------- Index of Articles

NUCLEAR
Navy near proposal to raise boat
China halts Iraq helpers
Hibakusha Wins in Nagasaki A-Bomb Matsuya Lawsuit
Powell may expand N. Korean agenda
Defense to shift blame on sub wreck
SUB COMMANDER TEARFUL, APOLOGIZES
CIA documents reveal differences over Cuba crisis
Document says CIA overstated Soviet threat
Ask More From N. Korea
Bush's N. Korea Stance Signals a Shift Policy:
U.S. Urged To Resume N. Korea Talks
Admiral Says Sub Captain Did Not Act Criminally
Sub's Sonar Probe Too Short, Expert Testifies
Powell wants North Korea to reduce million-man army
Anger at China
International Humanitarian Law in a World of Global Processes
Ditching Finn nuclear plans would raise bills
German activists occupy nuclear waste loading site
U.S. to Revisit North Korea Pact
U.S. Questioned on N. Korea Stance
Macho on North Korea
North Korea's Failures
The visitor from South Korea
Weapons sales concern Seoul, United States
Day 'warm' to missile system
USA Allies keep balking at US missile defense
Losing Momentum on Korea
Bush administration to review USEC-Russian deal
South by High-Tech
The Domenici Deception:
Senator seeks more US reliance on nuclear power
TVA mulls reviving Ala. nuclear power plant
Investigators question government uranium deal
Group seeks home for N-waste

MILITARY
Ranchers organize vigilante groups
China Reassures Powell on Iraq Dealings
G.I.'s Based in Kosovo Won't Help in Serbia
Mixed signals sent on evolving Bush foreign policy
Taiwan appeals for U.S. arms sales
Colombia talks attracting support
Colombia in New Dispute With Venezuela Over a Missing Rebel
The Trajectory of a Painkiller
Land mine heartland
Polishing Public Profile of U.N.
VOW TO U.N.
Sanctions imposed on diamond exports
U.S. SHIP NAMED FOR CHURCHILL:
3 Midshipmen Resign in Deal in Rape Case
Osprey Victims' Families Testify
Army gives China the order for berets

OTHER
ANTI-BEETLE PLAN
Ducks of Manhattan
Our Dependence on Oil
Tycoon to president
Norton's deputy
Unapproved corn found in veggie dogs
IMF reforms lacking
The banana wars
An Inquiry Into Claims That Motorists Were Ordered to Undress
Ticket-writing double standard
Guilty plea in Australian spy case
12 HELD AS SPIES
Embassy worker ID's defendant
Man in bomb plot case pleads guilty
REBEL EXHUMATION
Truck Pieces and Testimony Show Embassy Blast's Force

ACTIVISTS
Peter, Paul & Mary:
China's Leadership Pushes for Unity


-------- NUCLEAR

Navy near proposal to raise boat

3/9/2001
InfoBeat News
Associated Press
By SUSANNE M. SCHAFER
http://www.infobeat.com/cgi-bin/WebObjects/IBFrontEnd.woa/wa/fullStory?article=406351436

WASHINGTON (AP) - Navy engineers are expected to present a formal proposal to the Japanese early next week for lifting the fishing vessel sunk by a U.S. submarine, officials said Thursday.

A final decision on how to proceed is not expected until several days after that.

A Japanese delegation has been in Washington since Monday meeting with experts at the Naval Sea Systems Command, the Navy's technical division.

A Dutch salvage company that may take up the bulk of the recovery effort presented its contract proposal for dealing with the 500-ton vessel to the Navy on Thursday, said Navy spokesman Cmdr. Greg Smith.

``The Navy has received the proposal and will evaluate it over the next several days,'' he said.

The Ehime Maru, a training ship for fishing students, sank within minutes of being hit on Feb. 9 by the USS Greeneville. Four Japanese students, two teachers and three crewmen were lost. The 190-foot trawler lies in 2,000 feet of water nine miles off Waikiki Beach in Hawaii.

The recovery effort is expected to be a difficult one, given the depth of the wreckage and the damage sustained by the trawler.

The Naval Seas Systems Command is expected to take about four days to evaluate the contract proposal and then make a formal recommendation to Navy leaders, said one Navy official.

Once there is a decision about a course of action, there will have to be discussions with the Japanese, the official said, and the state of Hawaii, the Environmental Protection Agency and other segments of government will have to be dealt with.

For example, the vessel is expected to contain fuel or other oils that could have an impact on surrounding waters if spilled.

A second official, queried about a report from Japan that the method suggested involves wrapping steel plates around the Ehime Maru before it is lifted, said the exact method will depend on the condition of the boat's hull.

In 1999, the Navy contracted with the Dutch firm Smit-International to help retrieve wreckage from the EgyptAir Flight 990. The Boeing 767 crashed south of the Massachusetts island of Nantucket, killing all 217 aboard.

------

China halts Iraq helpers

3/9/2001
InfoBeat News
http://www.infobeat.com/cgi-bin/WebObjects/IBFrontEnd.woa/wa/fullStory?article=406351215

WASHINGTON (AP) - China has ordered Chinese companies helping Iraq to modernize its air defense systems to halt their activities, Secretary of State Colin Powell said Thursday.

Powell disclosed the Chinese action during a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

``China has now said they have told the companies that were in the area doing fiber optics work to cease and desist,'' Powell said.

He said the United States has made no decision on whether the activities of the companies were a violation of U.N. Security Council sanctions against Iraq.

Powell added that the United States will present a complaint to the U.N. sanctions committee if Washington concludes there was a violation.

Washington protested to Beijing after intelligence reports indicated that Chinese workers were in Iraq laying fiber-optic cables to improve communications for air defense networks.

Three weeks ago, U.S. and British forces bombed radar sites in what their governments said was an effort to prevent Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein from building an effective air defense.

-------- japan

Hibakusha Wins in Nagasaki A-Bomb Matsuya Lawsuit:
Claims of Thousands of Nuclear Victims of the World Justified

March 9, 2001
Gensuikyo
http://www.twics.com/~antiatom/ab/ehibaku/eh-menu.htm

On July 18, 2000, the Supreme Court of Japan dismissed the final appeal of the defendant, the Minister of Health and Welfare, on the Nagasaki A-bomb Matsuya Lawsuit. The court reconfirmed the Nagasaki District Court and the Fukuoka High Court rulings that Hideko Matsuya's disability was caused by radiation from the atomic bomb and ordered the Ministry to withdraw its rejection of Matsuya's application for official recognition of her disabilities as A-bomb induced. Matsuya's victory was made possible by the nationwide support she has received.

As the first ruling of the Supreme Court, this judgment holds great international significance. It gives strong impact supporting the claims of not only A-bomb victims, but also nuclear victims all over the world on their deaths and suffering caused by nuclear tests, weapons development/production and accidents at nuclear-related facilities. With this decision addressing properly the reality of long-distance A-bomb victims and pointing out the unreasonableness of the process by which official recognition was granted, the very ground for governments' denial to providing compensation to these nuclear victims has now been lost.

We express our heartfelt gratitude to the people of the entire world who have given support to this Hibakusha lawsuit, and hope that the information in this web-site will be of use and help to support the struggles of the world nuclear victims.

Summary of the Nagasaki A-bomb Matsuya Lawsuit

Text of the Supreme Court Judgement

Statement by Hideko Matsuya and the General Secretary of the Plaintiff Counsel at 2000 World Conference against A & H Bombs

History of the Matsuya Case

Summary of the Nagasaki A-bomb Matsuya Lawsuit

The Ministry of Health and Welfare rejected Ms. Hideko Matsuya's application for official recognition of her disabilities based on Article 8 of the Law on Medical Measures for the Victims of the Atomic Bomb (the A-bomb Medical Law). This Nagasaki A-bomb Matsuya Lawsuit was a case which sought to have this rejection dismissed. In short, in order for Matsuya to receive 'medical care (Article 7)' based on the A-bomb Medical Law, it was necessary that the Ministry 'recognize' that her disabilities were 'caused by the effect of the atomic bomb' or 'recognize' that she was 'currently in need of medical care because her healing ability had been affected by radiation from the bomb (Article 7 and 8)'.

However, the Ministry rejected Matsuya's request on the ground that 'the possibility that applicant's disabilities were caused by A-bomb radiation can be denied'. Matsuya decided to file a suit against the Ministry based on the argument that the Ministry's interpretation and application of Articles 7 and 8 of the A-bomb Medical Law were erroneous, and that therefore the rejection must be dismissed.

In its counterargument, the Ministry reiterated the reasoning it made when it rejected Matsuya's application in the first place, namely that Matsuya's disabilities could not be understood as having been caused by A-bomb radiation, and that consequently its decision to reject the application was lawful.

Therefore, the immediate focus of the case was on whether or not Matsuya's disabilities satisfied the above requirements. So it was necessary for the plaintiff counsel a) to identify the meaning of the requirements and medically explain the disabilities' relation to A-bomb radiation and b) to clarify the burden of proof. The latter refers to whether it was Matsuya who should explain how her disability was related to radiation or whether it was the Ministry who should demonstrate that the disorder was not related to radiation. Additional to these 2 points, the counsel elaborated on c) the reality of the A-bomb destruction and d) the government's responsibility for state compensation for the Hibakusha, because clear understanding of these two arguments were essential in the consideration of the burden of proof.

1. Requirement of Proving Causability Dr. Shuntaro Hida (was an army surgeon and in Hiroshima at the time of the bombing. Since the very day of the bombing he has engaged himself in providing medical care for the Hibakusha and for the abolition of nuclear weapons) and Dr. Kanehiko Yamashita (who has been in charge of Ms. Matsuya since 1985) testified before the court to medically demonstrate how Matsuya's disorder is related to radiation.

Hida's testimony can be summarized into 4 points. 1) The effect of radiation, as generally understood, does not necessarily diminish according to the distance from the hypocenter, and even at the same distance from the hypocenter, there were people who were severely affected by radiation and people who were not. 2) He witnessed boys who were at 2.5 km and a farmer who was at 4.0 km from the hypocenter die after showing radiation injuries. 3) There is an increasing understanding in radiological studies of the serious effect of low dose irradiation on the human body. And 4) medical science is still in its infancy in fully grasping the effect of radiation on the human body, so there are plenty of areas in this field which need to be explored.

Yamashita testified with concrete evidence that the relation between Matsuya's brain injury and radiation could not be denied. By showing X-ray photographs of Matsuya's CT scanned brain, Yamashita explained to the judges the large extent of the damage on her brain cells, which, he asserted, was unlikely to have been caused by mere external injury, but rather by multiple effects of radiation. Given that his patient had contracted a polyp in her stomach as well as hysteromyoma, he concluded that the possibility that Matsuya's entire body had been affected by radiation could not be ruled out.

In concluding his remarks, Yamashita expressed his indignation at the Ministry's inflexible attitude in rejecting Matsuya's application without showing any scientific facts.

When combined with the testimony of Professor Ikuro Anzai, the above evidence showed that the defendant's argument that 'there cannot be any effect of radiation because Matsuya was 2.45 kilometers from the hypocenter' was without rational basis.

Prof. Anzai (Ritsumeikan University, specialized in radiation protection) explained in his testimony that the DS 86 (Dosimetry System of 1986) was not based on estimation of all kinds of radiation emitted from the atomic bombs, and that there was no way to carry out such a thorough estimation since data on which the bombs' structures and calculations were based is still a military secret. The most important point of Anzai's testimony was that up to now, only ionizing radiation of the A-bombs, such as gamma and neutron rays, had been considered as having caused damage to the human body, but factors such as nuclear electromagnetic pulse and huge amounts of non-ionizing radiation (radio waves) radiated from the fire ball also must be taken into consideration in estimating the real effect of the bombs.

In short, the argument of the Health and Welfare Ministry had been that 'the amount of radiation Matsuya absorbed at 2.45 km from the epicenter was a mere 6.1 rad, and it is unthinkable that this amount could have any effect on the human body'. Such a conclusion, however, goes against our common knowledge on the real effect of the bombs. A number of Hibakusha, who ought to have been exposed to a small amount of radiation according to the current dose estimate (DS 86), showed symptoms of radiation injuries, such as loss of hair. Scientifically speaking, these could not have happened.

