the government's plans for Secure Flight had not alleviated their concerns.
In rolling out the test program, the Transportation Security Administration is responding to recommendations from the Sept. 11 Commission. The proposed system aims to compare each passenger's reservation information with a list of suspected terrorists more extensive than the one currently used by airlines. The TSA will also attempt to verify each person's identity, so the system will not falsely target travelers who might have similar names to those on the various terrorist "watch lists." Last month, Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) said he was falsely snared by the watch lists while traveling in March.
The TSA issued several public notices yesterday that began a process to collect by mid-November all domestic passenger records for June 2004 from the nation's 77 airlines. The agency said it will use the data to test the system for 30 days, then develop a more specific plan about how the program should move ahead. The TSA said it expects to launch Secure Flight by spring 2005, although officials yesterday said they knew few details of how it will work.
"We don't have any final decisions made yet," said Justin Oberman, director of the Office of National Risk Assessment, a division of the TSA that oversees the program. "That's why we need to conduct the tests."
The TSA has spent $100 million on the CAPPS II system. Oberman said yesterday that the money has gone toward technology and computer servers that will be used in Secure Flight to handle the high-speed data transactions.
A spokesman for the Air Transport Association, the airline industry's chief lobbying organization, said carriers would review the government's proposed order. But the airlines have the same concerns about how passengers' privacy would be protected and how the airlines would regularly share passenger reservation records with the government.
"We look forward to hearing some more details," said Doug Wills, spokesman for the association, which had opposed the TSA's earlier suggestion that the airlines volunteer passenger records. "If we're going to implement a system like CAPPS II, which on its face presents the potential to develop something that's much smarter and an unobtrustive way of doing security, then industry hopes the government, by this time, has learned some important lessons."
One major change, the TSA said, is that it no longer intends to scan passenger records for violent criminals and people with outstanding warrants. Instead, it will focus only on suspected terrorists. The agency no longer intends to rate travelers with a numerical score and a color code that reflect how much scrutiny they should receive at the checkpoint.
The agency said it still intends to test one of CAPPS II's more controversial elements: the use of commercial databases to help verify passengers' identities. The system will compare reservation records with information contained in commercial databases. The same repositories are used in the banking, home mortgage and credit industries for identity verification, according to a public notice issued by the TSA yesterday. The TSA said it will soon begin the bidding process on contracts to provide the databases and to test the program.
Privacy-rights groups said they were skeptical that the Secure Flight program differed substantially from the TSA's plans to develop CAPPS II. Several groups said the TSA did not explain how a passenger misidentified as a terrorist could contest the error or how a passenger could be removed from the TSA's terrorist watch lists.
Marcia Hofmann, staff counsel at the Electronic Privacy Information Center, a Washington group that advocates privacy rights, said the TSA's public notice exempts the agency from complying with several elements of the federal Privacy Act that entitle people to access records the government maintains on them.
"This is a program where TSA has complete discretion to let you see your information or correct anything that is wrong," Hofmann said.
TSA officials said yesterday that they plan to outline more formal redress procedures after the test period. At a minimum, the agency said, travelers who think they are unfairly targeted by Secure Flight can bring their concerns to the agency's privacy officer.
--------
Group Calls for Slowing Intelligence Reform
By Walter Pincus and Charles Babington
Washington Post Staff Writers
Wednesday, September 22, 2004; Page A04
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A39743-2004Sep21.html
A bipartisan group of former senior Cabinet members, senators and national security officials, including former secretaries of state Henry Kissinger and George P. Shultz, yesterday urged Congress not to rush to pass legislation restructuring the intelligence community based "on an election timetable."
The statement marks the first substantial opposition to a rapid congressional response to the recommendations of the commission that investigated the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. President Bush and most congressional leaders have signaled a determination to pass legislation restructuring the nation's intelligence machinery before Congress adjourns for the election.
"Intelligence reform is too complex and too important to undertake at a campaign's breakneck speed," the former officials wrote.
Kissinger told the Senate Appropriations Committee that swift enactment of proposed legislation would result in "months and maybe years of turmoil" as adjustments are made in operating procedures and intelligence machinery. But, he added, "we will have to deal with the immediate terrorist challenge by the apparatus that now exists."
Meanwhile, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee conducted the first of two scheduled markups of a 191-page bill to restructure the U.S. intelligence community, which Chairman Susan Collins (R-Maine) said she hoped to send to the Senate floor today.
