NucNews - April 27, 2000

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-------- top news

Sen. Byron Dorgan (D-ND) letter on nuclear weapons policy and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review (NPT) Conference

From: Kevin Martin - kmartin@fourthfreedom.org abolition-usa@lists.xmission.com

* DEAR COLLEAGUE AND TEXT OF LETTER

April 27, 2000

Dear Colleague:

The world's confidence in America's commitment to nuclear non-proliferation has been shaken recently, particularly because of the Senate's failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. After years of championing international attempts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, the United

States now is on the defensive at the NPT Review Conference in New York. A broad alliance of arms control advocates, U.N. officials and diplomats have charged that the United States is impeding the non-proliferation movement rather than leading it.

If you share my concern about this issue, I hope you will consider signing the attached letter to President Clinton which I drafted in coordination

with former Senator Alan Cranston and several non-government organizations.

It proposes a number of steps that the President could take during the remainder of this administration to help shore up confidence in America's commitment to the international non-proliferation regime.

If you would like to sign the letter, or wish additional information, please contact Wayne Pieringer or Brian Moran on my staff (224-2551) by May 3, 2000.

Sincerely,

Byron L. Dorgan U.S. Senator

--

The President The White House Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We laud your March 6th statement on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

(NPT), particularly your reiteration that "the United States is committed to the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons." Nevertheless, we are concerned that the non-proliferation regime will be corroded unless you take dramatic steps to back up your words with actions.

The NPT review conference is now underway in New York, and it is clear that the world's confidence in America's commitment to nuclear non-proliferation has been compromised by the Senate's failure to ratify the Comprehensive

Test Ban Treaty and by contradictions between American rhetoric and action.

For example, the 1997 Presidential Decision Directive 60 stated that nuclear weapons remain the "cornerstone" of our security policy, and the

U.S. has prodded NATO to reaffirm that nuclear weapons "will continue tofulfill an essential role" in its strategic policy.

The apparent rush to deploy a National Missile Defense (NMD) system threatens the integrity of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and strategic arms reductions. Unilateral NMD deployment could stimulate a dangerous new arms race with China and Russia. Even if there is a bilateral START/NMD compromise, NMD deployments will inevitably impede deep strategic force reductions.

When NATO members sought a review of NATO nuclear policy, the United States objected. Virtually all the countries in the Southern Hemisphere are members of nuclear weapons-free zone agreements. Yet, when they attempted to make the southern hemisphere one unified nuclear weapons free zone, the United States objected. The U.S. has also thwarted attempts to institute

formal bodies to discuss the preconditions necessary to negotiate nuclear disarmament. Countries without nuclear weapons are sensitive to the global hazard of maintaining nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert.

For these and other reasons, the world's confidence in the commitment of

nuclear weapons states to disarmament has been seriously weakened. We propose some simple steps that you can take during the remainder of your

administration to help shore up confidence in the commitment of the United States to non-proliferation.

• Because the U.S. has an obligation under Article VI of the NPT to

pursue the elimination of nuclear weapons, we urge you to take the lead in promoting multilateral discussions on how the international community can best pursue that goal.

• The U.S. should accept the lowest offer that Russia has extended for mutually-verifiable cuts in nuclear arsenals under START III.

• The U.S. should take clear steps to diminish the salience of nuclear weapons by, for example, making reasoned efforts to take them off hair-trigger alert, pledging never to use them first, negotiating an agreement that assures non-nuclear weapon states that nuclear weapons will not be used against them, and committing to an international prohibition on the development of new nuclear weapons.

• The U.S. should promote the establishment an international accounting system for all nuclear weapons and weapons-grade materials, and continue to push for a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty.

• The U.S. should encourage NATO to adopt a policy of "no first use of nuclear weapons."

Mr. President, it is unlikely that the NPT regime can endure indefinitely if a few states insist that nuclear weapons provide them with unique security benefits while denying these alleged benefits to others.

Unless the United States takes tangible steps now to stride beyond the lethargic bilateral processes commenced during the Cold War, arms control and disarmament will stagnate and the non-proliferation regime will be weakened. There could hardly be a less attractive legacy for your Presidency. However, people around the world would forever be indebted to you if you took some simple, practical steps to help fulfill one of humanity's deepest longings: a world free from the threat of nuclear destruction.

Sincerely, ---

(At the moment, only 7 Senators including Dorgan have agreed to sign Senator Dorgan's letter. This is due to the short amount of time that the letter has out and the very strong message it delivers on U.S. nuclear policy.

In order increase the possibility that the letter gains a more respectable number of signatories and to increase the possibility that it can be wrapped-up and delivered before the end of the NPT Review Conference (May 19), your help is needed.

PLEASE REDOUBLE YOUR EFFORTS TO CONTACT SENATORS MOST LIKELY TO SIGN THE LETTER.

Most likely candidates for signing Dorgan letter:
NOTE: Senators in (parentheses) have agreed to sign.

(Biden) - DE Bingaman - NM Boxer - CA Durbin - IL Feingold - WI (Harkin) - IA Johnson - SD Kennedy - MA Kerrey - NE Kerry - MA Kohl - WI Lautenberg - NJ (Leahy) - VT Levin - MI (Murray) - WA Reed - RI Reid - NV Schumer - NY (Wellstone) -MN Wyden - OR Jeffords - VT

Daryl Kimball, Executive Director Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers 110 Maryland Avenue NE, Suite 505 Washington, DC 20002 (ph) 202-546-0795 x136 (fax) 202-546-7970 website http://www.crnd.org

Kevin Martin Director, Project Abolition 219-534-3402, ext. 21 kmartin@fourthfreedom.org)

-------- activists

MEDIA RELEASE From: Abolition2000@aol.com

For Immediate Release
Contact: Carah Ong (212) 818-1861 or (212) 682-2747

On Thursday, 27 April 2000 Abolition 2000 Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons will present Ambassador Baali, Chairman of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference, with an International Petition that has been signed by 13,408,035 individuals from around the world. The ceremony will take place at the United Nations at 1:15 pm in Conference Room 4.

Abolition 2000 is a Global Network of some 2000 organizations and municipalities in 93 countries calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons and the redress of environmental degradation and human suffering caused by more than 55 years of nuclear weapons testing and production.. The Abolition 2000 International Petition calls upon all states, but particularly the nuclear weapons states, to make commitments to:

1. End the nuclear threat by dealerting all nuclear weapons, withdrawing all nuclear weapons from foreign soil and international waters, separating warheads from delivery vehicles and disabling them, committing to unconditional no first use of nuclear weapons, and ceasing all nuclear weapons tests, including laboratory tests and "subcriticals." 2. Sign a Nuclear Weapons Convention by the year 2000, agreeing to the elimination of all nuclear weapons within a timebound framework. 3. Reallocate resources to ensure a sustainable global future and to redress the environmental devastation and human suffering caused by nuclear weapons production and testing, which have been disproportionately borne by the world's indigenous peoples.

The petition has been translated into French, German, Japanese, Romanian, Russian and Spanish for global circulation.

Although the majority of people all around the world agree that nuclear weapons pose grave danger to almost all life forms and should be eliminated from the planet, nuclear weapons states have failed to eliminate nuclear arsenals as obligated under Article VI of the NPT. Disarmament efforts are at great risk of being diminished because of the resolve of nuclear weapons states to center their policies and security on outdated ideologies and expensive military hardware. During the NPT Review and Extension Conference, being held from 24 April to 19 May 2000, State Parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear weapons states, will have an opportunity to take advantage of this forum to commence negotiations leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Ambassador Baali will also be presented with an "Appeal to End the Nuclear Threat to Humanity" signed by more than 50 world leaders, including Jimmy Carter, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, The XIVth Dalai Lama, Michael Douglas, Harrison Ford, Queen Noor of Jordan, and Muhammad Ali. The Appeal calls for negotiations to achieve a verifiable international treaty for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons. Thirty-three signers of the Appeal are Nobel Laureates, including 14 Nobel Peace Laureates.

-------- alternative energy

Arizona First State to Require Solar Power Generation

By Cat Lazaroff
April 27, 2000 (ENS)
http://ens.lycos.com/ens/apr2000/2000L-04-27-07.html
Photos solar panel arrays:
http://ens.lycos.com/ens/pics10/solaryuma.jpg http://ens.lycos.com/ens/pics10/giantarray.jpg http://ens.lycos.com/ens/pics10/solaraz.jpg http://ens.lycos.com/ens/pics10/apssite.jpg

PHOENIX, Arizona, Arizona has become the first state to require electric utilities to produce a portion of their power from solar energy. Wednesday's vote by the state's Corporation Commission may increase utility bills for state residents, but could boost solar power in one of the nation's sunniest states.

A 450 kilowatt photovoltaic array at the U.S. Army Yuma Proving Grounds in southwestern Arizona (All photos courtesy National Renewable Energy Laboratory)

The three member Corporation Commission voted unanimously to approve a measure that will require utilities and other electricity providers to produce a small percentage of their electricity from solar and other renewable resources.

Under the Solar and Environmentally Friendly Portfolio Standard, electricity providers may have to derive 1.1 percent of their total product from renewable resources by 2007. At least 27 other states also mandate renewable sources for utilities, but Arizona is the first to require that solar energy make up a specific portion of that power.

The Standard requires providers to produce at least 50 percent of their renewable power from solar generating facilities. The remainder will come from other renewable sources, including methane from landfills, wind power and biomass generators.

By January 1, 2001, utilities must produce 0.2 percent of their electricity from renewable sources. By 2004, that amount will increase to 0.8 percent. The 1.1 percent requirement by 2007 will only be enacted if prices for renewables drop closer to prices for traditional power sources. The Commission will determine whether to enforce that higher percentage.

The Arizona Public Service Company is testing a high concentration solar system at its Solar Test and Research (STAR) Center in Tempe (Photo by Bill Timmerman)

Utilities say solar power currently costs five to 10 times more than conventionally generated electricity. Customers will be asked to shoulder part of the burden of the higher priced energy through per-month surcharges. The maximum per month increase would be 35 cents for residential electric bills and $13 per meter per month charge for most businesses, the Commission says. The largest businesses, including many of the state's mining industries, will pay $39 per meter per month more than their current bills.

The renewable power will also be funded by a systems benefit charge, which customers are now paying for consumer education programs.

Last year, the Commission rejected a proposal to require that one percent of all energy sold in Arizona come from solar sources. That plan had no cap on costs to consumers.

At the Backus Ranch in Arizona, this solar electric system meets various needs for power (Photo by Bob Hammond, Arizona State University)

Supporters of the plan, which include environmental groups and the solar industry, point out that national surveys have shown that a majority of consumers would be willing to give up electricity deregulation driven price cuts in order to opt for renewable power.

State utilities said the plan may cost more than the estimated $3 million that the new surcharges will raise, which could prompt them to ask the Commission for larger rate increases in the future.

The Arizona Public Service Co. (APS), the state's largest electric utility, already offers solar power. The company says its Solar Partners program, which charges customers a premium for power generated from small solar plants in Tempe and Flagstaff, has more customers than it can currently serve.

APS announced this week it plans to double the amount of solar energy it uses to generate electricity. The company will install 388 kilowatts (kW) of solar photovoltaic (PV) panels at proposed sites in Yuma, Prescott, and on either side of Phoenix to the east and the west. These installations will complement the 172 kW installation announced earlier this month for the Glendale Airport and the recent two kW PV installation on top of San Luis City Hall.

APS is evaluating the performance of the latest in Dish Stirling Solar power systems at its STAR Center in Tempe (Photo by Bill Timmerman)

"Because solar energy does not rely on non-renewable resources drawn out of the earth, nor does it have any emissions from the conversion into electricity, solar electricity holds promise for the earth's energy future," says Ed Fox, APS' vice president of environmental resources. "APS is proud to be leading the way toward furthering the development of this earth smart technology."

