* Export fees charged to send waste to S.C.
* Calvert Cliffs reversal
* For U.S., Bradley Favors an Internationalist Path
* Yeltsin Wants Test Ban Ratified As Priority
* Trump Calls Yeltsin `A Disaster'
* Russian General Says U.S. Aims To Destroy ABM
* Russia Nonchalant on Y2K Threat
* Jaswant's Japan visit highly successful: Japanese official
* No alternative to talks
Military rule elsewhere
* India PM in Serious Nuclear Talks With U.S. -Report
* Is This Your Rocket Launcher, Mr Clinton?
* The Military Coup in Pakistan: Implications for Nuclear Stability in South Asia
* China Dismisses U.S. Missile Base Charge
* Report: Syria tested chemical bomb
* Barak Discusses Iran With Chinese By The Associated Press
* Army DU training video
* Depleted Uranium found as Coloring Matter in Enamel
* Rockefeller Report -- Is Military Research Hazardous To Veterans' Health?
-------- us nuc waste
Export fees charged to send waste to S.C.
Boston Globe 11/28/99 12:43 By Associated Press
http://www.boston.com/dailynews/332/region/Export_fees_charged_to_send_wa:.shtml
COLUMBIA, S.C. (AP) The Southwestern Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact Commission will start charging fees next year to let the region's waste producers ship nuclear refuse to South Carolina for disposal.
South Carolina accepts waste from 38 states at its disposal site in Barnwell. Members of a task force studying ways to reduce the flow of waste said the export fees are just more proof that the state's open-door policy has got to change.
The Southwestern Compact is starving for money because the California General Assembly zeroed out its budget. So on Nov. 15, the commission decided that it will begin charging on Jan. 1 $50 per application to ship the material, or $1.25 per cubic foot of waste, whichever is greater. The money will process the applications for permission to ship waste to Barnwell or to a disposal site in Utah.
The fee will raise about $60,000 a year, enough to pay for a part-time staff and expenses, said Don Womeldorf, executive director of the Southwestern Compact. Currently, there is no fee for the service.
The idea of charging a fee is not simply to perpetuate a bureaucracy but to make sure that nuclear waste generators can legally continue to send their low-level waste out of the region, he said.
Under the law that set up the four-state compact among California, Arizona, South Dakota and North Dakota, generators can't ship their waste out of the region without permission from the compact.
''We're just trying to keep our people legal and operating until such time as there's a disposal facility in California as provided by the law,'' Womeldorf said.
But that could be a long time, Womeldorf said. The Southwest Compact expected to have a disposal site of its own by 1993, but the federal Department of the Interior refused to turn over the land the state of California had picked out, citing environmental considerations.
To Rep. Joel Lourie, D-Columbia, the Southwest Compact's desperate straits are just another sign that South Carolina needs to change its policy of allowing all states to send their waste to Barnwell.
He said that policy has taken some of the pressure off other states to site their own low-level waste landfills. Lourie is a member of a task force that is considering several options for reducing the flow of waste to South Carolina.
A leading option would have the state enter into an Atlantic Compact with Connecticut and New Jersey, under which South Carolina could exclude waste from any state not in the compact. That would send ripple effects all across the country and could spur the development of new sites. But that would take awhile.
In the meantime, Womeldorf said, Southwest Compact generators would have to store their waste because generators wouldn't have any place to put it.
The Southwestern Compact is not the first to charge export petition fees. The Central Interstate Compact does, and the Rocky Mountain Compact is considering it.
-------- nuc power plants
Calvert Cliffs reversal
Washington Post Sunday, November 28, 1999; Page C02
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPlate/1999-11/28/163l-112899-idx.html
* The battle over the proposed relicensing of the Calvert Cliffs nuclear plant has taken an unexpected twist. In a move that legal experts called highly unusual, a federal appeals court tossed out its own judgment backing a watchdog group's efforts for a wider review of safety issues concerning the Southern Maryland facility. A new hearing will be scheduled.
-------- us nuc other
For U.S., Bradley Favors an Internationalist Path By JAMES DAO
New York Times November 28, 1999
http://www.nytimes.com/library/politics/camp/112899wh-dem-bradley.html
WASHINGTON -- In his first major campaign event on foreign policy, former Senator Bill Bradley will use a meeting with students this Monday to cast himself as a committed internationalist who believes that America's vital interests abroad can best be advanced through the free flow of goods, capital and ideas across national boundaries, his aides said.
Bradley, who is running for the Democratic presidential nomination, will also argue in an appearance at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University that the Pentagon budget should not be increased above current levels and that military spending should be redirected toward fighting new threats, including terrorism, biological warfare and nuclear proliferation.
And echoing one of his longstanding criticisms of the Clinton administration, Bradley will contend that American policies toward Russia have failed to stem corruption, political instability and economic decay there. Vice President Al Gore, who is Bradley's lone Democratic rival, has played a central role in overseeing policy toward Russia.
The Bradley campaign is counting on the Fletcher School event in Boston to showcase what they consider the candidate's command of complex international issues, gained in part from serving on the Senate Intelligence Committee during 8 of his 18 years in Congress. To demonstrate his facility with those issues, Bradley plans to outline his foreign policy views through a question-and-answer session with students, instead of through a speech prepared with the help of advisers.
"He can handle any foreign policy question from anybody at any point," said Eric Hauser, Bradley's press secretary.
Bradley himself has said that he thinks many voters use foreign policy as a yardstick to measure the depth, stature and trustworthiness of presidential candidates. "I believe it is a very real way that people assess a candidate, because they ultimately are asking themselves that question: Whom do I trust with my life?" he told reporters this fall.
But the Gore campaign has already begun trying to paint Bradley as naïve and inexperienced about foreign affairs, saying he lacks a clear policy vision and is inconsistent about when to use military force overseas.
For instance, the Gore campaign has criticized Bradley for voting in 1984 against sending aid to Nicaraguan rebels fighting the Sandinista government, and then reversing field and voting for it in 1986.
Bradley, one of only 11 Democratic senators to support President Reagan's aid package to the rebels, said at the time that he became convinced the measure was needed to prevent the Nicaraguan government from trying to undermine democratic states in Central America.
Though his Fletcher School appearance will be his first prominent foreign policy event of the campaign, Bradley has been gradually laying out his vision for America's role overseas during the last year. At the core of that vision is the idea that technology and trade can spread prosperity to even the poorest nations, bring greater stability to global hot spots and encourage the growth of democracy.
In a speech before an Iowa nuclear disarmament group in September, he argued that a central goal of American foreign policy should be to reduce poverty worldwide. "If we do these things, we'll be a nation that has a clearer idea that we're not only standing up for our ideals domestically, but we're also influencing the world by knitting the world into a closer whole," he said.
Properly used, Bradley has argued, the global marketplace can provide powerful incentives to governments to resolve ethnic conflicts and improve human rights. Citing the case of Indonesia, where pro-Jakarta militias terrorized civilians in East Timor earlier this year, Bradley has said that the Indonesian government should be denied financial help from the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund if it does not prosecute militia leaders who are accused of mass murder.
"A globalized economy begins to exert new pressures to do things that serve the overall interests of human rights," he said in Iowa.
At the same time, Bradley has often urged caution about using American military forces abroad to quell ethnic disputes or calm regional tensions. In the Senate, he voted against sending troops to push Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991, saying he wanted to try economic sanctions against Baghdad first. He also questioned whether it was in the country's strategic interests to deploy American forces in Bosnia. And he described American policy in Kosovo as "bomb and hope diplomacy" that could have been avoided with earlier diplomatic intervention.
"I don't think the United States has either the resources nor the will to be the policeman to the world," he has said on many occasions during the campaign.
Instead, Bradley says, America needs to increase its reliance on the United Nations to resolve regional conflicts. He says the United States should have long ago paid the $1 billion it owed to the United Nations in back dues, arguing that it lost influence within the organization.
Russia policy may provide Bradley one of his clearest contrasts with the vice president. In an op-ed article in The Wall Street Journal in September, Bradley argued that the administration had allowed strategic arms negotiations with Russia to stall, erred in pushing for NATO expansion over Russian objections and done too little to encourage economic reforms. He also asserted that the United States needed to do much more to prevent Russian nuclear weapons and weapons materials from being sold to terrorists or rogue nations, and that the Administration had become an apologist for President Boris N. Yeltsin.
Instead of relying on Yeltsin, Bradley contends, the United States should broaden its ties to other Russian political and civilian leaders, a position also advocated by Gov. George W. Bush of Texas, the leading Republican presidential candidate. Bradley also advocates increasing spending on a program he helped create while in the Senate that brings high school students from Russia and other former Soviet republics to study in the United States.
He also supports beginning negotiations with Russia on a Start III treaty that would require each nation to reduce its nuclear arsenal to 1,000 to 2,000 weapons. And he would push for passage of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty for nuclear weapons that Congress rejected last month.
Bradley says he would keep the Pentagon budget at current levels, in contrast to Gore, who has called for increasing spending. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, Bradley argues that the United States no longer needs to prepare to fight wars on two fronts, and so can trim its troop levels and forgo building expensive new weapons systems like the F-22 fighter. Gore supports building the F-22.
Like the Clinton administration, Bradley supports modifying the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972, to allow development of a defense system to protect the United States from ballistic missile attacks.
But Bradley has expressed skepticism about a national missile defense system, calling it a "difficult and expensive proposition." He has suggested that he would prefer a more limited system that could protect American forces overseas, such as in Japan, or shoot down a few missiles launched at the United States either accidentally by a superpower or purposely by a nation like North Korea.
Also like the Clinton administration, Bradley supported bringing China into the World Trade Organization. And he supports a "one-China" policy that would peacefully and gradually unify Taiwan and China. But until unification, he says he would be willing to use American military power to protect Taiwan, provided it did not declare its independence from China.
"Essentially we are buying time" for China-Taiwan relations, he said in Iowa recently. "If there is any country that understands time, it is the Chinese."
--
President Clinton:
". . . I was honored to be the first of 146 leaders to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, our commitment to end all nuclear tests for all time -- the longest-sought, hardest-fought prize in the history of arms control." September 22, 1997
President Kennedy:
"Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us . . . The logical place to begin is a treaty assuring the end of nuclear tests of all kinds . . ." September 25, 1961
President Eisenhower:
". . . [not achieving a nuclear test ban] would have to be classed as the greatest disappointment of any administration -- of any decade -- of any time and of any party. . ." May 29,1961
------- russia
Yeltsin Wants Test Ban Ratified As Priority
Russia Today Sunday, Nov 28 at Prague 11:04 pm, N.Y. 05:04 pm
http://www.russiatoday.com/news.php3?id=111992
MOSCOW, Nov 22, 1999 -- (Reuters) President Boris Yeltsin announced on Monday he wanted parliament to ratify a nuclear test ban treaty as a priority, but it seems unlikely deputies will feel the same urgency while ties with the United States are strained.
The U.S. Senate dealt President Bill Clinton an embarrassing blow last month by rejecting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, drawing widespread international condemnation.
Yeltsin, seeking to capitalize on Washington's discomfort and deflect criticism of Russia's military campaign in Chechnya, said last week at the Istanbul summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe he had sent the treaty to the State Duma (lower house of parliament) to be ratified.
"The president of Russia has proposed that the question of ratifying the treaty be made a priority," the Kremlin said. "The treaty, in Boris Yeltsin's view, meets Russia's interests."
In theory, the Duma can review and ratify treaties within weeks. But such a weighty accord would need to be studied by several parliamentary committees just as deputies prepare for a December 19 election to the lower chamber. The upper house would also need to place its stamp on the document.
"I'm absolutely convinced this document has no chance whatsoever of being ratified in the present Duma," said Vladimir Ryzhkov, parliamentary head of the Our Home is Russia party. "It's to do with the geo-political situation in the world. The Americans are behaving like a bull in a china shop."
He said apart from failing to ratify the test ban accord and putting pressure on Moscow because of Chechnya, Washington wanted to violate another pact, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, to be able to deploy a national missile defense system.
"As long as the United States sticks to its clearly unfriendly policy toward Russia, no Duma is ever going to ratify that (test ban) treaty," Ryzhkov told Reuters.
The Kremlin statement said the treaty, which Moscow signed in 1996, would not damage Russia's defenses or security.