The bill, put together by Collins and Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman (Conn.), the ranking committee Democrat, calls for creation of a National Intelligence Authority (NIA) as an independent agency within the executive branch to be headed by the national intelligence director, who would become the president's chief intelligence adviser.
To make certain the intelligence chief is separate from the CIA and other intelligence agencies, the measure requires the NIA to be housed in a separate building and prohibits the director or any of his or her deputies from simultaneously holding a position in any intelligence agency.
The reform measure reflects some proposals put forward by the Sept. 11 commission and has support from Bush and Democratic presidential nominee John F. Kerry. Opposition to quick action came yesterday from the two senior senators on the powerful Appropriations Committee -- Chairman Ted Stevens (R-Alaska) and ranking Democrat Robert C. Byrd (W.Va.) -- and three former senior military officers who had served as commanders in chief of the European, Pacific and Strategic commands.
Byrd called attention to what he described as the "disastrous stampede" that led to passage of the Iraq war resolution and Department of Homeland Security legislation before the 2002 congressional elections. That experience, he said, "should give us sufficient pause to think twice before we attempt to reorganize crucial intelligence activities with one eye on the clock and one eye on the polls."
His solution was to wait until next year, a suggestion that was echoed by former deputy defense secretary John Hamre, president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Hamre, who helped organized the statement by the former officials, said yesterday there is "strong concurrence within the group that 'Let's not make a mistake.' "
The group includes former defense secretaries Frank C. Carlucci and William S. Cohen; former CIA director Robert M. Gates; and former senators Warren B. Rudman (R-N.H.), David Boren (D-Okla.), Bill Bradley (D-N.J.), Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Gary Hart (D-Colo.). "They didn't reach conclusions about what should be done, they only wanted to offer guidelines but not final solutions without more studying," Hamre added.
Kissinger testified that he is concerned about creating "another layer between the existing intelligence institutions and the president." He said he is worried about "combining domestic intelligence with foreign intelligence under one leadership" as the new proposal does.
Rep. Jane Harman (Calif.), ranking Democrat on the Select Intelligence Committee, said she is concerned about the push for a delay and feels it could scuttle the reform effort altogether.
"If we wait until the election is over," she said, "the issue will sink on the next president's agenda" because other issues will overtake it. She said Kissinger told her at lunch yesterday, "you won't like" what he said to the committee, and she replied, "You're right."
During the Governmental Affairs markup, senators with close ties to the intelligence community failed to give the proposed intelligence chief even greater authority over several Pentagon agencies than the Sept. 11 commission proposed. The 12 to 5 committee vote marked a victory for the Pentagon and its congressional allies, who are trying to limit erosion of the military's control over intelligence-gathering agencies.
The Collins-Lieberman bill would give the new intelligence director significant planning, budgetary and personnel authority over several agencies in the Defense Department, but the Pentagon would still control the agencies' operations.
Collins and Lieberman opposed stripping the Pentagon of authority over several agencies such as the National Security Agency, saying it would give the intelligence chief more powers than the commission recommended. In trying "to strike the right balance," Collins said, "we did not want to move the combat-support agencies . . . out of the Department of Defense."
--------
Ex-Pop Singer Held After D.C. Flight
Diverted Former Pop Singer, Now Known as Yusuf Islam, Is on the U.S. No-Fly List
By Sara Kehaulani Goo
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, September 22, 2004; Page A10
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A39772-2004Sep21.html
U.S. security officials yesterday diverted a Washington-bound United Airlines flight and detained Yusuf Islam, formerly known as the pop singer Cat Stevens, after discovering that he had been allowed to board the plane in London even though he was on the government's no-fly list.
Islam was questioned in Bangor, Maine, by Customs and Border Protection agents. Dennis Murphy, spokesman for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, said Islam is scheduled to be deported today on a flight to Europe. "He is being detained on national security grounds," Murphy said. He declined to elaborate.
Islam was denied entry into Israel several years ago out of concerns that his charitable contributions had funded militant groups. He denied knowingly contributing to any such groups.
Homeland Security officials worked with the Federal Aviation Administration yesterday afternoon to order the United flight to land in Bangor, the closest major airport on the East Coast, after learning that Islam was on board the Boeing 747. Islam, whose name is listed as "Usef Islam," is on several government watch lists, including the no-fly list, according to sources familiar with the event.