The solar projects are funded by APS, its Solar Partner customers and, when funds are available, the U.S. Department of Energy. The new solar facilities will be installed over the next year.

"With more than 350 days of sunshine per year, everyone recognizes that Arizona is the perfect place to develop and install solar electric generation," says Fox. "Currently, solar generation costs five times more than traditional non-renewable generation sources but, with the help of our customers, the increased demand will bring the price down."

-------- britain

British nuke weapons sites rife with waste - report

UK: April 27, 2000
Story by John O'Callaghan
REUTERS NEWS SERVICE
http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=6477

LONDON - Britain's nuclear weapons plants may be contaminated by far more radioactive and toxic waste than previously thought, New Scientist said on Wednesday.

The magazine, quoting from what it called a confidential report by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL), said the Ministry of Defence may also have seriously underestimated the amount of waste being stored at two sites west of London and one in Wales.

"Areas contaminated with asbestos, plutonium, depleted uranium, beryllium and tritium have been identified. Until comprehensive surveys have been completed, the potential extent of the problem will be unclear," it quoted the report as saying.

"There may be accumulations of wastes, both radioactive and toxic, in buildings on the sites that are not included in any identified inventory."

State-owned BNFL - in a consortium with Lockheed Martin of the United States and management consultants Serco Ltd - took over the running of Britain's three Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) sites at the start of April.

COMPANIES DISMISS MAGAZINE REPORT

Officials at BNFL and AWE dismissed the magazine's claims about the "confidential report" on the sites at Aldermaston, Burghfield and Cardiff.

"It is utter nonsense," Graeme Hammond, head of corporate affairs at AWE, told Reuters. "It's actually a waste inventory that was prepared during the AWE management lead-in," he said of the "confidential report".

"But it doesn't really change the price of bread as far as we're concerned because the quotes (in the magazine) appear to have been taken selectively and used out of context."

Hammond said a survey into land contamination had been under way for two years and, until it was complete, the exact amount of contamination would not be known.

"AWE was satisfied that there was no major underestimation of waste or contamination and is satisfied that its plans to deal with decommissioning waste and contamination will be effective," he said.

The company had used more drums than it estimated to hold waste buried on site because of the odd sizes of some of the contaminated material, he said.

"We will get better at that as we go through the programme and, as new equipment arrives, we'll be able to reduce the size of the individual waste particles in order that we can use our drums more effectively," he said.

"But having said that, it doesn't pose us any problem because we've got plenty of storage space."

BNFL, which this month announced sweeping changes to its board and senior management in the wake of a damning safety report, is under pressure to correct problems at its Sellafield nuclear reprocessing facility.

Japan and Germany have put business with BNFL on hold after revelations that Sellafield staff falsified data on shipments of mixed oxide fuel, a combination of plutonium and uranium.

Switzerland and Sweden have also banned trade with BNFL, while Ireland and Denmark have called for Sellafield's closure.


-------- china

China to speed approval of nuclear test ban treaty

CHINA: April 27, 2000
REUTERS NEWS SERVICE
http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=6479

BEIJING - China said on Tuesday it would "speed the process" towards ratifying the nuclear test ban treaty, raising the possibility the United States may soon be the only declared nuclear power not to have ratified the document.

Russia's parliament ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty last week, joining Britain and France as the three nuclear powers to have done so.

China and the United States have signed the treaty, which binds signatory states to quit nuclear explosions of any kind, but neither has ratified it.

The United States Senate stunned Washington's allies last year when it rejected approval of the treaty.

Both Washington and Beijing have agreed to abide by the ban even without ratification.

"We welcome the approval of the CTBT by the Russian Duma," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun Yuxi told a regular news conference.

"I believe the National People's Congress will speed the process of approving the treaty," Sun said, referring to China's parliament.

He declined to give a specific timetable for ratification. To date, 41 countries have signed the treaty and 28 have ratified it. A total of 44 nations with varying degrees of nuclear capability must sign as well as ratify the CTBT, initiated in 1996, for it to take effect.

All have signed except for India, Pakistan and North Korea. The treaty bans all explosions, whether in the atmosphere, space or underground, regardless of size.

----

Taiwan, China Sign Contract For Storing Nuclear Waste

Mar 12, 2000 --
Agence France Presse
http://www.insidechina.com:80/news.php3?id=142022

TAIPEI, Taiwan and rival China have quietly forged a memorandum of understanding for shipping more than 200,000 barrels of low-radiation nuclear waste to the mainland, it was reported Sunday.

Taiwan's state-run Taiwan Power Co. signed the memo in Hong Kong two months ago with a Chinese nuclear company "affiliated with an official nuclear agency," the United Daily News said.

Under the contract China will dispose of 210,000 drums of nuclear waste stored on the offshore Orchid Island and three nuclear power plants, the daily quoted New Party presidential candidate Lee Ao as saying.

Lee alleged he had obtained the memo from Taipower but would not identify the source.

But Tsai Mao-tsun, a Taipower vice president in charge of nuclear energy, denied the report of the memo although he did acknowledge that Taipower had contacts with the mainland over storing the island's nuclear waste.

Taipower signed an agreement with North Korea in 1997 to dispose of 60,000 drums of low-radiation nuclear waste, with a provision to increase the volume to 200,000 barrels.

But the power company was forced to virtually scrap the accord after the Taiwanese government was reluctant to give Taipower the required go-ahead amid pressure from China, the United States and South Korea.

The accord also met strong protests from South Korea and environmentalist organizations, including Greenpeace, which maintained that poverty-stricken North Korea lacked the ability to handle nuclear waste.

Reports said the famine-stricken country would receive a one-off payment of 1,300 US dollars from Taipower for each barrel of nuclear waste to be stored at an abandoned coal mine 90 kilometers (55 miles) north of Seoul.

Taipower is also negotiating with Russia and the Marshall Islands for disposal of the waste. ((c) 2000 Agence France Presse)

------- colombia

Bogota's link to far-right militias
This month's UN report on a Colombian-paramilitary link could jeopardize US aid.

Martin Hodgson,
The Christian Science Monitor
04/26/2000
http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/2000/04/26/fp4s1-csm.shtml

When they saw military helicopters dropping uniformed men on a hillside above town, inhabitants of the mountain village of Buenos Aires thought that the Army had come to protect them from a marauding band of far-right paramilitaries who were terrorizing this rugged Andean region.

But no troops intervened when some 200 militiamen stormed the community two days later. Brandishing assault rifles and machetes, the paramilitaries announced that they were hunting rebels.

"Where were the soldiers? Why didn't they stop those people?" asks villager Marlene Correa.

A new report from the United Nations that the Colombian security forces maintain an intimate relationship with these far-right death squads, could jeopardize the $1.6 billion aid package for Colombia still under debate in the US Senate. Analysts warn that the package - primarily military in scope - might help an Army which supports the violent squads.

According to the UN report, released on April 14, members of the military participated in massacres, organized paramilitary groups, and spread death threats. "The security forces also failed to take action, and this undoubtedly enabled the paramilitary groups to achieve their exterminating objectives," it added.

President Andres Pastrana and his forces are presently entangled in a devastating civil war with Marxist guerrillas - who have been waging war on the government since the mid-'60s. The main leftist groups are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in and the smaller National Liberation Army (ELN), mainly in the north. Both are fierce rivals of the ultra-right paramilitaries since all three are battling for territory, political power, and kickbacks from drug traffickers. Yesterday, Mr. Pastrana agreed to pull troops from a northern region and turn the zone over to the ELN for peace talks. But paramilitary commanders announced they might attack the zone.

Colombia's ambassador to the UN, Camilo Reyes Rodriguez, denies any collusion with the far-right militia. Addressing the General Assembly he said, "The Colombian government cannot accept that the authorities have a generalized responsibility for the actions of these criminal groups."

US law forbids aid to military units involved in human rights abuses. Unfortunately, concrete proof of links with the paramilitaries is hard to obtain.

According to one Western diplomat, witnesses are often too scared to testify, and even state investigators fear to delve into cases of possible collusion. "It's like abortion in a Catholic country. Everyone knows it's going on - but nobody sees it happen," he says.

Loosely allied as the "United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia," or AUC, the paramilitaries now field between 5,000 and 7,000 fighters. They are a hybrid force combining the private armies of powerful landlords and drug dealers with now-outlawed rural intelligence networks once set up by the government to combat leftist guerrillas. These militias rarely launch direct attacks against rebel groups, instead targeting civilians accused of supporting the guerrillas.

Although Pastrana has repeatedly pledged to crack down on soldiers who collaborate with paramilitaries, evidence suggests some units have done little to break old habits. According to the State Department, some servicemen provide them with weapons and intelligence. Others merely look the other way.

One region hit by last year's paramilitary onslaught was the Andean range north of Cali. The AUC's "Calima Front" murdered a peasant farmer and his daughter in July and publicly warned locals to leave the region or die. Since August the group has killed more than 90 people, and forced around 2,000 to flee their homes. The Calima Front then arrived in Buenos Aires in late September.

"It was the worst.... They said 'Speak, or we'll kill the men like dogs - where are the guerrillas?' " remembers Marlene Correa. Before dawn, the paramilitaries shot and killed her son, Luis.

What she cannot understand is how the paramilitaries managed to arrive and escape unchallenged.

Local police and army officials deny reports from villagers that military helicopters flew over the village in the days before the raid, dropping off armed men in the mountains above town.

When the paramilitaries finally withdrew from Buenos Aires they marched down the same road used just two hours later by an Army unit sent to intercept them. But those soldiers claim they never saw the militiamen.

"How do you explain that? Two hundred armed men don't just disappear," asked one Colombian human rights official, who asked not to be named.

After the incursion, over 700 villagers fled to the nearby town of Buga - many to makeshift lodgings like the sports arena. They still fear for their safety, especially since a lawyer who had taken up their case was killed in January.

In addition, Lt. Col. Rafael Jani of the "Palace" Battalion in Buga admits that an ex-guerrilla turned paramilitary spy has regularly visited him with information on rebel movements.

"It's true, but he doesn't work with us.... Many informers aren't model citizens, but if someone comes here and tells me where the guerrillas are hiding, I have to use his information," he says.

Military commanders say that the overstretched Army is powerless to stop the paramilitaries, and that many locals are uncooperative, thanks to accusations from human rights groups.

"Information always gets to us too late, because people are scared to speak to us. Look at the damage these slanders create," says Brig. Gen. Jaime Ernesto Canal.

But according to local priest Carlos Alberto Quiceno, "Everyone knows where [the right-wing fighters] are. But when the paramilitaries arrive, the police withdraw to their barracks."

And while Mrs. Correa must sleep in a crowded sports hall, farmers report the Calima Front has set up a permanent base in the abandoned village of Buenos Aires.

"The paras are living in our houses," she says. "They have dances and cock-fights up there. What more information do the army want ?"

----

Drug Czar Ignores Truth

(Here is my letter printed in the Washington Times.)
From: Paul Wolf - paulwolf@icdc.com
April 16, 2000, Apex, NC 27502

Dear Editor:

Barry McCaffrey's shameless April 14th op-ed, "Aid Colombia," ignored the potentially disasterous effects all that military aid could have on the fierce political violence raging in that country.

The Clinton administration's $1.6 billion emergency military aid proposal falls far short of the real plan Colombia needs to avoid a bloody and pointless civil war. Colombia must look for ways to end the escalating political violence, which has only been worsened by a terror campaign directed at rebellious civilian populations.

Colombia's counterinsurgency strategy includes the use of murder, disappearances, massacres, and the deliberate, massive displacement of guerrilla-supporting populations, through the use of illegal "paramilitary" units.