"If these national interests are placed under threat, the Russian Federation can use its right to leave the treaty," the Kremlin said.
Washington wants to renegotiate the ABM treaty to allow it to deploy a Star Wars-style national missile defense system to guard against so-called rogue states.
MIXED MESSAGE ON POSSIBLE COMPROMISE
Moscow believes the ABM treaty is the cornerstone of many other arms accords and is against any changes in it.
The head of Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces, Colonel-General Vladimir Yakovlev, gave an intriguing hint of compromise last Friday when he said the United States and Russia should set up a commission to examine the rogue threat.
"If this commission works properly we could speak in more detail about the need to create national anti-missile systems," he told ORT television. He was speaking after the OSCE summit at which Clinton and Yeltsin discussed arms control.
The chief of the Russian General Staff, Anatoly Kvashnin, stuck to a tougher line in the latest edition of the military weekly Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye. He said the U.S. plan had Russia and China in mind rather than rogues.
He said nuclear missile reductions could be suspended or halted altogether if the ABM pact was violated. The newspaper also said Russia aimed to upgrade missile testing sites to allow Moscow to test weapons capable of penetrating a defense shield.
---
Trump Calls Yeltsin `A Disaster'
New York Times November 28, 1999 Filed at 4:24 p.m. EDT Associated Press
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/p/AP-Trump.html
WASHINGTON (AP) -- Donald Trump said Sunday he would not rule out a U.S. military first strike to stem North Korea's missile production.
The potential Reform Party presidential candidate also called Russian President Boris Yeltsin ``a disaster'' and ``one tough hombre'' who suffers from ``a major alcohol problem.''
In a wide-ranging interview that touched on Trump's views about U.S. foreign policy and his own prospects for the presidency, he said on CNN's ``Late Edition'' that he will decide by February whether to run for president.
Trump said his Reform Party colleague, Patrick Buchanan, has ``no hope'' of winning the presidency, and he predicted that Buchanan's campaign would attract enough Republicans to let Democrats win office. His own campaign would not, Trump said.
Trump said he supports amending the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and negotiating with North Korea because the United States needs a missile-defense shield.
``We're a bunch of saps,'' Trump said. ``There's no question that North Korea is developing missiles. We give them nuclear power plants. We give them tremendous aid because we thought we could bribe them into stop developing. Well, they're developing, so much so that South Korea is now developing their own missile systems in order to protect. And I'm really not sure I can blame them.''
Trump continued: ``Would you rather have a very, very serious chat with them now? And if necessary you might have to do something fairly drastic? Or would you rather have to go after them in five years when they have more nuclear warheads and missiles than we do?''
Asked whether Trump would rule out a military strike against North Korea, such as Israel's attack against in 1981 to halt the completion of the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq, Trump said, ``You can never rule it out.''
``What Israel did was fantastic,'' Trump said. ``And you know what, if you ruled it out, you couldn't talk to them. Why would they -- he only thing they're afraid of is exactly what you just said. That's what they're afraid of. That's what they're concerned with.''
Trump also complained that Russia was ``out of control'' with a leader who is ``a disaster.'' As president, Trump said U.S. aid ``would probably stop if it were me, until they straightened out their act.'' He contends Russia is using the aid ``on developing more nuclear'' weapons.
He said Yeltsin suffers a ``major alcohol problem,'' and called him ``one tough hombre, but certainly he can't be there very much longer.''
On the domestic front, Trump described:
--Bill Clinton as someone who ``could have gone down as a very good and almost great president, primarily because of the economy. And he'll go down as something less than that because of the scandal and that's unfortunate.''
--Al Gore as ``very, very underrated. If his campaign doesn't get into gear, I'll have to take that apart and take that away. But I think he's starting to get it together.''
--Bill Bradley as ``a terrible senator,'' and the 1986 tax law Bradley championed as ``a disaster.'' A Bradley presidency ``would be very, very bad. ... He's almost Marxist in his leanings.''
--Bill Gates, chairman of Microsoft Corp., as having ``a vision that's amazing. I hate to see them ripping his company apart.''
Trump, famously opposed to shaking hands for health reasons, called it ``a very, very terrible custom.'' And he said much of his mail from potential constituents agrees with him on that point.
``I mean look, the concept of -- the other day a man comes up, he's walking at me -- he sneezes,'' Trump said. ``He grabs his nose. He sneezes. And he sees, he grabs, 'Mr. Trump how are you?' Now, I'm supposed to shake his hand and be happy with it? The guy's got a terrible cold.''
Trump also said he never took drugs, drank alcohol or coffee or smoke cigarettes.
``I do love women, but I'm single and I'm allowed to do that, I guess,'' Trump said. ``But I respect women. I admire women. And if that's supposed to be bad, then I'm guilty.''
---
Russian General Says U.S. Aims To Destroy ABM
Russia Today Sunday, Nov 28 at Prague 11:04 pm, N.Y. 05:04 pm
http://www.russiatoday.com/news.php3?id=113655
http://news.excite.com/news/r/991127/08/politics-arms-russia
MOSCOW, Nov 28, 1999 -- (Reuters) Russian Strategic Missile Forces' commander criticized on Saturday U.S. moves to change the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, saying any modification would destroy the landmark treaty.
RIA news agency quoted Colonel-General Vladimir Yakovlev as saying relations between Russia and the United States would suffer if Washington succeeded in changing the treaty to allow deployment of a new anti-missile defense system.
Any modification "would completely abolish the basis of the 1972 ABM treaty", RIA quoted him as saying. "If a political solution cannot be found which does not destroy the balanced system of agreements, then there will be a serious step backwards in understanding and transparency between the two countries."
Russia has mounted fierce opposition to Washington's desire to change the treaty, which bans defense systems designed to shoot down enemy missiles. The Cold War-era treaty was made under the logic that such shields would only have tempted the two countries to build ever bigger arsenals of nuclear weapons.
Yakovlev said earlier this month that Russia had test-fired one of its short-range anti-missile rockets for the first time in six years because of Moscow's fears over the treaty.
Washington says it wants to amend the treaty to allow it to deploy a system to protect itself and its allies from an attack by states such as Iran and North Korea which it believes are developing missile technology.
But Russia says any weakening of ABM would undermine the entire arms control system, including subsequent historic pacts, such as the START strategic arms reduction deals which have already led to thousands of warheads being scrapped
---
Russia Nonchalant on Y2K Threat
By NICK WADHAMS Associated Press Writer Newsday 11/28/99 11:37 AM Eastern
http://www.newsday.com/ap/rnmpin1a.htm
MOSCOW (AP) -- Western experts warn that Russia is among the countries that have done the least to prepare for the Y2K computer bug, but many Russians are decidedly nonchalant about the potential implications: severe failures in vital services.
``We will pass quietly through 2000 just like we have every other year,'' says Ilya Klebanov, Russia's deputy prime minister in charge of defense. ``I think it's best not to scare the little children of Russia.''
No one really knows exactly what Y2K glitches -- the result of unfixed older computers and embedded circuits mistaking 2000 for 1900 and going haywire -- might do in this vast nation of 148 million people spread across 11 time zones.
At their worst, computer failures could plunge Russian cities into icy darkness while in the grip of bone-chilling winter, cutting off heat and power to millions.
Foreign analysts are reasonably certain that chances of a nuclear disaster are remote. But they are especially concerned about utilities, including the possible cut off of natural gas supplies to much of Europe.
The U.S. State Department is worried enough about former Soviet states that it is giving nonessential embassy employees in Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus a free trip out over the New Year's holiday if they want. It has also warned Americans to reconsider traveling to those countries.
``Prolonged disruptions in energy supplies in Russia could put other systems dependent on electrical power at risk,'' the State Department said. ``In practical terms, this could mean disruption of basic human services such as heat, water, telephone and other vital services.''
The U.S. Embassy plans to set up letterboxes in Moscow hotels and offices to help foreign citizens keep in touch with each other if Y2K problems should knock out communications systems, an American diplomat said in mid-November.
Nadezhda Senna, a member of a private Y2K awareness group, said Russia is not ready to deal with computer problems.
``Our people haven't prepared for this at all,'' she said. ``They need to know what could happen on that day, what's possible -- electricity and heat going out, not in one house or region, but a massive outage.''
Even so, Senna and others agree the threat probably isn't as bad as some Westerners fear -- nor as small as Russia's government says.
Russians are used to living with disaster. In recent years alone, they've watched their society crumble amid unending political and economic crisis. And many take a typically Russian philosophical attitude toward the Y2K bug.
Still, Russia has worked with the West to make sure no problems occur with its nuclear weapons arsenals and nuclear power plants. Russian officials will camp out at a command center at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado to head off any potential confusion.
While Western officials admit chances are slightly higher that Russian nuclear reactors could go awry, they say the government has mostly cornered the problem.
At the top of Russia's potential Y2K problems are Gazprom, the world's largest natural gas producer, which sells Europe about a third of its gas, and United Energy Systems, Russia's electricity monopoly.
Natural gas suppliers in Italy, Germany, France and Switzerland -- all of which buy gas from Gazprom -- say they have received assurances from the company that supplies will not be interrupted. They will keep extra gas reserves just in case.
``Our impression is that Gazprom is very well prepared for the year 2000,'' said Astrid Zimmerman, a spokeswoman at Germany's Ruhrgas. She said Gazprom has made ``very detailed preparations'' for the Y2K bug.
Although the company doesn't detail its revenues, Gazprom's European sales are estimated at more than two-thirds of revenues, which were $6.6 billion in 1998.
Gazprom and United Energy have been working on the Y2K problem for far longer than the Russian government, since at least 1996, they say. ``Overall readiness of automated systems at Gazprom is 96 percent,'' said Olga Moreva, a Gazprom spokeswoman.
But there are signs Gazprom and United Energy may not be ready.
Moreva acknowledged that Gazprom has 9,000 ``problem'' computers among 28,000 that could critically affects its computerized systems. She said 5,500 of those computers would be replaced and the rest modified by year's end.
In a press release, Gazprom said the most serious Y2K threat was in computers handling ``information management.'' Moreva refused to detail those computers' function, saying only that they would be replaced on time.
At United Energy, which said it has spent $8 million on Y2K fixes since 1997, the huge electricity grid will be switched to manual control on Dec. 31, though what ``manual control'' is, no one exactly knows.
A Y2K expert at the company conceded problems were almost unavoidable.
``Obviously, no matter how much money is allotted, there won't be enough to prevent all kinds of failures in the work of UES,'' said Viktor Grunenkov.
Many systems connected to United Energy and Gazprom are so shoddy already that electricity and power outages are not uncommon outside Russia's major cities. Poor-quality phone lines are often the norm.
``Infrastructure in some areas isn't at all what it is in the United State or western Europe -- there's a certain level of expectation of unreliability,'' said Dale Vecchio, a research director at the U.S. technology consultants Gartner Group, which advises countries on dealing with the Y2K bug.
Vecchio said that in countries where Y2K awareness came late, governments have tended to exaggerate their level of readiness. ``Russia is certainly in that category,'' he said.
The Moscow government claims it has almost fully dealt with the bug, though it has been more focused on severe economic troubles and the war in Chechnya.
Another major concern is small- and medium-size businesses, which analysts say have treated the Y2K glitch so nonchalantly it would send techies on the other side of the Atlantic into a frenzy.
``They generally feel that it will be all right and things will be worked out by themselves,'' said Steve O'Sullivan, head of research with the United Financial Group investment bank.
ALSO:
http://www.boston.com/dailynews/332/world/Russia_decidedly_nonchalant_ab:.shtml
http://www.foxnews.com/js_index.sml?content=/news/international/1128/i_ap_1128_117.sml
http://flash.al.com/cgi-bin/al_nview.pl?/home1/wire/AP/Stream-Parsed/INTERNATIONAL/a0627_AM_Y2K-BlaseRussians
http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/w-eur/1999/nov/28/112800983.html
http://wire.nj.com/cgi-bin/nj_nview.pl?/home1/wire/AP/Stream-Parsed/INTERNATIONAL/a0627_AM_Y2K-BlaseRussians
http://www2.startribune.com/stOnLine/cgi-bin/article?thisStory=81133527
-------- japan
Jaswant's Japan visit highly successful: Japanese official
India Express Sunday, November 28, 1999
http://www.expressindia.com/news/33221899.htm
TOKYO: External affairs minister Jaswant Singh's four-day visit to Japan was "highly successful" with Tokyo acknowledging that its relationship with New Delhi was "too important" for it to be neglected, Japanese government officials said today. Singh convinced Japanese policy makers that the "rot must be stopped" and the damage repaired in the Indo-Japanese ties which is soured after the Pokhran nuclear tests may last year, they said, reports PTI.
