-------- activists
Urgent (and simple) Action!!!
From: "Joan Wade" disarmament@igc.org
Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2000 12:14:57 -0400
Dear Friends,
I am writing to express my deepest appreciation of all your efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Your passion and commitment is outstanding. After a year of working with many of you as the Disarmament Clearinghouse Coordinator, I will be leaving my position to go to graduate school and become an elementary school teacher. I thank you for all of your hard work and encourage you to apply for this excellent position (please see job description below my namestamp).
Of course, I wouldn't be the Clearinghouse Coordinator if I didn't have one more action item for you, so here goes:
Thank you to those of you who have signed on to the www.onedemocracy.com/stopmissiles petition against missile defense and to all of you who have taken action to stop this expensive and dangerous program. On June 20, 2000, this petition will be delievered to every member of the US Congress, driving home the message that national missile defense is not the object of the American public, but a political football that should not come at the expense of needed social programs and international treaties to reduce nuclear weapons.
If you have already signed on and notified your friends and family to do the same, THANK YOU. If you have not yet taken this simple action for a safer world, I urge you to do so as soon as possible and to forward this message on to many others. If you can link this petition to your web site, please do!
President Clinton is scheduled to decide this summer whether or not to deploy a $60 billion national missile defense system that doesn't work. As concerned citizens and activists, we must take every measure to avoid deployment, to avoid a new arms race. Please visit www.onedemocracy.com/stopmissiles today.
Yours in Peace,
Joan L. Wade, Coordinator Disarmament Clearinghouse 1101 14th St., NW, Suite 700 Washington, DC 20005 Ph: (202) 898-0150 x232 Fax: (202) 898-0172 E-mail: disarmament@igc.org Web: www.disarmament.org
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From: IFCO/Pastors for Peace <p4p@igc.org>
"Not one more bullet, not one more bomb." US Navy out of Vieques! Civil Encampments have assured over 335 days of Peace in Vieques - let's make it permanent. Your presence is needed.
IFCO/PASTORS FOR PEACE INVITES YOU TO JOIN A SPECIAL DELEGATION TO VIEQUES, PUERTO RICO
April 28 to May 9, 2000
Vieques, an island of 9,400, is a municipality of Puerto Rico. Since 1938, the US Navy has been acquiring land in Vieques by expropriation. The Navy controls 26,000 of the Island's 33,000 acres. The US Navy has used the island as a bombing range for live ammunition, shelling, strafing and illegal chemicals such as napalm and depleted uranium. Admiral Jay Johnson, chief of naval operations, has called Vieques the "crown jewel" of its Atlantic training sites.
On April 19, 1999 David Sanes Rodriquez, a civilian security guard in Vieques, was killed by an errant US Navy bomb. His death has incited public outcry and has brought together the islandÆs various political parties, religious sectors and civil society. Many have issued declarations supporting the people of Vieques. Over 12 different groups have organized encampments on the restricted area of the beach in an act of civil disobedience. The rallying cry in all of these activities has been "Not one more bullet, not one more bomb." The Evangelical Council of Churches of Puerto Rico, one the groups with a permanent encampment on the beach, prophetically states, "We are here in Christian obedience. We don't see this as civil disobedience; we are called by a higher power to be here."
Mr. Sanes' death is a sad addition to years of suffering of the people of Vieques. The people of Vieques have long opposed the military exercises, charging that the smoke, chemicals, and other residues from munition tests have poisoned the island's soil, polluted the natural water resources, destroyed their fishing industry, led to massive emigration of islanders, and caused cancer- related illnesses and subsequent deaths.
We are organizing this delegation in response to a call for solidarity by the Puerto Rican Evangelical Council of Churches. After the death of David Sanes at the hands of a U.S. Navy, a group of civilians gathered in the area of the "accident" to protest the bombardments as an act of civil disobedience to show outrage at the U.S. Navy's ill-gotten authority on the island of Vieques. On April 21, a group of 15 boats gathered at the site of the bombings, to place a large cross to commemorate the killing, and named the area Mount David in memory of Mr. Sanes.
To join us on this special delegation, please contact IFCO/Pastors for Peace at tel: 773-271-4817 or email p4p@igc.org. The group will meet in San Juan, Puerto Rico on April 28, 2000. A participant fee of $400 includes housing, food, ground and water transportation, and a donation to support ongoing work for peace in Vieques.
-------- alternative energy
Issue #128 (April 24 - 28) TRENDS in RENEWABLE ENERGIES (the condensed version)
This is the weekly summary of most articles carried last week.
To subscribe to the daily version or for other details, go to https://www.solaraccess.com/newsprojects/trends/trendssub.htm
- A U.S. coal producer is suing six renewable energy groups for criticizing coal-generated electricity. The suit alleges commercial defamation from an ad in The New York Times that called for the elimination of coal in power generation. The ad made negative claims about the environmental impact of coal, while promoting a competing product (renewable energy) for generation. The suit says three of the defendants receive funds from companies that support renewable energy, which competes with coal. WFA alleges that the renewables groups collaborated on an overall strategy designed to cast it in a negative light. The charges were laid under the Lanham Act, which is designed to stop misleading claims about a competitor from groups that are engaged in commerce in connection with services they provide.
- More than one million Americans have pledged to install solar roofs within the next decade. The preliminary pledges mean the federal Million Solar Roofs Initiative has met the target set by President Clinton before the United Nations in 1997. DOE will award $630,000 in grants to state and local partnerships in support of the initiative.
- One of the largest electronics companies in the world will increase production of PV by 800 percent in the next five years. Sanyo currently produces 15 MW of panels a year, and will invest 10 billion yen a year by 2005 to increase capacity to 120 MW. Sanyo is building the world's largest PV system in Gifu, where the 6 billion yen 'Mega Solar' memorial hall will exhibit Sanyo products. A 300 m 'Solar Ark' wall and a 'Solar Wave' on the roof of the parking garage will integrate PV panels for total capacity of 3.4 MW. The system will reduce GHG emissions by 670 tons and save 30 million yen a year in energy costs.
- DOE has been told to purchase more of its electricity from renewable energy sources. The federal agency is the first to make a department-wide commitment to purchase its electricity from green sources, with a goal of 3 percent from non-hydro renewable sources by 2005, and 7.5 percent by 2010. Last June, President Clinton issued an Executive Order that directs each federal agency to "strive to use electricity from clean, efficient and renewable energy sources." In cases where green power costs more than electricity from combustion fuels or nuclear, DOE will pay the incremental costs from savings in other areas to avoid any increase in its overall cost for power.
- Canada can cut its GHG emissions in half by 2030 using current technology, if there were a combined effort from both the public and the private sectors, says the Suzuki Foundation. Denmark's "explosive growth" in wind energy shows the transformation in the way energy is used, but the shift is not is not fast enough to avoid "significant and dangerous changes in our climate." Canada lags behind Europe and Japan because it lacks "the will and the vision" to use existing green energy technology, and its GHG emissions will increase 30 percent above the goal by 2030. The report calls for more use of solar energy and predicts that coal, oil, and nuclear power plants could be retired by 2030, with one million buildings using grid- connected PV by 2050.
- Renewables groups in Britain are attacking a government decision to drop binding targets for the generation of green power. An amendment to impose legal targets for generation from renewables was withdrawn in the House of Commons. Although the government is committed to producing 5 percent of electricity from renewables by 2003 and 10 percent by 2010, the change means that the targets are not legally binding, says BWEA. "This is a lost opportunity to send strong signals to the renewables industry that this Government means what it says." The wind lobby has criticized London for dropping support for offshore wind energy, which is growing by 30 percent a year. Renewable energy in Britain provides 3 percent of electricity, but the industry could grind to a halt without clear and decisive support. Almost 800 wind turbines generate 360 MW in Britain, which displaces the emission of 800,000 tonnes of carbon each year. By itself, wind could meet 6 percent of electricity demand by 2010 from both onshore and offshore turbines.
- The city of Santa Barbara will become one of the largest direct purchasers of renewable energy in the world. The California municipality will switch 80 percent of its facilities to green power, at an annual premium of $1.6 to $1.8 million from PES. It joins a growing list of cities in the state that purchase green power, following Santa Monica, Chula Vista and 50 public agencies. Santa Cruz and San Jose also want to buy renewable energy.
- Suzlon Energy will introduce a 1 MW wind turbine last this year in India. The company has built 350 kW units until now, and has installed 240 turbines. Revenue last year was Rs 160 crore, which it wants to increase to Rs 360 crore this year.
- Solar energy is being credited with an increase in proficiency test scores on mathematics and science. AEP's education program allows students to track the output from PV panels on the roof of a school, where teachers report that average science marks increased 13 to 25 percent, and math scores went up by 5 to 18 percent, following installation of the solar system. The higher proficiency scores are attributed to integrating the web site into the curriculum. AEP installed its first wind turbine recently, and will install four more 10 kW turbines this year.
- AWEA backs the combination of wind turbines with natural gas generating facilities. The wind lobby group supports NSP's purchase of 50 MW of electricity from wind and 300 MW from gas, in a hybrid peak-load plant that will optimize the seasonal fluctuations in local wind resources and natural gas supply costs. Wind and gas are "natural partners" because their operational characteristics are complementary, combining the high capital cost and low operating costs of wind with the reverse from gas facilities, resulting in a power plant without excessive financing risks of either type.
- A green power supplier will open the first world's first retail energy store this month. Commonwealth Energy will open its store in Santa Monica, to provide energy-efficiency products and renewable technologies, such as the NightStar renewable energy flashlight.
- A power utility in Oregon will launch a green power option that involves 1 MW of renewable energy power from BPA's wind and hydro facilities. Solar, landfill gas and more wind resources will be included.
- Pennsylvania has recognized a high school for its contribution to reduced GHG emissions by installing a GeoExchange heat pump system that uses absorbed solar energy in the ground to heat and cool buildings. GeoExchange systems are recognized by the U.S. and Canadian governments as an environmentally friendly and cost efficient heating system. The school expects to save $2 million in fuel costs over the next decade from the $1.4 million equipment.
- More than 250 politicians in Japan have drafted a bill to provide subsidies to firms that use renewable energy sources for power generation. The bill will be submitted to the current Diet session, and require the government to set targets for power from solar, wind and other sources, in consultation with private groups and be approved by the Diet. The draft bill requires power suppliers to submit their plans for promoting green power sources, and the government could require that those plans be changed. The bill would provide subsidies to promote the shift to renewables.
- Five 10 kW wind turbines will be installed this year by AEP, and the utility will monitor performance on the internet. The internet site is designed as an information aid for customers who are considering the purchase of a wind turbine for their own use. Viewers can use wind maps to see how much electricity is being generated by any turbine in real time, and compare that with the power typically required for a house or business. The site will also monitor power quality, which is an issue of concern to customers with sensitive electronic equipment. AEP is also monitoring PV and fuel cells.
- One of the largest retailers of renewable energy products will work with a new Internet site to become a premier destination for green information. Real Goods and verde.com will offer 1,500 renewable energy items on the web, in a segment that is growing at three times the revenues from last year.
- Switzerland has started a solar energy exchange for domestic retail customers and wants to start two more. Solar panels on a school in Nidau generate 45,000 kWh of green power each year and local residents can buy the power on the exchange. The price of solar is one franc per kWh, compared to conventional power at 0.25 francs. Participants pay the premium and the utility takes the power from the solar energy collector. Similar projects are planned for Basel and the Swiss capital of Berne.
- Major U.S. environmental groups will release an environmental 'scorecard' to provide consumers with the information they need to choose renewable sources of electricity. The coalition, which includes UCS and NRDC, will release the consumer information tool in June to rate the environmental impacts of all sources of electricity generation. Surveys show that consumers want to buy green power but lack credible information upon which to base a decision. Burning fossil fuels to produce electricity is the largest source of air pollution in the U.S., where almost half the power produced comes from coal-fired facilities. The scorecard will assess the environmental impacts of different sources and provide easy-to-understand ratings to compare competing suppliers.
- The U.S. coal industry has launched a campaign to seek public support for a "balanced energy strategy" and to promote carbon sequestration and low-impact coal for generation. Too much emphasis is placed on reducing dependence on imported oil, and too little on the need for coal-based power. Between 1970 and 1998, the U.S. population grew by 32 percent while consumption of electricity increased 133 percent. The coal group says opinion surveys indicate that most Americans are unaware that 50 percent of electricity in the country comes from coal.
- The largest electric utility in Arizona will double its use of solar energy. Almost 400 kW of PV panels will be installed, beyond the 174 kW of facilities installation earlier this month. To date, more than 500 kW of PV has been installed by the utility.
- One of the most successful green power programs in the U.S. has been recognized by the national Green Pricing Accreditation Initiative. Wisconsin Electric's 'energy for tomorrow' program is one of the first green power programs to be recognized by the CRS, and has more than 11,000 customers who purchase 7.2 MW of power from wind turbines, landfill gas and hydroelectric power facilities.
- An electric utility in Illinois will offer the first wholesale renewable power product in the state. ComEd and the ERT Trust will sell 'EcoPower' through the APX Midwest Market. Landfill gas is the current source of power, but ComEd will add small hydro, wind and solar, while ERT sets up a renewables investment fund to handle proceeds from the green power revenue, which will finance new renewables projects in Illinois.
- An internet-based exchange for the sale of renewable energy has opened in Illinois. APX opened the service in Chicago this month to facilitate the exchange of buying and selling of wholesale and commercial electricity in the region. Operating in ComEd's northern Illinois service area, the exchange provides market participants with a full view of the market with forward price tracking. The Illinois exchange trades renewable energy at a premium for investors, and the Green Tickets became available in March when ComEd launched its EcoPower green power option, marking the first time that renewable energy has been sold on the wholesale market in the U.S. Midwest.
- If politicians in Iowa are interested in creating jobs, they should promote renewable energy facilities rather than natural gas generating plants. The Iowa legislature has not passed its utility deregulation bill and utilities are offering to construct new gas plants if it passes, but AWEA says the utilities are blocking support for renewable energy provisions of the bill that would provide "much larger economic benefits" to the state. The wind lobby says wind and biomass plants will create more jobs than gas-fired plants, because they use fuels that are native to the state, so less money is sent to Texas and Louisiana to pay for the natural gas. In addition, wind power saves money in the long run, reduces pollution and provides an important income to farmers and rural governments. Electricity customers in Iowa could save $300 million over a 25-year period if the state generated 10 percent of its power from wind turbines, says a study released in January. It forecasts 1,200 MW of wind capacity will be added to the 245 MW that already is generated, as well as 60 MW of new biomass capacity.
- Planning officials in Ireland have refused permission for 14 turbines to be installed on the south-east coast in County Wexford. The Carnsore site had been earmarked for a nuclear reactor 30 years ago, and renewable energy advocates say it is ironic that a site identified for nuclear in the 1970s should be refused permission for a windfarm in 2000. Wexford Council refused permission because the project would conflict with noise guidelines and would interfere with views of special amenity value. Local residents opposed the windfarm because it would devalue property, destroy the scenery and cause noise. An appeal has been filed.
- The U.S. Air Force will fund a manufacturer of PV cells to improve its technology for use in space. ECD will refine its a-Si modules that are lightweight, radiation hard and perform well at high temperatures, which make them ideal for space applications and able to compete with crystalline silicon or gallium arsenide solar cells that are used on spacecraft. ECD panels on a plastic substrate provide 2,500 W/kg, compared to 50 W/kg for conventional modules. ECD and United Solar have created a strategic alliance with Bekaert, to expand manufacturing capacity to 25 MW a year.
- The largest producer of electricity in the United States has started a market test of green power. TVA will generate 8 MW of renewable energy power this year for 11 power distributors, and will fully open the program in 2003. Renewable energy will come from three wind turbines, with solar generation sites and landfill gas sites to be established.
- The decision by DOE to increase its purchase of renewable energy has been met with praise from AWEA. Government's strong support has been vital to increasing the capacity of renewable energy technologies, says the wind lobby, and wind will benefit because it is the fastest growing energy technology in the world. Last November, the U.S. Congress approved an extension of the wind energy Production Tax Credit. AWEA says total wind generating capacity in the U.S. is 2,500 MW.
- Kyocera Solar has purchased Solartec of Argentina in a US$50 million deal with Golden Genesis. Kyocera wants to expand its business in Argentina, where Soalrtec has sales of $8 million, accounting for 80% of the domestic market in competition with six other solar companies that distribute imported products.
- China will build more hydropower stations along a 918 km stretch of the upper Yellow River between Longyang Gorge and Qingtong Gorge, where there is a drop of 1,324 m. Officials say 25 large and medium-sized stations with combined installed capacity of 15.878 million kilowatts will be installed, generating 56.77 billion kWh of electricity each year. Seven power stations under construction will add capacity of 5.618 million kilowatts, and only one-third of the total hydro potential of the upper Yellow River has been developed.
- A Nigerian who claims he was duped by Austria on a solar energy project has taken the Austrian government to the European Court of Human Rights for a $1 million breach of contract suit. Phillip Asonmiwuri says legal action is necessary because his efforts to meet with officials in Vienna on the fate of the project have failed. He is head of the African Foundation which, in 1994, approached the Austrian government for assistance and was asked to submit a proposal.
- The state of Minnesota is expected to classify poultry manure as a renewable energy, allowing Northern States Power to burn the material to satisfy an alternative energy requirement imposed by the government in 1994. NSP must develop 425 MW of wind and 125 MW of biomass power in exchange for permission to store spent nuclear fuel in outdoor casks. The wind power is on track.
- Australian Environment Minister Robert Hill rejects criticism from renewable energy groups that the country will not meet its GHG targets in the Kyoto protocol. Australia can increase its emissions by 2012 to 8% above 1990 levels, and Hill says there is great potential to use carbon sinks and forestation.
- IDACORP has assumed sole ownership of its PV subsidiary, Applied Power. The investment started in 1996 when it acquired a majority ownership position in the Washington-based supplier and distributor of PV systems.
- WorldWater of New Jersey and Siemens Solar Industries of California have signed a strategic alliance to provide complementary technologies and systems toward a major contract under bid in Sri Lanka. Siemens Solar will supply PV panels and technical expertise; WorldWater will provide its proprietary solar pumping technology.
- Two storms in Denmark in December and January destroyed eleven wind turbines. The country has 5,700 installed units.
- A new organization has been set up in rural Ireland to promote wind energy. The Meitheal na Gaoithe co-operative was created by two farming organisations, the Irish Farmers' Association and the Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers' Association, to ensure that the harvesting of green energy sources did not become the sole domain of big power generators. Deregulation in Ireland's electricity industry in February means there are opportunities for generating revenues from alternative sources, and officials admit that they must be cautious with the visual aspects of wind turbines. Set-up costs range from £150,000 to £250,000, but offer a good return on investment.
- The Lloyd's Register in Britain is developing an Renewable Energy export service that will be funded initially by the government. By using the group's 283 offices around the world, renewable energy companies can obtain a confidential evaluation of the export market in any country. The pilot phase has funding for free trials but the goal is to make the implementation phase self financing from fees.
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WIND POWER TO HELP RUN FEDERAL OFFICES IN COLORADO
AmeriScan:
April 28, 2000
http://ens.lycos.com/ens/apr2000/2000L-04-28-09.html
DENVER, Colorado, April 28, 2000 (ENS) - The Department of Energy (DOE) has announced the largest commitment ever to purchase electricity generated by wind power. Regional offices of federal government agencies located along the Colorado Front Range - from Fort Collins to Colorado Springs - have committed to purchase more than 10 megawatts of electricity generated by wind turbines. That is enough wind power to meet the electricity needs of more than 3,500 average size homes in Colorado. "The increasing use of renewable energy sources such as wind power holds the promise of enhancing our energy security and protecting the environment," said Energy Secretary Bill Richardson. "Federal agencies in Colorado are setting an example for the rest of the nation."
Over the next several years, 30 federal agencies will join the DOE coordinated effort to purchase 10 megawatts of wind power through the Public Service Co. of Colorado's Windsource Program, and through other local utilities' wind energy programs. Participating federal agencies will pay a small premium for each 100 kilowatt hour block of wind generated electricity. To help offset the additional cost, the agencies will work through the DOE and with Public Service Co. of Colorado to improve energy efficiency in the agency's facilities and use the savings to purchase the wind power.
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U.S. sets largest-ever federal wind power purchase
USA: April 28, 2000
Story by Patrick Connole
REUTERS NEWS SERVICE
http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=6488
WASHINGTON - U.S. Energy Secretary Bill Richardson on Thursday announced the largest federal government purchase of wind power ever with a commitment by regional offices of federal agencies in Colorado.
In a statement, Richardson said regional federal offices located along the Colorado Front Range, from Fort Collins to Colorado Springs, have committed to purchasing 10 megawatts of electricity generated from wind turbines, equal to enough power to meet the power needs of 3,500 average Colorado homes.
"The increasing use of renewable energy sources such as wind power holds the promise of enhancing our energy security and protecting the environment," Richardson said. "Federal agencies in Colorado are setting an example for the rest of the nation," he said.
The Clinton administration has pushed for Congress to include in any electric power market restructuring legislation a provision mandating utilities to buy 7.5 percent of their fuel sources from renewables such as wind, solar and biomass by 2010.
Over the next several years, 30 federal agencies will take part in the Energy Department's effort to purchase 10 MW of wind power through the Public Service Co of Colorado's Windsource Programme, and through other local outlets.
Participating agencies will pay a small premium for each 100 kilowatt-hour block of wind-generated electricity bought. Last week, Richardson directed his energy agency to purchase a portion of its electricity from renewable sources. The department will buy 3 percent of its total power needs from non-hydro renewables by 2005 and 7.5 percent by 2010.
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Mega artichokes to power Spanish homes - newspaper
UK: April 28, 2000
http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=6489
LONDON - Spanish farmers are growing three-metre high artichokes for burning in special power stations to produce electricity, the Independent newspaper has reported.
The genetically-modified monster vegetables, which boast seven metre roots, will be generating power for 60,000 people when operations in the northern towns of Villabilla de Burgos and Alcala de Gurrea begin in two years.
The newspaper said twin power stations will burn 105,000 tonnes of the dried and pulped Cynara Cardunculs each year.
Farmers were persuaded to sow the prickly plant by EU subsidies and price guarantees from the electricity generator.
Burning plants for energy is not a new idea, but the biomass sector has seen a revival in recent years as environmental concerns rise.
While there are already a number of biomass schemes in Europe they often struggle to compete commercially with other green energy schemes.
An Irish scheme to burn cannabis as a fuel foundered last year because of it was considered too expensive compared with wind power projects.
REUTERS NEWS SERVICE
-------- britain
World Business Briefings
New York Times
April 28, 2000
http://www.nytimes.com/00/04/28/news/financial/biz-briefs.html
BAE BUYS LOCKHEED UNIT The cash-rich British military contractor BAE Systems extended its position in the United States aerospace industry, saying it would buy the control-systems business of Lockheed Martin for $510 million in cash. Lockheed said it was trying to focus on its core aerospace and military markets. Lockheed Martin Control Systems, which has facilities in Johnson City, N.Y., and Fort Wayne, Ind., makes gear that controls aircraft flight and engines. The unit had 1999 revenue of $360 million. (Reuters)
-------- china
Chinese fighters challenge U.S. jet
Washington Times
April 28, 2000
By Bill Gertz
http://208.246.212.80/national/default-2000428232751.htm
Chinese warplanes challenged a U.S. reconnaissance jet Thursday over the South China Sea as the aircraft monitored exercises by the People's Liberation Army in southern China, Pentagon officials said.
Rear Adm. Craig Quigley, a Pentagon spokesman, told reporters that two Chinese J-8 fighters flew within two miles of a U.S. Air Force RC-135 Rivet Joint reconnaissance aircraft.
"This is a reconnaissance aircraft, Air Force aircraft, well into international airspace, that was approached by two Chinese fighters," he said. "They did not come very close to the aircraft. I don't consider this a particularly unusual event."
Pentagon officials said the RC-135 was monitoring Chinese military exercises under way in southern China. The RC-135s usually fly in the region several times a month and are challenged by Chinese jets during a small portion of those flights.
The encounter comes at a time of heightened tensions between China and Taiwan following the election of a pro-independence president, Chen Shui-bian, in Taiwan last month.