Encouraged and often under the command of the Colombian military, paramilitary groups assassinate and massacre "subversives" - those thought to be sympathetic to the guerrillas, in a war neither Colombia nor the United States wants to discuss in any detail. (1) Numerous Colombian military officers have become notorious war criminals by anyone's standards, yet enjoy total impunity for crimes they've committed against the same people they are supposed to be protecting. (2)

Colombia's parallel strategy of forcibly displacing rural populations also violates international humanitarian law (3) and causes tragic, irreparable damage to Colombian society. Of the more than one million internally displaced Colombians, (4) two thirds are minors. (5) Only one in eight has access to education. (5) One in three has access to health care. (6) These poor children suffer from the neglect of the Colombian state and the ignorance of Washington policymakers. Many are recruited into the ranks of the guerrilla or paramilitary militias, renewing the cycle of violence.

The Colombian peace process must move beyond publicity stunts to address these and other profound problems facing Colombia today. The Colombian government and the FARC should use the proposed cease-fire to further the Common Agenda agreed in May 1999 (7), and the United States should support the peace process.

Democracy and negotiation are key to relieving the pressure. Colombia must find a way to manage strikes, demonstrations, and even terrorist attacks, without resorting to acts of terror itself. Until Colombia abandons its paramilitary strategy, there is no hope for peace.

---

Colombian Court Halts Oil Drilling

Associated Press
March 31, 2000
For Update on U'WA - http://www.ran.org/ran/ran_campaigns/beyond_oil/oxy/

BOGOTA, Colombia (AP) - A court on Friday ordered a halt to a U.S. oil company's exploration near a Colombian Indian reservation, in what appeared to be at least a temporary victory for the tribe.

Alberto Calderon, president of the state-owned Ecopetrol oil company, said the government had notified Los Angeles-based Occidental Petroleum Corp. (NYSE:OXY - news) of the order to suspend operations.

Details on the Bogota circuit court verdict favoring the 8,000 member U'wa nation were not immediately available.

Calderon, whose company has contracts with Occidental, denounced the verdict, saying it placed a small minority's interests above those of the nation. The government plans to appeal.

"This is a process in which if oil is found it could generate nearly $900 million a year," Calderon told a news conference Friday night. "It's a project of enormous importance for the country."

U'wa tribal leader Roberto Perez said the tribe still sees a long battle ahead.

"This is not a fight that's been won," he told The Associated Press, speaking from Washington, where he has been meeting this week with members of Congress and activists. "But we've taken a step forward and I feel content."

Occidental Corp. was unavailable for comment Friday night.

The tribe has waged a national and international campaign since 1995 to stop the company from drilling on or near its ancestral lands near Colombia's eastern border with Venezuela. At one point, the group threatened mass suicide to highlight their cause.

Seeking compromise, the government last September approved a nearly fourfold increase in the size of the tribal reservation, to 850 square miles stretching across four states.

An exploratory drill site - one Occidental and Colombian officials hope will lead to reserves of as many as 2.5 billion barrels of crude - was approved a few miles outside the expanded reservation.

-------- japan

Japan Nuclear Accident Claims Second Victim

April 27, 2000
By Reuters
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/international/international-japan-n.html

TOKYO (Reuters) - A plant worker exposed to massive radiation in Japan's worst nuclear accident died on Thursday, the second victim of an incident that has jolted public confidence in the nation's nuclear power industry.

Tokyo University Hospital officials said Masato Shinohara, 40 -- one of three workers exposed to heavy doses of radiation in the accident last September -- had died of multiple organ failure.

``It is true that Mr. Shinohara has died as a result of the accident,'' one hospital official said.

Shinohara, who was exposed to at least eight sieverts of radiation in the accident at a uranium processing plant in Tokaimura, northeast of Tokyo, was placed on a respirator in February after pneumonia and radiation damage to his respiratory system impaired his breathing, and on a dialysis machine this month after his kidney functions deteriorated.

Last October, he received a transfusion of blood cells from the umbilical cord of a newborn in an effort to stimulate his ability to produce blood cells, which was disastrously damaged by the radiation.

Another worker, Hisashi Ouchi, 35, died in December after being exposed in the accident to 17 sieverts of radiation -- the equivalent of about 17,000 times the average annual normal exposure in Japan.

Experts say seven sieverts is considered a lethal dose.

A third worker who also suffered heavy radiation exposure had recovered and was released from hospital in December.

The Japanese government came under heavy fire for lax supervision of the industry after the accident, which occurred when the workers put nearly eight times the proper amount of condensed uranium into a mixing tank, triggering a nuclear chain reaction.

Saying Shinohara's death had filled him with ``deep regret, Science and Technology Agency chief Hirofumi Nakasone pledged to renew government efforts to prevent such accidents, Kyodo news agency said.

On Tuesday, officials said they had decided to stick with a ''level four'' rating for the Tokaimura accident, despite earlier suggestions that they might raise it one notch to ''level five.''

Level four on the International Atomic Energy Agency's zero-to-seven International Nuclear Event Scale indicates the possibility of a fatal radiation leak at the accident site but no significant risk outside the plant, the official said.

A total of 439 workers and residents were exposed to radiation as a result of the Tokaimura accident.

America's Three Mile Island accident was a level five, while the Soviet Union's Chernobyl accident in 1986 rated a level seven -- the worst nuclear power accident on record.

Japan has a comparatively good record on nuclear accidents, but the Tokaimura case has sparked growing public concern about an industry that supplies some one-third of the nation's electricity needs.

Earlier this month, the government began a one-year review of its nuclear policy.

---

Second uranium worker dies of radiation exposure

News from around the world
Seattle Post-Intelligencer
Thursday, April 27, 2000
JAPAN
http://www.seattlep-i.com/national/wrld2711.shtml

A second plant worker died today after being exposed to a massive amount of radiation last September in Japan's worst nuclear accident ever.

Tokyo University Hospital officials said that Masato Shinohara, 40, one of three workers exposed to heavy doses of radiation, had died.

Another worker died in December as a result of the accident at a uranium processing plant in Tokaimura, 90 miles northeast of Tokyo.

A third worker who suffered heavy radiation exposure recovered and was released from hospital in December. The accident occurred when workers put nearly eight times the proper amount of condensed uranium into a mixing tank, triggering a nuclear chain reaction.

A total of 439 workers and residents were exposed to radiation as a result of the accident

-----

Japanese worker in nuclear accident dies
Japan Nuke Accident Claims 2d Victim

April 27, 2000
The Associated Press
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/i/AP-Japan-Nuclear-Accident.html
http://www7.mercurycenter.com/premium/world/docs/fordig27.htm

TOKYO (AP) -- A worker exposed to radiation in Japan's worst nuclear accident died Thursday morning, becoming the second fatality in a disaster that shook the nation's faith in nuclear energy.

Masato Shinohara, 40, died of multiple organ failure, the University of Tokyo Hospital said.

Shinohara's condition had improved after the accident, but began to deteriorate rapidly in mid-April as respiratory and kidney functions began to fail, said hospital spokesman Akiyoshi Iitsuka.

Shinohara had been at the University of Tokyo Hospital since April 10 after being transferred from another medical facility run by the university. He had been on a respirator since February.

He was the second plant worker to die since the Sept. 30 accident at a uranium-processing facility in Tokaimura, 70 miles northeast of Tokyo.

Hisashi Ouchi, 35, died of multiple organ failure on Dec. 21 after having been exposed to a massive amount of radiation. He was the first person in Japan to die as a result of a nuclear plant accident.

A third worker, Yutaka Yokokawa, was also hospitalized for exposure to a lesser amount of radiation, but was discharged in December.

Hearing of Shinohara's death, Japanese officials vowed renewed efforts to restore trust in the country's nuclear energy program.

``We will redouble efforts to strengthen safety and disaster prevention measures,'' said Masaru Hashimoto, the governor of Ibaraki Prefecture, where Tokaimura is located.

Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori expressed his condolences and said the government will work hard to ensure that a similar accident does not happen again, national broadcaster NHK reported.

Shinohara's death came on the same day that a Japanese atomic power association opened a symposium in Tokyo on regaining trust in nuclear power. The conference was to move to Tokaimura on Friday.

The accident was triggered when the three workers used too much uranium to make fuel and set off an uncontrolled atomic reaction.

A total of 439 people, including nearby residents, were believed to have been exposed to radiation.

An investigation found that workers at the plant, run by JCO Co., routinely violated safety procedures, including mixing uranium in buckets to get work done quickly.

Resource poor Japan relies on nuclear power for 30 percent of its electricity. But the accident at Tokaimura and others in recent years have called into question government assurances that the country's nuclear facilities are safely run.

In March, the government revoked the license of JCO, the first plant operator to face the penalty under Japanese law regulating nuclear fuel, materials and reactors.


-------- npt

The NPT Showdown: United David vs. Divided Goliath

By Senator Douglas Roche, O.C. Chairman, Middle Powers Initiative
Date: Thu, 27 Apr 2000 09:58:15 -0600
From: Delong - delong@nucleus.com

UNITED NATIONS - April 27, 2000. With the opening debate now winding down at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, the stage is set for a showdown between the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and the New Agenda Coalition (NAC).

To almost everyone's surprise, NAC jumped into a leadership position immediately. NAC tabled a Working Paper on the opening day calling on the NWS to "make an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and, in the forthcoming review period 2000-2005, to engage in an accelerated process of negotiations and to take steps leading to nuclear disarmament..."

The NWS assumed a defensive position, claiming that the American-Russian reductions in nuclear weapons show their compliance with Article VI of the NPT, and that the nuclear powers should be left alone without the need to have pressed on them a "new agenda."

One by one, the seven NAC countries, Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden, hammered home that they are unimpressed with reduction figures when nuclear weapons are at the same time being reaffirmed as central to strategic concepts for the indefinite future.

The NPT Review has now moved into the committee stage, prior to drafting a final declaration for the end of the conference May 19th.

A step forward was taken by the creation of two subsidiary bodies to focus on two key elements on which the conference will turn. Ambassador Clive Pearson of New Zealand will chair the group dealing with nuclear disarmament; Ambassador Christopher Westdal of Canada will chair the one on Middle East and South Asia issues, paying special attention to the refusal of Israel, a nuclear weapons capable State, to join the NPT. During the PrepComm process, the United States had resolutely opposed the creation of these two bodies.

NPT Reviews traditionally operate by consensus. Indeed, the president of the conference, Ambassador Abdallah Baali of Algeria, has signaled that he hopes to "bridge our differences" and find "common agreement" by all parties on ways to move forward. But a senior NAC spokesman told me privately that the discussions will be "eyeball-to-eyeball" right down to the final hours. NAC avers that it will not budge from its demand of an "unequivocal" commitment to negotiate the elimination of nuclear weapons. Since the NWS are presently committed to keeping their nuclear stocks, even at reduced levels, it is hard to see at this stage how a bridge between the two positions can be built.

At past NPT conferences, it was the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) which carried the flag for nuclear disarmament, calling for time-bound nuclear disarmament leading to a Nuclear Weapons Convention. But NAM, weakened by the nuclear testing activities of India and Pakistan (which do not belong to the NPT), has clearly been eclipsed in importance by the NAC, which did not even exist at the time of the 1995 Indefinite Extension of the NPT. NAC's seven core members are supported by 60 States spread around the world. NAC's positions are more moderate, and therefore more attractive to several key States, such as Canada and Germany, which can influence other NATO States.

A further complication for the NWS is the U.S. government's determination to develop a ballistic missile defence system, an issue that has not only split the U.S. from Russia but also virtually isolated the U.S. in the world community. Even the U.S.'s nuclear partners and strongest allies are publicly trying to dissuade the U.S. from proceeding because of the irreparable harm it will do the nuclear disarmament agenda. The U.S. is under siege at the NPT Review on two fronts: failing to implement Article VI and moving forward on a missile defence system.