Singh, the first Indian leader to visit Japan after the May 1998 nuclear explosions, had talks with Japanese premier Keizo Obuchi, foreign minister Yohei Kono and others before leaving for India on Friday night.
The officials denied signing the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) was sin qua non for normalisation of relationship with India while downplaying the issue of sanctions saying it was not meant to punish India. They admitted the relationship with India was too important for Japan to neglect. So, if the improvement in relationship was not dependent on New Delhi's signing of the CTBT, ways must be found to restore government level assistance to new projects of India's economic development suspended following the nuclear test, they said.
The officials indicated that some compensatory ways would be found to help Indian economy, which could even be in the form of large scale investment.
-------- india / pakistan
No alternative to talks
Military rule elsewhere
DAWN 28 November 1999 Sunday 19 Shaban 1420 By Afzal Mahmood
http://dawn.com/daily/text/op.htm
THE agreement between Indo-Pakistan border forces not to alter the status of working boundary and to put an immediate stop to firing across the border, followed by Prime Minister Vajpayee's statement that India is prepared for talks with the new government in Pakistan, are significant developments for the future of bilateral relations between the two estranged neighbours.
Besides agreeing not to target innocent civilians, they have agreed to exercise restraint while dealing with inadvertent border crossers. The meeting in Lahore, which was also attended by officials of Survey, Works and Narcotics Department of both countries, also agreed to further strengthen measures to stop smuggling, drug trafficking and illegal immigration. It is significant that the agreement has come in the wake of General Pervez Musharraf's decision to pull back his troops to peace-time locations from the country's international border with India in what he described as "a unilateral military de-escalation" move.
The statement of Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee that India is prepared to hold bilateral talks with the new government in Pakistan carries even greater significance. Mr Vajpayee did not explain what he meant by a "conducive atmosphere" which had to be created for a meaningful dialogue. However, going by the statements issued by External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh and other officials, New Delhi wants Islamabad to stop helping the freedom struggle in Kashmir (described as "cross-border terrorism") before starting a dialogue with Pakistan.
The important thing to remember is that it is the same conditionality which India had insisted on while Mr Nawaz Sharif was in power. It is for the first time that India has expressed its willingness to enter into a dialogue with the government of General Pervez Musharraf after the ouster of Nawaz Sharif. It would seem to signify a marked change in India's attitude to the military takeover in Pakistan.
Interestingly, after the ouster of Nawaz Sharif government India has bitterly opposed Pakistan's participation in any multi-lateral forum, including the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Commonwealth. The SAARC summit that was to be held at Kathmandu was postponed on India's insistence and the harshly-worded reference to Pakistan at the Commonwealth summit at Durban, was the result of Indian lobbying.On his return from Durban, Prime Minister Vajpayee even went to the extent of saying that as far as the Commonwealth was concerned, Nawaz Sharif continued to be the prime minister of Pakistan. But now by saying that India is prepared to enter into a dialogue with the new government in Pakistan, Mr Vajpayee seems to have accepted the reality of military takeover in Islamabad and recognized the government of General Pervez Musharraf. The all-important question is: what has caused this change of heart?
The stand India had hitherto taken - that it would have nothing to do with the new government in Pakistan - was so unreasonable that it could not have lasted long. Bilateralism has been the cornerstone of India's approach to its disputes with Pakistan which became even more pronounced after the Simla agreement. Since New Delhi has been opposed to any third-party mediation or UN involvement in setting its disputes with Pakistan, the only way to resolve them is through bilateral negotiations between the two countries. Therefore, New Delhi's initial reluctance to talks to the new government in Islamabad was inconsistent with that position and had to be abandoned sooner or later,anyway.
The international pressure on India to enter into talks with Pakistan, as so much is at stake, including nuclear stability in South Asia, may also have played a crucial role in bringing about a change in India's stance. Only three weeks back the United States and Russia made a joint call for the resumption of political talks between Indian and Pakistan "at the earliest opportunity." The joint statement issued in Washington after three days of intensive talks between US Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Gregoriy Karasin, urged the two South Asian countries to resolve their dispute over Kashmir.
Indo-Pakistan tension over Kashmir and the nuclear dynamic continue to remain major concerns for Washington. This was evident from the talks held on November 17 in London between India's External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh and US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. The talks focused not only on the four issues that lie at the heart of Indo-US nuclear dialogue - CTBT, fissile material production, export control of sensitive products and technologies and India's defence posture - but also on the recent developments in Pakistan and the question of revival of the Lahore process.
The terse statement issued at the end of the talks showed that no progress could be made on the nuclear issue. The two sides continue to remain divided over the CTBT and India's desire to deploy a minimum nuclear deterrent, especially its refusal to spell out its credible minimum deterrent. It is significant, however, that only a few days after the Jaswant-Talbott talks Prime Minister Vajpayee expressed his government's willingness to enter into a dialogue with the new government in Islamabad.
India is very keen that President Clinton's long-awaited visit to South Asia should go ahead and that there should be no excuse for another postponement. Some reports indicate that India is trying to bring President Clinton as the chief guest at the Republic Day celebrations on January 26, 2000. If the plan materializes, Clinton will be the first US president to be present on such an occasion and it will indicate the growing closeness between the two countries. But the snag is that Washington wants India and Pakistan to "create a positive environment" for President Clinton's visit to the subcontinent, as Assistant Secretary of State Inderfurth told Reuters in an interview on September 26.
A positive climate, according to the Americans, implies some progress on the nuclear issue and resumption of dialogue between India and Pakistan to lessen the current tension and restore the Lahore process. Since India is neither prepared to sign the CTBT in the immediate future nor willing to spell out its concept of minimum nuclear deterrence, no progress is possible on the nuclear issue prior to President Clinton's visit. The only other option left with New Delhi is to show its appreciation of American concerns by offering an olive branch to Pakistan and expressing a willingness to resume talks with the new government in Islamabad.
India has come to realize that the manner in which it manages its relations with Pakistan will affect the prospects of Indo-US relations in the coming months and years. Since New Delhi is aware that Washington has decided to deal with the new government in Islamabad, Mr Vajpayee seems to have taken a policy decision to adopt an attitude of reasonableness towards General Pervez Musharraf's government and avoid needless confrontation with it. Hence the recent agreement between the two countries not to alter the status of working boundary and to put an immediate stop to firing across the border, followed by Mr Vajpayee's statement that his country is prepared for talks with the new regime in Islamabad.
As for the rider of a "conducive atmosphere" prior to talks, it is unrealistic on the part of India to expect that Islamabad would stop supporting the Kashmiri freedom struggle for the sake of having a dialogue with New Delhi. Therefore, instead of laying it down as a precondition, it would be more realistic for India to press for the issue to be discussed as an agenda item during bilateral talks. Linked with it, of course, is the Pakistani complaint about gross violation of human rights and perpetration of atrocities in occupied Kashmir.
The two countries must realize that the overt nuclearization of the region has added to the urgency of eliminating flash points in the area. The reduction of tension between the two neighbours is the need of the hour. India should take seriously General Pervez Musharraf's offer to take ten steps forward for every step India takes towards normalizing relations between the two countries.
---
India PM in Serious Nuclear Talks With U.S. -Report
Los Angeles Times Sunday, November 28, 1999
http://www.latimes.com/wires/wpolitics/19991128/tCB00a0894.html
ALSO:
http://www.ab.sympatico.ca/news/Fullstories-Reuters/ron5.html
http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/19991128/pl/arms_india_1.html
http://www.foxnews.com/js_index.sml?content=/news/national/1128/d_rt_1128_103.sml
NEW DELHI, India--India and the United States are holding their most serious dialogue on nuclear non-proliferation in half a century and it is starting to show results, Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee was quoted as saying.
"Our dialogue since the summer of last year has been the most serious and substantive engagement between India and the U.S. since independence (in 1947)," the Press Trust of India (PTI) quoted Vajpayee Sunday as saying.
"As a result, our security concerns are now better understood," he said.
India carried out a series of nuclear tests explosions in the summer of 1998 and thereafter entered into marathon arms control talks with the United States which had sharply criticized the testing.
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh have led the talks aimed at reconciling India's security interests with U.S. non-proliferation concerns.
Talbott and Singh ended another round of talks in London this month and are due to meet again in January. Both sides said there was a need for tangible progress on disarmament and non-proliferation.
Another local news agency quoted Vajpayee as saying that his government was working to build consensus on the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty but public opinion could be affected by the refusal of the U.S. Senate to ratify the accord.
"We have been working for a national consensus on the signing of the CTBT," United News of India quoted the prime minister as saying in an interview.
"The U.S. Senate's rejection of the treaty does change the situation in the sense that it is going to influence public opinion in India as in other countries."
New Delhi has insisted on a minimum nuclear deterrent and in August unveiled a draft nuclear doctrine that visualizes a sophisticated arsenal based on ships, aircraft and land-based missiles.
Vajpayee said criticism of the draft was unjustified because it was not yet an accepted policy. "Any criticism of the draft paper and any attempt to describe it as the accepted doctrine is unwarranted," PTI quoted him as saying.
The U.S. government said the doctrine was "not encouraging" or in the security interest of the South Asian sub-continent where Pakistan, which has conducted its own nuclear test explosions, and India have been fierce rivals for decades. ---
Ashok Banker Is This Your Rocket Launcher, Mr Clinton?
11/23/99 The Rediff Special/
http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/nov/23ashok.htm
Recently, when the Lashkar-e-Toiba, a self-admitted hardline terrorist faction, organised a meeting of like-minded militant groups in Lahore, Indian diplomacy protested to the US. Even setting aside the decades of armed activism, terrorist acts and policy of ruthless Islamic jihad by these groups, how could you ignore the recent upsurge in their activities in J&K.
As Indian spokespersons put it to their US counterparts for the umpteenth time, these groups were virtually fighting a proxy war in J&K on behalf of Pakistan. This was why the casualties in terrorist attacks in the post-Kargil war period were already mounting past the casualty figure of the actual war itself!
And as if to underline their arrogance, just days before their meet in Lahore, the Lashkar-e-Toiba attacked the PRO office of the Indian army's 15 Corps headquarters in Srinagar, killing the army's chief PRO and making international headlines -- which was just their intention.
Yet, the Americans's only response to this was: "They are exercising their democratic rights!"
The US policy on Indian and Pakistan has always been skewed in Pakistan's favour. The reason for this is simple: Ever since the Cold War days of the 1950s, the US always perceived its greatest enemy to be the USSR. It took elaborate precautions against any possible Soviet aggression by becoming the world's supercop, financing regimes that resisted Communism, providing arms, training and funds to revolutionaries who sought to overthrow legitimate communist regimes, in short doing anything under the sun to ensure that the erstwhile Soviet Union never outgrew its bounds. Its fiasco in Vietnam taught America that a direct engagement was far too expensive. Better to pursue a policy of proxy support.
This it did with resounding success in Afghanistan, a nation that the USSR had effectively annexed by force. Supporting the mujahideen movement in the country, the USA pumped resources to enable the rebels to fight back and fight back hard. Allegedly, the CIA and some high-level military agencies set up training camps to indoctrinate the tribal rebels in the art of high-tech warfare. Estimates of the US funding of the mujahideen movement in the eighties are usually figured at around $ 2 billion a year.
This enormous financial and technological support created a Frankenstein's monster. Today, long after the Soviets have been sent packing and the Soviet Union itself has long since collapsed and ceased to be a danger to anybody, the same mujahideen are being employed by their neighbour Pakistan to fight the ongoing proxy war within our borders. The original intruders who first captured the heights in Kargil and held them through the winter of 1998 were mainly Afghan mujahideen. It was only in April 1999, with the breaking of spring, that the un-uniformed Pakistan army regulars moved in. Even now, the daily spree of terrorist attacks on military positions in J&K are the handiwork of these same mujahideen.