Then what is wrong with the Ministry's argument? It's wrong because it stands on the ground that the radiation dose computed by the DS 86 is capable of explaining every kind of effect of the bombs. Anzai's statement had great significance in the understanding of relief measures for the Hibakusha. He argued that such measures should be based on the reality of the Hibakusha's sufferings themselves and not on contemporary scientific knowledge, whose application would lead to certain A-bomb damages that fall outside its understanding being neglected. He stressed that such a practice should absolutely be avoided.

2. Effect of the Atomic Bombs For the sake of convenience, Matsuya's plaintiff counsel discussed the damage of the atomic bombing under different categories: physical, mental, property and social damage. At the same time, the counsel pointed out the insufficiency of such analytical consideration of the effect of the bombing and emphasized the need of a comprehensive understanding.

Ms. Chieko Watanabe (in 1959 officially recognized as having A-bomb induced injuries, hypochromemia and paralysis of lower side of the body) who was exposed to the bomb in Nagasaki at a slightly further distance than and in the same direction as Matsuya, also testified. She explained that she not only suffered from various acute radiation injuries, but also that she was still unable to fully recover from the wounds, which continued to suppurate at the time of her testimony. She also testified about other tragedies inflicted upon her by the bombing. Watanabe's physical symptoms were similar to Matsuya's, which are caused by degradation of the immune system due to the radiation. (On March 13, 1993, three months after giving the testimony, Chieko passed away as a result of heart failure. She was 64 years old.)

Mr. Mitsunori Kusumoto, who lived next door to Matsuya and suffered burns from the bombing while playing by the riverside, gave evidence of seeing his friends, who were with him, and a schoolgirl, who lived in the neighborhood of Matsuya, suffer from loss of hair after the bombing.

Mr. Senji Yamaguchi testified about his hell-like experience in Nagasaki. He also showed data prepared by the Japan Confederation of A and H Bomb Suffers Organizations (Nihon Hidankyo) and demonstrated the existence of a number of cases of acute radiation injuries among long distance Hibakusha as well as the incidence of various symptoms called A-bomb disease among them.

These testimonies by the Hibakusha refuted the Ministry's distorted view that 'Matsuya's radiation dose estimated by the DS 86 is a mere 6.1 rad, and that cannot have any effect on human body'.

3. Government's Responsibility for State Compensation The plaintiff's counsel elaborated on 5 points as to why the A-bomb Medical Law should be interpreted as having the nature of a state compensation law. One reason, which is central to this issue, is that the state is responsible for state compensation for A-bomb damage in the first place because the atomic bombs are peculiar in 'leaving perpetual physical disability due to late effects of radiation unique to the atomic bomb, and for this reason the Hibakusha have been gravely afflicted with physical, mental, economical and social damages not comparable to those of war victims in general (Ishida case)'.

The government is responsible for a state compensation also for a) initiating and waging the war which led to the atomic bombings, b) with the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, relinquishing its right to claim damages which it could have otherwise claimed from the Unites States and c) having continued to neglect the Hibakusha in the post-war period, thus aggravating their suffering.

4. Burden of Proof Given that the government is responsible for state compensation for the Hibakusha for the above reasons, the counsel stressed that, to the greatest degree possible, the A-bomb Medical Law must be interpreted and put into practice for the benefit of the Hibakusha. It was from this viewpoint that the counsel argued that the burden of proof lay with the defendant, the Ministry of Health and Welfare. That is, unless the defendant could verify the existence of no relation between a Hibakusha's injuries or diseases and A-bomb radiation, they should be recognized as having been caused by radiation.

Provided the burden of proof lay with the plaintiff, the counsel argued that a Hibakusha's injuries or diseases, which were the subject of the recognition, should be considered as having been caused by the radiation if they had been diagnosed as such and unless the diagnosis was medically unconvincing.

--

Text of the Supreme Court Judgement

(Unofficial Translation; * - inserted by the Editor for clarification)

July 18, 2000

Appellant: Minister of Health and Welfare Yuji Tsushima Appellee: Hideko Matsuya

Concerning the case between the above two parties examined by the Fukuoka High Court as Case Number Gyo-ko No. 17 of 1993, in which a repeal of the decision (*by the Ministry of Health) that turned down the application (*of Hideko Matsuya) for medical allowance for the A-bomb victims was claimed, the High Court issued a ruling on November 7, 1997, and the Appellant appealed the case (*to the Supreme Court). Hence, this court rules as follows:

Main Text

The appeal shall be dismissed. The cost of the appeal shall be born by the Appellant.

Reasons

I. The case under examination concerns the claim of the Appellee, a victim of the atomic bomb used at Nagasaki, seeking withdrawal of a decision by the Appellant reached on September 24, 1987 that turned down the request of the Appellee having been submitted on the basis of Item 1, Article 8 of the Law Concerning Medical Care for the Victims of the Atomic Bombs (Law No. 41 in 1957, annulled in 1994 due to Law No.117, hereinafter referred to as "the Law") to have the hemiplegia and paralysis of the right side of her body and the external injury on her head certified as having been caused by the injuring effect of the A-bomb.

II. Item 1, Article 7 of the Law provides that "the Minister of Health and Welfare confers an allowance on the Hibakusha (A-Bomb victims) who were injured or contracted an illness due to the damaging effect of the atomic bombs and that who actually need medical care. However, in case the injury or illness in question is not caused by the radioactivity of the atomic bomb, this allowance is applicable only when he or she actually needs medical treatment because of his or her healing ability being affected by the radioactivity of the atomic bombs." Item 1, Article 8 of the Law further provides that "those who seek to receive a medical allowance provided by Item 1 of the preceding article need to be certified in advance by the Minister of Health and Welfare that the injury or illness in question has been caused by the damaging effect of the atomic bombs." According to these provisions, in order to achieve this certification based on Item 1, Article 8 of the Law, it is understood that the Hibakusha need to be in a condition actually requiring medical care ("medical care requirement"). In addition to this requirement, the Hibakusha's current wound/illness, which actually requires medical care should be one caused by the A-bomb radiation, or, the above wound/illness should be caused by the damaging effect of the A-bomb other than the radiation but the Hibakusha's healing ability has been affected by the A-bomb radiation, causing him/her to remain in the above condition ("causability of radiation"). The original court ruled as follows: The above certification is made possible only when the applicant has proved that his/her injury or illness has been caused by the A-bomb radiation. However, in light of the severity of damage from the A-bombs, the special nature of the post-A-bomb diseases as well as the purpose and nature of the Law, the degree of proof on the causability of radiation should be interpreted as being sufficient if a "considerable degree of probability" is proved on the causality of applicant's injury or illness by the damaging effect of the A-bomb. Even if the degree of "high probability" is not proved from a physical and scientific point of view, the certification should be done by taking into consideration the situation at the time of the bombing, clinical history afterwards and the present condition of the Hibakusha.

However, when the existence of a causal relationship is required for a certain administrative disposition, in a lawsuit seeking revocation of the rejection of the disposition, the degree of proof on the causal relationship to be given by the person whose application was rejected should not be different from that in any other civil suit, as long as there has been no specific condition set beforehand. And the proof of causal relationship in a suit should be to demonstrate a high degree of probability that can confirm the relation in which a specific fact has brought about a specific result, through a comprehensive examination of all the evidence in light of empirical rule, if not through natural science allowing absolutely no doubts. The disposition on the proof should be understood as requiring the certainty of the truth to the degree where ordinary persons do not raise any doubts about it. Therefore, with regard to the causability of radiation, one of the requirements for certification set in Item 1 of Article 8 of the Law, proving the "considerable degree of probability" on the facts requiring proof cannot be judged as being sufficient. And it is needless to say that, in proving the influence of the bomb radiation on the healing ability of a person who is in need of medical treatment to his/her injury or illness not caused by the radiation, the fact that the person is affected by the above "influence" with high degree of probability must be proved. It follows that, if the original court had made a contradictory decision from the above principle based on the purpose of existing laws regarding the degree of proof on the causal relationship, which should have been dealt with as an issue of the law on civil suits, it cannot but be considered as making a wrong interpretation of the Law and the Code of Civil Procedure.

However, there are cases in which existing laws provide that the facts to be proven do not require strict existence of causal relationship. For example, Item 1 of Article 5 of the Law Concerning Special Measures for the A-Bomb Victims (Law No. 53 of 1968, hereinafter referred to as "Special Measures Law"; annulled by the enactment of the Law 117 of 1994), which was examined by the original court in the process of reaching the above ruling, provides as a requirement for eligibility of the health management allowance that disorder in hematopoietic function or others suffered by the Hibakusha "is not clearly established as not having been caused by the effects of the A-bomb radiation". So, this provision can be interpreted as having set as requirements "the inability of showing clear absence of causal relations" between the radiation and disorder in hematopoietic function or others, instead of proving the relationship. The above ruling of the original court may lead to the understanding that the requirement on the causality of radiation as provided for in Item 1 of Article 8 of the Law, which is an associated law of the Special Measures Law, should be interpreted in a similar manner. However, the Special Measures Law clearly sets separate requirements for the granting of each specific allowance. In contrast to the explicit provision in Item 1 of Article 5 of the law concerning the Health Management Allowance that requires only weak causal relationship as stated above, there should be no other interpretation for the provision in Article 2 of the law regarding the payment of the Special Medical Allowance than that the presence of ordinary causal relationship, not a weak one, is required. And, compared with these provisions in the Special Measures Law, Item 1 of Article 7 of the Law should be interpreted as setting the requirement of proving a general causal relationship between the radiation and a given injury, illness or healing ability. This should not change even if there lies consideration for the victims at the bottom of the Law or the Special Measures Law, which is similar to State compensation. Therefore, the above judgement of the original court should be regarded as a wrong interpretation of the law, even if it involves the requirements of substance.

III. The original court judged that the Appellee is in an actual situation requiring medical care and that the situation has the causality of radiation, after making comprehensive examination of all evidence in this case, and ruled that the administrative disposition in question was illegal. So, as set below, this court discusses the judgement made by the original court, which affirmed the stated causality of radiation.

1. The outline of facts lawfully confirmed by the original court as the precondition of the above judgement is as follows:

(1) At 11:02 on August 9, 1945, when the atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, the Appellee (then 3 years and 5 months old) was on the verandah of her home, located 2.45 km from the center of the blast at 1-15 Inasa-machi, Nagasaki City (Present address: 415-2 Asahi-machi, Nagasaki City). A roofing tile blown by the bomb blast hit her directly in the left top of the head, and she suffered a serious injury of a depressed fracture and partial loss in the left parietal region of the skull. Due to the above injury, the Appellee temporarily fell into unconsciousness and the loss of motor function of her superior and inferior limbs, but was able to receive only an application of mercurochrome as treatment. For several days that followed, the Appellee stayed home showing the symptoms of diarrhea, and started to lose the hair on her head.

(2) On August 16, the Appellee was taken from home by her parents on foot, past a place 1.7 km from the blast center to Nagasaki Station. They took a train, which passed an area in close proximity to ground zero, to take refuge in Aino-cho, Minami-Takaki-gun, Nagasaki, and spent about 10 days there before going home. During her stay there, the Appellee was bed-ridden and did not have a chance to get any medical treatment, which made her wound in the head fester and produce pus.

(3) Around early October the same year, the Appellee evacuated with her parents to Tomie-cho, Matsuura-gun of Nagasaki. There, too, she was bed-ridden, and lost even more hair. The wound in her head did not close, heavily oozing pus or a watery secretion with strong stench of something rotting. With a diagnosis of a doctor that her wound could heal in a short while, she received treatment, but when part of the wound was about to close, another part started to ooze pus. Such a situation occurred repeatedly and the treatment was hardly effective. It was about 2 years and a half after the atomic bombing that the wound finally managed to close. Such a process of the Appellee's condition and the delay in healing was something that could not be explained fully only by the insufficient or improper treatment she received. During the treatment in this town, a small piece of a roof-tile was extracted from the wound in the Appellee's head.

(4) From December 31, 1945 to January 1, 1946, the Appellee was attacked by serious continuous fits of convulsions accompanying fainting, but was brought around by cardiac compression. The frequency of similar fits gradually declined, but she fell into unconsciousness once or twice a year during her school years, which continued until around 1967. Around 1959, she had a high fever of about 39 degrees Celsius, which continued for a week. At that time, her condition was not diagnosed clearly as an infection disease, and the cause was not found.