Thus, the U.S. is trying at the same time to hold off the NAC attack and keep its nuclear partnerships from crumbling. But to hear or read the U.S. opening speech by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, one would get the impression that the U.S. is relaxed about its record and confident about the future.

The U.S. has dismantled 60 percent of its nuclear weapons, Ms. Albright said, and a START III process would cut U.S.-Soviet arsenals by 80 percent from Cold War peaks. "Simple math and common sense both suggest that it is folly to give up on a START process which is doing exactly what is called for in Article VI."

The Secretary added that NATO's nuclear weapons have been cut by 85 percent since 1991. "Such weapons now play a smaller role in our defense posture than at any time since the advent of the Cold War."

She highlighted the words of President Clinton in the Foreword to a glossy publication detailing how the U.S. is living up to its commitments to Article VI: "As we enter this new Millennium, we should all commit ourselves anew to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. The United States remains committed to this goal and will work tirelessly towards its ultimate achievement."

For the past few years, the U.S. has been getting support from Russia for its nuclear positions. Indeed, as Ms. Albright pointed out, the U.S. has paid $5 billion towards the costs associated with Russia's nuclear disarmament programs. But Russia's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Igor S. Ivanov, was not in a grateful mood. He warned the U.S. that reduction programs will be jeopardized if the U.S. proceeds with a ballistic missile defence (BMD) system. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty is a cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, he said, and cannot be tampered with.

Whereas Ms. Albright said there was no good reason why the ABM Treaty could not be amended, Mr. Ivanov said plainly: "Compliance with the ABM Treaty in its present form without any modifications is a prerequisite for further negotiations on nuclear disarmament." He made the same point several times: "Further reductions in strategic offensive weapons can only be considered in the context of preservation of the ABM Treaty." He called attention to Russia's initiative to establish a Global Missile and Missile Technologies monitoring and defence system which could be an alternative to the destruction of the ABM system. But, as the New York Times reported the following day, the U.S. is intent on pursuing only a national missile defence system and is now wrestling with the $60 billion cost to protect all 50 states of the Union. The day after his U.N. speech, Mr. Ivanov flew to Washington for discussions with U.S. officials who want to make a deal to obtain Russian approval for BMD in exchange for driving reductions to even lower levels, perhaps to the 1,500 warheads for each side sought by Russia. A Clinton-Putin summit is set for June.

However, China is wary of a Russia-U.S. deal on BMD. Ambassador Sha Zukang of China weighed in at the NPT Review with an attack on any kind of ballistic missile defence system as "posing a severe threat to the global strategic balance and stability." He accused the U.S. of trying to seek absolute security for itself, an impossible task that is tantamount to a nuclear arms buildup. He warned that the international nuclear disarmament process would come tumbling down if the U.S. proceeds with BMD.

While more circumspect, the U.K. and France both expressed similar concerns. "Active missile defence raises complex and difficult issues," said Peter Hain, U.K. Minister of State. "We have made it clear to [the U.S. and Russia] that we continue to value the ABM and wish to see it preserved." Ambassador M. Hubert de La Fortelle of France said his country was "anxious to avoid any challenges to the [ABM] liable to bring about a breakdown of strategic equilibrium and to restart the arms race."

The NAC countries also all warned against BMD, coupling this concern with the urgency of making concrete progress on nuclear disarmament. Ireland came right to the point. Foreign Affairs Minister Brian Cowen said: "This Treaty may not survive intact for another five years without a fundamental change in approach by all.... We must overcome interminable arguments about the retention of nuclear weapons to respond to every new perceived threat to security."

Sweden's Foreign Affairs Minister Anne Lindh warned that if the international community does not start the process of eliminating nuclear weapons, "we will see our own children demonstrating against us." South Africa said that if the international community cannot free itself from nuclear weapons, "We will never be liberated from the unspeakable destruction and human suffering which these weapons can cause." Brazil, a new signatory to the NPT and member of NAC, said that NAC was a "catalyst" for the elimination of nuclear weapons. NAC's composition, timing and comprehensive and balanced program of action "explains the increasingly broad support that it has been receiving from governments, parliaments, NGOs and civil society."

The NPT Review has become a drama of NAC versus the NWS. David against Goliath. At least David is united while Goliath is sorely divided. It remains to be seen how strong David will be on the nuclear weapons battlefield of the 21st century.

----

ALBRIGHT REPUDIATES JFK

From: "Edward Perry" eperry98@worldnet.att.net
Date: Thu, 27 Apr 2000 08:19:08 -0700

Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright established the position of the United States in her speech at the 2000 NPT Review Conference on April 24th. What she did not say is more important in establishing the conclusion that the Clinton-Gore administration has repudiated President John F. Kennedy's goal and program for general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

She noted that, "the sharpest suspicions under the Treaty are directed to whether the five nuclear states are doing enough under Article VI..." and referenced a new booklet on how the United States is meeting its commitment to Article VI.

The goal in Article VI is "general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." with two nuclear milestones - end the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

This goal was taken from President Kennedy's speech to the UN General Assembly on September 25, 1961 in which he said;

"The program to be presented to this assembly - for general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control - moves to bridge the gap between those who insist on a gradual approach and those who talk only of the final and total achievement. It would create machinery to keep the peace as it destroys the machinery of war. It would proceed through balanced and safeguarded stages designed to give no state a military advantage over another. It would place the final responsibility for verification and control where it belongs, not with the big powers alone, not with one's adversary or one's self, but in an international organization within the framework of the United 'Nations. It would assure that indispensable condition of disarmament - true inspection - and apply it in stages proportionate to the stage of disarmament. It would cover delivery systems as well as weapons. It would ultimately halt their production as well as their testing, their transfer as well as their possession. It would achieve, under the eyes of an international disarmament organization, a steady reduction in force, both nuclear and conventional, until it has abolished all armies and all weapons except those needed for internal order and a new United Nations peace Force. And it starts that process now, today, even as the talks begin."

President Kennedy added, "And we make our proposals today, while building up our defenses over Berlin, not because we are inconsistent or insincere or intimidated, but because we know the rights of free men will prevail - because while we are compelled against our will to rearm, we look confidently beyond Berlin to the kind of disarmed world we all prefer."

The American/Soviet(McCloy/Zorin) program for general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control that JFK presented to the UN General Assembly has the goal;

"a. that disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and

b. that such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations."

The American/Soviet(McCloy/Zorin) program was unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 20, 1961 about the same time that negotiations for the NPT were beginning. The non-nuclear states selected general and complete disarmament as the balancing obligation.

In the Berlin crisis, President Kennedy had a vision of a world in which "war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems." Now, a decade after the end of the cold war, the Clinton-Gore administration, by acts of omission, has repudiated JFK's goal and vision.

----

U.N.: Environmental Efforts Urgent

Associated Press
April 27, 2000 Filed at 12:17 a.m. EDT
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/a/AP-UN-Environment.html

UNITED NATIONS (AP) -- Despite improvements in the last 30 years, efforts to keep the globe eco-friendly remain the world's ``urgent, unfinished agenda,'' the deputy U.N. chief said.

In a speech Wednesday to environment ministers attending a U.N. conference on sustainable development -- the term for environmentally sound economic growth -- Deputy Secretary-General Louise Frechette called for a new ethic of conservation and stewardship to guide development in the 21st century.

``There is no denying the environmental achievements of the past three decades,'' Frechette said, listing the creation of government environment ministries and landmark treaties on climate change, biodiversity and the depletion of the ozone layer.

``However,'' she said, ``we must acknowledge the presence of an urgent, unfinished agenda: humans continue to plunder the global environment, unsustainable practices remain deeply embedded in the fabric of our daily lives, and despite some honorable exceptions, our responses to the challenges of sustainability have been too few, too little and too late.''

The environment conference of the U.N. Commission on Sustainable Development is meeting at U.N. headquarters to prepare for the 10th anniversary of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, where world leaders adopted a broad agenda to protect forests, clean up water, reverse atmospheric pollution, alleviate poverty and address other problems.

The environment group Greenpeace pointed out that the conference was occurring at U.N. headquarters at the same time as a monthlong review of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

``In one room, the rich few will argue that they have no money to spare for sustainable development, in the other they will struggle to maintain and further develop their multibillion dollar nuclear arsenal,'' said Remi Parmentier, head of Greenpeace's international political unit.

``If only a portion of what is spent by the nuclear weapons states to maintain and further develop their nuclear weapons was re-routed towards the protection of the environment, sustainable development could become a reality,'' he said.

----

"Helms Vows To Obstruct Arms Pacts," W Post, 04/27/00

By Helen Dewar and John Lancaster, Washington Post Staff Writers

In a defiant warning just six weeks before President Clinton leaves for a summit in Moscow, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) vowed yesterday to block approval of any arms agreement that Clinton might negotiate with Russia during his final months in office.

"This administration's time for grand treaty initiatives is at an end," Helms said in a speech on the Senate floor, adding that he wanted no part of a "final photo op" to help burnish Clinton's legacy in the international arena.

Although Helms has long harbored deep reservations about arms control agreements, his speech went beyond previous statements from Senate GOP leaders opposing deals that could limit U.S. options for a national missile defense. Helms explicitly ruled out any kind of new arms accord Clinton might negotiate.

His comments underscored the vehemence of Republican conservatives' opposition to new arms limitations, gave Clinton a shaky send-off for Moscow and offered a preview of the political furor that Clinton would find back home if he cuts any new arms deals when he meets with Russian President Vladimir Putin June 4-5.

The upcoming summit will focus on U.S. proposals to amend the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to allow the United States to build a limited system of national missile defense, beginning with 100 interceptor missiles based in Alaska to shoot down a small number of incoming warheads. Helms and other congressional Republicans want to scrap the treaty entirely because they fear the Clinton administration will promise to keep the U.S. missile defense system small and not to deploy interceptors in space or on ships as part of a more ambitious -- and costly -- shield.

Clinton administration officials have indicated that at the summit they may offer the Russians a "grand bargain," in which the United States would agree to deep cuts that Russia is seeking in both sides' nuclear arsenals in return for Russian agreement to amend the ABM Treaty.

In his speech yesterday, Helms was especially adamant on the missile defense issue, vowing to thwart any agreement to alter the ABM Treaty.

"Not on my watch, Mr. President, not on my watch," declared Helms, who has clashed repeatedly with the administration over foreign policy and played a key role in blocking approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty last year. "Let's be clear to avoid any misunderstandings down the line," he added. "Any modified ABM Treaty negotiated by this administration will be DOA, dead on arrival, at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee."

Helms also made it clear he would use his considerable powers as chairman of the committee with jurisdiction over treaties to block other arms pacts as well until a new president is inaugurated in January.

"For the remainder of this year, the Foreign Relations Committee will continue its routine work. We will consider tax treaties, extradition treaties and other already negotiated treaties," he said. "But we will not consider any new, last-minute arms control measures that this administration negotiates in its final, closing months in office."

Moreover, he said, the committee will not consider any such treaties binding on the new administration that will be elected in November. "The Russian government should not be under any illusion whatsoever that any commitments made by this lame-duck administration will be binding on the next administration," he said.

Despite Helms's opposition, the Clinton administration said it would continue to press for new agreements and consult with senators on how to proceed.

"There's nothing new about Senator Helms's view that he doesn't want to see the Senate approve anything that could strengthen the ABM Treaty," said State Department spokesman James P. Rubin. And the department will "consult with the Senate about the best way to proceed," he added. "Senator Helms is not the entire Senate."

Helms's speech came a day after Clinton met with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov in hopes of persuading Russian leaders to agree to changes in the ABM Treaty that would enable the United States to continue observing the landmark Cold War-era agreement while building a limited defense system of radars and interceptors. Russia has so far opposed changes in the ABM pact.