Beijing envoy Tan Shubei issued a new threat against Taiwan Thursday, warning Taipei it faces "disaster" and "hostility" if it fails to accept China's policy toward the island it views as a breakaway province.
Official Chinese news media earlier had reported that Mr. Tan had threatened to go to war, stating that "if they don't accept the 'one China' principle and that Taiwan is a part of China, then the result will not be peace, but war; not harmony, but confrontation; not good will, but enmity."
Adm. Quigley sought to play down the incident saying the Chinese, like other nations, often "send up aircraft to just have a look-see as to who is getting close to their airspace."
Adm. Quigley said the U.S. spy plane was far outside Chinese airspace and that the United States routinely operates "in international airspace around the world."
No U.S. warplanes were sent up to defend the RC-135 and it did not change course as a result of the encounter.
"I would mention that at no time did the U.S. aircraft feel the least bit threatened," Adm. Quigley said.
Richard Fisher, a specialist on the Chinese military with the Jamestown Foundation, said the incident appears similar to a Chinese submarine encounter with the U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk in 1995. Chinese jets intercepted U.S. aircraft that detected the submarine during that incident.
"These kinds of things have been increasing since that happened," Mr. Fisher said in an interview. As a result of China's military buildup, "the United States is going to have to be much more aggressive in reconnaissance of [People's Liberation Army] activities," he added. "I expect there will be many more opportunities for the PLA Air Force to intercept U.S. intelligence aircraft."
Defense officials said the RC-135 was seeking intelligence on possible Chinese military force redeployments from northern China, as well as on China's new command-and-control system known as Qu Dian.
The U.S. aircraft flight originated at the U.S. Air Force base at Kadena, Japan.
The RC-135, known as "hog" because of its extended nose, is a key intelligence collector for the U.S. military, used recently in the conflict in the Balkans. They can fly for up to 20 hours at a time and collect electronic-signals intelligence, such as military communications, at distances of hundreds of miles.
The J-8 is a twin-engine interceptor built by China based on the design of the Russian MiG-21. The most advanced version, the J-8 IIM, is armed with air-to-air missiles, and 30 mm cannon.
On Taiwan's newly elected leaders, Mr. Tan in Beijing said: "If they do not recognize that Taiwan is part of China and the one-China principle, this will lead to disaster instead of peace, confrontation instead of harmony, and hostility instead of good will." The remarks were carried by China's official Xinhua news agency.
A Taiwanese Defense Ministry spokesman said on Tuesday that the Chinese military exercises were unusual and included bomber and fighter training as well as naval activities near the Diaoyu or Senkaku islands in the East China Sea.
Thursday, however, Mr. Chen, the president-elect, said the military maneuvers were not unusual.
"Everybody can rest assured. Routine drills by the Chinese Communists are frequent, especially every April and May," Mr. Chen told a group of supporters. "Security units told me, the U.S. side told me, that there is nothing unusual. So we should not scare ourselves."
Asked about the exercises, Adm. Quigley said that "from what we have seen on mainland China, the level of effort is typical and seasonal."
The intercept of the RC-135 was first reported by Taiwan's ET Today Internet news service. The service quoted a Taiwanese general as saying it was the first time in three years that Chinese jets were scrambled to follow a U.S. reconnaissance jet.
U.S. officials, however, said the intercepts happen at least once a month. In Beijing, a government spokesman said the exercises are part of training.
"As far as military exercises carried out by the People's Liberation Army, this is normal and is aimed at enhancing the capability of the Chinese military," said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun Yuxi.
• This article is based in part on wire service reports.
-------- france
US gives Russia proposal on missile defenses: US diplomat
Agence France Presse
WASHINGTON, April 28 2000 (AFP) - The Clinton administration has given Russia a draft agreement that proposes to revise the 1972 Anti-Ballistic MissileTreaty to allow the United States to deploy a limited missile defense system, the US ambassador to Moscow confirmed Friday.
Ambassador James Collins declined to comment of the specifics of the draft agreement, but he told reporters here that US arms control negotiators had handed the agreement over.
"That was done in a venue in which I was not present. That was done by the negotiators," he said
Collins said the United States had left open a "very limited" door to subsequent expansion of the proposed missile defense system in its discussions with Russia on modifying the ABM treaty.
But the Russians have been assured that the proposed missile shield would contain built-in technological limits that would render it ineffective against Russia's massive strategic nuclear systems.
"What we are basically giving the Russians is the description of a system, including what you are describing as an open door, that remains very limited," he said at a breakfast with defense reporters here.
Republican supporters of the national missile defense system fear that an agreement on changes to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty negotiated by President Bill Clinton would tie the next administration's hands in deploying an anti-missile shield.
But Collins said overcoming Russian fears that a limited US anti-missile system would be expanded later to threaten Russia's nuclear deterrent would likely be at the heart of any US-Russian negotiations on modifying the ABM treaty.
"We are saying that the system that in any way is being described to them both in terms of the limits in the numbers (of interceptor missiles), the limits in technologies, cannot do that," he said.
According to the New York Times, the US draft agreement was submitted last January and assures Moscow that the system "will be incapable of threatening Russia's strategic deterrence" at the levels of the START II strategic arms reduction treaty recently ratified by Russia or START III, a follow-up accord the two countries are trying to negotiate.
The United States is considering deploying 100 missile interceptors in Alaska and building a sophisticated new radar there as part of the first phase of the nationwide missile defense system designed to defend the country from attack by "rogue" states, such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq, the Times said.
Clinton is to make a formal decision on deploying this system either later in the summer or early in the fall, according to administration officials.
After the initial stage of deployment is complete, Washington would likely move to a second phase, which involves deploying another 100 missile interceptors at another location, The Times said.
The ABM Treaty, seen by arms control experts as the linchpin of strategic deterrence, prohibits both the United States and Russia from deploying nationwide missile defenses in order to preserve the viability of the mutual assured destruction doctrine.
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said in Washington Wednesday that tinkering with the ABM Treaty would be a "fatal mistake" that would undermine every arms control agreement negotiated over the past 30 years.
But the US proposal assures Russia that even if the two sides conclude START III, which envisages reducing the two sides' strategic arsenals to between 1,500 and 2,000 warheads, Moscow will still have enough firepower to overcome any US missile defense, reported The Times.
"These strategic offensive forces give each side a certain ability to carry out an annihilating counterattack on the other side regardless of the conditions under which the war began," the daily quotes the proposal as saying.
----
France Urged to Halt Radioactive Discharges from La Hague
April 28, 2000 (ENS)
http://ens.lycos.com/ens/apr2000/2000L-04-28-03.html
PARIS, France, The La Hague nuclear reprocessing plant in France is discharging radioactive particles larger than permitted, Greenpeace claimed yesterday after sampling wastewater emitted from La Hague's waste pipe, off the Normandy coast.
The group called on the French government to immediately halt radioactive discharges from the nuclear reprocessing complex.
COGEMA-La Hague reprocessing plant (Photo courtesy COGEMA)
Greenpeace said it would take the facility's operator, the government owned company COGEMA, to court for violating its operating licence.
Greenpeace made a similar claim in October 1997 after a previous sampling exercise. COGEMA today denied Greenpeace's accusation, as it did two years ago.
According to Greenpeace, independent analysis of water samples from the end of La Hague's discharge pipe revealed a number of particles larger than the regulatory limit of 25 microns (ug), plus a total level of radioactivity higher than allowed under European Union law.
In the case of cobalt 60, Greenpeace said, levels found were 560 times that permitted under the 1996 European Union directive on ionising radiation.
A spokesperson for COGEMA denied the allegations. He said that filters were used to retain any radioactive particles above 25ug, while the company carried out 80,000 analyses per year, supplemented by regular official checks.
The spokesperson questioned the conditions used by Greenpeace for its "experiment."
The large radioactive particles were discovered by Greenpeace divers who installed a scientific water sampler at the end of La Hague's discharge pipe at a depth of 28 metres off the Normandy coast.
Greenpeace team waits off the Cogema reprocessing plant while the filter is installed in a pump for sampling the plant's discharge. April 16. (Photo courtesy Greenpeace/Matthieu Barret)
The discharge was pumped through a filter in which radioactive particles greater than the authorised 25 microns - about the size of a grain of salt - were isolated.
The sampling operation, which took place last week, was supervised by a legal witness who is a bailiff. Analysis of the sample was undertaken by an independent French Laboratory, ACRO.
"The particles are insoluble and will remain dangerous in the environment for hundreds of years. The fact that COGEMA discharges large particles has significant implications for the potential health impacts of its discharges," said Greenpeace scientist Diederik Samsom.
"It is conceivable that particles could be ingested by members of the public via seafood thus providing a relatively high radiation dose. Neither COGEMA's nor the regulatory authorities models take this effect into account," Samsom warned.
Mike Townsley of Greenpeace International said, "In 1997, the French environment minister, Dominque Voynet, promised to compel the plants operator COGEMA to produce a 'zero discharge' option. No such option has been produced. The only solution now is to end the dirty, dangerous and pointless practice of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel and instead store it in above ground monitorable stores."
COGEMA is currently seeking government approval for a plant expansion and an increase in radioactive discharges.
----
French court studies Chernobyl case
FRANCE: April 28, 2000
REUTERS NEWS SERVICE
http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=6490
PARIS - France's High Court said on Thursday it would need at least a month to say if it will take up a case against ex-cabinet ministers accused of failing to warn the public against the Chernobyl nuclear disaster.
The case was brought by Yohann Van Waeyenberghe, 31, from the Champagne capital of Reims, who claims his thyroid cancer was caused by fallout in eastern France from the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, justice sources said.
The complaint, the first such legal action in France, targetted then Interior Minister Charles Pasqua, Health Minister Michele Barzach and Environment Minister Alain Carignon.
Van Waeyenberghe asked that the three politicians "recognise their stupidity" in not issuing explicit warnings of the dangers of fallout after a blast at the Chernobyl nuclear plant in Ukraine.
He said in his complaint that he would show his medical condition was a result of the disaster The High Court of Justice of the Republic exists solely to try serving or past government members for offences committed while in office.
A radioactive cloud swept from Chernobyl across much of eastern and western Europe. Soviet officials originally tried to play down the seriousness of the disaster, which official data show killed thousands of people and affected millions more in Ukraine alone.
-------- imf / world bank / wto / nafta
Environmental groups protest "secret" NAFTA talks
USA: April 28, 2000
REUTERS NEWS SERVICE
http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=6493
WASHINGTON - Environmental groups on Thursday accused the United States, Canada and Mexico of holding secret talks that could weaken wildlife protection under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
In a letter to government ministers, 91 environmental groups called on NAFTA trading partners to immediately suspend the negotiations, which activists said have gone on for 10 months behind closed doors.
"These secret negotiations must stop," said Mark Van Putten, president of the National Wildlife Federation, one of the largest conservation groups in the United States.
U.S. officials no immediate comment.
Activists said NAFTA is the only trade agreement with guidelines that make it possible for groups to protest when environmental laws are not being enforced.
An environmental side-agreement calls for public input as the guidelines for determining environmental problems are developed.
Last June the guidelines were revised with input from environmental groups from Canada, Mexico and the United States.
There were only supposed to be small revisions to these guidelines after the June meeting, the environmental groups said. But instead, NAFTA ministers have been conducting "secret meetings to completely change key parts of these guidelines," they said in a statement.
The letter was signed by a wide range of groups, including the Sierra Club, the World Wildlife Fund, Enlace Ecologico A.C. and the Canadian Environmental Law Association.
-------- japan
Radiation kills second worker
Sydney Morning Herald
Date: 28/04/00
By MICHAEL MILLETT
http://www.smh.com.au/news/0004/28/text/world04.html
Tokyo: Japan's worst nuclear accident has claimed its second fatality, with the death in a Tokyo hospital of a uranium processing worker.
Mr Masato Shinohara, 40, died yesterday of multiple organ failure despite a seven-month fight by doctors after his exposure to huge doses of radiation at the JCO plant in Tokaimura, north of Tokyo, in September.
Their efforts included the world's first use of radical cancer treatment for a radiation victim.
Too weak to cope with conventional blood transfusions, Mr Shinohara was injected with umbilical cord blood to boost his stem cell count. While this proved successful in restoring his ability to reproduce blood cells, his body was unable to fight infections and other problems, including internal bleeding.
Doctors said Mr Shinohara's condition had declined rapidly over the past week after his lungs and kidneys collapsed.
A co-worker, Mr Hisashi Ouchi, died in the same hospital of the same causes in December.
The two men were working within metres of the uncontrolled nuclear reaction, triggered when they poured a dangerously high mix of enriched uranium dioxide into a storage tank.
Investigations found the company had flouted safety procedures for processing uranium, allowing workers to slop volatile mixtures around in metal buckets. The workers had ignored even these lax rules to save time. Mr Shinohara was exposed to 10 sieverts of radiation, about 10,000 times the yearly exposure limit for a person not working in the nuclear industry.
A third worker in an adjoining room suffered a lower level of exposure and was discharged from hospital in December.
Yesterday's death prompted vigorous declarations from the Government that it would renew its efforts to prevent a repeat of the accident.
But efforts to punish those responsible for the Tokaimura disaster are proceeding slowly.
Although police said in January that they would lay charges against JCO management, the investigation has not been concluded.
The plant has lost its licence to process uranium, and its president will resign this week.
At least 439 people, including 207 local residents, were exposed to abnormal levels of radiation. However, the International Atomic Energy Agency has found there was no significant contamination beyond the plant walls.
-------- korea
Two Koreas closer to summit agreement
Washington Times
April 28, 2000
http://208.246.212.80/world/ed-column-2000428221858.htm
PANMUNJOM, Korea - The two rival Koreas have moved close to an agreement on how to proceed at their unprecedented summit, South Korean officials said Thursday.
But North Korea and South Korea, who fought a 1950-53 war ending without a treaty, still must move forward on an agenda for the June 12-14 summit of the two leaders, the officials indicated.
"We will try to resolve it step by step, without a rush," said Park Jae-kyu, South Korea's unification minister, after officials of both Koreas met for 90 minutes meeting at the border village of Panmunjom.
-------- npt
NPT OR NUCLEAR CYNICISM
Welcome to the Prince of Egypt Passover Haggadah ...
Opinion Editorial Article
Friday, April 28 2000 23 Nisan 5760
The Jerusalem Post Internet Edition
From: FoE Sydney - Nuclear Campaign - nonukes@foesyd.org.au
The 2000 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) Review Conference has opened at the UN in New York, and once again Israel seems under the scrutiny of and isolated by the international community. But the fact that Israel is now one of only four nations that have not signed the NPT is not a failure on Israel's part, but of the non-proliferation regime to adapt to the real challenges of the post-Cold War order.
The NPT, though lauded on Monday by US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright as "an indispensable agreement for all nations, for all people, for all time," is as quirky an agreement as the international community has ever produced. The treaty embodies a bargain among the five declared nuclear weapons states (US, United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia) and the rest of the world: We will disarm our nuclear arsenals if you commit not to join the nuclear club. This bargain is, in turn, enforced by another - in exchange for accepting nuclear safeguards and inspections, signatory states are given greater access to nuclear technology for peaceful uses, such as generating energy.
In principle, Israel is perhaps the country which stands to gain most from the success of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Mideast peace process has not yet changed the fact that Israel is a small country that some of the world's most aggressive dictatorships still pledge to destroy. It is therefore one of diplomacy's great ironies that Israel, of all nations, finds itself outside the NPT process.
The reason for this anomaly can be found by noting Iran, Iraq, and North Korea are NPT signatories. No one seriously believes that these states have abandoned dreams of building or acquiring nuclear weapons, yet all have come to the conclusion that joining the NPT does not materially hinder the quest for the bomb, and may even assist in their race to obtain weapons of mass destruction.
In case there were any doubts on this point, the 1991 Gulf War provided a case study of how a determined outlaw state could use the membership to its benefit. Years of invasive UNSCOM inspections revealed that Iraq was much closer to building a bomb than International Atomic Energy Agency (the agency enforcing the NPT) inspections had indicated. Among the items found in Saddam Hussein's temporarily arrested nuclear program were critical "dual-use" technologies to which Iraq would not have had access without its NPT signature.
Following these revelations, the IAEA did tighten its inspection regime, but Iran has not acceded to the new inspection rules. Iraq, too, has avoided the new rules, and is no longer under the even more intrusive eye of UNSCOM.
Given this record, Israel has had ample reason not to trust its security to the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime. Faced with the choice of signing and cheating like the rogue states, or implicitly admitting that it cannot commit to unilaterally desisting from the development of nuclear weapons, Israel has chosen not to sign the treaty.
To single Israel out for criticism in this regard, as Egypt has led the Arab world in doing, belies incredible cynicism. Among the three other non-signatory nations, two - India and Pakistan - have not only declared their nuclear arsenals, but provocatively tested their weapons in 1998. Israel, by contrast, has signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, thereby wisely committing not to follow in those nations' footsteps.
Israel also supports the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East, as was called for at the 1995 NPT conference. The logical forum to reach such an agreement is the multilateral wing of the peace process, in this case the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) talks.
By continually stomping out of the ACRS talks, Egypt has shown that it is more concerned about scoring propaganda points against Israel than finding practical ways to promote effective arms control and disarmament in the region.
Rather than focusing on "universality" - the code word for pressing countries like Israel to sign the NPT - the review conference should ask itself how to strengthen an enforcement regime so weak that nations most threatened by proliferation, such as Israel, cannot rely upon it. In addition, US efforts to come out from under outdated restrictions on building defenses should be encouraged, not rebuffed. Treaties are potentially not the only, or even the most effective, form of arms control.
Ultimately, the best hope for stopping or rolling back nuclear proliferation lies in reducing the value of such weapons through the global deployment of missile defenses.
----
Details of U.S.-Russian ABM discussions in Bulletin & NYT; Helms declares opposition to any ABM/START III agreement
April 28, 2000
TO: Coalition members and friends
FR: Daryl Kimball, Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers dkimball@clw.org
Today's editions of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and The New York Times report on details of the U.S. proposal on modifications to the ABM Treaty that has been at the center of controversy between the two superpower rivals on the future course of strategic nuclear arms control.
As the New York Times writes: "The Clinton administration has presented Russia with a draft agreement that would revise a key arms control treaty to allow the United States to deploy a limited missile defense system and to hold open the possibility of building a larger system in the future."
A few quick observations:
First, the leakage of the documents may make it more difficult to conduct U.S.-Russian arms talks. Also, expect that the story will likely be used by the strongest NMD proponents to argue that the Clinton administration is not pushing for broad enough changes in the ABM Treaty. (See LA Times story attached below: "Helms Blasts Clinton on ABM Treaty")
Second, what is most revealing about the documents obtained by the Bulletin and the NYTimes is not so much the details of the proposal for modifying the ABM Treaty to allow for a "limited" national missile defense (with the possibility of a further round of modifications as early as March 2001), but the talking points relating to the U.S. position. As Steve Schwartz of the Bulletin writes, these particular documents make it clear that the U.S. assumes that the approach now being pursued will leave in place a very large number of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons on "hair-trigger" alert indefinitely in order to maintain a Russian deterrent force capable of overcoming the proposed NMD system.
This U.S. approach should not be too surprising ... but nevertheless, it is unnerving and, to say the least, very disappointing.
----
By Stephen I. Schwartz, publisher of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
You would think that 10 years after the end of the Cold War, the United States would be doing everything it could to get Russia to reduce its bloated, aging, and dangerous arsenal of approximately 6,000 deployed strategic nuclear warheads.
You would be wrong.
In fact, as revealed here for the first time, in documents obtained exclusively by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, U.S. negotiators have sought to allay Russian fears about a possible U.S. national missile defense (NMD) system by ruling out any future reductions in strategic nuclear warheads below the 1,500-2,000 level and encouraging Russia to maintain its nuclear forces on constant alert.
At the meeting earlier this year in Geneva where the documents below were presented to Russia, Russian negotiators countered with an offer to slash the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads held by each side (from the START II level of 3,000-3,500 to 1,500). The United States rejected the offer but provided no public justification for why it required more warheads.
That the United States is asking Russia to forsake deep reductions in nuclear weapons for the indefinite future is bad enough. This news is certain to anger many delegates to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference, currently taking place at the United Nations, who have been highly critical about the lack of progress in arms control and disarmament since 1995, when the United States renewed its promise under Article VI of the treaty to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament."
Worse yet, the United States is encouraging Russia to continue to maintain its strategic nuclear forces on hair-trigger alert, ready to fire within minutes of receiving a launch order. As a consequence of the breakup of the Soviet Union and the continuing economic difficulties in Russia, Russia's early-warning network is a shambles. So many satellites and radars are inoperative or only partially functional that for as much as 12 hours a day, Russia has no means of detecting an ICBM launch from the United States. As for attacks from U.S. Trident submarines, each of which can carry up to 192 warheads, Russia essentially has no detection capability at all. Combining decaying and inoperative early warning systems with a "launch on warning" posture for thousands of nuclear weapons is a recipe for nuclear disaster.
Russia's continuous high-alert posture has already led to one major scare. On January 25, 1995, Russian radar technicians detected a routine scientific rocket launch from Norway but misinterpreted it as a Trident missile from a U.S. submarine. President Boris Yeltsin hurriedly convened a threat assessment conference with his senior advisers and for about eight minutes they deliberated whether to launch a counterattack before the incoming missile arrived. Fortunately, Russian military officers were able to determine--with only two or three minutes to spare--that the rocket was in fact heading away from Russian territory and therefore posed no threat.
Although the Clinton administration's rationale for a limited NMD system centers around "rogue states" like North Korea, only Russia has the capability today and into the indefinite future to deliver a significant number of extremely powerful nuclear weapons to targets in the United States in 30 minutes or less. While the risk of deliberate nuclear war is far lower than in years past, the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons is rising, in no small part because of Russia's increasing reliance on nuclear weapons even as its early-warning systems (its eyes and ears) fall into disrepair.
But the Clinton administration has chosen to ignore this very real and growing danger and is instead expending significant time and political capital seeking to modify the ABM Treaty to allow the deployment of a not-yet-fully tested limited missile defense system against a threat which has yet to fully materialize. It is outrageous that the United States would not only pursue this path but actually exacerbate the danger by encouraging Russia to continue to deploy thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert.
About the Documents
These documents were presented to Russian officials by U.S. negotiators during meetings in Geneva on January 19-21, 2000. John Holum, senior adviser for arms control and international security affairs at the State Department, headed the U.S. delegation. Yuri Kapralov, head of the Russian Foreign Ministry's arms control department, led the Russian delegation. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs translated the English-language documents into Russian. A trusted source recently obtained a copy of the translated documents and provided them to the Bulletin. The documents were subsequently translated back into English and have been reviewed by both Russian and English language speakers for accuracy.
The first three documents appear to be talking points for the U.S. delegation, most likely presented to the Russians by John Holum. The U.S. delegation also presented its Russian counterparts with a proposed protocol and annex to the ABM Treaty that would modify the treaty and allow the legal deployment of the first phase of the planned U.S. national missile defense system.
The documents discuss SHF (Super High Frequency ) radars, which are also known as X-band radars. Their frequency band is 3 to 30 gigahertz, which includes the X-band (8-12 gigahertz).
ABM Treaty "Talking Point" Documents [See http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/2000/mj00/treaty_doc.html}
NMD PROTOCOL: TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION
ANNEX ON VERIFICATION: TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION
RUSSIA'S CONCERNS
RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN PROPOSAL
UNILATERAL STATEMENT
PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY
ANNEX TO THE PROTOCOL
----
"U.S. Hands Russia a Plan to Revise '72 Missile Treaty"
The New York Times,
April 28, 2000
By STEVEN LEE MYERS and JANE PERLEZ
WASHINGTON, April 27 -- The Clinton administration has presented Russia with a draft agreement that would revise a key arms control treaty to allow the United States to deploy a limited missile defense system and to hold open the possibility of building a larger system in the future.
The proposal would amend the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, long considered a linchpin of arms control, to allow the United States to protect itself against the threat of missile attacks from nations like North Korea, Iraq, Iran and Libya, according to a draft given to the Russians earlier this year.