Every day for the past decade, shockingly large quantities of arms, ammunition, and evidence of high-tech support are discovered in search-and-destroy operations in the besieged state. On an average day, it is not unusual to read in the daily army reports that among the arms recovered were Stinger Missiles, Kalishnikovs, grenades, mortars, and other heavy-duty weaponry. These are expensive weapons, and expert training in their use doesn't come cheap either. Military intelligence has learned that the most experienced mujahideen -- veterans of the rebellion -- are often paid as much as Rs 30,000 a month, a far cry from the pittance that most civilians-turned-militants were being paid during the days of the local insurgency in Kashmir.
So where do all these arms, training, and veterans come from to inflict wounds on our already bleeding borders? From those same US-funded and supported programmes, of course. Today, all those billions of dollars pumped into Afghanistan by the USA are being used against India. No wonder then that after a hiatus of almost thirty years, the Clinton administration became the first US government to actively involve itself in dialogues with India and Pakistan over the Kashmir problem. Not since Kennedy has any US president shown such a keen interest in resolving this issue.
Of course, the detonation of India's nuclear weapons and the similar nuclear response from Pakistan has been a major factor in this renewed US interest. But Pokhran-II, as the name suggests, was India's second round of tests. Whatever the public claims may be, the US knows quite well that India possessed the ability to build a nuclear weapon for almost two decades. What they're really worried about now is not that a nuclear conflagration might explode in the region, but that their own past errors of commission and omission might come home to roost.
Already, the US has seen the bitter result of funding what can only be called terrorist regimes in Third World countries. The growth of Osama bin Laden is a perfect example: Where do such monsters come from if not from US foreign policy? Would the mujahideen have the resources, the men and the confidence to wage its proxy war on behalf of Pakistan in J&K if not for all that US support? The spate of terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre, the CIA head office at Langley, the bombing in Ohio, and other events were all part of the backlash created by previous US "interference" in other nations' affairs. Today, more and more American bureaucrats and senators are increasingly protesting against any continuation of the supercop approach to foreign affairs management.
The defeat of Clinton's pet CTBT bill in his own senate underlined this fact. What right does the world's most nuclear-prolific nation have to police other nations? India's demand for total nuclear disarmament is not a stalling tactic, as some critics have groused, but a legitimate demand. We'll do as you do, not as you say, is the message that Vajpayee has thrown back at the US. Hopefully, someone in Washington is getting the message.
A perfect example of the USA's double-standard is visible in its Cuba policy: After the US military's 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba, the Americans wanted the entire world, starting with Mexico, to declare Cuba a security threat. In 1997, still seething over the matter, the Clinton government pushed through the Helms-Burton Act, which proposed sanctions against any corporate entity, in the US or outside, which did business with Cuba. This includes the stopping of all humanitarian aid such as the supply of food and medicines in a crisis!
In contrast, after the recent military coup in Pakistan, not only has the US not been half as stringent in imposing sanctions, it has been almost benevolently watchful in its attitude. While a democratically elected government is overthrown and with no sign of a return to democracy in the near future, the US buffs its nails and manages to look blissfully unconcerned. Even if the threatened sanctions against Pakistan are imposed, they don't entail anything even remotely similar to the harshness of the Helms-Burton Act. Business will continue, so will various aid packages, and even World Bank loans for certain categories.
The reason for this dichotomy in the US approach to Pakistan versus Cuba is simple: Cuba is within easy missile-launching distance of the US coast. Never mind that it poses no threat at all to the world's largest superpower. Its existence is enough to make America's skin crawl. While Pakistan is much too far away to harm the US directly in any way. The fact that it can and is harming its neighbour India, using US-provided funding, weaponry and militant training doesn't seem to bother America. American blood and borders are inviolate: India's on the other hand, are cheap.
It is time to tell the US to get off its high-moral ground and atone for its own mistakes. Helping clean up the mess it has indirectly contributed to in Kashmir would be one way to start. It was the threat of imminent US back in 1953 that probably led Nehru and his government to back off from a direct confrontation with Pakistan over Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. If not for the fear of US military involvement, today Kashmir might well be united, Indian, and peaceful.
But most of all, it's time to demand that the US takes action to clear up its own backyard. The demand for the extradition of Osama bin Laden is a good start. But it came only after repeated clandestine attempts, allegedly by the CIA, to have the terrorist ganglord assassinated: It was these attempts that caused Laden's supporters to retaliate by bombing the World Trade Centre and similar targets. The US has made a career out of interfering in other nations affairs and leaving messes that have impacted adversely on regional politics in Asia, South America, and even central Europe for decades afterwards. Today, the mujahideen are just as active in Kosovo and Chechnya as in Kashmir.
Take back your rocket launchers, Mr Clinton. Take back your CIA-trained terrorists,your dollar-funded mujahideen, your anti-communist hoodlums. Take all the billions of dollars worth of lethal weaponry being used in Kashmir today. Take it all, and shove it up your...um, arsenal.
---
The Military Coup in Pakistan: Implications for Nuclear Stability in South Asia
The Rediff Special/Gaurav Kampani 12/99
http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/nov/02pak.htm
The ouster of a legitimately constituted civilian government by the army for the fourth time in Pakistan's 52-year old history, has underscored the question of political stability and viability of democracy in the country.
From an arms control perspective, the military takeover raises significant questions about nuclear stability in South Asia. Concerns have centered around five issues: (1) the removal of civilian filters in the nuclear decision-making process; (2) reported divisions within the higher echelons of Pakistan's army that may impact on the custody of nuclear weapons; (3) whether the replacement of a civilian government with military hardliners will result in the intensification of the low-intensity war between India and Pakistan in Kashmir with risks of escalation to the conventional and nuclear levels; (4) whether the imposition of additional economic sanctions on Pakistan by the United States and international financial institutions will weaken the Pakistani government's commitment to export controls on nuclear technologies; and finally (5) Pakistan's commitment to multilateral arms control measures such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
Civilian Filters and Nuclear Decision-Making
Fears that the coup could leave Pakistan's nuclear arsenal in the military's hands, unfettered by civilian control, are exaggerated. The degree of actual civilian participation in Pakistan's nuclear decision-making has always been limited. In Pakistan, the military has been responsible for major decisions on defense, security, and nuclear issues. The civilian governments have participated in the process, but only in a supportive role. Pakistani observers also doubt whether any civilian government would have had access to such information as the precise number of nuclear warheads that Pakistan has in its inventory, nuclear storage sites, number of delivery vehicles, operational readiness, existing fissile material stocks, future production rates, command and control chain, future plans on the architecture of the nuclear deterrent, and so forth.
Former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has claimed that she was never privy to the more sensitive nuclear secrets and was kept at the margins of the nuclear decision-making process by the military. The recently-deposed premier, Nawaz Sharief, might have had access to more information because of his better relations with the military at one juncture. In the aftermath of the nuclear tests conducted in May 1998, the Sharief government sought to assure its interlocutors that although the military in Pakistan retained custody of the nuclear forces, final release authority rested with the civilians.
Nonetheless, it is doubtful if the civilian government in Pakistan ever controlled the nuclear button. The civilian finger was probably one among two or three that controlled the nuclear button. The unsettling implications of this and the recent falling out between Sharief and the army over the withdrawal from Kargil would suggest that direct communications between an Indian civilian chief executive and his or her Pakistani counterpart may be insufficient to control a volatile situation or crisis in the future.
Custodial Control over Nuclear Forces
Reports of divisions within the higher echelons of Pakistan's army have raised other grounds for concern. Pakistan's army remains the last viable institution of state; it also has custodial control over the country's nuclear arsenal. Divisions within the military command over policy could have potentially dangerous implications for the custody and security of nuclear warheads, delivery systems, nuclear materials, export controls, and nuclear terrorism.
The divisions within the higher military command were highlighted when General Musharraf retired his Quetta Corps Commander, Lt General Tariq Perwaiz on charges of holding an unauthorized meeting with Nawaz Sharief a week before the coup. Similarly, Lt General Saleem Haider, Corps Commander, Mangla, was transferred for leaking information about a Corps Commanders conference to the political leadership. Following the coup, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto told CNN that Pakistan was in the midst of a "civil war" as armed units loyal to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharief were resisting coup orders. The manner in which Sharief fired Musharraf and tried to foist the head of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate, Lt General Khwaja Ziauddin, on the army hints of cracks in the military command. Addressing the nation soon after deposing Nawaz Sharief, the coup leader, and now Chief Executive of Pakistan, General Musharraf, cited Sharief's attempts to divide the army as one of the primary reasons that led it to stage a coup.
Despite several indicators of differences within the army, the smoothness of the army takeover suggests that the unity of the Pakistani army as an institution remains intact. The majority of the Corps Commanders and the junior services (air force and navy) sided with General Musharraf to depose the civilian government. Although internal differences may have existed over policy, these do not necessarily extend to the nuclear realm. The army retains custodial control over Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and that custody remains robust.
Intensification of the Low-Intensity War in Kashmir
However, the ascendancy of the military in Islamabad could lead to a stepping up of the low-intensity war between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. General Musharraf is rumored to be an anti-India hardliner. He is also believed to be the key instigator behind the Pakistan army and Mujahideen's spring 1999 intrusion and seizure of the Kargil heights on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir.
In the wake of the coup, two schools of thought have emerged in New Delhi. The first school discounts the prospects of increased tensions or crises along the Indo-Pakistani border. The Pakistani army, according to this view, is more likely to become preoccupied with the day to day tasks of governance. Pakistan's failure to internationalize Kashmir, military setback in Kargil, diplomatic isolation, economic crisis, and the closure of strategic passes with the onset of winter, provide disincentives for another Kargil-type venture or increased support to the Kashmiri militants.
However, there also exists a contrarian view, which regards the ascendancy of the military in Pakistan with great alarm. Proponents of this view believe that Nawaz Sharief was India's best bet in Islamabad. With his ouster, the Lahore peace process is dead. India can now expect increased tensions over Kashmir. Musharraf has already identified Kashmir as a core concern and reiterated Pakistan's support to the Kashmiri militants. With the civilians out of the reckoning in Islamabad, there exsist few, if any, institutional curbs on the Pakistani military from repeating its mistakes. The pessimists in New Delhi also fear that the army might try and avenge Pakistan's diplomatic and military humiliation by intensifying the sub-conventional war in Kashmir.
Musharraf has sought to allay Indian and US concerns of renewed border tensions and crisis escalation by ordering a unilateral withdrawal of the Pakistani army units along the international border in Punjab and Rajasthan. However, he has ruled out any reductions along the LoC in Kashmir. The Indian foreign and military establishment does not regard Pakistan's unilateral withdrawal as a meaningful confidence building measure (CBM) so long as Pakistan continues to support the Kashmiri militants. India has also made the resumption of any negotiations with Pakistan contingent on what New Delhi describes a reduction in "cross-border terrorism."
Hence, the military coup in Pakistan has raised the likelihood of greater tensions between the South Asian rivals in Kashmir. Indian counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir and Pakistani-backed infiltration and exfiltration operations along the LoC have the potential to escalate to a large-scale conventional war and possibly a nuclear exchange.
Commitments on Nuclear Export Controls
Finally, there are concerns that economic sanctions imposed by the United States and the international community in the wake of the military coup could worsen Pakistan's macro-economic crisis. Sanctions might force a bankrupt Pakistani government to sell its nuclear and missile technologies abroad. Further, sanctions could also detract from the goal of securing Pakistani cooperation on critical multilateral arms control agreements such as the CTBT.
These concerns need to be tempered with a dose of realism. Although the United States is opposed to the overthrow of democracy in Pakistan, there is a growing realization in Washington that the United States has very little direct influence with the Pakistani army. Pakistan was already severely sanctioned as a consequence of its May 1998 nuclear tests. Washington has therefore indicated that it is prepared to deal with the new military regime in Islamabad. The Clinton administration is no longer insisting on the immediate restoration of a civilian government to power. Instead, Washington has demanded a timetable for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan.
Pakistan currently owes nearly $30 billion in external debts. Its hard currency reserves of little over $1 billion are barely sufficient to cover a few weeks of imports and are rapidly dwindling. It is thus critically dependent on the Paris Club for debt restructuring and continued international institutional lending to keep its external sector solvent. In light of the high possibility of sanctions-induced economic and political instability in Pakistan, the Clinton administration is unlikely to go beyond imposing the very limited sanctions that are mandated under Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act or to lean on international financial institutions to terminate support for Pakistan's economy.