GOP presidential candidate George W. Bush has accused the Clinton administration of dragging its feet on missile defense and said he would build the system over Russian objections.

In his speech, Helms accused Clinton of seeking "a signing ceremony, a final photo op . . . shaking hands with the Russian president" in order to strengthen his legacy as president -- and made it clear he wants no part of it.

"If the price of that final curtain call is a resurrection of the U.S.-Soviet ABM Treaty that would prevent the United States from protecting itself against missile attack, then that price is far too high," he said. "With all due respect, I do not intend to allow this president to establish his 'legacy' by binding the next generation of Americans to a future without a viable national missile defense."

Jon Wolfsthal, an arms control specialist at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said Helms's comments highlighted the wide chasms that now exist on the issue: "Any deal that the Clinton administration might be able to negotiate with Russia would be unacceptable to this Senate, and any deal that the Senate would like would be rejected by the Russians."

----

"Helms Blasts Clinton on ABM Treaty"

Los Angeles Times, April 27, 2000
By TYLER MARSHALL, Times Staff Writer

Politics: A deal with Russia on arms control is 'for the next president . . . to make, not this one,' he says.

WASHINGTON--Less than 24 hours after President Clinton personally launched a campaign to forge new arms control agreements with Russia, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) vowed Wednesday to block the effort.

In a speech deeply sarcastic in tone and reflecting the contempt with which many conservative Republicans view Clinton in the post-impeachment era, Helms left no doubt that he would make it a priority to kill any potential compromise the administration might work out with Moscow to amend the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty. The White House wants changes to allow deployment of a limited national missile-defense system.

"Any modified ABM treaty negotiated by this administration will be DOA--dead on arrival--at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee," Helms said. "Any decision on missile defense will be for the next president of the United States to make, not this one."

Like many other congressional Republicans, Helms has accused Clinton of timidity in his approach to missile defense and has urged a far more robust defense system against missiles launched toward the U.S. He sees the ABM treaty as obsolete and efforts to preserve it largely a waste of time.

Helms implied that Clinton has his eye more on how history will judge him than on the nation's best interests. "So, Mr. Clinton is in search of a legacy. La-de-da--he already has one."

While Helms' opposition to the president's arms control effort was known, the sheer vehemence of his attack Wednesday from the Senate floor would appear to further diminish the already dim prospects of any Clinton-era agreement between the United States and Russia winning congressional approval.

"The Russian government should not be under any illusion whatsoever that any commitments made by this lame-duck administration will be binding on the next administration," Helms said.

He said that the presumptive Republican presidential nominee, Texas Gov. George W. Bush, would give the Russians a chance to renegotiate the ABM treaty "to permit the defenses that America needs," but that Bush would be prepared to go ahead with deployment even if the Russians refused.

Russia strongly opposes the deployment of any national anti-missile system by the United States and any ABM treaty changes, but U.S. arms control specialists believe that Moscow might be willing to accept minor amendments if it can win concessions from Washington for major mutual reductions in existing nuclear arsenals.

As Helms spoke, Russian Foreign Minister Igor S. Ivanov was across town discussing these very issues with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Later, he delivered a speech at the National Press Club that sketched out Moscow's view of a possible path toward a U.S.-Russian agreement. Ivanov stressed Russia's eagerness to conclude a new arms reduction treaty, known as START III, which would reduce the nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and Russia to a maximum of 1,500 warheads each, 1,000 fewer than the current American proposal. He also proposed U.S.-Russian cooperation in developing short-range missile defenses and in assessing the global missile threat.

But Ivanov warned that U.S. deployment of a national missile defense shield "would inevitably undermine the whole architecture in the area of disarmament, which our countries have been building together with the world community for the last 30 years."

"There is still some time left to avoid this fatal mistake," he said.

While White House and State Department officials insisted that they will press forward with the negotiations, the Helms speech--as much in tone as in content--underscored just how little political capital Clinton has concerning foreign policy issues with Congress as he moves into his final months in office.

Although it is usual for a president's power to diminish as the end of his time in office nears, the lingering bitterness from the impeachment battle has further reduced Clinton's ability to lobby the Republican-controlled Congress, especially about security issues such as arms control. Last fall, Senate Republicans joined forces to defeat Clinton administration efforts to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in a vote that stunned America's allies and adversaries alike because it seemed motivated more by a desire to punish Clinton than to reject a flawed treaty.

In the wake of Helms' attack, some arms control specialists worried about a similar confrontation over the ABM Treaty. "There is a real need for better cooperation and leadership from the [political] middle in the Senate," said Daryl Kimball, director of the Washington-based Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers. "Otherwise, we'll see Helms and Clinton collide at the end of the year just as they did on CTBT, only with greater consequences because the entire framework of arms control could collapse.

"People need to understand the ramifications of this kind of approach."

----

"Russia, US Launch Security Talks"

April 27, 2000
By The Associated Press

WASHINGTON (AP) -- Following a day of security negotiations with the Clinton administration, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov says there is enormous potential for U.S.-Russian cooperation, but much depends on U.S. decisions on nuclear disarmament and anti-missile defenses.

Ivanov said his meetings had been ``very constructive,'' but he objected to a limited missile defense system that Clinton is contemplating and a far-reaching national defense backed by probable GOP presidential nominee George W. Bush and other conservative Republicans.

``This is an issue of tremendous importance and the answer will show whether the world is going to move forward toward a just and democratic world order or will go back to the time of Cold War and an uncontrolled arms race,'' Ivanov said Wednesday night at a dinner for the U.S.-Russia Business Council.

The Clinton administration says America needs the system to defend against a missile threat from such countries as North Korea and Iran.

``If there are any threats and if those threats are realistic, then let us work together,'' Ivanov said.

The foreign minister's three-day visit is designed to prepare for a smooth summit meeting in Moscow June 4-5 between President Clinton and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Ivanov said negotiations on new security arrangements started Wednesday at his lengthy meeting with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, which military experts attended, and continued later at the Pentagon.

Among the Russian goals are limiting the long-range nuclear warheads in U.S. and Russian arsenals to 1,500, he said.

Last week, U.S. and Russian negotiators opened talks in Geneva, Switzerland, on a treaty that would impose ceilings of 2,000 to 2,500.

Ivanov also met with Bush, who favors rewriting the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty so the United States can develop a national anti-missile system. Russia opposes such a move, fearing such a system could undercut its nuclear defenses.

At the Pentagon, Albright and Ivanov attended a closed door briefing in the National Military Command Center, the military's global command center.

The main topic was the U.S. plan for a national missile defense and U.S. views on how the ABM Treaty should be modified to permit such defenses, officials said.

``We believe that it is important and it is our task to, in maximum detail, present our arguments and our concerns to the partners, listen to their position and then elaborate on a joint decision,'' Ivanov said in Russian.

``It would be too premature to speak of the concrete outcome of those negotiations yet,'' he said. ``But I would like to tell you that we are holding a sincere, constructive dialogue on the whole variety of issues.''

* [NOTE: see http://www.clw.org/coalition/helms042600.htm for text of Helms' April 26 statement]

----

"Albright Challenges Helms on Russia"

April 27, 2000
By The Associated Press

WASHINGTON (AP) -- Challenging the powerful Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said Thursday the Clinton administration intends to pursue new arms control accords with Russia in the time it has left.

Albright, at a joint news conference with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, said the American people supported the dual quest for further cutbacks in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals and a way to mount a defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C., who has great but not insurmountable power to sidetrack treaties or even kill them, vowed Wednesday to block any new Clinton administration arms control pacts.

He included any agreement with Russia that might clear the way for a limited defense against missile attack from such countries as Iran and North Korea.

``The Russian government should not be under any illusion whatsoever that any commitments made by this lame-duck administration will be binding on the next administration,'' the North Carolina Republican told the Senate.

President Clinton is likely to ask Russian President Vladimir Putin at their summit meeting in Moscow June 4-5 to agree to modify the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to permit a U.S. project involving 100 anti-missile launchers and an improved radar system.

Senate approval would be required to change the treaty.

But such an initiative, Helms said, would be ``DOA -- dead on arrival'' at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The likely Republican presidential candidate, Texas Gov. George W. Bush, and many other conservative Republicans would go far beyond the administration's tentative plans and attempt to construct a nationwide defense against missiles.

Russia takes the position both approaches violate the 1972 treaty. Ivanov proposed during a three-day visit here the two sides cooperate on theater missile defenses allowed under the accord. In 1997 Russia approved all U.S. requests for a green light for missile tests as part of such a defense system.

But Albright said Thursday the United States was faced now with a new potential threat, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and had to deal with it.

``I don't think we can have a pause for the rest of the year,'' Albright said. ``I don't agree with what Sen. Helms said yesterday.''

At the same time, she made it clear differences with Russia had not been resolved during Ivanov's visit.

``We don't agree on all issues. This is only to be expected,'' Albright said. ``We cannot both be right all the time.''

Ivanov, registering his government's position on missile defenses, insisted the 1972 treaty ``be made a cornerstone of stability.''

He said Russia had proposed an ``adequate response'' to any threat of missile attack and that his government was prepared for further discussions on the subject.

``We are focused on finding solutions to the problems we are faced with,'' Ivanov said.

Meanwhile, Defense Secretary William Cohen, at a joint news conference with Colombia's minister of national defense, Luis Fernando Ramirez, said he was confident Russia would come to understand a limited U.S. anti-missile system was not threatening to them.

``We are satisfied that, as they understand the intent and the capability of the system, they will see that it does not pose a threat to their strategic systems,'' Cohen said.

Asked about Helms' statement on blocking any kind of arms agreement during the remainder of Clinton's term, Cohen said:

``This is not something that is a last-minute item on the agenda for President Clinton and any form of legacy that he might seek to achieve. He has been dedicated to reducing the level of strategic armaments and has worked diligently in that effort.''

---

"Dangerous Summit"

The New York Times,
April 27, 2000
ESSAY / By WILLIAM SAFIRE

WASHINGTON -- In six weeks, the cock-of-the-walk president of Russia and the lame-duck president of the U.S. will hold what Churchill called "a parley at the summit" in Moscow.

The central subject: Russia's need to cut the cost of maintaining thousands of missiles aimed at the U.S., and America's need for limited defense against rogue-nation missiles.

The threat to American cities is no longer from the huge Soviet missile arsenal, as it was when the Antiballistic Missile Treaty was signed three decades ago. That's when the superpowers agreed to stay vulnerable, each largely defenseless against the other's nuclear weaponry.

Today the growing threat comes from rogue states and terrorists. Defense Secretary William Cohen made the case yesterday: Saddam Hussein could build a nuclear bomb, buy a missile from North Korea and invade his neighbors on the presumption he could act with impunity -- because he could credibly threaten to kill millions of Americans if we dared to intervene.

Recognizing this potential blackmail threat, Congress passed and President Clinton signed a proposal to develop a defense against a few missiles. This is not the space-based shield derogated as "Star Wars" to block an all-out Russian attack, but a necessary precaution against a terrorist's nuclear blackmail or any accidental launches.

Clinton has promised to decide this summer (after his meeting with Vladimir Putin) whether to move beyond development to deploy a national missile defense. His announced criteria: Will it work? Will it upset the world? Is it worth the money?

Will it work? It's not easy to shoot down a missile with another missile; one test succeeded, another flopped. But many who insist it will never work were doubtful our technology could ever put a man on the moon.

World opinion? The Russians, the Chinese, the U.N.'s Kofi Annan, joined by Britain's Tony Blair, have all come out against the U.S. achieving safety against terrorist nukes.