The draft and accompanying documents outlining the administration's arguments for changing the treaty provide the most detailed and authoritative account that has yet emerged of the American negotiating position. Officials are pressing Russia to accept a defensive system that it considers a grave, destabilizing threat, but which some Congressional Republicans believe is not nearly big enough. [Excerpts from the American document, page A10.]
"The U.S. national missile defense system, which will be limited and intended to defend against several dozen long-range missiles launched by rogue states, will be incapable of threatening Russia's strategic deterrence," said a summary of the administration's arguments, presented to the Russians.
The administration wants to change the treaty to let the United States build the first phase of a defensive system with 100 missiles and their launchers, as well as a sophisticated new radar system on Shemya Island in Alaska. But the administration also wants a second phase, to include another 100 missiles and launchers at a second site. In its proposal, the United States calls for talks on an expanded system to begin as soon as next March -- after Mr. Clinton's successor is inaugurated.
Russia fears that any agreement to allow a limited defensive system would open the door to demands for a further expansion that would gut the aims of the ABM treaty, which prohibits national defensive shields. The theory was that by limiting the nations' defenses, the treaty takes away their compensating need to build up their offenses, providing some stability. And if nations feel invulnerable to attack, they might be tempted to launch a first strike.
American negotiators have tried to assure their Russian counterparts that the system would pose no threat to Russia's strategic nuclear deterrence, but rather would focus on more isolated threats of ballistic missile strikes.
The American document went to great lengths to reassure Russia that even if the two countries agree to reduce their warheads to between 1,500 and 2,000 as proposed under the next phase of the planned nuclear arms reduction, known as Start III, the Russian nuclear force would have nothing to fear from the American defensive shield.
"These strategic forces give each side the certain ability to carry out an annihilating counterattack," the document said. "Forces of this size can easily penetrate a limited system of the type the United States is now developing."
The summary, which was presented to the Russians in January by the senior American negotiator, John D. Holum, went on to say that in the event of a first-strike attack, Russia would still be able "to send about a thousand warheads, together with two to three times more decoys, accompanied by other advanced defense penetration aids" that would easily overwhelm the limited American system.
"Authoritative written Russian sources claim that the Russian Government understands that the capabilities of its defense penetration aids are extremely high," the document said. "These same written sources, supplemented by the statements of senior Russian military personnel and defense industry representatives, clearly present the idea that the Russian Government anticipated that is defense penetration aides could easily overcome the U.S. N.M.D. system," referring to the national missile defense.
The documents outlining the administration's position were obtained by The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in Russia and passed on to The New York Times. The bulletin plans to make them available on its web site (www.thebulletin.org). Senior administration officials declined to comment on the documents, but in interviews today discussed the rationale behind the proposals.
The proposals amount to the administration's opening offer in negotiations that have barely got off the ground.
While senior American and Russian officials have held repeated discussions over the last year, the Russians have not yet decided whether to even engage in negotiations on the treaty. In public -- and equally so in private, officials said -- the Russians have adamantly opposed any changes to allow a missile defense.
"It's very much an open question whether Russia is going to conclude that it is in Russia's interest to do a deal with this administration," a senior administration official said.
However, the discussions have intensified with the recent election of Vladimir V. Putin as Russia's next President and the coming end of President Clinton's second term.
At a news conference capping of three days of talks that centered on national missile defense, the Russian foreign minister, Igor S. Ivanov, and Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright said today that discussions would continue when Mr. Clinton and Mr. Putin meet in Moscow in June.
President Clinton has not made a decision so far on whether to deploy a defensive system. He is not scheduled to do so until after the Pentagon's next antimissile test in June.
Mr. Ivanov said that "considerable differences" remained, and he repeated that Russia believed the ABM treaty should "remain a cornerstone of strategic stability."
Dr. Albright responded by saying that the administration, too, wanted to preserve the treaty but also wanted to adapt it to "21st-century needs," a reference to the missile threats that intelligence experts have warned are fast approaching.
The administration's proposal would not directly amend the text of the treaty, but rather revise it by adding two brief "protocols." They would allow the first phase of a missile defense and provide extensive measures for verification of the system's missiles and radars.
Another senior administration official said the decision to propose protocols was simply easier than trying to revise the wording of the treaty line by line. It could also allow Russians to declare that the treaty itself remained unchanged. However, the administration official said, "It's not like cosmetics are going to solve this problem."
If approved by the Russians, the protocols would still face a test in the Senate, which would have to approve them before they took effect. More than 20 Republican senators said they would not accept Mr. Clinton's proposed changes, contending that they would limit a defensive system too much.
The protocol covers only the first phase of the American missile defense system, intended to counter an attack from North Korea, which will be able to threaten the continental United States with ballistic missiles by 2005, according to a classified intelligence estimate.
The administration stopped short of asking the Russians to approve immediately the second phase of the system, which would be based at a still undecided location and counter threats from the Middle East and Persian Gulf, which intelligence consider to be a decade or more away.
However, an article in the protocol explicitly allows either side to reopen negotiations as soon as March 1, 2001 "to take into account further changes in the strategic situation."
The decision to ask for only the first phase, while insisting on the right to expand it further, was a practical one, the officials said.
They said they assumed it would be easier to get the Russians to accept only a first phase, which American consider more urgent, rather than a larger system. The decision also reflected the change in administrations next January.
The officials emphasized that the United States only plans to build two phases, but the proposed language does not specify that. With Republicans in Congress pressing for a further expansion of the system, the protocol's lack of specificity may well stoke the Russian fears of facing a slippery slope to a larger system.
The protocol would also allow the United States to build a radar in Alaska and upgrade early-warning radar stations in Alaska, Massachusetts and California.
Lisbeth Gronlund, a senior staff scientist with the Union of Concerned Scientists, which opposes a national missile defense, said the radar undercut a linchpin of the treaty, which limited such systems on the theory that once they were built, antimissile missiles could be quickly deployed.
Stephen I. Schwartz, publisher of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, said he was troubled by the assumptions underlying the administration's reassurances to the Russians.
The documents, he said, showed that the administration was willing to accept the continued existence of a large Russian nuclear force, rather than seek bilateral reductions.
"The United States Government would forsake deep reductions in the Russian and American arsenals in favor of deploying a limited missile defense against a threat that doesn't yet exist," he said.
----
"Proposal on ABM: 'Ready to Work With Russia'"
The New York Times,
April 28, 2000
WASHINGTON, April 27 -- Following are excerpts from the document that American negotiators have presented to the Russians with proposals for amending the 1972 antiballistic missile treaty, in order to allow the United States to build a limited national missile defense system.
Topics for Discussion
President Clinton is counting on making the decision to deploy the national missile defense (N.M.D.) system no earlier than mid-2000.
The U.S. N.M.D. system would not be directed against Russia and would not weaken Russia's strategic deterrence potential.
We recognize that this system contravenes the current provisions of the ABM treaty.
We are ready to work with Russia to achieve confidence in the capabilities of a limited N.M.D. system to counter extremist rogue states and to develop revisions to the ABM treaty. You have our draft protocol to the treaty, which would permit the creation of a limited N.M.D. system.
Article I specifies the deployment of the limited N.M.D. system as an alternative to the deployment of ABM systems permitted under the current provisions of the ABM treaty. Thus, the ban on the development of national missile defense systems and the ban on the development of the basis for such a system contained in Article I of the treaty will not apply to the limited missile defense system.
Article II specifies that the development of this alternative system be permitted within the limits of one ABM system deployment region in which it deploys no more than 100 ABM launchers and 100 ABM interceptor missiles with a radius of no more than 150 kilometers -- in full compliance with Article III of the treaty.
Article II also specifies that existing long-range radar may be enabled for use as ABM radar to support this limited N.M.D. system and that each party may deploy one additional ABM radar each at any site within its national territory.
Article III specifies that if a limited NMD system is deployed in accordance with the provisions of the protocol, existing, operational ABM launchers deployed in accordance with Article III of the treaty must be dismantled or destroyed; no dismantling or destruction of existing ABM radars is required. According to this provision, existing launchers deployed at Grand Forks which are not operational do not have to be dismantled.
Article IV contains a reference to the annex, which is aimed at building confidence and assuring compliance with the protocol and which is an integral part of the protocol.
Later we will provide you with more detailed information about the annex we have proposed.
Article V specifies that all rights and duties of the parties stated in the treaty shall remain in force with respect to the amendments introduced by the protocol.
Article VI contains a requirement according to which, at the demand of one party, the parties shall begin further negotiations no sooner than March 1, 2001, to bring the treaty into agreement with future changes in the strategic situation.
Article VII specifies that the protocol shall enter into force after the exchange of ratification instruments, which shall take place after approval of the protocol by the procedure called for by the constitution of each party.
Finally, we would once again like to emphasize that the protocol will contain only those amendments to the treaty that are necessary to reflect the structure of the limited national missile defense. . . .
RUSSIA'S CONCERNS: The U.S. national missile defense system will threaten Russia's strategic deterrence potential and thereby disrupt strategic stability.
RESPONSE: The U.S. national missile defense system, which will be limited and intended to defend against several dozen long-range missiles launched by rogue states, will be incapable of threatening Russia's strategic deterrence at the level of Start II or Start III (or later).
For more than 30 years the classic argument in favor of strategic stability and against the deployment of a large-scale strategic missile defense system has been based on concerns that one side might have the ability to make a surprise disarming first strike against the enemy and then deploy a broad strategic missile defense system to knock out the enemy's combat resources which had survived the first strike and were being launched against the assailant. We have clearly stated that the U.S. missile defense system to be developed by the U.S. Government is a very limited strategic missile defense system intended to protect against a threat from some rogue state, which may, at most, use a few dozen warheads accompanied by advanced defense penetration aids. We also proposed steps to ensure Russia's confidence that the U.S. system is in fact limited and deployed within the bounds of the agreed-upon terms of the amended ABM treaty. This classic argument is, therefore, simply inapplicable to defense, where capabilities are just as limited as they would have been in connection with proposals on the U.S. N.M.D. system. Nor could the system be upgraded to alter this reality, except over the long term, which would create conditions for considerable advance warning.
First Strike Scenarios
Both the United States of America and the Russian Federation now possess and, as before, will possess under the terms of any possible future arms reduction agreements, large, diversified, viable arsenals of strategic offensive weapons consisting of various types of ICBM's, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. Specifically, Russia's proposal for Start III would make it possible to have 1,500-2,000 warheads and even according to highly conservative hypotheses, Russia and the United States could deploy more than 1,000 ICBM's and submarine-launched ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads over the next decade and thereafter.
These strategic offensive forces give each side the certain ability to carry out an annihilating counterattack on the other side regardless of the conditions under which the war began.
Forces of this size can easily penetrate a limited N.M.D. system of the type that the United States is now developing.
Russia now keeps its strategic arsenal on constant alert and apparently will do so even at Start III levels. Russian forces under Start III could make an annihilating counterattack even under conditions of a surprise disarming first strike by the U.S.A. in combination with a limited U.S. N.M.D. system. . . .
The bottom line is clear: the strategic missile defense system for the limited U.S. N.M.D. system which we are calling for could protect only against a few dozen ICBM warheads accompanied by sophisticated defense penetration aids.
-----
U.S. Confirms Giving Russia Draft of Treaty Changes
Friday April 28 10:06 AM
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - U.S. Ambassador to Russia James Collins confirmed on Friday that U.S. negotiators this week had handed to Russia a draft document amending the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, which the United States wants to change to allow it to build a missile defense shield.
Collins, speaking to reporters at a breakfast meeting, would not confirm whether the draft corresponded to one published on Friday in The New York Times.
He said the Russians were still ready to begin negotiating an amendment to the treaty, one of the cornerstones of Cold War-era arms controls between the two countries.
``On the other hand, they are making clear they are prepared to discuss the problem of missile threats,'' Collins said.
The ABM treaty prohibits Russia and the United States from deploying a national missile defense system like one currently being contemplated by the Clinton administration to defend against possible missile attacks by hostile states like North Korea.
President Clinton has promised to decide this summer whether to give the go-ahead build to build the missile shield, which would involve building an interceptor base in Alaska.
Collins, who was involved in a visit by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to Washington this week, said the Russian position would become clearer at a summit with Clinton in Moscow in June. Collins did not rule out that an amended ABM treaty could be signed at that meeting, but added: ``My own sense is that we are far from ready to do that.''
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2000 NPT Briefing # 4 28 April 2000
"What went wrong?" Rebecca Johnson, The Acronym Institute
As the General Debate kept going in the UN General Assembly hall, 17 more national statements were heard on Wednesday and a further 21 on Thursday: from Luxembourg, South Korea, Myanmar (Burma), Syria, Maldives, Poland, Venezuela, Kuwait, Norway, Mongolia, Turkey, FYRO Macedonia, Indonesia, Qatar, Azerbaijan, Yemen, Argentina, Austria, Holy See, Slovakia, Belarus, Thailand, Tunisia, Viet Nam, Hungary, Nigeria, Morocco, Sri Lanka, Tonga on behalf of the Group of South Pacific Countries (SOPAC), Swaziland, Lebanon, Uzbekistan, Bulgaria, Namibia, Zambia, Tanzania, Bolivia and Ghana. There was also a statement from the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).
The Main Committees have also begun work. MC.I and II (on disarmament and safeguards) held their first meetings on Wednesday, followed by MC.III (nuclear energy) on Thursday and a further meeting of MC.I. The President of the Conference, Ambassador Abdallah Baali, has requested the Chairs of the Main Committees, Camilo Reyes, Adam Kobieracki and Markku Reimaa, to complete their work by the end of the third week (May 12). The two agreed subsidiary bodies, chaired by Clive Pearson and Christopher Westdal, will hold their first meetings next week, and are expected to conclude their formal sessions by May 10 and report back to their respective main committees.
The national statements continued to cover the themes identified in Briefing #2. The nuclear weapon states are reportedly close to agreement on a P-5 statement which would call for early entry into force of the CTBT, a CD programme of work including negotiations on a fissile materials 'cut-off' treaty, and the strengthening and preservation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Such agreement now appears possible, providing no-one inquires too closely into what the United States, Russia or China (or Britain and France, for that matter) envisage as a 'strengthened' ABM Treaty and a CD programme of work. During the first two days the European Union representatives were reportedly locked in furious disagreement over their MC.I statement, with France backing away from language accepted in 1999. Disagreements of approach among the so-called NATO-5 (Belgium, Italy, Germany, Netherlands and Norway) have also emerged, as Germany pulls out of a joint statement, hoping to bridge the widening gap between France and the rest of the EU states.
After the very positive start, the mood seems flat. The general debate has been sparsely attended, and few statements go beyond the arguments put forward in the PrepCom meetings. There has been better media coverage than expected, in part due to the high level US and Russian participation, which has been followed by talks on START and the ABM Treaty in Washington. The group of over 110 non-aligned states parties (NAM), who had united behind a working paper presented on the first day by Ambassador Makarim Wibisono of Indonesia (see below), found many and varied ways of expressing criticism for inadequate disarmament progress. Egypt and the Arab states highlighted the Middle East and criticised Israel for hanging on to its nuclear weapons. Belarus spoke strongly against NATO expansion and missile defence, while new NATO members from Eastern Europe were sycophantic. Australia and Japan put in a proposal that was so modest it almost fell backwards, and the EU put in common positions for each main committee, but just barely kept hold of France for its joint statement on nuclear disarmament. So what's new?
The Review Process China has reportedly put forward an argument that, strictly speaking, the language of Decision 1 on strengthening the review process (1995) covers only the five years from 1995 to 2000. Although its representatives have assured everyone that this does not mean that China wants to curtail the review process, the analysis has caused some disquiet among Conference delegates. In addition to Ireland's proposal for the NPT to establish a small secretariat and hold annual meetings of states parties, several called for the "revitalisation of the review process". Lithuania proposed extending the review process from three to four sessions and wanted a mechanism to "transform principles and objectives into action". Switzerland wanted a package of "reaffirmed principles and updated and supplemented objectives" and an action plan on a range of issues. Similarly, Norway's Foreign Minister, Thorbjorn Jagland proposed a "programme of action" for the review process to follow up the decisions taken in the review conference, with annual meetings devoted to a limited number of specific issues, such as developing a comprehensive strategy for dealing with fissile materials, increased transparency for nuclear materials, arsenals and export controls, the CTBT, tactical nuclear weapons, and increasing uptake of the IAEA's additional protocol.
Without wanting to reopen or renegotiate the 1995 decisions, Japan proposed that the early PrepComs should focus more on the review, implementation and universality of the NPT, and should be able to address relevant international and regional issues at each session, and that drafting recommendations and preparing for the next review conference should be left to later PrepComs. Canada argued that the review process should be enhanced "with a requirement to more frequently track, discuss and document movement toward translating our commitments into action". Egypt stressed that the questions which "lend themselves to easy agreement" should not be treated separately from those on which consensus is harder to attain. Further working papers are expected next week, with the likelihood that Baali will convene a special closed plenary to discuss proposals for improving the review process next Friday.
Themes Few new ideas are emerging from the General Debate. The main points identified in Briefing #2 are being repeated in one statement after another, and there is a clear convergence of opinion that the outcome of the Review Conference will need to include something on the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan and the continuing problems with Iraq and North Korea, and statements of intent with regard to promoting the entry into force of the CTBT, getting fissban negotiations underway, furthering the START process to encompass deeper cuts and non-strategic weapons, increasing transparency with regard to fissile materials (at least), and promoting fuller uptake of the IAEA's additional protocol on safeguards. More problematic will be what to say about next steps in nuclear disarmament, missile defence, the Middle East and nuclear weapon free zones, and export controls.
Where the statements from some Arab countries did little more than castigate Israel, Egypt made concrete proposals for addressing implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which will be covered in a later briefing. Egypt stressed that without this resolution the indefinite extension of the NPT could not have been adopted without a vote. Like Egypt, Sweden gave full support to the New Agenda statement. Sweden's Foreign Minister, Anna Lindh, also referred to lost opportunities and asked "what went wrong?" She wondered whether the setbacks were temporary "or are we seeing the beginning of a new era of mistrust?" Lindh identified four major areas of concern "where we lack progress or where we face new problems": reducing nuclear arsenals, bring the CTBT into force, halting the development of new weapons and systems, and nuclear weapons in regional conflicts. She stressed that it was "unacceptable" that nuclear weapons were growing in importance in the military doctrines and postures of some countries. Criticising US plans for NMD and China's attempts to block fissban negotiations in the CD, Lindh said that no-one -- "and least of all the nuclear weapon states -- have the right to hold our common security environment hostage to domestic politics".
Switzerland raised concerns that nuclear deterrence remained part of defence doctrine and new arguments for maintaining nuclear arsenals were being put forward. Several other states, including Colombia, supported the New Agenda position. Referring to "self-serving national interests" of the NWS, Malaysia argued that indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 had resulted in loss of the "only leverage" the international community had: the problem was not lack of ideas, but "lack of political will". Many countries appeared to agree.
NAM
The NAM paper reflected negotiations arising from the Ministerial Meeting in Cartagena in early April, at which NAM members India and Pakistan were also present. Arguing for the "speedy and meaningful" implementation of the obligations and commitments enshrined in the NPT and the 1995 decisions, the NAM proposed 47 draft recommendations to be considered by the review conference. Following on from earlier criticisms of NATO nuclear sharing arrangements, nuclear cooperation between Britain, France and the United States, and concerns that Israel, India or Pakistan may still be receiving assistance in nuclear-related technology, the NAM paper carried strong statements endorsing articles I and II and calling on nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states to "refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements", and also to prohibit the transfer of nuclear-related equipment and technology etc. to states non-party to the NPT "without exception".
Five paragraphs dealt with nuclear testing, endorsing the CTBT's prohibition of "peaceful nuclear explosions", which Article V of the NPT had allowed. The NAM urged universal adherence to the CTBT and called on all states which had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty. In an unmistakable reference to sub-critical tests and laboratory testing, the nuclear powers were enjoined to refrain from conducting all types of tests in conformity with the objectives of the CTBT and to "comply with the letter and spirit of the CTBT".
Twelve paragraphs were devoted to nuclear disarmament and article VI. These re-affirmed nuclear disarmament as the priority in disarmament negotiations, endorsed the START process and gave support for an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the CD. The call for negotiations for a treaty "banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material" for nuclear weapons went beyond the basic Shannon mandate for a cut-off treaty. Particular concerns were raised about missile defences and "the pursuit of advanced military technologies capable of deployment in outer space" and the NAM called on the United States and Russia to comply fully with the ABM Treaty. Reiterating the proposals first made by South Africa in 1998, the NAM backed the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee I to "deliberate on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons" and for specific time to be allocated for the same purpose at the Preparatory Committee meetings.
The NAM emphasised the importance of universality and gave support to NWFZ, including the initiatives in Central Asia and Mongolia. They supported NWFZ in South Asia and the Middle East "on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region" and devoted a further seven paragraphs to the Middle East resolution, supporting the establishment of a subsidiary body and calling for the resolution's full implementation. They stressed "the special responsibility of the depositary states", Britain, Russia and the United States, which had co-sponsored the resolution in 1995.
Under article III, the NAM supported the IAEA safeguards regime and supported full-scope safeguards as a "necessary precondition" for new supply arrangements. No mention was made of the strengthened IAEA safeguards arising from Programme 93+2 developed after the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. Much was made of the "inalienable right" to develop nuclear energy, and the paper called for the removal of "unilaterally enforced restrictive measures" -- namely the export controls operated through the Zangger List and Nuclear Suppliers Group -- saying that no NPT-party should be denied technology, equipment or assistance on the basis of "allegations of non-compliance not verified by the IAEA".
The Acronym Institute 24, Colvestone Crescent, London E8 2LH, England. telephone (UK +44) (0) 20 7503 8857 fax (0) 20 7503 9153 website http://www.acronym.org.uk
* New Agenda Coalition Statement
General Debate
2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non -Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
New York, 24 April 2000
Mr. President,
May I begin by expressing to you our congratulations on your assumption as President of the VI Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and express our full confidence in your diplomatic skills to provide the appropriate guidance for a successful outcome. Let me assure you of our support in the discharge of your important responsibilities.
I have the honor to take the floor on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden, to address some issues of nuclear disarmament and no n-prol ife ration that we think are important to ensure that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized.
This is the first occasion that the States Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are gathered to review the operation of the Treaty since the adoption- without a vote of the three Decisions and the Resolution of 1995. One of the cornerstones of this package was the Principles and Objectives which we agreed would govern our actions in pursuing the goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
Our renewed commitment in 1995 to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective nuclear disarmament measures included a commitment to the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States Parties of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally.
We must concede that the period of this review has not delivered systematic and progressive efforts by the nuclear weapon states, nor the entry into force of any multilateral instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament. We must recognize that the international nuclear non-proliferation regime is in a fraught state and that our Treaty is under stress.
It was within this context that we jointly launched the Declaration: Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World: The Need for a New Agenda. Our purpose in taking such an initiative was to put the nuclear agenda back on track, to give a clear perspective and underpinning through a new and clear undertaking to bring about a nuclear weapon free world without further prevarication.
The New Agenda is a programme of action sufficiently flexible to adapt to the circumstances and requirements of each successive stage in the process that leads to the achievement of a world without nuclear weapons. It captures the elements of ongoing processes. And, in a pragmatic and r(~alistic way it brings together successive steps for the international community to implement the obligations of this Treaty.
Fundamental to this initiative is the requirement for an unequivocal undertaking on the part of the five nuclear weapon states to the total elimination of their respective nuclear arsenals. Such a commitment would be new. It would determine all future action on the part of.the nuclear weapon states. It would provide a reference point to evaluate progress towards the goals of the NPT, when we again meet in 2005 to review the implementation of the Treaty. And it would signal determination to uphold disarmament imperatives.
Mr. President,
The singular goal of the States Parties to the NPT is the total elimination of nuclear weapons. This requires bringing to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects, an imperative that was the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice. Adherence to this Treaty by all but four states, three of which operate
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and retain the nuclear weapons option, is a testament to the extent of international commitment to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Underwritten by this unique commitment, there is now an inescapable onus on the nuclear weapon states to meet that challenge. And they must do so by making a definitive and unequivocal undertaking to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. This would be demonstrated by engaging in an accelerated process of reductions. This new signal of determination, together with the efforts of the international community working in concert can achieve the goal of a nuclear weapons free world; a goal that is both realistic and pressing.