While the flight was over the Atlantic, Customs and Border Protection agents were routinely comparing the passenger manifest against the watch lists and realized that Islam was on board, these sources said. Airline agents conduct similar checks before flights depart; it was not clear yesterday why Islam was not flagged before he boarded.
Transportation Security Administration spokesman Mark Hatfield said his agency made the decision to divert the flight. "We did not want that aircraft to enter the Northeast corridor airspace," which would have taken it over New York and into Washington, Hatfield said. "We got information that led us to make a decision, based on the fact there was a confirmed individual on board."
United Airlines declined to comment on the incident yesterday but said that its Flight 919 eventually continued to Dulles International Airport yesterday evening.
Islam recorded 12 albums before abandoning his singing career in the late 1980s after he converted to Islam. He drew criticism in the late 1980s after he publicly supported Ayatollah Khomeini's death edict against author Salman Rushdie. After the terrorist attacks in 2001, Islam said he would donate profits from his CD box set to families of the victims of the attacks.
Staff researcher Don Pohlman contributed to this report.
--------
Cat Stevens Held After D.C. Flight Diverted
Washington Post By Sara Kehaulani Goo September 22, 2004 http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A39772-2004Sep21?language=printer
U.S. security officials yesterday diverted a Washington-bound United Airlines flight and detained Yusuf Islam, formerly known as the pop singer Cat Stevens, after discovering that he had been allowed to board the plane in London even though he was on the government's no-fly list.
Islam was questioned in Bangor, Maine, by Customs and Border Protection agents. Dennis Murphy, spokesman for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, said Islam is scheduled to be deported today on a flight to Europe. "He is being detained on national security grounds," Murphy said. He declined to elaborate.
Islam was denied entry into Israel several years ago out of concerns that his charitable contributions had funded militant groups. He denied knowingly contributing to any such groups.
Homeland Security officials worked with the Federal Aviation Administration yesterday afternoon to order the United flight to land in Bangor, the closest major airport on the East Coast, after learning that Islam was on board the Boeing 747. Islam, whose name is listed as "Usef Islam," is on several government watch lists, including the no-fly list, according to sources familiar with the event.
While the flight was over the Atlantic, Customs and Border Protection agents were routinely comparing the passenger manifest against the watch lists and realized that Islam was on board, these sources said. Airline agents conduct similar checks before flights depart; it was not clear yesterday why Islam was not flagged before he boarded.
Transportation Security Administration spokesman Mark Hatfield said his agency made the decision to divert the flight. "We did not want that aircraft to enter the Northeast corridor airspace," which would have taken it over New York and into Washington, Hatfield said. "We got information that led us to make a decision, based on the fact there was a confirmed individual on board."
United Airlines declined to comment on the incident yesterday but said that its Flight 919 eventually continued to Dulles International Airport yesterday evening.
Islam recorded 12 albums before abandoning his singing career in the late 1980s after he converted to Islam. He drew criticism in the late 1980s after he publicly supported Ayatollah Khomeini's death edict against author Salman Rushdie. After the terrorist attacks in 2001, Islam said he would donate profits from his CD box set to families of the victims of the attacks.
-------- POLITICS
Republican Senators tell unpleasant truths
If you don't want to hear a Democrat say that the situation in Iraq is deteriorating dangerously, listen to a Republican
09.22.04
Joe Conason
The New York Observer
http://www.workingforchange.com/article.cfm?itemid=17722
In a Sept. 20 speech that was long overdue, John Kerry outlined the deceptions and failures of George W. Bush's policy in Iraq. Because he is the Democratic nominee for President, and because he hasn't expressed his view of the war with such clarity and cogency before, many voters may remain deaf to Mr. Kerry's realistic warnings about the price of Mr. Bush's "stubborn incompetence."
Partisan though his speech at New York University surely was, however, much the same message is being delivered by the most respected figures in the ruling party.
So if you don't want to hear a Democrat say that the situation in Iraq is deteriorating dangerously, listen to a Republican Senator instead. "The worst thing we can do is hold ourselves hostage to some grand illusion we're winning," said Chuck Hagel, a Republican from Nebraska. "Right now, we are not winning. Things are getting worse .... The fact is, we're in deep trouble in Iraq."
If you don't want to hear a Democrat tell how the Bush administration botched the mission that is further from being accomplished today than a year ago, listen to another Republican Senator. "We made serious mistakes right after the initial successes by not having enough troops there on the ground, by allowing the looting, by not securing the borders," said Arizona's John McCain, still a fervent supporter of the war. "There were a number of things that we did. Most of it can be traced back to not having sufficient numbers of troops there."