(5) The Appellee, both at the time of the administrative disposition and at present, has been diagnosed as having dextro-hemiplegia (brain atrophy) with head injury and has such disabilities as incomplete paralysis on the right side of her body and a flexion contracture of the right elbow joint. The left parietal region of her skull suffered a depressed fracture and some brain tissue was lost in the part of the fracture. This defect part is connected with the lateral ventricle, which is diagnosed as medullary porencephaly, and she has a variety of other indefinite complaints. It is difficult to fundamentally treat them, but for easing these conditions, drug therapy and physiotherapy are actually necessary.

(6) In general, in the case of head injury caused by a small object flying at high speed, the effect on the brain tissue is usually limited only to the injured area and does not cause much effect on the whole of the brain. However, the Appellee's injury was beyond such general explanation and extensive damage was inflicted on the parenchyma of the brain. Such an extensive medullary porencephaly is a rare condition and cannot be explained as just a complication of the head injury. This strongly suggests that there have been additional elements other than the blow by the roofing tile.

(7) According to the result of a survey conducted by a Japan-US joint investigation team in 1945 in Nagasaki, loss of hair was observed in 18% of the people within 1.5 km of the blast center and 10 % within 2 km. In Hiroshima, it was 19% within 1.5 km, and 7.5% within 2 km. In both cities, it is said that as the distance from the blast center got larger, the frequency of hair-loss grew less. Also, the survey conducted by the Ministry of Health in 1965 suggested that among those who were beyond 2 km radius of the blast center, there were significant number of people who had acute symptoms such as loss of hair, and even among the people who were outside a 4 km radius, 11% of those having entered the city in an early period, and 3.1% of others showed the loss of hair. Further, according to a Ministry of Health survey of 1985, among the deaths caused within 2 or 3 km radius of the blast center, 3.2% in Nagasaki and 5.4% in Hiroshima were from acute diseases.

Also, Chieko Watanabe, hit by the A-bomb at 2.9 km from the Nagasaki blast center , which was in the same direction of the area where the Appellee was located, had her spine fractured under a steel beam of a collapsed factory. She developed high fever immediately after the bombing, and after some time, it was followed by loss of hair. She did not have menstruation for a year after the bombing. The wound did not heal easily, which festered and let off a stench. As of June 29, 1959, she received recognition that Item 1 of Article 8 of the Law was applicable to her.

Mitsunori Kusumoto, who was at 2.4 km from the ground zero of Nagasaki, experienced some loss of hair about one month after the A-bombing, but a friend of his who was with him at the time of the bombing lost all his hair.

Masako Kajiwara, who was 2.5 km away from the center of the blast of Nagasaki City, developed a fever right after the bombing. Loss of hair was observed about one month later, and after two months, she suffered from nose bleeding, vomiting and diarrhea.

2. On the other hand, in addition to the above facts, the original judgment lawfully confirmed the following facts:

(1) There are stochastic effects and deterministic effects among the effects of radiation exposure on human body, and only the induction of cancer and genetic effects belong to the former, while all others belong to the latter. Therefore, the point in question in this case should be the deterministic effects. However, it is argued that there is a threshold dose of radiation exposure for deterministic effects, under which effects of radiation should not occur. It is said that the threshold for each symptom is 1000 rad for damage on cerebral nerve cells; 100 rad for leukopenia; 300 to 500 rad for epilation; a little over 10 rad for lowering of immunocompetence due to damaged lymphatic corpuscles and so forth.

(2) DS86, a dosimetry system for radiation from the atomic bombing, was adopted in March 1986 by a Japan-US joint committee set up to reevaluate the A-bomb radiation dose, and has been treated around the world as a superior systematic dosimetry system. According to DS86, a total radiation dose of gamma rays and neutrons in the air in Nagasaki was 2.963 rad at 2.4 km from the blast center, and 2.092 rad at 2.5 km, and the dose from residual radiation was insignificant. It is said that the assessed value of uncertainty on the above dose was 13% in the air, and organ dose was 25-35%.

3. Indeed, a mechanical application of the above threshold theory and DS86 would lead to the conclusion that the present condition of the Appellee was not due to the effects of radiation, and it is difficult to deny that a significant doubt would be raised in leading to the recognition that there was a causality from radiation in this case.

However, the fact that DS86 produces assessed values still containing undetermined parts and a review on this dosimetry system is going on at present was lawfully confirmed by the original judgment. And by mechanically applying DS86 and the threshold theory, it seems that the facts as stated in (7) of 1 of III cannot necessarily be explained fully. For example, regarding epilation, a typical acute symptom caused by radiation, the court cannot but hesitate to judge that most cases of epilation, having occurred in the areas where, as long as DS86 and the threshold theory were applied mechanically epilation could not have happened, were caused by factors other than the bomb radiation, such as malnutrition or psychogenic reasons. While taking this into consideration, if the case is examined based on the facts stated in 1 of III, especially the extensive damage inflicted on the brain of the Appellee inexplicable by the physical impact only, and the loss of hair appearing on her, the following conclusion can be drawn: The brain damage of the Appellee was inflicted by the hit of a roofing tile blown by the blast of the atomic bomb as a direct cause, but it became serious because she was exposed to a significant level of the A-bomb radiation, or because her healing ability was lowered by the radiation. As a result, she has been in the present condition requiring medical treatment, i.e., her condition can be judged as having causability from radiation, and it is not possible to conclude that this judgment cannot be accepted based on empirical rules.

IV. If such is the case, the original judgment of this case, which confirmed the radiation causability, is not something that cannot be upheld, and thus the stated violation of the Law (*Code of the Civil Procedure) by the original court regarding the degree of proof in court cannot be definitively considered as something that would influence the conclusion of the ruling. Therefore, after all, the claim (*of the Appellant) cannot be accepted.

Thus, this court renders decision as set forth in the main text, with the unanimous opinion of all of the justices.

The Third Petty Bench of the Supreme Court Presiding Judge: Justice Toshihiro Kanatani Justice Hideo Chigusa Justice Toshifumi Motohara Justice Masamichi Okuda

Statements by Hideko Matsuya and the General Secretary of the Plaintiff Counsel at 2000 World Conference against A and H Bombs

Nagasaki, Aug. 9, 2000

Hideko Matsuya Plaintiff of the Nagasaki A-bomb Matsuya Lawsuit

It is a great pleasure to be able to report to you, who have came from across Japan and the world, of the victory of the Nagasaki A-bomb Matsuya case in the Supreme Court. Please look. This is the official certificate that recognizes my disease as caused by the atomic bombing. I want to thank all of you with all my heart for your longtime support.

My dream of the final victory has finally come true. I have no words other than to say "happy" to explain my present feeling. This victory is not only mine, but also the victory of all the Hibakusha and people who aspire to achieve the abolition of nuclear weapons.

Twelve years had passed since I filed the lawsuit against the government in 1988. I never imagined the ordeal would be so long. As the case went through the Nagasaki District Court and the Fukuoka High Court, it gathered more and more support from people across the country. While the case was being heard at the High Court, petitions supporting my case had reached 530,000. Such a number of petitions was unprecedented in the history of the Court and had a great influence on the ruling, which ended up in favor of my case. However, the government was persistent in refusing to recognize my illness as A-bomb disease and appealed the case to the Supreme Court. How cruel they can be! I was exasperated by their attitude. I was agonized by the unforeseen struggle before me, but I always knew that there are people like you out there across the country who support my case to inspire and encourage me.

Yesterday, this certificate was issued. But I have received no word of apology from the Ministry of Health and Welfare. The Ministry owes a load of responsibility for taking a long 23 years to have this issued. Now our next work is to hold the Ministry responsible to make the best use of this judicial decision for the Hibakusha administration. Until then our struggle is not over.

Now 3 similar Hibakusha cases are pending in court. All three Hibakusha are forcing themselves in pursuit of the state recognition despite their illness. I am determined to exert my utmost effort for their earliest victory. I want to ask you to give your support to each of the Hibakusha.

On August of 55 years ago nuclear weapons were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Today we stand at the dawn of the 21st century. I, as a Hibakusha, am determined to do my best, however small it may be, to achieve the abolition of nuclear weapons.

Naotatsu Nakamura General Secretary of the Plaintiff Counsel Nagasaki A-bomb Matsuya Lawsuit

I am General Secretary of the Plaintiff Counsel of Matsuya Lawsuit. First, I want to thank all of you for your support to the Nagasaki A-bomb Matsuya Lawsuit, which greatly contributed to the final victory of the case.

On July 18 this year, the Supreme Court ruled to reject a final appeal of the Minister of Health and Welfare against lower courts' decisions that ordered the Ministry to provide special medical coverage to Ms. Hideko Matsuya for her illness caused by the atomic bombing of Nagasaki. Based on the ruling, the Ministry finally approved Matsuya's illness was related to the bombing. It took 12 years since she first filed suit with a district court against the Ministry for its refusal to recognize her claim. This victory was made possible when Matsuya's struggle with an indomitable spirit was joined with forces of the Plaintiff Counsel of 150 lawyers, a networking support activities of 10,000 people, a petition campaign, which succeeded in collecting more than 1 million signatures and backups of a number of scientists. I want to convey our wholehearted gratitude for your tireless and affectionate support.

In filing the lawsuit, we had identified significance that the lawsuit would have, if resulted in favor of our case, in government's recognition criteria, according to which state-covered medical care is provided to the Hibakusha.

Firstly, the lawsuit could work for removing a condition of distance from the Ministry criteria. Under the present criteria, to qualify for medical support as having A-bomb symptoms, a person must have been within 2-km-radius of the hypocenter. Matsuya was at 2.45 km from the hypocenter at the time of the bombing. The Ministry's "within 2-km-criteria" is based on a system called the DS 86 (Dosimetry System of 1986). The DS 86, established mostly by American scientists, is a computation system used in nuclear weapons development for estimating amounts of radiation generated by a nuclear explosion. This computation system is used to derive an amount of radiation at a certain distance from the hypocenter of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Supreme Court confirmed that mechanical application of the DS 86 is a fault. We think that the court ruling will effectively widen the door for state-covered medical care given to the Hibakusha, who do not fall in the category of "2-km-range."

Secondly, we wanted to remove a condition on the types of diseases and disorders from the ministry criteria. Hitherto, to qualify for the Sate-covered medical care, a Hibakusha has to have an illness, such as cancer or leukemia, which has a clear link with radiation in view of medical science. In Matsuya's case, her motor function disorder was caused by damage to the brain. Since the ruling recognized Matsuya's symptom as linked with radiation exposure, we believe that many more Hibakusha in similar situation as Matsuya will be able to receive the state medical care.

We had also identified two goals to achieve through the lawsuit. One is to hold the government responsible for state compensation for the Hibakusha, and accordingly have it thoroughly examine and revise its Hibakusha administration. We have won the case. But, if we stopped our march here, the government's Hibakusha administration will stay the same. The ruling of the top court is a first tool we have achieved through our struggle. With this, our campaign needs to be further developed.

To hold the government responsible for state compensation is to have it support and work towards the abolition of nuclear weapons. This lawsuit has been a struggle for the abolition of nuclear weapons. That is why the case won support of such a great number of people and the victory. Let us remind ourselves that our struggle continues until the day the world is finally set free of nuclear weapons.

--

History of Nagasaki A-bomb Matsuya Lawsuit

1988 Sep. 26: Hideko Matsuya filed a lawsuit with the Nagasaki District Court against the Ministry of Health and Welfare for retraction of its decision dismissing her application for official recognition of her as an A-bomb disease patient.

Dec. 10: The Association of Supporters for the Nagasaki A-bomb Matsuya Lawsuit was formed.

Dec. 16: First oral proceeding: Plaintiff Hideko Matsuya made a statement; the defendant, the Minister of Health and Welfare, insisted that the ruling should be transferred to the Tokyo District Court.

1989 Oct. 26: The 5th oral proceeding: the defendant withdrew the statement seeking the transfer of the case and it was decided the suit could be handled at the Nagasaki District Court.

1990 Apr. 20: The 7th oral proceeding: the Matsuya side argued that the principle of interpretation of the present law should be that in case there is doubt, it should be to the advantage of the Hibakusha.

1991 Jan. 9: Shima Matsuya, Hideko's mother, died at age 85.

Jul. 3: The 12th oral proceeding: From the plaintiff's side, Ikuro Anzai, professor of Ritsumeikan University, testified that the A-bomb damage could not be explained only by ionized radiation.

Sep. 26: The 13th oral proceeding: From the plaintiff's side, Anzai testified that damage beyond the explanation of the present science should not be ignored.