Worth the money? The Congressional Budget Office just put out an estimate that this plan, adding in all conceivable bells and whistles, might cost $60 billion over the next 15 years. Sounds expensive, but that annual $4 billion is less than two-tenths of 1 percent of the federal budget -- not a bad insurance premium to pay for protecting a city's population.

Putin's gambit at the summit will be to offer Clinton this package: Russia will finally go along with Start II, reducing the Russian and U.S. stockpiles of missiles, provided (1) the U.S. agrees to slash its stockpile in half again in Start III, and (2) Clinton adheres to the ABM treaty and allows U.S. cities to remain vulnerable to attack from rogue states and China.

Pretty shrewd opening, because Russia cannot afford to keep even its reduced missile force operational, and wants the U.S. to weaken itself beyond prudence in Start III. By making a big deal out of not touching the ABM treaty, Putin cleverly puts his counterpart with the stronger hand at a disadvantage: the legacy-hunting Clinton will be tempted to cave on one or the other -- ABM or Start III -- to make a deal that he can say is historic.

Putin knows that a limited missile defense poses no threat to Russia's deterrent. But what he has done is to create a valuable bargaining chip out of nothing.

Clinton is being snookered by it. His new security spokesman, Mike Hammer (to gun-toting La Femme Nikita at Justice, now add Mickey Spillane's hero at the White House), told yesterday of "our efforts to preserve the ABM treaty" by amending it.

The Clinton response to Putin's gambit is likely to be a plea for a minor modification in the ABM treaty that would lock us into a puny, not just a limited, defense. When Putin oh-so-reluctantly accedes to this, all those resentful of U.S. power will applaud his statesmanship. Clinton would then match the Russian's concocted "concession" by slashing our missile force in Start III, which is Putin's other goal.

A better deal is no deal at all. Go to Moscow; work the fence; sign environmental stuff, and kick the can of worms that is serious national missile defense down the street to the next president, who will have a fresh mandate to ensure American safety.

Daryl Kimball, Executive Director Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers 110 Maryland Avenue NE, Suite 505 Washington, DC 20002 (ph) 202-546-0795 x136 (fax) 202-546-7970 website http://www.crnd.org

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These press releases are available (together with many others not of direct NPT relevance) on the website below. http://www.un.org/News/Press/7days.html

27 April 2000
Press Release DC/2701

AFRICAN SPEAKERS IN CONCERTED ASSAULT AGAINST FAILURE OF NUCLEAR POWERS TO HONOUR 1995 COMMITMENTS

Ghana Calls for "New, Rather Than Renewed" Disarmament Agenda

Nuclear weapons continued to be developed quantitatively and perfected qualitatively, the representative of Namibia told the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as it continued its general debate this afternoon.

One wonders whether what has taken place was real reduction or just the replacement of obsolete weapons with newer, more accurate weaponsÓ, he said. The international community was now confronted with claims that nuclear weapons were needed indefinitely for national security or deterrence. No doubt such claims encouraged other States to acquire nuclear weapons for the same reason, as every country had security interests to protect.

Reiterating that point, the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said those who possessed nuclear weapons could not deter other countries from joining the clubÓ, using the same arguments of deterrence. Also of concern was the resistance by other nuclear-weapon States to renounce the no-first-use option. Only China had unequivocally done so. There was an urgent need for the rest to commit themselves to a no-first-use posture as well. That should be coupled with de-alerting nuclear arsenals in all their forms.

The representative of Zambia said undue restrictions still persisted on exports of nuclear materials, equipment and technology to developing countries for peaceful purposes. That was a violation of the commitments made at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Concerns over perceived proliferation should not be used to justify any form of restriction on exports to non-nuclear-weapon States. Such concerns should be addressed through appropriate multilateral forums. All non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent, and open to participation by all States.

He also drew attention to the recent attempts by some members of the NPT regime to use the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Technical Cooperation Programme as a tool for political purposes, in clear violation of the Agency's statutes.

Conference of Parties to NPT - 1a - Press Release DC/2701 8th Meeting (PM) 27 April 2000

The representative of Ghana asked how long the nuclear-weapon States could expect non-nuclear-weapon States to show commitment to the NPT and other disarmament treaties when they themselves evinced attitudes to the contrary. His delegation believed that the pursuit of a new, rather than renewed disarmament agenda would provide hope. Ghana therefore supported the New Agenda coalition sponsored by a number of middle-level countries.

Also speaking this afternoon were the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan, Deputy Foreign Minister of Bulgaria and representatives of Swaziland, Lebanon and Bolivia. The Deputy-Secretary of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) also made a statement.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the Conference also approved the nominations of Vadim Reznikov (Belarus) as Vice-Chairman for Main Committee I and Pedro Villagra-Delgado (Argentina) as Vice-Chairman of the Drafting Committee.

The general debate will resume at 10 a.m. Monday, 1 May.

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Conference of Parties to NPT - 3 - Press Release DC/2701 8th Meeting (PM) 27 April 2000

Conference Work Programme

The 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference met this afternoon to continue its general debate. The purpose of the four-week Conference is to provide appraisal of the progress achieved in the field of nuclear non-proliferation since the 1995 Review Conference, and to identify the areas where future efforts should be made. (For background information, see Press Release DC/2691.)

Statements

JOEL M. NHLEKO (Swaziland) said universal adherence to the NPT was essential. He urged those States that still remained outside of the Treaty to consider joining the overwhelming majority of the international community and acceding to the instrument without delay. The early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was also a high priority for the international community. Its strength lay in its ability to create a moral and political norm against the testing of nuclear arsenals. It further promoted compliance with the verification regime, as well. The resumption of negotiations on a legally binding instrument banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons was another positive development that was yet to be realized.

He said that the enhanced role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) lay at the core of a strengthened NPT regime. The adoption in May 1997 of Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements was a positive development, and ushered in a new era in the history of NPT verification. The Protocol gave the Agency the means to provide credible assurances of compliance with non-proliferation commitments, including assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and related activities. Further, the Protocol would have a positive impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the AgencyÕs safeguards regime, resulting in a strengthened NPT.

SELIM TADMOURY (Lebanon) said that the NPT was the basis of the international non-proliferation and disarmament system, and its achievements should not be underestimated. However, four States had failed to accede to it in conflict-prone regions of the world. Ratification by Russia of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II), the conclusion of the CTBT, and the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on nuclear threats, were among positive developments since the 1995 Review Conference.

Under the Treaty, peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be promoted, especially in the developing countries. States parties to the Treaty should increasingly turn to the IAEA, or establish supplementary organs, which should contribute to the use of nuclear energy for the purposes of development, human health and energy.

Turning to the resolution on the Middle East which was part of the package of 1995 decisions, he said that Israel should comply with its provisions. It was disquieting that Israel still failed to adhere to the NPT and to place its facilities under the IAEA safeguards regime. Its compliance would also contribute to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Excluding one State in the Middle East from the provisions of the resolution would result in a tension-fraught climate. No efforts should be spared to achieve compliance with the resolution.

An objective evaluation of progress in the context of the Conference, he said, demanded new policies that would put an end to the feeling of frustration and break the stalemate in nuclear disarmament. He also supported convening an international conference to evaluate means of achieving total disarmament.

ALISHER VOHIDOV (Uzbekistan) said the process of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament was one way to ensure human survival, and was also the major argument in support of cooperation. He drew attention to the potential role of nuclear terrorism and provocation in local conflicts. His countryÕs foreign policy was based on the principle of non-nuclear development. We are convinced that Central Asia can become the fifth region in the world to be free from nuclear weaponsÓ, he said. Uzbekistan was asking the Conference for support in achieving that aim. The draft of the Central Asian treaty should receive its approval in the final document of the ongoing Review Conference, he said.

The world situation forced the international community to recognize the need to undertake serious measures to strengthen the global system of strategic stability and the whole nuclear disarmament process. New tendencies had an adverse effect on the durability of the non-proliferation regime. It was obvious that nuclear weapons would long remain one of the major elements of global policy. Establishing and strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime was therefore the only way to establish a world order that prohibited nuclear testing. Uzbekistan hoped that this 2000 NPT Review Conference would become a significant milestone in the continuation of international efforts to eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons.

VASSILY TAKEV, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, supported the position of the European Union and said that there was no doubt that the implementation of the NPT had created the necessary conditions for putting an end to the dangerous nuclear arms race. It was satisfying that the number of States parties to the Treaty had increased, thus indicating the growing recognition of the TreatyÕs key importance and universality. The development of the situation since the 1995 Review Conference indicated the need to establish an effective control system over the whole spectrum of activities related to nuclear weapons, their delivery systems and components and materials for their production.

An early entry into force of the CTBT should be pursued through its ratification by the 44 States required for the Treaty to come into being. Bulgaria had ratified the Treaty on 11 September 1999. His country recognized the decisive role of the CTBT in the improvement of the present nuclear non- proliferation regime and in promoting nuclear disarmament.

Fostering international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy constituted one of the prime objectives of the Treaty, he continued. As a country operating nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, Bulgaria closely cooperated with the Agency and the European Union on nuclear safety and non- proliferation issues. The Additional Protocol with the IAEA would be considered by the Bulgarian Government in May. On the issue of export control measures, he said that as a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee, Bulgaria strictly implemented the relevant guidelines in its export control policy with regard to dual-use goods and technologies.

MARTIN ANDJABA (Namibia) said implementation of article VI of the NPT had not yielded the desired results since the TreatyÕs entry into force. Although nuclear arsenals had declined substantially from cold war peaks, they still remained at levels far in excess of any reasonable military requirement. Nuclear weapons continued to be developed quantitatively and perfected qualitatively. One wonders whether what has taken place was real reduction or just the replacement of obsolete weapons with newer, more accurate weaponsÓ, he said.

The recent failure of the United States to ratify the CTBT was yet another setback for nuclear disarmament. His delegation also felt that the nuclear- weapon States had failed to pursue with any determination the systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons they agreed on at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. There had also been no serious efforts to encourage the four States still outside of the NPT to become part of the Treaty.

We are now confronted with claims that nuclear weapons are needed indefinitely for national security or deterrenceÓ, he said. No doubt such claims encouraged other States to acquire nuclear weapons for the same reason, as any country had security interests to protect. Concrete steps had to be taken to ensure the realization of the goals of the NPT, including: accelerating negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament; ensuring universal adherence to the Treaty; ratifying the CTBT; prioritizing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East; banning the production of fissile materials; adherence by States parties to all obligations under the terms of the ABM Treaty; and establishing a nuclear weapons register to promote transparency.

MATHIAS DAKA (Zambia) expressed grave concern that the package of 1995 decisions had not been fulfilled by the nuclear-weapon States. That was very regrettable and represented a betrayal of confidence, to say the least. He would like the Conference to address the reluctance by the nuclear-weapon States to undertake their commitment to fully implementing the package endorsed at the 1995 Review Conference.

Continuing, he said that his delegation appreciated the difficulties encountered in the entire preparatory process of the Conference. He therefore hoped that the Conference would set an agenda for non-proliferation in the new millennium. In that regard, Zambia noted with satisfaction that at the Third Preparatory Session there had been a discussion of the proposals regarding the provisions of article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 of the 1995 principles and objectives regarding nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. He appealed to the Conference to establish a subsidiary body to deliberate on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate all nuclear weapons. Another subsidiary body should make recommendations for proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East.

Zambia was concerned that undue restrictions still persisted on exports of materials, equipment and technology to developing countries for peaceful purposes. That was a violation of the commitments made at the 1995 Conference. It was necessary to ensure that concerns expressed over perceived proliferation should not be used to justify any form of restriction on exports to non-nuclear- weapon States. Such concerns should be addressed through appropriate multilateral forums. To be more effective, all non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent, and open to participation by all States. In recent years, his Government had observed with deep concern the attempts by some members of the NPT regime to use the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme as a tool for political purposes, in clear violation of the AgencyÕs statutes.