If you don't want to hear a Democrat criticize the President and his associates for their delusional approach to Iraq, listen to a very senior Republican Senator.
"Our committee heard blindly optimistic people from the administration prior to the war and people outside the administration -- what I call the 'dancing in the street' crowd -- that we just simply will be greeted with open arms," said Richard Lugar of Indiana, who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. "The nonsense of all that is apparent. The lack of planning is apparent."
Those three Senators are speaking out because they believe the President isn't being candid about the crisis in Iraq, and because they fear that he has no plan to stabilize the country and extricate our troops.
They're rightly outraged when Mr. Bush, the would-be Woodrow Wilson, declares himself pleased by the "progress" toward "democracy" in Baghdad, where nobody can travel without bodyguards. They're furious that his administration cannot account for billions spent, and cannot even spend the billions they authorized. While the President complains constantly about Mr. Kerry's vote against the $87 billion supplemental appropriation last year, the sad fact is that his appointees so far have found no way to use that money wisely -- and are now asking Congress to allow them to "reprogram" the funds they failed to spend.
The three Republican Senators are appalled as well by the evident influence of politics on military strategy, as American commanders struggle to pacify an increasingly alienated population. While Islamist and Baathist insurgents consolidate, the administration hesitates to act -- because a sudden spike in U.S. casualties would endanger Mr. Bush's electoral prospects.
And although they politely avoided the topic, those honest Republicans may well wonder how Mr. Bush can pretend ignorance of the grim assessment delivered by U.S. intelligence agencies last July. That estimate warns that Iraq will remain unstable at best for the foreseeable future, and at worst will descend into civil war.
That is a sickening prospect -- not only for the continuous suffering it would cause the Iraqi people, but for the opportunity such internecine strife would afford our most determined enemies. There is already reason to worry that the Shiite rebellion has created an opening for Iranian agents to extend their influence in Iraq -- and for terrorists linked to Al Qaeda to find refuge there.
The American occupation already seems to have inspired new cooperation between Shiite and Sunni Islamists, despite their religious antipathy. A chaotic "failed state" is the perfect environment for terror to flourish, posing a worse threat to our security than Saddam Hussein ever did.
Actually, as a timely leak from the C.I.A.'s Iraq Survey Group reiterated last week, Mr. Hussein had no "weapons of mass destruction" and no way to manufacture such weapons in meaningful amounts. That isn't Democratic propaganda, or an outtake from a Michael Moore movie. It is merely factual information, gathered over many months by Mr. Bush's own appointees, that explodes any justification for war.
Having made war anyway, Mr. Bush eventually will be forced to confront its unsustainable realities. This could mean a series of horrifically violent confrontations in Iraq's cities, a postponement of the January elections, a wider call-up of National Guard and Reserve units, or even a renewed military draft.
Dissembling now may preserve Mr. Bush's advantage for the next six weeks. But should he win a second term, beware the "November surprise" that will begin to bring home the true costs of his feckless adventure. Joe Conason writes for the New York Observer and Salon.com, and is the author of Big Lies: The Right-Wing Propaganda Machine and How It Distorts the Truth.
-------- propaganda wars
Dyke contributed to his own downfall, counters BBC chief
22/09/2004
telegraph.co.uk
By Tom Leonard, Media Editor
http://www./news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/09/22/ndyke22.xml&sSheet=/news/2004/09/22/ixhome.html
The BBC director-general, Mark Thompson, has criticised Greg Dyke's handling of the Iraqi dossier row and the Hutton inquiry, accusing his predecessor of glossing over his mistakes.
Ending the corporation's silence over Mr Dyke's version of events, he made clear that he believed Mr Dyke had contributed substantially to his own downfall and had let his political views affect his judgment. 'Messed up': Greg Dyke
Mr Thompson, in a review of Mr Dyke's new autobiography - which was accompanied by a television documentary - is repeatedly withering about his predecessor.
Just days after Mr Dyke said he was "depressed" by his successor at the BBC, Mr Thompson returned fire in the corporation's in-house magazine, Ariel.
He accused Mr Dyke, a former Labour donor, of allowing his opinions on "wider issues" - such as the overall justification for the war, New Labour spin and Tony Blair's trustworthiness - to cloud his thinking.