The erstwhile civilian government in Pakistan had made the signing of the CTBT contingent on two conditions: (a) an easing of the coercive atmosphere (read US economic and technological sanctions regime that was constituted to punish Pakistan for its May 1998 nuclear tests); and (b) India's signature of the CTBT.
After the US Congress granted a permanent sanctions waiver authority to the executive branch, the Clinton administration was expected to provide sanctions relief to Pakistan in order to persuade it to sign the CTBT. The military coup has obviously put a brake on the momentum of events forcing the Clinton administration to respond with a partial sanctions waiver. However more sanctions relief can be expected should Pakistan decide to sign the CTBT.
In his 17 October speech, General Musharraf reiterated Pakistan's commitment to a "nuclear and missile restraint" regime in South Asia and "sensitivity to global nonproliferation and disarmament objectives." Economic revival, tax reforms, and restoring domestic and foreign investor confidence in the Pakistani economy remain high on the army's agenda. Should Pakistan's economy improve as a result of a new wave of reforms, then there would be less pressure on the present or any future Pakistani government to contemplate nuclear and missile sales to bolster a precarious economic situation.
Conclusion
The military coup has provided a setback to the prospects of some form of formal civilian control over Pakistan's nuclear deterrent. Although the armed forces would have retained operational control under any civilian disposition, a formalized civilian institutional setting would have provided more room for caution, deliberation, and crisis stability. The coup brought to light sharp divisions within the military at the Corps Commander level; it highlighted the institutional schism between the ISI and the army. However, there is no evidence of vertical divisions within the army and the military as an institution. The cracks that were visible just before the coup appear to have been papered over. However, if the political impasse continues, economic pressures mount, and sectarian violence worsens further, those cracks could reappear.
A more serious cause for concern is the possibility of greater armed support by the Pakistani military to the militants fighting the Indian government in Kashmir. Such a policy would invariably lead to a state of permanent tension between New Delhi and Islamabad. A repeat of Kargil-type operations in the future could also increase the chances for an expanded conventional war and nuclear exchange in the region.
The Indian government could also respond by encouraging and arming disgruntled ethnic and sectarian groups within Pakistan. Another option often debated in New Delhi is to drive Pakistan into bankruptcy by forcing it into an expensive conventional and nuclear arms race. In the medium- and long-term, both options might threaten the existence of the Pakistani state, with extremely dangerous implications for nuclear command and control, secure custody of nuclear weapons and materials, export controls on weapons of mass destruction technologies, and nuclear terrorism.
At present, Pakistan remains committed to export controls on sensitive nuclear technologies. There are also indications of Pakistan's willingness to sign the CTBT if the United States were to extend long-term sanctions relief. Pakistan's military regime might also sign the CTBT as a means of securing greater acceptability and legitimacy in Washington. However, Pakistan's ratification decision will be closely tied to the CTBT-debate in New Delhi and the ratification decisions of other nuclear weapon states.
Given the complexity of the above scenario, the international community must avoid sanctioning Pakistan any further. Political engagement and continued external financial lending would better serve to support the goals of restoring a viable system of democratic governance in the country. Engagement is also vital to secure the military regime's continued commitment to export controls and multilateral arms control agreements. The international community must also continue to support CBMs between India and Pakistan, discourage any Kargil-type military operations, and encourage the resumption of the Lahore peace process.
Although the international community cannot condone the removal of a democratically elected government through armed force, in Pakistan the existence of elected governments has never really translated into democratic governance. The supposedly democratic governments have epitomized tyranny, corruption, and misgovernance. The ambitious reforms outlined by Pakistan's army, therefore, provide some hope for social, economic, and political stability, and an eventual return to a more viable democracy in the near future.
Gaurav Kampani is a Research Associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the CNS or the Monterey Institute of International Studies
-------- china
China Dismisses U.S. Missile Base Charge
Reuters Updated 12:55 AM ET November 26, 1999
http://news.excite.com/news/r/991126/00/politics-arms-china
BEIJING (Reuters) - China dismissed on Thursday a U.S. newspaper report that it was constructing a missile-related base near Taiwan, saying the report had "ulterior motives."
Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun Yuxi said he had no information on the Washington Times report that U.S. spy satellites photographed the construction at the People's Liberation Army missile base in mid-October.
But Sun said any nation with a strong military deployed weapons every day.
The report had "ulterior motives," he told reporters.
A U.S. official later confirmed that there appeared to be missile-related construction at the site 480 km (300 miles) from Nationalist-ruled Taiwan, which Beijing regards as a breakaway province.
The United States closely monitors China's military buildup because of the potential threat to Taiwan and the region. China has threatened to invade if Taiwan declares independence.
Sun repeated that China was opposed to U.S. plans to build an anti-missile defense system or any attempt to include Taiwan under the umbrella.
Asked if China would build an anti-missile system, Sun said China would not join an arms race, but had the right to possess a small number of nuclear weapons and missiles for defensive purposes.
Sun said U.S. efforts to develop anti-missile missiles, known as the National Missile Defense (NMD) system, would have an adverse impact on the global and regional strategic balance and stability in the 21st century.
The United States wants to amend the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to permit it to build a limited defense against any missile attack on U.S. troops stationed abroad by "rogue states," such as North Korea and Iran.
The treaty limits defense systems designed to shoot down enemy missiles on the theory that such shields would only tempt the other side to build more missiles to overwhelm the defenses.
Russia, which has rejected U.S. offers to amend the ABM treaty, flexed its military muscles this month. It test fired one of its short-range anti-missile rockets and, for the first time in six years, and an old nuclear-capable tactical missile.
-------- syria
Report: Syria tested chemical bomb
Jerusalem Post Sunday, November 28, 1999 19 Kislev 5760 By ARIEH O'SULLIVAN
http://www.jpost.com/com/Archive/28.Nov.1999/News/Article-1.html
TEL AVIV (November 28) - Syrian military forces late last month conducted a live chemical weapons bombing test, The Washington Times reported on Friday.
The test was carried out by what the report said was a Syrian Air Force MiG-23 jet that dropped a chemical weapons-laden bomb on a practice range in Syria. The bombing was detected by US spy satellites.
It reportedly left a distinct coloration on the impact area that US intelligence agencies believe was due to a chemical explosion. Pentagon officials said the chemical agent is not known. But Syria is known to have several types of poison gas, including the nerve agent sarin. The test demonstrated that Syria can use the chemical munitions in both aircraft bombs and ballistic missiles.
Senior Israeli intelligence sources could not be reached over the weekend for comment on the report, but they have said recently that Syria is concerned about the deployment of the Arrow 2 anti-missile defense system. The reported test of the Syrian, air-launched chemical bomb came just a few days before the successful and final test of the Arrow 2, which paved the way for its initial deployment early next year.
The IAF sees Syria's surface-to-surface missile threat as the greatest immediate danger to the state, because of its chemical warhead potential. Syria is estimated to have between 300 to 400 Scud B and Scud C missiles with about two dozen launchers. In addition to this, Israeli sources said, Syria is reinforcing its missile silos and taking other steps to protect its missile launchers from attack.
Israeli sources have recently revealed that Syria is developing a new longer-range, Scud D which could be tipped with a "cluster" non-conventional warhead. With a 700-kilometer range, it would be able to strike at Israel from deep inside Syrian territory.
Israeli sources said that it could be ready in less than a year. The missile program tops Syrian military priorities and Damascus is receiving help from Iran in developing the rockets. Both the missiles and the engines are made in Syria.
The Syrian chemical weapons test bolstered fears by Pentagon officials that any future Middle East war will be dirty, the Washington Times said. Pentagon officials quoted by the newspaper said the chemical weapons test was a reminder of the Clinton administration's over-reliance on arms control pacts, such as the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention, which bans the production and stockpiling of the deadly arms.
Syria is not a signatory to the treaty and has developed the weapons as a counter to Israel's arsenal of nuclear missiles, the newspaper said.
Itim adds:
Danny Yatom, the prime minister's chief of staff, rejected the claim by Syrian President Hafez Assad that Prime Minister Ehud Barak would back off from a unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon.
Yatom, who was speaking on Channel 2's morning current affairs program with Dan Margalit, was responding to a Friday report in Yediot Aharonot that said Assad believed Barak wouldn't pull back unilaterally.
"The State of Israel desires an agreement with Syria before leaving Lebanon, but whatever happens, the IDF will regroup on the international border in July 2000," he said.
-------- israel
Barak Discusses Iran With Chinese By The Associated Press
New York Times November 28, 1999 Filed at 4:35 p.m. EDT
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/i/AP-Israel-China.html
JERUSALEM (AP) -- Prime Minister Ehud Barak on Sunday told Li Peng, the No. 2 official in China's Communist Party, that Israel is concerned that China is selling arms to Iran.
Israel is worried about Iran's development of the Shahab-4 missile, which has a range of 800 miles, and its attempts to build nuclear weapons. Israel has accused China, Russia and North Korea of selling Iran the technology and know-how for its arms programs, but Chinese leaders have denied it, Israeli officials have said in the past.
``The prime minister raised the regional threats to Israel and, in this regard, especially emphasized the threat of arming Iran,'' Barak's office said in a statement.
Li, speaker of China's National People's Congress, emphasized that his country has normal relations with Iran, according to Barak's office.
The two leaders had a lighter moment while posing for photographers before their meeting.
Standing in front of Israeli and Chinese flags, Li asked Barak his height.
When the stocky Israeli responded that he is 5 feet 6 six inches tall, Li smiled and said he was about the same height.
``(But) you represent 1 billion and 200 million people and I, only 6 million,'' Barak answered.
Li, who arrived Thursday for a five-day visit to Israel and the Palestinian areas, commended Barak for advancing peace negotiations with the Palestinians. Li said Saturday that China supports the Palestinian ``sacred goal'' of statehood.
The two leaders expressed satisfaction with the relations between their countries and hope that ties will improve, Barak's office said.
Earlier Sunday, Li toured holy sites in Jerusalem's Old City, stopping at gift shops to look at olive wood sculptures depicting Jesus in the Biblical manger scene. At one store, Li tried unsuccessfully to blow into a ram's horn, which is used by religious Jews on the Jewish New Year
------ du
Army DU training video
http://www.amc.army.mil/amc/sf/du.html
The Army has produced a new depleted uranium training video. It was released in October 1999. Only the first five minutes downloaded for me, but perhaps you will have better luck. The Army's first DU video, completed in 1995, has been shelved supposedly because the Army did not like images of soldiers wearing full protective suits when climbing on DU-contaminated tanks. For a copy of the original Army video, contact me at mtpd-@dclink.com.
Dan Fahey
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Depleted Uranium found as Coloring Matter in Enamel
http://www.egroups.com/group/du-list/1851.html?
See also CRII-RAD release of Oct. 27, 1999 (in French):
http://www.criirad.com/criirad/actualites/uranium.appauvri.html
Depleted uranium was found in yellow enamel powder sold by a French company, and in pieces of enamel jewelry.
By gamma spectrometic monitoring done at the independent laboratory of CRII-RAD, a uranium concentration of 10% was found in the powder "jaune no.17"; the uranium was depleted to 0.23% uranium-235. The dose rate at the surface of the powder was 8 micro-Sv/h. Jewelry pieces identified as made with this enamel powder were enamel plates, pendants, and rings. The dose rate at the surface of the jewelry pieces was 6.7 micro-Sv/h.
The powder is sold at a price of 480 FF (US$ 74) per kg incl. tax by Cristallerie de Saint-Paul at Condat-sur-Vienne (Haute-Vienne), the only producer of enamel powder for use on copper, silver, and gold in France. Until very recently, the powder was sold without any mention of its hazards.
For the handicraft-artists using the powder for manufacturing enamel jewelry, the powder presents an inhalation hazard. The annual dose limit for the public of 1 mSv corresponds to the inhalation of 14 - 45 milli-grams of the powder (depending on age).
For the users of the jewelry, there exists the external radiation hazard to the skin: for continuous exposure, the skin dose would be 58.7 mSv per year. There moreover exists the risk of dissolution of toxic uranium from the enamel.