DAUDI N. MWAKAWAGO (United Republic of Tanzania) said he wanted to add his delegationÕs voice to those who had spoken against the possible deployment by the United States of a national missile defence system. Such a deployment would be a gross violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty, which was still the cornerstone of strategic arms reduction between the United States and the Russian Federation. Any violation of that Treaty could have a negative impact on the principle of strategic stability, and could roll back nuclear disarmament achievements. It could also trigger a new round in the nuclear arms race. The persistent determination of the nuclear-weapon States to safeguard their security through nuclear deterrence had also given them a ready excuse for continuing the development of new weapons and the modernization of their nuclear arsenals.

Yet, he continued, those nuclear-weapon States argued emphatically that the chances of nuclear war breaking out were slim. No one could vouch for that. Ultimately, the use or non-use of nuclear weapons was a political decision made by a national government. Good intentions alone could not be the basic precept of international security. There was little comfort to be derived from such assurances. Even if the threat of a deliberate nuclear holocaust seemed unlikely, there was a persistent danger of war breaking out, either by accident or by wrong assessment, as long as nuclear weapons continued to exist. However minimal the level of nuclear deterrence might be, the threat it posed to life and the environment made it totally unacceptable.

On a higher plane, he said, those who possessed such weapons could not deter other countries from joining the clubÓ, using the same arguments of deterrence. That was frightening. Also of great concern was the resistance by other nuclear-weapon States to renouncing the no-first-use option. Only China had unequivocally done so. The rest had persistently resisted calls to abandon that dangerous posture. There was an urgent need for them to commit themselves to a no-first-use posture as well. That should be coupled with de-alerting nuclear arsenals in all their forms, he stressed.

ALBERTO SALAMANCA (Bolivia) endorsed the statements by Peru on behalf of the Andean Community and by Mexico on behalf of the New Agenda Group. He said that the tensions created by the nuclear tests in India and Pakistan, the slowness of the arms limitation negotiations, the threat posed to the stability of the ABM Treaty, and the lack of clear political leadership on the part of the nuclear-weapon States represented present-day realities, which demanded deep reflection.

He said that his country had learned with encouragement of the ratification by the Russian Duma of the CTBT and the approval of START II. On the other hand, he had been surprised by the Russian declaration stressing the importance of maintaining the countryÕs military potential. He hoped that the positive movement towards peace might receive an added impulse from the active participation of the four countries that now stood in the way of achieving universality of the Treaty.

The success of the Sixth Review Conference would not rest exclusively on any consensus that might emerge regarding the texts to be agreed upon, but mainly on the way those agreements contributed to bolstering the weak structures of nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and nuclear control measures. Much would depend on their ability to obtain a greater political will for development -- the proper instrument for peace.

YAW OSEI (Ghana) asked how long the nuclear-weapon States could expect non-nuclear-weapon States to show commitment to the NPT and other disarmament treaties when they, themselves, evinced attitudes to the contrary. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, had stated that the established multilateral disarmament machinery had started to rust because of the lack of political will to utilize it. Such a perception hardly lifted the gloom and pessimism that overshadowed the Conference, and should be a cause for concern. His delegation believed that the pursuit of a new rather than a renewed disarmament agenda provided hope. Ghana, therefore, supported the New Agenda coalition sponsored by a number of middle-level countries.

He said developing countries had honoured their commitments to the NPT, and now had the right to have access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without discrimination, as stated in article IV of the Treaty. In addition, the IAEAÕs technical cooperation work needed to be fully complemented by the provision of adequate budgetary resources. Flexibility on the part of the key nuclear actors would have a salutary impact on the outcome of the Conference, and also boost other aspects of the disarmament process.

He said, we have choices to make; either we have as our focus the wider goal of promoting mankindÕs survival, or we remain fixed in our narrow, parochial and short-sighted vision of national goals, and are doomed.Ó

CARLOS FEU ALVIM, Deputy-Secretary of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), said that in 1991 in Guadalajara, Mexico, the Governments of Brazil and Argentina had signed an agreement on the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy in order to dispel certain regional tensions. The Guadalajara Agreement was meant to ensure conditions for the application of full-scope international safeguards in the two countries. At the same time Brazil, Argentina and Chile had proposed modifications to the Tlatelolco Treaty in order to put that instrument into force in those three countries.

At the time, the Guadalajara Agreement was viewed as a substitute to the NPT, he continued, as the countries assumed commitments under that Treaty without subscribing to certain items in the document, which they considered discriminatory. In fact, the set of signed Guadalajara agreements could even be considered more stringent then the NPT. Consequently, both countries adhered to the NPT. There were no alterations in the application of safeguards after the Treaty came into effect for Brazil and Argentina.

Regional nuclear safeguards organizations had the advantages of physical proximity to the system, with better knowledge of the situation in the countries in question, he said. They also represented the political will of those countries, committed to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Regional safeguards also made sense from the technical and economic standpoints, when integrated with international safeguards applied by the IAEA. That meant that the integration of safeguards was of utmost importance. It was achieved through Euratom/IAEA and ABACC/IAEA cooperative actions.

Technical cooperation between Brazil and Argentina was a definitive way of establishing trust between the two countries, he said. During the almost eight years of safeguards application in Brazil and Argentina, the ABACC had carried out 944 inspections that involved 4,560 inspector days in the field. The ABACC had also forwarded 3,200 accounting reports and 30 inspection reports to the IAEA. Seven hundred and seventy inspection reports had been sent to both countries.

SLOW PROGRESS ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT FRONT, SHARP RISE IN NUCLEAR PROFLIFERATION PINPOINTED IN CONTINUING NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE DEBATE

Speakers Invoke International Court 1996 Opinion On Nuclear Arms; Holy See Says World Needs ÔAuthentic Culture of PeaceÕ

Unless nuclear-weapon States made a commitment to engage in immediate negotiations for nuclear disarmament, and to conduct their nuclear disarmament policies in a way consistent with the unanimous decision of the International Court of Justice in 1996, the credibility and viability of the Treaty would be endangered, the representative of Thailand told morningÕs session of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

[In its 1996 Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice stated that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international controlÓ.]

In the last five years there had been insufficient progress in nuclear disarmament and a specific increase in nuclear proliferation, Thailand's representative remarked. That was contrary to the core objective of the NPT. The conclusion of an internationally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear- weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be a good starting point. That could be followed by other practical steps, which could be unilaterally undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States without hampering the core of their international security arrangements.

Viet Nam's representative expressed concern that nuclear-weapon States had recently been given growing importance to nuclear weaponry in the definition of their military doctrines, in spite of the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice in its 1996 Advisory Opinion.

He said that the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), its actions in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the prospective deployment of national missile defence systems that encroached upon the integrity of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty), were particularly contentious issues which could have damaging global repercussions on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Conference of Parties to NPT - 1a - Press Release DC/2700 7th Meeting (AM) 27 April 2000

Sri Lanka's representative said that in article VI of the Treaty, what was being sought was a fundamental balance between the obligations undertaken by the vast majority of States parties to never acquire nuclear weapons, and the continued and indefinite retention of nuclear weapons by the nuclear Powers who were parties to the Treaty. What was immediately noticeable, however, was that the article did not contain a prohibition of nuclear weapons or their use.

What the Treaty did was impose to place upon nuclear weapon States a lesser obligation -Ð to divest themselves of nuclear weapons -Ð whereas other States were obliged to "never ever" acquire such weapons. Of that unique balanceÓ, the International Court of Justice had unanimously stressed the full importance of the recognition by article VI of an obligation to negotiate in good faith a nuclear disarmamentÓ. That twofold obligation to pursue and to conclude negotiations formally concerned 182 States parties to the Treaty, in other words the vast majority of the international community.

Nigeria's representative said management questions had too often been at the core of the problems of the NPT review processes. During the long intervening periods between review conferences, States parties did not have Treaty-based mechanisms to turn to for their frustrations, concerns, complaints or difficulties. In the past such frustrations had been allowed to reach boiling point and then heaped on the review conferences. The result was inconclusive meetings in certain cases. In that light, NigeriaÕs proposal for establishment of an NPT management board should be seriously considered at this Conference.

Also speaking this morning were the Minister and Director for Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs of the Austrian Foreign Ministry, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia, the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Belarus, and the representatives of the Holy See, Tunisia, Morocco and Tonga.

The general debate will continue at 3 p.m. today.
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Conference of Parties to NPT - 3 - Press Release

DC/2700 7th Meeting (AM) 27 April 2000

From: FoE Sydney - Nuclear Campaign - nonukes@foesyd.org.au Date: Sat, 29 Apr 2000 22:00:29 +1000

Conference Work Programme

The 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference met this morning to continue its general debate. The purpose of the four-week Conference is to provide appraisal of the progress achieved in the field of nuclear non- proliferation since the 1995 Review Conference, and to identify the areas where future efforts should be made. (For background information, see Press Release DC/2691.)

Statements

WERNFRIED KŠFFLER, Minister, Director for Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs, Foreign Ministry of Austria, said the task in the weeks ahead was to reaffirm commitment to the NPT. Deploring the fact that four countries were still outside the scope of the Treaty, he called on those States to adhere to the instrument and make it truly universal. The challenge of banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear devices had not yet been met. During the Austrian Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament early this year, all efforts were made to translate existing consensus into concrete negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. Expressing disappointment at not having succeeded, he said common efforts would continue to achieve that aim.

It was imperative, he said, that the Principles and Objectives of the 1995 Review Conference remained intact. Not only was there a need to build on the results of that meeting, but also to devise mechanisms for translating aims into concrete actions and tangible results. Austria favoured the idea of a plan or programme of action to achieve a more systematic review of implementation. Such a plan would contain both issues that had not been realized in the past and new measures and initiatives. Substance and procedure needed to be considered in a delicate balance.

He said the elements of a programme of action should include: early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); negotiations on a fissile material cut-off agreement; reduction and destruction of strategic and tactical nuclear arsenals in a continuous and transparent manner; universal implementation of additional protocols of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on full-scope safeguards; negative security assurances for non-nuclear- weapon States that were party to the NPT; promotion of existing as well as new nuclear-weapon-free zones; and a code of conduct or guidelines for missiles capable of carrying nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. In addition, transparency and information-sharing needed careful consideration as public consciousness and global citizenry were giving increasing attention to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

JEAN-LOUIS TAURAN, observer for the Holy See, said that the Treaty had been one of the most significant efforts in disarmament, because it involved prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Review Conference was a providential opportunity to take stock of how the objectives defined in 1968 had been met. However, the work of the Preparatory Committees had unfortunately shown how uncertain the situation really was.

The application of article VI of the Treaty regarding effective measures for disarmament, efforts in favour of negative securityÓ, the setting up of zones free from nuclear weapons and the strengthening of safety measures was progressing very slowly, he continued. Many still believed in the use of force and counted on nuclear weapons. The rule of law, confidence in others and the will for dialogue were not yet priorities. What was basically lacking was an authentic culture of peace, founded on the primacy of law and respect for human life. In that regard, one might recall that the International Court of Justice had declared the threat or use of nuclear weapons contrary to international humanitarian law.

If the nations really wanted peace, they were bound to acknowledge the facts, he said. There could be no peace in a world which continued to produce more and more sophisticated arms and prepared itself for their use, where peace was maintained only by a balance of terror. The time had come to discard the inherited mindsets of the cold war and to resolve the problems of mutual security. Only universal, progressive and controlled disarmament would guarantee a climate of confidence, collaboration and respect among all countries. In that regard, the Holy See was committed to heralding the hopes of the people of our times, particularly of believers engaged in building a world where it would be good to live side by side in the sight of God.