"But hard though it is for many people who were caught up in the emotions of January to accept, none of these are matters on which the BBC can take a view and they can't affect our judgment on the editorial decisions taken at the time," said Mr Thompson.
He also criticised Gavyn Davies, the former BBC chairman, for the "tactical error" of calling an emergency meeting of the governors that gave almost unqualified support to the management stance.
Until now, the BBC has studiously avoided responding to Mr Dyke's claims and giving him publicity for his book, Inside Story.
Mr Dyke insists he was sacked in January simply because he tried to defend the BBC's integrity and independence. He accuses the BBC governors of getting rid of him because they panicked.
In an interview on Monday, Mr Dyke criticised his successor, saying he was "unnerved and depressed" by Mr Thompson's hints of major BBC staff cuts and his failure to capitalise on the Butler report on Iraq.
Mr Thompson, who was chief executive of Channel 4 as the controversy raged at the BBC, has certainly got his own back. He described Mr Dyke's account as "not always pin sharp", adding: "Awkward moments tend to get, at best, a fleeting mention."
Mr Thompson defended the Today reporter Andrew Gilligan's investigation into the Government's justification for going to war in Iraq but he dismissed Mr Dyke's justification that the story was "broadly right".
He said Mr Dyke "messed up" his appearance before Lord Hutton.
While Gilligan's story that the Government "sexed up" the crucial 45 minutes claim over Iraqi weapons "wasn't completely wrong, it wasn't completely right either", said Mr Thompson. Mr Dyke had devoted an entire chapter of his book to showing how the story was "overwhelmingly true" in the light of what we now know, he added.
"But we have to judge the editorial and management decisions about the Gilligan story on the basis of what we knew then, not now. All complaints should be taken seriously, even if one suspects the motives of the complainant."
Mr Thompson also accused Mr Dyke of being "ungenerous" about his own predecessor and old rival John Birt, who had "handed him such a brilliant inheritance".
He added: "Greg belongs to that generation of TV people who . . . nurse vendettas stretching over decades."
-------- us politics
Iran's nuclear ambitions absent from US presidential debate
WASHINGTON (AFP)
Sep 22, 2004
http://www.spacewar.com/2004/040922173603.97afb4mc.html
While Iraq, where weapons of mass destruction were never found, has dominated the US presidential race, mounting fears over neighboring Iran's nuclear arms capacity have barely hit the campaign radar screen.
A State Department spokesman expressed alarm Tuesday over Iran's admitted program of uranium enrichment and declared outright that Terhan was defying the world with an "unrelenting push toward nuclear weapons capability."
But neither President George W. Bush nor his Democratic challenger John Kerry had any immediate reaction Wednesday. A Kerry spokesman, when asked for comment, called the situation "another national security failure" for the Republican administration.
Spokesman Mark Kitchens said Bush's "arrogant unilateralism" made it harder to get support within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to refer Iran to the UN Security Council for possible sanctions.
"We must make clear to Iran that the United States will lead an international effort to push for tougher measures, including sanctions, if they do not comply with the IAEA resolution," Kitchens told AFP.
Despite his remarks, neither side gone out of its way to make Iran an issue in the November 2 election, a passivity that contrasts sharply with the heated rhetoric over Iraq.
Bush argues that Saddam Hussein's mere intention to develop nuclear arms justified the invasion last year to oust him. But Iran, another member of his "axis of evil," never came up in a major speech Tuesday to the United Nations.
The 21-minute address made one just passing reference to his determination to "prevent proliferation" as part of his war on terror keyed by the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Both Kerry and Bush have publicly attached the highest priority to preventing the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. But neither side has spelled out how they would handle continued intransigence by Iran.
Nor have they even hinted at the possibility of eventual military action to prevent Tehran from developing a nuclear weapons capability. Asked about the prospect Wednesday, Kitchens declined to comment.
Kerry appeared to have hardened his position on Iran since December when he proposed bilateral talks "to explore areas of mutual interest with Iran, just as I was prepared to normalize relations with Vietnam a decade ago."
By June he seemed to be soft-pedalling the idea as he declared: "a nuclear armed Iran is unacceptable. An America, whose interest and allies could be on the target list, must no longer sit on the sidelines."
The Massachusetts senator called for strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and suggested Washington "call their bluff" when the Iranians say they are merely trying to meet their domestic energy needs.