The one hundred and eighty seven State * s Parties gathered in this review process must engage in plain speaking. We have witnessed continued challenges to the purposes of the Treaty since we last met in 1995. Two states non-parties have carried out nuclear weapon test explosions. These states non-parties and one other state non-party continue to operate unsafeguarded facilities and have not renounced the nuclear weapon option. There has been alleged non-compliance by others. The achievements of the two major nuclear weapon states parties have fallen short of the systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, as required by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Besides the completion of the negotiation of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty nothing else has been achieved on the multilateral front. In short the response to the challenge of the persistence of nuclear weapons has been of complacency or indifference in some quarters.
This critical Review Conference offers us a unique opportunity to move definitively forward in the achievement of a world without nuclear weapons. We have reached the juncture when more far-reaching action must be decided upon. We already have precedents when firm steps were taken which initiated a process leading to the elimination of entire categories of weapons of mass destruction. In the case of nuclear weapons more than half a century after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we are long overdue in taking a determined step in the same direction.
Yet, in place of such determination we continue to witness re-statements of policies and postures which reaffirm the central role of nuclear weapons in strategic concepts and the
possibility of fighting war with the use of nuclear weapons. In short, we are witnessing a re-rationalization of nuclear weapons in an age when the context which gave rise to the original proliferation of nuclear weapons among the five nuclear weapon states has long disappeared.
The elements of the agenda which we have set before you are not in themselves novel. Each of these elements has been the subject of detailed consideration. In this review process we are called upon jointly to develop nuclear disarmament objectives on the basis of the Treaty and the Principles and Objectives of 1995, What the New Agenda advocates is a coherence in approach that could be attained with the necessary political commitment.
The achievement of our common goal requires action by all states. We do not seek to interfere in the details of those negotiations which are the primary responsibility of the nuclear weapon states. We acknowledge the prime responsibility of the United States and the Russian Federation in providing the leadership and first steps in nuclear force reductions. We welcome the ratification of the START 11 Treaty by the Russian Federation and urge the United States to complete the ratifica tion procedure as soon as possible so that full and effective implementation of the Treaty can proceed. We acknowledge the unilateral measures undertaken by two of the five nuclear weapon states but call for the early involvement of all five nuclear weapon states in bringing about the elimination of their respective nuclear forces. We consider that the principle of irreversibility should be applied to all disarmament measures. We look to greater transparency as the nuclear disarmament process gains pace.
We recognize that the process of nuclear weapons elimination will take time, even with the implementation of an accelerated program of force reductions. But we are also conscious that the nuclear weapon states parties have a responsibility to undertake interim measures consistent with a determination to lessen the prospect of the unleashing of nuclear weapons whether by design or accident before they are eliminated. The measures which we advance are those which our governments consider achievable if not in all cases with immediate effect, but at least in step with underlying nuclear force reductions:
- we propose that the outcome of any evaluation of nuclear policies and postures should result in the adoption of non-first use strategies,by all nuclear weapon states among themselves and of non use with respect to non-nuclear weapon states.
- we propose that de-alerting and arrangements for the separation of warheads from delivery vehicles be progressively advanced.
- we underline the importance of withdrawing non-strategic nuclear weapons from deployment and their elimination.
- we advocate the provision of security assurances of a legally binding nature to all non-nuclear weapon states parties.
In the process of nuclear disarmament, the priority pursuit of force reductions by the nuclear weapon states must be paralleled by the conclusion of instruments necessary to guarantee the conditions of confidence required for a world without nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament is the responsibili ty of all states and all states must be involved in the process leading to this goal. The maintenance of a nuclear weapons free world will require an instrument or a series of instruments negotiated multilaterally, which will result in a non discriminatory and universal nuclear non-proliferation regime.
The conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was an essential building block in the nuclear disarmament agenda. The urgent commencement of negotiations on a fissionable materials treaty must be another essential element, providing as it would the beginnings of the extension of multilateral verification to cover all fissile materials for weapons purposes, as required in a world free of nuclear weapons. Pending the conclusion and entry into force of these instruments, we call for a moratorium by the nuclear weapon states on all further production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and to uphold the purposes of the CTBT to which they are all signatories. We also urge those states non-parties that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to halt immediately production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
The further extension and development of existing nuclear weapon free zones and respect for their status by the nuclear weapon states through adherence to the relevant protocols reinforce the global thrust of non-prol ife ration efforts and the international consensus that these contribute to that end. We also call'for the establishment of additional nuclear weapon free zones'especially in areas of tension such as the Middle East and South Asia.
To date, the Conference on Disarmament has been central to the shaping of the agenda for a world free of nuclear weapons. It is now time to advance our engagement there on the next steps as well as the overall framework necessary for the achievement of a global ban on these weapons. Other organizations, in particular the IAEA, should be mandated to inte nsify work on elaborating the verification mechanisms required in a world free of nuclear weapons.
Mr. President,
We are encouraged by the fact that the. Secretary General in his rep ort to the Millennium Assembly of the United Nations proposes to give consideration "to convening a major international conference that would help to identify ways of eliminating nuclear danger". We consider that an international conference on nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, which effectively complements efforts being undertaken in other settings, could facilitate the consolidation of a new agenda for a nuclear weapon free world.
Mr. President,
The States Parties of the NPT gathered here today comprise one hundred and eighty seven out of the one hundred and ninety two member states of the international community. The three states non-parties to the Treaty that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and engage in nuclear weapons development are central to the achievement of nuclear disarmament. This Review Conference must address these states non-parties and work for their accession to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states and for the placement of their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.
We are committed to this treaty. But no treaty can be upheld, if the bargain which originally gave rise to is not being fulfilled. This is a critical moment for the NPT. This Review Conference may be our last and best opportunity to move definitively towards the. achievement of the goals of the Treaty and to deliver the security that the retention of nuclear weapons can never confer on humankind. Failure to move now or to signal new determination will make these weapons accepted currency. Nuclear power must not be perverted to endow humanity with the reckless instrument of its own destruction. The New Agenda is the advocacy of responsible and concerned states for a future in security. It is for this Conference to give this message substance by supporting the call for a new political undertaking for an accelerated process of action.
Mr. President:
- Consistent with the need to identif y areas in which and the means through which further progress should be sought, the delegations of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden are putting forward a working document with measures and steps regarding the obligation under Article VI to achieve nuclear disarmament, and request the Secretariat that it be circulated as an official document of this Conference.
-------- puerto rico
Government Plans to Rout Demonstrators at Vieques
New York Times
April 28, 2000
By DAVID JOHNSTON
http://www.nytimes.com/yr/mo/day/news/national/base-vieques.html
Related Articles
Puerto Rico Allows Navy to Resume Some Use of Base (Feb. 1, 2000)
http://www.nytimes.com/yr/mo/day/early/020100puerto-vieques.html
Uproar Against Navy War Games Unites Puerto Ricans (July 10, 1999)
http://www.nytimes.com/yr/mo/day/early/071099puertorico-firing-range.html
WASHINGTON, April 27 -- Prodded by the Pentagon, federal authorities are preparing a sea-and-land law enforcement operation next week on Vieques, a small island off Puerto Rico, to clear demonstrators from a Navy bombing range there, government officials said today.
Preparations to move a large number of federal special weapons and tactics teams to Vieques are under way less than a week after armed immigration officers stormed a house in which the Cuban boy Elián González was staying with his great-uncle in Miami.
As the furor over the Miami operation continues, Attorney General Janet Reno has been planning the much larger and potentially risky operation in Vieques. She has met with the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Louis J. Freeh, whose agents would play a central role in the assault, and with Defense Secretary William S. Cohen, the officials said.
The Vieques protesters have been demonstrating against an agreement reached on Jan. 31 by President Clinton and Gov. Pedro J. Rosello of Puerto Rico. The deal allowed the Navy to conduct limited exercises on Vieques in exchange for an American promise to abide by a referendum in Puerto Rico on whether to close the range.
The officials said that most days 50 to 75 protesters are camped on the island in the path of aircraft on bombing runs. Their ranks are expected to swell as knowledge of a pending operation spreads. Protesters are expected to arrive by boat and congregate at entry gates to the base.
Today, a Pentagon spokesman, Rear Adm. Craig Quigley, said that the Pentagon had been consulting with other government organizations, but would not discuss the status of the law enforcement operation.
"We've been in consultation with the Puerto Rican government, with the Department of Justice, to work out a way to clear the range of the trespassers," Admiral Quigley said. "That process continues, and I am just not going to go into any further detail on that process at all."
Several civilian federal agencies are involved in the law enforcement operation, the officials said. Among them are the Treasury Department and the Transportation Department, which has jurisdiction over the Coast Guard, which would help block the flotillas of demonstrators expected to arrive by sea from Puerto Rico.
The officials said that federal authorities are prepared to clear the bombing range, but have expressed serious reservations about the operation, which is scheduled for next week if the White House approves it.
They said that Pentagon officials have been insistent that the Navy needed the bombing range for training exercises, even though Justice Department officials have said that another military-style assault would provoke another avalanche of criticism of the Clinton administration.
The officials said they feared that neither the F.B.I. nor the federal marshals were adequately prepared for such a large-scale enforcement action so far from the mainland.
The operation would take place over a large area in which there would be virtually no chance for a surprise raid, on beaches and open terrain including some areas where live munitions are thought to lie.
Moreover, the officials said, they feared the law enforcement operation would provoke demonstrations in other parts of Puerto Rico, and that local authorities were unprepared for large-scale disruptions.
Under the tactical plan, the officials said, marines would arrive aboard ships to provide perimeter security, but only after the operation, and the Puerto Rican police would be responsible for crowd control.
When the arrangement between the White House and Puerto Rico was announced, Mr. Rossello said he would help federal efforts to stop trespassing at the bombing range, but little action has been taken against the protesters.
Exercises on Vieques, where the Navy maintains a bombing range that it considers essential to the training of its Atlantic fleet, were suspended last spring after a wayward bomb killed a civilian security guard, an accident that intensified longtime protests against the military presence. The Pentagon has been putting pressure on the Justice Department to clear the bombing range of protesters. Earlier this year, an aircraft carrier battle group had to conduct some training exercises in different places, including using a bombing range in Scotland.
The next carrier group, led by the George Washington, is headed to sea in coming months and the Navy is eager to use the range, which officials say offers the ideal location for coordinating air-ground-and-sea training exercises.
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Alerta! Llama a Janet Reno - Call Janet Reno (202-514-2001)
From: Vieques Libre April 28, 2000 - viequeslibre@viequeslibre.org - http://www.viequeslibre.org
Alert! Media has confirmed that two Navy Warships just left Virginia, will stop in North Carolina to pick up 1000 Marines and equipment, and will participate, along the FBI and Federal Marshals, in a military operation to remove by force protesters from the resistance camps on Vieques. The navy says it takes 2-3 days to sail to Vieques.
Now is the moment for all of us to take action and call IMMEDIATLY Janet Reno (202-514-2001) to let her know that the people of Puerto Rico reject any military raid on Vieques. Let her know that the best interest of the U.S. will be served by suspending said plan, since arrests will only bring shame to the U.S. in the eyes of the international community and that massive protests will take place both in Puerto Rico and the U.S.
Now, more than ever; PEACE FOR VIEQUES! Not one more bomb!
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Norfolk-based ships headed for Vieques
By STAFF AND WIRE REPORT
April 28, 2000,
The Virginian-Pilot
http://www.pilotonline.com/military/ml0428cle.html
WASHINGTON -- Federal authorities late Thursday apparently launched a military/law enforcement operation aimed at ending the yearlong camp-in that has closed the Navy's bombing range in Vieques, Puerto Rico.
A pair of amphibious ships, the Bataan and Nashville, left Norfolk shortly before dusk, headed for Morehead City, N.C., to pick up more than 1,000 Marines who are expected to help secure the range once U.S. marshals and FBI agents have arrested and removed the several dozen demonstrators occupying the 900-acre site.
The ships also may serve as a command center for the law enforcement portion of the operation. Federal law prohibits military personnel from direct participation in policing efforts.
The Marines and their gear are expected to be loaded by tonight. Vieques is about two steaming days from North Carolina.
The ships' departure came several hours after a Pentagon planning session in which Attorney General Janet Reno, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, and top Navy and Marine officials reviewed the plan.
All involved were tight-lipped about their intentions. ``I don't comment on any prospective, or otherwise considered, law enforcement action,'' Reno said.
Rear Adm. Craig Quigley, a Pentagon spokesman, told reporters earlier in the day that defense officials remain in ``consultation with the Puerto Rican government (and) with the Department of Justice to work out a way to clear the range of the trespassers.'' Navy officials suggested that as soon as the range is available, the service will move quickly to resume bombing and shelling. An agreement made in January by the White House and Puerto Rico Gov. Pedro Rossello allows the service to use inert ordnance on the range pending a referendum in which Vieques' voters will determine whether live bombing can resume.
Leaders of the several dozen protesters occupying the range have said they will accept arrest peacefully. But military and law enforcement officials remain wary that a move to evict the demonstrators will spark the movement of hundreds or thousands more people across the 5-mile strait that separates Vieques from the rest of Puerto Rico.
Rossello warned of such a move last fall, before cutting the deal to reopen the range to inert weapons in exchange for an economic aid package that could grow to $90 million.
Rep. Jose Serrano, D-N.Y., the senior Puerto Rico-born lawmaker in Congress, urged President Clinton to halt the plans for a federal roundup.
``This is not going to be nice,'' he warned in a letter. ``It's not too late to call the whole thing off.''
A federal raid to break up peaceful civil disobedience on Vieques would likely be a hot campaign issue for the 900,000 Puerto Rican voters in New York who could play an influential role in the outcome of the Senate campaign of first lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, Serrano said.
``What happens in Vieques affects greatly the largest Hispanic voting bloc in New York,'' he said. Many of Puerto Rico's 3.8 million residents -- U.S. citizens by birth -- have relatives living in the United States.
One defense official said the Navy wants to ``demonstrate use of the range in a prudent fashion as soon as we can -- just to get that principle established or restarted.''
The protesters, led by Puerto Rico Sen. Ruben Berrios, the Puerto Rico Independence Party's candidate for governor in November, occupied the bombing range after a Marine bombing accident in April 1999 killed a Puerto Rican security guard working for the Navy.
The occupation has prevented the Navy and Marine Corps from conducting on Vieques the combined air, land and sea training exercises that the Pentagon says are vital for the forces being prepared for combat.
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Vieques Protesters Face Showdown
Associated Press
April 27, 2000
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/i/AP-Puerto-Rico-Vieques.html
SAN JUAN, Puerto Rico (AP) -- Any raid to remove protesters from the U.S. Navy's Vieques bombing range will unleash anti-Americanism in Puerto Rico and antagonize Hispanic voters in the United States, opponents have warned.
With recurring rumors of imminent arrests, critics say forcibly ending the one-year standoff would strengthen a grass-roots anti-Navy movement and harm Navy plans to regain its prized Atlantic training ground.
``This issue unites Puerto Ricans not only in Puerto Rico but throughout the 50 states,'' said U.S. Rep. Jose Serrano, D-N.Y. ``It would definitely become a campaign issue.''
Jose Rivera, a Puerto Rico-born New York City councilman, said Hispanic-Americans have yet to recover from the way federal agents took Elian Gonzalez from his Miami relatives' home by gunpoint. ``It won't look good for anyone if they do one thing right after the other,'' he said.
That anger, Rivera said, would show at New York's annual Puerto Rican Day Parade -- an important event for many politicians, including U.S. Senate candidates Rudolph Giuliani and Hillary Rodham Clinton.
Military officials agree Vieques is a potentially explosive issue.
Clearing dozens of U.S. citizens from primitive campsites on a scrubby, pockmarked wasteland rife with unexploded bombs is a daunting task. And with arrests, militants have vowed demonstrations at U.S. facilities throughout Puerto Rico.
The Vieques protesters are blocking a Jan. 31 agreement between President Clinton and Puerto Rican Gov. Pedro Rossello to resume exercises for at least three years using ``dummy'' bombs in exchange for a referendum in Vieques on whether to close the range.
It includes $40 million for economic development on Vieques and the return of one-third of the island used as a munitions dump.
According to reports Monday, the Justice Department was planning a raid involving federal marshals, FBI agents, Marines and Puerto Rican police. Officials have since refused comment.
While most protesters say they won't resist arrest, they do say other demonstrators will replace them. Some vow to scatter into the ordnance-laden hills.
They've occupied the range since April 19, 1999, when errant bombs from a Marine Corps jet killed civilian guard David Sanes Rodriguez.
Hardly a cohesive group, the protesters include fishermen, teachers, two bishops -- one Catholic, one Methodist -- students, pro-independence politicians, pro-statehood activists and veterans of foreign wars.
Their message: five decades of bombing an island populated by 9,300 U.S. citizens is enough. Though they live nine miles from the range, Vieques residents blame bombing for what they say is a high cancer rate, stunted tourism, unemployment and ecological damage.
The Navy says Vieques is critical to the military's preparedness, and patriotic Americans shouldn't put servicemen's lives in danger by denying them the kind of live-fire training that made the crucial difference in the Middle East, Kosovo and elsewhere.
``This is not a game. This is reality,'' said Rear Adm. Kevin P. Green in a recent San Juan Star column commemorating Sanes' death. ``We are serving around the globe to protect your interests, and we must be prepared.''
Many Puerto Ricans, albeit quietly, support that argument. Local polls, however, suggest most back a firm stand and argue the bombings would stop immediately if Spanish-speaking Puerto Rico were a U.S. state.
The threat of a Vieques raid should put Puerto Rico's political status -- a U.S. territory that can't vote for president or Congress -- on the nation's political agenda, Serrano said.
``Look at the Cuban issue. You have two Florida senators demanding hearings'' into the Elian Gonzalez raid, Serrano said. ``If Puerto Rico was a state, it would have two senators filibustering over Vieques.''
Critics say the Navy lied in the past about its use of napalm and depleted uranium-tipped shells on Vieques and didn't fulfill a 1983 pledge to promote the economy of Vieques, where most people live in poverty.
While the Roosevelt Roads Naval Station that administers Vieques injects $340 million into Puerto Rico's economy each year, officials acknowledge their public relations efforts have been less than stellar.
Rossello and others have urged the protesters to abandon the range -- then vote the Navy out.
``I'm urging people to take everything calmly and let them make the arrests,'' said Vieques Mayor Manuela Santiago. ``It would be painful for blood to run in Vieques.''
-------- terrorism
Lockerbie Bomb Trial To Begin Next Week Prosecution Fails To Win Extension
Washington Post
By T. R. Reid Washington Post Foreign Service
Friday, April 28, 2000; Page A24
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPlate/2000-04/28/112l-042800-idx.html
LONDON, April 27-The trial of two Libyans charged in the fatal 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, will begin Wednesday in the Netherlands, the presiding judge ruled today after dismissing a bid by prosecutors to postpone the proceedings.
Lord Advocate Colin Boyd, the chief prosecutor, had requested the delay on Tuesday after being presented with the final list of defense witnesses. Boyd said he had been surprised to find 119 people added to the list--including residents of Sweden, Malta, Libya and other countries--and needed extra time to investigate their bearing on the case.
But the judge, Lord Sutherland, concluded today that postponing the trial would be unfair to the defendants, who have been jailed in the Netherlands since they were handed over by Libyan authorities more than a year ago, and that a "fair and proper" trial could be held without any further delay.
The bombing of the New York-bound Boeing 747 killed all 259 people aboard the plane--189 of them Americans--and 11 more on the ground. Testimony in the trial is expected to last about a year. The prosecution will present its case first, before any defense witnesses are called, so prosecutors will presumably still have time to investigate the new defense witnesses before they are called to the stand.
Denial of the request for a delay is just one more setback for the prosecution, which has not had an easy time of it in the months leading to the trial. Among other problems, the longtime chief prosecutor, Andrew Hardie, abruptly quit in January, leaving his assistant, Boyd, in charge. Witnesses who had previously made incriminating statements are now said to have recanted, which could further undermine the prosecution's case.
The defendants, Abdel Basset Ali Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah, were indicted in 1991 after an exhaustive criminal investigation that reached 20 countries, but Libyan ruler Moammar Gadhafi refused to turn them over. After years of negotiations, Gadhafi agreed to a trial, but not on U.S. or British soil. Accordingly, the case will be heard in the Netherlands, in a specially built courtroom at a former U.S. military base 25 miles south of Amsterdam, with Scottish prosecutors and defense lawyers arguing before a Scottish judge who will apply Scottish law.
At the time of the bombing, both defendants held jobs with Libya's national airline, but Western investigators maintain they were intelligence agents for Gadhafi. In an earlier round of pretrial motions, the Libyans asked the judge to order prosecutors not to use the term "intelligence agents," but the court ruled that that description was permissible.
Pan Am Flight 103 left Frankfurt, Germany, four days before Christmas 1988 and made a stop in London en route to New York. Many passengers were heading home to the United States for the holidays. Today's ruling was a relief for some victims' relatives, some of whom were packing their bags for the trial when they received news on Tuesday of the request for a delay.
"Enough, already," said Susan Cohen, of Cape May Courthouse, N.J., whose 20-year-old daughter was killed in the bombing. "This crime took place in 1988. It's time to go to trial."
---
Drill Shows Cincinnati Unready for Terror
D.C., Prince George's County to Participate in Tests of How Other Areas Respond
Washington Post
By David A. Vise Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, April 28, 2000; Page A02
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPlate/2000-04/28/118l-042800-idx.html
A secret exercise to determine how a medium-sized U.S. city would fare after detonation of a weapon of mass destruction by a terrorist showed that Cincinnati's hospitals, police and other services are woefully unprepared for such a disaster, sources said yesterday.
The findings were presented to Attorney General Janet Reno, then-Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre and senior FBI officials in two closed-door Saturday sessions at the Pentagon earlier this year, sources said. The senior officials immediately ordered the formation of interagency working groups to begin addressing the mammoth problems that would result from a major terrorist attack.
In addition to hundreds of thousands of casualties, the list of problems revealed by the table-top simulation conducted by the Pentagon included what to do with the large number of dead bodies; a shortage of hospital beds and emergency medical personnel; and inadequate equipment and training of local law enforcement and health officials.
Major legal issues also were identified, including whether the government has the right to force someone dying from contagious biological agents to remain in quarantine to avoid infecting others.
The exercise "is just responsible government officials coming together and doing a responsible thing," said Justice Department spokesman Myron Marlin. "It was about getting together and thinking about ways to handle various situations."
Cincinnati was selected because it is a typical medium-sized city, not because it faces any terrorist threat or is less capable of coping with an attack than other places, federal officials emphasized yesterday.
Also yesterday, the Justice Department announced that a cadre of federal agents, professional actors, presidential Cabinet members and local officials will conduct large-scale mock terrorism raids and responses to the use of biological and other weapons over 10 days next month. The drill will be in Washington, D.C.; Prince George's County; Denver; and Portsmouth, N.H.
"Although counterterrorism response exercises are conducted routinely across the country, this marks the first time that an exercise of this scope, with the participation of top-level federal, state and local officials, has ever been conducted," the Justice Department said in a statement. "The exercise consists of a combination of weapons of mass destruction incidents, but there will be no release of any actual weapons or agents."
Participants will include Reno, Health and Human Services Secretary Donna E. Shalala and senior leaders from the Department of Defense, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the FBI and state and local governments, officials said. The exercises in Colorado and New Hampshire were mandated by Congress, which provided $3.5 million for the drills.
To minimize the risk of public panic or fear that an actual attack is taking place, no sirens will be used and traffic laws will be obeyed.
In addition, Justice officials are working with local communities to publicize the mock terrorist raids in advance. But they will not reveal exactly when the mock attacks will occur so that first response teams are forced to participate in an exercise that more closely resembles reality.
"It is vitally important that our nation be prepared for the consequences of a terrorist event," said FEMA Director James Lee Witt.
The mock raids will simulate chemical and biological attacks and are designed to give senior officials better information about how prepared the United States is to respond.
The goal of the drills in Colorado and New Hampshire, dubbed "TOPOFF" because top officials will be involved, is to improve the readiness of U.S. officials at all levels to respond to terrorism. Mayors, city managers and governors also will be involved, as will local and state law enforcement and emergency medical personnel.