1992 Apr. 3: The 16th oral proceeding: Shuntaro Hida, director of the Central Counseling Office of Nihon Hidankyo, entered the witness box for the plaintiff and refuted with evidence the position of the state that there was no effect of radiation at more than 2 km from the A-bomb explosion center.

Jun. 4: The 17th oral proceeding: From the plaintiff's side, Kanehiko Yamashita, Hideko's doctor, testified that the relationship between the plaintiff's injuries and effects of radiation could not be denied.

Dec. 18: Clinical examination of Chieko Watanabe, A-bomb survivor and witness for the Matsuya side, was conducted.

1993 Jan. 13: The 21st oral proceeding: Questioning of Mitsunori Kusumoto and Senji Yamaguchi, A-bomb survivors and witnesses for the plaintiff's side.

Feb. 9: The 22nd oral proceeding: Questioning of Matsuya; presentation of the closing statement of the Matsuya side; the trial was concluded.

Mar. 13: Chieko Watanabe died at age 64.

May 26: A ruling in favor of Hideko Matsuya was handed down by the Nagasaki District Court.

Jun. 7: The Ministry of Health and Welfare appealed to the Fukuoka High Court.

Oct. 14: The first oral proceeding: the State side presented a written statement of reasons for appeal and the Matsuya's side made a statement.

1994 Jan. 21: The 2nd oral proceeding: the Matsuya side refuted the State's statement of reasons for appeal; the Fukuoka Center of the Supporters' Association was formed.

Apr. 15: The 3rd oral proceeding: The Matsuya side again refuted the State's statement of reasons for appeal.

1995 Jun. 23: The 7th oral proceeding: From the plaintiff side, Kanehiko Yamashita, Hideko's doctor, again testified that the relationship between the plaintiff's injuries and effects of radiation could not be denied.

Oct. 13: The 8th oral proceeding: From the plaintiff side, Masaharu Hamatani, professor of Hitotsubashi University, refuted the logic of the State with data from a survey of Hibakusha, testifying that acute symptoms of radiation appeared among those who were exposed to the A-bombing at more than 2 km from the epicenter.

1996 Apr. 19: The 10th oral proceeding: the State side submitted its closing preparatory statement.

1997 Jun. 27: The Matsuya side made its closing statement; the trial of the Fukuoka High Court was concluded.

Nov. 7: The Fukuoka High Court rendered a ruling that was a victory for Matsuya, the plaintiff.

Nov. 20: The Ministry of Health and Welfare appealed to the Supreme Court.

1998 Jan. 14: The state side presented a written statement of reasons for its appeal.

May 1: A signature campaign for requesting the Supreme Court to turn down the appeal was begun.

May 14: The Nagasaki A-bomb Matsuya Lawsuit Network (national organization) was formed.

Jul. 23: The first petition action to the Supreme Court was carried out (presentation of signatures)

Dec. 11: A Kyoto lawsuit for recognition as an A-bomb disease patient resulted in a victorious ruling; the Ministry of Health and Welfare appealed to the Osaka High Court.

1999 May 6: Matsuya's counsel submitted a written statement to refute the State's written statement of reasons for appeal.

May 11: Matsuya made a speech at the "Global Hibakusha" session of the Hague Appeal Conference for Peace held in the Netherlands.

Jun. 29: Kazuo Azuma, A-bomb survivor, filed a lawsuit with the Tokyo District Court for official recognition as an A-bomb disease patient.

Oct. 1: Koichi Yasui, A-bomb survivor, filed a lawsuit with the Sapporo District Court for official recognition as an A-bomb disease patient.

2000 Mar. 22: The 10th round of petition actions to the Supreme Court was carried out; the signatures so far presented exceeded 500,000.

Jul. 18: The Supreme Court handed down a ruling completely in favor of Matsuya.

Jul. 31: The Ministry of Health and Welfare recognized Matsuya as having A-bomb diseases.

Matsuya's speech at the 1998 World Conference against A & H Bombs

--------

Powell may expand N. Korean agenda

3/9/2001
InfoBeat News
Associated Press
By GEORGE GEDDA
http://www.infobeat.com/cgi-bin/WebObjects/IBFrontEnd.woa/wa/fullStory?article=406351067

WASHINGTON (AP) - Secretary of State Colin Powell said Thursday he may try to enlarge prospective missile negotiations with North Korea to include U.S. misgivings about the million-man military force Pyongyang maintains near the South Korean border.

Powell told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the deployment is ``probably as great a threat to South Korea and Seoul and regional stability as are weapons of mass destruction.''

Clinton-era talks with North Korea were aimed largely at persuading the communist government to curb its missile development and missile export programs in exchange for economic benefits.

President Bush told visiting South Korean President Kim Dae-jung on Wednesday that the United States will not resume talks until after it finishes a review of policy toward North Korea.

It was in the context of the policy review that Powell suggested Pyongyang's ``huge army'' might be a suitable topic for negotiation.

Using rhetoric more provocative than that used during President Clinton's final months in office, Bush said he was ``skeptical'' about North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and expressed doubt that a missile deal could be verified, given North Korea's penchant for secrecy.

But the South Korean president, who met with Kim Jong Il last June, told a luncheon gathering Thursday he believes North Korea is eager for good relations with the United States.

``It seems to be well aware that for assurance of its security and economic assistance, improved relations with the United States are essential,'' he said. ``For North Korea, change is not a matter of choice but of survival.''

He said it would be difficult for South-North relations to improve without progress between Washington and Pyongyang.

Later, Kim Dae-Jung met with senators and House members. Sen. Joseph Biden, D-Del. said Kim told senators he believes the North Koreans have decided on a Chinese-Vietnamese model in which ``they will maintain the communist system and the dictatorship, but will considerably lessen their hold on the economy'' and other matters.

``They don't need these weapons of mass destruction in order to successfully negotiate that route if, in giving them up, they get enough of a boost to get their economy back in shape and to survive,'' Biden said, citing what he called the essence of Kim's rationale.

Speaking for himself, Biden said: ``I don't think we should count on that. But I think it would be absolutely irresponsible not to pursue to find out whether or not he is right.''

In his testimony, Powell said the United States supports the 1994 agreement under which North Korea agreed to freeze a nuclear weapons program in exchange for light-water nuclear reactors to generate electricity.

The replacement reactors would be used as alternatives for the country's plutonium-producing reactors, whose fuel can be converted into weaponry. Powell hinted he is dissatisfied with that arrangement, however, but is open to different types of ``energy-generating capacity'' for the North.

One advocate of an alternate approach is Henry Sokolski, of the Non-Proliferation Education Center, who says nonnuclear methods are safer, quicker and less dangerous.

They include upgrading the North Korean electric grid, refurbishing existing power plants, building new, smaller power plants and integrating North Korea's grid with that of South Korea, he says.

President Kim Dae-jung told the luncheon gathering he does not believe Kim Jong Il is interested in revising the 1994 agreement.

On other subjects, Powell told the Senate committee:

_All Arab countries he visited on his recent trip are willing to work with the United States to curb development of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq. To allay Arab worries with the impact of U.N. sanctions on the Iraqi people, he wants to eliminate sanctions on material used by civilians and focus on keeping forbidden weapons out of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's hands.

_China has ordered Chinese companies helping Iraq to modernize its air defense systems to halt their activities. Also on China, Powell said it will be ``very tough'' for the United States to gain passage of an anti-China resolution in the U.N. Human Rights Commission because of lack of support. The commission convenes this month.

_He will weigh the possibility of recommending an international tribunal to investigate abuses committed by Indonesian forces against the people of East Timor in 1999. Sen. Russ Feingold, D-Wis., said Indonesian authorities have yet to hand down a single indictment in response to the violence.

---

Defense to shift blame on sub wreck

3/9/2001
InfoBeat News
Associated Press
By PAULINE ARRILLAGA
http://www.infobeat.com/cgi-bin/WebObjects/IBFrontEnd.woa/wa/fullStory?article=406351246

PEARL HARBOR, Hawaii (AP) - Lawyers for submarine officers under investigation for the sinking of a Japanese fishing boat sought to shift the blame Thursday to a crewman who failed to report that the ship was nearby.

As testimony at a rare Navy court of inquiry entered its fourth day, criticism mounted of a fire control technician. The crewman neglected to tell officers another boat was in close range of the USS Greeneville minutes before the submarine surfaced and smashed through the Ehime Maru, killing nine people.

Friday marks one month since the accident. The court will help determine the fate of Cmdr. Scott Waddle; Lt. j.g. Michael Coen, the officer of the deck; and Lt. Cmdr. Gerald Pfeifer, the second in command. They could face no disciplinary action or anything froto court-martial and imprisonment.

Waddle's attorney asked the chief Navy investigator whether the commander was criminally negligent in the operation of his submarine.

``In my opinion,'' Rear Adm. Charles Griffiths Jr. said, ``he was not criminally negligent.''

After the court session, the commander offered a long-awaited apology to the families of some of the nine victims who are in Hawaii to watch the inquiry.

``I can't ask for forgiveness. This is a burden I will carry to the grave,'' he told them tearfully, according to a Japanese official who was present.

Ryosuke Terata, whose 17-year-old son died, said later, ``Now I feel kind of sorry for Waddle, too.''

Some family members had complained that Waddle refused to make eye contact with them during the inquiry. Last month, he issued a statement expressing ``sincere regret'' for the crash.

During the court session, Waddle cried while Griffiths described rescue efforts. One of his attorneys passed him a tissue. Waddle's wife, sitting in the front row, also wept, as did the father of one of the Japanese victims.

Griffiths praised the Greeneville crew for their response to the accident, calling their efforts ``remarkably professional.'' A brief video showed the choppy waves at the time of the rescue.

Terata leaned forward and stared at the video monitor looking for any sign of his son.

About six minutes before the collision, the fire control technician obtained data showing a boat 4,000 yards from the Greeneville. This happened as Coen and Waddle were conducting periscope scans for surface vessels.

Another admiral suggested Waddle may have thought he was acting properly based upon the information he had.

``Would it be fair to say that it's a two-way street _ the CO backs up his crew, and the crew backs up the CO?'' asked Rear Adm. Paul Sullivan.

``You need your crew to back you up,'' Griffiths agreed.

---

SUB COMMANDER TEARFUL, APOLOGIZES

MARCH 9-11, 2001
THE MORROCK NEWS DIGEST
Fast, free and independent http://morrock.com

The commander of the USS Greeneville nuclear submarine offered a tearful apology Thursday to the families of nine Japanese who were killed when the submarine surfaced and sliced through a Japanese fishing boat. Lawyers for three of the sub's officers are blaming a crewman for failing to warn his superiors that the boat was in the area before the Feb. 9 disaster off the coast of Hawaii.

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CIA documents reveal differences over Cuba crisis

March 9, 2001
CNN
http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/03/09/cia.russia.usa.reut/index.html

PRINCETON, New Jersey (Reuters) -- The CIA released secret Cold War documents Friday showing how U.S. analysts overestimated Soviet power and disagreed over how close the world came to a nuclear war over the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

The 859 documents, declassified to coincide with a Central Intelligence Agency conference at Princeton University on U.S. analysis of the Soviet Union from 1947 to 1991, included a conclusion that the Soviet Union, which broke up in 1991, had backed revolutionary groups that used "terrorism."

A 1981 intelligence report said there was "conclusive evidence" that the Soviet Union supported revolutionary groups that used "terrorism," specifically mentioning El Salvador.

Lloyd Salvetti, director of the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence, described the release as "a treasure trove of great material." The documents will be available on the CIA's Web site www.foia.ucia.gov.

An August 27, 1963, CIA paper revealed a deep disagreement between CIA analysts and those of the National Intelligence Council (NIC), which draws on several security sources, over how close to the brink Moscow and Washington came over Cuba.

The CIA document refers to an NIC paper that "implies that the Soviet Union was willing to confront the U.S. militarily when the deployment of strategic missiles in Cuba was discovered" in 1962.

"This position cannot be logically supported if one holds, as is almost universally done, that the Soviets were trying to partially correct a grave imbalance in long-range strike capabilities in order to give them a better bargaining position at a later date," the CIA document said.

Soviet actions showed they clearly realized the only response to U.S. military pressure was a nuclear one, and understood the limitation of their nuclear strike capability compared with the United States, the CIA paper said.