"We should ... organize a group of states that will offer the nuclear fuel they need for peaceful purposes and take back the spent fuel so they can't divert it to build a weapon. If Iran does not accept this, their true motivations will be clear."
The administration has not picked up on the idea but Bush insisted last month "we are paying very close attention to Iran. ... We are working with our friends to keep the pressure on the mullahs to listen to the demands of the free world."
The Bush administration has stayed away from any detailed explanation why it was willing to go after Saddam's alleged nuclear arsenal but was not ready to brandish the threat of force against Iran.
"Different threats require different strategies," the president said in his State of the Union address to Congress last year.
-------- ENERGY
-------- energy
U.S. Could Eliminate Oil Use in 50 Years
September 22, 2004
SNOWMASS, Colorado, (ENS)
http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/sep2004/2004-09-22-09.asp#anchor3
By 2015, the United States can save more oil than it gets from the Persian Gulf; by 2025, use less oil than in 1970; by 2040, import no oil; and by 2050, use no oil at all, according to a new study by the Rocky Mountain Institute.
"Unlike previous proposals to force oil savings through government policy, our proposed transition beyond oil is led by business for profit," said Rocky Mountain Institute CEO Amory Lovins.
"Our recommendations are market-based, innovation-driven without mandates, and designed to support, not distort, business logic," Lovins said. "They're self-financing and would cause the federal deficit to go down, not up."
The plan, "Winning the Oil Endgame: Innovation for Profits, Jobs, and Security," shows how at an average cost of $12 per barrel, in 2000 dollars, the United States can save half its oil usage through efficiency, then substitute competitive biofuels and saved natural gas for the rest
This can be accomplished without taxation or new federal regulation, the study shows.
"Because saving and substituting oil costs less than buying it, our study finds a net savings of $70 billion a year," Lovins said. "That acts like a giant tax cut for the nation. It simply makes sense and makes money for all."
The RMI study focuses on cars and light trucks (SUVs, pickups, and vans). These vehicles account for nearly half of projected 2025 oil use. The report demonstrates that ultralight, ultrastrong materials like carbon-fiber can halve vehicles' weight, increase safety, and boost efficiency to about 85 mpg for a midsize car or 66 mpg for a midsize SUV.
"BMW has confirmed that carbon-fiber autobodies weigh only half as much as steel and have exceptional crash performance," said Lovins. "The resulting fuel savings can be like buying gasoline for 56 cents a gallon."
This peer-reviewed Rocky Mountain Institute study is based on its five coauthors' 70 years of combined energy experience, mainly in the private sector, and on extensive industry input. The Pentagon and diverse foundations and private donors funded the research.
The report predicts that to fight better and save money, the Pentagon - the world's largest oil buyer - will accelerate the market emergence of superefficient land, sea, and air platforms.
"A fuel-efficient military could save tens of billions of dollars a year," said Lovins, who served on a Pentagon task force studying this issue.
"As our nation stops needing oil, think of the possibilities of being able to treat oil-rich countries the same as nations that don't own a drop. Imagine too our moral clarity if other countries no longer assume everything the United States does is about oil."
The report is introduced in forewords by former Secretary of State, Treasury, and Labor George P. Shultz, an ex-Marine who also chaired the Bechtel Corporation, and by oil geologist and former Shell Chairman Sir Mark Moody-Stuart.
The report, its executive summary, and its technical backup is found at: www.oilendgame.com.
-------- OTHER
-------- environment
Brownfields Cleanup Progress Slow
September 22, 2004
ST. LOUIS, Missouri, (ENS)
http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/sep2004/2004-09-22-09.asp#anchor4
Cleaning up the nation's contaminated and unwanted properties, known as brownfields, has absorbed $126.7 million in funding from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in fiscal year 2004, according to a new report released at the Brownfields 2004 National Conference in St. Louis.
The EPA issued the report surveying two years of activity by the Brownfields Federal Partnership Action Agenda, a Bush administration initiative announced in November 2002.
The Agenda contained more than 100 commitments from 23 federal organizations to address brownfields contamination. The EPA reports that more than 75 percent of the commitments have been met.
But while the report touches on what 23 government agencies intend to do about brownfields, it contains little of substance that is new. For instance, while it says that the Economic Development Administration (EDA) of the Commerce Department, "Managed a substantial and growing brownfields investment portfolio that has increased to a quarter billion dollars in the last five years," it does not say that this money was actually used to remediate brownfields.