EDUARD KUKAN, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia, said his country was one that used nuclear energy, in line with its international commitments, solely for peaceful purposes. The exclusively peaceful use of such energy was the first and foremost principle of SlovakiaÕs Act on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, which entered into force in April 1998. The IAEA safeguards system could be greatly strengthened by the application of safeguards on the basis of universality. Fifty-two States still needed to enter the comprehensive safeguards agreements under article III of the NPT. Following the conclusion of the Additional Protocols, his delegation felt that the texts of those instruments should correspond as closely as possible to the wording of the Model Protocol approved by the IAEA Board of Governors. Slovakia also sought the early entry into force of the CTBT.

He said his country considered the NPT to be the only global mechanism for dealing with issues vital to humanity. The number of parties to the Treaty confirmed its paramount significance to the international community. The momentum created at the 1995 Review Conference had therefore to be preserved. The success of the present conference was thus another challenge for all of us to minimize the risk of nuclear conflict, and to contribute to the development of cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the benefit of mankindÓ.

SERGEY MARTYNOV, First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belarus, said that the international community could not ignore the present challenges before the non-proliferation regime. There were serious concerns in connection with the nuclear tests in South Asia, refusal of several States to ratify the CTBT, and non-adherence to the NPT by four countries. Belarus was convinced that despite its faults, the NPT remained the cornerstone of the safety of the world. Any challenges to the non-proliferation regime presented a threat to international security.

On April 25, he said, ratification of the CTBT had been completed in both chambers of the Belarus Parliament. His country believed that it was necessary to achieve universality of the NPT and ensure full implementation of the provisions leading to total elimination of nuclear weapons and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was a well-known fact that Belarus had been the first former Soviet republic to turn its back on nuclear weapons. Belarus was convinced that it was important to have legal underpinnings for those States which wanted to receive guarantees when they decided to renounce nuclear weapons.

Belarus was concerned over the possibility that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) would be destroyed by plans to deploy certain national anti-missile defence systems. That would undermine the whole security system, which had been constructed over the years. Under the current non-proliferation regime, nuclear-weapon-free zones acquired special importance. Belarus believed it would be useful to establish such a zone in Central and Eastern Europe. It was also important to strengthen the de facto non-nuclear status of Eastern Europe on the basis of existing bilateral and multilateral agreements in the region. He also supported the efforts to make the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

As for IAEA safeguards, they should be made more universal, he said. As many countries as possible should sign additional protocols with the Agency. For its part, Belarus was ready to start consultations on the Additional Protocol with the IAEA. It was of paramount importance to fully implement article VI on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Belarus, Ukraine and Russia continued to bear the brunt of tragic events of Chernobyl. It was essential for the world to remember that tragedy and to analyse the reasons for the accident.

ASDA JAYANAMA (Thailand) said that in the last five years there had been insufficient progress in nuclear disarmament in general, and a specific increase in nuclear proliferation. Those developments ran contrary to the very core objective of the NPT. Unless nuclear-weapon States made a commitment to engage in negotiations for nuclear disarmament, and to conduct their nuclear disarmament policies in a way consistent with the unanimous decision of the International Court of Justice in 1996, the credibility and viability of the NPT would be endangered. The conclusion of an internationally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be a good starting point. That could be followed by other practical steps, which could be unilaterally undertaken by the nuclear- weapon States without hampering the core of their international security concerns.

Those steps, he continued, included: reducing tactical nuclear weapons with a view to their elimination; examining possibilities for de-alerting or deactivating and removal of nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles; demonstrating transparency with regard to nuclear arsenals and fissile material inventories; and placing all fissile material for nuclear weapons in excess of military requirements under IAEA safeguards. Another substantive issue that might affect the outcome of the present Conference was the essential goal of universality for the NPT. Unless and until States with nuclear technology became members of the NPT regime, complete non-proliferation would not be achieved. After the nuclear testing in South Asia in 1998, that goal had become more and more elusive.

He said that Thailand and other States parties to the Bangkok Treaty felt that nuclear-weapon States should make more progress on accession to the instrument. They must show greater flexibility in the negotiations on the Protocol to reach an early agreement. So far, China had reiterated its readiness to be the first nuclear-weapon State to sign it. He hoped that the other three countries would follow suit in order to ensure the relevant and significant contribution of the Treaty in enhancing regional peace and security. Another concern was related to export control technology. Although there was a need to implement the relevant provisions of the NPT to ensure compliance with non-proliferation obligations, nuclear-related export control regimes should be applied in a transparent, realistic and non-discriminatory manner, and should in no way hamper the flow of technical cooperation.

SAID BEN MUSTAPHA (Tunisia) said that the universality of the NPT was the basis for its strength and credibility. Undeniably, progress had been made in developing the non-proliferation regime, and the Conference would allow States to review achievements and identify future actions. The conclusion of the CTBT should be welcomed, and a fissile-material cut-off treaty urgently needed to be completed. However, there was little progress as far as entry into force of the CTBT was concerned. Recent ratification of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) by the Russian Federation was a significant breakthrough, which would allow the United States and Russia to proceed with negotiations on a START III Treaty.

To achieve total nuclear disarmament, safety guarantees were needed for non-nuclear-weapon States, he continued, and nuclear-weapon States had particular obligations in that respect. A credible regime for non-proliferation and disarmament must be respected by all countries, including those which had not yet acceded to the Treaty. Tunisia was a signatory of a treaty creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. It also supported establishment of a similar zone in the Middle East. It was disturbing that not all countries of the Middle East had joined the NPT or submitted to the IAEA safeguards regime.

NGUYEN THANH CHAU (Viet Nam) said the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), its actions in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the prospective deployment of national missile defence systems that encroached upon the integrity of the ABM Treaty, were particularly contentious issues which could have damaging global repercussions on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

He said his country was also concerned that nuclear-weapon States had recently been given growing importance to nuclear weaponry in the definition of their military doctrines, in spite of the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice in its 1996 Advisory Opinion. The Court stated that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion, negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international controlÓ.

At this Conference, he went on, all States parties should reaffirm their unequivocal commitment to the goal of speedy and total elimination of nuclear weapons. While moving towards the total elimination of nuclear armaments, interim steps should be taken to complement and reinforce bilateral reductions that were currently under way. Bilateral and multilateral efforts were all needed, since they could mutually reinforce nuclear disarmament. He said his country was now actively involved in ratifying the CTBT, a significant legal instrument in preventing the nuclear arms race and fostering non-proliferation. The NPT had played a vital role, but its continued success very much depended on the cooperation of Member States and their adherence to the Treaty. Much of the responsibility now lay in the hands of the existing nuclear Powers, he added.

JANOS HERMAN, State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, aligned himself with the position of the European Union, noting that since the successful conclusion of the 1995 Conference, there had been growing concern about the prospects of nuclear non-proliferation. Nuclear tests by India and Pakistan had been a dramatic departure from the norms of conduct established by the non-proliferation regime. Several years after its signature, the CTBT had not yet entered into force because of the failure of some important countries to ratify it. However, he did not think it was appropriate to give an entirely bleak assessment of the current situation. A relentless focus on practical steps and consistent efforts to build consensus at the 2000 Conference would allow States parties not only to preserve, but also to reinforce the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

His delegation reaffirmed its full support for the Security Council resolution, adopted in the wake of the nuclear tests in South Asia, he continued. As one of the 44 countries whose ratification was required for the entry into force of the CTBT, Hungary had already adopted the relevant legislation. Hungary also strongly supported the guidelines adopted at the last session of the Disarmament Commission, which unambiguously stated that creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones could only be achieved on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. In that respect, positive development in the Middle East peace process would be instrumental in furthering the idea of making that important area a region free from nuclear weapons.

Hungary had steadfastly supported the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while also insisting on the need for proper implementation of relevant safeguards, he said. There had been tangible progress in adherence to the Additional Protocol of the IAEA. Hungary was among the countries which had concluded the required agreement with the Agency, and it urged the States that had not yet done so to do the same.

SOLA OGUNBANWO (Nigeria) said while universality was within reach, there were still a number of countries that were yet to join the NPT. The challenge facing the international community was how to engage those States through some sort of consultative mechanism. One such mechanism could be an NPT management board, whose establishment Niger was proposing in order to handle Treaty-related functions. The fact that 182 out of 187 States parties to the NPT were non- nuclear-weapon States demonstrated that security was possible without nuclear weapons. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones by those same non- nuclear-weapon States in their various regions further reinforced the fact that nuclear weapons did not guarantee security. Rather, they distracted from it. The problem lay with the continued existence of and reliance on nuclear weapons for security.

When the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995, he said, the possession of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States was not extended indefinitely. Regrettably, the 1995 programme of action was still unimplemented. In addition, there had been no new treaty on the reduction of nuclear weapons. There had also been no negotiations on the reduction and destruction of all tactical weapons. The CTBT had not yet entered into force, due to delays in ratifications. The Conference had also not begun any negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. That failure was a source of serious concern. To further complicate disarmament efforts, the world was now witnessing the development of strategic nuclear doctrines that continued to rely on nuclear weapons for security. He also expressed concern about the possible deployment of anti-missile defence systems that could have negative implications for nuclear weapons reduction.

He said that what was needed now was to capitalize on the positive trend of new initiatives and proposals, and use them to advance nuclear disarmament. The time had come for serious dialogue between the nuclear- and non-nuclear- weapon States. The review process must also be upgraded so that it could accomplish more than just adopting decisions and procedures. Management questions had too often been at the core of the problems of the NPT review processes. During the long intervening periods between review conferences, States parties did not have treaty-based mechanisms to turn to for their frustrations, concerns, complaints or difficulties. In the past, such frustrations had been allowed to reach boiling point and then heaped on the review conferences. The result in many cases was inconclusive meetings. In that light, the proposed NPT management board should be seriously considered at this Conference.

AHMED SNOUSSI (Morocco) said that the overall picture of the implementation of the Treaty was somewhat complex. The accessibility of nuclear technology had complicated the situation in recent years, as well as proliferation of the number of suppliers of nuclear energy. Many States were skeptical about the preparedness of nuclear-weapon States to conduct negotiations on nuclear arms reduction in good faith. Moreover, the fears and apprehensions of non-nuclear-weapon States must be taken into consideration. The implementation of the goals of non-proliferation and disarmament could not be achieved without providing an international legally binding instrument, providing assurances for such States.

Continuing, he expressed concern over the situation in the Middle East, where universality of adherence to the NPT had not yet been achieved. Nuclear- weapon States had an obligation in that region. True accession by Israel to the Treaty, and its commitment to the settlement of various aspects of the peace process, were crucial. Flexibility was also needed to implement the Council resolution on the Middle East, and it was important to achieve consensus on that matter.

The role of the IAEA was fundamental in ensuring the implementation of the non-proliferation regime, he said. Despite the modest accomplishments in the Preparatory Committee, it had at least developed essential recommendations on procedural matters. The Conference now had the important goal of dealing with a long list of uncompleted measures and rocky negotiations. Given the complexity of the issues before the Conference, States parties must work to strengthen the Treaty, which still remained the cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Every party should make contributions to this important dialogue.

JOHN DE SARAM (Sri Lanka) said the obligations of the NPT should fall under three categories. The first was the primary obligation of the nuclear- weapon States not to "transfer" nuclear weapons and for non-nuclear-weapon States not to acquire them. The second category was to ensure that non-transfer and non-acquisition of nuclear weapons were scrupulously observed under the supervisory authority of the IAEA. The third category of obligations related to article VI of the Treaty, which lay at the heart of the NPT. What was being sought there was a fundamental balance between the obligations undertaken by the vast majority of States never to acquire nuclear weapons, and the continued and indefinite retention of nuclear weapons by the Powers who were parties to the Treaty.

It was immediately noticeable, however, that article VI did not contain a prohibition of nuclear weapons