"They obviously took great care to ensure that the situation would not escalate into a thermonuclear war," CIA analysts at the Office of Research and Reports wrote.

Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev backed down and withdrew missiles from Cuba after threats from President Kennedy, averting what many feared could be a nuclear war.

Overestimated Soviet missile buildup

Gerald Haines, the CIA's chief historian, said analysis of NIC reports showed they continued to overestimate the Soviet missile buildup in the 1980s, when then-President Reagan was promoting his "Star Wars" missile shield plans.

A 1987 analysis of the Soviet Union's response options to "Star Wars" concluded that the Soviets were likely to pursue arms control measures to gain U.S. concessions on the proposal.

Many independent analysts believe Reagan's vigorous and hugely expensive buildup of the U.S. military in the 1980s caused the downfall of the Soviet Union, which was unable, with a moribund economy, to match it with a similar buildup.

A September 1991 CIA analysis of the defense implications of a breakup of the Soviet Union concluded that a Russia without Ukraine and other republics would "retain the potential of a major military power."

Washington has spent hundreds of millions of dollars in the past decade helping Moscow demolish parts of its nuclear arsenal, but Russia still retains a force similar in size to that of the United States.

More fact, less speculation

Haines said the newly released documents overall showed how CIA analysis became based more on facts rather than speculation after technical means of gathering information were employed.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the CIA was operating with "no eyes and ears," he said. But then the U-2 spy plane and Corona spy satellite began operating and "gave the United States tremendous advantage," Haines said.

A 1978 CIA memo said the selection of a Polish pope, John Paul II, would be "extremely worrisome to Moscow" because it would make it more difficult to integrate Poles more closely into a communist Soviet-dominated system of alliances.

The reports were "carefully scrubbed" to exclude intelligence sources or sensitive information that could affect current U.S. relations with other countries, Ed Cohen, director of the CIA's Office of Information Management, said.

Salvetti said documents on the policies of former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who presided over the collapse of the Soviet Union, showed U.S. analysts "trying to keep pace with a rapidly moving train."

He added, "It was often the case where analysts were just trying to determine what it is that Gorbachev's intentions were when it was really hard for Gorbachev himself to understand where he was going."

A 1986 CIA report said a controversial Soviet radar under construction in Krasnoyarsk was mainly for ballistic missile detection and tracking rather than for satellite detection as the Soviets argued.

The CIA's analysis was the basis for U.S. administration policy that declared the radar a violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and that it be dismantled, CIA historians said.

---

Document says CIA overstated Soviet threat

Friday, March 9, 2001
Philadelphia Inquirer
By Jonathan S. Landay
http://inq.philly.com/content/inquirer/2001/03/09/national/NUKES10.htm

WASHINGTON - For more than 10 years during the Cold War, U.S. intelligence forecasts greatly exaggerated the pace at which the former Soviet Union would improve its long-range nuclear forces, a newly declassified CIA document indicated today.

The summary of a 1989 CIA internal review said every major intelligence assessment from 1974 to 1986 - a period covering at least three presidencies - "substantially" overestimated the Kremlin's plans to modernize and expand its strategic nuclear arsenal.

The document raised new questions about how well the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies judged the Soviet Union's aims and intentions, and the extent to which mistaken analyses influenced U.S. military spending and Washington's defense and foreign policies.

The persistent errors also raise questions about the intelligence community's ability to collect reliable information on today's targets, which are more diverse and even harder for spies to penetrate than the Soviet Union was.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union's force of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarines, and long-range bombers was the U.S intelligence community's primary target. But today's spies must try to keep track of international terrorists, rogue nuclear-weapons programs and computer hackers, and also plumb the minds of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and North Korea's Kim Jong Il, all of which is much harder than counting missile silos in Kazakstan or estimating the wheat crop in Ukraine.

The study is part of more than 19,000 pages of documents that have been declassified for a two-day conference on the CIA's analysis of the Soviet Union from 1947 to 1991 that opened today at Princeton University. The documents deleted material still considered important to national security.

Titled "Intelligence Forecasts of Soviet Intercontinental Attack Forces: An Evaluation of the Record," the study reviewed the U.S. intelligence community's projections of efforts to modernize Soviet nuclear forces in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.

The forecasts, known as national intelligence estimates (NIE), were intended to guide the president and his top aides in setting defense and foreign policies, including military spending and the size of U.S. nuclear forces. An NIE represents the consensus of 13 agencies, including the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency, which frequently disagreed about the severity of the Soviet threat.

The study found that predicting the rate of Soviet nuclear-force modernization "has proven to be the most difficult aspect of Soviet strategic forces to project."

As an example, it cited a 1975 forecast that by 1985 more than 90 percent of Soviet long-range missiles and bombers would be replaced. "In reality, the Soviets replaced less than 60 percent of them," the study said.

"This tendency to substantially overestimate the rate of [Soviet] force modernization occurred in every NIE published from 1974 to 1986, and it was true for every projected force - whether it assumed high, moderate or low levels of effort," the study continued.

In another example, it said an NIE published in 1985 - the beginning of President Ronald Reagan's second term - "projected that virtually the entire [Soviet] ICBM force would be replaced within 10 years."

But by 1989, "more than one-third of the projection period has passed, and so far only about 10 percent of the force is new," the study said.

Another document showed that inaccurate forecasting continued in a 1988 NIE. This one projected that Moscow could field up to 18,000 intercontinental nuclear weapons by the late 1990s if the United States deployed Reagan's proposed space-based national missile-defense system, known as the Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI.

In fact, the cash-strapped Russian military has struggled in recent years to maintain an aging force of some 6,000 nuclear warheads and a deteriorating command and control system.

The study attributed the tendency to overestimate Soviet nuclear-modernization plans to a number of reasons, including the intelligence community's failure "to correctly understand Soviet military requirements."

Intelligence analysts also relied on the rate of a massive Soviet missile buildup in the late 1960s "as a guide for future deployment rates, but that rate of deployment was never approached again," the study said.

Melvin Goodman, a former senior CIA Soviet analyst, said the study bolstered criticism that intelligence assessments of the Soviet threat were deliberately inflated to justify increases in U.S. defense spending and nuclear forces, as well as SDI.

"This is the first time that the CIA has gone on the record confirming the exaggeration of [Soviet] force modernization," said Goodman, who teaches at the National War College in Washington.

Jonathan S. Landay's e-mail address is jlanday@krwashington.com.

---

Ask More From N. Korea
A sound bilateral relationship requires mutual accommodations and greater openness.

Friday, March 9, 2001
Los Angeles Times
http://www.latimes.com/news/comment/20010309/t000020950.html

Anyone looking this week for clarity or even consistency in the Bush administration's policy toward North Korea would have been perplexed.

On Tuesday, Secretary of State Colin Powell said the new administration would pick up where the Clinton administration left off, pursuing agreements to halt Pyongyang's missile and nuclear programs in exchange for greater U.S. economic aid and improved political relations. But on Wednesday, President Bush, following a White House meeting with South Korea's President Kim Dae Jung, said he is in no hurry to resume talks and that he has doubts about how trustworthy North Korea really is.

Administration explainers say that policy toward North Korea is still under review, which seems obvious from the disparate comments made. That the developing policy may be linked to Bush's eagerness to build a national missile shield--a prime rationale for which is a potential, if dubious, threat from North Korea--seems obvious as well.

Two guidelines for a new policy are already apparent, and both are sound. Bush seeks reciprocity from North Korea. He wants it to take concrete tension-reducing measures in exchange for the humanitarian and energy aid it gets from the United States. One important step could be a major thinning out of North Korean troops and artillery along the demilitarized zone that separates it from South Korea. And Bush insists on "transparency," meaning Pyongyang must accept verification of any curbs on its weapons programs that it agrees to. It already permits international inspection of the nuclear reactor it shut down in the mid-1990s.

North Korea is suffering from a collapsed economy and a famine that so far has claimed more than 2 million lives. Yet it remains a master at using bluff and bluster and winks and nods to squeeze material help from the United States, South Korea and others. Now it ominously hints that it might resume long-range missile tests and restart its nuclear weapons program unless Washington gives it yet more.

The U.S. response should not be provocative or appear to threaten Pyongyang's security. Everyone's interests would be served if self-isolated North Korea becomes a more responsible participant in the international system. At the same time, Washington is right to insist that a sound bilateral relationship must be a two-way street, requiring mutual accommodations and greater openness.

So far the traffic on that street has largely run one-way.

---

Bush's N. Korea Stance Signals a Shift Policy:
In breaking with Clinton's efforts for a speedy rapprochement, he makes good on campaign talk--and deals a setback to the South's Kim.

Friday, March 9, 2001
Los Angeles Times
By JIM MANN
http://www.latimes.com/cgi-bin/print.cgi

WASHINGTON--South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's visit to Washington has brought forth the first significant change by the Bush administration in U.S. policy toward Asia.

With a few brief remarks by President Bush on Wednesday and further explanations by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell on Thursday, the new administration threw cold water on the Clinton administration's efforts last fall to bring about a speedy rapprochement with the Communist regime in North Korea.

"What the president was saying . . . is that we're going to take our time . . . and in due course, at a time and at a pace of our choosing, we will decide and determine how best to engage with the North Korean regime," Powell told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Thursday.

During his campaign for the White House, Bush suggested that he might take a tougher line in dealing with China and North Korea than had the Clinton administration, without saying exactly what he would do. This week's standoffish remarks on engagement with North Korea represent the first sign that his campaign rhetoric on Asia will translate into a different approach to policy.

At the least, these remarks mean that there will be a freeze for several months in the movement by the U.S. government toward a deal to halt North Korea's missile program. It remains possible that after a review of policy, the Bush team will pursue a deal not radically different from the one envisaged by the Clinton administration.

But privately, some Bush administration officials this week have gone further than merely talking about a delay. They also have called into question the underlying assumptions of the Clinton administration in dealing with the regime of Kim Jong Il, and even suggested that the Bush team might abandon the Clinton administration's quest for a deal curbing Pyongyang's missile program.

"There needs to be a timeout to break [the North Koreans] out of the bad habits the Clinton administration created," said Robert Manning, a Korea specialist with the Council on Foreign Relations who is familiar with the views of the Bush foreign policy team.

"There was a premise there that we're scared of the North Koreans, that they are irrational and that if we're not nice to them, they'll start a war. I don't think that's true," he said. "I think everything they [the North Koreans] do is aimed at survival of their regime."

The Bush team's coolness represented at least a temporary setback for the South's Kim, who won the Nobel Peace Prize last year for his efforts at reconciliation with the North.

On Thursday, Kim gamely pleaded for U.S. help in dealing with Pyongyang, suggesting that his own "sunshine policy" toward North Korea could be jeopardized by the U.S. position.

"Without progress between the U.S. and North Korea, advances in South-North Korean relations will be difficult to achieve," the South Korean president said in a speech here.

The heart of the Clinton administration's North Korea policy was to try to bring an end to Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs by offering economic inducements.

In 1994, the Clinton administration negotiated an agreement with North Korea in which the United States agreed to help Pyongyang obtain new energy supplies--two light-water nuclear reactors and heavy fuel oil--in exchange for a freeze on its nuclear weapons program.

Four years later, North Korea test-fired its newly developed Taepodong missile over Japanese airspace, and the Clinton team began seeking to negotiate a freeze on North Korea's missile program similar to the nuclear freeze.

North Korea delayed in responding until last fall, when the Clinton administration had only a few months left in office. Then, U.S. and North Korean officials began moving hurriedly toward a deal for a missile freeze, but the agreement wasn't completed because the United States couldn't work out detailed procedures to verify North Korean compliance.

No one in the new administration appears to be talking about abandoning the 1994 agreement freezing North Korea's nuclear program--although some officials suggest that they would be happy if North Korea were willing to change some of the terms of the deal.

But other parts of Clinton's North Korea policy are now being reexamined.

One element in the Bush administration's approach seems to be to try to ensure that any accommodation with North Korea will cover not just its missile and nuclear weapons programs but also its conventional forces.

"For example, there's a huge [North Korean] army poised on the demilitarized zone [between the North and South] that is probably as great a threat to South Korea and Seoul and regional stability as are weapons of mass destruction," Powell asserted in his congressional testimony Thursday.

Beyond this emphasis on conventional forces, the administration also appears to be trying to alter the dynamics of the U.S. negotiations with North Korea.

In effect, the Bush team is arguing that Pyongyang should be in a hurry for a deal with the United States, rather than the other way around.