Instead, the report says the EDA "maintained a National Brownfields Coordinator at headquarters; requested that budget dollars be earmarked for brownfields cleanup activities as part of its Congressional reauthorization legislation; hosted a national satellite telecast entitled Brownfields: Market-Based Solutions for Rehabilitation in March 2004; and held a high-profile session on brownfields entitled Brownfields: Unlocking Economic Opportunity at the EDA's national economic development conference in Washington, D.C."
The EDA has also, "Continued to consider eco-industrial development proposals in the context of brownfields redevelopment investments and has begun discussing collaborative models to facilitate joint support of eco-industrial development with EPA."
The rest of the report is a rehash of old announcements such as the selection of the first three Portfields Pilots by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
While the EPA makes much of the Portfields initiative to remediate brownfields in the vicinity of ports, the progress report shows that little has actually been done. Meetings have been held, a website has been built and identification of possible sites is underway, but no cleanups have been done.
One sign of progress came from NOAA which provided $90,000 in FY 2004 to serve as seed money to leverage additional finance and technical assistance for the Portfields effort. One of the three demonstration sites - New Bedford - has received $5 million from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to conduct navigational dredging in coordination with EPA's Superfund cleanup of New Bedford Harbor. Private sector users are contributing $200,000 to this effort.
View the Brownfields Federal Partnership Progress Report at: http://www.epa.gov/brownfields.
-------- ACTIVISTS
Fall Gathering and Gov't Nuke Waste Meetings
From: shundahai <shundahai@shundahai.org>
Date: Wed Sep 22, 2004 1:06pm
Action Alert. Please Forward and Distribute Widely
U.S. Government Nuke Waste Panel Follows Skull Valley Environmental Justice Gathering October 2004
A Panel representing the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (NWTRB) will be in Salt Lake City, Utah, for two days of meetings- Tuesday, October 13th, and Wednesday, October 14th, 2004.
The NWTRB is an independent agency of the U.S. Government. Its sole purpose is to provide independent scientific and technical oversight of the U.S. program for management and disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel from civilian nuclear power plants.
The purpose of these meetings is to discuss issues related to planning for the potential transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste to a proposed repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada, and to the proposed temporary storage facility on the Skull Valley Goshute Indian Reservation in Utah.
Opportunity for public comment will be available.
These panel meetings come on the heals of the three-day Nuclear-Free Great Basin fall gathering scheduled for the prior weekend on the Skull Valley Goshute reservation. The Skull Valley gathering will be hosted October 8th-10th, 2004, by Margene Bullcreek on her family's reservation land. It is organized with the cooperation of the Shundahai Network.
The purpose of the Skull Valley gathering is to provide opportunity for Goshute opponents of the Private Fuel Storage nuclear waste project to share their experiences and information, for related concerns to be shared and discussed by allied indigenous activists, and for other concerned interests to share experiences and to demonstrate solidarity in support of environmental justice.
These events are organized independently of each other by seperate entities. As such, this announcement should not be costrued as endorsement of each other's events by either organizing party. However, Shundahai Network invites our friends and supporters to participate in both the weekend gathering in Skull Valley and the Technical Review Board discussions two days later in Salt Lake City.
Event Information:
1. Nuclear Free Great Basin Fall Gathering- October 8-10th, 2004.
Location: Skull Valley Goshute Reservation- near the home of Margene Bullcreek.
Directions to Gathering Site: From Salt Lake City, UT Take I-80 West Toward Wendover, NV- Drive 43 miles Take Exit # 77 (Rowley/Dugway Exit) Turn Left on the Skull Valley Road- Drive 26 miles Follow Signs to Gathering Location
Gathering Schedule: Friday, Oct. 8th- Sunrise Ceremony led by Corbin Harney, Western Shoshone Spiritual Leader Breakfast Greeting- Event protocols discussion Issues Orientation-Update Lunch Formal Orientation/Protocols Review- Issue Update/Discussion Of Weekend Itinerary. Dinner Talent Show (Bring your instruments, poetry and voice!) Camping
Saturday, Oct. 9th: Sunrise Ceremony led by Corbin Harney Breakfast Work/Infoshops/Prepare for Hearing Lunch and Traditional Native Dancers Press Conference People's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Hearing Men's and Women's Sweat Lodges Dinner Concert- David Rovics Camping
Sunday, Oct. 10th: Sunrise Ceremony led by Corbin Harney Men's and Women's Sweat Lodges Breakfast Indigenous Presentations Lunch Goshute-led Spirit Run from Camp to proposed PFS Site- Rally and March from Camp to Skull Valley Road (tentative) Camp Break-Down Dinner For Remaining Participants/Event Staff
Be prepared for high desert camping, where the weather can be either hot or cold, dry or wet. A $10.00 per day registration donation is requested. Meals and all events are included with Registration. No one will be turned away for lack of funds. NO Alcohol, Drugs, or Weapons.