In the Washington area, the FBI, the Department of Energy and the Federal Emergency Management Agency will conduct "NCR-2000"--short for National Capital Region 2000--a first responder drill designed to test what would happen in the nation's capital if terrorists surprised government officials by using an unknown type of weapon of mass destruction.
New York, Los Angeles, Chicago and other major cities have received federal funds and training from the Department of Defense and FBI on how to cope with a terrorist attack. But most small and medium-sized communities have been left behind.
"We are all going to be dead ducks," Gerald Arenberg, founder of the National Association of Police Chiefs, said of smaller cities. "It is so much icing on a cake that does not exist. It is frustrating."
"Several million dollars were appropriated by Congress to prepare first responders," said George Vuilleumier, president of the organization. "We are still scratching our heads as to where the funds went. They never really got down to the local level."
-------- ukraine
Chernobyl aftereffects grimly visible
Consequences of disaster still felt in number of cancer cases, other illnesses
By Marina Sysoyeva /
Associated Press,
Friday, April 28, 2000
http://detnews.com:80/2000/nation/0004/28/a15-45573.htm
KIEV, Ukraine -- When a reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Ukraine exploded and caught fire 15 years ago, in the world's worst nuclear accident, it was at first a nearly invisible tragedy.
Soviet authorities tried to keep the accident under wraps and its deadly consequences -- radiation -- could not be seen with the eye.
But the aftereffects of the April 26, 1986, blast are grimly visible: an estimated 4,000 deaths among those who took part in the hasty and poorly organized cleanup; 70,000 people disabled by radiation, according to government figures.
Overall, about 3.4 million of Ukraine's 50 million people, including some 1.26 million children, are considered affected by Chernobyl, and many may not show the affects for years.
Although the exploded reactor is now covered in a steel-and-concrete sarcophagus, one reactor at the Chernobyl plant still runs, suffering repeated shutdowns this winter due to safety valve failures. Officials have repeatedly promised to close the plant, but say they cannot do so until the economically strapped country gets aid to help build a plant to replace the power that would be lost.
"To close down Chernobyl without proper works and financing will be very difficult," Ecology Protection Minister Ivan Zaiats said.
The consequences of the accident are likely to become more visible in coming years. The number of various diseases among affected children is 17 percent higher on average than among their counterparts, and the incidence of some illnesses twice exceeds the norm, officials say.
A Ukrainian Health Ministry report said thyroid cancer among Ukrainian children has risen dramatically since the accident. While no cases were registered in 1981-85, some 1,400 people who were children or adolescents at the time of the disaster have been operated on for thyroid cancer so far.
The government is far from clear on what to do with about 6,000 plant workers and their families once Chernobyl is closed. Vast areas of Ukraine remain contaminated by radiation. Tons of nuclear fuel apparently are still hidden inside the sarcophagus.
"The Ukrainian people have performed a heroic deed during those 14 years as they fought to contain this tragedy," Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko said. "Ukraine must not be left alone."
-------- us nuc facilities
-------- california
WHAT IS THE LAB DOING ABOUT TRITIUM CONCERNS?
The Berkeley Daily Planet,
"Letters to the Editor," Fri., 4-28-00:
From: Steve Wagner [mailto:lakemerrittneighbors@yahoo.com]
I am concerned about recent reports of possible tritium leakage at the Lawrence Hall of Science, including a decision by some local schools to no longer take field trips there.
I looked-up tritium in a dictionary. It said it is "a radioactive isotope of hydrogen having an atomic weight of 3 and a half-life of about 12.5 years: it decays by beta-particle emission and is used in thermonuclear bombs, as a radioactive tracer, etc." Sounds like some nasty stuff! If it's leaking, I'm sure we all want to know about it.
My daughter is a student. She also works with young children at a day care center. Do I need to worry that my child or the children she cares for may get cancer from exposure to tritium if they visit the Lawrence Hall of Science?
Other than public relations efforts designed to make us think tritium is no big deal, what are the Lawrence Laboratory people doing about this?
-- Steve Wagner, Oakland (California)
-------- kentucky
Experimental incinerator not the way to clean up plant
April 28, 2000
Paducah Sun
http://www.paducahsun.com/cgi-bin/view.cgi?/200004/28+00mW_editorial.htm l+20000428+editorial
EDITOR: This letter is in response to the editorial about getting Patton to "Fight back, take off the gloves.†The gist of the editorial was that it was Clintonâ€(tm)s fault that the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion plant wasnâ€(tm)t cleaned up. It also called on Patton to demand that Clinton fork over the money for cleanup. What I want to know is where has not only Patton been but where have all the other Kentucky governors been since the plant began making waste and dumping it? Where has The Paducah Sun been in investigating and reporting the waste and resulting pollution that has been going on since 1952?
It was easy to see. Drum mountain was there. The radioactive and PCB warning signs have been at the creeks. Neighborsâ€(tm) wells were contaminated. Ex-workers told those who would listen how bad the plant conditions were. What took so long!
Now The Sun wants the DOE to hurry up and use an experimental incinerator, Vortec, to burn up radioactive mixed waste. This incinerator has a smoke stack. It will put out contamination into our air. But the pushers say "only a little." But since itâ€(tm)s never been used before, we don't really know how much. We must experiment to see.
Vortec will also dump millions of gallons of contaminated water into our streams. This plant will pollute us even more.
A radioactive waste incinerator was just stopped in Idaho and the Oak Ridge incinerator is a nightmare for that community. There are better ways to take care of the waste, and landfills ain't it.
Haven't we been used as experiments enough? Letâ€(tm)s not make the cleanup even worse than what we've been through so far. Great care is called for here.
KRISTI HANSON
Brookport, Ill.
----
'Cannibalizing' aids USEC's cost-cutting
No new problems: State report finds no undisclosed health concerns at plant.
By Joe Walker, jwalker@paducahsun.com--270.575.8650,
April 28, 2000
Paducah Sun
http://www.paducahsun.com/cgi-bin/view.cgi?/200004/28+00mQ_news.html+200 00428+news
USEC Inc. quarterly earnings rose $6.2 million from the same period last year, but the company is losing ground with declining prices for enriched uranium. Trying to compensate, the firm is relying more heavily on the sale of Russian enriched uranium and a stockpile of natural uranium, which worries Congress, labor leaders and economic experts. USEC runs the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant and its sister plant near Portsmouth, Ohio.
At a congressional hearing last month, concerns were expressed that USEC could close one or both plants and the government may have to bail out the enterprise it sold in a $1.9 billion public stock offering in July 1998. The hearing's chairman, Rep. Ed Whitfield, R-Hopkinsville, said USEC appeared to be "cannibalizing" itself.
To cut costs, USEC will eliminate about 425 jobs at each plant starting in July. It also is buying back 20 million additional shares of stock, has cut its dividend in half to 55 cents a share and predicted an earnings drop of 60 percent from this year to next. Yearly earnings this fiscal year are expected to be $107 million to $110 million, down from almost $121 million last year.
USEC earnings for the third quarter ending March 31 were $22.6 million, or 25 cents a share, up $6.4 million from the same period last year. The results reflect $31.4 million more in revenue, mainly from one-time replacement sales to Japanese customers, the company said. The plants sell to nuclear power plants worldwide.
USEC earned $71.3 million, or 77 cents a share, during the nine-month period. During the same time last year, earnings were $56.9 million, or 57 cents per share, excluding a special income tax benefit of $54.5 million related to USEC's becoming subject to income tax after it privatized.
Third-quarter revenue was $281.8 million, up $21.4 million from a year ago. Enriched uranium sales rose by $28.6 million on a 14 percent volume increase, but the average unit price dropped 2 percent.
The impact of declining prices was more dramatic during the past nine months. Sales were $960.3 million, $30.4 million lower than the same period last year. Although volume dropped 1 percent, the average price dipped 5 percent.
Meanwhile, USEC sold $44.9 million in natural uranium, compared with $19.4 million a year earlier.
USEC said increased buying of enriched uranium from Russia continues to drop plant output and raise overall production costs. As agent for uranium from dismantled nuclear warheads, USEC is paying Russia more for the material than it costs the plants to enrich it.
During the nine-month period, 41 percent of the product USEC needs came from Russia and 59 percent from the plants. A year ago, Russia provided 28 percent and the plants 72 percent.
USEC President and Chief Executive Officer William "Nick" Timbers said he expects to reach an agreement later this year to ease the prices paid for Russian uranium, but that would not take effect until January 2002.
After decades of work, the company stopped research last year on a promising laser-based technology called AVLIS that was a key reason for privatizing USEC. Less than a year after the sale, USEC said it was ditching AVLIS because recent tests proved it too expensive and hard to deploy commercially.
As a result, USEC spent $6.7 million on new technology research during the recent nine-month period, compared with $78.7 million during the same period a year ago. Although the company continues to look at other technologies, critics say the future looks grave without AVLIS.
Electricity accounts for about half the plants' production costs. USEC is trying to lower those costs and expects to exercise a three-year notice to end the current contract with Portsmouth supplier OVEC as of May 2003. That will save USEC its share of the huge cost of upgrades OVEC must make at its plants in the last two years of the contract, Timbers said.
Earlier this month, a financial analyst's report said the company should announce in late summer that it will close one of the two enrichment plants to save $65 million a year in power and labor costs, and complete the shutdown by July 1, 2001. The report said the plant that gets a multiyear power contract will stay open. Rich Rossi, who wrote the report, said Thursday that the Portsmouth power contract announcement is not a hint of which plant might close.
From a bondholder's perspective, the best news of the quarterly report was that USEC has cut its short-term debt by $113.3 million, Rossi said.
-------- pennsylvania
13 Year Study Finds No Cancer Increase Near Three Mile Island
By Cat Lazaroff,
April 28, 2000
Environmental News Servivce
http://ens.lycos.com/ens/apr2000/2000L-04-28-06.html
PITTSBURGH, Pennsylvania, April 28, 2000 (ENS) - Radiation released by the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant has not led to an increase in cancer deaths among nearby residents, a new study reports.
The Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, as it appeared in 1979 (Photo courtesy Engineering Library, Pennsylvania State University)
The researchers from the University of Pittsburgh caution that many cancers take more than 20 years to appear, and mortality from the accident could still rise.
The 13 year study is the longest so far to examine the long term radiation effects of the accident on people living near the Three Mile Island (TMI) plant. It followed more than 32,000 people who lived within five miles of the plant at the time of the accident and who were interviewed by state health workers within two months of the accident.
While at least 15 other studies have explored the health effects of the accident, this one is the most extensive due to its longer time frame and the use of information about residents' lifestyles, such as smoking habits and education levels, and everyday background radiation exposure beyond what was caused by the TMI accident.
"This study helps put to rest the lingering question of whether the residents of Three Mile Island are experiencing an increase in cancer deaths as a result of the nuclear accident," said Dr. Evelyn Talbott, associate professor at the department of epidemiology, and principal investigator on the study.
The study, published Thursday on the website of "Environmental Health Perspectives," is due to appear in the June 2000 print version of the journal.
TMI is located just south of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (Photo courtesy Three Mile Island Alert)
The TMI accident occurred at a nuclear power plant along the Susquehanna River near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on March 29, 1979, when equipment malfunction and operator errors caused about a third of the plant's nuclear fuel to melt inside a reactor. The plant's owners maintain that only a negligible amount of radiation escaped from the plant. It is often referred to as the worst nuclear accident in American history.
The accident itself progressed to the point where over 90 percent of the reactor core was damaged. The containment building in which the reactor is located as well as several other locations around the plant were contaminated. Containment of the radioactivity in the containment building enabled the operators to eventually cool the damaged core and regain control of the system, according to Dr. Tony Baratta, professor of Nuclear Engineering at Pennsylvania State University.
Scientists have calculated that the average person present in the area during the 10 days after the incident was exposed to considerably less radiation than the annual dose an individual receives from the everyday environment in the United States.
The University of Pittsburgh study covered the years from 1979 to 1992. Researchers used information collected by the Pennsylvania Department of Health in interviews conducted with TMI residents within two months of the accident to provide demographic and lifestyle data on the individuals living in the TMI area. Information collected on these 32,135 individuals included education, occupation, smoking status, residential history, medical history, previous radiation exposure and daily travel in and out of the area during the 10 days following the accident.
Investigators from the University of Pittsburgh determined these individuals' maximum radiation exposure and probable gamma radiation exposure during the 10 days after the accident and combined the results with the interview data as well as mortality data from the Pennsylvania Department of Health.
They then compared the number of actual deaths with the expected number of deaths in the general population.
One reactor is still operating at Three Mile Island (Photo courtesy Nuclear Regulatory Commission)
The researchers included deaths from heart disease, central nervous system disorders, and all malignant cancers, as well as specific cancers that are known to be sensitive to radioactivity - bronchus, trachea and lung, breast, and blood forming tissues, excluding chronic lymphocytic leukemia and Hodgkin's disease. Thyroid cancer was considered, but no deaths were reported during the study period.
Initial results indicated a significantly higher mortality from all causes among the TMI population as compared with residents of the surrounding three county area. The largest contributor to that mortality was heart disease. However, after adjusting for smoking and education, the increases were no longer apparent.
"The effects of smoking and education levels on the incidence of heart disease are well known," said Talbott. "When we controlled for these risk factors, along with background radiation factors, we found that the elevations in mortality were not noteworthy."
The researchers did find increased numbers of deaths from cancers of the bronchus, trachea and lung were observed in women, as well as an increase in lymphatic and hematopoietic tissue cancers in men, even after controlling for background radiation exposure, education and smoking.
However, the researchers say these deaths did not show a significant dose response trend, meaning that individuals exposed to more radiation were not more likely to get cancer than those exposed to less radiation.
The investigators found an increasing risk of breast cancer in relation to increasing levels of probable exposure to gamma radiation, suggesting a possible link between dose of radiation and increased risk. But they concluded that overall, there was no significant relationship between likely exposure to gamma radiation and breast cancer deaths.
"A relationship between gamma radiation and breast cancer has been noted in other investigations, but emissions from the TMI incident were significantly lower than in other documented studies," said Talbott. "Therefore, it is unlikely that this observed dose trend is related to radiation exposure on the day of the accident."
To fully explore the relationship between low level radiation and breast cancer, an in depth study would be necessary, Talbott said.
Nearby residents remain concerned about potential threats from Three Mile Island (Photo courtesy President's Commission Report)
TMI Alert, a citizens watchdog group formed in 1977 to oppose nuclear power, calls the study "seriously flawed" due to its reliance on data from the 1979 Department of Health study, which the group says has been discredited. Eric Epstein, chairman of TMI Alert, says the study also fails to include areas outside the five mile radius around the plant, excluding areas exposed to radiation carried on the wind and weather.
"I can find you cancer clusters 10 miles out from the plant," said Epstein, "just by following the direction of the radioactive plumes."
The authors found no consistent evidence suggesting that the low dose radiation released during the TMI accident had a measurable impact on the mortality of those living in the area for 13 years after the event. But they acknowledge that further study is warranted.
"Because the latency period for many cancers is 20 years or more, continued follow-up on the TMI residents will provide a more comprehensive look at their mortality, as well as morbidity, from various cancers," said Talbott. The University of Pittsburgh research team is currently analyzing data collected through 1999 on the same population.
This research was supported by a grant from the Three Mile Island Public Health Fund.
-------- utah
MOAB MINE DUMP CLEANUP PLAN GETS REASSESSED
AmeriScan: April 28, 2000
http://ens.lycos.com/ens/apr2000/2000L-04-28-09.html
MOAB, Utah, April 28, 2000 (ENS) - Environmental groups are declaring a major victory for rare native fish. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) has asked the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to reassess its plan for groundwater cleanup and endangered species protection at the Atlas uranium tailings dump in Moab. The dump, which is located on the banks of the Colorado River, is leaching deadly levels of ammonia and other toxic contaminants into the river and is jeopardizing the survival of the endangered Colorado pikeminnow and razorback sucker. In 1998, the USFWS signed off on an NRC plan to place a clay cap on the dump and leave it next to the bank of the river, based on the assumption that groundwater cleanup would some day take place.
The plan did not address how to clean up poisonous discharges of ammonia and other toxic contaminants that are jeopardizing the survival of the endangered Colorado pikeminnow and razorback sucker, so the Grand Canyon Trust, Grand County, Utah, the Sierra Club and a number of river outfitters in Moab filed suit against the USFWS to challenge its authorization of the plan. With a court ruling expected in the case next week, the USFWS sent a letter to the NRC on Wednesday indicating that its biological opinion authorizing the plan inadequately addressed groundwater cleanup. The letter asked for renewal of consultation to consider specific cleanup options to protect the Colorado River and its native fish. "This is a victory of science over bureaucracy," said Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund attorney Susan Daggett. "We have been pushing the USFWS to revisit protection of the Colorado River and native fish because there has been no groundwater cleanup plan in place. It is better for the USFWS to reinitiate consultation than to have a court order requiring it."
The Atlas Mine tailings site in Moab (Photo courtesy Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund)
http://ens.lycos.com/ens/pics10/atlas.jpg
-------- us nuc weapons
Albright challenges Helms on arms control
USA Today
04/28/00- Updated 10:01 AM ET
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washdc/ncsthu14.htm
WASHINGTON (AP) - American negotiators have proposed to Russia changes in a landmark treaty to clear the way for a limited defense against missile threats from other countries, Ambassador James Collins said Friday.
The written proposals, specifically revising the 1972 anti-ballistic missile accord, also ''in a limited way'' could open the door to an even more extensive defense system, Collins told reporters here.
''We have told them we do not intend to expand to the point where there is a threat'' to Russia's nuclear weapons system, he said.
Publicly, the Russian government has declared any changes, even the ones proposed by the administration to permit deployment of 100 launchers with improved radar, would violate the treaty. ''On the other hand they are making clear they are prepared to discuss the problem of missile threats from emerging countries,'' he said.
''They do not walk out the door,'' the veteran diplomat said at a breakfast session.
''At this point,'' he said, ''we are involved in quite extensive discussions. There is more sensitivity on the Russian side that this isn't just an American problem.''
President Clinton is certain to press Russian President Vladimir Putin to agree to modify the treaty when they meet in Moscow June 4-5. ''The discussions between the two presidents in June will determine how far we will go into negotiations,'' Collins said.
In 1997, at the behest of the Clinton administration, Russia approved a variety of anti-missile tests as permissible under the treaty. But on Thursday, after two days of talks here with Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said the agreement dealt only with theater missile defense and not with a new threat of intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Collins said today the United States and Russia were continuing to cooperate under the 1997 understanding. He said they have had two joint exercises and are likely to revive plans for a third one that Russia put off in its objections to the U.S.-NATO military campaign against Yugoslavia over Kosovo.
Otherwise, he said, ''we have not gotten very far with them'' in other areas of nuclear cooperation except for sharing information for an early-warning system to detect missile threats.
On anti-missile defenses, the ambassador said, ''The official Russian position has not changed.''
The proposed treaty changes were first reported by The New York Times. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists obtained the proposal in Russia and provided it to the newspaper and posted the material on its Web site.
A summary of the administration's position, accompanying the draft and other documents, said the U.S. national missile defense system is intended to defend only against several dozen long-range missiles launched by rogue states.
The system, the document said, ''would not be directed against Russia and would not weaken Russia's strategic deterrent potential.''
In addition to pressing Russia for new agreements, the administration says it will push the Senate to approve them despite the opposition of Sen. Jesse Helms.
It could be a struggle for the administration on both fronts.
Ivanov, in two days of security talks here, said his government was ''focused on finding solutions.'' But he gave no sign that Putin will agree with Clinton's call to modify the 1972 treaty.
Helms, the North Carolinian who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has already cautioned the White House that any new arms control agreement with Russia would be ''DOA - dead on arrival'' at his committee.
Asserting that Clinton was trying to enhance his own legacy, Helms notified Russia this week in a Senate speech that it ''should not be under any illusion whatsoever that any commitments made by this lame-duck administration will be binding on the next administration.''
Challenging Helms on Thursday at a joint news conference with Ivanov, Albright said the administration intends to pursue new arms control accords with Russia in the time it has left.
''I believe that the American people support a policy that seeks to both further reduce nuclear dangers left over from the Cold War and to address new threats,'' Albright said. ''And we are going to continue to pursue this policy in the months ahead.''
Albright told a U.N. disarmament conference Monday the threat was posed by North Korea and Iran, with ''tens'' of missiles.
''I don't think we can have a pause for the rest of the year,'' Albright said in response to Helms. ''I don't agree with what Senator Helms said yesterday.''
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"Wrong Target"
Philadelphia Inquirer, Editorial, 04/28/00
Soaring price is the latest problem plaguing an unnecessary antimissile system.
The misguided dream of a defense system to intercept hostile missiles is suffering from sticker shock. The Pentagon had said it could set up such a system for about $25 billion, then make upgrades at a price to be named later.
This week, the Congressional Budget Office said the whole shebang would cost $49 billion. That's not even counting an additional $11 billion for satellites with multiple functions beyond this project.
One response to this whopping cost has been to say it's still a bargain for protecting U.S. cities from Armageddon. The real problem isn't the price; it's the illusory benefits. The project is technically questionable, based on shaky tactical presumptions, and could disrupt arms control.
The rationale for a National Missile Defense is different from the Reagan-era "Star Wars" vision for zapping as many missiles as the Soviet Union might launch. The new goal is to be able to knock out a handful of ICBMs launched by some lunatic. It's a rush job because, within five years, North Korea and Iran are expected to have missiles that can hit America.
So far, tests have seemed promising but inconclusive. A test firing did work last year, but in January, a defensive missile missed a dummy warhead. Another test is planned for June.
These tests, however, don't account for wily weapons alterations. Early in flight, for example, a missile could disperse chemical or biological weapons into lots of "bomblets" that can't be stopped by a single missile. Or a super-cooled shroud over a nuclear warhead could keep a heat-seeking interceptor from homing in.
Even if it works, a National Missile Defense defends against only one way of wreaking mass destruction. A viable low-tech option is weapons - chemical, biological or nuclear - hidden in a car trunk or a suitcase, which multibillion-dollar missiles can't address. Defense depends on rigorous intelligence-gathering and law enforcement.
The decision on this new system also must consider the overall goal of arms reduction and the particular requirements of arms treaties. The 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty prohibited national anti-missile systems. Russia, echoed by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, has warned the United States not to break that agreement.
President Clinton apparently hopes that Russian President Vladimir V. Putin will agree to loosen the missile-defense prohibition - linked to new nuclear-arms reductions - when they meet in June. But giving each other permission to rush to build an expensive National Missile Defense makes no sense.
America's fundamental defense against missile-building upstarts is the same as its defense against thousands of nuclear-tipped missiles controlled by Moscow: the certainty of annihilating the attacker. Thus the nervous rush for an antimissile defense against Iran or North Korea is overwrought.
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"Documents Reveal US True Intentions," UCS Statement, 04/28/00
Lisbeth Gronlund and David C. Wright April 28, 2000
[The authors are Senior Staff Scientists at the Union of Concerned Scientists and researchers at the MIT Security Studies Program. Gronlund serves on the Board of the Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, which publishes the Bulletin.]
What these documents reveal about US nuclear policy is far more interesting than what they reveal about the US proposed changes to the ABM Treaty.
The most interesting and revealing of these documents are the US talking points intended to address Russia's concerns about the US NMD. In these documents, the United States asserts that the US NMD will not undermine Russia's deterrent for two reasons, arguing that:
(1) both countries "will possess under the terms of any possible future arms reduction agreements, large, diversified arsenals of strategic offensive weapons." (2) Russia keeps its nuclear forces on constant alert (to permit launch on warning) and will continue to do so. The documents point out that by launching on warning of an incoming attack, enough of Russia's nuclear missiles would survive a US first strike that Russian forces could still overcome a US NMD.
The first point makes it clear that to deploy its NMD system, the United States is willing to give up-- indefinitely--the potential for cutting the Russian arsenal below 1000 missiles. If the United States is telling Russia that retaining a large arsenal for the indefinite future is its hedge against a US NMD system, then the United States cannot credibly argue that it is also taking steps toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. Just this week, at the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference taking place at the UN in New York, Secretary of State Albright and other administration officials have been trying to assure the rest of the world that the United States remains committed to fulfilling its obligations under the NPT to pursue nuclear disarmament. These documents reveal just how empty those assurances are.