"They are the ones with all the problems in food, energy and jobs. They're the ones who need a billion dollars in aid a year," said Douglas Paal of the Asia Pacific Policy Center, who served in the administration of Bush's father. "We don't have to rush to a conclusion of our negotiations with them."

---

U.S. Urged To Resume N. Korea Talks

Friday, March 9, 2001
Washington Post
Associated Press
By Eun-Kyung Kim
http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/world/issues/koreas/ap/A45550-2001Mar9.html
http://www.foxnews.com/world/030901/nkorea_us.sml

WASHINGTON -- South Korea's president tried to ease American wariness about potential missile talks with North Korea by insisting the isolated nation is eager to improve relations with the United States.

Hoping to persuade the Bush administration to restart missile talks with the communist regime, President Kim Dae-jung said North Korea realizes better U.S. ties are essential for its economic recovery.

"For North Korea, change is not a matter of choice but of survival," he told a luncheon gathering Thursday. "Without opening and reform to bring in outside assistance, it will be difficult for North Korea to overcome its economic difficulties."

Across town just minutes earlier, Secretary of State Colin Powell told lawmakers he may seek to widen potential talks with North Korea beyond missiles to include American concerns about the million-man military force North Korea maintains along the Demilitarized Zone. In addition to South Korea's military, 37,000 American soldiers are facing the North Koreans south of the demarcation line.

Powell told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the North Korean deployment is "probably as great a threat to South Korea and Seoul and regional stability as are weapons of mass destruction."

Clinton-era talks with North Korea were aimed largely at persuading the communist government to curb its missile development and missile export programs in exchange for economic benefits.

On Wednesday, President Bush told Kim that the United States would not resume talks until after it finishes a review of policy toward North Korea. He said he was skeptical that North Korean leader Kim Jong Il would respect any missile-control agreements, given that nation's penchant for secrecy.

The South Korean president, who met with his North Korean counterpart last June, offered a less suspicious view based on that meeting: "My impression was that he wants to improve relations with the U.S."

During a session Thursday with about a dozen members of Congress, Kim said he believes the North Koreans have decided on a Chinese-Vietnamese model in which "they will maintain the communist system and the dictatorship, but will considerably lessen their hold on the economy" and other matters.

"They don't need these weapons of mass destruction in order to successfully negotiate that route if, in giving them up, they get enough of a boost to get their economy back in shape and to survive," said Sen. Joseph Biden, D-Del., citing what he called the essence of Kim's rationale.

But Biden, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said he didn't think the United States could count on that, "but I think it would be absolutely irresponsible not to pursue to find out whether or not he is right."

Powell, during his testimony to the House International Relations Committee, said the United States supports the 1994 agreement under which North Korea agreed to freeze a nuclear weapons program in exchange for light-water nuclear reactors to generate electricity.

The replacement reactors would be used as alternatives for the country's plutonium-producing reactors, whose fuel can be converted into weaponry. Powell hinted he was dissatisfied with that arrangement, however, but was open to different types of "energy-generating capacity" for the North.

One advocate of an alternate approach is Henry Sokolski of the Non-Proliferation Education Center. He says nonnuclear methods are safer, quicker and less dangerous.

They include upgrading the North Korean electric grid, refurbishing existing power plants, building new, smaller power plants and integrating North Korea's grid with that of South Korea, he says.

President Kim Dae-jung told the luncheon gathering he does not believe Kim Jong Il is interested in revising the 1994 agreement.

---

Admiral Says Sub Captain Did Not Act Criminally

March 9, 2001
New York Times
By STEVEN LEE MYERS
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/09/national/09HAWA.html

HONOLULU, March 8 - After chronicling a series of errors contributing to the collision between the submarine Greeneville and a Japanese trawler, an investigating admiral said today that he did not believe the submarine's captain, Cmdr. Scott D. Waddle, had acted with criminal negligence.

As he ended a fourth day before the Navy's court of inquiry at the Pearl Harbor Naval Station here, the investigator, Rear Adm. Charles H. Griffiths, acknowledged that he had uncovered no evidence that Commander Waddle had ignored warnings of a collision or otherwise acted negligently.

It was the first time that the question of which charges Commander Waddle and two other officers could face, if any, had been raised during the court's investigation into the collision on Feb. 9, which sank the Japanese vessel, the Ehime Maru, and left nine people lost at sea.

Cross-examining the admiral, Commander Waddle's civilian lawyer, Charles W. Gittins, repeatedly suggested that his client had acted within accepted Navy standards at all times and had done nothing to warrant criminal prosecution.

"Did you find any evidence that Commander Waddle acted criminally, negligently in the operation of his vessel?" Mr. Gittins asked.

Admiral Griffiths replied, "In my opinion, he was not criminally negligent."

Later, as Admiral Griffiths called the crew's efforts to assist in the rescue of the Ehime Maru admirable, Commander Waddle began to cry quietly.

And after the session, the captain met privately in the court building with relatives of some of the missing people and for the first time apologized to them directly, Navy officials said.

The court of inquiry is an investigation, not a trial, but its three presiding admirals will ultimately decide whether to recommend that Commander Waddle or two other officers aboard the Greeneville should be disciplined for their roles in the sinking of the Ehime Maru. Potential disciplinary action ranges widely, from admonishments to courts-martial in crimes as serious as dereliction of duty and negligence.

As their lawyers cross-examined Admiral Griffiths on Wednesday and again today, it was clear that their strategy was to identify circumstances that would explain why the officers were not aware that a fishing trawler was nearby when the Greeneville surfaced abruptly in a maneuver called an emergency main ballast blow.

In one of the inquiry's most dramatic moments, a lawyer for Lt. j.g. Michael J. Coen, the officer of the deck at the time of the collision, cited records showing that a technician had calculated that a sonar contact - which turned out to be the Ehime Maru - was 4,000 yards away and not out of range, as had been thought. Even so, he did not notify Commander Waddle or Lieutenant Coen.

The technician, identified in testimony today as Petty Officer First Class Patrick T. Seacrest, adjusted that calculation just as Lieutenant Coen began a periscope search, six minutes before the collision.

"He should have forcefully told the captain and the officer of the deck," Admiral Griffiths said.

When asked whether that information could have changed the course of events in the minutes before the collision, Admiral Griffiths replied, "Most emphatically, yes."

It was not clear whether the technician changed his calculation based on new sonar readings. No record of those readings exists. Mr. Gittins suggested today that the reason there is no record is that part of the sonar system had been used to play whale sounds for the 16 civilians aboard rather than make a permanent record of sonar contacts.

The testimony appeared to shift the weight of the investigation onto Petty Officer Seacrest, 34, who was described as an experienced veteran of the submarine fleet. He is among those scheduled to testify.

It is also possible he could be named a party to the investigation, meaning that he, too, could face disciplinary action.

In today's session the presiding officers expressed several judgments about the case so far - something unheard of in a civilian trial, but allowed in military justice.

One of them, Rear Adm. David M. Stone, commander of Cruiser Destroyer Group Five and of the aircraft carrier Nimitz battle group, openly challenged many of the issues raised by Mr. Gittins. In particular, he questioned the lawyer's efforts to show that Commander Waddle had used his "best judgment."

"A C.O.'s best judgment," Admiral Stone said, referring to the commanding officer, "does not necessarily mean the action conducted by him was prudent. A C.O.'s best judgment does not necessarily mean the action conducted by him was safe. A C.O.'s best judgment does not necessarily mean the action conducted by him was satisfactory or correct."

"In peacetime operations where lives are at stake," he said, "it is the outcomes based on prudent, safe and correct actions that serve as the basis by which our commander officers are judged and held accountable."

Afterward, Admiral Stone and the court's president, Vice Adm. John B. Nathman, emphasized that they had not reached any judgments in the investigation.

---

Sub's Sonar Probe Too Short, Expert Testifies

March 9, 2001
Associated Press
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/national/AP-Submarine-Collision.html

PEARL HARBOR, Hawaii (AP) -- Navy admirals watched a computerized simulation Friday of the periscope search conducted before a U.S. submarine struck and sank a Japanese fishing vessel.

The video showed how easy it would have been for USS Greeneville Cmdr. Scott Waddle and another officer to miss the boat in choppy seas and overcast skies with only 80 seconds devoted to the search.

It also showed how the 180-foot ship would have been clearly visible had Waddle conducted a standard three-minute search at a higher power and depth.

Vice Adm. John Nathman, who is presiding over a Navy court of inquiry into the collision, said the court would not draw sweeping conclusions based on the re-enactment.

``There's nothing absolute about this,'' he said. ``This is a way of finding out what we can diverge from.''

Navy Capt. Thomas Kyle, who assisted the National Transportation Safety Board in its investigation, said the simulations factored in the depth of the submarine, the length of the periscope search, the weather conditions the day of the accident and the size and coloring of the Ehime Maru.

The high school fisheries training vessel sank in 2,003 feet of water south of Oahu after the Greeneville surfaced underneath it while conducting a rapid-ascent drill on Feb. 9. Nine men and boys were killed.

Kyle is the second naval officer to testify at the inquiry, which could lead to courts-martial of Waddle; the executive officer, Lt. Cmdr. Gerald Pfeifer; and the officer of the deck, Lt. j.g. Michael Coen.

Wave heights have been estimated at between 3 and 6 feet, with an 8-foot swell, on the day of the collision. Factoring in the hazy conditions, the simulation showed the Ehime Maru as a split-second, mostly wave-obscured blip on the screen at the depth Coen conducted an initial periscope search.

The white ship was similarly hard to spot in the simulation of the second periscope search conducted by Waddle at a higher power and depth of 57 feet. At that point, the periscope would have been about 7 1/2 feet out of the water in a calm sea.

Kyle then showed a simulation of a more ideal, 360-degree sweep done at high power with the submarine nearly skimming the ocean surface and the periscope 10 to 12 feet exposed. The ship was clearly visible in the sweep, which lasted three minutes.

``That's a very obvious presentation of the ship. You would stop and look at that,'' Kyle said.

The court questioned Kyle about whether the Greeneville's sonar team had enough time to ensure the ocean surface was clear before the sub surfaced. Kyle said a longer sonar search would have prevented errors that led to the sinking.

``Time would have helped tremendously,'' he said. ``A little bit more time ... would have made it clear as could be'' that the Ehime Maru was within 1 1/2 miles of the submarine before the collision.

The inquiry, in its fifth day, has focused in part on the role of the sub's fire control technician. Rear Adm. Charles Griffiths Jr., who headed the Navy's preliminary investigation, testified the technician stopped manually plotting sonar contacts and did not notify Waddle about a nearby contact because he was distracted by 16 civilians who were crammed into the control room.

Griffiths said Thursday the collision probably wouldn't have occurred had Waddle been notified of the sonar contact.

But Rear Adm. Paul Sullivan, one of three admirals overseeing the court, asked Kyle on Friday whether more time would have allowed the submarine's sonar operators to gather better information on the contact now known to have been the Ehime Maru.

Griffiths has said the Greeneville devoted about six minutes to two ``legs'' of a sonar search before it rose to periscope depth, then descended to 400 feet to begin a rapid-surfacing drill. He said standards call for about 10 minutes to be devoted to the search.

``When you press the clock, in the back of my head, you run the risk that your solutions are not going to be as good as they should be,'' Sullivan said. ``It doesn't mean it's not the right thing to do, but it's something you have to weigh.''

Kyle agreed.

``You want to have enough data to make sure that the data is reliable, and that takes time,'' he said. ``If you try to compress the time too much, then you start losing accuracy and you can make an improper conclusion.''

Sullivan, Nathman and Rear Adm. David Stone will forward recommendations about possible disciplinary action and policy changes to Adm. Thomas Fargo, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Fargo will take final action.

Marking the one-month anniversary of the accident, a relative of one of the nine killed said tensions in the courtroom had eased since Waddle made a tearful apology to the grieving families Thursday.

``We understand that he knew our feelings and he couldn't stand staying silent anymore,'' said Ryosuke Terata, who lost his son. ``Even though we can't forgive him for causing the accident, after all, we think he is a good person.''

---

Powell wants North Korea to reduce million-man army

March 9, 2001
Washington Times
By Ben Barber
http://www.washtimes.com/world/default-200139215229.htm

Secretary of State Colin Powell raised the price of continued U.S. engagement with North Korea yesterday by calling on Pyongyang to trim its million-man army and suggesting that Washington would seek to renegotiate a 1994 nuclear deal.