This event is hosted by Ohngo Gaudedeh Devia Awareness and organized by The Shundahai Network. For more information about the Nuclear Free Great Basin fall gathering, please call 801-533-0128 or email shundahai@s...
2. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (NWTRB) Panel Discussions- October 13-14th, 2004.
Location: Sheraton City Center Hotel 150 West 500 South Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 (tel.) 801-401-2000 (fax) 801-534-3450
Public Panel/Hearing Schedule: Wednesday, October 13th 2004 8:00 a.m.- 5:30 p.m.
The purpose of this meeting is to discuss the DOEıs transportation planning and the experience of regional groups involved in transporting spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste.
October 14th 2004 8:00 a.m.- 12:00 noon
The purpose of this meeting is to review the experiences of Private Fuel Storage, LLC, in planning for transportation of spent nuclear fuel to its proposed facility in Utah. The panel also will review issues of risk perception in the transportation planning process.
Agenda details will be confirmed approximately one week before the meeting dates. Copies of the agendas can be requested by telephone or obtained from the Boardıs Web site at http://www.nwtrb.gov.
Transcripts of the meetings will be available on the Boardıs Web site, by e-mail, on computer disk, and on a library-loan basis in paper format from Davonya Barnes of the Boardıs staff, beginning on November 29, 2004.
This event is organized by the US Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board. For more information about these NWTRB Meetings, contact the NWTRB: Karyn Severson, External Affairs; 2300 Clarendon Boulevard, Suite 1300; Arlington, VA 22201-3367; (tel.) 703-235-4473; (fax) 703-235-4495.
--------
Carter: U.S. Presence Fuels Attacks
September 22, 2004
Atlanta Journal-Constitution
http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,FL_carter_092204,00.html?ESRC=eb.nl
Former President Jimmy Carter said Tuesday he hopes the United States will withdraw its troops from Iraq next year, if Iraqis are able to govern themselves by then.
Carter said bloodshed in the country "would be tremendously reduced" if Iraqis knew U.S. troops were not there to stay.
The former president, answering written questions at a Carter Center forum, said the perception among Iraqis of a long-term U.S. military presence is the main reason the violence continues.
He also said elections planned for Iraq next year could help reduce tensions there. Those elections, he said, may not be as problem-free as most U.S. elections but generally would be fair.
"There is a ghost of a chance for democracy," Carter said.
He reiterated his belief that the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was an unnecessary and "horrible war" that was based on a "deliberate" misinterpretation of intelligence. Saddam Hussein, while "a horrible man," did not threaten U.S. security, he said.
Carter, who has visited about 120 countries over the years, said he's never seen opinions of the United States as low as they are now.
"It's hard to find a country that looks to the U.S. with admiration," he said.
Turning to domestic politics, Carter discussed the bitter controversy over Sen. John Kerry's military service in the Vietnam War. Those who "refused to go" into the military during the Vietnam era are quick to question Kerry's service, he said.
"He's stigmatized as someone who's not worthy to defend our country," he said.
Asked about the race, Carter bemoaned the abundance of negative television ads and a culture in which he said big companies and special-interest groups give money to candidates with the expectation of later rewards.
And Carter decried the loss of civility in the campaign.
When he ran for president in 1976 and for re-election in 1980, Carter said, he and his Republican opponents generally addressed each other as "my distinguished opponent."
He cited the 2002 U.S. Senate campaign in Georgia, when Saxby Chambliss, who won, attacked incumbent Max Cleland for opposing a homeland security bill. A Chambliss TV ad, Carter said, depicted Cleland with Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein.
Carter took particular exception to Chambliss' criticism of Cleland --- a Vietnam veteran who lost three limbs in that war --- saying Chambliss had never served in the military.
The sad, thing, Carter said, is how effective such negative campaigns are. "The best way to win an election is to totally destroy the character of your opponent."
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