The second point makes it clear that the United States is also willing to pay an even higher price for its NMD system: it is willing to live with the continued threat of Russian unauthorized, accidental and erroneous launches, which remains the biggest missile threat to the United States. Despite the end of the cold war, both the United States and Russia deploy large numbers of nuclear-armed missiles ready for immediate launch, so they could launch their weapons before a first strike could disarm them. The document itself states that under tactical warning of a US first strike, "Russia's response to an assault would obviously be to send about a thousand warheads..." This is exactly the concern. A problem with Russia's early warning system that led to false warning could result in a devastating attack on the United States--and the United States should be doing everything in its power to change this situation. Instead, in its talking points, the United States almost encourages Russia to maintain its launch on warning policy, because this would permit the United Stated to deploy its NMD without undercutting Russia's deterrent.
The US proposed protocol to modify the ABM Treaty would only permit the first phase of the planned NMD. US administration officials argue that it is in Russia's interest to agree to treaty changes now so it will have predictability about the future of the treaty and can plan accordingly. As reported in the New York Times (Jane Perlez, "US Says Russians May Want a Deal on Missile Defense," 27 April 2000, p.1):
As one administration official said, "The big sell is: 'Take a sure bet now. Don't take a risk in the future.'" However, these documents make clear that even if Russia does agree, it will not gain predictability about the future of the treaty. In its unilateral statement, the United States anticipates that it will seek further treaty changes to permit a larger NMD. The protocol stipulates that the parties could begin these next negotiations anytime after March 2001--less than a year from now.
The US proposed treaty changes take the form of a protocol that would exempt the planned NMD from the restrictions of the original ABM Treaty. Because so many changes would be needed to the treaty text to accommodate even the first phase of the NMD, negotiating such an exemption is a more attractive approach for the United States--from both a political and negotiating standpoint. This would allow the United States to argue that the changes to the treaty text were minimal. But this does not change the fact that the original treaty is altered significantly. For example, three of the first five articles of the treaty would have to be changed significantly just to permit the first phase of deployment.
As the ABM treaty now stands, the limits on radars are fundamental to the ability to prevent rapid breakout because it takes a long time to build a radar and doing so is visible. In these documents, the United States argues that limiting the number of interceptors and launchers (rather than restricting radars) would effectively limit the size of the defense and provide a long warning of breakout. The documents state: "In fact, our experience to date indicates that the speed with which the US could build interceptor missiles, not radars, is a key factor preventing rapid expansion." This argument is not compelling, for two reasons: (1) the United States is arguing that the reason it needs to begin construction of the radar in Alaska is that the radar--not the interceptors--is what will limit the deployment date of the first phase of the system, and (2) it ignores the possibility of linking sea-based Navy Theater Wide interceptors into the NMD system, of which the US plans to deploy more than 600.
Navy Theater Wide was the unresolved point of contention on the demarcation agreements because Russia feared it could be used as a strategic missile defense. And according to a recent Pentagon study (Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, "Summary of Report to Congress on Utility of Sea-Based Assets to National Missile Defense," 1 June 1999) the NMD X-band (SHF) radars could support the NTW interceptors in engagements against strategic missiles. The study concluded that integrating the NTW into the NMD would result in a more "flexible and robust" national defense. And there is a vocal constituency in the US for doing just that. So Russia's fears are well-grounded.
The documents also state: "Even a US national missile defense system with a large number of SHF radars, which we would like to deploy in the long term, would not be able to deal with an arsenal of the size or sophistication that Russia would likely deploy under START-III." This makes no sense because the full system will have nine X- band (SHF) radars that would provide world-wide coverage of ICBM launches and could be used to support a very large number of interceptors. It may be that these radars could not be used to defend against Russian submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) launched from some parts of the oceans, but Russia has never relied on its SLBMs and is not likely to do so under START III.
Finally, the documents include a long verification protocol. It is quite detailed, but contains a gaping loophole: how can Russia have confidence that US Navy Theater Wide (NTW) interceptors (of which the US plans to deploy some 600 on ships) would not be integrated into the NMD system, thus turning a limited defense into a much larger one?
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Missile Defense Takes Center Stage
International Herald Tribune
Friday, April 28, 2000
By Brian Knowlton International Herald Tribune
http://www.iht.com/IHT/TODAY/FRI/FPAGE/arms.2.html
WASHINGTON - Jesse Helms, the defiant senior Republican senator who vowed Wednesday to block any arms-control agreements reached between the Clinton administration and Russia, almost certainly has the leverage to do so, analysts said Thursday.
But they said that would probably not affect the administration's determination to reach, and respect, even an unratifiable deal.
Speaking six weeks before President Bill Clinton is to meet with President-elect Vladimir Putin in Moscow, Mr. Helms, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, said he would obstruct any arms treaty negotiated in the Clinton administration's waning months.
''This administration's time for grand treaty initiatives is at an end,'' Mr. Helms said.
The North Carolina senator, as chairman of the committee most relevant to security issues and ratification of treaties, and with backing from many other leading Republicans, almost certainly can carry out that threat, analysts said.
For the president, they said, the threat provided a painful reminder of the partisan manacles that will limit him in any major foreign-policy initiative he may undertake.
The administration sought to play down the gravity of Mr. Helms's threat. ''Senator Helms is not the entire Senate,'' a State Department spokesman said.
But the Helms warning comes at a sensitive time, with Mr. Clinton set to meet with Mr. Putin on June 4-5. U.S. negotiators hope to reach agreement on amendments to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that would permit the United States to construct a limited system of national missile defense.
U.S. arms-control specialists say Russia might agree to a scaled-down version of such a U.S. missile defense program in exchange for large reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both countries.
For Mr. Helms to block amendments that would clear the way for a system he strongly supports might appear perverse, analysts said.
But he and some other conservative Republicans fear that the administration might bargain down the U.S. nuclear arsenal to dangerously low levels while committing to an inadequate national missile defense. Mr. Helms, moreover, is a strong opponent of the 1972 ABM Treaty.
The Clinton administration wants to maintain that treaty and secure major cuts in nuclear warheads on both sides. The president is to make a decision this summer on whether to go ahead with the missile-defense plan.
The only likely alternative to Senate Republicans refusing to bring up an amended treaty for ratification, suggested Spurgeon Keeny Jr., president of the private Arms Control Association, would be for them to introduce it peremptorily to inflict a humiliating defeat on the administration, ''in a repeat of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,'' which the Senate rejected last year.
But even if Mr. Helms blocks Senate consideration of an amended treaty, said Michael O'Hanlon, senior analyst with the Brookings Institution, ''that's not necessarily the end of the war.''
''I have to believe,'' he said, ''that the Clinton administration has a theory for why this is worth negotiating even if it's not going to get ratified.''
He said he believed that the administration was seeking an agreement that would placate moderate Republicans by committing to a national missile defense while also being acceptable to the Russians, who fear that without that concession, the United States will withdraw entirely from the ABM Treaty.
As with the START-2 treaty, both sides might be expected to respect even an unratified agreement, Mr. O'Hanlon said.
And if the presumed Republican candidate for president, Governor George W. Bush of Texas, is elected, Mr. O'Hanlon said he doubted that he would ''do something so brusque'' as withdrawing from the treaty.
But Mr. Keeny, whose association favors reducing nuclear stockpiles, was less convinced that the administration had a clear and sensible strategy.
''They're stumbling around,'' he said.
While the administration may be offering to maintain the ABM Treaty and trim its missile-defense plans in order to secure deeper Russian arms cuts, Mr. Keeny said, it is his hunch that Clinton will not approve the missile-defense program. The president's criteria for approval ''cannot be met - not this summer,'' Mr. Keeny said.
Those criteria are that there must be a real threat, feasible technology, an affordable cost and tolerable diplomatic repercussions. Mr. Keeny questions all four.
He sees no serious threat. The technology remains mostly untested, he said. And costs for a multitiered program could reach hundreds of billions of dollars.
As for diplomatic fallout, he added: ''You're certainly going to worsen relations with Russia, and with the Chinese - who view this as directed toward them and will accelerate efforts to develop a nuclear deterrent. And the NATO allies are all perplexed and confused.''
The Clinton administration has agreed to decide by late summer whether to begin construction in Alaska of facilities to base 100 interceptor missiles intended to destroy incoming warheads.
Backers of the system say that countries such as North Korea and Iran might be only years away from being capable of launching nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles able to reach U.S. targets.
Meantime, Mr. Helms's attacks on Mr. Clinton also underscored the difficulties that the president - already politically weakened by the national trauma of an impeachment trial- appears certain to face in his final months.
Republican bitterness has left Mr. Clinton as a lame duck with a particularly tenuous hold on the levers of foreign policy, the analysts said.
''It bodes very ill for the administration,'' said Brian Burgoon, a professor of foreign policy at the School for Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University. On sensitive, partisan issues, ''his lame-duck position really does haunt him.''
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Planned US anti-ballistic missile shield not proved under reasonably realistic tests, scientists say
Agence France Presse, April 28 2000
UNITED NATIONS(AFP) - A system of satellites and interceptor rockets which the United States wants to build against missile attack by North Korea could be thwarted by aggressors, nuclear scientists said Friday.
The scientists, some of whom have worked for the US government, said counter-measures to confuse or overwhelm a missile shield were inexpensive and could be supplied by Russia or China.
"We are not testing this system in anything remotely like the conditions it would encounter in an attack," Stephen Schwartz, publisher of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, told AFP in a telephone interview.
Under a plan being studied by President Bill Clinton, the United States would deploy 100 interceptor missiles in Alaska by 2007 and an additional 150 interceptors in North Dakota by 2015. Interceptors would be guided by land-based radar and by space-based sensors.
The Congressional Budget Office estimated Tuesday that the system would cost 49 billion dollars, compared with a Pentagon forecast of 26 billion.
The system was designed to shoot down "a few dozen warheads" fired by a rogue state, the CBO said.
It said an extra 10.9 billion dollars would be needed for 24 low-orbit infrared satellites to distinguish between warheads and decoys.
Opponents of the system said decoys were only one of a range of counter-measures that might be used.
Writing in the March/April issue of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Richard Garwin, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, compared intercepting a warhead to "hitting a bullet with a bullet."
The warhead would be travelling at 10 kilometers (six miles) a second through the vaccuum of space and would be especially hard to detect if it were not spinning, he said.
"Spin is added for re-entry accuracy, but the first-generation ICBMs (inter-continental ballistic missiles) of rogue states would be so inaccurate" it would make little difference if they did not spin, he said.
Garwin has worked for the US government on anti-submarine warfare, sensor systems, nuclear weapons and satellite systems.
He quoted a National Intelligence Estimate of September 1999, which said "Russia and China each have developed numerous counter-measures and probably are willing to sell the requisite technologies."
They included shrouds of aluminium-coated plastic, which could be fitted closely over a five-foot warhead and inflated to 30 feet in diameter as the warhead re-entered the atmosphere, he said.
If an interceptor hit the shroud, it would not necessarily destroy the warhead, which might have more shrouds to inflate.
Kurt Gottfried, a physicist at Cornell University, said a rogue state would be more likely to attack the United States with biological weapons "delivered by bomblets" scattered from a warhead in the upper atmosphere.
"The planned missile defence system could not defend against such an attack," he wrote in a report by the Union of Concerned Scientists.
The report was released for the five-year review of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the United Nations, which began on Monday.
Garwin said it would be much easier to destroy an ICBM immediately after launch by homing in on its flame.
"A missile under power is a thousandfold more visible than the same missile once the burn has ended," he said.
"The third stage of an ICBM intercepted 10 seconds before burnout would fall about 5,000 kilometers short of its target," he wrote.
A missile typically takes 250-400 seconds to reach ICBM velocity, Garwin said, and to be effective, an interceptor must reach that speed within 100 seconds.
Garwin said interceptors could be fired from sea close to the attacking state and pointed out that that they were not banned by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty because "they would not be effective against a single ICBM launched from the interior of Russia."
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BUDGETARY AND TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN FOR NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE Congressional Budget Office - April 2000
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/2000_r/000425-cbo-nmd.htm
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Proposal on ABM: 'Ready to Work With Russia'
New York Times
April 28, 2000
http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/global/042800arms-text.html
Related Article
Documents Detail U.S. Plan to Alter '72 Missile Treaty
http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/global/042800russia-us-arms.html
WASHINGTON, April 27 -- Following is the document that American negotiators have presented to the Russians with proposals for rewriting the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, to allow the the United States to build a limited national missile defense system.
The document refers to SHF radars, which are often referred to as X-band radars in discussions of the NMD system. SHF stands for "super high frequency" and is the frequency band 3 to 30 gigahertz. This includes the X-band (8-12 gigahertz).
The documents outlining the administration's position were obtained by The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in Russia and passed on to The New York Times. The bulletin has made them available on its web site, www.thebulletin.org.
NMD PROTOCOL: TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION
President Clinton is counting on making the decision to deploy the national missile defense (NMD) system no earlier than mid-2000.
The US NMD system would not be directed against Russia and would not weaken Russia's strategic deterrence potential.
We recognize that this system contravenes the current provisions of the ABM Treaty.
We are ready to work with Russia to achieve confidence in the capabilities of a limited NMD system to counter extremist rogue states and to develop revisions to the ABM treaty.
You have our draft Protocol to the Treaty, which would permit the creation of a limited NMD system.
We have decided to present the Treaty amendments we propose in the form of a new "Protocol" prepared on the model of the 1974 Protocol. The Protocol would contain only those corrections to the Treaty that are necessary to permit the initial Phase I of the deployment of the limited NMD system. The rest of the Treaty would remain unchanged.
Allow me to present the provisions of our draft Protocol.
Article II also specifies that existing long-range radar may be enabled for use as ABM radar to support this limited NMD system and that each Party may deploy one additional ABM radar each at any site within its national territory.
Article III specifies that if a limited NMD system is deployed in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol, existing, operational ABM launchers deployed in accordance with Article III of the Treaty must be dismantled or destroyed; no dismantling or destruction of existing ABM radars is required. According to this provision, existing launchers deployed at Grand Forks which are not operational do not have to be dismantled.
Article IV contains a reference to the Annex, which is aimed at building confidence and assuring compliance with the Protocol and which is an integral part of the Protocol.
Later we will provide you with more detailed information about the Annex we have proposed.
Article V specifies that all rights and duties of the Parties stated in the Treaty shall remain in force with respect to the amendments introduced by the Protocol.
Article VI contains a requirement according to which, at the demand of one Party, the Parties shall begin further negotiations no sooner than March 1, 2001 to bring the Treaty into agreement with future changes in the strategic situation.
Article VII specifies that the Protocol shall enter into force after the exchange of ratification instruments, which shall take place after approval of the Protocol by the procedure called for by the constitution of each Party.
Finally, we would once again like to emphasize that the Protocol will contain only those amendments to the Treaty that are necessary to reflect the structure of the limited national missile defense.
ANNEX ON VERIFICATION: TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION
As I already explained during our previous consultations, the US is ready to discuss several measures to build confidence and increase transparency, as well as to advance proposals aimed at strengthening verification under the Treaty with measures to be taken on the basis of mutuality and to promote additional confidence that none of the limitations specified in the amended ABM treaty is being violated.
Article IV of the proposed Protocol pertains to the Annex containing provisions on verification, the goal of which is to "build confidence and assurance compliance with the provisions of the Treaty."
In our approach we have been guided insofar as possible by the goal of adapting certain fundamental aspects of inspection procedures specified in the START and other arms control agreements, keeping in mind the specific lessons we have learned from joint fulfillment of these treaties.
In developing specific monitoring measures, the USA has tried to achieve a balance between the necessary operational burden created by these measures and the real, tangible verification results that they should produce.
As we know, the ABM treaty now limits the number of deployed ABM launchers and ABM interceptor missiles for each side to 100, and our planned initial national missile defense system does not exceed these quantities.
It is relatively easy to observe permanent ground-based ABM launcher silos using national technical means of verification.
We, however, believe that steps to be taken on the basis of mutuality aimed at strengthening the observation of the number and location of each party's non-deployed ABM interceptor missiles could build the mutual confidence of the parties that the deployment of a limited NMD system will not reduce the other party's strategic deterrence potential.
Our approach is based on the following four fundamental elements:
1. information exchange with annual updating sufficient to give a comprehensive picture of key elements in the system (among other things, the number and location of ABM interceptor missiles, both deployed and non-deployed);
2. notification of key events, in preparation and past, pertaining to the ABM system to assist in observation of compliance with the provisions of the Protocol;
3.inspections to verify raw data and short-notice inspections to ensure safeguards of the accuracy attained within the bounds of the exchange of information and notifications to be provided by each Party;
4. a mechanism for resolving matters of concern related to compliance, such as visits with special access rights within the bounds of the START. Using this mechanism, for example, one Party can request a visit to facilities inaccessible under other circumstances to verify the presence or absence of ABM interceptor missiles.
These measures are aimed at increasing the transparency and predictability of our respective actions related to the ABM Treaty, as well as confidence that any system intended to provide limited national defense will not jeopardize the strategic deterrence of the other Party.
By mutual agreement, the information exchanges, notifications and inspections specified in the Annex will not be required until the United States' first installation of an ABM interceptor at an ABM launcher within the ABM system deployment region.
As a result, the Russian Federation will not unilaterally bear the burden of providing the proposed notifications and verification measures.
Naturally, either Party may on a voluntary basis provide any information or notifications according to the provisions of Sections I and II of the Annex before the provision of such information or notification becomes mandatory.
The United States, for example, is prepared to consider the matter of providing certain information and notifications on a voluntary basis, if necessary, even before its first installation of an ABM interceptor in an ABM launcher within the ABM system deployment region.
Allow me to present the US proposal in each of these four areas in more detail as they are discussed in the proposed Annex on Verification.
Information Exchange
The key provision on reporting in the Protocol we propose remains, of course, a quantitative maximum number of ABM launchers (just as in Articles III and IV of the 1972 ABM Treaty).
The US approach requires declaring the total number of ABM interceptor missiles transported from their respective final assembly facilities.
With respect to ABM deployment regions and other facilities subject to inspection, launch position diagrams are to be provided.
Demonstrations and information exchanges will be carried out with respect to all "types" of ABM interceptor missiles and ABM launchers.
Notifications
The US approach to developing the control regime for the revised ABM Treaty calls for several notifications of measures in progress and completed.
Notifications will, for example, be provided on flight tests within the bounds of national missile defense, on the first installation of an ABM interceptor missile on an ABM launcher in the ABM system deployment region, on movement between facilities, dismantling or elimination, and construction of new ABM-related facilities.
Inspections
The US approach includes certain types of onsite inspections, both to verify raw data and a quota for short-notice inspections to be performed to confirm the accuracy of the information provided on ABM interceptor and ABM launcher numbers and locations within the ABM system deployment region.
The US approach assumes that after the first US ABM interceptor missile is installed on an ABM launcher in the ABM system deployment region, there will be demonstrations of each type of ABM launcher and ABM interceptor missile.
Other steps to increase transparency will include voluntary demonstrations, observation, and visits using approved procedures.
If there arises a sufficiently serious, ambiguous situation or matter related to compliance with the Protocol, either side may decide within the bounds of the Annex to request that the mechanism that we took from the control regime under the START-I Treaty be used, i.e., visits with special access rights. Using this mechanism, one side can, for example, request a visit of the other side's facilities where in other cases it would be impossible to perform short-notice inspections, to verify whether non-deployed ABM interceptor missiles have been unlawfully deployed at those facilities.
We hope that you will carefully review these proposals and express your thoughts on this matter.
Russia's concerns: The US national missile defense system will threaten Russia's strategic deterrence potential and thereby disrupt strategic stability.
Response: The US national missile defense system, which will be limited and intended to defend against several dozen long-range missiles launched by rogue states, will be incapable of threatening Russia's strategic deterrence at the level of START-II or START-III (or later).
For more than 30 years the classic argument in favor of strategic stability and against the deployment of a large-scale strategic missile defense system has been based on concerns that one side might have the ability to make a surprise disarming first strike against the enemy and then deploy a broad strategic missile defense system to knock out the enemy's combat resources which had survived the first strike and were being launched against the assailant. We have clearly stated that the US missile defense system to be developed by the US Government is a very limited strategic missile defense system intended to protect against a threat from some rogue state, which may, at most, use a few dozen warheads accompanied by advanced defense penetration aids. We also proposed steps to ensure Russia's confidence that the US system is in fact limited and deployed within the bounds of the agreed-upon terms of the amended ABM treaty. This classic argument is, therefore, simply inapplicable to defense, where capabilities are just as limited as they would have been in connection with proposals on the US NMD system. Nor could the system be upgraded to alter this reality, except over the long term, which would create conditions for considerable advance warning.
First Strike Scenarios
Both the United States of America and the Russian Federation now possess and, as before, will possess under the terms of any possible future arms reduction agreements, large, diversified, viable arsenals of strategic offensive weapons consisting of various types of ICBM's, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. Specifically, Russia's proposal for START-III would make it possible to have 1,500 2,000 warheads and even according to highly conservative hypotheses, Russia and the United States could deploy more than 1,000 ICBM's and submarine-launched ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads over the next decade and thereafter.
These strategic offensive forces give each side the certain ability to carry out an annihilating counterattack on the other side regardless of the conditions under which the war began.
Forces of this size can easily penetrate a limited NMD system of the type that the United States is now developing.
Russia now keeps its strategic arsenal on constant alert and apparently will do so even at START-III levels. Russian forces under START-III could make an annihilating counterattack even under conditions of a surprise disarming first strike by the USA in combination with a limited US NMD system.
As a result of this Russian response initiated from nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines at sea, land-based mobile missiles, silo-based ICBM and bombers that would survive the first strike, a minimum of a few hundred warheads could be delivered. Moreover, Russian forces have sophisticated decoy systems and other defense penetration aids, and this means that it would not have to count on simply exhausting defensive resources to overcome them. Furthermore, the surviving Russian forces would be so large and sophisticated that they could carry out an assault to enhance the offensive, which no rogue state would be capable of.
Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that any enemy would ever contemplate a first strike, since it would have to assume that Russian ICBM's and submarine-launched ballistic missiles/nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines in port would be launched after tactical warning, which would neutralize the effectiveness of the assault. In this case Russia's response to an assault would obviously be to send about a thousand warheads, together with two to three times more decoys, accompanied by other advanced defense penetration aids.
If an attempt at a disarming strike were made after a period of increased international tension or conflict using conventional weapons, Russia's counterattack would be considerable after the US repulsed the first strike as a result of explicit steps that the Russian armed forces would have taken to increase combat readiness by dispatching an additional number of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines out to sea, by field deployment of a large number of mobile missiles and by putting bombers on takeoff alert.
The planned American strategic nuclear forces deployed under the START-III ceilings would also be able to be on constant alert or on crisis alert to deliver many hundreds of warheads in response to any assailant.
Both the United States and the Russian Federation therefore have solid capabilities to respond to a strike from any assailant with a large number of retaliatory weapons.
Furthermore, the tremendous risks associated with initiating a nuclear war under any circumstances make these theoretical calculations largely irrelevant. Obviously, neither side could ever contemplate such an assault.
Limiting the Scale and Capabilities of the Proposed US National Missile Defense System
Single Line of Defense
The Moscow ABM system and the US ABM system that was briefly deployed at Grand Forks have (or had) exo-atmospheric and endo-atmospheric interceptor missiles. By contrast, the NMD system that the USA is developing will be a single-layer system: exo-atmospheric interception of incoming warheads midway toward their targets.
In the long term, even a US NMD system with two deployment regions, as we are planning, would not permit the establishment of multi-layer defense. Moreover, a two-region system would enable us to maintain an effective single layer with exo-atmospheric capability to intercept several dozen single-warhead missiles accompanied by sophisticated defense penetration aids launched from North Korea or the Near East/Persian Gulf regions.
Limited Number of Interceptor Missiles
The first phase of deployment will be limited to 100 interceptor missiles. Ultimately, when a second deployment position is added, there will be 200 or so interceptor missiles. This will be enough to knock out several dozen warheads accompanied by advanced defense penetration aids, but inadequate to counter a larger Russian counterstrike.