Nothing is known so far on the source of the depleted uranium used in the powder. But, it most probably comes from Cogema's Pierrelatte facility, where depleted UF6 is being converted to the form of U3O8 for long-term storage in the Bessines storage facility.
Uranium was widely used as a coloring matter for porcelain and glass in the 19th century. The total production of uranium colors was 260 tonnes (with an uranium contents of 70%), 150 tonnes of which were used for uranium glass. While the uranium in those times had to be mined at high cost, depleted uranium now is available at virtually no cost, since it is a waste from the uranium enrichment process.
This use of depleted uranium in enamel resumes, after nearly 100 years, the practice of dispersing the radiating and toxic uranium in everyday's items, a practice that was believed to be a matter of history.
Peter Diehl E-Mail: p.dieh-@sik.de
Am Schwedenteich 4, D-01477 Arnsdorf, Germany
Tel.+Fax: +49-35200-20737
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Rockefeller Report --
Is Military Research Hazardous To Veterans' Health?
Lessons Spanning Half A Century
A Staff Report Prepared For The Committee On Veterans' Affairs
United States Senate December 8, 1994
http://www.gulfweb.org/bigdoc/rockrep.cfm
103d Congress, 2d Session - COMMITTEE PRINT - S. Prt. 103-97
John D. Rockefeller Iv, West Virginia, Chairman
Dennis Deconcini, Arizona
Frank H. Murkowski, Alaska
George J. Mitchell, Maine
Strom Thurmond, South Carolina
Bob Graham, Florida
Alan K. Simpson, Wyoming
Daniel K. Akaka, Hawaii
Arlen Specter, Pennsylvania
Thomas A. Daschle, South Dakota
James M. Jeffords, Vermont
Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Colorado
Jim Gottlieb, Chief Counsel/Staff Director
John H. Moseman, Minority Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Diana M. Zuckerman, Professional Staff Member
Patricia Olson, Congressional Science Fellow
FOREWORD
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Veterans' Affairs,
Washington, DC, December 8, 1994
During the last few years, the public has become aware of several examples where U.S. Government researchers intentionally exposed Americans to potentially dangerous substances without their knowledge or consent. The Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, which I have been privileged to chair from 1993-94, has conducted a comprehensive analysis of the extent to which veterans participated in such research while they were serving in the U.S. military. This resulted in two hearings, on May 6, 1994, and August 5, 1994.
This report, written by the majority staff of the Committee, is the result of that comprehensive investigation, and is intended to provide information for future deliberations by the Congress. The findings and conclusions contained in this report are those of the majority staff and do not necessarily reflect the views of the members of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.
This report would not have been possible without the dedication and expertise of Dr. Patricia Olson, who, as a Congressional Science Fellow, worked tirelessly on this investigation and report, and the keen intelligence, energy, and commitment of Dr. Diana Zuckerman, who directed this effort.
John D. Rockefeller IV, Chairman
CONTENTS
I. Introduction
II. Background
Codes, declarations, and laws governing human experimentation
Mustard gas and lewisite
Seventh-Day Adventists
Dugway Proving Ground
Radiation exposure
Hallucinogens
G. Investigational drugs
III. Findings and conclusions
A. For at least 50 years, DOD has intentionally exposed military personnel to potentially dangerous substances, often in secret
B. DOD has repeatedly failed to comply with required ethical standards when using human subjects in military research during war or threat of war
C. DOD incorrectly claims that since their goal was treatment, the use of investigational drugs in the Persian Gulf War was not research
D. DOD used investigational drugs in the Persian Gulf War in ways that were not effective
E. DOD did not know whether pyridostigmine bromide would be safe for use by U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf War
F. When U.S. troops were sent to the Persian Gulf in 1994, DOD still did not have proof that pyridostigmine bromide was safe for use as an antidote enhancer G. Pyridostigmine may be more dangerous in combination with pesticides and other exposures
H. The safety of the botulism vaccine was not established prior to the Persian Gulf War
I. Records of anthrax vaccinations are not suitable to evaluate safety
J. Army regulations exempt informed consent for volunteers in some types of military research
K. DOD and DVA have repeatedly failed to provide information and medical followup to those who participate in military research or are ordered to take investigational drugs
L. The Federal Government has failed to support scientific studies that provide information about the reproductive problems experienced by veterans who were intentionally exposed to potentially dangerous substances
M. The Federal Government has failed to support scientific studies that provide timely information for compensation decisions regarding military personnel who were harmed by various exposures
N. Participation in military research is rarely included in military medical records, making it impossible to support a veteran's claim for service-connected disabilities from military research
O. DOD has demonstrated a pattern of misrepresenting the danger of various military exposures that continues today
IV. Recommendations
A. Congress should deny the DOD request for a blanket waiver to use investigational drugs in case of war or threat of war
B. FDA should reject any applications from DOD that do not include data on women, and long-term followup data
C. Congress should authorize a centralized database for all federally funded experiments that utilize human subjects
D. Congress should mandate all Federal agencies to declassify most documents on research involving human subjects
E. Congress should reestablish a National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects
F. VA and DOD should implement regular site visits to review Institutional Review Boards
G. The Feres Doctrine should not be applied for military personnel who are harmed by inappropriate human experimentation when informed consent has not been given
Appendix -- Survey of 150 Persian Gulf War Veterans
http://www.gulfweb.org/bigdoc/rockrep.cfm#appendix
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last 50 years, hundreds of thousands of military personnel have been involved in human experimentation and other intentional exposures conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD), often without a servicemember's knowledge or consent. In some cases, soldiers who consented to serve as human subjects found themselves participating in experiments quite different from those described at the time they volunteered. For example, thousands of World War II veterans who originally volunteered to "test summer clothing" in exchange for extra leave time, found themselves in gas chambers testing the effects of mustard gas and lewisite. (Note 1) Additionally, soldiers were sometimes ordered by commanding officers to "volunteer" to participate in research or face dire consequences. For example, several Persian Gulf War veterans interviewed by Committee staff reported that they were ordered to take experimental vaccines during Operation Desert Shield or face prison. (Note 2)
The goals of many of the military experiments and exposures were very appropriate. For example, some experiments were intended to provide important information about how to protect U.S. troops from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons or other dangerous substances during wartime. In the Persian Gulf War, U.S. troops were intentionally exposed to an investigational vaccine that was intended to protect them against biological warfare, and they were given pyridostigmine bromide pills in an experimental protocol intended to protect them against chemical warfare.
However, some of the studies that have been conducted had more questionable motives. For example, the Department of Defense (DOD) conducted numerous "man-break" tests, exposing soldiers to chemical weapons in order to determine the exposure level that would cause a casualty, i.e., "break a man." (Note 3) Similarly, hundreds of soldiers were subjected to hallucinogens in experimental programs conducted by the DOD in participation with, or sponsored by, the CIA. (Note 4), (Note 5) These servicemembers often unwittingly participated as human subjects in tests for drugs intended for mind-control or behavior modification, often without their knowledge or consent. Although the ultimate goal of those experiments was to provide information that would help U.S. military and intelligence efforts, most Americans would agree that the use of soldiers as unwitting guinea pigs in experiments that were designed to harm them, at least temporarily, is not ethical.
Whether the goals of these experiments and exposures were worthy or not, these experiences put hundred of thousands of U.S. servicemembers at risk, and may have caused lasting harm to many individuals.
Every year, thousands of experiments utilizing human subjects are still being conducted by, or on behalf of, the DOD. Many of these ongoing experiments have very appropriate goals, such as obtaining information for preventing, diagnosing, and treating various diseases and disabilities acquired during military service. Although military personnel are the logical choice as human subjects for such research, it is questionable whether the military hierarchy allows for individuals in subordinate positions of power to refuse to participate in military experiments. It is also questionable whether those who participated as human subjects in military research were given adequate information to fully understand the potential benefits and risks of the experiments. Moreover, the evidence suggests that they have not been adequately monitored for adverse health effects after the experimental protocols end.
Veterans who become ill or disabled due to military service are eligible to receive priority access to medical care at VA medical facilities and to receive monthly compensation checks. In order to qualify, they must demonstrate that their illness or disability was associated with their military service. Veterans who did not know that they were exposed to dangerous substances while they were in the military, therefore, would not apply for or receive the medical care or compensation that they are entitled to. Moreover, even if they know about the exposure, it would be difficult or impossible to prove if the military has not kept adequate records. It is therefore crucial that the VA learn as much as possible about the potential exposures, and that the DOD assume responsibility for providing such information to veterans and to the VA.
II. BACKGROUND
A. CODES, DECLARATIONS, AND LAWS GOVERNING HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION
The Nuremberg Code is a 10-point declaration governing human experimentation, developed by the Allies after World War II in response to inhumane experiments conducted by Nazi scientists and physicians. The Code states that voluntary and informed consent is absolutely essential from all human subjects who participate in research, whether during war or peace. The Code states:
The person involved should have the legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject, there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonable to be expected; and the effects upon his health and person which may possibly come from his participation in the experiments. (Note 6)
There is no provision in the Nuremberg Code that allows a country to waive informed consent for military personnel or veterans who serve as human subjects in experiments during wartime or in experiments that are conducted because of threat of war. However, the DOD has recently argued that wartime experimental requirements differ from peacetime requirements for informed consent. According to the Pentagon, "In all peacetime applications, we believe strongly in informed consent and its ethical foundations.....But military combat is different." (Note 7) The DOD argued that informed consent should be waived for investigational drugs that could possibly save a soldier's life, avoid endangerment of the other personnel in his unit, and accomplish the combat mission.
More than a decade after the development of the Nuremberg Code, the World Medical Association prepared recommendations as a guide to doctors using human subjects in biomedical research. As a result, in 1964 the Eighteenth World Medical Assembly met in Helsinki, Finland, and adopted recommendations to be used as an ethical code by all medical doctors conducting biomedical research with human subjects. This code, referred to as the Declaration of Helsinki, was revised in 1975, 1983, and 1989. (Note 8) It differs from the Nuremberg Code in certain important respects. The Declaration of Helsinki distinguishes between clinical (therapeutic) and nonclinical (nontherapeutic) biomedical research, and addresses "proxy consent" for human subjects who are legally incompetent, such as children or adults with severe physical or mental disabilities. (Note 9) Proxy consent for legally competent military personnel who participate in military research is not considered appropriate under the Nuremberg Code or the Declaration of Helsinki.
On June 18, 1991, the Federal Government announced that 16 U.S. governmental agencies would abide by a set of regulations, referred to as the "Common Rule," designed to protect human subjects who participate in federally funded research. (Note 10) The provisions of the "Common Rule," first promulgated for the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) in 1974, described how federally funded research involving human subjects shall be conducted. However, local Institutional Review Boards (IRB's) may revise or exclude some or all consent elements if the research exposes subjects to no more than "minimal risk," meaning "that the probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests." (Note 11) IRB's vary greatly in their interpretation of the risks of daily life.
There are three provisions governing research funded by DHHS that are intended to protect vulnerable populations, such as pregnant women and fetuses, prisoners, and children. (Note 12) There are no special Federal regulations to protect military personnel when they participate as human subjects in federally funded research, despite logical questions about whether military personnel can truly "volunteer" in response to a request from a superior officer.
Current law prevents the Department of Defense from using Federal funds for research involving the use of human experimental subjects, unless the subject gives informed consent in advance. This law applies regardless of whether the research is intended to benefit the subject. (Note 13)
B. MUSTARD GAS AND LEWISITE
According to a report published by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) last year, approximately 60,000 military personnel were used as human subjects in the 1940's to test two chemical agents, mustard gas and lewisite. Most of these subjects were not informed of the nature of the experiments and never received medical followup after their participation in the research. (Note 14) Additionally, some of these human subjects were threatened with imprisonment at Fort Leavenworth if they discussed these experiments with anyone, including their wives, parents, and family doctors. (Note 15) For decades, the Pentagon denied that the research had taken place, resulting in decades of suffering for many veterans who became ill after the secret testing. According to the 1993 IOM report, such denial by the DOD continues: "This committee discovered that an atmosphere of secrecy still exists to some extent regarding the WWII testing programs. Although many documents pertaining to the WWII testing programs were declassified shortly after the war ended, others were not." (Note 16)
Based on findings from the National Academy of Sciences, the Department of Veterans Affairs recently published a final rule to compensate veterans for disabilities or deaths resulting from the long-term effects of inservice exposure to mustard gas and other agents which blister the skin (these are called vesicants). (Note 17) The final rule expands coverage to veterans exposed to mustard gas under battlefield conditions in World War I (WWI), those present at the German air raid on the harbor of Bari, Italy (WWII), and those engaged in manufacturing and handling vesicant agents during their military service. Thus, for the first time, VA will compensate certain veterans for illnesses which may have been caused by their exposure to vesicants over half a century ago.
C. SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS
Many experiments that tested various biological agents on human subjects, referred to as Operation Whitecoat, were carried out at Fort Detrick, MD, in the 1950's. The human subjects originally consisted of volunteer enlisted men. However, after the enlisted men staged a sitdown strike to obtain more information about the dangers of the biological tests, Seventh-Day Adventists who were conscientious objectors were recruited for the studies. (Note 18) Because these individuals did not believe in engaging in actual combat, they instead volunteered to be human subjects in military research projects that tested various infectious agents. At least 2,200 military personnel who were Seventh-Day Adventists volunteered for biological testing during the 1950's through the 1970's. (Note 19)
Unlike most of the studies discussed in this report, Operation Whitecoat was truly voluntary. Leaders of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church described these human subjects as "conscientious participants," rather than "conscientious objectors," because they were willing to risk their lives by participating in research rather than by fighting a war. (Note 20), (Note 21)
D. DUGWAY PROVING GROUND
Dugway Proving Ground is a military testing facility located approximately 80 miles from Salt Lake City. For several decades, Dugway has been the site of testing for various chemical and biological agents. From 1951 through 1969, hundreds, perhaps thousands of open-air tests using bacteria and viruses that cause disease in human, animals, and plants were conducted at Dugway. (Note 22) For example, antigens produced by animals that had come in contact with Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis (VEE), a disease usually found in horses, were later found in animals around Dugway. Prior to the identification of these substances in the Dugway vicinity, VEE had only been identified in the rat population in Florida. Such a finding suggested that VEE had been used in the open-air tests at Dugway or within laboratories, and transferred to the nearby animal population. (Note 23)
In 1968, approximately 6,400 sheep died following the intentional release of a deadly nerve gas from a plane. According to a veterinarian who evaluated the sick and dying sheep, there was little doubt that the sheep had been poisoned with nerve gas. (Note 24) The sheep and other animals in the area had depressed cholinesterase levels, suggesting organophosphate nerve poisoning. Initially, the Department of Defense denied any responsibility for the accident, stating that the sheep died from organophosphate pesticides sprayed on a nearby alfalfa field. However, the nerve agent VX was identified when the poisoned sheep were autopsied, which made it clear that the deaths were not caused by pesticides. (Note 25) Eventually, the Department of Defense reimbursed the ranchers for their animals.
It is unknown how many people in the surrounding vicinity were also exposed to potentially harmful agents used in open-air tests at Dugway. In 1969, concerns were expressed at a congressional hearing about the possible public health implications of the VEE virus tested at Dugway. (Note 26)
Due to previous problems with dangerous organisms and chemicals, Dugway has developed an active program of "simulant" testing. According to the Department of Defense, simulants are harmless organisms or chemicals which do not cause disease. However, during 45 years of open-air testing, the Army has stopped using a variety simulants when they realized they were not as safe as previously believed. (Note 27)
E. RADIATION EXPOSURE
ATOMIC VETERANS
From 1945 to 1962, the United States conducted numerous nuclear detonation tests: Crossroads (Bikini); Sandstone, Greenhouse, and Ivy (Eniwetok Atoll); Castle (Bikini Atoll); Pacific Ocean 400 miles southwest of San Diego; Redwing and Hardtack I (Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls); Argus (South Atlantic); and Dominic (Christmas Island, Johnston Island, 400 miles west of San Diego). (Note 28) The main goal was to determine damage caused by the bombs; however, as a result, thousands of military personnel and civilians were exposed to radioactive fallout. Similar tests were conducted within the continental United States, including sites in New Mexico and Nevada. (Note 29) Veterans who participated in activities that directly exposed them to radioactive fallout are referred to as "atomic veterans."
Data obtained on some military personnel who were exposed to radioactive fallout were collected after these men were unintentionally exposed. However, some atomic veterans believe they were used as guinea pigs to determine the effects of radiation from various distances, including those at ground zero, on human subjects. Their suspicions are supported by a 1951 document from the Joint Panel on the Medical Aspects of Atomic Warfare, Research and Development Board, Department of Defense, which identified general criteria for bomb test-related "experiments" and identified 29 "specific problems" as "legitimate basis for biomedical participation." (Note 30)
The National Research Council's Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR) have prepared a series of reports to advise the U.S. Government on the health consequences of radiation exposure. (Note 31) The first of these reports was not published until the late 1980's, decades after military personnel were first exposed to ionizing radiation. For the last 13 years, the VA has provided free medical care to atomic veterans who have disorders they believe to be caused by ionizing radiation, even if there is no conclusive evidence of the cause. (Note 32) In addition, the VA provides monthly compensation to veterans who were exposed to ionizing radiation during military service, who have illnesses that are believed to be associated with their exposure. The lists of compensable diseases have been revised as more research information has become available. For example, on October 11, 1994, the VA announced that tumors of the brain and central nervous system would be considered for disability compensation for veterans exposed to ionizing radiation. (Note 33)
RADIATION RELEASES AT U.S. NUCLEAR SITES
In addition to detonation testing, radioactive releases were also intentionally conducted at U.S. nuclear sites in the years following World War II. According to the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), at least 12 planned radioactive releases occurred at three U.S. nuclear sites during 1948-1952. These tests were conducted at Oak Ridge, TN; Dugway, UT; and Los Alamos, NM. (Note 34) Additionally, a planned release occurred at Hanford, WA, in December 1949, which has been referred to as the Green Run test. It is not known how many civilians and military personnel were exposed to fallout from these tests.
OTHER EXPOSURES TO IONIZING RADIATION
In January 1994, the Clinton administration established a Human Radiation Interagency Working Group to coordinate a Government-wide effort to uncover the nature and extent of any Government-sponsored experiments on individuals involving intentional exposure to ionizing radiation. The working group represents the Administration's response to Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary's promise to comb Government files for information on hundreds of experiments conducted on people in the 1940's and 1950's.
To assist in identifying those people who may have been harmed by secret experiments utilizing ionizing radiation, the Clinton administration solicited complaints from possible victims by installing several telephone hotlines. As of September 1994, 86 percent of the 21,996 callers to the radiation hotline were veterans who believed they had participated in various radiation "experiments." (Note 35)
A VA advisory committee has concluded that activities other than atomic weapons tests and occupation force activities resulted in the exposure of veterans to ionizing radiation during their military service prior to 1970. (Note 36) The committee concluded that the records for many individuals who were exposed to such activities are inadequate or inaccessible. Additionally, the committee concluded that information pertinent to military exposures is not always adequate to evaluate the health risks.
F. HALLUCINOGENS
Working with the CIA, the Department of Defense gave hallucinogenic drugs to thousands of "volunteer" soldiers in the 1950's and 1960's. In addition to LSD, the Army also tested quinuclidinyl benzilate, a hallucinogen code-named BZ. (Note 37) Many of these tests were conducted under the so-called MKULTRA program, established to counter perceived Soviet and Chinese advances in brainwashing techniques. Between 1953 and 1964, the program consisted of 149 projects involving drug testing and other studies on unwitting human subjects. (Note 38)
One test subject was Lloyd B. Gamble, who enlisted in the U.S. Air Force in 1950. In 1957, he volunteered for a special program to test new military protective clothing. He was offered various incentives to participate in the program, including a liberal leave policy, family visitations, and superior living and recreational facilities. However, the greatest incentive to Mr. Gamble was the official recognition he would receive as a career-oriented noncommissioned officer, through letters of commendation and certification of participation in the program. During the 3 weeks of testing new clothing, he was given two or three water-size glasses of a liquid containing LSD to drink. Thereafter, Mr. Gamble developed erratic behavior and even attempted suicide. He did not learn that he had received LSD as a human subject until 18 years later, as a result of congressional hearings in 1975. (Note 39) Even then, the Department of the Army initially denied that he had participated in the experiments, although an official DOD publicity photograph showed him as one of the valiant servicemen volunteering for "a program that was in the highest national security interest." (Note 40)
According to Sidney Gottlieb, a medical doctor and former CIA agent, MKULTRA was established to investigate whether and how an individual's behavior could be modified by covert means. (Note 41) According to Dr. Gottlieb, the CIA believed that both the Soviet Union and Communist China might be using techniques of altering human behavior which were not understood by the United States. Dr. Gottlieb testified that "it was felt to be mandatory and of the utmost urgency for our intelligence organization to establish what was possible in this field on a high priority basis." Although many human subjects were not informed or protected, Dr. Gottlieb defended those actions by stating, "...harsh as it may seem in retrospect, it was felt that in an issue where national survival might be concerned, such a procedure and such a risk was a reasonable one to take." (Note 42)
G. INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS USED IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, all vaccines and medical products must be proven safe and effective by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in order to be sold and distributed in the United States. This law also applies to medical products used by the Department of Defense, even if given to U.S. troops who are stationed in other countries.
FDA also regulates medical products that are proven safe and effective for some uses or with specific doses, but not for other uses or other doses. If the product is only sold at certain doses and not others, its use at the non-approved dose would be considered investigational. If the product is legally available for sale at the same dosage, physicians can legally prescribe it; however, manufacturers can not advertise it for that purpose. Such "off label" use is also considered investigational. So, for example, a drug may be proven safe and effective to treat one kind of cancer, but be considered investigational to treat a different disease.
Under current law, an unapproved vaccine or investigational use of a drug could only be administered by the DOD under an Investigational New Drug (IND) procedure. (Note 43) Under an IND, any individual who is given the investigational product must give informed consent, i.e., must be told of the potential risks and benefits of the product, orally and in writing, and choose freely whether or not to participate. In addition, the IND requires that the medical product be distributed under carefully controlled conditions where safety and effectiveness can be evaluated.
When the Department of Defense began preparations for Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990, officials were extremely concerned that Iraq would use chemical and biological weapons against the United States. Despite years of study and billions of dollars, the DOD lacked drugs and vaccines that were proven safe and effective to safeguard against anticipated chemical nerve agents and biological toxins. Therefore, DOD officials wanted to use a medication (pyridostigmine bromide) and vaccine (botulinum toxoid) that they believed might protect against chemical nerve agents and botulism. Because the safety and effectiveness of pyridostigmine bromide and botulinum toxoid had not been proven for their intended use, these products were considered investigational drugs.
Pyridostigmine bromide is a chemical which enhances the effectiveness of two drugs, atropine and 2-PAM, which are proven effective for the treatment of nerve agent poisoning. (Note 44) Pyridostigmine is also a nerve agent itself. Nerve agents exert their biological effects by binding to, and inhibiting, the enzyme acetylcholinesterase (AChE) which normally shuts off the neurotransmitter, acetylcholine (ACh). When levels of ACh increase, nerve impulses and organ activity increase. When nerve and organ stimulation are excessive, death can result.
There are two major categories of nerve agents, carbamates and organophosphate (OP) compounds. (Note 45) German scientists developed many of the OP compounds for warfare agents and pesticides in the 1930's and 1940's. Examples of warfare agents include tabun, sarin, soman, and VX. Many organophosphates permanently inhibit AChE. This permanent effect, which can only be reversed when new enzymes are synthesized, makes OP warfare agents extremely lethal.
Pyridostigmine bromide is a carbamate, rather than an OP compound. (Note 46) Although it is a nerve agent, pyridostigmine has a reversible effect which can protect the AChE from permanently binding to OP compounds. When appropriate doses are selected, pyridostigmine theoretically should not cause nerve agent poisoning and should help protect against some lethal chemical warfare.
Efficacy. Pyridostigmine only works when taken in combination with other drugs and only if taken before exposure to nerve gas. (Note 47) Two antidotes to nerve agents, atropine and pyridine-2-aldoxime methochloride (2-PAM), are reportedly enhanced if pyridostigmine has already been given. Atropine and 2-PAM were included in the nerve agent antidote kits (Mark I) which were issued to U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf.