The new U.S. conditions came as South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, now visiting Washington, continued to tack in the opposite direction by urging the Bush administration to "seize this opportunity" for peace.

Mr. Powell's comments marked a further retreat from a pledge Tuesday to pick up where President Clinton left off, with missile talks that included an attempt by North Korea to bring an American president to Pyongyang for a groundbreaking summit.

The secretary of state suggested substituting conventional power plants for twin atomic reactors that were promised to North Korea in exchange for freezing its nuclear weapons program.

"We're going to take our time; we're going to put together a comprehensive policy; and in due course, at a time and at a pace of our choosing, we will decide and determine how best to engage with the North Korean regime," Mr. Powell told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Under the 1994 deal - known as the Framework Agreement -the United States, South Korea and Japan formed a consortium to build two modern nuclear power plants in North Korea and supply fuel oil until the plants came on line.

North Korea last year ended decades of isolation, opened diplomatic relations with a half-dozen Western countries and held a friendly summit with South Korea.

But Mr. Powell's remarks yesterday underscored the new administration's suspicions of Pyongyang openly voiced by President Bush on Wednesday after a White House summit with Mr. Kim.

"[North Korea] is a regime that is despotic," Mr. Powell said. "It is broken. We have no illusions about this regime. We have no illusions about the nature of the gentleman who runs North Korea. He is a despot."

He was referring to North Korean leader Kim Jong-il.

Mr. Powell tempered the praise he gave Tuesday for Clinton administration efforts to negotiate an agreement with North Korea to end its development and sales of missiles.

"As we look at the elements of the negotiation that the previous administration had left behind, there are some things there that are very promising," he said.

"What was not there was a monitoring and verification regime of the kind that we would have to have in order to move forward in negotiations with such a regime."

However Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr., Delaware Democrat, voiced concern that the new tough line would spoil the chance of an agreement.

"What I'm very worried about is that this opportunity to find out whether or not there is any real possibility [for peace] here is slipping away," he said.

The South Korean president, meanwhile, urged the Bush administration not to let North Korea's present eagerness to normalize ties with the United States slip away.

One day after President Bush called the North a "threat" and delayed missile talks until a policy review takes place, Mr. Kim agreed with the need for verification and for keeping security measures in place.

But he went on to push his sunshine policy of friendship toward the North, which won him a Nobel Peace Prize and led last year to the first North-South summit since the 1950-53 Korean War.

Mr. Kim said he favors "engagement with a background of a solid security stance" but added that he believed - based on nine hours of talks with Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang last year -that the North Korean leader wants peace.

Above all, the North Korean leader wanted good relations with the United States and needed help, the South Korean president said.

"We must assist so that North Korea can go along on the path of change," he told the American Enterprise Institute.

The South Korean president said his North Korean counterpart agreed that even after North-South reconciliation, American troops should remain in place to prevent power plays by Russia, China and Japan.

"We do not have any illusions about North Korea - we will help them where we can but seek assurances" there will not be any future military conflict, he said.

Wendy Sherman, the former State Department counselor who led negotiations with North Korea until the end of the Clinton administration, expressed hope that the Bush administration would move quickly to restart talks.

"I don't know what their real intent is, but I hoped they would have walked through the open door" and set talks on missiles and other issues of concern to the United States, she said in an interview.

"We should remain engaged with North Korea. We were close to an agreement, and North Korea would have stopped exports and production of missiles," she said. "We had discussions on verification - no arms-control agreements would not include it. It was on the table.

"I hope [the Bush administration] will complete their review very quickly and get their team in place."

Mr. Powell said for the first time that the United States might seek, as part of a deal to normalize relations, a cut in the size of North Korea's million-man army.

He characterized it as "poised on the Demilitarized Zone pointing south."

"That's probably as great a threat to South Korea, Seoul and regional stability as weapons of mass destruction," Mr. Powell said.

South Korean newspapers yesterday noted that the sunshine policy of Mr. Kim seemed to clash with the skepticism voiced by Mr. Bush.

"The sunshine theorists in Korea have up till now denounced general demands for 'reciprocity,' hinting we should 'give now and receive later,' while Americans want to take an entirely different approach," said an editorial in the on-line edition of the Chosun Ilbo, South Korea's largest-circulation daily.

Mr. Kim said yesterday that his policy is for "comprehensive reciprocity," under which the North agrees on three things:

• Strict adherence to the 1994 Framework Agreement to freeze nuclear weapons.

• Complete resolution of missile development and sales issues.

• A pledge of no armed aggression against the South.

In return, he said, North Korea would receive three things:

• An assurance of security from South Korea and the United States.

• An appropriate level of economic assistance.

• Aid in joining international lending institutions such as the World Bank.

-------- china

Anger at China

March 9, 2001
Inside the Ring Notes from the Pentagon.
Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough
http://www.washtimes.com/national/default-200139211815.htm

National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice got an earful from a group of three Chinese diplomats who came calling on her at the White House complex.

The three diplomats, former Ambassadors Zhu Chizhen, Li Daoyu and Zhang Wentu, were expected to hold discussions with Miss Rice on a variety of U.S.-China topics: arms sales to Taiwan, China's human rights record and U.S. missile defense plans.

Instead, one of the diplomats pulled out a prepared speech and harangued Miss Rice for some 20 minutes about the Chinese religious group Falun Gong, which China's communist government regards as its greatest internal threat.

Behind the Chinese presentation is China's belief that the CIA is backing the group, a position rejected as ridiculous by U.S. officials.

Falun Gong is a Chinese meditation, exercise and breathing group that is target No. 1 of the Beijing authorities. Its members have been imprisoned and its leaders tortured because of their activism. Several members of the group recently set themselves on fire in Beijing's Tiananmen Square to protest the crackdown.

Miss Rice, we are told, was angered by the Chinese diplomats' tirade and quickly ended the meeting after the 20-minute reading.

The ambassadors are part of a major propaganda campaign now under way by Beijing to influence the new Bush administration before it can get its national security team up and running.


-------- depleted uranium

International Humanitarian Law in a World of Global Processes

Mar 9, 2001
Russia Today
By Maximenko V.I.
http://www.russiatoday.com/news.php3?id=305894
http://www.transcaspian.ru

ALMATY -- (Transcaspian Project) NATO aggression against Yugoslavia in March - June 1999 and the disastrous consequences of the 78-days air war of the North-Atlantic Alliance against a small country in South-Eastern Europe have clearly shown that "humanitarian intervention" as an element of global military and political strategy of the U.S. turned into the most serious potential source of humanitarian catastrophes on the globe".

The last war on the Balkans has also shown how fragile is the world order when the only superpower is trying to secure for itself the possibility of communicating with the rest of the world using only the language of power. The question of overall effectiveness of international law and of the need to perfect international humanitarian law in particular has now become the order of the day in the global community (especially in the part of it, which rejects the dictate of a group of western countries).

Humanitarian aspect of the international law gains today special significance due to at least two main reasons.

Firstly, the most dangerous kind of modern expansionism (the strategy of expanding territorial and political control of the North-Atlantic Alliance eastwards and south-eastwards, towards the heart of Eurasia) uses the pretense of "moral" motives of protecting the universal humanitarian values (using the notion of "human rights" suggested to the world by the advocates of the ideas of French revolution) as a cover. Ideological guise of expansionist aims created by means of information war is all the more dangerous as the emergence of global computer networks in the 90s created new technical means of consciousness manipulation. The falsification of the facts of the struggle of the Yugoslavian nation against an armed and externally supported Alban separatism in Kosovo would be a good example of such manipulation. The aims of a forced change of constitutional state system of Yugoslavia and the disposition of foreign (NATO) troops were successfully disguised as "humanitarian" aims of protecting the Alban minority to manipulate international public opinion.

Secondly, the NATO "humanitarian intervention" on the Balkans turned from a fictitious propagandistic humanitarian catastrophe into a real one, while the West is trying to hush up its scale. This should not surprise anyone: the aftermaths of destroying by missile strikes and bombings the economic infrastructure of a country, which did not attack anyone and the tests of "no-contact" wars carried out on civilians reduced the "humanitarian" phraseology of the interventionists to powder. In the light of the facts of a humanitarian catastrophe, which burst out on the Balkans in 1999, the significance of international humanitarian law and the need of perfecting it under the conditions of global processes become fully visible. The Balkan Task Force and the Special Commission of the Yugoslavian Ministry of Development, Science and Environment collected the facts under consideration. The political assessment of the facts being opposite, the conclusions of these two commissions were practically identical.

Over the period from March 24 to June 10, 1999 NATO aviation with over 1200 aircrafts dropped more than 22000 tons of explosives on Yugoslavia. According to NATO, the overall sortie number sums up to 34250. 25000 residential, 78 industrial, 64 telecommunication and 42 energy objects, 66 road-transport and railway bridges as well as 8 aerodromes are destroyed. 2000 Yugoslavian citizens, mostly civilians have died in the course of bombings. Just before the NATO attack environmental situation in Yugoslavia including water, air, soil and other characteristics was better than in the neighbor countries (according to the 1998 data of the European Commission on Protection of the Environment). According to the experts military actions of the North-Atlantic Alliance, which turned into an ecological war, have changed this situation radically.

Toxic substances emitted into the atmosphere as a result of a purposeful destruction of chemical and oil-processing plants were spreading towards the Adriatic Sea and Italy since northern and north-eastern winds predominate in Yugoslavia. The relief peculiarities promoted southward and southeastward pollution of the Yugoslavian territory by the rivers Morava and Vardara. The fact that Danube waters carried polluting substances towards the Black Sea, while they partly settled on the river bottom, became especially dangerous. Taking into account the natural peculiarities of the Danube basin (slow water change etc.) it may be stated that slowly decaying substances as chlorine compounds and heavy metals (lead and mercury), which got into the river, will still be dangerous for all the countries in this region for 10 or even 20 more years. Rainwater samples taken by oil-processing plants in Novy Sad and Panchevo, systematically destroyed ever since the bombing started, looked like venous blood. The fact that chemical rains pollute the soil puts the aptitude of using agricultural production of Yugoslavia and neighboring countries under suspicion. In April 1999 highly toxic combustion products were carried by southern and southwestern winds through Byelorussia to the Russian territory up the Pskov - Smolensk line for 2 days.

One of the most flagrant violations of international norms guaranteeing the human right for a healthy and safe environment (Geneva Conventions, Rio Declaration 1992) was the use of ammunition with depleted Uranium-238 cores in the course of NATO bombings. Such ammunition was part of the regulation rounds of the 30-mm aircraft guns adopted by the U.S. on A-10 attack planes. It was also used by the "Apache" helicopters and in the heads of "Tomahawk" missiles. This kind of ammunition is particularly valued in Pentagon since it is regarded to possess extra high ability to penetrate tank armor. The U.S. widely used the Uranium-238 ammunition in the war against Iraq. Medical research conducted several years after the military actions show that in the parts of Iraq, where such ammunition was used, there is a higher percentage of stillborn babies and children with various congenital anomalies or infant leukemia. It has also been proved that toxic and radiological damage called forth by depleted uranium provokes cancer.

People are not able to control uranium and to stop uranium particles from spreading. According to a well-known rule of environmental security, pollution knows no borders. According to the wind rose, the particles (uranium oxides and highly radioactive radium and radon) created as a result of employing depleted uranium ammunition and may be carried by wind to Bosnia, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Macedonia or Albania. Yugoslavia is situated on the crossroads of international communications and an uncontrollable emission of radioactive waste on its territory is nothing less than an ecological war of the U.S. against Europe. If one would compare this war to an other one, which took place in the 90s - the Gulf War - it would become understandable that the Russian newspaper was quite right when giving in May 1999 an article concerning the NATO bombings of Yugoslavia an eloquent title "They hit Serbia aiming at Eurasia". It is symptomatic, that a Zb. Brzezinski's book "Chessgame" published on the Balkans a year before the war started, contained a part entitled "Eurasian Balkans". On the map printed in that book Zb. Brzezinski points to the new Central Asian countries, Caucasus and the Caspian and the Black Sea basins as the center of the "Eurasian Balkans", the region of coming shocks.