Deployment of a significant number of additional interceptor missiles and their silos would require major construction, which would take several years to complete, and this could easily be detected by national technical means of verification. In fact, our experience to date indicates that the speed with which the US could build interceptor missiles, not radars, is a key factor preventing rapid expansion. In any case, in view of the openness of budgetary processes in the US, this hypothetical increase in the number of interceptor missiles would be known several years before the expanded forces would first be deployed.
The USA has clearly stated its readiness to work with the Russians on transparency measures to increase confidence in both the nature and scope of the US NMD system, including production of interceptor missiles and in the fact that no rapid "breakout" will occur.
Limited Number of Radars
The Clinton administration is now considering a US limited NMD system to counter missile threats by rogue states. It is intended to intercept long-range missiles launched from North Korea or from the Near East/Persian Gulf region midway toward the United States.
Consequently, advanced early warning radars, as well as ABM tracking radars associated with the proposed system should detect approaching warheads and track them in flight in space above the upper levels of the Northern Hemisphere, as shown on the attached diagrams.
As a result, the architecture of our US NMD requires that the existing early warning system radars around Clear, Alaska; Thule, Greenland; Fylingdales, UK, Beale AFB in California; and Otis AFB in Massachusetts be upgraded to provide the necessary warning and tracking of missiles from rogue states.
These same radars could, of course, detect and track any long-range missiles headed toward the United States that might have been launched from any country in the Northern Hemisphere. It is the case that the system has to track the approach route for minimum-energy attack trajectories of ballistic missiles launched from North Korea and the Persian Gulf/Near East. This is not a sign of our intent to focus the US limited NMD system on possible attacks by Russia and China.
The existing five early warning radars, which we intend to upgrade, were developed and deployed for early warning purposes, and by design they are less capable than radars built specially to support missile defense system tasks.
In view of their technical characteristics (their operating frequency in particular), even after these radars are upgraded, they will not be able to provide sufficiently accurate information on tracking (distinguishing between warheads and defense penetration aids) to achieve effective defense against attack by more than a dozen warheads accompanied by the simplest defense penetration aids.
The initial level of defense we are striving for would have only one SHF ABM radar deployed in Alaska. Even a US national missile defense system with a large number of SHF radars, which we would like to deploy in the long term, would not be able to deal with an arsenal of the size and sophistication that Russia would likely deploy under START-III.
Penetrating the US NMD System
The number and level of sophistication of Russian warheads and defense penetration aids will ensure that the US NMD will not have significant capabilities against Russia's nuclear deterrence.
In accordance with START-3 levels proposed for the USA and Russia, Russian ICBM's and submarine-launched ballistic missiles clearly would carry more than 1,000 warheads accompanied by twice that many decoys and defense penetration aids. Authoritative written Russian sources claim that the Russian Government understands that the capabilities of its defense penetration aids are extremely high. These same written sources, supplemented by the statements of senior Russian military personnel and defense industry representatives, clearly present the idea that the Russian Government anticipates that its defense penetration aids could easily overcome the US NMD system. The limited NMD system that the USA is developing relies on hit-to-kill technology, in which the interceptor missile destroys the warhead on impact with it.
This approach clearly differs from the use of the interceptor missiles with nuclear warheads in the Russian system deployed around Moscow, which could destroy several warheads with one interceptor missile.
In the American hit-to-kill system at least one interceptor missile has to be launched against each warhead and "authentic object." By this we mean a decoy or its likeness, which are frequently accompanied by aids to overcome defense (active and passive jamming, etc.) which cannot be distinguished from warheads. To achieve high certainty that no warhead is overcoming the defense system, one has to launch a multitude of interceptor missiles against each warhead or authentic decoy combined with additional defense penetration aids.
In view of the operational realities of the defense of a large area, a limited strategic missile defense system consisting of 100 non-nuclear interceptor missiles will be able in the best case to destroy 20 25 warheads on impact with comparatively primitive defense penetration aids. Two hundred interceptor missiles could destroy 40 50 warheads. We do not think that reducing Russia's ability to counterattack by 20 50 warheads would substantially affect Russia's strategic deterrence, even at START-III levels.
In an encounter with a retaliatory attack from Russia, which would include sophisticated defense penetration aids, a limited North American missile defense system could destroy far fewer warheads.
Furthermore, the system as developed is not equipped to defend against submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which might be launched from a large number of deployment sites. Quite to the contrary, it was developed to defend against an ICBM attack from a comparatively narrow direction from specific rogue states.
The bottom line is clear: the strategic missile defense system for the limited US NMD system which we are calling for could protect only against a few dozen ICBM warheads accompanied by sophisticated defense penetration aids.
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Proposal on ABM: 'Ready to Work With Russia'
New York Times
April 28, 2000
http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/global/042800arms-text2.html
RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN PROPOSAL ON DEVELOPMENT OF A GLOBAL MONITORING SYSTEM AND EXPANSION OF COOPERATION IN OTHER AREAS TO TRACK MISSILE AND MISSILE TECHNOLOGY PROLIFERATION
Russia has expressed great interest in studying the missile defense issues we have discussed in the context of a broader approach to nonproliferation.
We can reach agreement. Our own strategy with regard to nonproliferation of missile technologies includes three elements: first, we are trying to prevent the danger from arising, although if it does, we want to be ready to deter it or, if this is impossible, to be ready to protect ourselves against it. We think that each of these elements complements the others.
You should not mistakenly interpret the limited national missile defense system that we are developing as evidence that we have given up trying to prevent the proliferation of missile technologies or are unable to counter it. Despite all our efforts, however, we cannot expect that steps to prevent or counter it will be successful in all cases.
At this group's last meeting in October, I made a detailed presentation on global nonproliferation issues in which I covered a wide range of issues, including export control, Y2K, exchange of early warning information on missile launches and pre-launch notification, the Perry mission to North Korea and Iran.
A significant part of my presentation focused on areas in which we are already working together.
Joint efforts to adapt the ABM Treaty must be a part of this overall nonproliferation strategy, since it is a direct result of the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction.
In the past month in Moscow, Mr. Mamedov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs gave Defense Minister Talbot [sic] two documents on a Global Monitoring System and a third document entitled "On Agreed Russian and American Approaches to Expanding Cooperation in Countering Worldwide Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technology."
These documents enabled us to raise the discussion of these issues to another level.
We are ready to present our preliminary thoughts on your proposal on the Global Monitoring System (GMS) and seek further clarifications. In addition, we will offer our amendments to your draft document on a coordinated Russian-American approach to countering the worldwide proliferation of missiles and missile technology.
Allow me to make a few general comments on your draft document and the concept of GMS.
Global Monitoring System
Allow me first to dwell on the GMS, which is the main point of your cooperation proposals. The GMS proposal apparently has four basic elements:
The first is global monitoring of missile launches, which encompasses notification, exchange of early warning information, and the establishment of an international center, is a continuation of our joint effort on the initiative on missile launch information exchange put forth by our Presidents in September 1998.
Wide access to information contained in launch notifications and universal launch monitoring would be an important tool in building trust.
We agree that the principle of broad international participation is important to the success of launch notifications, and we can support the voluntary participation of any state provided that this participation does not legitimize the missile programs of rogue states.
Broad international participation in early warning or early detection information exchange or the establishment of an international monitoring center for this purpose will go beyond the framework of our concept in this area, but we are ready to study this idea in the future.
It is important that we gradually move toward bilateral agreements and understandings before we expand our efforts to involve others.
We are completely convinced that the first step in establishing any international system should be the signing of the agreements on exchanging missile launch information and notification of planned launches which we have been working on together. We hope that these discussions can be renewed in early February.
As soon as we reach an understanding on the agreement on notification of scheduled launches, we will be ready to discuss a diplomatic strategy to achieve broad international participation in this effort.
Previously we also informed you that we are ready to discuss the possibility of including, where necessary and reasonable, individual members of the "Big Eight" in the Joint Warning Center as a first step in carrying out President Yeltsin's initiative set forth at the Big Eight meeting in Cologne.
We have many questions about the second proposed element of the GMS, namely guarantees of the security of any state participating in the GMS.
Safeguarding the security of states that halt their missile programs is unfeasible.
We must, however, better understand what Russia thinks about this before further continuing discussion of this element.
The third element of the GMS pertains to incentives, including aid to national space programs for states that turn away from possessing missile systems.
We agree that in certain cases incentives can play an important role as part of an overall approach to a specific country in countering missile technology proliferation.
In our approaches to North Korea with regard to both issues of the proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies, we have found that positive incentives can be effective, at least in deterring proliferation activities.
One-size-fits-all approaches to incentives would, however, be counterproductive in countering missile technology proliferation, and it is not clear that this can be done on a multilateral basis (in contrast to a bilateral basis)--we would welcome your assessments.
We are especially concerned about offering aid within the framework of national space programs. It is difficult to "aid" space efforts, especially a space launch, without promoting the proliferation of missile technologies. These technologies overlap much more than do technologies for the development of nuclear reactors for peaceful civilian use and those for a nuclear weapons development program.
While we are not ready to provide aid to national programs for the development of booster rockets, other space-related incentives might be considered, such as providing rocket-launching services at favorable prices for key countries. This might be an appropriate topic for discussion at a Big Eight meeting.
And finally, as regards the consultation mechanism, we are in favor of holding regular consultations among countries involved in this matter.
We do not believe that broad multilateral discussions will be productive at this time. These issues should be discussed within the framework of the MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime] (and groups of MTCR partners) before they are moved outside this framework.
Discussions within the framework of MTCR partners, the Big Eight, and Russian-American bilateral discussions are possible ways to study these ideas in depth. We would not want GMS proposals to diminish the effectiveness of existing forums.
Other Proposals on Cooperation
Your additional proposals on cooperation were based on ideas that the USA put forth at our discussions of the ABM Treaty, for example, exchanging information on missile system proliferation, joint actions toward computer modeling and renewing and continuing our TMD [theater missile defense] testing programs.
We welcome your interest in these areas of possible cooperation that we proposed during our discussion of the ABM Treaty. We will be ready to study your ideas in detail in future meetings.
It is not clear from Russia's statement whether you are proposing that additional aspects of cooperation will be effected on a bilateral basis or with multilateral involvement.
From our side, we would like to study whether multilateral participation is logical in each individual case. We previously stated our desire to discuss with Russia the possibility of including individual Big Eight countries in the TMD testing program as a first step in implementing the initiative put forth by President Yeltsin in Cologne.
There is one Russian proposal pertaining to additional cooperation that raises some concern, namely the proposal to carry out confidence-building measures agreed to in the context of demarcation agreements on ABM's and theater ABM's on a bilateral basis. We do not believe that this will be proper.
Approach to Cooperation
We fully concur with point 5 of your draft statement that cooperation in countering missile and missile technology proliferation "should be long term and established in phases."
In general we believe that we should build a firm foundation for cooperation, first on a bilateral basis and later by involving Big Eight states and other states participating in the MTCR as necessary.
We are convinced that steps toward starting negotiations on an international agreement on GMS at a meeting in Moscow at the beginning of this year, as you suggest, will be premature.
This meeting is not only premature because of the many bilateral issues requiring our analysis, but also because both our sides agreed at the plenary meeting on the MTCR in Noordwijk in October of last year to continue discussion of approaches to the global threat of missile technology proliferation at a special meeting of MTCR partners in Paris in March.
To be honest, we were disappointed by the fact that Russia has moved away from the understanding on MTCR and invited non-partners to the conference it has proposed.
Conclusion
We welcome the study of new ideas on countering missile technology proliferation that will not disrupt current efforts.
A joint approach by the USA and the Russian Federation could make any nonproliferation efforts much more effective.
We also welcome your initiative in developing a statement on a coordinated US-Russian approach to this problem.
We are ready to work on this statement and determine if it is possible to find a basis for a coordinated approach.
A Russian response to our revised draft statement could be the next step.
Unilateral Statement
The draft Protocol introduces into the ABM Treaty only those amendments that are necessary to deploy phase 1 of the defensive system against ballistic missile attack.
If the threat created by ballistic missiles in countries such as North Korea and Iran will grow, as we think it will, it will be necessary to deploy more anti-missile missiles, more radars and another deployment region later.
The USA's unilateral statement expresses the US opinion that the evolution of the threat may require further deployment of defensive systems that will be more effective than those allowed by the Protocol.
This defensive system will nevertheless be limited and will require negotiations under future protocols.
If the threat will grow, as we think it will, we will exercise our right, in accordance with the Protocol, to request further negotiations to draft further amendments to the Treaty to protect against more serious and sophisticated threats from North Korea and the Near East.
The danger posed by states threatening international peace and stability is spreading to other countries besides the USA and Russia. The response to this threat may require international cooperation.
New negotiations may thus include a reconsideration of Article IX and Agreed Statement G involving international cooperation outside the bounds of that permitted by the Treaty.
The unilateral statement expresses the viewpoint of the United States. At present we are not seeking Russian agreement, but are explaining, as a part of the protocol record of these negotiations, that we foresee a continuation of negotiations on more effective systems to counter the threat if, as we assume, it will increase.
PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS[1]
--------------------, the Parties to the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems, signed May 26, 1972, with amendments introduced by the Protocol of July 3, 1974, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,
Recognizing the importance of the Treaty for strategic stability,
Noting the commitment of the Parties to the Treaty to consider proposals to increase the viability of the Treaty as necessary,
Considering changes in the strategic situation that have occurred as a result of the proliferation among states of weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missiles which threaten international peace and security,
Recognizing the necessity of protecting their citizens and, consequently, their territories from the threat that these states will use long-range ballistic missiles and recognizing that this threat is increasing and that the defensive capabilities necessary to protect against this threat must also increase, from which it follows that the Treaty must be updated as necessary to permit the creation of the necessary defense,
Intending to adapt the Treaty to these changes in the strategic situation,
Proceeding from the understanding that the deployment of ABM systems for limited defense of their respective national territories will neither threaten nor allow a threat to the strategic deterrent forces of either Party,
Undertaking to carry out this deployment on the basis of cooperation and transparency, and
Reaffirming their commitment to continue consultations aimed at strengthening and improving the efficacy of the Treaty,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
The United States of America and the Russian Federation shall be permitted to deploy a missile defense system for purposes of limited defense of their national territory against limited long-range ballistic missile strikes as an alternative to deploying the ABM systems permitted by Articles I and III of the Treaty.
Article II
The limited territorial missile defense system permitted by Article I hereof shall be subject to the following provisions:
a) With regard to the provisions of Article I of the Treaty, the United States and the Russian Federation may each deploy no more than 100 ABM launchers and no more than 100 antimissile missiles at launching positions within one deployment region within their national territory. The radius of this limited territorial defense deployment region may not exceed 150 km;
b) With regard to the provisions of Article VI, subparagraph a and Article IX of the Treaty, the United States and the Russian Federation shall be permitted to enable strategic ballistic missile attack warning radars in existence on December 1, 1999 to perform ABM radar functions to support the limited territorial missile defense system deployed in accordance herewith;
c) The United States and the Russian Federation may deploy one additional ABM radar each at any site within their national territory.
Article III
If the United States or the Russian Federation decides to deploy a limited territorial missile defense system pursuant to the provisions hereof as an alternative to deploying the missile defense permitted by Articles I and III of the Treaty,
a) ABM launchers deployed in accordance with Article III of the Treaty that are not operational, under construction or undergoing testing, overhaul, repair, or refurbishment on December 1, 1999 will not have to be dismantled or destroyed. These launchers shall not be counted in the number provided for by Article II, subparagraph a hereof;
b) ABM launchers deployed pursuant to Article III of the Treaty that are operational, under construction or undergoing testing, major overhaul, repair, or refurbishment as of December 1, 1999 shall be dismantled or destroyed so that there shall be no more than 100 ABM launchers deployed at any time;
c) ABM radars deployed pursuant to Article III of the Treaty on December 1, 1999 will not have to be dismantled or destroyed.
Article IV
To increase confidence in compliance and ensure compliance with the Treaty and with this Protocol, the Parties shall carry out the provisions of the Annex, which shall be an integral part hereof.
Article V
Except for changes specified hereby, all existing rights and duties of the Parties to the Treaty shall remain in force and shall be applicable to the limited national defense system.
Article VI
At the request of one of the Parties, but no sooner than March 1, 2001, the Parties shall commence good faith negotiations to review this Protocol to take into account further changes in the strategic situation caused by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missiles which therefore might require deployment of more effective limited national territorial defense systems necessary to counter these long-range missiles.
Article VII This Protocol shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party and shall enter into force on the day of exchange of the Protocol ratification instruments.
ANNEX TO THE PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS
In accordance with the provisions of the Protocol to the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems signed ---------------------, 2000, hereinafter Protocol, the Parties hereby agree on the following steps to build confidence in compliance and ensure compliance with the provisions of the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems, hereinafter Treaty, and of the Protocol.
Section I 1. In accordance herewith, the Parties shall carry out an initial exchange of information and notifications no later than 90 days after the Protocol enters into force. This exchange shall reflect data on the effective date of the Protocol. Unless otherwise agreed, this information shall be updated annually on January 1 of each year and shall be provided no later than April 1of that year. The annual update of information shall not be required to report data that remained unchanged since the previous information exchange. This information exchange shall not be required until the first installation by the United States of an anti-missile missile on an ABM launcher within an ABM system deployment region.
2. Each Party shall submit the following information on its missile defense system:
a) anti-missile missiles;
i) designation/name; type of warhead (nuclear; high-explosive fragmentation, neutron); the number of stages; the length and maximum diameter of the anti-missile missile, which by its configuration is intended both for installation on an ABM launcher and for storage; the type of fuel (solid or liquid); the length and maximum diameter of the anti-missile missile outside its launch container;
ii) the number and location, with regard to each facility, of the deployed anti-missile missiles (i.e., anti-missile missiles installed on ABM launchers within an ABM system deployment region) and non-deployed anti-missile missiles;
iii) photographs of each type of anti-missile missile that, by its configuration, is intended both for installation on an ABM launcher and for storage; each type of anti-missile missile outside its launch container; a silo loader indicated in paragraph 2, subparagraph d of this section;
b) ABM launchers:
i) designation/name; diameter;
ii) number and geographic coordinates of deployed ABM launchers;
c) ABM radars:
i) designation/name; frequency range (using designations accepted by the International Electrical Communications Union);
ii) the number and geographic coordinates of each ABM radar;
d) the number of silo loaders in the ABM deployment region and intended for installing anti-missile missiles in ABM launchers;
e) the general concept of the operation of the Party's missile defense system (in a form of the Party's choice);
f) the status of the Party's plans and programs with respect to its missile defense system (in a form of the Party's choice).
3. Each Party shall provide the following information with respect to ABM Test Ranges for testing its missile defense system;
a) the name and geographic coordinates of all such ABM test ranges;
b) the number and geographic coordinates of ABM launchers, ABM radars, anti-missile missile maintenance facilities and anti-missile missile storage facilities in the ABM test range.
4. Each Party shall report the name and geographic coordinates of each strategic ballistic missile attack warning radar.
5. Each Party shall provide the following information on the following facilities located outside its ABM system deployment area:
a) the name and geographic coordinates of all final assembly sites for anti-missile missiles, anti-missile missile maintenance facilities, and anti-missile missile storage facilities;
b) with respect to each facility subject to inspection in accordance with Section III herein, a diagram of the facility shall be provided to the other Parties in accordance with paragraph 1 herein or no later than 30 days after initial notification of a facility at which non-deployed anti-missile missiles are located in accordance with Section II, paragraph 7 hereof.
6. Each Party shall provide the following information on the region where its own ABM will be located:
a) a diagram of the entire deployment region showing the location of each ABM launcher, each anti-missile missile maintenance facility, and each anti-missile missile storage facility;
b) with respect to an ABM deployment region established after the Protocol enters into force, the Party shall provide a diagram of that region no later than 30 days prior to the installation of the first anti-missile missile on an ABM launcher within the ABM system deployment region. This diagram shall show the actual or planned location of each ABM launcher, each anti-missile missile maintenance facility, and each anti-missile missile storage facility.
Section II
In accordance with Section I, paragraph 1 of this Annex, each Party shall provide the following notifications of its ABM system. These notifications shall be provided within the bounds of the initial exchange of information and notifications. In the future these notifications will be provided in accordance with the provisions of this Section II.
The provision of these notifications is not required before the United States has installed an anti-missile missile on an ABM launcher within the ABM system deployment region.
1. Notifications provided under the initial information exchange as specified in Section I, paragraph 1 or no later than within 90 days of the date of commencement of:
a) any construction or assembly work which is not earthmoving (soil excavation) associated with the construction of anti-missile missiles; or
b) any construction or assembly work associated with the construction of antennae (arrays), structures associated with an ABM radar antenna or antenna pedestal supports that are not parts of buildings pertaining to ABM radars.
2. Notifications to be provided within no less than 90 days of the first installation of an anti-missile missile on an ABM launcher within the ABM system deployment region.
3. Notifications to be provided within no less than 10 days of the launch of an anti-missile missile. These notifications shall indicate the designation/name of the anti-missile missile and the geographic coordinates of the anti-missile missile launch site.
4. Notifications to be provided within no less than ----- days, of the maiden launch of each new type (to be defined by the Party providing the notification) of anti-missile missile.
5. Notifications to be provided no later than 48 hours after completion thereof, of the transit of an anti-missile missile between the ABM system deployment region, anti-missile missile maintenance facilities which are not within the ABM system deployment region, anti-missile missile storage facilities which are not within the ABM system deployment region, and anti-missile missile final assembly facilities.
6. Notifications to be provided no later than 5 days after completion thereof, of the dismantling or elimination of an anti-missile missile (including elimination as the result of an accident or elimination by launch).
7. Notifications of a facility not previously indicated in accordance with Section I, paragraph 5, subparagraph a and paragraph 6, subparagraph a to be provided no less than 30 days before the first arrival of an anti-missile missile at that facility.
Section III
1. Each Party shall have the right to perform the following inspection activity in accordance with procedures subject to the approval of the Parties. This inspection activity shall not be performed prior to the initial installation by the United States of an anti-missile missile on an ABM launcher within the ABM system deployment region:
a) commencing 30 days after the date of the initial installation of an anti-missile missile on an ABM launcher within the ABM system deployment region, but no less than 90 days after an agreement is reached on the specific procedures for performing this inspection, each Party shall have the right to perform inspections with respect to raw data to confirm the accuracy of the information submitted on the number and location of non-deployed anti-missile missiles and ABM launchers. These inspections shall be performed in the ABM system deployment region, including at anti-missile missile maintenance facilities and at anti-missile missile storage facilities within this ABM system deployment region;
b) commencing 60 days after the date of the initial installation of an anti-missile missile on an ABM launcher within the ABM system deployment region, but no less than 90 days after an agreement is reached on the specific procedures for performing this inspection, each Party shall have the right to perform a total of ----- short-notice site inspections in each treaty year to confirm the accuracy of the information provided on the numbers and locations of non-deployed anti-missile missiles and ABM launchers. These inspections shall be performed in the ABM system deployment region, including at anti-missile missile maintenance facilities and anti-missile missile storage facilities at the same locations.
2. If either Party has a concern with respect to compliance with the provisions of this Protocol, that Party may express this concern under the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission and request that specific measures be taken to alleviate this concern. These measures may include, but not be limited to, a visit with special right of access to a facility or place where, in the opinion of the requesting Party, the activity that raised the concern occurred. The receiving Party shall provide a response no later than 7 days after receipt of such request. The receiving Party's response shall include:
a) consent or refusal to take the proposed specific measure to alleviate the concern, including, if a visit with special access right is proposed, the date, place, and procedure for such visit; or
b) a proposal on a specific alternative measure to alleviate the concern, including, if a visit with special access right is proposed, the date, place, and procedures for such visit.