In research studies, animals given pyridostigmine, atropine, and 2-PAM were more likely to survive exposure to one chemical nerve agent, soman, than those given only atropine and 2-PAM. However, pyridostigmine is unable to enter and protect the brain, so that animals exposed to soman can still suffer from convulsions despite the pyridostigmine pretreatment. (Note 48) To protect against brain damage from ongoing seizure activity, valium may also be required following exposure to a warfare nerve agent. Similarly, pyridostigmine may offer little protection against the damage caused by nerve agents in the spinal cord. (Note 49)
Safety. Pyridostigmine bromide is approved by the FDA for treating myasthenia gravis, a neurological disease characterized by extreme weakness. This disease occurs when individuals develop antibodies that prevent ACh from causing muscle impulses at the neuromuscular junction. Therefore, treatment with relative high doses of pyridostigmine increases ACh to levels that are able to overcome the "block" created by the antibodies. An analogy might be that of a fishing pond. The two ways to increase the number of fish caught are to increase the number of fishing poles or to increase the number of fish in the pond.
FDA and DOD officials claimed they were confident of the safety of pyridostigmine as an antidote enhancer for chemical warfare protection because it would be used at a much lower dose (Note 50) in combat than normally used for treating patients with myasthenia gravis. However, normal patients and those with myasthenia gravis may not respond similarly to the same dose of pyridostigmine bromide. Whereas the dosage of pyridostigmine bromide for patients with myasthenia gravis may reach 120 mg every three hours, (Note 51) the dose for U.S. troops was only 30 mg every 8 hours. A good analogy is the use of insulin for diabetes mellitus; very high doses of insulin are sometimes necessary to treat diabetics, but similar doses could be fatal for non-diabetic individuals.
Some scientists also question whether pyridostigmine is completely safe even for treating patients with myasthenia gravis. The proportion of patients with myasthenia gravis that recover after surgical treatment (thymectomy) has decreased since pyridostigmine therapy was introduced several decades ago. (Note 52) Experts speculate that whereas the problems caused by myasthenia gravis can be corrected by surgery, pyridostigmine may cause immune damage to the neuromuscular junction that cannot be corrected by surgery. Since the symptoms of pyridostigmine damage would be similar to the symptoms of myasthenia gravis, any damage from the pyridostigmine would be extremely difficult if not impossible to diagnose.
In addition to its use for myasthenia gravis, pyridostigmine bromide has been approved by FDA for use with surgical patients; it is administered after surgery to reverse the effect of anesthesia, which are neuromuscular blocking agents. The dose is relatively small (15 mg) and not repeated. This treatment does not provide relevant information about the safety of repeated use of pyridostigmine by healthy individuals, since the dosage is small and the patients have received neuromuscular blocking agents.
The bromide that is included in pyridostigmine bromide pills is known to sometimes cause problems referred to as "bromide intoxication" when used for the treatment of myasthenia gravis. (Note 53) Bromide intoxication may cause confusion, irritability, tremor, memory loss, psychotic behavior, ataxia, stupor, and coma. Some patients with bromide intoxication have a skin disorder of the face and hands resembling acne. A 60 mg tablet of the commercially available pyridostigmine bromide contains 18.4 mg bromide (30.6 percent). (Note 54), (Note 55)
FDA has not approved pyridostigmine bromide for repeated use in healthy individuals as an antidote enhancer or for any other reason. Since it would be unethical to expose individuals to potentially lethal chemical weapons in order to evaluate the efficacy of pyridostigmine, this use has only been studied on animals. The product is therefore an investigational drug when used as an antidote enhancer for treating nerve gas poisoning.
Botulinum toxoid is an unapproved vaccine that is used to protect laboratory workers and others who are likely to be exposed to botulism. Botulism is caused by at least one of seven neurotoxins produced by the bacteria Clostridium botulinum. When home-canning of food was common, food poisoning was the most common cause of botulism in the United States; the bacteria in the food produces a toxin which is eaten. Today, the most common form of botulism occurs in infants, since the bacteria that produces the toxin can thrive in a baby's intestinal tract.
A botulism vaccine that is intended to protect against five of seven neurotoxins (called A,B,C,D,E) is produced by the Michigan Department of Health. This is called pentavalent toxoid. This vaccine is not a licensed product and must be distributed as an Investigational New Drug (IND).
Efficacy. Desert Shield began on August 8, 1990. Since the air war did not begin until January 16, 1991, and the ground war took place from February 24-27, 1991, the Pentagon had several months to review the possible use of investigational drugs and vaccines. In December 1990, the FDA advised the Department of Defense that it would be unable to test the botulism vaccine for efficacy, presumably because of limited time before the onset of the war. The FDA agreed to test the vaccine for safety, but these tests were not completed until late January 1991. At a meeting of the Informed Consent Waiver Review Group (ICWRG) on December 31, 1990, a representative of FDA's Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research discussed the vaccine, explaining that the existing supply was nearly 20 years old and consisted of three lots, stored under continuous refrigeration. (Note 56) Given the age of these vaccines, there were concerns about their safety.
The recommended schedule for immunization with the pentavalent vaccine includes a series of three initial injections at 0, 2, and 12 weeks, followed by a booster 12 months after the first injection. According to the Centers for Disease Control's Center for Infectious Diseases, subjects given the vaccine did not have detectable antitoxin titers after the first two shots in the initial series, which means that they were unlikely to be protected at week 2. (Note 57) If for any reason only two immunizations can be given, at least 4 to 8 weeks should elapse between injections if most individuals are to be protected against the disease. (Note 58)
Safety. The Michigan Department of Health reported that 4.2 percent of patients reported a sore arm or other local reactions to the initial series of three shots, and 12.1 percent had local reactions to the booster shots. (Note 59) Almost 3 percent had systemic reactions, such as general malaise, after either the initial three shots or the booster shots. Because of the relatively large percentage of adverse reactions, new lots of the vaccine were manufactured in 1971. However, there is no evidence that the newer lots produced fewer adverse reactions than the older lots.
In her review of the DOD's application for use of botulinum toxoid in the Persian Gulf, an FDA reviewer pointed out that in 1973, the Centers for Disease Control had considered terminating the distribution of the vaccine because of the relatively large number of individuals who had negative reactions to it. (Note 60) The FDA reviewer also pointed out that "there are no efficacy data in humans" and that the dose for humans was an estimate based on results from guinea pigs. In addition, potency testing had suggested that the vaccine would not be effective against two of the five botulism toxins.
According to the Michigan Department of Health, the effects of the botulism vaccine on pregnant women had not been studied prior to its use in the Persian Gulf War.
Anthrax vaccine is an FDA-approved vaccine that is considered safe and effective for individuals whose skin may come in contact with animal products such as hides, hair, or bones likely to contain the anthrax infection. It is also recommended for veterinarians and others who are likely to touch infected animals. (Note 61) However, the vaccine's effectiveness against inhaled anthrax is unknown. Unfortunately, when anthrax is used as a biological weapon, it is likely to be aerosolized and thus inhaled. Therefore, the efficacy of the vaccine against biological warfare is unknown.
It appears that there is only one relevant animal study which showed that anthrax vaccine apparently provided additional protection against relapse in monkeys exposed to inhalation anthrax and treated with antibiotics. (Note 62) Although the results of this study suggest the vaccine might protect against anthrax that has been sprayed, it is not sufficient to prove that anthrax vaccine is safe and effective as used in the Persian Gulf. The vaccine should therefore be considered investigational when used as a protection against biological warfare.
The anthrax vaccine is given as three injections 2 weeks apart, followed by three additional injections given 6, 12, and 18 months after the initial injection. If immunity is to be maintained, subsequent booster injections of anthrax vaccine are recommended at 1-year intervals. (Note 63) According to the Interagency Task Force on Persian Gulf War Illnesses, one dose provides some immunity in 85 percent of those individuals vaccinated. (Note 64)
According to the Michigan Department of Public Health which manufactures anthrax vaccine, it is not known whether anthrax vaccine is safe for pregnant women or their offspring.
III. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. FOR AT LEAST 50 YEARS, DOD HAS KNOWINGLY EXPOSED MILITARY PERSONNEL TO POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES, OFTEN IN SECRET. The U.S. General Accounting Office issued a report on September 28, 1994, which stated that between 1940 and 1974, DOD and other national security agencies studied hundreds of thousands of human subjects in tests and experiments involving hazardous substances. (Note 65) GAO stated that some tests and experiments were conducted in secret. Medical research involving the testing of nerve agents, nerve agent antidotes, psychochemicals, and irritants was often classified. Additionally, some work conducted for DOD by contractors still remains classified today. For example, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has not released the names of 15 of the approximately 80 organizations that conducted experiments under the MKULTRA program, which gave psychochemical drugs to an undetermined number of people without their knowledge or consent. According to the GAO report, the CIA has not released this information because the organizations do not want to be identified. (Note 66)
WORLD WAR II VETERANS
As recently as 1993, the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences reported that an atmosphere of secrecy still existed regarding World War II testing of mustard gas and lewisite. (Note 67) Although many documents pertaining to the World War II testing programs were declassified shortly after World War II ended, others remain "restricted" even today. In addition to the classified or restricted documents, World War II veterans who participated in the research were sworn to secrecy. These classified documents and promises of secrecy have impeded medical care for thousands of veterans during half of the last century.
For example, Rudolph R. Mills participated in gas chamber experiments as an 18-year-old in 1945, one year after he joined the U.S. Navy. (Note 68) He was sworn to secrecy and did not learn until 46 years later that approximately 4,000 servicemen were human subjects in mustard gas experiments conducted from 1942 through 1945 by the Chemical Warfare Service. Although his health began to deteriorate even before his discharge from the Navy in 1946, he did not learn that mustard gas might be responsible for his physical problems until more than 40 years later.
At a May 6, 1994, hearing of the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, entitled "Is Military Research Hazardous to Veterans' Health? Lessons from World War II, the Persian Gulf War, and Today," Mr. Mills testified, "I had on an experimental mask and the Navy was trying to determine if people wearing these masks could communicate with each other. I was enticed to sing over the intercom....No one ever told me that the mask became less effective against the gas with each use....We were sworn to secrecy....At the age of 43 I underwent a long series of radiation treatments and later surgery to remove part of my voice box and larynx....It didn't occur to me that my exposure to mustard gas was responsible for my physical problems until June 1991, when I read an article in my hometown newspaper." (Note 69)
John T. Harrison participated in Navy chemical tests in 1943 to get an extra week pass. He was also sworn to secrecy. According to written testimony submitted to the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs by Mr. Harrison, "[I] was never warned or told anything about the dangers of what [I] volunteered for....told never to reveal what [I] did or where [I] was; if anyone asked [I] was to say [I] was on rowing maneuvers." (Note 70) At the time of his discharge from the military, he could not even describe his exposures to a Navy doctor who was trying to determine the cause of his severe respiratory illnesses. Although Mr. Harrison has suffered from recurrent breathing problems and has greatly diminished pulmonary function, he has never received any compensation for his illness. According to the VA and DOD, his medical and services records have been lost, making it difficult to prove that his disability is service-connected.
COLD WAR VETERANS
During the years immediately following World War II, military personnel were intentionally exposed to radiation during the testing of atomic bombs and during radioactive releases. While it is unclear how many of these servicemembers were intentionally exposed to what were known to be harmful levels of radiation, there is clear evidence that in some cases military personnel were ordered to locate themselves in areas of high radioactive fallout. They were given no choice in the matter, and they were not told of the potential risks of those exposures.
Similarly, military personnel were intentionally given hallucinogenic drugs to determine the effects of those drugs on humans. The servicemembers were not told that they would be given experimental drugs, they had no choice of whether or not to take them, and even after the unusual effects of the drugs were obvious to researchers, the unwitting human subjects were given no information about the known effects of the drugs. Even if the DOD did not know about the potential long-term effects of the drugs, that would not justify their failure to provide information to thousands of servicemembers about the known short-term effects of the drugs.
PERSIAN GULF WAR VETERANS
Persian Gulf veterans were also given investigational vaccines and ordered not to tell anyone. In a Committee survey of 150 individuals who served in the military during the Persian Gulf War (see Appendix), many of those surveyed indicated they were ordered, under threat of Article 15 or court martial, to discuss their vacc