The war of NATO against Yugoslavia is a gross violation of many basic documents of international law. Among them are the UN Charter, especially chapter VII "Actions concerning peace threat, peace violations and aggression acts" (above all - articles 39, 40, 41, 42 determining the UN Security Council authority); the UN General Assembly December 17, 1984 resolution "On inadmissibility of state terrorism politics and any state actions aimed at undermining social and political order in other sovereign states"; the Final Statement of the Conference on Security and Collaboration in Europe (Helsinki, 1975); Code of conduct regarding military and political aspects of security (Budapest, 1994); Helsinki (1992) and Lisbon (1996) OSCE documents. All these documents proclaim non-interference in domestic affairs of other states, mutual respect of state sovereignty and territorial unity, settlement of international arguments only in a peaceful way as well as the possibility to use force in international relations only based on a corresponding resolution of UN Security Council.

In the course of the Balkan war NATO violated the 1997 Convention banning military and every other hostile use of the means of influencing the natural environment. The Supplementary proceedings of the 1949 I Geneva Convention and the UN resolution A47/37 (1992) "Environmental protection in armed conflicts" were violated. The 1954 convention on the protection of cultural values in case of armed conflicts was violated. Supplementary proceedings of the II Geneva Convention regarding the protection of the victims of internal armed conflicts was violated.

The NATO "humanitarian intervention" also exerted a destroying influence on the "Geneva law" - the humanitarian law in its classical definition, providing protection to the people not participating in military actions - and on the "Haag law", which determines the rights and the duties of the belligerents in an armed conflict and limiting the choice of methods and means of inflicting casualties on the enemy (the use of weapons, ammunition and the methods of waging war, which could cause excessive harm or needless suffering; the bombings intended to terrorize civilians, destroying or damaging private property of no military significance etc. are prohibited.)

Catastrophic humanitarian aftermaths of "humanitarian intervention" and its destroying effect on international law created a new international situation, very different from the one that existed ten years ago by the end of the Cold War. The destruction of the Eurasian superpower achieved by the U.S. at the end of the Cold War exerted a rather contradictory influence on the system of international relations. The Cold War world order was a legal order as it was based on a global balance of power. The creation of two dozens of new independent states in Eurasia at the end of the XX century (on the territory of former USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) broke this general geopolitical principle. People and governments of the newly independent states hardly had time to realize the possibilities of national development opened for them as a result of the fall of totalitarian regimes as the world is now experiencing active propagation of "sovereignty limitation" through "humanitarian intervention" with even stronger military actions to follow. In this aspect the 1999 Balkans war turned out to be a decisive moment for many people.

Holding a speech at a session of the Interparliamentary Assembly in Brussels in April 1999, at the height of the bombings, the president of the Federal Council of the Federal Assembly Yegor Stroyev noted: "The principles of the modern world order - peace, law, respect for the sovereignty of a state and human dignity are torpedoes by the most powerful military machine of our time - the NATO. The basis of today's global civilization - priority of the law over arbitrariness - is now endangered. In the global community there is a power considering itself to be above the norms of international law. This power pretends to be simultaneously the judge and the jury".

One would hardly disagree with such an evaluation. However a question arises: what can the community of the states really oppose to aggressive aspirations for global hegemony of the only superpower except for the well-known reasoning about the priority of law over the arbitrariness?

The answer may be found not as much in the legal sphere since within the states and in their mutual relations power was and stays being a necessary sanction of law. The laws of geopolitical balance are old as the world and nobody can abolish them. Yet today the need for an improvement of the norms of international law, which could make them fit the world of global processes better, becomes truly vital.

Concrete directions of such efforts may be different, however it is quite possible that the growth of a destabilizing menace of intervention into domestic affairs of sovereign states under the pretense of human rights protection will force us to turn to the international political ideas, which let the states limit certain rights and freedoms of their citizens. In a general form these ideas are stated in the 1966 International Pact on civil and political rights (article 4), in the 1950 Convention on Human Rights and Basic Freedoms (articles 8 to 11 and 15). These documents stipulate for the limitation of human rights in cases when "life of the nation is in danger", for the sake of preventing disorders and crimes, preserving territorial unity and public morality. We may assume that the significance of these international legal norms shall rise in the world of global processes.

-------- finland

Ditching Finn nuclear plans would raise bills

March 9, 2001
REUTERS
http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=10035&newsDate=9-Mar-2001

HELSINKI - The chairman of the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers (TT) said yesterday Finnish households would pay a heavy price should plans to build a fifth nuclear power reactor be shelved.

"It would mean a bill between 10 to 20 billion Finnish markka ($1.6-3.1 billion) to households through... financing another means for increasing electricity production," Jyrki Juusela told a news conference at a TT energy seminar.

"In addition, it would inevitably also mean slowing down of (Finnish) economic growth," Juusela said.

In November, Finnish power group Teollisuuden Voima (TVO) applied for a permit to build a new nuclear reactor to help satisfy increasing demand and ensure the country fulfils its greenhouse gas emission obligations under the Kyoto protocol.

Industry studies estimate Finland's electricity consumption will increase by 25 percent to around 100 terawatt hours annually by 2015, boosted by steady economic growth. Finnish industry consumes more than half of the current annual electricity consumption of nearly 80 TWh.

The decision to apply to build the reactor, which goes against the grain in a Europe moving away from nuclear power, has sparked furious debate in Finland and opened fissures within the ruling five-party coalition.

Opponents to nuclear power in Finland - which satisfies 28 percent of the country's electricity consumption - want alternative energy sources, such as natural gas, to be considered instead, with overall consumption to be cut as well.

The reactor proposal is expected to be sent to parliament for a vote later in the year.

Juusela said raising the share of natural gas in total energy consumption - now around 15 percent - would not be a viable option in satisfying demand as it would further increase dependency on Russian gas and electricty imports.

"Our electricity supply would then be 40 percent dependent on Russian gas and electricity imports," Juusela said.

-------- germany

German activists occupy nuclear waste loading site

March 9, 2001
REUTERS
http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=10036&newsDate=9-Mar-2001

DANNENBERG, Germany - About 30 environmentalist activists occupied a loading station for nuclear waste containers yesterday in protest at the planned resumption of waste shipments in Germany later this month.

A police spokeswoman said the demonstrators, members of the environmentalist group Greenpeace, ended the protest peacefully after about four hours, although three were still on a temporary police communications mast they had climbed.

"With this symbolic action we want to show our opposition to nuclear waste transport and make a call for peaceful resistance," Greenpeace spokesman Stefan Schurig said.

Police detained some 25 demonstrators and said they were considering increasing security measures at the station at the northern town of Dannenberg where nuclear waste containers were due to be moved from railway transporters onto trucks.

In another development, police said explosives experts were investigating two barrels probably filled with a petrol mixture found by children on a railway between Dannenberg and the town of Lueneburg that they said could have been primed to explode.

Unknown saboteurs damaged a rail line last month in what police said was probably a protest against the shipments.

Radioactive waste is due to be shipped later this month for the first time in four years from France's La Hague reprocessing plant to the Gorleben permanent storage site. Germany banned nuclear waste shipments in 1998 amid mass protests and concern over radiation leaks from containers containing waste.

Anti-nuclear activists also blocked the railway track near Dannenberg at the weekend. Police said they were expecting some 10,000 demonstrators to try to block the transports and they would have 15,000 officials on hand to break up any blockades.

-------- korea

U.S. to Revisit North Korea Pact

Friday, March 9, 2001
International Herald Tribune
Reuters
http://www.iht.com/articles/12900.htm

WASHINGTON The United States may ask North Korea to negotiate a reduction in the size of its army, as well as an end to its missile programs and exports, Secretary of State Colin Powell said Thursday.

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, General Powell said the Bush administration had reservations about a 1994 agreement that froze North Korea's nuclear programs, saying it might want to "revisit or change" some of the provisions.

The assertions came in response to Democratic senators dismayed at a Bush administration that has been in no hurry to resume North Korean negotiations where the Clinton administration left off. "What I'm very worried about is that this opportunity to find out whether or not there is any real possibility" of a missile agreement "is slipping away," said Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware.

---

U.S. Questioned on N. Korea Stance

Friday, March 9, 2001
Washington Post
Associated Press
By Thomas Wagner
http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/world/issues/koreas/ap/A45530-2001Mar9.html

TOKYO -- The Bush administration's tough talk about North Korea's communist regime raised concerns in Asia on Friday about regional security, with one Japanese editorial warning that "treating Pyongyang like an enemy will ensure that it becomes one."

However, some analysts said that holding the North and its million-man army accountable isn't likely to derail South Korea's efforts to reconcile with Pyongyang.

If a consensus emerged, it seemed to be that Bush should try to capitalize on the Clinton administration's progress toward curbing the North's long-range missile threat.

Bush's summit in Washington on Wednesday with South Korean President Kim Dae-jung was closely scrutinized across East Asia, where democratic South Korea, Japan and Taiwan rely on the 87,000 U.S. troops based in South Korea and Japan for their security against communist countries such as North Korea and China.

Bush told Kim that the United States will not immediately resume Clinton-era talks with North Korea, which achieved a moratorium on its missile testing in September 1999 in exchange for the partial lifting of sanctions.

Bush said he was skeptical about North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and expressed doubt that a missile deal could be verified, given North Korea's penchant for secrecy.

On Thursday, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said he may try to expand prospective missile negotiations with Pyongyang by including U.S. misgivings about its conventional force. He also said Washington would consider modifying a 1994 agreement aimed at halting the North's suspected nuclear weapons program.

North Korea did not immediately react to the Bush-Kim Dae-jung summit. But a statement released on Wednesday by its Foreign Ministry said Pyongyang sees Bush as hostile.

His administration is "increasingly assertive for a hard-line stance toward Pyongyang," which could jeopardize reconciliation between the two countries, the statement said.

It also said the United States should not assume that the North would be willing to "totally disarm itself first" as part of any agreement.

After decades of enmity, the Clinton's administration engineered the first visit of a high-ranking North Korean military official to Washington, and negotiations in Pyongyang in October involving then-U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.

Kim Dae-jung's reconciliation policy with the North helped produce a groundbreaking summit in Pyongyang with Kim Jong Il last year, the first family reunions across the border since the 1950-53 Korean War, and efforts to reconnect an inter-Korean railway.

For years, officials in Japan, South Korea and the United States have coordinated closely on North Korea policy.

So the nuances in the appraisals of the North by the U.S. and South Korean presidents alarmed some observers in Japan, who recalled the shock of a North Korean missile test over their country in 1998.

"It is imperative that Washington and Seoul understand and trust each other when dealing with North Korea," The Japan Times said in an editorial. "Treating Pyongyang like an enemy will ensure that it becomes one."

However, the Times also said Bush's views don't necessarily clash with those of South Korea and Japan. "It would be hard to paint Mr. Bush as a hard-liner as he applauded the South Korean president's leadership and vision, and acknowledged that Mr. Kim was a realist," it said.

China, North Korea's main ally, was silent on the Kim-Bush summit.

However, Li Xiguang, director of international communications at Beijing's elite Qinghua University, urged Bush to continue the policies of his predecessor.

"It would be counterproductive to change the policy of engaging North Korea," Li said. "If that changes, the North could react with hostility and become more confrontational and defensive."

In South Korea, some analysts believe the Bush administration is delaying talks with the North in order to promote a planned missile defense system to thwart potential missile threats by "rogue" nations such as North Korea.

But Koh Jae-nam of the state-run Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, noted Russia and China have joined the United States in supporting inter-Korea reconciliation. He said he doubted the summit would jeopardize East Asia's security.

---

Macho on North Korea

March 9, 2001
New York Times
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/09/opinion/09FRIE.html

Pay attention to the brouhaha at the White House Wednesday, when President Bush shot down the hopes of President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea that the Bush team would quickly resume negotiations with North Korea. This episode highlights the fine line between a tough, effective foreign policy and a tough, ineffective foreign policy, and it raises the question: On which side of that line does Mr. Bush plan to reside?

On Tuesday, Secretary of State Colin Powell, who represents the pragmatic, hard-nosed internationalists within the administration, declared that the Bush team intended "to pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off" in negotiations with North Korea to curb its production and sale of ballistic missiles. But President Bush, after meeting President Kim Wednesday, brusquely indicated that the missile talks with the North would not be resumed any time soon.

What gives? This is the second time in two weeks that Mr. Powell has been out of step. Last week it was his signaling a willingness for "smarter," but smaller, sanctions on Iraq to hold our Arab allies together. That sparked grumbling from the Dick Cheney-Don Rumsfeld camps. (If t