3. Each Party shall, in accordance with procedures subject to an agreement between the Parties, give demonstrations of each type (as defined by the Party giving the demonstration) of anti-missile missile and ABM launcher to be used in its ABM system. The goal of these demonstrations is to provide the opportunity to confirm the accuracy of dimensional information contained in the notifications to be provided in accordance with the provisions of Section 1, paragraph 2, subparagraph a and of paragraph 2, subparagraph b of this Annex:
a) with regard to anti-missile missiles and ABM launchers included in the initial exchange of information and notifications in accordance with Section I, paragraph 1 of this Annex, the time of these demonstrations shall be subject to agreement by the Parties;
b) with regard to anti-missile missiles and ABM launchers not included in the initial exchange of information and notifications in accordance with Section I, paragraph 1 of this Annex, these demonstrations shall be given within a 30-day period commencing:
i) with respect to anti-missile missiles, at a time and place subject to agreement by the Parties;
ii) with respect to ABM launchers, on the date of the initial installation of an anti-missile missile in such ABM launcher; [sic]
5. [sic] For the efficient performance of their functions in fulfillment of the provisions of this Annex, but not in their personal interest, inspectors shall be granted the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by diplomatic agents in accordance with the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961.
Section IV
1. Either Party may, on a voluntary basis, organize for the other Party a demonstration of its system or the components thereof or other activities pertaining to missile defense; an observation of the launchings of its anti-missile missiles; or a visit to facilities related to missile defense and the area where its missile defense system is located. In each specific case, the participating Parties shall agree in advance on the goal of these demonstrations, observations and visits and on the steps to accomplish them.
2. Each Party may, on a voluntary basis, provide any other information or any other notifications not mentioned in the other provisions of this Annex. In addition, either Party may, on a voluntary basis, provide information in accordance with Sections I and II hereof before this information is required to be provided. This information and these notifications shall be provided on the matters, to the extent, and within the timeframes that each Party itself shall determine.
Section V
1. Each Party shall use the channels of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers or equivalent intergovernmental communications channels to provide and receive notifications and to exchange information in accordance with the provisions of this Annex.
2. Each Party undertakes not to disclose information provided in accordance herewith except with the express consent of the Party that provided that information.
Section VI Upon the entry into force of the Protocol, the Parties undertake to propose and agree upon, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, additional administrative and technical procedures that may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Annex. These administrative and technical procedures shall be devised as quickly as possible.
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U.S. Wants Missile Treaty Changes
Associated Press
April 28, 2000 Filed at 3:40 p.m. EDT
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/i/AP-US-Russia.html
WASHINGTON (AP) -- The Clinton administration has outlined to Russian negotiators a two-phase program to defend the United States against missile attack from Asia and later from the Middle East, a senior U.S. official said Friday.
Deployment of a limited defense, involving 100 launchers and improved radar, is envisaged for 2005. North Korea, at this point, is considered the mostly likely Asian country to attack U.S. targets.
The second phase, involving additional interceptors and radar and a second deployment site, would rely on an orbiting satellite system that is not due to be completed before 2010, the senior U.S. official told The Associated Press.
As a result, the Clinton administration, while notifying Russian officials of the program, is leaving negotiations over the details of a second phase to its successor, said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
The second, more elaborate system is focused on threats from the Middle East. Iran already has been identified as a potential attacker.
It appears to be clearly in conflict with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between the United States and Russia, which limited defenses on the theory a potential attacker would be inclined to hold its fire if was exposed to devastating retaliation.
Russian negotiators have exchanged their own ideas with American counterparts about how to respond to a missile threat, the official said. But the Russians have not talked about amending the treaty, which would be required to implement both steps.
The Clinton administration is asking Russia to amend the treaty to clear the way for the first phase, the official said.
But American negotiators have made it clear that -- assuming the threat continues to evolve as expected -- the United States would request further changes in the treaty specifically focused on the second phase, the official said. Further negotiations would be required by Clinton's successor.
Earlier, another high-ranking U.S. official, Ambassador James Collins, said Russian negotiators had told their American counterparts they are ready to discuss the problem of missile threats from emerging countries.
Officially, Russia is opposed to modifying the 1972 treaty to permit the kind of missile defense the Clinton administration is exploring and a more far-reaching one backed by conservative Republicans, Collins said.
``At this point, we are involved in quite extensive discussions,'' he said. ``There is more sensitivity on the Russian side that this isn't just an American problem.''
He told reporters at a breakfast meeting that the U.S. negotiators had made written proposals to revise the treaty ``in a limited way.''
``We have told them we do not intend to expand to the point where there is a threat'' to Russia's nuclear weapons system, he said.
President Clinton is expected to urge Russian President Vladimir Putin to agree to alter the treaty to make way for the U.S. defense when they meet at a summit in Moscow June 4-5.
At the same time, U.S. and Russian negotiators are seeking agreement on another cutback in long-range nuclear weapons to a ceiling of 2,000 to 2,500 on each side.
Collins said the Russians appear interested in a reduction to 1,500 or even lower.
Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C., has publicly cautioned the administration that any new arms control agreement would be ``DOA -- dead on arrival'' at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which Helms chairs.
Helms, in a Senate speech this week, said Clinton was a lame-duck president looking for ways to improve his legacy and that he should not attempt to bind the next administration with agreements.
But Collins said ``developments don't stop just because we have an election every four years'' and that both governments should be engaged in reducing weapons stockpiles and exploring defenses against attack.
White House spokesman Joe Lockhart added: ``We're going to work with Senator Helms because it is in our national security interest, as well as the 99 other senators, to move our arms control agenda forward.''
Lockhart also told reporters he did not expect ``any sort of breakthrough'' on missile defenses at the summit, but it is high on the agenda.
In 1997, at the behest of the Clinton administration, Russia approved a variety of anti-missile tests as permissible under the treaty.
But on Thursday, after two days of talks here with Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said the agreement dealt only with theater missile defenses and not with a new threat of intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Collins said the United States and Russia were continuing to cooperate under the 1997 understanding. He said they have had two joint exercises and are likely to revive plans for a third one that Russia put off in its objections to the U.S.-NATO bombing of Yugoslavia over Kosovo.
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Albright Challenges Helms on Russia
Associated Press
April 28, 2000 Filed at 1:05 a.m. EDT
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/w/AP-US-Russia.html
WASHINGTON (AP) -- Challenging the powerful Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said Thursday the Clinton administration intends to pursue new arms control accords with Russia in the time it has left.
Albright, at a joint news conference with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, said the American people supported the dual quest for further cutbacks in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals and a way to mount a defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles.
The administration has presented Russia with a draft agreement that would revise the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty, The New York Times reported on their Web site early Friday.
The proposal would allow the United States to protect itself against missile attacks from nations such as North Korea, Iraq, Iran and Libya, the Times said. It said the draft was presented to the Russians earlier this year.
Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C., who has great but not insurmountable power to sidetrack treaties or even kill them, vowed Wednesday to block any new Clinton administration arms control pacts.
He included any agreement with Russia that might clear the way for a limited defense against missile attack from such countries as Iran and North Korea.
``The Russian government should not be under any illusion whatsoever that any commitments made by this lame-duck administration will be binding on the next administration,'' the North Carolina Republican told the Senate.
President Clinton is likely to ask Russian President Vladimir Putin at their summit meeting in Moscow June 4-5 to agree to modify the ABM treaty to permit a U.S. project involving 100 anti-missile launchers and an improved radar system.
Senate approval would be required to change the treaty.
But such an initiative, Helms said, would be ``DOA -- dead on arrival'' at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
The likely Republican presidential candidate, Texas Gov. George W. Bush, and many other conservative Republicans would go far beyond the administration's tentative plans and attempt to construct a nationwide defense against missiles.
Russia takes the position both approaches violate the 1972 treaty. Ivanov proposed during a three-day visit here the two sides cooperate on theater missile defenses allowed under the accord. In 1997 Russia approved all U.S. requests for a green light for missile tests as part of such a defense system.
But Albright said Thursday the United States was faced now with a new potential threat, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and had to deal with it.
``I don't think we can have a pause for the rest of the year,'' Albright said. ``I don't agree with what Sen. Helms said yesterday.''
At the same time, she made it clear differences with Russia had not been resolved during Ivanov's visit.
``We don't agree on all issues. This is only to be expected,'' Albright said. ``We cannot both be right all the time.''
Ivanov, registering his government's position on missile defenses, insisted the 1972 treaty ``be made a cornerstone of stability.''
He said Russia had proposed an ``adequate response'' to any threat of missile attack and that his government was prepared for further discussions on the subject.
``We are focused on finding solutions to the problems we are faced with,'' Ivanov said.
Meanwhile, Defense Secretary William Cohen, at a joint news conference with Colombia's minister of national defense, Luis Fernando Ramirez, said he was confident Russia would come to understand a limited U.S. anti-missile system was not threatening to them.
``We are satisfied that, as they understand the intent and the capability of the system, they will see that it does not pose a threat to their strategic systems,'' Cohen said.
Asked about Helms' statement on blocking any kind of arms agreement during the remainder of Clinton's term, Cohen said:
``This is not something that is a last-minute item on the agenda for President Clinton and any form of legacy that he might seek to achieve. He has been dedicated to reducing the level of strategic armaments and has worked diligently in that effort.''
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Documents Detail U.S. Plan to Alter '72 Missile Treaty
Text Proposal on ABM: 'Ready to Work With Russia'
New York Times
April 28, 2000
By STEVEN LEE MYERS and JANE PERLEZ
http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/global/042800russia-us-arms.html
WASHINGTON, April 27 -- The Clinton administration has presented Russia with a draft agreement that would revise a key arms control treaty to allow the United States to deploy a limited missile defense system and to hold open the possibility of building a larger system in the future.
The proposal would amend the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, long considered a linchpin of arms control, to allow the United States to protect itself against the threat of missile attacks from nations like North Korea, Iraq, Iran and Libya, according to a draft given to the Russians in January.
The draft and accompanying documents outlining the administration's arguments for changing the treaty provide the most detailed and authoritative account that has yet emerged of the American negotiating position. Officials are pressing Russia to accept a defensive system that it considers a grave, destabilizing threat, but which some Congressional Republicans believe is not nearly big enough.
"The U.S. national missile defense system, which will be limited and intended to defend against several dozen long-range missiles launched by rogue states, will be incapable of threatening Russia's strategic deterrence," said a summary of the administration's arguments, presented to the Russians.
The administration wants to change the treaty to let the United States build the first phase of a defensive system with 100 missiles and their launchers, as well as a sophisticated new radar system on Shemya Island in Alaska. But the administration also wants a second phase, to include another 100 missiles and launchers at a second site. In its proposal, the United States calls for talks on an expanded system to begin as soon as next March -- after Mr. Clinton's successor is inaugurated.
Russia fears that any agreement to allow a limited defensive system would open the door to demands for a further expansion that would gut the aims of the ABM treaty, which prohibits national defensive shields. The theory was that by limiting the nations' defenses, the treaty takes away their compensating need to build up their offenses, providing some stability. And if nations feel invulnerable to attack, they might be tempted to launch a first strike.
American negotiators have tried to assure their Russian counterparts that the system would pose no threat to Russia's strategic nuclear deterrence, but rather would focus on more isolated threats of ballistic missile strikes.
The American document went to great lengths to reassure Russia that even if the two countries agree to reduce their warheads to between 1,500 and 2,000 as proposed under the next phase of the planned nuclear arms reduction, known as Start III, the Russian nuclear force would have nothing to fear from the American defensive shield.
"These strategic forces give each side the certain ability to carry out an annihilating counterattack," the document said. "Forces of this size can easily penetrate a limited system of the type the United States is now developing."
The summary, which was presented to the Russians in January by the senior American negotiator, John D. Holum, went on to say that in the event of a first-strike attack, Russia would still be able "to send about a thousand warheads, together with two to three times more decoys, accompanied by other advanced defense penetration aids" that would easily overwhelm the limited American system.
"Authoritative written Russian sources claim that the Russian Government understands that the capabilities of its defense penetration aids are extremely high," the document said. "These same written sources, supplemented by the statements of senior Russian military personnel and defense industry representatives, clearly present the idea that the Russian Government anticipated that is defense penetration aides could easily overcome the U.S. N.M.D. system," referring to the national missile defense.
The documents outlining the administration's position were obtained by The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in Russia and passed on to The New York Times. The bulletin plans to make them available on its web site (www.thebulletin.org). Senior administration officials declined to comment on the documents, but in interviews today discussed the rationale behind the proposals.
The proposals amount to the administration's opening offer in negotiations that have barely got off the ground.
While senior American and Russian officials have held repeated discussions over the last year, the Russians have not yet decided whether to even engage in negotiations on the treaty. In public -- and equally so in private, officials said -- the Russians have adamantly opposed any changes to allow a missile defense.
"It's very much an open question whether Russia is going to conclude that it is in Russia's interest to do a deal with this administration," a senior administration official said.
However, the discussions have intensified with the recent election of Vladimir V. Putin as Russia's next President and the coming end of President Clinton's second term.
At a news conference capping of three days of talks that centered on national missile defense, the Russian foreign minister, Igor S. Ivanov, and Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright said today that discussions would continue when Mr. Clinton and Mr. Putin meet in Moscow in June.
President Clinton has not made a decision so far on whether to deploy a defensive system. He is not scheduled to do so until after the Pentagon's next antimissile test in June.
Mr. Ivanov said that "considerable differences" remained, and he repeated that Russia believed the ABM treaty should "remain a cornerstone of strategic stability."
Dr. Albright responded by saying that the administration, too, wanted to preserve the treaty but also wanted to adapt it to "21st-century needs," a reference to the missile threats that intelligence experts have warned are fast approaching.
The administration's proposal would not directly amend the text of the treaty, but rather revise it by adding two brief "protocols." They would allow the first phase of a missile defense and provide extensive measures for verification of the system's missiles and radars.
Another senior administration official said the decision to propose protocols was simply easier than trying to revise the wording of the treaty line by line. It could also allow Russians to declare that the treaty itself remained unchanged. However, the administration official said, "It's not like cosmetics are going to solve this problem."
If approved by the Russians, the protocols would still face a test in the Senate, which would have to approve them before they took effect. More than 20 Republican senators said they would not accept Mr. Clinton's proposed changes, contending that they would limit a defensive system too much.
The protocol covers only the first phase of the American missile defense system, intended to counter an attack from North Korea, which will be able to threaten the continental United States with ballistic missiles by 2005, according to a classified intelligence estimate.
The administration stopped short of asking the Russians to approve immediately the second phase of the system, which would be based at a still undecided location and counter threats from the Middle East and Persian Gulf, which intelligence consider to be a decade or more away.
However, an article in the protocol explicitly allows either side to reopen negotiations as soon as March 1, 2001 "to take into account further changes in the strategic situation."
The decision to ask for only the first phase, while insisting on the right to expand it further, was a practical one, the officials said.
They said they assumed it would be easier to get the Russians to accept only a first phase, which American consider more urgent, rather than a larger system. The decision also reflected the change in administrations next January.
The officials emphasized that the United States only plans to build two phases, but the proposed language does not specify that. With Republicans in Congress pressing for a further expansion of the system, the protocol's lack of specificity may well stoke the Russian fears of facing a slippery slope to a larger system.
The protocol would also allow the United States to build a radar in Alaska and upgrade early-warning radar stations in Alaska, Massachusetts and California.
Lisbeth Gronlund, a senior staff scientist with the Union of Concerned Scientists, which opposes a national missile defense, said the radar undercut a linchpin of the treaty, which limited such systems on the theory that once they were built, antimissile missiles could be quickly deployed.
Stephen I. Schwartz, publisher of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, said he was troubled by the assumptions underlying the administration's reassurances to the Russians.
The documents, he said, showed that the administration was willing to accept the continued existence of a large Russian nuclear force, rather than seek bilateral reductions.
"The United States Government would forsake deep reductions in the Russian and American arsenals in favor of deploying a limited missile defense against a threat that doesn't yet exist," he said.
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Russian missile roulette
Washington Times
EDITORIAL • April 28, 2000
http://208.246.212.80/op-ed/ed-house-200042817332.htm
Who wants to play Russian roulette with American national security? The White House may be inclined to do so. Fortunately, Sen. Jesse Helms, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is refusing to go along. Let's hope the senator remains firm in this stand.
At long last, the new Russian government has placed on the table the deal on arms control and missile defense that has been the subject of speculation for more than a year now. It involves nothing less than two arms control treaties and the future of U.S. national missile defense. These are high stakes indeed, and must be declined by the Senate should the White House be foolish enough to play along - as every indication is that it will. The timing of the Russians is beautiful. With an outgoing president eager for something - anything - to show for his scandal-ridden presidency, the U.S. government would appear poised to fall into the trap.
First step was the belated ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II, which Russian President Vladimir Putin pushed through the Russian Duma as one of his first official acts. START II reduces the number of nuclear warheads on both sides to 3,500 and was foolishly viewed in the West as a conciliatory Russian step and a good omen for the new presidency.
Then came the iron fist. At the United Nations on Tuesday, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov issued a tough warning: Should the United States decide to proceed with a national missile defense system, it would "destroy" the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), he said, and have dire consequences. "The prevailing system of arms control agreements is a complex and quite fragile structure," Mr. Ivanov said. "Once one of its key elements has been weakened, the entire system is destabilized. The collapse of the ABM treaty would, therefore, undermine the entirety of disarmament agreements concluded over the past 30 years." This "entirety" obviously includes START II.
This doesn't mean, however, that the Russian government will not generously allow the United States an itsy-bitsy missile defense, a mere handkerchief of a system, wherewith to defend its citizens. Yesterday, Mr. Ivanov told reporters that Russia would be willing to accept a limited, land-based system capable of intercepting a few incoming missiles from Iraq or North Korea. Allegedly, such a system can be built (is indeed being planned by the Clinton administration for construction in Alaska) with just a few revisions to the ABM treaty. Mr. Ivanov was all sweetness and light and came up with a constructive proposal: The United States and Russia would implement minor changes to the ABM Treaty negotiated in 1997, and agree to START III cuts of nuclear warheads to 1,500.
Isn't that nice? The Russians will get to cut an arsenal that is deteriorating rapidly anyway, and we will get to tie our own hands behind our back as regards missile attack from any and all enemies of the United States (which of course may include the Russians).
To his enduring credit, Mr. Helms has made it clear that no such deal will get the stamp of approval from his committee; it would be "dead on arrival." "This administration's time for grand treaties is clearly at an end," Mr. Helms said. "We will not consider any new, last-minute arms control measures that this administration negotiates in its final closing months." It would be a disaster if Mr. Clinton's final act in office was to undermine American national security. It must not happen.
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Officials search for new arms deal
Washington Times
April 28, 2000
By Ben Barber
http://208.246.212.80/world/default-2000428222712.htm
U.S. and Russian negotiators searched Thursday for a new arms-control deal that would keep existing treaties intact, permit construction of a national missile defense (NMD) and overcome opposition in the Senate.
The effort followed a warning on Wednesday by Sen. Jesse Helms, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, that any new arms treaty would be rejected by the Senate.
"I disagree with Sen. Helms," said Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright after meetings with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov.
"I don't think we can take a pause with threats to the U.S. national interest," she told reporters at the State Department Thursday.
Asked if the Clinton administration might try to carry out plans to develop and deploy a limited 100-missile shield based in Alaska without Senate approval, Mrs. Albright was vague.
"Obviously, we want support [for the NMD] and we will be involved in discussions," to overcome opposition by Mr. Helms and other Republicans in Congress, Mrs. Albright said.
The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty represents the main obstacle to a missile defense because it limits the United States to developing one anti-missile site to protect its capital.
The treaty was interpreted in 1997 to allow building as many as 100 interceptors - a view that Russia has hinted it may be willing to accept.
"I think the American people want us to end some of the problems left over from the Cold War . . . I think we are following what the American people want," Mrs. Albright said.
Mr. Helms wants the United States to abandon the ABM Treaty, which bars Russia and the United States from building a national anti-missile shield.
The logic behind the ABM pact was that peace was secure because each side was threatened with mutually assured destruction. ABM supporters at the time feared that a missile defense would destabilize that balance.
Mrs. Albright Thursday said that the 1972 treaty failed to meet today's threats.
With nations such as North Korea, Iraq and Iran moving to acquire long-range nuclear-tipped missiles, the United States needs a limited shield to face that new threat, say U.S. officials.
The 1997 interpretation of the ABM "deals with short-range missiles but does not deal with intercontinental ballistic missiles . . . It can't deal with the problem," Mrs. Albright said Thursday.
Presumptive Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush does not agree with the Clinton administration's efforts to preserve the ABM Treaty and build a limited NMD, his top foreign-policy adviser said Thursday.
"We want very much to move to a national missile defense," said Condoleezza Rice. She said she agreed with Mr. Helms' warning that President Clinton should not try to create a new arms-control system that would not survive his presidency.
"In the spirit of what Sen. Helms said, it would be a pity if we got an agreement with Russia that constrains what we really want and then it was unacceptable under the new president and Senate," said Miss Rice.
The former Stanford University provost and National Security Council adviser said it could be a repeat of the humiliating defeat of the nuclear test-ban treaty last year "where the president negotiated an arms-control accord and it got voted down."
Asked if she would advise a Bush administration to accept the limited 100-launcher missile shield - which might be acceptable to Russia, as well as meet some threats from rogue states - Miss Rice said that would be a "mistake."
"A single site is only a start," she told reporters.
Mr. Helms and other critics are seeking a more ambitious missile-defense plan.
Russia has threatened to stop compliance with all nuclear-weapons reduction accords if the ABM Treaty is abrogated by the United States.
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Shots Fired At Missile Defense Price
Space.com
00/04/28
http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/technology/missile_defense_000426.html
WASHINGTON (AP) -- A national missile shield that would offer limited protection from attack by smaller, newly armed countries would cost almost $60 billion through 2015, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) says.
A CBO report released Tuesday said that's how much would be needed to defend the country from attack by a relatively small number of incoming ballistic missiles. It said those missiles could contain nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, capable of killing millions of people.
The report cautioned that many still believe hostile countries just developing long-range missiles, such as North Korea or Iran, could find easy ways to outmaneuver the proposed defense system.
Senate Democratic leader Tom Daschle of South Dakota, who requested the report with Sens. Carl Levin (D-Michigan) and Frank Lautenberg (D-New Jersey), said it made clear that the criteria of cost, operability, effect on national security and impact on arms reduction efforts can't be ignored in deciding whether to proceed.
"It is far too soon to evaluate the overall feasibility or advisability of the missile defense project," he said.
But Rep. Curt Weldon (R-Pennsylvania), a chief proponent of a missile defense system, said the CBO estimate was far too high and has "no basis in reality."
"You can't put a price on protecting American cities," Weldon said, but $60 billion was "totally out of line, out of synch with anything I've seen."
Congress last year passed by large majorities, and President Clinton signed, a bill stating it is the policy of the United States to deploy, as soon as technologically possible, a system capable of defending U.S. territory against limited ballistic-missile attack.
The program has had problems with test failures and has met strong opposition from nuclear powers such as Russia and China. Russia says it would violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and threatened to pull out of other arms-reduction pacts if the United States builds the system.
Clinton is to decide this fall, after another Pentagon test of the system in June, whether to continue with plans to have it operating by a target date of 2005.
"The costs are going up, up and away." Daryl Kimball, the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers
The CBO said the first phase of a national missile defense would cost $29.5 billion through 2015, $3.9 billion more than the administration has estimated.
It would include locating 100 interceptors in central Alaska, constructing a high-resolution X-band radar and upgrading several existing early-warning radars.
The second phase, to be deployed by 2010 under current plans, would use satellites that could track not only powered-flight missiles but also missiles gliding through space. The third phase would add 150 interceptors, some at a second site currently planned for Grand Forks, North Dakota.
The administration has not yet estimated the cost of the last two phases. The CBO said the second phase would cost another $6.1 billion and the third phase $13.3 billion through 2015. It said another $10.6 billion would be needed for space-based sensors, satellites that share other missions with missile-defense support.
"The costs are going up, up and away," said Daryl Kimball of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, an advocacy group that believes a national missile defense is unlikely to work even against a minimal threat.
"Congress and the American people, once they realize this, will experience a bit of sticker shock," he said.
Advocates of the system insist the cost is justified because the threat is increasing for long-range missile attack from North Korea or a similar potential adversary.
President Reagan in the 1980s proposed the far more ambitious Strategic Defense Initiative, or "Star Wars," a space-based anti-missile system designed mainly to defend against Soviet attack.